University of GlasgowThe Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International CommunityAuthor(s): Mike BowkerSource: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 7 (Nov., 1998), pp. 1245-1261Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/153958 .Accessed: 10/10/2014 19:19Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. .Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Europe-Asia Studies.http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsEUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 50, No. 7,1998, 1245-1261 TheWarsin Yugoslavia: Russiaandthe International Community MIKE BOWKER AsYUGOSLAVIACOLLAPSEDINTOWARin1991-92Moscowhadits problems closerto home and paid relatively little attention toevents in the Balkans. Initially, Moscow was prepared to play a largely passive role in support ofWestern diplomatic efforts, but from 1993Moscowshowed a greater willingness to adopt amore independent pro-Serb line-a development not universally welcomed in the West, particularly as it coincided with the emergence of a virulent strandof nationalismin Russian political life, symbolised by thesuccessofVladimir Zhirinovsky and hisso-called Liberal Democratic Party in the December elections ofthat year. AsMoscow tilted towards the Serbs, critics argued that Russian policy was encouraging Serb aggression and helping to protect their subsequent territorial gains. Russian opposition to any form of external military interventionwas felt to have delayed the end of the war and made a just settlementmore difficult to achieve.1 Although Moscow often used vituperative language and occasionally acted in an obstructionist way, the above view is simplistic for twomain reasons. First, Moscow'sinfluence over the Serbs was often exaggerated-not least by the Russians themselves. Although there wasalotofrhetoric about the historical and cultural links between the twoSlavonic nations, in practice opportunism dominated their relationship. Belgrade sawMoscowasauseful ally because ofits permanent seatontheUN Security Councilandits consequent power ofvetooverUN resolutions but, when it suited them, the Serbs were quite prepared to ignore Russian diplomatic initiatives even at the expense of Russia's international prestige. Moscow, for its part, saw Bosnia as an opportunity to reassert itself on the international stage as a great power whilst at the same time re-emphasising its nationalistcredentials to an often doubting domestic audience. Nevertheless, Moscowwas quick todistance itselffrom itsBalkan ally when itslackofinfluence over theSerbs was publicly exposed to the embarrassmentofthe Russian leadership. Second, Russian policy-even after its pro-Serb tilt-remainedwithin what might be called the parameters of the internationalconsensus. As its voting record in the UN shows, Russia rarely stood alone.2In fact, it was Germany and America, for better or worse, which were more willing to defy the internationalconsensus on Yugoslavia. Bonn swept asideEC policy and unilaterally recognised Sloveniaand Croatia in December 1991, whilst Washington played a role in undermining the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in1993 and then the following year refused to monitor the arms embargo onthe republics ofthe former Yugoslavia. In contrast, Moscowremained 0966-8136/98/071245-17?1998 University of Glasgow This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER closely allied to Britainand France throughout most of the crisis. This does not mean, of course, that Russia's policies(or thoseofBritain and France) were beyond criticism.3Far from it. It does, however, refute the suggestion that Moscow was acting unilaterally and indefiance ofWestern interests. The main criticism ofMoscow's Yugoslav policy related toits opposition tothe use of external military force in the region. Russian concerns, however, were mirrored inall the capitals of Europe and America. Many strategists feared that intervention would do more harm than good. Military interventionrisked escalation and the spread ofthe war to the rest ofthe Balkans whilst offering few hopes for a successful and speedy conclusion to the conflict.4 Any such action also endangered the livesofthe UN peacekeepers already in Yugoslavia, and itwasnoticeable that evenPresident Clinton, who was a leading advocate ofa more activist policy, refused to deploy US ground troops inBosniauntil after acease-firehadbeen signed.Nevertheless, Moscow's implacable opposition to the use ofeven minimal force against the Serbs seemed largely discredited whenthe NATOair strikes oflatesummer 1995were swiftly followed by theBosniancease-fireandthe Daytonpeaceagreement in November. Undoubtedly, the NATO air strikes were important, not least because they signified a change of political will in Western capitals, but there is a danger of placing undue emphasis on this aspect of policy. The air strikes were effective only because other factors, both political and military, were already in place. These included the formation ofthe Muslim-CroatFederation inBosniain 1994, the emergence ofa much stronger Croatian army from 1994, and a policy shift in Belgrade over time which favoured a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement. Washingtonplayed a crucial roleinthecreation oftheMuslim-Croat federation and in givingsupport tothe MuslimandCroat military, butMoscowdeservesatleastsomecreditforits diplomacy in Belgrade which encouraged thetransformationoftheSerb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, from warmonger to peacemaker. Without Belgrade's willingness tomake concessionsat Dayton, no peace settlement inBosniawouldhavebeen possible. This willbeshown below. The descent into war The fragmentation of Yugoslavia was the result ofacombination offactors. These included long-standing ethnic rivalries, widening income differentialsbetween the six republics, power struggles between the ethnic elites and, most notably, aSerb bid, under the leadership of Milosevic, to forcibly increase the power ofSerbia at the expense oftheother republics and ethnic groups. Tensionswere risingagainst a background ofeconomicdeclineathomeandcommunist collapse intherestof Eastern Europe. The process of disintegration culminated ina joint statement on 25 June 1991 by the two wealthiest Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Slovenia, declaring theirformal independence. However, themovewascondemned by the leading members oftheinternational community, including Moscow.TheSoviet Foreign Ministry summed up theviewsofthe majority whenitstatedthata single, independentYugoslavia was'an important element of stability in the Balkans and in Europe asawhole'.5 Moscow's position was scarcely surprising since Gorbachev wasinvolved at that 1246 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1247 very timeina protracted struggle tomaintain the integrity ofhis homeland, the USSR. Despite hiscommitment to democratisation, Gorbachev remained suspicious ofnational self-determination, believing nationalism tobea genuinely reactionary force in world politics. Gorbachev argued for integration, rather than disintegration, and favoured the EU as a model for the future ratherthan the micro-statesadvocated by some ofhis nationalist opponents. Gorbachev's analysis might well prove correct in the long term but, as he later acknowledged, he gravely underestimatedthe power ofnationalism.6In the caseofthe Balkans, hewas not alone. International diplomacy in Yugoslavia failed both to maintainthe federationand to prevent the ensuing conflict. War flared first in Slovenia when the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), dominated bySerbs, moved against Ljubljana after itsdeclaration of independence in June 1991. The war in Slovenia lasted just 10 days. The EC (without anyparticipation from Moscow) brokered acease-fire atBrioni on7 July 1991. Although theWestseemedslowto recognise the implications ofthe agreement, Serbia's withdrawalfrom Slovenia symbolised the end of Yugoslavia as a state. Thus Milosevic's initial goal of creating a strong Yugoslavia dominatedfrom Belgrade was abandonedfor a new cause-aGreater Serbia, carved out of the existing republics of Croatia and Bosnia where the majority ofthe Serb diaspora lived. After the election in Croatiaof the nationalist, FranjoTudjman, the Croatian Serbs, with encouragement from Belgrade, set up the autonomous republic of Krajina(which comprised WestSlavonia, EastSlavoniaand Krajina itself) in August1990,and declared independence the following spring. The dispute over Krajina led to fighting from autumn 1990, escalating into all-out war after Croatia's formal declaration of independence inJune1991. Atthe Moscowsummit in July, Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint statement condemning the violence and demanding respect for human rights.7 Gorbachev's hard-line opponents in the Kremlin, however, backed the Serbs. Asecret $2 billion arms deal was negotiated by the Soviet Defence Minister, Dmitrii Yazov, on10-11 August 1991.8 It only failed to gothrough because ofthe abortive coup inMoscowlaterthatmonth,afterwhichthecommunist hard-liners were removed from officeand influence. Asa result, Milosevic lostan important base of external support, butthedefeatofhisalliesinMoscowseemedtohavelittle immediate effectonthe Serb war effort. The fighting continued asaseries ofcease-fire agreements was negotiated inthe conference hall but ignored on the battlefield.In the hope of containing the conflict, the UN decided to impose an arms embargo on all of Yugoslavia in September 1991. Gorbachev supported the UN resolution, which was very much in line with his own thinking regarding theresolution ofinternational conflicts.The following month Gorbachev also indulged insome personal diplomacy ofhisownwhenhemet Milosevicand Tudjman inMoscowandhammered out yet another cease-fire agreement.9However,Gorbachev was disappointed asthe agreement, likeothers negotiated by the EC, was not honoured by either side. Gorbachev, much weakened after the August coup, found that hisinfluence over hisfellowSlavsinSerbia and Bosnia was strictly limited. This became a familiar experience for all future Russian politicians and diplomats. Moscow soon discovered that it had lost the influence and power ofthe Cold War days. As the war in Croatiaescalated, the issue of recognition became a source of tension This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER within the international community. The Germansfavoured recognition on both moral and pragmatic grounds. Bonn argued that the EC should not oppose the democratic willofthe peoples ofCroatia and Slovenia for independence.European support for a single Yugoslav state, it was said, was having the unintendedeffect of legitimising military action by theSerbs against the breakaway republics. Other states-most notably Britain and France-argued that recognition would encourage the complete disintegration of Yugoslavia and imply, erroneously, a readiness onthe part ofthe international community todefend the sovereignty ofthe newlyindependent states. Internationallaw isa muddle on the issue. It accords no absolute right to minorities to secede, but italso argues that central authorities haveno right touseforceto maintain the integrity ofthe state.10 The ECset up the Badinter commission tolookinto the issue.The commission reported back inDecember 1991 and advocated recognition ofSlovenia but not of Croatia, which was neither in full control of its territory nor in a position to guarantee civil rights toitsethnic minorities. Bonn, however, refused to accept the Badinter recommendationsand declareditself ready to unilaterallyrecognise both Slovenia and Croatia.This was an insensitive move at best. It evoked fears in Serbia that a newly reunified Germany, which had historical links with the Croats, was once again flexing itsmuscles and preparing to extend itsinfluence into the Balkans. It also upset the Western powers. For the Germandeclarationcame at a time when Bonn was lecturing the rest ofthe ECat Maastrichtonthe need for unity and acommon foreign and defence policy. Yet it was the rest ofthe EC ratherthan Bonn which compromised and agreed to recognise the two breakawayrepublics on15 January 1992. The exact reasonfortheEC'sU-turnisstill unclear,butitwould appear thatalliance management took priority over a consistent policy towards Yugoslavia." Neverthe- less, itwould beunfair to say that was the only reason. Undoubtedly, events in the Soviet Union also had an impact. One important reason for the EC's earlierreluctance to recognise the breakaway states in Yugoslavia wastoavoid embarrassing Gor- bachevashe struggled to keep theUSSR together. Suchworries wererendered superfluous, however, whentheSovietUnion collapsed inDecember1991.Boris El'tsin,thenewRussian leader, declared his support forthe concept ofnational self-determination12and saw no reason to back the Serbs since Milosevic had backed his opponents atthetimeoftheMoscow coup in August 1991.13 Thus,oneof El'tsin's first foreign policy decisions was to follow the EC's lead and recognise both Slovenia and Croatia in February 1992-sometwo months before Washington. At first, Bonn's argument that international recognition would facilitate a settlement inCroatia appeared vindicated when acease-fire agreement was signed in January 1992. AUN ProtectionForce (UNPROFOR) was set up and 14 000 troops were sent toCroatia in June to monitor the agreement. NoUSor German ground troops were deployed, but Moscow, for the first time in its history, accepted a UN peacekeeping role and deployed 1000 soldiers in the Serb-occupiedKrajinaregion ofCroatia.The Russian deployment waslimited, but it provided a useful opportunity for El'tsin to emphasise Moscow's break with the past and its willingness to play a more positive role inthe future of European security. This decision represented the high point of Moscow's pro-Westernforeign policy. The truce in Croatia,however, proved unstable. Agreement was reached only after 1248 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1249 the Serbs were in occupation of as much as a third of the Croatian republic. This was quite unacceptable to Zagreb and to many in the West who argued that the practical effectofUNPROFOR wasthe protection andconsolidation ofSerbwar gains. Tudjman remained committed to regaining Krajina and, theUN presence and the arms embargo notwithstanding, hewasable to slowly rebuild the Croatian army to that end. ThewarinBosnia Thecease-fireinCroatia leftthe republic ofBosnia Herzegovina inadifficult position. Both Zagreb and Belgrade perceived Bosnia not as a bona fide nation-state but aslittle more than an administrativearea of Yugoslavia created by Tito for his own political purposes. Thus, before the outbreakofwar in Bosnia, Milosevicand Tudjman made well-publicised plans to partition the republic between themselves.'4 In the circumstances, Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian leader, viewed independence as the only credible alternativeto the partition ofhis country. This viewwas supported by an overwhelmingmajority of Muslims and Croatsin a referendumwhich was held inMarch 1992, butthe Serbs, whomade up athird oftheBosnian population, boycotted the referendum.It seemed the majority ofSerbs was not prepared to live inastate led by a Muslim, and so they set up a parallel government at Pale with Radovan Karadzic as leader. Izetbegovic hoped that independence would not lead to war since Bosnia, and particularly its capital Sarajevo, had a reputation for ethnic tolerance. Izetbegovic also hoped that international recognition, which followedthe referendum result, would help deter Serb aggression. Sadly, his optimism proved badly misplaced. Bosnia rapidly descended into violence and the most brutalconflict seen in Europe since1945. From the spring of1992 the Serbs launchedtheir war against the non-Serb Bosnian population. TheBosnian government seemedunable todo anything toresistthe onslaught. Most ofthe weaponry from the JNA headquarters located in Bosnia fell intothehandsoftheSerbs.It appeared thatBosniacould only surviveasan independent sovereign statewithexternal military support. Yettheinternational community simply wrung its hands in despair. Nostate or institution was willing to offer the estimated 40 000 troops required to repel the Serb offensive.15 By theendofthe year thesituation hadworsened. TheSerbswerenowin occupation of about 70% of Bosnia and the Croats were in the process of abandoning their uneasy alliance with the Muslims to launch their own land-grab in Bosnia. As the war became a complex three-way battle, the Muslims were soon reduced to barely 10% ofBosnian territory. At this point the diplomatic options were greatly reduced. It seemed impossible to envisage the imposition ofa military solution when such a large proportion ofthe population refused to accept the legitimacy oftheBosnian state. The onlypossible opportunity todefend Bosnian sovereignty in the spring of 1992had beenmissed. Yetthe brutality oftheSerb offensive against thecivilian population ofBosnia created pressure on the outside world to'do something'.'6 But whattodo?Peaceenforcement wasno longer an option and peacekeeping was practically impossible-there wasno peace to keep. So, asatwin-tracked compro- This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKEBOWKER mise, the international community offered humanitarianaid to help mitigate the worst excessesof war, and its good offices to help mediate a negotiated settlement. It was an unsatisfactorycompromise in many ways, but the new harmony between the great powers in the post-Cold War world gave reason to hope that a negotiated settlement in Bosnia might be possible. In the first phase of the war (up to Christmas 1992) Moscow fullysupported Western initiatives. Moscow accepted that the Serbs bore the heaviest responsibility for the war and backed Western initiatives at the UN to exert pressure on Belgrade and Pale.17 Thus Moscow supported economic sanctions against Serbia in May1992, approved the extension ofUNPROFOR toBosniain September todeliver humanitarian aid, and backed a No-Fly Zoneforall military aircraft overBosniainOctober.18Moscoweven agreed toaroleforNATOin policing the No-Fly Zoneas long as anymilitary actionwas approved by the UN-theso-called 'dual key'strategy, which later came infor criticism, especially from the USA, for causing paralysis in the decision-making process. In January 1993the EUand theUN formally unveiled theVance-Owen Peace Plan, thefirst peaceproposal for Bosnia, whichwas enthusiastically receivedin Moscow.19The VOPP aimed to maintainBosnia as a sovereign state within its current boundaries, but proposed that itshould bedivided into10cantons roughly along ethnic lines, with the Serbs required to give up approximately 30% of their territorial war gains. However, the new American President, Bill Clinton, who had been highly criticalof George Bush's policy towards Bosnia during hiselection campaign, opposed the plan. Washington said that the VOPP appeased the Serbs, ratifiedethnic cleansing and, worst of all, offered no long-term solution to the conflict since the plan was unjust and wholly unacceptable to the Muslim population. The unwillingness of theUSAtobacktheVOPPandofferAmerican groundtroops was generally perceived to have led to its failure.20Clinton's alternative proposal was the so-called 'lift and strike' strategy which called for an end to the arms embargo on the Bosnian government and support for the Muslim war effort against the Serbs through the use ofNATO air strikes. 'Lift and strike' did not go as far as peace enforcement, but it did involve an end to UN neutrality. The USA argued for this shift in policy on two grounds. First, theUNarms embargo didnot apply toBosniasinceithadbeen imposed in September 1991, before Bosnia had been internationallyrecognised as an independent sovereign state.Second,Bosnia,like everysovereignstate,hadthe absolute right in internationallaw to self-defence. If the international community was not prepared todefend Bosnia, then theUSAdeclared themoral duty to give the Muslims the means to dosothemselves.21 Clinton'sinitiative was greeted unenthusiastically by his European allies.The implicit aim of'lift and strike' was the escalation of the war. This ran directly counter to the diplomatic efforts of the rest of the international community. After the collapse ofthe VOPP, Britain, France and Russia favoured the speediest possible termination of hostilities in Bosnia-almostat any price. Whilst Washington was encouraging the Muslims to fight on to get a better deal, the rest ofthe international community felt that the Muslims had already lost the war and should sue for peace on the best terms possible. There was a fear that any escalation could lead to the conflict spreading to other statesintheBalkans, thereby destabilising thewholeofthe region. With memories ofWorld War Istill vivid,this wasthe nightmare scenario. Asaresult, 1250 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1251 containmentofthe war almost became an end initself. Ifasettlement involved the effectivesurrenderoftheMuslims-sobeit. Justice, assoofteninthe Balkans, would have to giveway to Realpolitik. Division over the fundamentalsof policy led to tension within the Atlantic alliance. Clinton continued to press for a more activist stance inBosnia but, owing tohis unwillingness toback up hisrhetoric with US groundtroops, hehadlittlealternative butto goalong withtheinternational consensus and accept the policy ofcontainment. As part ofthisnewcontainment strategy, theUN approved a'safeareas' policy-first inSrebrenica in April1993, and then extended in May to Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, BihacandTuzla.Theostensibleaimwastodefendthecivilian population in these six designated areas from Serb attack. However, the declaration was based on bluff since little effort was made by the UN to demilitarisethese areas, and only 7500extra UN troops were deployed instead oftheestimated 35 000 required. As a result, the Serbs continuedto besiege the safe areas whilst the Muslims continued tousethem as military basestolaunch attacks against their enemies.22 Hopes for peace were low in the autumnand winter of1993. It was also a difficult year inMoscow. Parliamentwas critical ofEl'tsin's perceived servility towards the Westatthe expense ofSerbia-Moscow'straditional ally. El'tsin'scriticswere vilified by many in the West as extreme nationalistsand slavophiles, and it was quite true that many statements made inthe Russian parliament wereill-considered and blindlypro-Serb. Itwasalsotruethat many statements weremade simply to embarrassthe Russian President as part ofthe ongoing power struggle in Moscow.23 This did not mean, however, that all nationalist opposition to El'tsin's Balkan policy was without merit. In1993 the nature ofthe war inBosnia changed fundamentally whentheCroats abandoned their alliance withtheMuslims and began their own land-grab. At a minimum, the end ofthe Muslim-Croatalliance demanded a review of policy. The Croat betrayal did not exculpate the Serbs as some Russian parliamen- tarians claimed, but itdiddemolish thecommon perception ofSerbia asthesole villain ofthe piece. The international strategy of singling out Belgrade for economic sanctions was left without any obvious rationale.If Belgrade, why not Zagreb? Both states were supporting their compatriots in the war effort across the borderin Bosnia. Therefore,the Russian parliament's demand for an end to the economic embargo on Belgrade was not without some justification. Although El'tsin ignored such demands andrefusedtoact unilaterally outsidetheinternational consensus,the growing divisionsintheWest,aswellasthefailure ofWestern policy toendthewar, encouraged and legitimised Moscow's more independent role in the Yugoslav crisis.24 Russia began to tilt towards Belgrade. In contrast, the US position towards the Serbs toughened after abomb killed 68 civilians and wounded 200in the Sarajevo market on 5 February 1994. TV cameras were there to capture the event and the horror galvanised much ofWestern public opinion. Clinton argued again fordecisiveaction against theSerbs,whowere suspected of firing the bomb, and threatenedair strikes to remove the heavy weaponry around Sarajevo. When Russia rejected theUS proposal forair strikes at theUN Security Council, only China supported Moscow.Moscowwas heavily criticised at the time for failing to keep in step with the West,25but the proposal represented a dramaticand sudden shift in Western policy. Air strikes had been rejected back in the This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER spring of1993and the reasons for that rejection seemed just asvalid a year later. How could the UN claim neutrality for its troops on the ground whilst bombing Serb positions from the sky?26 NATO air strikes would clearly endanger the livesofthe lightly-armed UN peacekeepers, whilst offering little hope of materiallychanging the balance of power on the battlefield. Clearly, the attack on the Sarajevo market was a tragic event, but as many commentators pointed outatthe time, itwas only one among a series of atrocitieswhich had resulted in almost 10 000 deaths since the start ofthe siege in1992.27 From Moscow's perspective the Sarajevo bomb changed nothing. It seemed the shift in Western policy was due to the presence of CNN rather than to any change onthe ground. Asthe Bosnian Serbs refused to comply with NATO's demands to withdrawtheir heavyweaponry fromaround Sarajevo, Vitalii Churkin, Russia's specialenvoy, conducted somebilateral diplomacy withPale.Churkin got theSerbs to agree to NATO's demands in returnfor the deployment of400 Russian troops to prevent the Muslims from moving into the positions vacated by the Serbs. The deal was greeted intheRussianmediaasa triumph forMoscow.TheRussian army newspaper, Krasnaya zvezda, said the settlementshowed that Russia was still a great power. Only Russia, it announced, was trusted by the Bosnian Serbs and able to do a deal.28Whilst most Western governments were relieved that the risks of NATO air strikes had been averted, many commentators, especially inthe USA, viewedthe Russian initiative withalarm. Although the guns fell temporarily silent,theremoval ofthe heavy weapons did not end the siege ofthe city. Western critics argued that the Russian troops were providing protection fortheSerbsaround Sarajevo and encouraging further atrocities against the Muslims in other areas.29 In what looked likean attempt toshow that the USAwas not intimidated by the Russian diplomatic intervention,NATO intercepted Serb jets over the No-Fly Zone on28February, just afew days afterthesettlement in Sarajevo. Thiswasa momentous decision for NATO since it represented its first military action since its creation in1949. Russia was deeply suspicious ofthe motives behind the air strikes sincethere hadbeen any number ofviolationsinthe past without any Western response. Yettheviolation wasblatant and undisputed, soMoscowcameoutin reluctant support ofthe NATO action. However, when NATO planes attacked Serb positions on the ground aroundthe safe-area of Gorazde in April, this caused greater ructions inMoscow.NATO justified theair strike under UNresolution 824which authorisedclose air support for UN troops under siege, but Moscow was not alone in believing NATO action had broader implications. An American newspaper wrote that the UN resolution was little more than a fig-leaf as the USA sought to up the stakes and take amore partisanposition in the Bosnian conflict.30 El'tsin expressedoutrage atNATO'sactionswhich,hewarned,couldmean 'eternal war'intheBalkans.31Thiswas clearly hyperbole largely directed athis increasingly vocal domestic critics. At the same time, it does appear that El'tsin was genuinelydismayed by theWest'slackofconsultation withMoscowonmatters which could cause him embarrassmentat home. For the Russian political classwas fairly well united that the air strike was furtherevidence of America's determination tothrow its weight about inareas of strategic interest toMoscow.32However, the furore soon died down, for two main reasons. First, the air strikes were light and had 1252 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1253 minimal effect on the Serb war effort, and second, the Serbs embarrassedthe Russians by defying their initiatives to defuse the crisis and end the bombardmentof Gorazde. Churkin expressed outrage whenhislater diplomatic effortsoverGorazde were ignored.33 His failure, barely twomonths after the triumph at Sarajevo, gravely weakened the Russian claim to have effective leverage over the Bosnian Serbs. Asa result, Moscow's objections toasecond round ofair strikes against Serb positions around Gorazde werelifted. The subsequent climb down by Karadzic whenfaced with the prospect of NATO air strikes led some to suggest that air strikes should have been used earlier to weaken, ifnot defeat, the Serb military effort.34 America's moreactiveand partisan diplomacy continued inMarch 1994when Washingtonsponsored both a cease-fire between the Muslims and the Croats and the creation ofaMuslim-CroatFederation onBosnian territory.Tudjman agreed tothe proposal after theUSAofferedeconomicaidtorebuild theCroatian economy. Washington also encouraged Tudjman's compliance byturning ablind eye tothe delivery of military equipment to Zagreb in violation ofthe UNarms embargo and byallowing ex-US army officers to train the Croatian military.35 A leading Russian defence correspondent, Pavel Felgengauer, estimated that Croatia, which, unlike Serbia, wasnot constrained by an economic embargo, spent $1billion annually on arms after itsdefeat by the Serbs in1991-92.36 TheMuslim-Croatcease-fire soon began to shift the balance of power on the battlefieldfor the first time away from the Serbs. In April, the Contact Group was formed with just five members-theUSA, Russia, Britain, Franceand Germany-in an attempt tostreamline the decision-making process. Asa consequence, theUNandtheEUwere effectively sidelined.The followingmonth, the Contact Group put forward a new peace proposal which gave 51% ofBosnia to the new Muslim-CroatFederationand 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic,whohadbeeninterested ina peace settlement sincethetimeofthe Vance-Owen Peace Plan in1993, came out firmly infavour ofthe proposal. When the Contact Groupplan, which was rather vague on details, was rejected by Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs, Milosevic cut economic tieswith his compatriots across the Drina River in August 1994. This proved to bea turning point in the course ofthe war. MoscowusedtheMilosevic-Karadzic split tofreezerelations withtheBosnian Serbs.37Atthe same time, Moscow moved closer toMilosevicinthe hope that he couldmediate asettlement. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev wentsofarasto describe Milosevicas'the leader ofthe peace party', and pressed for the lifting of economic sanctions onBelgrade onceacease-fire had been agreed.38 In these new circumstances,Moscow responded with restraintafter NATO air strikes hit Bosnian Serb targets in early August in the region of Sarajevo. Karadziccalled for 'total war', but without response from Moscow.The independent Russian newspaper Izvestiya wrote: 'One gets the impression that the Bosnian Serb leaders have utterly discredited themselves inthe eyes ofRussian foreign policymakers, and that henceforth the Kremlin intends todeal only with Slobodan Milosevic'.39 However, the UN effort appeared to be collapsing when 300 of its troops (including 13 Russians) were taken hostage by the Serbs in May after furtherNATO air strikes. The Serb action was predictable,but it remained a humiliation for the international This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER community. The UNwas not only unable to protect the Muslim civilian population, it was unable to protect its own soldiers too. The complete withdrawalof UN troops seemedthe onlyoption unlessthere wasaradical change in policy. Atacrisis meeting inLondon in July 1995total withdrawal ofUNPROFOR was rejected as politically unacceptable. Instead, it wasdecided to provide better protection for the UN troopsthrough theintroduction ofa rapid reaction force (including French, British and Dutch soldiers) and the redeployment of existing troops to less vulnerable regions outside Serb occupied areas. Kozyrev backed the initiative and declared that Moscow would not seek to obstructit.40At the same time, the USAresolved to take furtherunilateralaction in Bosnia. Thus, the Contact Group, which was divided over many issues,including the lifting ofeconomic sanctions on Belgrade, was elbowed aside and the tough talking Richard Holbrooke was delegated by Clinton to get a peace settlement. Russia found itselfsidelined once again. The immediateeffect of relocating UN forces was the fall to the Serbs of two more safe areas-Srebrenicain July and Zepa in August. However, Croatia had used the four-monthcease-fire over the winter of1994-95to rebuild and retrain its military. Asa result, the Croats were finally in a position to challenge Serb supremacy on the battlefield. Thus, in May 1995 Croatianforces took back West Slavonia and swept through Krajina the following August. The easewith which the Croats expelled the Serbs suggested tosome cynics in Serbia that a deal ofsomesort might have been done with Zagreb.41 This seemed all the more likely later at Dayton when Milosevic also agreed tohandoverEastSlavonia,the onlyremaining Serb possession on Croatian territory, overa period ofonetotwo years. FortheSerbsinCroatia, however, theCroat advance represented nothing lessthan a humiliating defeat as thousands were forced toabandon their homes and seek refuge inSerbia. Meanwhile, the USA had decided to back up its more forceful negotiating strategy with military power. From 30 August 1995 NATO's operation 'DeliberateForce' was launched with a two-week campaign ofair raids and artillery strikes against Bosnian Serb positions. The Russian government condemnedthe air strikes which, it was said, '...calls into question the survival ofthe current generation ofBosnian Serbs, who are in effect threatenedwith genocide'.42 Moscow called for an immediate end to the NATO air strikes, but the Russian demand was ignored until 14 September when the Serbs withdrew their heavyweaponry from around Sarajevo and finally liftedthe siege oftheBosnian capital. Atthesametime,theMuslim-Croat Federation had taken advantage ofthe NATO bombing raids to push the Serbs back to roughly the 49% of territorystipulated by the Contact Group plan. Milosevic was delegated, on USinsistence, to negotiate on behalf ofthe Bosnian Serbs, and a settlement soon followed. A cease-fire was signed on 5 October (with no Russians present), followed by the Dayton peace agreement on 22November 1995. Itcontained five key elements.43First, Bosnia was recognised asa sovereign state withinits present borders. Second,Bosniawouldcontaintwomini-states,the Muslim-Croat Federation and theBosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srspka) with both of these mini-states having their own presidents,parliaments and military. Third, Sarajevo would bethe indivisible capital ofthe Bosnian Muslim-CroatFederation. Fourth, war criminals would be excluded from public office in Bosnia. Fifth, NATO would police the agreement with support from other states-approximately 55 000 1254 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1255 troops were deployed under IFOR (ImplementationForce), including 20 000Ameri- cansand1400Russians. Thenumbers werereduced to35 000whenIFOR was replaced by SFOR (Stabilisation Force) inDecember 1996. Despite differences over policy during the war, Moscow was eager to participate in implementing the peace. There were difficulties in finding an arrangement which wouldallowRussia to participate without its troops beingformally under NATO command.A compromise was reached,however, which placed the Russian contingent directly under thecommand ofaRussian officer (at that time, ColonelGeneral Shevtsov) at SACEUR, whilst intheatre the Russian troops were under the tactical control ofaUS-ledmulti-national division.44Moscow alwaysemphasised that its troops were serving under an American, notaNATOcommander inthe field, although the difference was more formal than real. According to NATO sources, this special relationship wasrather simpler in practice than itsounded on paper.45 The main advantage fortheRussians inthis arrangementlay inthefactthat it gave Moscow greater input into policy making than otherwise would have been the case. Their participation inIFOR and SFOR alsoshowed that theRussian troops were capable of working alongside Western troops as independent,non-partisanpeacekeep- ers.46 The specialrelationship wasextended for SFOR, and Moscowhas already indicated a willingness toserve onthat basis beyond the current deadline ofJune 1998.There havebeendifferences of opinion over policy, most notably whenan indicted warcriminal wasshot by British troops in July1997,47 butMoscow's participation in IFOR and SFOR has improved Moscow's reputationamongst West- ern leaders and is frequently cited as a model of co-operation for the future.48 The Croats emerged as the main victors from the Yugoslav wars. They had won back Croatia, driven out the Serbs, and become legally confederatedto half of Bosnia inthe Daytonagreement. Theother ethnic groups wereless happy. Many Serb nationalists were dismayed by the lossof Krajina tothe Croats and Sarajevo tothe Muslim-CroatFederation. Serbia was linked to the Bosnian Serb Republic, but this seemed wellshort of Belgrade's war aims when the conflict started allthose years ago. The Muslims lost most of all. The future of Bosnia as a sovereign state remains indoubt. Stability relies ona complex arrangementconsisting ofone country, two independent statesandthree governments. Thereturn ofwartoBosnialooksa possibility with Muslims still fearing the effective partition ofthe country along the linesdiscussed byTudjman and Milosevicbefore the war. The presence ofSFOR appears to bethe main barriertothe unravelling of Dayton. Why did the Serbs agree to Dayton? There are two general explanations why the Serbs made concessions at Dayton. The first argues that the Serbs had little choice but tosue for peace. After four years of dominance onthe battlefield, fortunes began to change for the Serbs inthe period 1994-95.Theformation ofthe Muslim-CroatFederation in 1994, followed by the rearming and retraining ofthe Croat army, shifted the balance of power away from the Serbs. In addition, the Serbs had also become war-wearyby this time-they were militarily overstretched and economically closeto bankruptcy.49Importantly, the position oftheSerbs inBosnia had become militarily vulnerable after the lossof This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER Krajina tothe Croats and the NATO air strikes of August-September 1995. There- fore, according to this view, Milosevic was astute enough to recognise the weakness ofthe Serb position and agreed to a cease-fire to avoid furtherterritoriallosses.50In the circumstances, thefinal Daytonagreement couldbeseenasareasonable compromise allowing the Serbs to keep 49% ofBosnia and the right of Republika Srspka to keep close political tieswith Belgrade. The second view accepts that reverses on the battlefieldreduced Serb options in the summer of1995 but denies that this can offer a complete explanation for Belgrade's willingness to accept a compromisepeace. For Milosevic's campaign for peace began at the time of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in 1993-long before the Serb setbacks on the battlefield. Significantly, Milosevic also offered to hand back Krajina toCroatia as part ofa long-term settlement at thetimeofthe VOPP, as long asthe region retained meaningful autonomy.51 In the summer of1994Milosevic changed policy again and finally abandoned the concept ofaGreater Serbia and put considerable political pressure onhis compatriots across theDrina tosuefor peace. Milosevic appeared to acknowledge that the massive Serb war gains in Bosnia and Croatiawere unsustainablein the long term and he was no longer willing to pay the military and political costsof maintaining them. Theeconomic embargo on Belgrade wasalso beginning to bite, soMilosevic was eager to have the sanctions lifted.52Asa result, a compromise peace began tolookan attractive option long before the NATO air raids of August-September 1995. LauraSilber, a distinguished commentatoron the Balkans, has put forwarda rather different reason for Milosevic's willingness to compromise. She has argued that his change of heart can best be understoodin terms of his protractedpower struggle with the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. Milosevic,Silber has written, wasno ideologue. Over a period ofa few years hewasable to change from communist to nationalist to pragmatist withlittle apparent difficulty or personal embarrassment.Hisone abiding beliefwashisown right torule.SowhenKaradzic began to challenge Milosevic for the unofficial post of supreme leader of the Serb nation, Milosevic was quick toabandon Karadzic'smaximalistclaims.Milosevicwassuccessfulin deflecting responsibility for defeats on the battlefieldonto the Bosnian leadership, and Karadzic's popularity suffered as a result. According to Silber, it was in this context that Milosevic's concessions at Dayton should be understood.In particular, she wrote, Milosevic gaveupSarajevo totheMuslim-Croat Federation becausethiswould 'irreparablydestroy Karadzic's power base'.53Milosevic is certainly a wily politician. Despite leading the Serb people to disaster and international opprobrium, he has been able to sweep aside any potential challenge for power with consummate ease.The extent towhich hesaw Karadzic as a real rival in1995 islessclear. If hedid, the power game seems to have shifted, for he appeared to be backing Karadzic, against thewishesoftheWest,inhis ongoingpowerstruggle with Biljana Plavsicfor political control of Republika Srpska.54Inevitably, Milosevic'sMachiavellian ways will alwaysencourage rumours of conspiracies andhidden agendas. Withthe evidence currentlyavailable, however, it isdifficult to know how much emphasis to place onsuch theories. What role did the international community play in all ofthis? Did the NATO air strikes influence policy in Belgrade? Could they and should they havebeenused 1256 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1257 much earlier to bring the war to a speedier close?55As stated above, the NATO action did place the Bosnian Serbs under pressure, but the impact ofthe air strikes should notbe exaggerated. Thiswas mainly because theair strikes were limited, both in intensity and in aims. For whilethe NATO air strikes in the summer of1995 were far more intense than anything previously witnessed in Bosnia, the actual number of sorties by NATO bombers was roughly equivalent to only one day in the Gulf War.56 Furthermore, theairstrikes werenever intended toforcetheSerbs to agree toa cease-fire, never mind an overall peace settlement. The aim was simply toend the siege of Sarajevo and deter furtherattacks on other safe areas.57For the air strikes to have broader implications, other factors had tobein place. First, the international community had to besure that Belgrade would not escalate the war byintervening militarily onbehalf oftheBosnian Serbs. Thiswas only thecaseafter Milosevic abandonedKaradzicin August 1994. Second, it was important that the Muslims and Croats were in a position militarily to take advantage of Serb weakness. This, in turn, was onlypossible aftertheformation oftheMuslim-Croat Federation andthe rebuilding oftheir respective armies. Finally, italsoneeded America tobe firmly committed tothe international peace plan onoffer. Maynard Glitman has convinc- ingly argued that Dayton was successful because it was the first time that Washington had come up with a realistic plan which it was prepared to back up with force.58The international community had probably underestimated itsown power andover- estimated the power ofthe Serbs throughout the conflict, but it isstill the casethat air strikes on their own much before 1995 would have been unlikely to reverse Serb territorial gains in Bosnia. Asissooften the case in war, timing wasall important. Moscow'srole Moscowwascriticised forits pro-Serb stance formuch ofthe Bosnian war. Itis arguable that its opposition to air strikes and the lifting ofthe arms embargo on the Muslims offered the Serbs some encouragement in their war against the Bosnians- but only at the margins. For theSerbs made their biggest advances inCroatia and Bosnia at a time when Moscow's policy was most closely allied to that ofthe west. Although Moscowshifted toamore pro-Serb position later, El'tsincontinued to support the various international plans put forwardto end the conflict-including the VOPP and the Contact Group plan. The main cause of dispute with the West related to Russian pride. In essence, El'tsin wanted Moscow to beconsulted over decisions andtreated asan equalpartner by theWestern powers.Therefore, hefavoured working through the UNor the Contact Group, whilst the USAbecame increasingly frustratedover the lack of progress in both bodies-afact only partly due to Russian intransigence. AstheUSAactedmore unilaterally from 1994, Moscowbecame concerned that Washington was using theBalkans as yet another opportunity to emphasise its power in the post-Cold War world. However, theRussians neither hadthe military power nor the political willto intervene onbehalf oftheSerbs. Crucially, Moscowwasnever willing torisk its relations with the West for the sake ofPale. In the spring of1993 Churkinsaid that Moscow 'will never get into a confrontationwith the world community over the map of Bosnia',59 andtheDefence Ministry alsowarned againstover-stretching the This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKE BOWKER military inareas no longer ofvital strategic importance.6 Afterthedebaclein Chechnya, enthusiasm for military interventions outside theformer SovietUnion declined even further.61The presence of only about 1000 Russian troops in SFOR was aclear indication ofMoscow's declining interest inthe region. Although theRussian parliament articulated amore pro-Serb stancethan the El'tsin government, it lacked the power, particularly after the constitutional changes ofDecember 1993, to materially affect policy. Itcouldnotevenclaimtobe representative of majority public opinion. Most people in Russia did appear to have anatural empathy withthe Serbs,recognisingparallels withtheir owncircum- stances inside a disintegrating Soviet Union,62 but the appeal of pan-Slavism is easy to exaggerate. Therewaslittle public interestinthewarsof Yugoslavia and Zhirinovsky's attempts to whip up support for the Serbs fell largely on deaf ears.63 The former Soviet Premier, Nikolai Ryzhkov, even went so far as to complain about the apathy ofthe Russian people inthe faceofthe air strikes against Gorazde in spring 1994.64The apathy might be gauged by the fact that only about 500Russian volunteers, according toWestern intelligence, were fighting intheformer Yugoslavia in1993. Furthermore, not allofthem were fighting on the sideofthe Serbs.65This latter fact was not altogether surprising since all the belligerents in the conflict were Slavs,although only theSerbs wereOrthodox Christians. Eventhis cultural link was undercut, however, after the publicsplit between Milosevicand Karadzic in August 1994.Afterthat, itwasdifficult forRussian pan-Slavists to demand a more pro-Serb stance from Moscow when Belgrade and Pale were at odds over the fundamentals of policy. Russia's policy towards Yugoslavia canbecriticised for givingsuccour tothe aggressors in the conflict. It was a policy based on Realpolitik ratherthan morality. Yet no country can claim much credit for their actions in Yugoslavia: 300 000died during the conflict and an estimated two million were forced to leave their homes.66 Yet, in the overall context ofthe internationaleffort, Russia's policieswere defens- ible.ForMoscow'scontinued linkswith Belgrade servedauseful purpose. No negotiated settlement was possible withoutSerb compliance.Itwas important, therefore,that the Serbs were not isolated and that their interests were represented in internationalfora, such asthe UNand the Contact Group. Owing toitslinks with Belgrade, Moscow recognised far earlier than Washington that Milosevic was serious about a compromise settlement and worked diplomatically to encourage such an end. TheUSA,ontheother hand, had virtually nocontact with Belgrade atalluntil Holbrooke took over as Clinton's special envoy.67 Moscow'sefforts were acknowledged in many Europeancapitals, but itisunde- niable that Russia's image suffered because ofits conduct during the war in Bosnia. Themore positiveaspects ofRussian foreign policy weretoooftenlostin petty obstructionism and hyperbolic language. El'tsin spoke of genocide whenNATO finally took action against the Serbs in the summer of1995,68yet this was at a time whenhisown troops wereinvolvedina truly genocidal attack onthe people of Chechnya. Such language only served toconvince sceptics that, intimes ofcrisis, Russia would always bean unreliable partner. Italsocreated fears that Moscow's more cooperative policy towards the West would not last. It seemed to many that its cooperative policy was based more on weakness than a genuine belief in the benefits 1258 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIAANDTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1259 of partnership. OnceRussia regained its militaryprowess, itwas argued, Moscow wouldsoonbe tempted toreturn toitsColdWar ways. However, onthebasisofRussian policy towards Yugoslavia, suchan interpretation seemstoo pessimistic. For despite allthe rhetoric, theRussian government acted cautiously andwithinthe generallyacceptedparameters oftheinternationalconsen- sus.69 Moscow'srolewasneveras important asthatofthe USA, oreventhatof Britainor France, butRussiadid play a part in bringing thewartoanend. Contrary totheviewofthe sceptics,Yugoslavia showedthatMoscowwasableto play a positive rolein Europeansecurity evenat timesof great domesticcrisis.Asthefuture forRussia begins tolookalittle brighter, thereare grounds to hope that Moscowwill continuetobea co-operative rather than disruptive forcein Europe. Universityof East Anglia 1 SeeInternationalHerald Tribune, 8December 1994; and Paul A. Goble, 'Dangerous Liaisons: Moscow, the Former Yugoslavia andthe West', in RichardH. Ullman (ed.), The Worldand Yugoslavia's Wars (New York, Councilon ForeignRelations,1996), pp. 182-197. 2 See Ullman (ed.), p. 29. 3 Thereare many commentarieswhich are highly criticalof the 'consensus'view on Yugoslavia promotedby Russia, Britainand France. See, for example, Mark Almond,Europe's BackwardWar: The Warin the Balkans (London,Heinemann,1994); and David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (London,Vintage, 1995). 4 See, for example, LawrenceFreedman,'Why the WestFailed',ForeignPolicy, no. 94, Winter 1994-95; Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 3rd edition(Harmondsworth,Penguin,1996); and DouglasHurd,Searching For Peace: A Centuryof Peace Diplomacy(London,Little,BrownandCo, 1997), pp. 129-131. 5 Pravda, 29 June 1991. 6 Gorbachevmade many speeches on nationalismand the dangers of breakingup the USSR. See, for example, his report to the CentralCommittee,19 September1989, availablein translation in SovietNews, 27 September1989;andon interdependence,see, for example, MikhailS. Gorbachev, Perestroika:New Thinkingfor our Country and the World(London,Fontana,1988), pp. 137-138. 7 Andrei Edemskii, 'Russian Perspectives', inAlexDanchev &Thomas Halverson (eds), International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict(Basingstoke,Macmillan,1996), p. 31. 8 Glenny,p. 61. 9 Izvestiya, 16 October1991. 10 Rosalyn Higgins, 'The NewUnited Nations and theFormer Yugoslavia', International Affairs, 69, 3,1993, p. 468. "1For a discussionon why the Germansdecidedto recognise SloveniaandCroatiaandhow they persuaded the other membersof the EC to supportthem, see HIannsW. Maull, 'Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis', Survival,37, 4, Winter1995-96. 12 See, for example, El'tsin's famousremarkto the regions of Russiain 1990 to 'take as much sovereignty as you can digest', Pravda,9 August 1990. 13 InternationalHerald Tribune,1 March 1994. 14 Glenny,pp. 143-144. 15 Estimatefrom Freedman,p. 61. 16 The British ForeignSecretary,Douglas Hurd,used this phrasefrequently in criticismof the media which demandedaction,but without indicating what action that shouldbe. See, for example, Hurd,p. 11. 17 See Kozyrev's commentsin Nezavisimayagazeta, 20 January 1993. 18 See Izvestiya, 2 April 1993. 19See Andrei Edemskii,'Russian Perspectives', in Danchev& Halverson (eds), pp. 39-40. 20 For an officialEU versionof this view, see DavidOwen,TheBalkan Odyssey(London,Victor Gollancz, 1995), p. 282. 21 See InternationalHerald Tribune,29 November1994. 22 Owen, p. 355. 23 For an overviewof the Russian parliament'sviews on the Yugoslavcrisis, see SuzanneCrow, 'Russia Adopts A More Active Policy', RFEIRL Report,2,12, 19 March1993, pp. 1-5. This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMIKEBOWKER 24 Foranother example ofthis view, see Goble,'Dangerous Liaisons: Moscow, theFormer Yugoslavia and the West',p. 188. 25 See, for example,Crow,pp. 1-5. 26 Thiswastheviewof many,including theEU's representative, DavidOwen.See Owen,pp. 103-104. 27 Laura Silber&Allan Little, The Death ofYugoslavia(Harmondsworth, Penguin,1995),p. 345.Theestimated number ofdeaths during the siege of Sarajevo rose to 20 000 by its endin 1995; seeInternational Herald Tribune, 8-9November1997. 28 Krasnayazvezda, 19 February 1994. 29 International Herald Tribune, 4March1994. 30 International Herald Tribune, 13 April 1994. 31 Pravda, 13 April 1994. 32 See, for example, twoeditionsofMoscow News, 15-21 April 1994and22-28 April 1994. 33 SeeMoscow News, 29 July-4August 1994. 34 For this view, see Rieff,pp. 156-157. 35 Time, 11March 1996,p. 24. 36 Segodnya, 5 August 1995. 37 Segodnya, 4 August 1995. 38 Izvestiya, 3 August 1994. 39 Izvestiya, 9 August 1994. 40 Moscowabstained onthisissueat the UN, see Segodnya, 5 July 1995. 41 For an outlineofthis case, see Glenny,p. 287. 42 Rossiiskayagazeta, 14 September 1995. 43 The full Daytonagreement isavailable at the web-site http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/boshome.html. 44 NATO Office of Information and Press, 'The NATO-ledStabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina', NATO BasicFact Sheet, no. 11,April1997,p. 2. 45 Interviewswithresearchers at NATO lHeadquarters, 6November1997.Seealso Gregory L. Schulte, 'Former Yugoslavia and theNew NATO',Survival,39,1,Spring1997,pp. 32-33onthe detailsofthe arrangements betweenNATOand theRussian troops. 46 Schulte,p. 33. 47 Russia Todaywebsite, 15 July 1997. 48 See, for example, Javier Solana,Secretary Generalof NATO, 'NATO'sRoleinBosnia: Charting aNewCourseforthe Alliance', NATO Review,44, March 1996, p. 5. 49 Glenny,p. 279. 5( Maynard Glitman, 'US Policy inBosnia: Rethinking aFlawed Approach',Survival,38,4, Winter 1996-97,p. 75. 51 Glenny,p. 277. 52 TheGNPinSerbiahalvedbetween1990and 1994; seeIvan Vejvoda, 'Serbian Perspec- tive', in Danchev& Halverson (eds),p. 104.On Belgrade's desire to end the embargo, see Glenny, p. 270. 53 Laura Silber, 'TheHero of Dayton: SlobodanMilosevicand the PoliticsofWar and Peace', World PolicyJournal,XIII,1,Spring1996,p. 69. 54 International Herald Tribune, 25-26October1997. 55 For this view,see, for example, Ed Vuillamy, The Guardian, 27 April1996; and Rieff, pp. 156-157. 56 Rick Atkinson, 'The Anatomy ofNATO'sDecisiontoBomb Bosnia', International Herald Tribune, 17November1995. 57 NATOOfficeofInformationand Press, 'NATO'sRolein Bringing PeacetotheFormer Yugoslavia', NATO BasicFact Sheet, No. 4, March 1997,p. 3. 58 Glitman, p. 74. 59 Izvestiya, 21 April 1993. 60 Moscow News, 7 September 1993. 61 Nezavisimayagazeta, 4 February 1995. 62 Conversations with various Russian people and academics over the course of the war. Seealso Ullman, pp. 29-30. 63 See Izvestiya, 5 February 1994; and Alex Pravda, 'The Politicsof Foreign Policy', in Stephen White, AlexPravda&ZviGitelman (eds),Developments inRussianPolitics4 (Basingstoke, Macmillan,1997),p. 217. 64 The Observer, 17 April 1994. 65 SeeInternationalHerald Tribune, 27-28 February 1993. 66 Ullman,p. 1. 1260 This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsYUGOSLAVIA, RUSSIAANDTHEINTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY1261 67 Pauline Neville-Jones,'Dayton, IFORandAllianceRelationsin Bosnia',Survival,38,4, Winter 1996-97,p. 46.Seealso Glenny,p. 270. 68 InternationalHerald Tribune, 12 January 1995. 69 For this view,see, for example,Ullman,pp.29-30; and Hurd, pp. 133-134. This content downloaded from 155.33.16.124 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 19:19:53 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions