Bouldin Dam Case History

8/13/2019 Bouldin Dam Case History

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ADVANCED DAMENGINEERINGFOR DESIGN,CONSTRUCTION,AN DREHABI LIT A TION

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~~bi;)'gical features in the area/reservoir margins. for many years should be reassessed; new projects reaction to changed conditions in must be evaluated for landslide potential in a critical

context of project time. manner.shoul.d set forth a syste~ for acq~i~ng . A tremendous amou~t of potential ene~gy ~s stored in

-'data on the interactIon between geologIcal condItIons a rock mass undergoIng creep along an InclIned preex- :J:~nd~hanges induced by project operation, with the isting failure zone (as at Vaiont): With the increasing,following factors recognized: displacements, the friction factor drops, ~nd the ve-

-c'.Rock masses, under changed environmental con- . locity of the mass increases. Consequently, a slidingcan weaken within short periods of time- mass has the potential to increase from slow creep to

weeks, months. a fantastically high rate of movement in a brief periodThe strength of a ~ck mass can decr.ease ery rap- of secon~s or minut~s. The.ene~gy goes int.o momen-

idly once creep IS underway, partIcularly when turn, not Into deformIng the mtenor of the slIdIng mass outside forces are involved. as in the typical slide with no preexisting rupture sur- . Evidence of active creep should be considered a face.

warning that warrants immediate technical assess-ment because acceleration to collapse can occurquickly. Two techniques assist the engineer today in assessing the

potential for sliding: using the most improved methods for engineering implications are as follows:2 observing and measuring the changes of strain within a rock

mass, and using a forewarning system in case the phenom-Speed of sliding movement: Rock ma~ses are capable enon acts ~uic~y and the failure of a rock is imminent.of t~ans atory movement as fast as quIck clays or at a Some warnIng sIgns are:liquId-lIke speed. Influence of strain energy on a rock mass: Release andassociated movement can be critical. The interplay . Moveme~t shown by slope indicato~, all types.between a rock mass, the buoyancy (pore pressure) . Changes m the groundwater level m the rock mass, effect, and the lightening of a rock mass allows an reflecting either inflow or alteration of permeability acceleratedelease f the nherent trainenergy.This due o creep y "opening" or "closing" of fracturescreates more release fractures, the cycle is repeated, and openings.and the net result is an increase in the amount of sub- . Rock noise (microseismic).surface water and a stronger buoyancy effect-both . Animals showing signs of unrest, as they detect slightaided by the energy release phenomenon. motion underfoot and leave.

THE WALTER BOULDIN DAM FAILURETHOMASM. LEPS

February 10, 1975, shortly after midnight (at approxi- celerating, and by daybreak the breaching was essentially10 A.M.), the security guard at the Walter Bouldin complete, having progressed below the level of the pow-

(Fig. 2-37), looking out a window of the right erhouse deck, over 90 ft (27 meters) below the crest of theof the semi-outdoor structure, saw muddy water on the dike. Heavy flows continued through the breach for about'

deck, an area illuminated by normal outside 14 hours until inflow to the forebay was finally eliminated.Seeinghewater lowing rom he eft sideof the Thebreach,whichoccurred t hemaximum eight ectionof the powerhouse to the right side, he quickly tele- of the dike on the left side of the intake and powerhouse,

this information to a powerhouse supervisor who was over 120 ft (37 meters) deep and 250 ft (76 meters) nearby. Shortly thereafter, the outside lighting failed, wide (Fig. 2-38). The failure outflows were fully contained clear and reliable observations became virtually im- in the broad, 5-mile (8-km)-long, excavated, tailrace chan-

The progress of breaching adjacent to the pow- nel. They caused no injuries to people residing nearby, and165-ft 50-meter)-highikewasby thenac- little damage xcepto project acilities.

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Fig.2-37.WalterBouldinDam,beforeailure,Courtesy: labama ower Fig. 2-38.WalterBouldinDam,after ailure,Courtesy: labama oCo. Co.

GeologicSetting grained, ompacted, icaceousand, ocally silty. . . . clayey.The Walter Bouldm Project IS ocated at the approXImate . re-Cambrian o Paleozoic (Ashland Mica Schis

fall li~e con~ct b~tween he c~stalline rocks of the Ap- weathered,metamorphic ock, slightly to complet~alachlan ham (PIedmontP~vmce) and he. oungersed- decomposed, aprolitic.Imentsof the Gulf Coast Plain, about 70 miles (113 km) . Pre-Cambrian o Paleozoic (Ashland Mica Schissoutheas~f Binningh~m, ~ab~a.. unweathered,metamorphic rock, hard, dense, wThe P~edmont rovmce m this .areaconsIsts?f a broad siliceousand garnetiferous ones. band of Irregular, northeast-trendmgopographic eatures caused y the ntensive olding and metamorphism f pre-Cambrian o Paleozoicage rocks. In the project area, he Terrace deposits comprise the surface materials ovolder crystalline rocks and structureshave been runcated most of the project area. These are Quaternary depoby the sedimentsof the Coastal Plain. Theseyounger de- consisting of flat-lying sandsand gravels with aggregposits have a general northwesterly strike, normal to the thicknessof up to 50 ft (15 meters). nterbeddedsilts aolder system, and a slight dip to the southwest.Deposits clays of low permeabilityare widespread n the upper pothicken toward the coast n a wedgelike manner. tions of thesedeposits.Younger depositsoccur hroughFour formationsexist at the site, as follows: the forebay areaand under most of the forebay dikes.The embankmentswere generally constructedon low. Quaternary erraceDeposits:unconsolidated andand permeability silt and clay interbeds that overlie mo

gravel with lesseramountsof silt and clay. permeable andand gravel strata.The overall reservoird. Cretaceous Tuscaloosa)Formation: fine to medium- sign depended pon a naturalblanket over the forebay oi

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dikes. A lack of unifonnity in the forebay one.mch (25.mm) m width, and were not specifically sealedowever,pennitted seepage ater to enter he un,- dunng the dIke constructionoperations. gravelstrata,and o rechargehe grav- .~shlandm~ca chist n a weatheredo decomposedonThis pennitted forebay seepage o pass beneath he dltIon underlIes he Cretaceous ediments.This rock ex-be discharged long he toe of the embankments. hibits varying degreesof penneability and soundness c-failed section, aU alluvium and Cretaceous trata cording o the extentof weathering, racturing, and genera

been ocally excavated or powerhouseconstruction physic.ai haracteristics. n the areaof the concretestrucmica schist, and the adjacent~ike em. tures, It w~s generall~excavated~ufficiently o expose heas oundedon the slope esulting rom better-qualityunderlYIng ock. Bemg much ess penneablexcavation or the intake and powerhouse oun- than he overlying sediments, he uppercontactof this rockesting ransitionally on all fonnations, from nonnally provides he seepage ase or the lateral moveo Terracesandsand gravels. ment of groundwater. The materialsof Cretaceous ge consist of fine to me- In an essentiallyunweathered tate,Ashland mica schismicaceous andwith lesseramountsof silt provides the foundation for the principal concrete strucclay horizons.The sandsare compactand without ce- tures of the project. Its total thickness s unknown but isThe fonnation is moderately penneable and believed to be appreciable. This rock exhibits the usuaerodible. characteristics f old metamorphics,but remainshard andThe Cretaceousmaterialsat the failure site showedevi- dense,providing an impenneable oundation of excellen

grout travels n excessof 200 ft (60 me- quality.along existing and grouting-induced ractures, rans- o the dam axis and adjacent to the, intake and Design

Grouting had been done after theconstruction, n an attempt to reduce oundation The Walter Bouldin Project is an off-stream developmenhe orientationof fractures n the Cretaceousor- adjacent o JordanReservoiron the CoosaRiver, Alabaman suggests hat they were related to fonnation un- It consistsof an extensively diked forebay fed by gravitywellpoint dewatering,and stress elief. The most via an nterconnecting anal rom nearbyJordanReservoirime for development f preexisting ractures a 225 MW powerplantandgated ntakeon the perimetehavebeenduring excavation or the intake and pow- at the deepest oint of the forebay, two forebay dikes ex-and site,dewatering (Fig. 2.39). Frac- tending ight and eft from the intake/powerhouse omplex

Fig. 2-39. Walter Bouldin Dam, failure area foundation soils. Note erodibility of Cretaceous sandy silt. Courtesy: Alabama Power Co.


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-ormal Maximum Tailwatert:"f' . . Excavation Surface Adjacent\. ) Highly Pervious Sands and Gravels T L ft S.d Of P h e I e ower ouse@ Cretaceous Fine Sandy Silt@ Schist

0 50 100 feetI I IFig. 2-40. Walter Bouldin Dam, cross section through dam in failure reach. Courtesy: Alabama Power Co.

[2320 ft (710 meters) o the right and 5120 t (1560meters) seepage ontrol was added, presumablybecausemostto the left], and a 5-mile (8-km)-10ngexcavated ailrace the teuace sands herein had been removed during exchannel o carry up to 27,000 cfs (770m3js) (Fig. 2-37). vation for the powerhouse.Hence, the excavated lopeAt the dike sectionadjacent o and on the eft sideof the Cretaceousine sands,and the teuace sands emainingintake/powerhouseFig. 2-40) where breachingoccurred, that excavation (Fig. 2-39), had' no piping protectiothe embankments up to 165 t (50 meters)high, with its Moreover, seepage xiting from those ormationswas hcrest at elevation265 ft (81 meters).The dike was a com- den by riprap, and the dike-to-Cretaceous-foundationopacted earthfill of nearly homogeneous ross section, but tact was partially inundatedby tailwater.with a thin, compactedclay upstreamzone, tied, in theintake vicinity, to a clay blanket extendingupstream o the Construction forebay's natural earthblanket. The upstream lope of the dikes was protectedby riprap, generallyonly for its upper Constructionof the principal featuresbegan n July 19620 ft (6 meters),but adjacent o the ntake or the full height and he dikes were essentially ompleteby April 1967 Tof 65 ft (20 meters)above he horizontal clay blanket. The dikes were constructedby a generalcontractor, with codike upstream lopevaried between2H: 1V and 2.5H: 1V, struction monitored and quality-controlled by Alabambut adjacent o and'approachinghe ntake was ransitioned Power Company personnel. Only fairly normal constrfrom 2H: IV to 1.38: IV over a distanceof 100 t (30 me- tion problems occurred, such as interruptions for wters). The downstream lopewasat 1.8H: 1V. Downstream weather, short strikes, and groundwater control. Sofrom the dam axis, the embankmentwas oundedon a 36- 2,711 000 cy (2,070,000 m3) of fill were placed in tin. (9l-cm) thick "drainage ayer," the atter consistingof dikes, all of the fill except rockfill, filter material, aunprocessedocal sands and gravels, with up to 100% riprap having been secured rom nearby borrow areaspassinga No.4 screenand up to 50% passinga No. 200 th~ forebay and from excavation or the intake and poscreen. erhouse.Significantly, the design did not include an engineered,subsurface, oe drain to guard againstpiping in either the Reservoir Operationsfoundation errace sandsor, more important, the underly-ing, highly erodible, Cretaceousine sands.Subsequento The forebay was initially filled in May 1967. The normconstruction,as a result of springs,boils, and so on, many maximum reservoir is at elevation 252 ft (77 meters)small-diameter elief wells were placed along the down- level determined y the spillway for the interconnected ostream oe to drain the teuace sands;but, in the short ail- dan Reservoir. In part becauseof flow constraint n thure reach to the left of the intake/powerhouse,no such canal nterconnection, he Bouldin pool at maximum lo

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,feet be ow. elevation.25~ ft (77 meters), but first indication of failure was the observation a~ 1: 10 A.~.,0n It was mamtam~d at or above ~le- February 10, 1975, 8 hours later, by the all-light secunty

,""'i48 ft (76 meters) most of the tIme, except dunng guard, who saw muddy water flowing over the powerhouseperiods for projects on the Coosa River, when deck. After his telephoned report to a company supervisor,

briefly averaged ele~ation 246 ft (75 m~ters). vario~s comp~ny personnel. were notified: who traveled to1972, seven Inadvertent reservolf draw- the sIte as quIckly as possIble. By the tIme they had ar-

red. The most .severe, on September ~8, ?ved, the failure was well advanced, and all lights on thed to 10 ft (3 meters) m 7 hours, the level havIng Intake and powerhouse were out because of short circuits

oelevation 238 ft (73meters)~ ~4 ft (4.3 meters) due t.o invasion of the switchyard an~ powerhouse by water,normal. Upon recogmtlon of that event, debns, and mud. Hence, they had lIttle or no opportunity ,

reservoir was promptly refilled by reduction of the in the dark, to approach or to view the failure are , and todischarge. Six days later, during a routine dike observe the sequence of events. Sketchy recorded impres-tion, a small, surficial slide, estimated to be 300 cy sions seem to provide a consensus that, by about 1 :45 A.M.,

m3)was noticed on the upstream slope immediately about a 40-ft (12-meter)-long section of the dike crest-inleft of the intake. The slide area was carefully re- a 150-ft (45-meter) reach to the left of the intake, near to

Subsequently, no reservoir drawdown greater than but not at the intake-had sagged perhaps as much as 25 ftft (2 meters) below normal maximum pool was permit- (7.5 meters). If this was the case, water-possibly 10 ft (3

meters) deep-must then have been rushing through the sag.The critical, but unobserved, sequence is the one that had

Remedial Actions been occurring in the several hours prior to that time.If the dimly observed sag was, in fact, not immediately

the beginning of reservoir operations, significant adjacent to the intake, it must have been remarkably sim-occurred through the foundation of the left and right ilar to the sag observed at the late stage of piping failureantly in the short reaches adjacent to and on of both Teton and Baldwin Hills dams, just prior to col-

sides of the intake/powerhouse, and less importantly lapse. If it was immediately at the intake contact, however,the over 5000 ft (1500 meters) length of the left dike. its relation to a possible upstream slope slide in the area,

the advice of consultants, 128 small-diameter where that slope was only 1.3B: IV, would be inferred. Itwells were installed along the downstream toe of the is clear from both the Baldwin Hills and the Teton cases

dike, a 270-ft (82-meter)-10ng French drain was placed that the clearly observable stage of final piping failure isft (40 meters) downstream from the left dike beginning very short, a matter of a few hours.ft (49 meters) lef t of the powerhouse, and grout cur- Breaching was evidently complete by 6:00 A.M., but

in alluvium were attempted in short reaches of both continuing severe damage and erosion occurred for the fol-beginning on the crest 150 ft (46 meters) to the left lowing 14 hours, until Jordan Reservoir had been lowered

the intake and 130 ft (40 meters) to the right of the in- enough to cut off flow to the Bouldin forebay.The holes extended down through the terrace sands

gravels and deeply into the Cretaceous fine sands.the curtains were not closed against Postfailure Finding of Causeintake, and on the left the ungrouted gap was the lo-

where the 1975 breach occurred. The grouting, The cause of failure was investigated intensively by Ala-consumed over 6300 cf (178 m3) of cement in the bama Power Company, and separately by the Federal

curtain and 4900 cf (139 m3) in the right, effected no Power Commission. The company set up an in-house Boarddecrease in leakage. Excessive grout pressures of Inquiry on February 11, 1975. The board retained three

hydraulic fracturing and several escapes of veins of independent consultants of wide experience to assist andto distant points. advise. In their June 26, 1975, report to the inquiry board,

All observable leakage was collected, passed over weirs they advised that it was". . . highly probable that themeasurement, and monitored. An undetermined, un- breach began with a slide of the upstream impervious em-

discharge of leakage must have constantly entered the bankment zone adjacent to the east (left) side of the intakebelow tailwater level, on both sides of the pow:: . . . ." This is the reach in which a drawdown slide oc-

curred in September 1972, involving slippage, probablymostly on the rockfill-to-impervious-zone, 1.0B: 1.0V,

'lu S contact, in the about 100-ft (30-meter)-long transition reachre equence wpere the upstream, outer, rockfill slope transitioned from

inspection of the dikes was made during the late after- 1.3B: IV at the intake to 2.0B: IV. The overall investiga- of February 9, 1975, by a knowledgeable supervisor, tion ruled out the following possible failure causes:


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. . , , ~.. Earthquake . All seepage, through and under the highest dike. Sabotage reaches on both sides of the intake, was brought to . Burrowing animals single, monitoring weir at a location just above tail. Overtopping by reservoir operations water.

consultants advised that foundation piping was' 'highly ReconstrUction was completed in 1981, and the projec' , has been in satisfactory operation since that time.

To the contrary, and as offered separately and subse-by an expert witness during the 1976 FPC hearing, Conclusion

believe piping of foundation soil in the 150 ft (45 meters)each of dike on the left side of the intake to be a possible Although very detailed examination of the right-hand dikcause of failure of such importance that it should not have suggested that fill placement against the intake was locallybeen discounted. The vulnerable location of initial piping imperfect, and hence the same might be true of the leor seepage-caused subsurface erosion is visualized as being dike, such a finding has also been made in numerous othat the downstream toe of the left dike at about dike axis cases of autopsy of fill placement, and should not be a suSta. 47 + 40, about 60 ft (18 meters) to the left of the prise to the profession. It merely confirms that the designintake, in the Cretaceous fine silty sand formation between must be aware of the inevitability of defects despite goelevations 125 ft (38 meters) and 135 ft (41 meters). In this quality control, and should provide those conservativlocation, the Cretaceous-to-fill contact was invisible be- measures that prevent defects from being critical, suchcause it was covered by riprap (Fig. 2-40), and it was in good filter zones, total collection and visual moniwring and beneath the zone of fluctuation of the tailrace level (el- all leakage, and adoption of conservative slopes and z

evations 125 to 135 ft). Moreover, (a) the Cretaceous zone ing.ad been damaged and loosened somewhat by excavation With reference to the cause of failure, it is unfortunateduring powerhouse constrUction to a 1.5H: 1 V slope; (b) it true that the total washout of the breached area occurredmay have been seriously loosened by installation of a row night when observation was impossible, and removed of construction wellpoints, which tended to create a privi- tually all conclusive evidence. Hence, there is no real prleged seepage path transverse to the dike axis and com- of a probable single cause. My assessment, however, pletely under the dike from the reservoir side to the tail- that because there was no drawdown event in the forebwater side (the holes for which were not grouted up after during February 9 to trigger an upstream slope failure, constrUction); and (c) it was not provided with filter pro- there was no physical distress evident at the dike crestection against exiting seepage. With tailwaterflows of up late as 8 hours before the first notice of failure, it is mto 27,000 cfs (770 m3/ sec), and total inability to observe probable that the dike failed initially by foundation pipthe gradual formation underwater of a "pipe" in the Cre- in the highly erodible Cretaceous Formation, followed taceous, it could have been just a matter of time before a collapse of the crest into the quickly enlarging' 'pipe.""pipe" in that highly erodible and locally pervious for-mation worked its way slowly upstream to unrestrictedcommunication with the reservoir. The discharge of fines REFERENCESinto the tailrace would have been unnoticed, because of Th B Id . H ' II R . F .1 . e a Win I 5 eserVOlr al ureboth the natural turbIdity of the powerhouse discharge andhe daily scouring action of that discharge. 1. California Department f Water Resources, Investigation of F

Baldwin Hills Reservoir," Apr. 1964.2. Leps. ThomasM.. "Analysis of Failure of Baldwin Hills ReseReconstruction Proceedings f ASCE SpecialtyConference.PurdueUniversit1972.The redesign and reconstruction of the damaged reaches of 3.. Hamilton. Douglas H.. and Meehan. Richard L.. "Ground R

the dikes were deliberately conservative, utilizing the best in the Baldwin Hills." Science.Vol. 172. Apr. 1971.modem practices. The principal changes from the original 4. Cas~~rande. ~ur. ~ilson. Stan~ey .. an~ Schwantes.~;Ddesign were as follows' Jr.. The Baldwin Hl1ls Reservoir Failure In Retrospect. pr. ings of ASCE SpecialtyConference.PurdueUniversity. June. he upstream slopes were flattened to 2~H: 1V.. ositive dike seepagecutoffs (compacted fill and slurry The Failureof MalpassetDamtrench) were provided throughout, tying in to imper- 1. Bellier.Jean. The Malpasset am." Travaux. ol: 50. Nvious, weathered schist. pp. 363-383. uly 1967.


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. Wes t Lafa y ette IN 1985.*' ,., "Malpasset Dam," ~roce~dings, nternational Work- I. Kiersch, G. A., "Vaiont Reservoir Disaster," Civil Engineering,am Failures, PurdueUnIversIty, 1985.* Vol. 34, No.3, Mar. 1964.The MalpassetReport," WaterPower, Feb, 1963. 2. Kiersch, G. A., "The Vaiont Reservoir Disaster," LandslidesandGogue , ean, "The MalpassetReport," Water Power, p. 58, Feb- Subsidence;Geologic Hazards ConferenceProceedings, The Re-tuary 1963.. souocesAgency,StateofCalifornia,pp.136-145,May26-27, 1965.Louis G., Letter o the editor, Wate~ ower, p. 229, June 1963. 3. ~endron, A..J., and Patton, F. D., " he Vaiont Slide, A Geotech-

P., "Laboratory Tests o Determme he Effect of Rock Tex- mcal AnalysIs Basedon New GeologIc Observationsof the FailurePermeability-a Discussion," International Workshop on Surface," U.S. Army Corps Engineers,Technical Report GL-85-5,Failures,PurdueUniversity, 1985.* . Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS, Vols. I and II, JuneLonde, Pierre, "Malpasset Dam," Proceedings, International) 1985.Workshop n Dam Failures, PurdueUniversity, 1985.*, 4. Muller, L., "The Rock Slide n the Vaiont Valley," RockMechanicsW., andLeonards,G. A., "Modified Hypothesis or Failure and Engineering GeologyJournal, International Society Rock Me-of MalpassetDam," Proceedings, nternational Workshopon Dam chanics,Vol. 2, No. 3-4, pp. 148-212, 1964.

PurdueUniversity, 1985.* 5. Miiller, L., "New Considerations n the Vaiont Slide " Rock Me-G., and Bonazzi, D., "Latest Thinking on the MalpassetAc- chanicsandEngineeringGeology ournal, InternationalSocietyRockcident," Proceedings, nternational Workshop on Dam Failures, Mechanics,Vol. 6, No.1, pp. 1-91,1968.PurdueUniversity, 1985.* 6. Broili, L., "New Knowledgeon the Geomorphologyof the VaiontD., and Post, G., "Four Major Dam Failures Re-exam- Slide Slip Surface," Rock Mechanics and Engineering Geologyined," International Water Power and Dam Construction, pp. 42- Journal, International Society Rock Mechanics,Vol. 5, No: I, pp.44, Nov. 1985. 38-88,1967.J. L., "Four Major Dam Failures Re-examined," Inter- 7. Frattini, M., Arredi, F., Boni, A., Fasso, C., and Scarsella, F.,national WaterPower and Dam Construction,p. 44, Nov. 1985. "Relazione sulle cause heHannoDeterminato a frana nel SerbatoioJ. Guthrie, Presidential ddresso the 8th InternationalCom- del Vajont (9 Ottobre 1963)," Frattini Commission Report tomission n Large Dams, Edinburgh,Scotland, COLD Transactions, E.N.E.L., 92 pp., Jan. 1964.Vol. V, p. 8,1964. 8. Semanza,E., "Sintesi Degli Studi Geologici sulla frana del Vajontnternational Workshop n Dam Failures, PurdueUni- dal1959 al 1964," Memorie del Museo Tridentino di ScienzeNa-versity,1985.* turali, Trento, Italy, Vol. 16, No. I, pp. I-52, 1966-67.

G., and Bonazzi, D. "Latest Thinking on the MalpassetAc- 9. Lo. K. Y., Lee, C. F., and Gelinas, P., "Alternative Interpretationcident," Proceedings, nternational Workshop on Dam Failures, of the Vaiont Slide," in Cording, E. J. (ed')' Stability of RockSlopes,PurdueUniversity, 1985.* Proceedings 3th Symposiumon Rock Mechanics,University of Il-linois, Urbana American Society Civil Engineers, pp. 595-623,St. Francis Dam Failure 1971.10. Miiller, L., "Die Felsgleitung m Bereich Toc," TalsperrveVajontNathanA., "St. Francis Dam Catastrophe-A Great Foun- 15, Baugeologischer ericht to S.A.D.E. (unpublished), 1961.Failure," EngineeringNews-Record,Vol. 100, No. 12, Mar. 11. Miiller, L., "Discussion of Differences n the CharacteristicFeatu11:s1928. of Rock Mechanicsand Mountain Masses," Proceedings5th Inter-by GovernorC. C. Young, "Causes Leading national Conference nternationalBureauRock Mechanics,Leipzig,of the St. Francis Dam," California StatePrinting Of- Germany DDR), Nov. 1963.Mar. 24, 1928. 12. ENR, "Vaiont Trial Defendant Blames Geologists," EngineeringH. P., "The Causeof the St. Francis Dam Failure," Engi- News-Record,New York, p. 13, Feb. 27, 1969.and Contracting, Apr. 1928. 13. Giudici, F., and Semanza,E., "Studio Geologicodel SerbatoiodelRalph, "St. Francis Dam Failure-An Engineer's Study of Vajont" (unpublishedReport) 21 pp., 68 photographs, 2 pp., dis-Engineering News-Record,Vol. 100, No. 13, Mar. 29, cussions,2 mapsand sections, 1960.14. Rossi, D., and Semanza,E., "Carte Geologichedel VersanteSet-

RobertB., Dams and Public Safety, u.s. GovernmentPrint- tentrionaledel Monte Toc e Zone Limitrofe, Prima e Dopo il Fen-Office, Denver, CO, 1983. omeno di Scivolamentodel 9 Ottobre 1963," Istituto di GeologiaF. L., "High Dams: The Viewpoint of the Geologist," dell 'Universita di Ferrara, 1965.American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 95, Paper 15. Selli, R., and Trevisan, L., "Caratteri e interpretazione ella frana1766, 1931. del Vaiont," La Frana Del Vaiont, Annali del Museo Geologico diBologna, Ser. 2, Vol. 32, No. I, 1964.re of T t D 16. Carloni, G. C. and Mazzanti, G., "Rilevamento Geologico dellaeon am f dlV ' " La ""rana e alont, lrana Del Vaiont, Annali del Museo Geolo-Causeof Teton Dam Failure, "Failure gi.codi.Bolog~~, Ser: 2, ~ol. 32, No.1, pp. 105-138, 1964.Teton Dam," Dec. 1976. 17. Clabatti, M., La Dmamlca della frana del Vaiont," La Frana DelDept. of Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group, "Failure of Vaiont, Annali del Museo Geologico di Bologna, Ser. 2, Vol. 32,

Findings,"Apr.1977. N~:1,1964:,. .Dept. of Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group, "Failure of 18. Muller,,~:, Rock MechamcsConsIderationsn the Design of RockDam, Final Report," Jan. 1980. Slopes, m Judd, W. (ed.), State of Stress n Earth's Crust, RandCorp., SantaMonica, CA, June 1963.19. Folberth,P. J., "Written Communicationn Measurementlopenards, . A. (ed.), Engineering eology,Vol. 24, Nos. 1-4, Movementsaiontof September-October963 Letter FolberthAmsterdam, 1987. -rA I 0 ~ ,f- ts .- ElectroconsultMilan, Italy to G. A. Kiers'ch,M~y 12, 1964.

Bouldin Dam Case History

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