Brexit and Europe’s 4.8%: Understanding the Anti-Islamic ... · Muslims account for 4.8% of the...
Transcript of Brexit and Europe’s 4.8%: Understanding the Anti-Islamic ... · Muslims account for 4.8% of the...
Brexit and Europe’s 4.8%: Understanding the Anti-Islamic
Rhetoric of the Brexit Campaign
Hattie Schofield
Research paper for the module Political Communications
University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies
(academic year 2017/2018)
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Abstract:
Muslims account for 4.8% of the total EU population yet many of the debates during
Britain’s EU referendum campaign centred around the discussion of Islam and expanding
Muslim communities in the UK. This paper discusses how UKIP’s Nigel Farage successfully
captured the UK’s anti-immigration sentiments over several years by connecting the refugee
crisis, the Paris terrorist attacks and Brexit migration arguments to generate strong resistance
to continued membership of the EU due to fears of Muslim immigration. It draws upon the
communication tools of rhetoric, frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and
frame transformation to show how Nigel Farage managed to intensify and prolong the effects
of mental model generation regarding Muslims and terrorism.
Keywords:
Political discourse, political communications, Brexit, UKIP, framing, rhetoric, European
Union.
Introduction
On 23rd June 2016 – in one of the most significant moments in modern history - Britain
voted by a slim majority (48.1-51.9%) to leave the EU and its institutions (BBC News, 2016).
The British population has had a history of poor engagement with the EU, its turnout for
elections consistently having stood at around 35% (UK Political Info, 2017). Despite this, it
could be argued that it had legitimate concerns – like most member states - surrounding EU
immigration. However, unfolding within some of the anti-immigration arguments used by
Leave campaigners was a strong anti-Islamic sentiment.
In a pivotal moment towards the end of the campaign, prominent Leave advocate and former
UKIP leader, Nigel Farage, unveiled his party’s latest poster – “Breaking Point” - which
displayed lines of Syrian refugees from a photo taken, not in the UK, but in Slovenia and which
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ordered Britain to “take back control of its borders”. (Telegraph, 2016) Its resemblance to
1930s Nazi Germany propaganda was chilling. More worryingly, Islamophobic hate crimes
spiked in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote and have not since returned to pre-
referendum levels (Al-Jazeera, 2017).
However, official figures show that the Muslim population of Europe stands only at around
4.8%*1 (Pew Research, 2017) and Oxford University’s Migration Observatory statistics show
that most Muslim immigration does not come from within the EU itself but from non-EU
countries, notably from Pakistan and Bangladesh. (Rienzo & Vargos-Silva, 2017)
Therefore, the research question that I seek to answer through this paper is : why was the anti-
Islamic rhetoric so deeply entrenched into political discourse during the Brexit campaign given
that the Muslim population of the EU stands at roughly 4.8%?
Thesis statement:
It is necessary to cast a wider glace at the political discourse regarding Muslims in
relation to the EU by politicians made before the Brexit campaign even started. In this paper, I
will argue that key peddler in the Leave campaign, Nigel Farage, successfully bridged and
reinforced disputes surrounding two notable events of 2015 – the refugee crisis of that summer
and the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks - through a process of frame alignment to
successfully incorporate strongly anti-Islamic sentiments into the EU membership debate.
1 In this research, Europe is defined as the 28 EU member states plus Switzerland and Norway
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Methodology:
This paper will focus primarily on frame analysis. I seek to first briefly identify key
aspects of three individual frames in this conundrum as projected by Nigel Farage. Framing,
as defined by Gail Fairhurst, is:
the ability to shape the meaning of a subject, to judge its character and significance. To
hold the frame of a subject is to choose one particular meaning (or set of meanings)
over another. When we share our frames with others (the process of framing), we
manage meaning because we assert that our interpretations should be taken as real over
other possible interpretations. (Fairhurst, 2005)
In the Art of Framing and Reframing the Art of Framing, she elaborates on how to successfully
frame a scenario, primarily through three key components: language (including its five tools:
metaphor, jargon/catchphrases, contrast, spin, and stories), thought and forethought (Fairhurst,
2005) . Therefore, I will apply this structure to the three moments to highlight the
characteristics of the given frames and ultimately determine their success on an individual
basis.
Taking from the works of Snow and Benford, who define frame bridging as the "linkage of
two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular
issue or problem" (Benford & Snow, 2000), I will demonstrate how the Islamophobic rhetoric
could be stretched across the three events through the process of frame alignment.
Finally, to highlight the future risks of frame alignment, I will utilise Nicholas Winter’s work
Dangerous Frames to substantiate the argument that beliefs about race can influence seemingly
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unrelated policy when a political rhetoric about that group has already been established, even
when solid statistics can prove the rhetoric wrong (Winter, 2008).
Frame 1: The Refugee Crisis - "Isis are using this route to put jihadists on European
soil"
2015 saw a sharp influx in the number of refugees arriving into Europe and the world
witnessed more and more mass casualties in the Mediterranean. More than 911,000 landed in
Europe that year, the majority over the summer period, 75% of them fleeing war and terror in
Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq (UNHCR, 2015). On 2nd September 2015, the circulation of an
image of young Aylan Kurdi, a 4 year old Syrian refugee who had drowned in the
Mediterranean, was a turning point for the refugee crisis. The right-wing, anti-immigration
press hailed Kurdi a “tiny victim of a human catastrophe” (Huffpost, 2015).
Exactly a week later, at the 2015 State of the Union in Strasbourg, Nigel Farage spoke out
against the Mediterranean refugee movementi (see appendix. 1) in a relatively unscripted
address which would later be shared by UKIP throughout social media platforms. In doing so,
Farage used three successful tools for framing the refugee crisis: firstly, he contrasted himself
against that week’s sentiment and the application of the European Common Asylum Policy for
shared responsibility in sharing out asylum seeker applications (European Commission, 2017)
and, in doing so, effectively denied the legitimacy of those landing in Europe. By highlighting
the negatives when framing the refugee crisis, he made the problem seem overwhelming
(Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996) . This is successfully done through use of select language, as Farage
stirs up imagery of a mass exodus of those coming from the Middle East and Africa by boat
through his use of “flow of biblical proportions”. This is used to invoke extreme terror in the
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targeted audience who would be able to relate to the holy story of Exodus. Farage then further
develops his version of the refugee story by using the narrative that “all they have to do is
throw their passports in the Mediterranean” and a builds a picture for his audience that the
refugees are gleefully throwing away their passports in order to travel onwards to the promised
land.
The thought aspect of Fairhurst’s model is heavily based on Peter Senge’s definition of mental
models in his work The Fifth Discipline i.e. ‘conceptual frameworks consisting of
generalizations and assumptions from which we understand the world and take action in it’
(Senge, 2010) . This is best observed through the ‘Ladder of Inference’ (see fig.1) as outlined
in Senge’s later work The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (Senge, 1994)).
(fig.1)
I TAKE ACTIONS BASED ON BELIEFS
I ADOPT BELIEFS (about the world)
I DRAW CONCLUSIONS
I MAKE ASSUMPTIONS BASED ON MEANINGS
I ADD MEANINGS (Cultural/personal)
I SELECT “DATA” FROM WHAT I OBSERVE
OBSERVABLE “DATA”/EXPERIENCES
The reflexive loop: our
beliefs determine which
data we process next time
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In this scenario, we can see that Farage has a pre-formed mental model regarding the refugee
crisis, i.e. he has already created a generalisation of those coming over in boats as “economic
migrants”, jihadists put on “European soil” by ISIS and people sent over by “criminal
trafficking gangs”. These mental models are then projected to his audience through use of
strong, emotive language.
Finally, through the forethought aspect, Farage exerts control over his audience. This is
achieved through the method of priming, a way of producing the state of readiness that is
critical for effective spontaneous communication (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996) and a process which
brings mental models to the surface. It is possible to prime your own thought process but in
this paper, I will take the interpretation that the media or an individual can (politically) prime
its audience to activate certain constructs, so that if the constructs are judged to apply to the
current situation – applicability – they can ultimately influence people’s political judgments
(Price & Tewksbury, 1997) and in turn can affect voting outcomes. In this speech, Farage has
been able to prime his audience to accept his interpretation of the refugee crisis, enabled them
to form similar mental models to the ones upon which he bases his own beliefs and actions and
then ultimately linked the influx of migrants to the possibility of leaving the European Union
– a idea that could be activated in voters later in the EU Referendum campaign.
Frame 2 : Terror in Paris – “Isis said they would use the migrant tide to flood the EU
with half a million jihadists”
With 130 people dead and several hundred left wounded, the terrorist attacks of 13th
November 2015 brought the issue of Islamic migration across the EU to light again (BBC
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News, 2015). The violent and co-ordinated attacks, carried out by IS, fit perfectly with the
timing of UKIP’s “Say NO to EU Tour” which was making its way across the country ahead
of the referendum in 7 months’ time and which was showcased throughout social media.
On 16th November 2015, Nigel Farage stood before an audience in Basingstoke, England to
urge them to vote to leave the EU. In advance of the keynote speech, the audience watched
footage of the speech made by Farage on 9th September at the State of the Union in Strasbourg.
The 30-minute-long speech then opened with and focused predominantly on the “problem” of
Muslims in the UK. Farage described Muslims as the “fifth pillar” to the EU and states that
“The warnings were pretty clear… ISIS said they would use the migrant tide to flood the EU
with half a million jihadists… I would suggest 5000 is too many… 500 is too many… it only
took eight to cause that destruction in Paris the other night… This dream of the free movement
of people, this dream for others of the Schengen area. It hasn’t just meant the free movement
of people, it has meant the free movement of Kalashnikov rifles. It has meant the free movement
of terrorists, and it has meant the free movement of jihadists.” (Farage, 2015)
In this important part of the speech, Farage positions himself as a soothsayer. Using language
to provide a strong narrative, he continues to build upon his own biblical-sounding account of
the refugee crisis and of migration across the EU. Using the tool of anaphora (Keith &
Lundberg, 2008), or repetition, he also manages to contrast the concept of “the dream of the
free movement” against a nightmarish vision of terrorists armed with Russian weapons.
What we can also see here is another mental model of Farage’s - the notion that migrants
coming to the EU on boats are terrorists and a clear dismissal of genuine reasons for fleeing.
The argument is substantiated through inductive reasoning, a type of reasoning that assumes
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that if something is true in specific cases then it is true in general (Keith & Lundberg, 2008)
and the justification for such reasoning is shown with “5000 is too many… 500 is too many…
it only took 8”. In this case, Farage inflates the case of the Paris attacks to incorporate the idea
that only a couple of jihadists are needed to cause such extreme terror. Equally, he misleads
the audience in this case since at least 7 of the 9 perpetrators of the attacks were, in fact, Belgian
and French citizens, having operated out of a terrorist cell in Brussels. (BBC News, 2015).
Furthermore, Fairhurst notes that “because our memory works through associations, language
helps us to remember and retrieve information” (Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996). Given this well-
established view, we can deduce that the audience’s memory can be triggered by language and
therefore, that Farage retains the capability to activate mental models by linking the words
“freedom of movement” to such vivid imagery of terrorism. Freedom of movement, as a key
feature of EU membership, would be a term frequently used throughout the referendum
campaign period and in creating an association of the term with terrorism, Farage has again
been able to prime his audience to apply these same mental models and which could ultimately
affect the outcome of the referendum.
Frame 3: Brexit – “Breaking Point”
On 16th June 2016- exactly one week before the referendum- Nigel Farage unveiled the
first in his series of six pre-referendum posters entitled “Breaking Point”. On the same day,
Labour MP Jo Cox was brutally murdered in her constituency by far-right extremist and
“terrorist”, Tommy Mair (The Guardian, 2016) . Farage subsequently came under fire for
blaming the outrage over the poster on “unfortunate timing” (Mirror, 2016) with the murder.
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Three days later, Farage made one of his final TV appearances of the referendum campaign.
When scrutinised by Sky News’ Dermot Murnaghan on his failure to apologise for the poster
and questioned why he would release the poster given that the UK is not part of the Schengen
zone, he justified himself:
“The vast people who have come into the Schengen zone would not qualify as refugees under any
measure… They can come [to the UK] if they get passports in years to come… We have effectively
no border controls to over 500m people” (Farage, 2016)
Farage has effectively added spin to create his own version of the refugee story, making use of
the passport tool again, as used in previous frames. Taking the interpretation that the poster can
be viewed as a piece of propaganda (a form of communication that attempts to achieve a
response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist) (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006). We
can infer that Farage is attempting to persuade his audience that all the refugees in the picture
are eligible and looking for UK citizenship through the EU system. Additionally, the mental
model that the refugees are economic migrants has resurfaced again and has been reinforced
through language “under any measure”. Finally, priming is seen here as Farage equates
membership of the EU with no border controls and thus giving the impression that the UK has
an open-door policy to 500 million people, refugees (or economic migrants) included.
Building a bridge for a strong rhetoric
Snow and Benford, in Framing Processes and Social Movements, argue that to achieve
collective action (in this case, UKIP, headed by Farage, wanted to achieve the common
objective of leaving the EU), there must be a process of frame alignment: “the connection and
alignment of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified fashion.”
(Benford & Snow, 2000) . To achieve frame alignment, a “frame alignment process” must be
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carried out (Benford & Snow, 2000). This is achieved, and I believe was successfully
accomplished, through four steps for which I will elaborate:
Frame bridging: “the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem”. This is most “prominent” form
of frame alignment (Benford & Snow, 2000). In this case, Farage took legitimate concerns
surrounding migration within the EU and linked it directly with concerns over the number of
people arriving into the EU in 2015 or the free-movement of “jihadists” around Europe.
Given that the UK is not part of the Schengen Zone and that, according to FullFact, “the UK
doesn’t accept asylum applications from abroad, and within the EU people are supposed to
apply to the first safe country they arrive in.” (FullFact, 2016), Farage has managed to bridge
loosely connected ideas despite them being based on weak statistics . Equally since bridging
is effected primarily by organisational outreach and information diffusion (Snow, 1986),
UKIP has utilised social media to reach a wide audience.
Frame amplification: “the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of
existing values or beliefs.” (Benford & Snow, 2000)Farage has built on a part-justified idea
that EU migration is a problem. However, he includes the exaggerated use of 500m people who
might have access to the UK and the fearmongering tactic of reiterating that it only took 8
people to carry out the Paris terrorist attacks, therefore that EU membership should be
withdrawn and all immigration to the country to be stopped.
Frame extension: “Depicting an SMO’s [social movement organisations] interests and
frame(s) as extending beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are
presumed to be of importance to potential adherents.” (Benford & Snow, 2000) UKIP’s
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primary function pre-referendum to remove the UK from a “political union” (Farage, 2016).
Its latest manifesto at the time made no mention of Muslim immigration (UKIP, 2015) yet
Farage used his mental models to prime an audience of voters to believe that the issues are
intrinsically linked.
Frame transformation: “changing old understandings and meanings and/or generating new
ones” (Benford & Snow, 2000). Farage, eventually succeeded in transforming the framing of
Muslims entirely throughout the process of almost a year to link membership of the EU with a
rise in terrorism and a mass migration of Muslim refugees into England. It may be no shock
that data released in July 2016 showed the UK topping the EU tables for largest increase in
unfavourable opinion towards Muslims with a leap of 9% on the previous year (Pew Research,
2016).
Frame issues for a forward-looking Britain
Nicholas Winter’s work is particularly relevant to the future of this conundrum. Even
though its focus is on race discrimination, since religious groups are also “othered” in a similar
manner to races, I maintain that the word religion could be substituted and maintain relevance
to the argument. Dangerous Frames explores how “political rhetoric can engage our ideas
about race… even when the subject at hand has nothing explicit to do with…race… —a process
[called] “group implication.” (Winter, 2008)
Winter further argues that
[g]roup implication is certainly dangerous in this sense: political rhetoric that subtly draws on
our ideas about race… can—and does—cause harm by mobilizing prejudice it can have
powerful effects, and this power is particularly problematic because it is often invisible and
because its effects may go beyond what we realize or intend. (Winter, 2008)
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Given this definition, Farage successfully used group implication within key arguments which
would ultimately help him achieve his goal - to leave the EU. However, he enthusiastically
pursued a route which would scapegoat Muslims at a time when tensions in the UK were high.
Had he intended or not to achieve a result of violence towards Muslims, we cannot truly know.
However, since the power that he exerted on his audience is ultimately invisible, we are unable
to judge whether his linking of Muslims to the EU debate had had a damaging effect on the
Muslim population.
Conclusion
Regardless of any ethical arguments surrounding the framing process - whether it was
ethical or not to draw in issues of the refugee crisis and Muslim immigration - it is abundantly
clear that Nigel Farage successfully captured the anti-immigration feeling within the UK
around the time of the EU referendum and employed his own prejudices to create a bigger and
more sinister representation of Muslims. The process of frame alignment may well have
contributed to the rise in Islamophobic hate attacks in the UK, however there is no empirical
evidence to support a theory that the perpetrators of said racist acts were UKIP or Farage
supporters nor is there evidence to suggest that UKIP attempted to incite racial or religious
violence during the campaign process.
It is, therefore, much likely that Nigel Farage triggered and continuously reinforced mental
models within those who were more susceptible to his opinions and more likely to vote to leave
the EU on anti-immigration grounds- both before and during the campaign season.
Furthermore, the two incidents of 2015 provided him with ample opportunity to exploit the
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anti-EU sentiment with the how extreme – and perceivably threatening to the country’s security
– the cases were.
Conversely, as per Nicholas Winter, voters maintained an ability to play a more conscious role
in digesting this kind of rhetoric, should they have chosen to. If citizens “evaluate frames
consciously, they may be more active and discerning consumers of the political spectacle”
(Winter, 2008) and so, had they opted to take a more sceptical approach to the “information”
pushed out by Nigel Farage and truly scrutinised its threat and/or validity within the Leave
arguments, the power could have lay within their hands to push back against this disturbing
rhetoric, rather than let it snowball as it has done until now.
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1 APPENDIX 1.
Nigel Farage – 2015 Speech at the State of the Union
Below is the text of the speech made by Nigel Farage in the European Parliament on 9 September 2015.
Mr President, Mr Juncker has simply got this wrong. As I warned in April, the European Common Asylum
Policy sets its terms so widely as to say that anyone setting foot on EU soil can stay: I said it would lead to
a flow of biblical proportions, and indeed that is what we are beginning to see. This has been compounded
by Germany saying last week that basically anyone can come. It is a bit too late now to draw up a list, by
countries of origin, of who can stay and who cannot stay. All they have to do, as they are doing, is throw
their passports into the Mediterranean and say they are coming from Syria.
As we know, the majority of people who are coming – and the Slovakian Prime Minister has been honest
enough to say so – are economic migrants. In addition, we see, as I warned earlier, evidence that ISIS is
now using this route to put their jihadists on European soil. We must be mad to take this risk with the
cohesion of our societies. If we want to help genuine refugees, if we want to protect our societies, if we
want to stop the criminal trafficking gangs from benefiting as they are doing, we must stop the boats
coming – as the Australians did – and then we can assess who qualifies for refugee status.
I noted your comments, Mr Juncker, because there is a referendum coming in the United Kingdom. I look
forward to seeing you in the UK. I know you intend to spend tens of millions of pounds of British
taxpayers’ money telling us what we should think. I have a feeling that the British people will warm to you
on a personal level, but, as to suggesting that getting rid of a few EU regulations is going to change our
minds, sorry – unless you give Mr Cameron back control and discretion over our borders, the Brits, in the
course of the next year, will vote to leave.
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