The nuclear agreement with Iran

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research ServiceAuthors: Christian Dietrich, Patryk PawlakMembers’ Research ServicePE 572.820

BriefingJanuary 2016

7 500

300 260215 110100 807

7 260Russia

France ChinaUnited

Kingdom PakistanIndia IsraelNorth Korea

United StatesThose countries that exploded a nuclear weapon before 1967 are considered ‘nuclear-weapon states’ under the NPT.

Israel is assumed to have a small nuclear arsenal. The government insists, however, that it will not be the �rst country 'to introduce nuclear weapons to the region'.

199819741960 1964 1970NPT

1949 19521945FIRST NUCLEAR TEST 2006 dateunkown

NUCLEARWARHEADS

NPT SIGNATORYThe Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

came into force in 1970.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IN FORCEAdditional Protocols (AP) are optional

measures that enhance the IAEA’s veri�cation tools in a given country.

NUCLEAR-WEAPON POSSESSORNine countries are known to possess

nuclear weapons.

1950 201020051960 1970 1980 1990 2000 201519681957 1979 1984 2002 2003 2006 2009 20122011 2013 2014

nuclear programme begins under Atoms for Peace programme

nuclear programme suspended under Khomeini

Ahmadinejad elected President of Iran

Rouhani elected President of Iran

EU bans import of Iranian petroleum

products

nuclear programme restarted during Iran-Iraq war

1980sIran acquires nuclear technology from Pakistani nuclear scientist AQ Khan

Iran signs NPT

Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action

IAEA: Iran failed to meet safeguards obligations

IAEA refers Iran case to UN Security Council

IAEA: Iran conducts nuclear test at Parchin

Joint Plan of Action

IAEA and Iran sign Framework for Cooperation

discovery of clandestine nuclear programme

previously unkown to UN

POLITICS

NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

The International Atomic Energy Agency referred the issue of Iran's nuclear programme to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. The UN gradually adopted restrictive measures against Iran, including an embargo on states exporting materials that could be used for Iran's nuclear programme and placing financial and travel restrictions on certain individuals. Following several years of rather chilly relations between Iran and the E3/EU+3 (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU High Representative, China, Russia, and the United States) the discussions about Iran's nuclear programme gained new impetus with the election of Hassan Rouhani as president in June 2013. Building on a series of contacts between Iran and the E3/EU+3, the Joint Plan of Action was adopted on 24 November 2013. In April 2015, negotiators announced agreement on a set of parameters which provided the framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and annexes agreed on 14 July 2015.

CONTEXT: TIMELINE - THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMMECONTEXT: TIMELINE - THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

CONTEXT: NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONSCONTEXT: NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLDWIDE

CONTEXT: TIMELINE - THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMMECONTEXT: TIMELINE - THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

CONTEXT: NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONSCONTEXT: NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLDWIDE

Members’ Research Service Page 2 of 4

The nuclear agreement with IranEPRS

resolved resolved resolvedResolution to continue sanctions lifting

no Resolution,‘snapback’ unless UNSC decides otherwise

unresolved unresolved unresolved

cessation ofperformance

Complainingparticipant

Complainingparticipant

JointCommission

JointCommission

JointCommission

JointCommission

UN SecurityCouncil

UN SecurityCouncil

Ministers ofForeign A�airs

Ministers ofForeign A�airs

Advisory BoardAdvisory Board

15days

5days

30days

15days

1990 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 41995 2000 2005 201520106 7 8 9

United Nations

Author of sanction

United States

European UnionTarget of sanction

ArmsNuclear/MissilesFinancialEnergyTravelAssetsTradeOther

Non-proliferation-related sanctions were �rst levelled against Iran by the United States in 1992. Sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU followed from 2006 onwards, after the IAEA referred the Iranian nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. While Iran has also become the target of sanctions triggered by allegations of human rights abuses, supporting terrorism and others, only non-proliferation-related sanctions are a�ected by the JCPOA.

YEAR OF ADOPTION OF SANCTIONS IAEA refers Iran case to UN Security Council

IAEA: Iran conducts nuclear test at Parchin

IAEA and Iran sign Framework for Cooperation

recycling

reproce

ssing

UF6

MINING & MILLING

HIGH LEVELWASTE

STORAGE

CONVERSION

ENRICHMENT

WEAPONS OPTIONHighly enriched uranium

WEAPONS OPTIONPlutonium

FUEL FABRICATION

POWER PLANT

ELECTRICITYGENERATION

SPENT FUELSTORAGEFINAL DISPOSAL

Key proliferation concerns are associated with uranium enrichment, where levels beyond those needed for nuclear fuel can yield weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium; and spent fuel reprocessing, where weapons-grade plutonium is extracted from spent fuel to be recycled back into reactor fuel.

The nuclear fuel cycle describes the life cycle of the main radioactive materials in the fabrication, consumption and disposal of nuclear reactor fuel. It is referred to as ‘closed’ when components of spent fuel are reused for the production of new fuel; and as ‘open’ when spent fuel is mainly destined for disposal.

The Nuclear Materials Security Index assesses the security of nuclear materials in countries. The index only lists countries in possession of at least one kilogramme of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Overall scoreNUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY INDEX

81-100 61-80 41-60 0-40

Types of facilitiesenergy militaryresearch

RussiaRussiaKazakhstanKazakhstanUzbekistanUzbekistanNorth KoreaNorth KoreaJapanJapanChinaChinaIndiaIndiaPakistanPakistanIranIranIsraelIsraelAustraliaAustralia

CanadaCanada

United StatesUnited States

PolandPolandUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom

NetherlandsNetherlandsBelgiumBelgium

FranceFrance

GermanyGermanySwitzerlandSwitzerland

ItalyItaly

South AfricaSouth Africa

NorwayNorwayBelarusBelarus

ArgentinaArgentina

ArmeniaBrazilBulgariaCzech RepublicEgyptFinlandHungaryIndonesia

LibyaMexicoLibyaRomaniaSlovakiaSloveniaSouth KoreaSpain

SwedenTaiwanTurkeyUkraine

25 COUNTRIES>1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

25 COUNTRIES>1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

9 COUNTRIESknown military

nuclear programmes

20 COUNTRIES<1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

Arak Heavy Water Research ReactorArak Heavy Water Research Reactor

Esfahan Uranium Conversion FacilityEsfahan Uranium Conversion Facility

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant

Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant

Natanz Nuclear FacilityNatanz Nuclear Facility

Fordow Fuel Enrichment PlantFordow Fuel Enrichment PlantParchinMilitaryComplex

ParchinMilitaryComplex

Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center

Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center Tehran

Research Reactor

Tehran Research Reactor

enrichment/energymining/millingmilitaryresearch

BEFOREAFTER

AFTERBEFORE

9 156

696

5 060

1 044348

7 272

2 014installed,not enriching

enriching

installed,not enriching

enriching

Stored IR-1 centrifuges will be used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges.

The Arak heavy water research reactor will be redesigned by Iran so as to minimise the production of plutonium and limit its power to 20 MW thermal.

Fordow can hold 2 976 centrifuges. It will be converted from a fuel enrichment plant into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre.

Natanz enrichment plant can hold almost 50 000 centrifuges. It will be Iran’s only location for uranium enrichment for 15 years.

centrifuges engaged in stable isotope separation

by number & type

CAP ONCENTRIFUGES

after

before

6 000

19 000

of spent nuclearfuel and

heavy water

EXPORT

of uranium above 3.67%

NOENRICHMENT

reduction of 98%

URANIUMSTOCKPILE

after

before

0.3t

12t

to Iran’s declared andsuspected nuclear sites

FULL IAEA ACCESS

phased termination

and snapbackin case of

non-compliance

SANCTIONS RELIEF ANDSNAPBACK

monitors procurement &settles disputes

JOINT COMMISSION

During the 15-year period, Iran will only enrich uranium to up to 3.67% (substantially below the 90% threshold required for the production of a nuclear bomb) and it will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 10 000 kg today to a maximum 300 kg for 15 years. Iran's research and development and testing capacities for enrichment will also be limited. Enrichment will be further restricted to a single site, where only Iran’s oldest, least e�cient centrifuges will be operating for a duration of 10 years. In addition, Iran agreed that it will not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

The agreement foresees extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the 'Roadmap for Clari�cation of Past and Present Outstanding Issues' agreed with the IAEA. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign A�airs and Security Policy – or her designated representative – will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission established to monitor the implementation of the agreement and resolve related disputes.

The deal also includes provisions for the reintroduction of sanctions in case Iran is found to be in non-compliance.

A political understanding by the parties concerned, the JCPOA aims to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, in exchange for the termination of sanctions against Iran. The signatories of the agreement envisage that its implementation will allow Iran to move forward with 'an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme' and for the rest of the international community to progressively 'gain confidence' in the peaceful nature of Iran's programme.

The IAEA's verification process focuses on a number of key issues, including removing centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordow facilities, redesigning the heavy water research reactor in Arak and shipping out excess uranium stockpiles. The IAEA is also expected to implement several transparency measures, such as installing active electronic seals for online enrichment monitoring purposes and improving monitoring at uranium mills.

The Joint Commission comprises representatives of Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The HR/VP or her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and she will serve as coordinator of a Working Group on procurement and a Working Group on the implementation of sanctions. The objectives of these working groups are, respectively, to review and decide proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear-related transfers to, or activities with, Iran, and to review and consult on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting.

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA

EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

NON-PROLIFERATION-RELATEDSANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLECONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA

EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

NON-PROLIFERATION-RELATEDSANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLECONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA

Members’ Research Service Page 3 of 4

The nuclear agreement with IranEPRS

resolved resolved resolvedResolution to continue sanctions lifting

no Resolution,‘snapback’ unless UNSC decides otherwise

unresolved unresolved unresolved

cessation ofperformance

Complainingparticipant

Complainingparticipant

JointCommission

JointCommission

JointCommission

JointCommission

UN SecurityCouncil

UN SecurityCouncil

Ministers ofForeign A�airs

Ministers ofForeign A�airs

Advisory BoardAdvisory Board

15days

5days

30days

15days

1990 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 41995 2000 2005 201520106 7 8 9

United Nations

Author of sanction

United States

European UnionTarget of sanction

ArmsNuclear/MissilesFinancialEnergyTravelAssetsTradeOther

Non-proliferation-related sanctions were �rst levelled against Iran by the United States in 1992. Sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU followed from 2006 onwards, after the IAEA referred the Iranian nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. While Iran has also become the target of sanctions triggered by allegations of human rights abuses, supporting terrorism and others, only non-proliferation-related sanctions are a�ected by the JCPOA.

YEAR OF ADOPTION OF SANCTIONS IAEA refers Iran case to UN Security Council

IAEA: Iran conducts nuclear test at Parchin

IAEA and Iran sign Framework for Cooperation

recycling

reproce

ssing

UF6

MINING & MILLING

HIGH LEVELWASTE

STORAGE

CONVERSION

ENRICHMENT

WEAPONS OPTIONHighly enriched uranium

WEAPONS OPTIONPlutonium

FUEL FABRICATION

POWER PLANT

ELECTRICITYGENERATION

SPENT FUELSTORAGEFINAL DISPOSAL

Key proliferation concerns are associated with uranium enrichment, where levels beyond those needed for nuclear fuel can yield weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium; and spent fuel reprocessing, where weapons-grade plutonium is extracted from spent fuel to be recycled back into reactor fuel.

The nuclear fuel cycle describes the life cycle of the main radioactive materials in the fabrication, consumption and disposal of nuclear reactor fuel. It is referred to as ‘closed’ when components of spent fuel are reused for the production of new fuel; and as ‘open’ when spent fuel is mainly destined for disposal.

The Nuclear Materials Security Index assesses the security of nuclear materials in countries. The index only lists countries in possession of at least one kilogramme of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Overall scoreNUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY INDEX

81-100 61-80 41-60 0-40

Types of facilitiesenergy militaryresearch

RussiaRussiaKazakhstanKazakhstanUzbekistanUzbekistanNorth KoreaNorth KoreaJapanJapanChinaChinaIndiaIndiaPakistanPakistanIranIranIsraelIsraelAustraliaAustralia

CanadaCanada

United StatesUnited States

PolandPolandUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom

NetherlandsNetherlandsBelgiumBelgium

FranceFrance

GermanyGermanySwitzerlandSwitzerland

ItalyItaly

South AfricaSouth Africa

NorwayNorwayBelarusBelarus

ArgentinaArgentina

ArmeniaBrazilBulgariaCzech RepublicEgyptFinlandHungaryIndonesia

LibyaMexicoLibyaRomaniaSlovakiaSloveniaSouth KoreaSpain

SwedenTaiwanTurkeyUkraine

25 COUNTRIES>1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

25 COUNTRIES>1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

9 COUNTRIESknown military

nuclear programmes

20 COUNTRIES<1kg weapons-usable

nuclear material

Arak Heavy Water Research ReactorArak Heavy Water Research Reactor

Esfahan Uranium Conversion FacilityEsfahan Uranium Conversion Facility

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant

Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant

Natanz Nuclear FacilityNatanz Nuclear Facility

Fordow Fuel Enrichment PlantFordow Fuel Enrichment PlantParchinMilitaryComplex

ParchinMilitaryComplex

Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center

Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center Tehran

Research Reactor

Tehran Research Reactor

enrichment/energymining/millingmilitaryresearch

BEFOREAFTER

AFTERBEFORE

9 156

696

5 060

1 044348

7 272

2 014installed,not enriching

enriching

installed,not enriching

enriching

Stored IR-1 centrifuges will be used to replace failed or damaged centrifuges.

The Arak heavy water research reactor will be redesigned by Iran so as to minimise the production of plutonium and limit its power to 20 MW thermal.

Fordow can hold 2 976 centrifuges. It will be converted from a fuel enrichment plant into a nuclear, physics, and technology centre.

Natanz enrichment plant can hold almost 50 000 centrifuges. It will be Iran’s only location for uranium enrichment for 15 years.

centrifuges engaged in stable isotope separation

by number & type

CAP ONCENTRIFUGES

after

before

6 000

19 000

of spent nuclearfuel and

heavy water

EXPORT

of uranium above 3.67%

NOENRICHMENT

reduction of 98%

URANIUMSTOCKPILE

after

before

0.3t

12t

to Iran’s declared andsuspected nuclear sites

FULL IAEA ACCESS

phased termination

and snapbackin case of

non-compliance

SANCTIONS RELIEF ANDSNAPBACK

monitors procurement &settles disputes

JOINT COMMISSION

During the 15-year period, Iran will only enrich uranium to up to 3.67% (substantially below the 90% threshold required for the production of a nuclear bomb) and it will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from 10 000 kg today to a maximum 300 kg for 15 years. Iran's research and development and testing capacities for enrichment will also be limited. Enrichment will be further restricted to a single site, where only Iran’s oldest, least e�cient centrifuges will be operating for a duration of 10 years. In addition, Iran agreed that it will not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

The agreement foresees extensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the 'Roadmap for Clari�cation of Past and Present Outstanding Issues' agreed with the IAEA. The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign A�airs and Security Policy – or her designated representative – will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission established to monitor the implementation of the agreement and resolve related disputes.

The deal also includes provisions for the reintroduction of sanctions in case Iran is found to be in non-compliance.

A political understanding by the parties concerned, the JCPOA aims to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, in exchange for the termination of sanctions against Iran. The signatories of the agreement envisage that its implementation will allow Iran to move forward with 'an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme' and for the rest of the international community to progressively 'gain confidence' in the peaceful nature of Iran's programme.

The IAEA's verification process focuses on a number of key issues, including removing centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordow facilities, redesigning the heavy water research reactor in Arak and shipping out excess uranium stockpiles. The IAEA is also expected to implement several transparency measures, such as installing active electronic seals for online enrichment monitoring purposes and improving monitoring at uranium mills.

The Joint Commission comprises representatives of Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The HR/VP or her designated representative will serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and she will serve as coordinator of a Working Group on procurement and a Working Group on the implementation of sanctions. The objectives of these working groups are, respectively, to review and decide proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear-related transfers to, or activities with, Iran, and to review and consult on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting.

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA

EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

NON-PROLIFERATION-RELATEDSANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLECONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA

KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA

EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDECONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

NON-PROLIFERATION-RELATEDSANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN

CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLECONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE

OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA

Disclaimer and Copyright. The content of this document is the sole responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed therein do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. It is addressed to the Members and staff of the EP for their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. © European Union, 2016.

eprs@ep.europa.eu – http://www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet) – http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet) – http://epthinktank.eu (blog)

Members’ Research Service Page 4 of 4

The nuclear agreement with IranEPRS

European External Action Service (2015), Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action & Annex I-V, 14 July 2015.

European External Action Service (2015), Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, 30 September 2015.

International Atomic Energy Agency (2015), Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Materials.

International Crisis Group (2013), Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, Middle East Report No 138.

J. Lewis (2015), Visualizing the Iran Deal, Armscontrolwonk, 14 July 2015.

Nuclear Threat Initiative (2014), 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2015), Nuclear Forces.

World Nuclear Association (2015), Country Profiles.

Main References

2015 2016 17 18 19 2020 202521 22 2023 24 26 27 28 29 2030 31 32 33 34 20402035 36 37 38

ADOPTIONDAY

IMPLEMENTATION DAY

TERMINATIONDAY

TRANSITIONDAY

advanced centrifuge testing & manufacturingUN sanctions on ballistic missiles lifted

some EU sanctions lifted (incl. on conventional arms and ballistic missiles)

Iran rati�es IAEA Additional Protocol

IAEA veri�es key restrictions (Annex I)US terminates/ceases application of nuclear-related sanctions a�ecting non-US companiesUN terminates sanctions subject to reimposition (UNSC Resolution 2231 comes into e�ect) and other sanctionsEU asset freezes and SWIFT ban lifted (asset freezes a�ecting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard remain in force until TRANSITION DAY)

end of heavy water export obligationend of enrichment capsend of enrichment &testing restricted to Natanzend of enrichment prohibition at Fordow

UNSC ‘consideration’ of Iranian nuclear programme endsremaining EU sanctions and provisions liftedenrichment & centrifuge caps lifted IAEA deadline to con�rm that nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful purposes only

UN sanctions on conventional arms lifted

end of IAEA monitoring of centrifuge production

end of IAEA monitoring of uranium production

On 18 October 2015, the European Union and the United States adopted the legal acts to prepare for the lifting of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions (Adoption Day). On 16 January 2016, the Director-General of the IAEA presented a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which confirms that Iran has completed the necessary steps to start the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Implementation Day). The same day, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 entered into force, confirming the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions.

The UNSC sanctions on ballistic missiles will be lifted in 2023 (Transition Day) at the latest, and Iran must seek ratification of the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards. In 2025, on Termination Day, the UNSC resolution endorsing JCPOA and all heightened scrutiny (‘consideration’) of the Iranian nuclear programme terminate. The EU is obliged to terminate all remaining sanctions on the same day. The remaining constraints on Iran will be gradually phased out by 2040. Parliamentary elections in Iran scheduled for February 2016, and US presidential elections in November 2016 may influence the achievement of further milestones on this timeline.

LENGTH OF IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS & RESTRICTIONSLENGTH OF IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS & RESTRICTIONS