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PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Peti t ioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Courtof Cebu City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, Respondents .

Antonio T. Uy for Peti t ioner.

Numeriano G. Estenzo for Respondents .

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTIONNOT BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filingactions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate thepremises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146,Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demandwas dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982.Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months

of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined inSection 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman andthe Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample timeindeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, itcannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would bebarred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under Section 4(a) of PD1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are"individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group orinstitution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of theparties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate,estate, etc.

3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON, NOTREQUIRED. In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing inbehalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Courtallows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit theaction is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestateof Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the samebeing coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

D E C I S I O N

ESCOLIN, J.:

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of CebuCity from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to theBarangay Lupon for conciliation.

The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceaseds name,located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda.

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de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the month.

On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident ofCebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding tothe period from March to September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed todo so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in theMunicipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and assignedto the sala of respondent judge.

On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want ofjurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in thecomplaint, petitioner contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure ofrespondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508,otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance from (sic)filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil divisionof this court could be considered as meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk

of Court would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular from theChief Justice of the Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President ofthe Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions must not be filed withoutpassing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13, Rollo).

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petitionfor certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availedhimself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred bythe Statute of Limitations, as applying to the case at bar.

The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, theperiod for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from

demand to vacate the premises. 2

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment wasfiled in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, therebyleaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the CivilCode. Under the procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliationproceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Givingprivate respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to bring his case before theproper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondentwould want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if he had to coursehis action to the Barangay Lupon.

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition

precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS,JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITYCOURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Chief JusticeEnrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and CommunityDevelopment that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Luponsprovided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, inimplementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from

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receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of saidLupons."cralaw virtua1aw library

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless choseto overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with therequirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside theoperation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in theperformance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome bythe disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkatsecretary attached to the complaint. 4

Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral ofa dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An"individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously,the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridicalperson such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of theIntestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows theadministrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is

presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is theintestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administratormay file the complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon forarbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide CivilCase No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., concurs in the result.