Bride Abduction in Kyrgyzstan: social rationale and personal consequences

Bride abduction in KyrgyzstanSocial Rationale and Personal Consequences

Charles M. Becker 1 Joshua Jacobs 1 Susan Steiner 2

1Duke University

2Leibniz Universitat Hannover

December 2016

Becker, Jacobs, Steiner Bride abduction in Kyrgyzstan December 2016 1 / 25

Background: Forced marriages

Economists addressed many questions about love marriages andarranged marriages (Weiss 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2008).The economic literature on forced marriages is very thin and theirconsequences are understudied.The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2006) defines forcedmarriage “where one or both parties are coerced into marriage againsttheir will and under duress.”Another UN definition (2007): “marriage imposed on a woman not byexplicit force, but by subjecting her to relentless pressure and/ormanipulation, often by telling her that her refusal of a suitor will harmher family’s standing in the community, can also be understood asforced.”


Background: Kyrgyzstan

Anthropologists extensively studied the practice of bride abductionand it disappeared in most countries with the development of modernlaws and social norms (Stross 1974; McLaren 2001)Historically, Kyrgyz people are traditional nomads with a herdingculture. The traditional role of a woman was a housekeeper (Abazov2004)Under Soviet rule, laws were established in the 1920s that bannedforced marriages. Women were generally well-integrated into thelabor force and public life. Kyrgyzstan had Central Asia’s first femalepresident in 2010.


Background: Ala kachuu

In Kyrgyzstan, “ala kachuu” is the traditional practice of abducting awoman to marry her. The term ala kachuu in the Kyrgyz languageliterally means “to take and run away.”There are different forms of ala kachuu; it ranges from elopement toviolent non-consensual kidnapping. According to the HistoricalDictionary of Kyrgyzstan, non-consensual kidnapping is described as ayoung man kidnapping a young woman when he cannot either win heraffection or cannot find an appropriate bride until a certain age(Abazov 2004).This practice is a complex social and cultural phenomenon; it is alsoillegal.


Background: Ala kachuu statistics

No official reliable data on the number of kidnappings that occureach year: up to a third of all ethnic Kyrgyz women may have gottenmarried through the process of non-consensual kidnapping (Kleinbach2003). Several sources indicate that approximately 15,000 girls arekidnapped and forced into marriage anually.According to a single village survey conducted in 2004, 80 percent ofKyrgyz marriages were the result of ala kachuu, and 57 percent ofthese marriages were non-consensual (Kleinbach et al. 2005). Theysuggest there is an increase over the last 40-50 years.According to the 2011-2012 nationally representative survey collectedon men and women in Kyrgyzstan, one-third of marriages were theresult of kidnappings among Kyrgyz; half of these marriages were of aforced nature (Agadjanian and Nedoluzhko 2013). They suggest thereis a decline since the collapse of the USSR.


Conceptual Framework

Kidnapping is socially harmful for young women. Once a woman iskidnapped by force, it imposes high psychological, emotional andphysical costs.She cannot choose the timing of fertility and the number of children.The psychological stress and anxeity during gestation can result inpoor pregnancy outcomes. Low birth weight imposes substantial costson society (Almond et al., 2005; Currie et al., 1999). It is animportant public health concern.Mansour et al. (2012) discuss four factors associated with low birthweight: psychological stress, physical exertion, prenatal care andmalnutrition. They find positive associations between fatalities 9–6months before birth caused by Israeli security forces and low birthweight. They argue that psychological stress is a plausible mechanism.


Stylized facts from Kyrgyz bride abduction

Bride abduction is harmfulKidnappers and non-abductors are very similar

No strong separation by SESReasonable separation by ageOnly very elite safe from abduction

Bride prices high, women get education, work

Big Question:Why does Kyrgyz society allow (not punish) men to abduct women formarriage, despite evidence of harm?

Hypothesis:1 Kidnapping threatened by family to induce early marriage2 Individual abductions are a result of search failure3 Parents less patient than sons


Data

We use data from Kyrgyzstan. “Life in Kyrgyzstan” survey (LiK)collected anually (2010-2012) by the German Institute for EconomicResearch (DIW Berlin) in collaboration with partners in Berlin andBishkek (funded by Volkswagen Foundation)LiK is a multi-purpose socio-economic panel; data are representativeat the rural/urban, North/South, and national levels (Bruck et al.,2014).In 2010, 3000 households and 8160 adult individuals interviewed. In2011, 2863 households and 8066 adult individuals re-interviewed in120 communities.We use the 2011 (Wave 2) data; it includes information on children.Children’s birth weight was recorded based on their mother’s recallCurrently we do not explicitly distinguish consensual vs.non-consensual kidnapped marriages. Non-kidnapped marriagesinclude love and arranged marriages.


Descriptive Statistics

We restrict our sample to rural Kyrgyz women between the ages of 18and 59308 women (22%) reported that they got married through the processof kidnapping. Out of that, 8% are currently married, 11% divorcedand 9% widowed.1077 women were not kidnapped. Out of that, 90% are currentlymarried, 5% divorced and another 5% widowed.The mean age gap at first marriage is higher among kidnappedcouplesKidnapped women obtain less education on averageKidnapped women are more likely to live in mountain and sparse areasKidnapped mothers have more children on averageChildren of kidnapped women have lower birth weights on averageKidnapped women’s self-assessment of life satisfaction is lower onaverage


Modeling search

Men have linear utility over the “quality,” q, of women they marry“Quality” encompasses, SES, idiosyncratic preferences, beauty,personality. . .

Discount future at rate δGet payoff of 0 from being unmarried, q in any period they aremarried in perpetuityBride prices, other payoffs annuitized into qMeet one woman per period, drawn from distribution q ∼ U([0, 1])

Can choose to marry or not marry any woman he meets (love orarranged marriage)Can keep searching until period T ; ages out of marriage market


Solution to the search problem

Men must choose when to keep searching and when to marryOptimal strategy conditional on time (how long until age out) andquality of potential brideChooses cutoff strategy

{q1, q2, . . . , qT−1

}At t, marries any woman with q ≥ qt


Modeling abduction

Parents may choose to force an unmarried man to abduct a woman ata pre-announced time T ≤ TKidnapping gives men a utility k in each period, beginning at TMen respond to this possibility of being forced to abduct by changingtheir strategyParents have same utility as sons, but with discount factor δParents choose T to maximize their utility, knowing how his strategywill change in responseNon-abduction case is k = 0, T = T


Roadmap

Stage 1: Model tradeoff between time and qualityStage 2: Endogenize women’s preferences and strategiesStage 3: Aggregate to many agents


Solution

qT−1 = δk (1)

For n ∈ {2, . . . ,T − 1},

qT−n = δ

(F (qT−n+1) qT−n+1 +

∫q≥qT−n+1

q dF (q)

)(2)

Define m(t) to be the probability of marrying at time t:

m(t) = (1− F (qt))t−1∏s=1

F (qs) , t < T (3)

m(T ) =T−1∏s=1

F (qs) (4)


Solution

Then, the expected quality of the bride, expected time of marriage, andthe mother’s expected utility are, respectively:

EQ(T ) =T−1∑t=1

m(t)

1− F (qt)

∫q≥qt

q dF (q) + m(T )k (5)

EM(T ) =T∑

t=1tm(t) (6)

EU(T ) =T−1∑t=1

δt−1

1− δm(t)

1− F (qt)

∫q≥qt

q dF (q) +δT−1

1− δm(T )k (7)


Numerical Solution

Qualities uniform on [0, 1]

qT−n =12δ(

1 + q2T−n+1

)EU(T ) =

T−1∑t=1

δt−1

1− δm(t)(1 + qt)

Find arg maxT EU(T ) through grid search in δ − k spaceHold externality constant, δ − δ = .05


Abduction Date


Abduction Probability


Expected Quality of Marriage


Expected Time until Marriage


Expected Utility of Mother


Expected Utility of Son


Takeaways

If abduction isn’t very bad, it is best to immediately abductKidnapping is more optimal as agents get more patientk is left as a black box, but women’s strategic behavior should beendogenized: waiting for marriage despite abduction risk


Takeaways

Kidnapping is used to overcome high cost of not being marriedActs as a commitment deviceExpect to see abduction or similar institutions where delay inmarriage is socially costlyMen may have different qualities, behavior may change whenaggregation accounted forGreater externalities lead to greater prevalence of abduction


Bride Abduction in Kyrgyzstan: social rationale and personal consequences

Economy & Finance

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