Bonaventura Sententiarum 1

COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

http://www.franciscan-archive.org/bonaventura/opera/bon02013.html[2012-09-11 4:41:04]

S. Bonaventurae BagnoregisS. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae

atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of BagnoregioCardinal Bishop of Alba& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in QuatuorLibros Sententiarum

Commentaries on theFour Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS I.De creatione humanae naturae quantum ad

principium efficiens in generali.

PART IOn the creation of human nature as much as

regards its efficient principle in general.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 13-19.

Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 13-19.

Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Creationem rerum etc. Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS. DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Unde liber iste secundus, qui incipit: Creationemrerum etc., dividitur in duas partes.1 In prima agit dehominis conditione; in secunda de lapsu eius ettentatione, infra distinctione vigesima prima: Vidensigitur diabolus etc. Prima pars habet duas; quia enimhomo communicat cum . . .

Wherefore this Second Book of his, which begins: Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc., isdivided into two parts.1 In the first (Master Peter)deals with the foundation of man [de hominisconditione]; in the second with his fall and temptation,below in the Twenty-First Distinction, (where hesays): Therefore, the Devil seeing, that etc.. The firstpart has two (parts); for, because man communicateswith . . .

1 Coniungenda est haec propositio cum fine Prooemii. Cfr. suprapag. 6, nota 5. Vat., contradicentibus mss. legit sic: PostquamMagister supra in primo libro determinavit de mysterio Trinitatis,consequenter in hoc secundo libro determinat de rebus creatis. Et

1 This proposition is to be conjoined with the end of (St.Bonaventures) Foreword. Cf. above p. 6, footnote 5. TheVatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts, reads thus: AfterMaster (Peter) determined above in the First Book concerning the



dividitur ista pars in duas. In prima etc. Mystery of the Trinity, he consequently determines in this SecondBook concerning created things. And this part is divided into two(parts). In the first etc. [Postquam Magister supra in primo librodeterminavit de mysterio Trinitatis, consequenter in hoc secundolibro determinat de rebus creatis. Et dividitur ista pars in duas. Inprima etc.]

p. 14

cum omnibus creaturis, et cetera facta sunt propterhominem, ideo primo agit de conditione rerum ingenerali, secundo vero in speciali, infra distinctionesecunda: De angelica vero natura etc.

all creatures, and all others have been made for thesake of man, for that reason he first deals with thefoundation of things in general, but second inparticular, below in the Second Distinction (where hesays): And so of angelic nature etc..

Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat deconditione rerum quantum ad principium efficiens, insecunda vero quantum ad finem, ibi: Et quia non valeteius beatitudinis1 etc. Prima pars habet tres particulas. In prima proponit veritatem, quae exprimitur inScripturae sacrae auctoritate. In secunda veroauctoritatem explanat, ibi: Creare est de nihilo2 etc. In tertia vero, quia per illam auctoritatem positioneserroneae eliduntur, concludit ultimo earumevacuationem, ibi: Horum ergo et similium errorumetc. Et quaelibet harum partium habet duas. In primanamque parte proponit auctoritatem veritatis; insecunda errorem Platonis ibi: Plato namque etc. Similiter et secunda duas habet. In prima explanatauctoritatem et verba auctoritatis. In secunda poniterrorem Aristotelis, ibi: Aristoteles vero duo etc. Eodem modo tertia habet duas. Prima enim concluditerrorum improbationem, secunda vero fideiconfirmationem, ibi: Credamus igitur etc.

The first part has two (parts). In the first (Master Peter)makes a determination [determinat] concerning thefoundation of things as much as regards (their)efficient Principle, but in the second as much asregards (their) End, there (where he says): And sinceno one can prevail to exist as a sharer of His Beatitudeetc..1 The first part has three subparts [particulas]. Inthe first he proposes the truth, which is expressed inthe authority of Sacred Scripture. In the second,however, he explains the authority, there (where hesays): to create is properly to make something fromnothing etc.2 In the third, however, because theerroneous positions are crushed through that authority,he concludes, last, their refutation [evacuationem],there (where he says): Refuting the error, therefore, ofthese and similar (men)* etc.. And each of these partshas two (parts). And indeed in the first part heproposes the authority of the truth; in the second theerror of Plato there (where he says): For indeed Platoetc.. Similarly also the second (part) has two (parts). In the first he explains the authority and the words ofthe authority. In the second he posits the error ofAristotle, there (where he says): But Aristotle said that(there are) two etc.. In the same manner the third(part) has two (parts). For the first concludes therefutation [improbationem] of the errors, but thesecond the confirmation of the Faith, there (where hesays): Let us believe, therefore, etc..

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM. TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam vero eorum quae in hac parte3dicuntur, quaeritur hic de exitu rerum in esse.

For an understanding, however, of those (things) whichare said in this part,3 there is here asked of the comingforth [exitu] of things into being.

Primo quantum ad principii entitatem. First as much as regards the entity of (their)principle.



Secundo quantum ad unitatem. Second as much as regards (its) unity.

Circa primum duo quaeruntur. About the first two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum res habeant principiumcausale.

First there is asked, whether things have acausal principle.

Secundo, utrum habeant principium initiale. Second whether they have an initial principle.

ARTICULUS I.

De entitate principii.

ARTICLE I

On the entity of the principle (of things).

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum res habeant principium causale.

QUESTION 1

Whether things have a causal principle?

QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sic proceditur. MOREOVER REGARDING THE FIRST (the argument) isadvanced in this manner:

Cum constet secundum Sanctos et philosophos, quodomnes res mundanae habuerint principium productivumtum propter rerum varietatem, tum propter rerummutabilitatem, tum propter rerum ordinem, tum etiampropter imperfectionem multitudo enim ortum habetab unitate, et motus sive mutabile ab immutabili, etordo ad primum, et imperfectum ad perfectumoriginaliter reducuntur4 ideo hoc supposito, scilicetquod res habeant principium causale aliquo modo, estquaestio, utrum res sint productae omnino, hoc estsecundum principium materiale et formale, an tantumsecundum alterum principiorum. Et quod secundumutrumque, videtur:

Since it is established according to the Saints andphilosophers, that all mundane things had a productiveprinciple both on account the variety of things, and onaccount of the mutability of things, and on account ofthe order of things, and even on account of theimperfection (of things) for a multitude has (its) risefrom a unity, and movement or the mutable from theimmutable, and order is originally lead back to thefirst, and the imperfect to the perfect4 for that reasonwith this supposed, namely, that things have a causalprinciple in some manner, there is the question,whether things have been entirely produced, that isaccording to (their) material and formal principle, orwhether (they have been produced) only according toone of (these) principles. And that (they have beenproduced) according to each, seems:

1. Primo a parte producentis sic. Quanto producens estprius et perfectius, tanto plus influit in rem:5 ergoprimum et perfectissimum influit totum et in totum; etsi hoc, ergo totum producit. Sed primum agens esthuiusmodi: ergo etc.

1. First on the part of the one Producing in thismanner: As much as the one producing is prior andmore perfect, so much more does He inflow [influit]into the thing (produced):5 therefore the First and MostPerfect influences [influit] the whole and (inflows)unto the whole; and if this, therefore He produces thewhole. But the Prime Agent is of this kind: ergo etc..

2. Item, nobilius et perfectius est agens, quantopaucioribus indiget ad agendum,6 ergo agensnobilissimum nullo extra se eget: ergo si ipsum solumesset, adhuc res produceret; sed non ex se, cum ipsenullius sit pars: ergo ex nihilo: patet ergo, quod Deuspotest in totam substantiam creaturae.

2. Likewise, more noble and more perfect is the agent,as much as it needs fewer (things) for acting,6 thereforethe most noble agent will need nothing outside ofitself: therefore if it alone were, it would still producethings; but not out of itself, since it is a part ofnothing: therefore out of nothing: therefore it is clear,that God is able unto [potest in] the whole substance of



a creature.

3. Item, agens secundum formam potest producereformam: ergo pari ratione agens secundum se totumpotest producere totum; sed Deus se . . .

3. Likewise, one acting according to form can producea form: therefore for an equal reason one actingaccording to its whole self can produce a whole; butGod acts according to His whole / self [se toto agit] . . .

1 Plurimi codd. bonitatis.2 Vat. Creator enim est etc. Sed haec propositio in textu Magistripraecedit immediate illam, quam nos fide fere omnium codd.posuimus. Mox codd. cum ed. 1 minus congrue Tertio pro In tertia,et includit pro concludit.3 Codd. N Z in littera. Paulo inferius Vat. cum uno alteroque cod.post entitatem subiungit vel causalitatem.4 De his cfr. tom. I. pag. 342, nota 5; pag. 420, nota 5. et 7, et pag.421, nota 2; pag. 78, nota 2, et pag. 157, nota 11; d. 43. q. 3.in corp.; infra q. 2. fund. 2, et Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 2. (X. c. 2.): Quo namque pacto ordo erit, non existente aliquo perpetuo, separatoac permanente? pag. 326, nota 7; pag. 421, nota 2; pag. 77, dub.1; et Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10: Omne enim, quodimperfectum esse dicitur, id imminutione perfecti imperfectum esseperhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid essevideatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod esse necesse sit. Etenimperfectione sublata, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur,exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest etc.5 Haec propositio formata est ex prop. I. libri de Causis, quam videtom. I. pag. 471, nota 3, et pag. 638, nota 2.6 Secundum Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 62. seqq. (c. 12.). Paulo inferius ed. 1 producere posset pro produceret. Verborumimmediate sequentium sed non ex se etc. fusiorem probationeminvenies I. Sent. d. 8, p. II. q. 2; d. 19. p. II. q. 3, et d. 31. p. II. a. 2.q. 1.7 Supponitur hic et in tota fere quaestione Aristotelis de materia etforma doctrina, in specie, quoad omnis actio naturalis praesupponitsubiectum, in quod transit, et hoc est materia, utpote principiumpassionis, et quod forma est principium actionis, mediante quasimilis forma producitur. Cfr. I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. 9.); I. deGener. et corrupt. text. 55. (c. 7.) et II. text. 53. (c. 9.).

1 Very many codices have Goodness [bonitatis] for Beatitude[beatitudinis].2 The Vatican edition reads For a creator is he etc. [Creatorenim est]. but this proposition in the text of Master (Peter)sprecedes immediately that, which we have placed here, trusting innearly all the codices. Next the codices, together with edition 1,have less congruously Third [Tertio] for In the third [In tertia], andincludes [includit] for concludes [concludit].3 Codices N and Z have in the text [in littera] for in this part [in hacparte]. A little below this the Vatican edition, together with one orthe other codex, after entity [entitatem] subjoins and/or causality[causalitatem].4 On these (doctrines) cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p.342, footnote 5; d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, p. 420, footnote 5 and 7, and p. 421,footnote 2; d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 78, footnote 2, and d. 8, p. I, a.3, q. 1, p. 157, footnote 11; d. 43, q. 3, in the body of theQuestion; (and) below in q. 2, 2nd argument of the fundament, andAristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 2 (Bk. X, ch. 2): For by whatpact will there be an order, with nothing perpetual, separate andpermanent existing ? d. 18, a. sole, q. 3, p. 326, footnote 7; d. 24,a. 1, q. 1, p. 421, footnote 2; d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 77; and (St.Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III;prose 10: For everything which is said to be imperfect, is held tobe imperfect according to the lessening of the perfect. Whence itcomes to be, that if something seems to be imperfect in any genus, itis necessary, that in that (genus) there also be something perfect. For indeed with perfection borne away, from which that, which isheld (to be) imperfect, existed, etc.5 This proposition has been formed from the proposition in the firstBook of Causes, which is cited in Sent., Bk. I, d. 27, p. I, a. sole, q.2, p. 471, footnote 3, and d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 638, footnote 2.6 According to Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. II, text 62ff. (ch. 12). A little below this edition 1 has it could still produce[producere posset] for it would still produce [produceret]. You willfind a more lengthy proof of the words immediately following: butnot out of itself etc. [sed non ex se etc], in Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q.2; d. 19, p. II, q. 3, and d. 31, p. II; a. 2, q. 1.7 There is supposed here and in nearly the entire Question thedoctrine of Aristotle concerning matter and form, in particular, thatevery natural action presupposes a subject, into which it passes, andthis is the matter, or rather the principle of the passion, and that formis the principle of the action, by means of which there is produced asimilar form. Cf. Physics, Bk. I, text 81 f. (ch. 9); On Generationand Corruption, Bk. I, text 55 (ch. 7), and Bk. II, text 53 (ch. 9).

* [Trans. note: Here the critical text reads the equivalent of Refuting(the assertions), therefore, of these and similar errors [errorum]instead of Refuting the error, therefore, of these and similar (men)[errorem], on account of the fact, as often will occur, that the codices



of st. Bonaventures commentaries have a variant reading ofLombards work than that employed here by the Quaracchi editors;in fact, in the 1493 Freiburg Edition of St. BonventuresCommentary, folio Aa 2 v, and Aa 3 r, respectively, the reading ofBonaventure here seems to be errorum, where as that of Lombard onthe next page is errorem, the same as that of the Quaracchi edition. Accordingly, I have changed the English to conform with the Latintext of Lombard used by the Quaracchi Editors, for the sake of thereaders facility and comprehension.]

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toto agit, cum sit omnino simplex: ergo producittotum.

according to His whole / self [se toto agit], since He isentirely simple: therefore He produces the whole (of acreature).

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte rei conditae sic: quod non est ab alio, est a se ipso; nihil autem talequod a se ipso est, indiget alio, ut sit;1 sed omneintrinsecum principium rei indiget alio, ut sit, namforma indiget materia, et e converso: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown on the part ofthe thing founded in this manner: what is not fromanother, is from its very self [a se ipso]; but nothingsuch which is from its very self, needs another, to be;1but every intrinsic principle of a thing needs another, tobe, for form needs matter, and vice versa: ergo etc..

5. Item, efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae,2 ergoquod non est ab alio, non est ad aliud; sed omnia suntad aliud secundum omne quod sunt, quia secundumomne quod sunt, appetunt bonum; et status non est nisiin summo bono. Et quod ista ratio sit bona, ostenditur. Si enim bonum et ens convertuntur3, ergo quod est seipso ens se ipso est bonum; sed quod se ipso estbonum, non est propter aliquid aliud: ergo quod non estab alio, non est propter aliud. Si ergo omnia mundanasecundum se tota sunt propter aliud, ergo sunt ab alio.

5. Likewise, the one effecting (the thing) and the end(of the end) are correlative causes (of the thing),2therefore what is not from another [ab alio], is not foranother [ad aliud]; but all are for another according toeverything which they are, because according toeverything which they are, they seek after [appetunt]the good; and there is no standing still but in the MostHigh Good. And that this reason is a good one, isshown (thus): For if the good and being are convertible[convertuntur],3 therefore what is by its very self abeing, is by itself very self good; but what by its veryself is good, is not for the sake of anything else[propter aliquid aliud]: therefore what is not fromanother, is not for the sake of another. If therefore allmundane (beings) according to their whole selves[secundum se tota] are for the sake of another,therefore they are from another.

6. Item, si res non est totaliter ab alio, aut hoc estratione formae, aut ratione materiae. Constat quod nonformae,4 quia videmus, formas produci, et si formaenon producerentur, omnino nihil produceretur. Siratione materiae; sed contra: ut dicit Philosophus inPrima Philosophia,5 actus est ante potentiam ;constat, quod non loquitur de potentia activa, sedpassiva: ergo cum actus rei sit ab alio, similiter etmateria. Si tu dicas, quod intelligitur non de actu, quiest forma, sed efficiens; idem concluditur. Et

6. Likewise, if a thing is not entirely from another,either this is by reason of (its) form, or by reason of(its) matter. It is established that (it is) not (by reason)of (its) form,4 because we see, that forms are produced,and if forms were not produced, nothing entirely wouldbe produced. If by reason of (its) matter; but on thecontrary: as the Philosopher says in (his) FirstPhilosophy,5 act is before potency [potentia] ; it isestablished, that he is not speaking of active power[potentia activa], but passive (power): therefore since



iterum, ego quaero, quare materia non sit ab alio. Siquia est principium, ex quo fiunt cetera, nec habet undefiat;6 tunc ego quaero de forma, utrum fiat ex aliquo,vel ex nihilo. Si ex nihilo, pari ratione et materia exnihilo. Si ex aliquo, quaero, quid sit illud. Nonessentia materiae; constat, quia forma simplex est: ergo forma non fit ex materia, ita quod materia sit eiusprincipium constitutivum. Nec fit ex materia, ita quodmateria fiat forma: fit ergo ex aliquo, quod est inmateria.7 Tunc ego quaero: de quo est illud? Etconstat, quod non est ex materia, pari ratione: ergo velerit abire in infinitum in causando,8 vel necesse estponere, essentias formarum a primo opifice productasex nihilo: ergo pari ratione et materiam.

the act of a thing is from another, similarly too thematter (of a thing). If you say, that (his saying) is notunderstood of the act, which is a form, but (of the actwhich is) the one effecting, the same is concluded. And again, I ask, For what reason is matter not fromanother? If because it is a principle, out of which allothers are made, and (because) it does not have whenceit is made;6 then I ask concerning form, whether it ismade out of something, and/or out of nothing. If out ofnothing, for an equal reason matter too (is made) out ofnothing. If out of something, I ask, what that is. Notthe essence of matter; (that) is established, because aform is simple: therefore a form is not made out ofmatter, so that matter be its constitutive principle. Neither is it made out of matter, so that matter be madea form: therefore it is made out of something, which isin matter.7 Then I ask: Of what is it? And it isestablished, that it has not (been made) out of matter,for an equal reason: therefore either there will be anregress unto infinity [abire in infinitum] in causing,8and/or it is necessary to posit, that the essences offorms (have) been produced by the First Worker out ofnothing: therefore for an equal reason matter also.

1. Ad oppositum sunt rationes primo a parte efficientis. Prima haec est: omnis effectus aliquo modoassimilatur causae;9 sed principium primum est actuspurus, nihil habens de possibili, materia autem rerumest possibile purum per sui essentiam, nihil habens deactu: ergo cum materia in nullo assimiletur opifici, nonest ab ipso.

1. For the opposite (side) the reasons are first on thepart of the one effecting. The first is: every effect is insome manner assimilated to a cause;9 but the FirstPrinciple is a pure act, having nothing of the possible,but the matter of things is a pure possible through itsown essence, having nothing of act: therefore sincematter is assimilated in nothing to the Worker, it is notfrom Him.

2. Item, ab agente pulcherrimo et luminosissimo nonprocedit turpe et tenebrosum; sed Deus est ipsapulcritudo et ipsa lux,10 materiale principium est turpeet tenebrosum: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, from a most beautiful and most luminousagent there does not proceed (anything) ugly [turpe]and shadowy [tenebrosum]; but God is Beauty Itselfand Light Itself,10 (and) the material principle is uglyand shadowy: ergo etc.

3. A parte rerum ostenditur de formali principio: Omne enim quod producitur et fit, fit a sibi similinomine et specie, ut homo ab homine , secundumquod dicit Philosophus septimo Philosophiae primae.11 Si ergo formae rerum sunt principia producendi, etprincipium producendi praecedit rerum productionem;ergo res non sunt productae quoad principium formale.

3. On the part of things it is shown concerning (their)formal principle: For everything which is producedand is made, is made by (something) similar to itself inname and species, such as a man (is produced) by aman , according to what the Philosopher says in theseventh (book) of (his) First Philosophy.11 If,therefore, the forms of things are the principles ofproducing, and the principle of producing precedes theproduction of things; therefore things have not beenproduced in regard to (their) formal principle.

1 Cfr. Anselm., Monol. c. 3. seqq. De minori vide tom. I. pag.169, nota 4. Pro a se ipso, quod bis occurit, plurimi codd. cum

1 Cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologion., ch. 3 ff. On the minor seeSent, Bk. I, d, 8, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, p. 169, footnote 4. For from



ed. 1 secundo loco habent se ipso, quod etiam a paucioribus mss.primo loco ponitur (cod. bb et ed. 1 in se ipso).2 Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.) ostendit, tres causas, scil.efficientem, formalem, et finalem, esse connexas inter se, immomultoties in unam concurrere. De maiori eiusque addita ratione cfr.Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11. Simili argumento S. Doctor,libr. I. d. 2. q. 1. fundam 3. probat, unum tantum esse Deum. Paulo inferius non pauci codd. in summe bonum pro in summo bono,incongrue.3 Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5; cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 2. Moxplures codd. se ipso est ens bonum pro primo se ipso est bonum, ubiVat. cum paucis mss. adiungit et e converso.4 Cod. Q ratione formae.5 Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.), ubi probat, actumpotentia priorem esse ratione (definitione), substantia (perfectione)et quandoque tempore; ac XII. text. 30. (XI. c. 6.), ubi eademratione monstrat, praeter substantias naturales unam esse, quaesempiterna sit et actus. Verba, quae sequuntur: constat, quodnon loquitur etc. intellige secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 2. a.3: et loquitur de potentia, quae perficitur per actum . Pauloinferius multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt similiter.6 Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.): Si enim (materia) fiat, subiicialiquid oportet primum, ex quo inexistente fiat. Hoc autem estipsius natura. Quare, erit antequam fiat. Dico enim, materiamprimum subiectum uniuscuiusque, ex quo fit aliquid, cum insit, nonsecundum accidens.7 Quod vocatur ratio seminalis, de qua infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, velsecundum alios potentia materiae.8 Quod est impossibile in omni genere causarum, ut ostenditAristot., II: Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior. c. 2.). Cod. aainquirendo pro in causando).9 Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 2. 8. et c. 9. 6. Quod materia sitpura potentia, docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 69. (c. 7.) et VII. Metaph.text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), de quo tom. I. pag. 358, nota 11, et infra d. 12. a.1. Paulo inferius plures codd. ut B C I O P R T de materiapossibili pro de possibili; dein Vat. potentiale pro possibile.10 Epist. I. Ioan. 1, 5. De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text.81. (c. 9.), ubi docet, materiam appetere forma, sicut turpepulchrum. Aliquanto superius cod. W lucidissimo proluminosissimo. Cod. F conclusionem argumenti supplet ergo nullomodo est ab ipso.11 Text. 28. (VI. c. 8.): In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestumest, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur, non tamen idemnec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in naturalibus; homonamque hominem generat . Et text. 30. (VI. c. 9.) iuxtatranslationem Arabico-latinam: Manifestum est igitur ex dictis,quod quoquo modo omne quod fit, fit a conveniente in nomine (exomwnumou), sicut illud quod est per naturam . Averroes in hunctextum: Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis, quod omne quodgeneratur, generatur a conveniente in nomine et ratione, ut illudquod est per naturam, i. e. homo ab homine. De seq. prop. cfr.Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7), ubi contra Platonemostendit, formas existentes in rebus corporalibus esse a formis, quaesunt in materia.

its very self [a se ipso], which occurs twice, very many codices,together with edition 1, have in the second position by its very self[se ipso], which is even the reading of a few manuscripts in the firstposition (cod. bb and edition 1 read in its very self [in se ipso].2 Aristotle in Physics, Bk. II, text 70 (ch. 7), shows, that the threecauses, namely the efficient, formal and final, have been conjoinedamong themselves, indeed very often to concur in one (thing). Onthe major and its added reason, cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On theConsolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prosa 11. By a similarargument the Seraphic Doctor, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 1, in 3rdargument of the fundament, proves that there is only one God. Alittle below this not a few codices have incongruously in One mosthighly good [in summe bono] for in the Most High Good [in summobono].3 (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 5; cf.Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, p. 32, footnote 2. Next severalcodices have is by its very self a good being [se ipso est ens bonum]for the first is by its very self good [se ipso est bonum], where theVatican edition, together with a few manuscripts, adjoins and viceversa [et e converso].4 Codez Q reads by reason of (its) form [ratione formae] for not (byreason) of (its) form [non formae].5 Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 13 ff. (Bk. VII, ch. 8), where he proves,that act is prior to potency according to reckoning (definition),according to substance (perfection) and whenever according to time;and in Bk. XII, text 30 (Bk. XI, ch. 6), where by the same reckoninghe shows, that besides the natural substances, there is one(substance), which is sempiternal and an act. Understand thewords which follow: it is established, that he is not speaking etc.[constat, quod non loquitur etc.] according to Alexander of Hales,Summa, p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 3: and he is speaking of the potency,which is perfected through act . A little below this manycodices, together with edition 1, omit similarly [similiter].6 Aristotle (says) in Physics, Bk. I, text 82 (ch. 9): For if (matter) ismade, it is necessary that something first be subjected, out of whichnon-existing (thing) it is made. But this is its nature. Wherefore itwill be before it is made. For I say, that matter (is) the first subjectof each (thing) [uniuscuiusque], out of which something is made,since it is in (it), not according to accident.7 Which is called the seminal reason [ratio seminalis], concerningwhich see below d. 18, q. 1, q. 3, and/or, according to others, thepotency of matter [potential materia].8 Which is impossible in every genera of cause, as Aristotle showsin Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 5 ff (Bk. I, in the shorter version, ch. 2). Codex aa has in inquiring [inquirendo] for in causing [incausando].9 (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 2, 8and ch. 9, 6. Aristotle teaches, that matter is pure potency, inPhysics, Bk. I, text 69, (ch. 7), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8(Bk. VI, ch. 3), concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. II, a.sole, q. 2, p. 358, footnote 11, and below in d. 12, a. 1. A littlebelow this several codices, such as B C I O P R T, have of possiblematter [de material possibili] for of the possible [de possibili]; thenthe Vatican edition has a pure potential [potentiale purum] for apure possible [possibile purum].10 1 Jn. 1:5. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle,Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9), where he teaches, that matter desires



form, as the ugly (desires) the beautiful. Somewhat above thiscodex X has most lucid [lucidissimo] for most luminous[luminossissimo]. Codex F supplies the conclusion of the argument: therefore in no manner is it from Him [ergo nullo modo est ab ipso].11 (That is, his Metaphysics): Text 28, (Bk. VI, ch. 8): Forindeed in certain (things) it is manifest, that as such is the onegenerating, so that which is generated, yet not the same nor one innumber, but one in species, as in natural (things); for indeed a mangenerates a man . And text. 30 (Bk. VI, ch. 9) according to theArabic-Latin translation: It is manifest, therefore, from (what has)been said, that in whatever manner everything which is made, it ismade from one convening in name (ex omwnumou), just as thatwhich is (made) through nature . Averros on this text (says): It ismanifest, therefore, from the aforesaid, that everything which isgenerated, is generated from one convening in name and reckoning,such as that which is (generated) through nature, i. e. a man from aman. On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk.VII, text 22 ff. (Bk. VI, ch. 7), where against Plato he shows, thatforms existing in corporal things are from the forms, which are inmatter.

p. 16

4. Item, artifex non potest producere, nisipraecognoscat; non potest praecognoscere nisi performas;1 non potest per formas cognoscere, quae nullomodo sunt: ergo impossibile fuit, quod summus artifexmundum formaret, nisi formae prius essent, per quascognosceret; et illae non potuerunt produci similiternisi per formas: ergo si non est in infinitum abire, estponere, formas rerum non esse productas.

4. Likewise, a craftsman cannot produce, unless hecognizes (the thing) beforehand; he cannot cognize (it)before hand except through forms;1 he cannot cognizethrough forms (those), which in no manner are: therefore it was impossible, that the Most HighCraftsman form the world, unless there were formsbeforehand, through which He cognized (it); and thosecould not be produced, similarly, except throughforms: therefore if there is not a regress unto infinity,there is a positing, that the forms of things have notbeen produced.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur quoad materialeprincipium. Omne quod producitur, producitur exaliquo, vel ex nihilo; sed ex nihilo nihil: ergo omniaex aliquo ;2 illud autem est materia: ergo si stare estet non abire in infinitum, illud non est productum. Quod autem ex nihilo nihil fiat, videtur. Productioenim rei est actio; sed omnis actio requirit in quidagat,3 ergo et omnis productio: ergo omni productionisubiicitur aliquid; non nisi materia: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown in regard to amaterial principle. Everything which is produced, isproduced out of something, and/or out of nothing; butout of nothing nothing (is produced): therefore all (areproduced) out of something ;2 but that (something) ismatter: therefore, if there is a standing still and not anregress unto infinity, that (something) has not beenproduced. But it seems that out of nothing nothing ismade. For the production of a thing is an action; butevery action requires (that) upon which it acts,3therefore also every production: therefore to everyproduction there is subjected something; (and thissomething is) not but matter: ergo etc..

6. Item, ego quaero de productione sive creationepassiva,4 utrum illa sit substantia, vel accidens; nonsubstantia, ergo accidens. Sed omne accidens fundatur

6. Likewise, I ask concerning production or passivecreation,4 Whether that is a substance, and/or anaccident?; not a substance, therefore an accident. But



in aliquo; sed hoc non potest esse creatum, cum illudsequatur naturaliter ipsam creationem: ergo necesseest, quod sit increatum et aliud a Deo, quia creatio-passio in alio est: ergo necesse est, omne quodproducitur, ex aliquo produci; et ideo Philosophus inprimo Physicorum5 dicit, quod materia est ingenita.

every accident is founded in something; but this cannotbe a created (being), since that follows naturallycreation itself: therefore it is necessary, that it be(something) created and other than God, because thecreation-passion (i.e. the act of creation, reckoned as apassion) is in another: therefore it is necessary, thateverything which is produced, be produced out ofsomething; and for that reason the Philosopher in thefirst (book) of (his) Physics5 says, that matter isunbegotten.

CONCLUSIO.

Mundus de nihilo est productus et secundum se totumet secundum sua principia intrinseca.

CONCLUSION

The world was produced from nothing both accordingto its whole self and according to its intrinsic

principles.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod haec veritas est: mundus in esse productus est, et non solum secundumse totum, sed etiam secundum sua intrinseca princpia,quae non ex aliis, sed de nihilo sunt producta. Haec autem veritas, etsi nunc cuilibet fideli6 sit apertaet lucida, latuit tamen prudentiam philosophicam, quaein huius quaestionis inquistione longo temporeambulavit per devia. Fuerunt enim quidam antiquiphilosophi,7 qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse a Deoet de sui essentia, quia non videbant, quomodo aliquidposset fieri ex nihilo; et solus Deus fuit in principio, etideo dixerunt, quod fecit omnia de se ipso. Sedhaec positio non solum fidelibus, sed etiam sequentibusphilosophis apparuit improbabilis, quod Dei essentia8omnino invariabilis et nobilissima fieret corporalium etvariabilium materia, quae de se est imperfecta, nisiperficiatur per formam.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that this is true: Theworld has been led forth into being [in esseproductus est], and not only according to its wholeself, but even according to its intrinsic principles,which have been produced not out of others, but fromnothing. But this truth, even if it is now open andlucid to any of the faithful [cuilibet fideli],6 it belied[latuit], however, the prudence of the philosopher,which in the inquisition of this question walked for along time through devious (paths). For there wereindeed certain, ancient philosophers,7 who said, that theworld had been made by God and from His ownEssence, because they did not seen, in what mannersomething could be made out of nothing; and in thebeginning there was God alone, and for that reason theysaid, that He made all (things) from His very self. But this position appeared improbable not only to thefaithful, but even to subsequent [sequentibus]philosophers, that Gods entirely invariable and mostnoble Essence8 would become the matter of (things)corporal and variable, which (matter) is imperfect, if itis not perfected through form.

Fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse exprincipiis praeexistentibus, scilicet ex materia et forma;sed formae latebant in materia, antequam intellectusillas distingueret. Et hoc posuit Anaxagoras.9 Sedquia formas esse omnes simul in materia, non capitratio recta, ideo per sequentes philosophos ista positioimprobata est.

There were also others, who said, that the world wasmade out of pre-existing principles, namely out ofmatter and form; but forms lay hidden in matter, beforean intellect distinguished them. And this didAnaxagoras9 posit. But because right reason doesnot grasp that all forms are together in matter, for thatreason this position of theirs was disproved bysubsequent philosophers.

Fuerunt et tertii, qui mundum ex principibuspraeexistentibus factum posuerunt, scilicet materia etforma; sed materiam per se posuerunt, formas

There were also (those) third, who posited that theworld (had) been made out of pre-existing principles,namely matter and form; but the posited that matter



separatas et postmodum ex tempore ab opifice summoesse coniunctas. Et hi fuerunt Platonici.10 Sed quiaillud irrationabile videtur, quod materia ab aeternofuerit imperfecta, et quod eadem forma sit separatapariter et coniuncta; et absurdum videtur triplicemhominem ponere, scilicet naturalem, mathematicum etdivinum: ideo etiam per sequentes philosophos haecpositio reprobata est.

(existed) through itself, (and) that separated forms wereafter a while conjoined in time by the Most HighWorker. And these were the Platonists.10 Butbecause it seems irrational, that matter was imperfectfrom eternity, and that the same form is equallyseparate and conjoined; (because) it seems absurd toposit a threefold man, namely the natural (man), themathematical (man) and the divine (man): for thatreason this position was also reproved throughsubsequent philosophers.

1 Plato, Gorg. (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 465) ait: Ego autem artisnomine dignam minime eam rem esse existimo, quae careat ratione. Et X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 596): Nonne solemus etiamdicere supellectilis utriusque artificem sic opus suum absolvere, utin formulam illam [ideam] intueatur . . .? Non enim ullus artifexideam ipsam fabricat. Qui enim posset ? Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 4: Ars igitur, sicut dictum est, habitus quidam est cum ratione veraeffectivus ; et VII. Metaph. text. 23. (VI. c. 7.): Ab arte autemfiunt quorum forma in anima . Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 7. Paulo post Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. praecognoscere procognoscere, et est pro fuit. Deinde aliqui codd. ut H bb poterantpro potuerunt. Hoc argumentum est Platonis dicentis in Timaeo(tom. III. pag. 28.): Quidquid autem gignitur, ex aliqua causa gigninecesse est; fieri enim nullo modo potest, ut quidquam sine causagignatur aut fiat. Quocirca, si is qui aliquod opus efficere molitur,eam speciem, quae semper est eadem, intuetur atque eam sibiproponit exemplar, et quidem illam cogitationisque suae vim educitin opus, ita omnino necesse est, rem totam praeclare absolvi; sinautem in illam, quae gignitur, inspicit, genitum exemplar sibiproponens, non praeclarum certe opus perficiet . . . Atqui si pulcherest hic mundus, si bonus est eius opifex, perspicuum est, ipsum adsempiternum illud exemplar respexisse etc.2 Vide Aristot., I. Phys. text. 34. et 71. (c. 4. et 8.), ubi hocargumentum antiquis philosophis, praecipue Anaxagorae, tribuitur. Ibid. text. 82. (c. 9.) insinuatur minor seq. de materia. Vat.primam minorem exhibet sic: Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit.3 Gilbert. Porret. in libro Sex princip. c. 2 ait: Actio vero est,secundum quam in id quod subiicitur, agere dicimur, ut secans quis,in eo quod secet, secans dicitur . Quare etiam cod. P hic addit inSex principiorum. Paulo inferius cod. F et hoc est, non paucialii codd. falso non igitur pro non nisi.4 De qua vide infra a. 3. q. 2. in corp.5 Text. 82. (c. 9.). Cod. O aliquanto superius creatio passivapro creatio-passio, et dein Vat. post ex aliquo addit in producto.6 Vat. etsi cuilibet fides, quae etiam cum uno alteroque cod. postlatuit tamen subiungit providentiam vel.7 Eleatae, qui docebant monismum, quorum dux fuit Xenophanes(versus a. 569 ante Chr.). Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I.Metaph. c. 9. (c. 5.).8 Cod. P quod Dei natura, quae est.9 Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. seqq. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. c. 4-7. (c.3. seq.); et August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. seqq; ubi placitaantiquorum philosophorum breviter enumerantur.10

1 Plato in his Gorgias (in the edition of Serrano, tome I, p. 465)says: But I judge that this thing, which lacks a reckoning, is leastof all worthy of the name of art . And in The Republic, Bk. X(tome II; p. 596): Are we not accustomed to even say that thecraftsman of each (piece) of household furniture absolves his workthus, that he intuits that (idea) upon (its) design [in formulam]? Forno craftsman fabricates that idea itself. For who could ? Aristotlein (his) Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 4 (says): Art, therefore, just as hasbeen said, is a certain habit, effective with a true reckoning ; and in(he says) in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 23 (Bk. VI, ch. 7): Moreover from art there are made (those) whose form (is) in thesoul . Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, a. sole, q. 1, p. 600, footnote 7. Alittle after this the Vatican edition, together with one or the othercodex, has precognize [praecognoscere] for cognize [cognoscere],and it is [est] for it was [fuit]. Then some codices, such as H andbb, have could not have been [potuerant] for could not be[potuerunt]. This is Platos argument in the Timaeus (tome III,p. 28): But whatever is begotten, it is necessary that it be begottenout of some cause; for it can in no manner come to be, that anythingbe begotten or come to be without a cause. On which account, if hewho contrives to work any work, intuits that species, which alwaysis the same, and proposes it to himself as (his) exemplar, and indeedalso leads that and the force of his own thought upon the work, it isthus entirely necessary, that the whole thing be completed in anoutstanding manner; but if, however, he looks upon that, which isbegotten, proposing the begotten to himself as (his) exemplar, hewill certainly not perfect an outstanding work . . . Nevertheless, ifthis world is beautiful, if its Worker is good, it is obvious, that Hehas looked back to that sempiternal Exemplar etc..2 See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, texts 34 and 71 (chs. 4 and 8), wherethis argument is attributed to the ancient philosophers, chiefly toAnaxagoras. Ibid., text 82 (ch. 9), he insinuates the followingminor, concerning matter. The Vatican edition exhibits the firstminor thus: If out of nothing; (then) nothing comes to be out ofnothing [Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit] for but out of nothingnothing (is produced) [sed ex nihilo nihil].3 Gilbert of Porretain in (his) book Of Six Principles, ch. 2, says: However an action is, (that) according to which we say (there is) anacting upon that which is subjected, so that anyone cutting, in thisthat he is cutting, is said (to be) one (who is) cutting . Whereforecodex P also here adds in Of Six Principles [in Sex principiorum]. A little below this codex F reads and this is [et hoc est], but nota few other codices falsely not therefore [non igitur], for (and thissomething is) not but [non nisi].4 Concerning which, see below a. 3, q. 2, in the body of theQuestion.



Plato in Timaeo, ex quo iam (nota 1.), aliqua retulimus. Cfr.etiam Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (c.6.), VII. text. 51. seqq. (VI. c. 14.) et XIII. c. 4. usque in finem libri(XII. c. 4. seqq.), ubi inter cetera argumenta etiam illa afferuntur,quorum S. Doctor mentionem facit. Paulo inferius cod. aageneralius, sed minus conformiter dictis Aristotelis loc. cit.,mundum pro hominem.

5 Text 82, (ch. 9). Codex O somewhat above this has passivecreation [creation passiva] for creation-passion, and then theVatican edition after out of something [ex aliquo] adds in the oneproduced [in producto].6 The Vatican edition reads even if the Faith is revealed and lucidto anyone [etsi cuilibet fides sit aperta et lucida] for even if it is nowopen and lucid to any of the faithful [etsi nunc cuilibet fideli sitaperta et lucida], which (edition) also, together with one or the othercodex, after it belied, however [latui tamen] subjoins the foresightand/or [providentiam vel].7 The Eleatics, who taught Monism, whose leader was Xenophanesof Colophon (born c. 569 B.C.; died c. 499 B.C.). Cf. Aristotle,Physics., Bk. I, text. 32 (ch. 4), Metaphysics Bk. I, ch. 9 (ch. 5).8 Codex P has Gods Nature, which is entirely invariable and mostnoble, [Dei natura, quae est omnino invariabilis et nobilissima] forGods entirely invariable and most noble Essence [Dei essentiaomnino invariabilis et nobilissima].9 Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32 ff (ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I,chs. 4-7 (ch. 3 f.); and (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk.VIII. ch. 2 ff.; where the opinions of the ancient philosophers arebriefly enumerated.10 Plato in the Timaeus, from which (book) we have already cited afew things (in footnote 1). Cf. also Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32(ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 5 ff., (ch. 6), Bk. VII, text 51 ff.,(Bk. VI, ch. 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 4, unto the end of the book (Bk.XII, ch. 4 ff.), where among all the other arguments there are alsocited those, of which the Seraphic Doctor makes mention. Alittle below this codex aa more generally, but in a manner lessconformed to the sayings of Aristotle, loc. cit., has world [mundum]for man [hominem].

p. 17

Fuerunt etiam quarti, scilicet Peripatetici, quorumprinceps et dux fuit Aristoteles, qui veritati magisappropinquantes dixerunt mundum factum, sicut legiturin secundo Metereorum:1 Dico igitur, quod marefactum est , et in principio de Caelo et mundo; et depluribus aliis locis potest elici. Sed dixerunt, non essefactum ex principiis praeexistentibus. Sicut enim vultin primo Vegetabilium,2 mundus semper fuit plantis etanimalibus plenus, ubi loquitur contra Abrucalem. Utrum autem posuerit materiam et formam factam denihilo, hoc nescio; credo tamen, quod non pervenit adhoc, sicut melius videbitur in problemate secundo: ideo et ipse etiam defecit, licet minus quam alii.

There were also (those) fourth, namely the Peripatetics,whose prince and leader was Aristotle, who,approaching the truth more, said that the world (was)made, just as is read in the second (book) OfMeteorology:1 I say, therefore, that the see has beenmade , and in the beginning of On Heaven and theWorld; and (as) can be elicited from many otherpassages. But they said, that it was not made out ofpre-existing principles. For just as he would have it inthe first (book) Of Vegetables,2 the world was alwaysfull of plants and animal, where he speaks againstEmpedocles [Abrucalem]. But whether he posited thatmatter and form (was) made from nothing, this I do notknow; yet I believe, that he did not come to this, just aswill be better seen in the second Question [problematesecundo]: for that reason he was also deficient, thoughless than the others.

Ubi autem deficit philosophorum peritia, subvenit nobis Moreover, where the expertise of philosophers fails,



sacrosancta Scriptura, quae dicit,3 omnia esse creata etsecundum omne quod sunt in esse producta. Et ratioetiam a fide non discordat, sicut supra in opponendoostensum est.

there comes to our aid the Sacrosanct Scripture, whichsays,3 that all have been created and produced inbeing according to everything which they are. Andreason too does not discord from the Faith, just as hasbeen shown in the opposing (side) above.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur de similitudine, quod materia estens omnino in potentia; dicendum, quod materia nonpropter se facta est, sed propter sustentationem formae,quae eius est actus; quamvis ergo materia non sit Deoactu similis, tamen assimilabilis est per formam. UndeAugustinus4 dicit, quod ispa materia, etsi non habeat dese et in se actum formae, ipsa tamen capacitas formaeest ei pro forma. Ideo patet illud.

1. What, therefore, is objected concerning a similitude,that matter is a being entirely in potency; it must besaid, that matter has not been made for its own sake,but for the sake of the sustenance of the form, which isits act; therefore, although matter is not similar to Godin act, yet it is able to be assimilated [assimilabilis]through form. Wherefore (St.) Augustine says,4 thatmatter itself, even if it does not have the act of form ofitself and in itself, yet the very capacity for form is itsown in virtue of form [est ei pro forma]. For thatreason that (objection) is clear.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod turpis etc.; dicendum, quod necturpis nec tenebrosa dicitur nisi comparative. Nammateria non est privatio pura, immo ratione suaeessentiae habet aliquid de pulchritudine et aliquid deluce. Unde Augustinus5 dicit, quod habet modum,speciem et ordinem, quamvis imperfecte. Non opportetautem, quod Deus omnes res producat sibi aequalitersimiles, immo secundum gradum. Et ideo ad hoc, quodgradus sint perfecti, necesse est ponere aliquid propeDeum, et hoc simillimum; et aliquid prope nihil, et hocaliquo modo simile, licet non omnino nec perfecte,quod quamvis in se minimum habeat de bono, tamenoptime ordinatum est.6

2. What is objected, that what is ugly etc.; it must besaid, that (matter) is said (to be) neither ugly norshadowy, except in a comparative manner. Formatter is not a pure privation, nay by reason of its ownessence it has something of beauty and something oflight. Wherefore (St.) Augustine5 says, that it has astandard of measure, a beauty and an order [modum,speciem et ordinem], though imperfectly. It is notnecessary, moreover, that God produces all thingsequally similar to Himself, nay according to agradation [secundum gradum]. And for that reason, forthis, that the grades be perfect, it is necessary that oneposit something near God, and that this (belongs) to(those) most similar (to Him); and something nearnothing, and that this (is) in some manner similar (toHim9, though not entirely nor perfectly, because,though it has in itself a minimum of the good, yet it hasbeen ordered in an optimum manner.6

3. 4. Quod obiicitur, quod omne quod producitur,producitur per simile in forma, et cognoscitur similiter;dicendum, quod est agens secundum naturam, etsecundum intellectum.7 Agens secundum naturamproducit per formas, quae sunt vere naturae, sicuthomo homine, et asinus asinum; agens per intellectumproducit per formas, quae non sunt aliquid rei, sedideae in mente, sicut artifex producit arcam; et sicproductae sunt res, et hoc modo sunt formae rerumaeternae, quia sunt Deus. Et si sic posuit Plato,commendandus est, et sic imponit ei Augustinus.8 Siautem ultra processit, ut imponit ei Aristoteles, absquedubio erravit, et ratio sua, quae praedicta est, omninonihil cogit. Nam sicut ostendit Philosophus,9 formaererum extra Deum a singularibus separatae nihil

3. 4. What is objected, that everything which isproduced, is produced through (something) similar inform, and is cognized similarly; it must be said, thatthere is an agent according to nature, and according tointellect.7 An agent according to nature producesthrough forms, which are truly of the nature, just as aman (produces) a man, and a donkey a donkey; anagent through intellect produces through forms, whichare not anything of a thing, but ideas in the mind, justas a craftsman produces a chest; and thus have thingsbeen produced, and in this manner there are eternalforms of things, because they are God. And if Platoposited (it) thus, he is to be commended, and thus does(St.) Augustine interpret [imponit] him.8 But if heproceeded further, as Aristotle interprets him, without



omnino faciunt, nec ad operationem, nec adcognitionem.

doubt he erred, and his own reckoning, which isaforesaid, compels entirely nothing (in this regard). For just as the Philosopher says,9 outside of God theforms of things separated from singulars cause entirelynothing, neither regarding operation, nor regardingcognition.

5. Quod ultimo obiicitur de materia: materia . . . 5. What is objected last concerning matter. matter . . .

1 Cap. 3: Hoc igitur visi sunt omnes confiteri, quod [mare]factum est, siquidem et omnis mundus . Textum sequentem exprincipio de Caelo et mundo S. Doctor secundum translationemArabico-latinam iam in libro I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. in fine corp. (pag.58) allegavit, in quo dicitur: Hoc [ternario] numero adhibuimusnosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium,eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata . Cfr. etiam I. deCaelo et mundo, text. 102. seqq. (c. 10.), ubi recitat diversasantiquorum opiniones de origine mundi ostenditque, impossibileesse, ipsum fuisse ortum per generationem, sed esse sempiternum. Sed I. Topic. c. 9. hanc quaestionem: utrum mundus sit aeternusnecne, inter ea recenset problemata, de quibus contrarii suntsyllogismi . . . eo quod de utriusque sunt rationes suasibiles, et dequibus rationem non habemus, cum sint magna, difficile arbitrantesesse propter quid assignare .2 Seu de Plantis, c. 1. in fine (c. 7.): Dixitque Empedocles, quodplantae habent generationem in mundo, diminuto tamen et non suismodis perfecto absolutoque, et quod eo completo animal nongenerabitur; qui sermo aptus non est, quia mundus integer est acsempiternus et animalia generare cessavit nunquam ac plantas etomnis generis species alias. Codd. cum Vat. Abrutalum proAbrucalem, quo nomine ex versione Arabica in hoc libroEmpedocles vocabatur. Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F I Y ZSed non dixerunt, cod. aa Sed dixerunt pro Sed dixerunt, non.3 Gen. 1, 1. Paulo inferius multi codd. habent esse producta proin esse producta, et in fine corp. aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 opposito proopponendo.4 Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 6. ad 2: Ad aliud dicendumsecundum illud Augustini [de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq.]: Illudquod in comparatione perfectorum informe dicitur, si habet aliquidformae, quamvis exiguum [ed. Augus. addit: quamvis inchoatum],nondum est nihil . . . nonnullum ergo bonum est et capacitasformae; et ideo [bonorum omnium auctor], qui praestitit formam,fecit etiam posse formari . Secundum ergo Augustinum diciturnatura [materiae] capacitas formae, secundum quam dicimus, quodmateria est possibilis ad capiendas formas et ipsi materiae est proforma, secundum quam dicimus in materia esse speciem. Et hoc estetiam quod dicit Augustinus [de Natura boni, c. 18.], quod materia habet capacitatem formarum suarum; nam si capere impositamformam ab artifice non posset, nec materies diceretur . Cfr. etiamde Fide et symbolo, c. 2. n. 2; XII. Confess. c. 6. n. 6, et de Gen. adlit. (liber imperf.) c. 15. n. 51. Aliquanto superius Vat. post sedpropter inserit substrationem seu; deinde permulti codd. cum ed. 1ponunt quae est actus pro quae eius est actus; tandem cod. U circafinem solutionis et per se pro et in se, ac est ei forma pro est ei proforma.5 De Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq. et de Natura boni, c. 18, ex

1 Chapter 3: This, therefore, it seems all confessed, that (the sea)has been made, if indeed even all the world . The following textfrom the beginning of On Heaven and the World, the SeraphicDoctor has already cited according the Arabic-Latin translation, inSent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 4 at the end of the body of the Question (on p.58), in which there is said: For we say everything perfect inthrees, and by this number we invite our very selves to magnify theone God, the Creator of all things, eminent in the properties of thosethings which have been created . Cf. Also On Heaven and theWorld, Bk. I, text 102 ff. (ch. 19), where he recites the diverseopinions of the ancients concerning the origin of the world andshows, that it is impossible, that it had arisen through generation,but that it is sempiternal. But in Topics, Bk. I, ch. 9, he cites amongthese problems this question: Whether the world is eternal or not?, concerning which there are contrary syllogisms . . . to this(extent), that concerning each there are persuasive reasons [rationessuasibiles], and concerning which we have no reckoning, since thereare great (arguments), that judge that it is difficult to assign (that) onaccount of which (any one of them is truer) .2 Or On Plants, ch. 1, at the end (ch. 7): And Empedocles said, thatplants have a generation in the world, yet in a diminished mannerand one not perfected and absolute according to their standards ofmeasures, because the entire world is also sempiternal and it hasnever ceased to generate animals and plants and the other species ofevery genus. The codices, together with the Vatican editionhave Abrutalem for Abrucalem, by which name Empedocles isknown in the Arabic version of this book. Somewhat above this,several codices, such as F I Y and Z, have But they did not say, thatit was [Sed non dixerunt], and codex z But they said, that it was[Sed dixerunt] for But they said, that it was not [Sed dixerunt, non].3 Gen. 1:1. A little below this many codices have have beenproduced [esse producta] for produced in being [in esse producta],and at the end of the body of the Question in an opposite manner [inopposito] for in the opposing (side) [in opponendo].4 Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 18, m. 6, in reply to n. 2: Tothe other it must be said, according to that (saying) of (St.)Augustine (On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 f.): That which issaid (to be) unformed in comparison to perfect (beings), if it hasanything of form, even though it requires (it) (in the edition of St.Augustines works there is added: even though (it is) inchoate), it isstill nothing . . therefore there is some good and a capacity for form;and for that reason (the Author of all goods), who proffers the form,made also (its) being able to be formed . Therefore, according to(St.) Augustine the nature (of matter) is said (to be) a capacity forform, according to which we say, that matter is able [possibilis] tograsp forms and (this) belongs to matter itself in virtue of form,according to which we say that in matter there is a species. And thisis also what (St.) Augustine says (On the Nature of the Good, ch.



quibus locis iam in nota praecedente aliqua retulimus. Paulosuperius plures codd. cum edd. 1, 3 tenebra pro tenebrosa.6 Cfr. August., XII. Confess. c. 7. n. 7. seq. 7 Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seq. (VI. c. 7.). Pauloinferius plures codd. agens secundum intellectum pro agens perintellectum; deinde aliqui codd. verbis transpositis non quae sunt proquae non sunt, et cod. F aliquid in re pro aliquid rei.8 Libr. 83. Qq. q. 46. n. 2, et VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 28. Cfr. I. Sent. d.35.9 Libr. I. Metaph. text. 32. seqq. (c. 9.), VII. text. 28. et 51. seqq.(VI. c. 8. et 14.) et XIII. c. 3. (XII. c. 5.). Mox cod. I. formaererum quamdiu sint pro formae rerum extra Deum.

18), that matter has a capacity for its own forms; for if it were notable to grasp the form imposed by a craftsman, neither would it besaid (to be) material [materies] . Cf. also On Faith and theCreed, ch. 2, n. 2; Confessions., Bk. XII, ch. 6, n. 6, and On aLiteral Exposition of Genesis, the unfinished Book, ch. 15, n. 51. Somewhat above this the Vatican edition after but for the sake of[sed propter] inserts the under-paving or [substrationem seu]; thenvery many codices, together with edition 1, have which is (its) act[quae est actus] for which is its act [quae eius est actus]; finallycodex U, near the end of the solution, has and through itself [et perse] for and in itself [et in se], and is its own form [est ei forma] foris its own in virtue of form [est ei pro forma].5 On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 ff. and On the Nature of theGood, ch. 18, from which passages where have already, in thepreceding note, cites some (things). A little above this, severalcodices, together with editions 1 and 3, have shadows [tenebra] forshadowy [tenebrosa].6 Cf. (St.) Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 7, n. 7 f..7 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 22 f. (Bk. VI, ch. 7). A little below this several codices read an agent according tointellect [agens secundum intellectum] for an agent through intellect[agens per intellectum]; then some codices, having transposed thewords, have not (those) which are [non quae sunt] for which are not[quae non sunt], and codex F has anything in a thing [aliquid in re]for anything of the thing [aliquid rei].8 In the book Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, n. 2, and On theCity of God, Bk. VII, ch. 28. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35.9 Metaphysics., Bk. I, text 32 ff. (ch. 9), Bk. VII, texts 28 and 52 ff.(Bk. VI, chs. 8 and 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 3 (Bk. XII. ch. 5.). Next codex I has the forms of things, so long as they are, [formaererum quamdiu sint] for outside of God the forms of things [formaererum extra Deum].

p. 18

non potest fieri, quia1 vel ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo;dicendum, quod ex nihilo, et hoc per creationem. Quod obiicitur, quod actio est in quid;2 dicendum,quod creare non est agere, sed facere, et hoc refertinter agere et facere; nam agere in quid, non quid agatexigit; facere autem e converso.

cannot be made, because1 either (it is made) out ofsomething, and/or out of nothing; it must be said, that(it is made) out of nothing, and this through (an act of)creation. What is objected, that there is an actionupon something;2 it must be said, that to create is notto act, but to make (is), and it refers (to anoperation) between acting and making; for to act uponsomething, does not require something to act; but tomake on the other hand [e converso] (does).

6. Quod ulterius quaeritur, in quo sit creatio-passio;dupliciter respondetur. Quidam dicunt, quod non estsubstantia nec accidens, sed via ad utrumque; et talepraecedit illud, ad quod est naturaliter, quamvis in eohabeat esse. Aliter dicunt alii, quod aliquid crearinon est aliud quam nunc primo esse; nec creatio dicitnaturam aliquam mediam inter Deum et creaturam, sed

6. What is further asked, In what is the creation-passion?; is responded to in a twofold manner. Certain (authors) say, that it is not a substance nor anaccident, but a way to each; and such precedes that, towhich it is naturally, though it has (its) being in it. Others say otherwise, that that something becreated is not other than to be now for the first



solum dicit esse rei, connotando ordinem ad primumefficiens a quo, et ad non-esse, ita tamen quod ordo illetotaliter est in re creata, et non in nihilo.3 Unde cumdicitur, ex nihilo aliquid fieri, potest intelligi tripliciter: aut materialiter, ut ex ferro cultellus; aut causaliter, utex patre filius; aut ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies. Primis duobus modis verum est, ex nihilo nihil fieri;tertio vero modo verum est secundum naturam, sedfalsum supra naturam. Per virtutem enim infinitam,quae non indiget fulcimento materiae, ita faciliterpotest aliquid produci ex nihilo, sicut de aliquo;alioquin non esset virtus primi principii infinita, sedegeret materiae fundamento; et ideo illi virtuti soli hocattribuendum est necessario, quamvis non possitconsimile reperiri in aliquo creato. Hoc enim est eiusproprium, sicut et ipsa omnipotentia.4

(time); nor does creation mean some naturalmedium between God and the creature, but it onlymeans the to be of the thing, by connoting (its) orderto the First Efficient (Cause) from which (it comes tobe), and (its order) to non-being [non-esse], yet thusthat that order is entirely in the created thing, and not innothing.3 Whence when it is said, that something ismade out of nothing, it can be understood in athreefold manner: either materially, as a knife (comesto be) out of iron, or causally, as a son (comes to be)out of a father; or ordinally, as noon comes to be out ofmorning. In the first two manners it is true, thatnothing is made out of nothing; but in the third mannerit is true according to nature, but false above nature. For through infinite virtue, which does not need thesupport [fulcimento] of matter, something can be aseasily produced out of nothing, as from something;otherwise it would not be the Infinite Virtue of theFirst Principle, but would be in want of a fundament ofmatter; and for that reason to that Virtue alone thismust necessarily be attributed, though the completelysimilar cannot be found in any created (being). Forthis is proper to It, just as omnipotence itself.4

SCHOLION. SCHOLIUM

I. In hac quaestione supponitur, mundum siveaggregationem omnium rerum finitarum aliquomodoproductum esse ab aliqua causa; et pro hacsuppositione in principio quaestionis tanguntur quatuorrationes, quas in quadam quaestione disputata ineditadiffuse exponit S. Doctoris discipulus et succesor inministerio generali Ordinis et cardinalitia dignitate,Matth. ab Aquasparta (cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q.1. m. 1. in princ.). Quaeritur autem de modoproductionis mundi. Triplex autem concipi potestmodus productionis: vel ex natura producentis, ut ingeneratione; vel ex natura aliena rei iam existentis, utartifex novas formas accidentales rebuspraeexistentibus inducit; vel tertio, quando tota reisubstantia, nihil extra producentem supponendo,producitur, qui modus productionis proprie est creatio. Deum hoc tertio modo mundum produxisse hicprobatur, et confutantur quatuor errores antiquorumphilosophorum, qui hic in corp. recensentur et diffusiusinfra dub. 2. (ubi dicitur etiam multiplex explicatioverborum, Gen. 1, 1.: In principio etc.). De eisdemerroribus multum disputat B. Albert., hic a. 3. seqq. etS. Thom., de Potent. q. 3. a. 5. Pro intelligentiasententiae Aristotelis observandum est, aliud ipse esseprincipia praeexistentia, aliud principia non producta. Negabant quidem Peripatetici, principia mundi, licetsint aeterna, fuisse praeexistentia, cum etiam productio

I. In this Question it is supposed, that the world or theaggregation of all finite things has been produced insome manner by some cause; and in favor of thissupposition, at the beginning of the Question, there aretouched upon four reasons, which are expounded in acertain, unpublished Question by (Friar) Matthew ofAquasparta, the disciple and successor of SeraphicDoctor, in the Minister Generalship of the Order and inthe dignity of the Cardinalate (cf. also Alexander ofHales, Summa., p. II, q. 1, m. 1, at the beginning). Moreover there is the question concerning the mannerof the production of the world. However, the mannerof (its) production can be conceived in a threefoldmanner: either out of the nature of the One producing,as in generation; and/or out of another nature of a thingalready existing, as a craftsman induces new accidentalforms upon pre-existing things; and/or third, when thewhole substance of a thing, by supposing nothingoutside of the one producing, is produced, whichmanner of production is properly a creation. Here it isproven that God produced the world in this thirdmanner, and there are confuted the four errors of theancient philosophers, which are cited here in the bodyof the Question and more diffusely below, in Doubt 2(where there is even given a manifold explication ofthe words of Genesis 1:1: In the beginning etc.). Onthe same errors Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here



mundi secundum eos sit aeque aeterna. Utrum autemAristoteles docuerit, ista principia fuisse ab aeterno,quin sint producta, an ea esse ab aeterno a Deoproducta, secundum S. Bonaventuram est dubium.

in a. 3 ff., and St. Thomas, de Potentia, q. 3, a. 5,dispute at length. For an understanding of the sentenceof Aristotle it must be observed, that it is one thing thatprinciples are pre-existing, another that principles (are)not produced. Indeed the Peripatetics deny, that theprinciples of the world, though they are eternal, hadbeen pre-existent, since even the production of theworld, according to them, is equally eternal. Moreover, whether Aristotle taught, that theseprinciples, which were not produced, were frometernity, or whether that these were produced by Godfrom eternity, is doubtful according to St. Bonaventure.

II. In hac quaestione (fundam. 6. et ad 1.) et alibipassim termini actus et potentia usurpantur in sensuPeripateticis et Scholasticis familiari, sed valde diversoa significatione vulgari et in philosophia recentiorerecepta; quae diversa significatio facile confundarepoterit non versatos in philosophia scholastica. Iuvatigitur haec notare:

II. In this Question (fundament 6, and in reply to n. 1)and elsewhere passim, the terms actus (act) andpotentia (power in the active sense, or potency inthe passive sense) are used in the sense familiar toPeripatetics and Scholastics, but in a very diversemanner from the popular signification and (that)received in recent philosophy; which diversesignification could easily confound (those) not versedin Scholastic Philosophy. Therefore, it will help tonote these (points):

1. In rerum phaenomenis distinguimus mutationessecundum agere et pati; principium autem proximumactionis, communiter vocamus potentiam activam(activitatem), passionis autem proximum principiumdicimus potentiam passivam: illa active producitactum ut suum effectum, haec autem ab alio agentepassionem in se recipit. In hoc sensu actio (actus) etpassio cum suis principiis proximis (potentia activa etpassiva) non spectant ad ordinem rerum substantialem,sed accidentalem, nec faciunt compositionemessentialem, sed accidentalem.

1. Among the phenomena of thins we distinguishchanges according to acting [agere] and suffering[pati]; but the proximate principle of an action, wecommonly call the active power [potentiam activam](or activity), but the proximate principle of a passionwe call the passive power (or potency): the formeractively produces the act as its effect, but the latterreceives from another agent the passion in itself. Inthis sense the action (or actus) et passion together withtheir proximate principels (the active and passivepowers) do not pertain to the substantial order ofthings, but the accidental one, nor do they cause anessential composition, but an accidental one.

2. Duce Aristotele Scholastici terminos actus etpotentia secundum analogiam transferebant ad ordinemsubstantialem et essentialem, et quidem dupliciter,scilicet in sensu metaphysico et physico. In utroquesensu mutatur significatio utriusque termini, ita ut tuncactus non importet operationem, sed in ordine essendiintrinsecum principium actuale; potentia nonactivitatem, sed principium passivum, quod suscipit abactu suam actuationem. In sensu metaphysico duocommuniter distinguuntur actus, scil. substantia etexistentia, ad quos ipsa essentia comparatur utpotentia, quae passive recipit illos actus. In specie deexistentia dicit S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 53.): Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantiascreatas sicut actus earum; ex quo relinquitur, quod inqualibet substantia creata sit compositio actus et

2. Following Aristotle, the Scholastics transferred theterms actus and potentia according to analogy to thesubstantial and essential order, and indeed in a twofoldmanner, namely, in the metaphysical and physicalsense. In each sense the signification of each term ischanged, thus that actus no longer conveys anoperation, but the intrinsic actual principle in the orderof being; potentia not an activity, but a passiveprinciple, which takes up from act its own actuation. In the metaphysical sense two acts [actus] arecommonly distinguished, namely substance andexistence, to which the essence itself is compared as apotency, which passively receives those acts. In thespecies of existence St. Thomas (Summa contraGentiles, Bk. II, ch. 53) says: Therefore to be isitself compared to all created substances just as their



potentiae . In sensu autem physico isti terminitransferuntur ad duo principia sive elementasubstantialia, scil. materiam et formam, ex quarumunione substantiali resultat unum compositum, unasubstantia completa (cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.Scholion.). Unde in composito humano ipsa animarationalis, quae secundum decretum ConciliiViennensis est forma corporis humani per se etessentialiter , vocabatur actus corporis organici, iuxtadefinitionem Aristotelis communiter receptam: Anima est actus primus corporis physici, organici,potentia vitam habentis . Manifestum autem est, quodanima non est actus, quem elicit corpus, sed e contra- /-rio . . .

act; from which it results, that in any created substancethere is a composition of act and potency . But inthe physical sense these terms are transferred to twoprinciples or substantial elements, namely, to matterand form, out of the substantial union of which thereresults one composite, one complete substance (cf.below d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium). Whereforein the human composite the rational soul itself, whichaccording to the Decree of the Council of Vienne is,per se and essentially, the form of the human body , iscalled the act of the organic body, in accord with thedefinition of Aristotle commonly received: The soulis the first act of the physical, organic body, having thepower of life . Moreover it is manifest, that the soulis not the act, which the body elicits, but on thecontrary . . .

1 Codd. I. cc cum ed. 1 nisi; cod. aa bis nec pro vel.2 Cod. cc et ed. 1: Quod obiicitur de actione, quod requirit in quidagat. Paulo inferius sola Vat. et in hoc differunt pro et hoc refertinter. Solutio huius obiectionis fundatur in definitionibusverborum agere et facere, prout a Gilberto Porretano in libro de Sexprincipiis, c. de Actione dantur: Dico autem actionem non quid,sed in quid agat exigere . . . Facere vero id, quod quale est ex segignit . Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 2. seqq. hanc differentiam inter agereet facere assignat, quod agere fiat actione pertinente ad voluntatemvel electionem, facere autem sit operari super alienam velextrinsecam materiam. Unde etiam artem definit habitum cumratione vera effectivum, prudentiam vero habitum cum ratione veraactivum circa ea quae bona et mala homini sunt. Cfr. etiam hic lit.Magistri, c. 1.3 Plura de hoc vide infra a. 3. q. 2, et de his quae sequuntur, cfr.Anselm., Monol. c. 8. Paulo anterius plures codd. cum ed. 1,perperam verbis transpositis, et non ad esse pro et ad non-esse. Mox cod. aa post ut ex ferro adiicit fit. Aliquanto inferius nonnullicodd. ut H Z cc et ed. 1 ponunt fundamento pro fulcimento.4 Quod omnipotentia sit Dei proprium probat S. Doctor fusius libr.III. Sent. d. 14. a. 3. q. 3. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 43.

1 Codices I and cc, together with edition 1, have unless [nisi];codex aa has neither . . . nor [nec . . nec] for either . . . and/or [vel .. . vel].2 Codex cc and edition 1 read: What is objected concerning action,that it requires (something) upon which it acts [Quod obiicitur deactione, quod requirit in quid agat]. A little below this the Vaticanedition alone has and in this there differ [et in hoc differunt] for andthis refers (to an operation) between [et hoc refert inter]. Thesolution of this objection is founded in the definition of the verbs toact and to make, insofar as they are given by Gilbert of Porretainin (his) book On Six Principles, in the ch. on Action: Moreover, Isay that action (is) not something, but requires (something) uponwhich it acts . . . However, to make begets that, which is such, outof itself . Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 2 ff, assigns this differencebetween acting and making, that acting comes to be by an actionpertaining to the will and/or to choice [electionem], but making is anoperating upon the (matter) of another and/or (upon) extrinsicmatter. Wherefore he also defines art as a habit effective with atrue reckoning, but prudence as a habit active with a truereckoning concerning those which are good and evil for a man. Cf.also here the text of Master (Peter) ch. 1.3 See more on this below in a. 3, q. 2, and concerning those whichfollow, cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologion, ch. 8. A little before this,several codices, together with edition 1, faultily having transposedthe words, read and not to being [et non ad esse] for and to non-being [et ad non-esse]. Next codex aa reads as a knife comes to beout of iron [ut ex ferro fit cultellus]. Somewhat below this not a fewcodices, such as H Z and cc, and edition 1, put the fundament[fundamento] for the support [fulcimento].4 That omnipotence is proper to God, the Seraphic Doctor proves atlength in Sent, Bk. III, d. 14, a. 3. q. 3. Cf. also Sent., Bk. I, d. 43.

p. 19

contra- / -rio, quem anima habet in corpus , utdicitur infra p. II. a. 1.* q. 2, a. 3. q. 2. fundam. 4.

, (is the act) which the soul has upon the body , as issaid below in p. II, a. 1,* q. 2; a. 3, q. 2, in the 4th



Illam definitionem inter multos explicat sociusAlexandri Hal. Ioan. a Rupella. Ord. Min., in suo librode Anima, p. I. c. 5. (ed. P. Theophilo Domenichelli,Prato 1882, pag. 110). Et generatim omnis formasubstantialis vocatur actus primus, et materia potentia,non quidem activa, sed passiva, quae actuatur a formasubstantiali. De isto duplici sensu vocabulorumactus et potentiae in ordine substantiali ita loquitur S.Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 54.): In substantiis autemcompositis ex materia et forma est duplex compositioactus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae,quae componitur ex materia et forma; secunda vero exipsa substantia iam composita et esse, quae etiampotest dici ex eo quod est et esse, vel ex eo quod est etquo est . Quod magis explicatur ab eodem, de Spirit.Creaturis, a. 1. in corp. Cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.

argument of the fundament. Among many others, theassociate of Alexander of Hales, (Friar) John ofRepella, O. F. M., explains that definition in his bookde Anima, p. I, ch. 5 (ed. P. Theophilo Domenichelli,Prato 1882, p. 110). And in general every substantialform is called the actus primus (first act), and matterthe potentia, not indeed active (that is not as thepower), but passive (as the potency), which isactuated [actuatur] by a substantial form. Onthis twofold sense of the words actus and potentia inthe substantial order St. Thomas speaks thus (Summacontra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 54): Moreover insubstances composed out of matter and form there is atwofold composition of actus and potentia: the firstindeed of the substance itself, which is composed outof matter and form; but the second out of the substanceitself already composed and (its) to be [esse], whichcan also be said to be (composed) out of that which itis [quod est] and that it is [esse], and/or out of thatwhich it is [quod est] and whereby it is [quo est] . Which is explained more by the same in de Spirit.Creaturis., a. 1, in the body. Cf. below d. 3, p. I, a. 1,q. 1.

3. Communiter etiam recepta erat distinctio inter actumprimum et secundum: ille est in ordine substantiali utpars constitutiva essentiae; sed actus secundus est inordine accidentali et est actio sive operatio. In hocsensu dicit S. Bonaven. (I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1. ad 5.): Alio modo dicitur vivere, secundum quod est actusprimus et est ab essentia animae ut in ratione formae,non in ratione agentis etc. (cfr. II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a.1. q. 3. ad 4; d. 26. q. 3. ad 4.). Scotus (in IX. Metaph.c. 1. n. 27.) dicit: Prima divisio est, quod actusquidam est primus, qui est forma rei; quidam secundus,qui est operatio ; S. Thom. (de Potent. q. 1. a. 1.): Actus autem est duplex, scilicet primus, qui est forma,et secundus, qui est operatio . . . unde et similiterduplex est potentia: una activa, cui respondet actus,qui est operatio, et huic primo nomen potentia videturfuisse attributum; alia est passiva, cui respondet actusprimus, qui est forma, ad quam simliter videtursecundario nomen potentia devolutum . Notandum autem est, quod non raro actus primus inalio sensu usurpatur; accipitur enim non in ordinesubstantiali, sed pro potentia activa, vel habitu respectuactus secundi, qui est ipsa actio.

3. There was also commonly received a distinctionbetween the first and second act (of a thing): theformer is in the substantial order as a constitutive partof the essence; but the second act is in the accidentalorder and is an action or operation. In this sense St.Bonaventure says (Sent, Bk. I, d. 43, q. 1, in reply to n.5): In another manner to live is said, according towhich it is a first act, and it is from the essence of thesoul as in the reckoning of a form, no in the reckoningof an agent etc. (cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3in reply to n. 4; d. 26, q. 3, in reply to n. 4). (Bl. JohnDuns) Scotus (commenting on Aristotles Metaphysics,Bk. IX, ch. 1, n. 27) says: The first division is, that acertain act is first, which is the form of the thing; acertain one second, which is (its) operation ; St.Thomas (de Potentia, q. 1, a. 1) says: Moreoveract is twofold, namely the first (act of a being),which is (its) form, and the second (act of the being),which is (its) operation . . . wherefore there is also atwofold potential: the one active (the power), towhich there responds the act, which is an operation,and to this the name potential seems to have been firstattributed; the other is passive (the potency), towhich there responds the first act, which is the form, towhich there similarly seems (to have) devolved thename potentia in the secondary (sense) . Moreover it must be noted, that not rarely the firstact is used in another sense; for it is accepted not inthe substantial order, but for an active power, and/orhabit in respect of the second act, which is itself an



action.

4. Denique alia omnino diversa distinctio potentiae estin potentiam obiectivam et subiectivam: illa respicitordinem idealem et non est nisi intrinseca reipossibilitas; sed subiectiva dicit in ordine reali subiectum potentiae (cfr. Scot., IV. Metaph. c. 3. n.64.).

4. Finally there is another entirely diverse distinction ofpotentia into objective and subjective potentia: theformer respects the ideal order and is not but theintrinsic possibility of the thing; but the subjective(potentia) means, in the real order, the subject of thepotentia (cf. Scotus, In Metaphysica., Bk. IV, ch. 3, n.64).

III. Argumentum 3. in fundam. nititur illo principio,quod Scot. (de Rerum princip. q. 7. a. 2. n. 28.) itaexprimit: Sicut forma est principium actionis, sicmateria passionis ; vel verbis negativis (ibid. infra): Sicut in essentia materiae non fundatur potentia activa,sic nec in essentia formae potentia passiva (cfr. infrad. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. praesertim ad 2.). Hocargumentum magis explicatur a S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2,et de Potent. q. 3. a. 1. De verbis Augustini insolut. ad 1, quod capacitas formae sit materiae proforma, cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. et ad 1. 2, etd. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3. Quoad solut. ad 5. decreatione passiva cfr. hic a. 3. q. 1. 2. Quod autemverba ex nihilo non accipienda sint nec materialiter neccausaliter, sed ordinaliter, dicit etiam S. Thom., S. I. q.45. a. 1. ad 3. et Scot., Report. hic q. 3. n. 2.

III. The 3rd argument of the fundament is supportedupon this principle, that (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Onthe First Principle of Things., q. 7, a. 2, n. 28)expresses thus: Just as form is the principle ofaction, so matter of passion ; and/or in negative terms(ibid., below): Just as in the essence of matter thereis not founded an active power, so neither in theessence of form a passive power (cf. below d. 7, p. II,a. 2, q. 1, chiefly in reply to n. 2). This argument isexplained more by St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, and inde Potentia, q. 3, a. 1. Concerning the words of(St.) Augustine in the solution to n. 1, that the capacityof form belongs to matter in virtue of form, cf. belowd. 12, a. 1, q. 1, in the body of the Question, and inreply to nn. 1 and 2, and in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3. In regard to the solution to n. 5, concerning thepassive creation, cf. here a. 3, qq. 1 and 2. Moreover, that the words out of nothing [ex nihilo]are not to be accepted either materially or causally, butordinally, St. Thomas also says, Summa, I, q. 45, a. 1,in reply to n. 3, and (Bl.) Scotus, Reportatio, here in q.3, n. 2.

IV. De tota quaestione: Breviloq. p. II. c. 1. Alex.Hal., S. p. II. q. 6. m. 1, et m. 2. a. 1. Scot., hic q.2; Report. hic q. 3; de Rerum princip. q. 5. S.Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2, S. I. q. 45. a. 1. 2; de Potent. q. 3.a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 15. 16. B. Albert., S. p. II. tr.1. q. 1. 2; q. 4. m. 1. a. 1. partic. 1. 3.; m. 2. a. 1. Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2, et q. 2. a . 1. Aegid.R., hic p. I. q. 2. a. 1-4. Henr. Gand., S. a. 2. q. 23. Durand., hic q. 1. Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. 3.

IV. On the entire question: Breviloquium., p. II, ch. 1. Alexander of Hales., Summa., p. II, q. 6, m. 1, andm. 2, a. 1. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 2;Reportatio., here in q. 3; de Rerum principio., q. 5. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2, Summa. , I, q. 45, aa. 1and 2; de Potentia., q. 3, a. 1; Summa contra Gentiles.,II, chs. 1

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