Bombardment of Valparaiso Speech of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Together With the...

8/3/2019 Bombardment of Valparaiso Speech of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs Together With the Diplomatic Circular

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BOMBARDMENT OF VALPARAISO.

S P E E C HIt,''

OF THE

IMBISI I H I i f 1 1F O R E I G N A F F A I R S ;

TOG-ETHER WITH THE

D I P L O M A T I C C I R C U L A R S ,KEP0KT OF THE SPANISH AMORAL,

&c. &c. &c.

E E P E R E E D T O T H

LONDON: ;FEINTED BY J. H. SCHRDER, 45, ST. JtABY AXE, I.C.

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SPEECHDELIVERED BY HIS EXCELLENCY

T H E M I N I S T E R F O B F O R E I G N A F F A I R SIN THE C H AM B E R OF DEPUT I ES ,

On the 22ndMay, 1866.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (M. BERMUDEZ DE CASTRO): M essieurs the Deputies. The questions that have beenput this evening by Senor Salazar y M azarred o, in accorda ncewith the notice previously given by him, are three ; andagreeably to the promise I then made that I would reply tothem this day, I will now proce ed to do so as clearly andbriefly as I possibly can.

The first of the questions relates to the language used byMr. Layard, Under Secretary of State, before the BritishParliament, on the subject of the bombardm ent of Valparaiso.Th at gentleman stated, in the House of Commons, that theSpanish Government, taking as a pretext and endeavouringto find anexcuse in the delay of Chile toreply in a definitivemanner to the proposals of friendly- intervention wh ich hadbeen submitted to her, had desired to break off thenegotiations ; but that France and England had opposedthemselves, had protested against such conduct, and had con-

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2tinued negot iating , in spite of the resistance of the SpanishGovernment.

Th e second enqu iry is to the effect that when news hadbeen received of the projected bom bardment of Valparaiso,the British Minister at this Court had held a conferencewith m e, with the obje ct of ascertaining whether this werereally the fa c t ; that he was furnished with instructionsto remonstrate energetically with m e sh ould it be foun dcorrect; and that I had replied to his enquiries in anevasive and equivocal manner; that the conduct of theSpanish Government had been neither just or loyal (I do notkno w, gentlem en, how you would translate the word " fair " ) ,and that it had been such as to cause the .Governm ents ofFrance and England to be led into an error or deception.Th e third is, that while M r. La yard recognise d the fullright of the Spanish Government to bombard the city ofVa lpar aiso, we had, notwithstanding, com mitted an act ofbarbarism unworthy of a great and civilised nation.

I shall subsequently refer to the two first assertions ; andwill now commence by saying that a nation which onlyexercises a legitimate and indisputable righ t can never b echarged with committing an act of barbarism unworthy of acivilised cou ntry ; for it should be borne in mind that M r.La yard admitted in Parliamen t that the Spanish Go vernm enthad acted in conform ity with the rules of wa r, and did notoverstep those of international law . H e likewise ack now ledged(and it is of great importance this circum stance should beparticularly recorded) that the apprehensions of a bombardment of Valpara iso were not of recen t or ig in ; that thisquestion had been already und er debate for some tim e, andthat in consequence thereof the British merchants residentat that port had applied to the Chilian Governm ent to pre -


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3pare a place where the merchandise might safely be depositedbeyond the reach of the cannon of our s qu ad ro n; but that,not having been able to come to an agreem ent on accoun t ofmotives of expense, this measure of precaution had not beencarried into effect. It is requisite to take note of this circumstance ; because having once recognised the right to bombard,and this right not having been carried into effect sudd enly,but after long previous no tice, this recogn ition will he reafter prevent the raising of claims wh ich, although fruitlessin their results, as not found ed upon ju st ice , prove none theless vexatious when made the subject of debate betweenfriendly Governments.

A n d now , after having made these statements, I canno tcomp rehend how the epithet of " barbarous " can be appliedto the bom bardm ent of Va lpar aiso. N o one acts barbarously"^who p roceeds strictly within the limits of the law , and 1does not overstrain any of the powers it con fers . Th e bo m - sbardm ent of Valpara iso lias been a subject of reg ret, all the more spa infu l as it regard s a Rep ubl ic aga inst wh ich we entertain n o ">fee ling whatever ^of bitterness or anim osity, how ever serious smayTiaVe^been the causes o f com plaint sh e has given u s ; but ,its being carried into effect could not have been avoided unlessthe -Governm ent had consented to sacrifice entirely thedignity and honour of the nation, and relinquished at thesame time the important interests which have been entrustedto its car e. Th is a very few word s w ill be sufficient topro ve. I do not intend to enter into the history of the war,or of its orig in, that havin g been already explainedto satiety in the reiterated circula rs wh ich have been issuedby the M inistry of Fo reig n Affairs, demon strating the utteiunreasonableness exhibited by Chile in refusing to make asuitable satisfaction . I shall proceed to speak only of the

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4circumstances which have occurred subsequent to thebreak ing out of hostilities.

A s soon as the news reached Europe that General P ar ejahad declared the city o f V alparaiso and other ports of theRe pu blic of Chile to be in a state of bloc ka de , the Br itish ,Minister presented himself to the Spanish Government inorder to oifer to it, not me diation, as M r. Laya rd haserroneously rep resented , but goo d offices .* Th is only was whatthe Government accepted, for it could never consent toreceive the arbitration or med iation of any one when treatingof questions of honour and dignity.

The reply returned to Sir John Crampton accordingly was,that the British Governm ent m ight submit a definite pro pos ition as to the ma nner in w hich its goo d offices were to beem plo ye d; that Spain looked upon the war as a lamentablemisfortune, as a calamity which she had done nothing toprovoke; and that she ardently longed for peace, for the veryreason that she was entirely free from any sentimen twhatever of bitterness or animosity towards the Re pu blic ofCh ile.f Th is conversation took place towards the end ofN ov em be r; and on the 7th of D ecem ber the Eng lishPlenipotentiary and the Fren ch Am bass ador simultaneouslypresented a mem orandum , wh ich they accomp anied w ithsuch proposals for peace as, in their opinion, would bedeemed acceptable and honourable by the two belligerentcountries. These were as fol lo w s: first, that Ch ile.shou ldaddress a note to the Spanish P lenipotentiary, declaring thatshe had had no intention to offend us ; that she desired tore-adjust her good understanding with us; and that she

* Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 62.t Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 26.


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5would cons ider the treaty of peace and amity wh ich existedwith that Ee pu blic as much in force as if no war had takenplace. Secon dly, that Spain should reply in the same tone ,declaring that she desired to maintain her good understanding with Chile, and that she entertained no designseither of conquest or of exclusive influence of any de scription in those re gi on s; and lastly, that a corresp ond ingmutual salute should be fired, canno n replying to can no n,to be commenced by Chile from her forts.* The Gov ern ment desiring peac e, not consid ering war advisab le, an dwishing to put an end to it by any honourable means,accepted these pr op os als ; and before twenty-four hourshad expired, replied to the Representatives of the twoGovernm ents that it consented to content itself with thosesatisfactions which they them selves had consid ered as co n sistent with the honour due to the two na tion s. It did notinsist upon Chile's saluting the Span ish flag w ith 21continuous gun s, a vessel o f our squadron to reply afte rw ard s;it consented , on the contrary , that the salute shou ld be firedsimultaneously, gun replying to gu n, Chile to co m m en ce ; itrenounced entirely every indemnity for war expenses, whichGeneral Pareja had previously declared should be demandedfrom the moment hostilities were begun ; in a word , it man ifested its consent in toto, and without the slightest discussionor observation, to that wh ich was proposed by the two friendlyand allied nation s, as honourable to both par ties.t Inpursu ance of this agreemen t, new instructions were forthw ithsent to the Comm ander of our fleet in the Pa cific, and carewas even taken that these should be transmitted in triplicate,

* Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book, No. 67.t Vide Sir J. Crampton to Earl Russell , Blue Boo k, N o. 75.


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6in order that it should be rend ered imposs ible ever to accusethe Spanish Governm ent, in case of loss, of not hav ingfaithfully carried out that to which it had bound itself. Onecopy of the instructions was entrusted to the BritishGo vern m ent; another to the hands of the Fren ch G over nment ; and the third was forwa rded direct by the SpanishGov ernm ent. Th e instructions left M adrid on the 14thD ece m ber , in order to be in time to reach the mailsteamer which left Southampton on the 17th of the samemonth.

Notw ithstanding this, gentlem en, the Gov ernm ent, in thecourse of three day s, found itself under the necessity o fadopting certain measures of precaution, sugge sted by thesuspicion that Chile, encoura ged by the cond uct of certainof the Foreign Diplomatic Agents resident in that Republic,would refus e to accept the good offices. 1 had m yselfrem arked the attitude of partiality assum ed by theForeign Diplomatic Corps resident in Santiago, even previousto General Pareja's proclaiming the state of blockade; I hadobserv ed that it was to them proba bly to be attributed thatthe war had not been arrested at its com m en cem en t; I hadnoticed various steps which had been taken by the said R ep re sentatives against the wish of their respective Governments ;and these symptom s inspired me with the apprehen sion thatChile, encou raged by such partial con du ct, and perhapsinterpreting it in an erroneous sense, migh t refuse to acceptthe good offices which the Governm ents of En gland andFrance were about to offer to her.

My apprehensions have, unfortunately, been all confirmed;the proofs of a partial influence have continued daily toaugmen t in we ight. Th e agents of certain Govern m entshad exhibited great sympathy towards the Republic of Chile


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7a sympathy which might be interpreted as a breach of neutrality ; and even although it may be true that in many casesthe British Government, rendering justice to our observations,has gone so far as to remove some of its agents, yet as thismea sure could not be carried into effect until two or th reem onths after the even ts, the effect had been already produce dupon the minds of the Chileans. Consequen tly, under dateof the 20th D ecem ber , I add ressed a com mu nication to theSpanish Ambassador at Paris, and another to our Representative in Lo nd on , in ord er that they m ight ascertain, in aconfidential m anner, what would be the opinion of the twoGovernments in case the Republic of Chile should refuse thegood offices which both Governments were about to offer to it.The answer of the Fr enc h Government was clear and exp licit:it replied that if Chile were to refuse the good offices, theposition of Spain would be exceedingly clear ; she was authorised to employ every description of hostility; which reply didnot, how ever, exclude the right and liberty wh ich Fra ncereserved to herself to form her opinion as to every particularact of the Spanish Governm ent. Th at is to say, F ra nc e,reserving to herself the full liberty of judgment and appreciation as to the acts of the Spanish G overnm ent, consideredthat when on ce the said goo d offices had been rejec ted , Spainwas duly authorized to employ every kind o f hostility.

Th e answer of the British Governm ent was distinct.W itho ut any doubt whatever it was so convinced of thejus tice and moderation of Spain, that its only reply was thatit could not discuss such a question, inasmuch as the veryhypothesis that the Re pu blic of Chile migh t refuse the pr oposals of the two Governm ents was not to be admitted .*

* Vide Sir J. Cram pton to Karl of Clarendon, Blue Boo k, No. 106, and Eaof Clarendon to Sir J. Crampton, Bine Book, No. 113.


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8In the meantime, M essieurs De puties , what I had feared had

come to pas s. Th e Chileans, becoming emboldened , had in fused into the war a characte r of m uch greater severity andharsh ness , which contrasted strongly with the mild terms ofthe blockad e wh ich General P areja had established in V a l paraisoa blockade so extremely benign that it had meritedthe eulogium of all the foreig n residents, and not only ofthe commanders of the vessels belonging to the squadrons offriendly Powers, but of the consular body itself, and thediplomatic corps resident at Santiag o. Th e Chilean Gove rnmen t, responding ungraciouslyrespon ding unw orthilytoour mo deration, b egan by sending out in all directions, as wellto Europ e as to A m eri ca, numerous agents provided withletters of marque to enable them to attack and injureSpanish com m erce. Th e inefficiency of the law in En glan dto prevent similar armaments either animated or aided it inso doin g, and the result is that the Spanish G overnm ent, inspite of its exertion s, had to stand by and w itness thedeparture of various suspicious vessels from British ports.Spanish subjects resident in Chile, instead of receiving be forehand the notice or advice usual amongst civilized nationsto enable them to leave the Rep ub lican territory within astated tim e, were sent into the interior, con veyed to San tiago,subjecte d to vexations and opp ressions, and were even pr ohibited from disposing of their property and goo ds.* A n dhere I reply to Senor Salazar y M azarredo that the G ove rnment cannot abstain from characterising, in the severestterms, the infamous conduct observed by Chile towards

* Vide Mr. Thompson to Earls Russell and Clarendon, Blue Book, Nos. 73,124 , 134, and 188. Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Thom pson, Blue Bo ok , No s. 85,and 86. Senor Covarrubias to Mr . Thom pson, Blue Bo ok , N o. 187. " Live s ofSpanish residents threatened."


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9-Spanish subjects, in return for the consideration shown heretowards all the subjects of the Hispano-American Republics.Th at Gov ernm ent, availing itself of perverse mea ns, flattering evil passions, protecting the revolutionists of Peru, wasenab led, by means of false protestations that the questiontreated of was purely an Am eri can on e, to excite the odiumof those Republics, which proceeded to form alliances inviolation ,of treaties, trampling up on all rig hts, as hasoccurred in the case of Peru, or forgetting bonds of completeamity, such as those wh ich existed w ith tho Re pub lics ofBolivia and Equador.

Bu t this did not suflice. Chile adopted a measure d is honourable and unworthy of a civilized country, viz. thatof purchasing and introducing torpedoes infernal enginesinvented to blow squadrons into the air, and occasion needlessbloodshed and destruction.* W e have proof of this in whathas occurred at various points. Ve sse ls, laden with co m bustible materials and different diabolical contrivances, havebeen blown up before their time in the Island of T o b a g o ; inPanama, and at San Francisco, California; causing a greaterloss of life than would have resulted in three or four navalengagements.

Further, gentlemen, while all this was being done, the" Covadonga" was captured by a Chilean corvette, not in faircom bat, b ut by usurping a foreign and neutral flag, whichallowed her to approach within cannon shot. A corvetteof 16 to 20 guns emp loyed this treacheron s artifice toseize a schooner of only two. A n d he re, in answer to M .Salazar y M azarre do, I declare that such an abuse of theBrit ish flag by the enem y's vessels is an act which I do not

* Vide Rear-Admiral Denman to Secretary of Adm iralty, Blue Bo ok, No. 175.


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10feel called upon to ch arac terise , but which I hold to be apiece of treachery which ought never to be practised byvessels belonging to the military service.*

Up on the capture of the "Co va do ng a," new instructions weregiven to the acting Com mander of the squadron, the deathof General Pa reja having already taken place. In theseinstructions he was told that since Spanish blood had beenshedsince a Spanish vessel had been captured in an almostpiratical m ann er he had no other alternative but to obtaina reparation for our a rm s ; that for this purpose he wasresolutely to search for the Peruvian and Chilean fleet, eithercapture or sink it, and afterwards to negotiate a peace ; thatif it proved absolutely impossible for him to come up withthe ene mies' vessels on account of their withdraw ingfrom the. pursuit of the Spanish squad ron, no remedywould then be left, in view of the infamou s con duc t of Ch ile,but to bombard the ports of the R ep ub lic. The se were theinstructions which the Spanish Government gave to BrigadierSenor Mendez Nunez, who by the same packet received, notonly his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, but that of HerMajesty's Minister Plen ipoten tiary; thus furnishing an evidentproof of the desire which animated the Spanish Gove rnm ent,even amidst so much treachery and so many insults, to makepeace with that Rep ublic. The Brigadier M . M endez N un ez ,in obedience to the orders of the Gov ernm ent, accord inglysought for the Chilo-Peruvian squadron, and for that purposesent out the expedition with the particulars of w hichMessieurs the Dep uties are already acquainted, since itresulted in the combat of A bt ao . Th e enem ies' vessels had

* Vide M r. Thompson to Earl Russell , Blue Bo ok , N o. 109 . " She showedsignals of distress."


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1 1taken refuge in places into which our ships could not pene trate on account of their greater draft of water, and wherethey were protected by two land batteries; here, notwithstand ing, one frigate was de st ro ye d; the boilers ofanother were blown u p ; and our ships did all thedamage that was possible. Th e two Spanish frigatesremained waiting several hour3 for the enemy, outside theinaccessible retreat in which he had taken refuge, provokinghim to an engag em ent. Th ose same Chileans and P er uvians who now vaunt themselves so valiant, and who havedepicted the combat of Abtao as a great triumph gainedby them , did not then dare to com e out w ith their sevenor eight vessels to fight with two. A n d this fac t is the bestreply that can be m ade to the Chileans, who pa int as a greatvictory that impu nity wh ich their vessels had obtained frombeing concealed amongst cliffs and roc ks , where our shipscould not close with them . Th e S panish ships waited for themtwelve or fourteen h o u rs ; they fired guns repeatedly to letthem know they were there; yet, Messieurs the Deputies, nota single vessel ventured to com e out.

Bu t this expedition did not suffice. A few days afterwa rdsBrigadier M. Nunez proceeded there with the " Numancia "and " Blanca " ; but our gallant enemies had not only buriedthemselves in those localities where the water is excee dinglyshallow, but had sunk a vessel in order more completelyto prevent our entrance into that chann el. Messieurs theDe put ies, what was the com man der to do when he thusproved the futility of all his efforts to bring about a regularcombat, and this while not making an abuse of his superiorresou rces ; by no means,-he first sent two frigate s, andafterwards two oth ers, and never em ployed all the forces athis com m and. W ha t was he to do ? I ask, when he found


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12that the enem y's only warlike manoeuvre was ignomin iouslytaking to flight to place himself under shelter from ourguns \

It was then, gentlemen, that the bom bardm ent of Valpara isowas decided upon . The manner in which the chief of thesquadron has behaved on that occ as ion ; the tact displayedby him in the negotiations which took place with the Englishand Am erica n Comm odore and Minister ; and the scrupulousrespect which was paid to private property; are shown inthe published despatches. A ll the Deputies may see inthem the noble and gallant conduct observed by the BrigadierMendez Nunez.

The Am erican Commodore and General Kilp atrick,Minister for the United States, at once held a conferencewith him . They submitted to him various propositions ofpeace ; and M. Mendez Nunez, who held orders to proceed toenergetic measures of hostility, desirous notwithstandingfor p eace, and becoming the faithful interpreter of theintentions of the G overnm ent, exercised that latitude wh ich,as customary when sending instructions to so great adistan ce, had been left him by the Governmen t, and repliedthat he took upon him self the respon sibility of listeningto the terms proposed for coming to an agreem ent. A n dwhat were these proposals, gentlemen \ Precisely the sameas those which had form ed the basis of the good offices ofFr an ce and En glan d ; the identical ones which had b eencharacterise d as highly honourable for both countries bythe English and Fre nch Governm ents. Th e sole additionalindispensable co ndition stipulated by M . Nu nez wa s, thereturn of the schoone r " Covadong a " in excha nge for thetwelve or fourteen or more prizes which w ere then in thehands of the Spanish squadron.


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13The conduct of the Chilean Government was the same as

it always had been. Th e reply was a nega tive. Th ey would n otaccept these conditions ; but said that if the Spanish Admiralwould withdraw all his ships, leaving one only in the ro ad stead of Va lpar aiso , and present his credentials to thePresident of the Re pu blic, they would not object to the re opening of neg otiations. Such was the reply of the samehaughty Republic which is not ashamed to turn her backupon an enemy.

The second proposal made to the Brigadier Mendez Nunezby the Am erica n agents, in pursuance of their constantdesire for conciliation, after the bombardment had beenalready annou nced , was to the effect that, supp osing V a lparaiso su rren de red ; supposing the city undefended ; sup posing it might be considered prostrate at his feet, andthe Brig ad er M endez N un ez would promise to spare it abombardment; then they would not hesitate to give theassurance that the G overnm ent of Chile wou ld accept theconditions which the Spanish Commander had previouslyoffered in vain. M . M endez N un ez , animated with the utmostmoderation, replied, that he assented; but desired that asingle M inister should come from Santiago to confirm theoffer. Th e reply to this was a nega tive. A n d lastly, ge ntlemen, came the disgrace ful challenge in the form of aproposed international duel. Th is was proposed by theChilean Minister of M arine, in a missive which causedAd m iral R od ge rs, who w as to be appointed the ju dg e, todeclare to M . Mendez Nu nez that the dem and m ade wasridiculous ; and Admiral Denman to state, that if any motivewere wanting to justify the bombardm ent of Valp araiso,it was furnishe d by a docum ent wh ich was unworthy of acivilized nation. H ow could the comm ander of the fleet


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1 4accept of an obsolete cartel of defiance which would transportus back into the middle ages, to exhib it ourselves at a t ou rnament with a ju dg e of the combat and a queen of beauty,to decide which was in the right ? And what did this absurddocument propose 1 That the " N um anc ia" should be sent adistance off, and the Spanish fleet reduced to an equal strengthwith that of the Chilean and Peruvian combined.W ha t would the Spanish Government have said, whatwould all Europ e have said, if M. Mn dez N un ez hadaccepted so derisive a challenge'! A n d w hat was the realobject of it \ To gain time , to deceive , to await the arrivalof the " H usca r," the " Inde pen dencia," and some othersteamers wh ich were on their way to Chile ; an d, when theyfou nd themselves superior in num bers to lay down the lawan d, in compliance with the tactics com m on to Chile and theother Republics, ignore all the comprom ises previouslyentered into? A n d after all, if they really wanted to fight,had they not had the opportunity for 12 or 14 hours, tocome out and fight, with the seven or eight vessels theyhad, two of our frigates, the " B la n c a " and " Villa deMadrid V F or what reason did they conceal them selves ?Why did they remain shut up 1 Why did they sink a vesselat the entrance of the strait in order to rend er it imp ossiblefor a single one of our vessels to approach ? I f they reallydesired an engagement, an opportunity had been offeredto them . W hy had they declined if? Ho w was it theyhad rather chosen to cover themselves with ignominy byrefusing it 1 Such co ndu ct only proved they had no otherintention but to gain time, to await until the vessels theyexpected should arrive, and when they found themselves

* Vide Mr. Thompson to Earl Russell , Blue Boole, No. 101.


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15possessed of a numerical superiority then to act as they havealways done before.

I believe, gentlemen, that when the treatment inflictedupon Spanish su bj ec ts ; the piratical warfare carried on ; thetorpedoes ; the ships that were expected; and the injury theyhoped to inflict upon our squadron by distributing explosivemachines at the entrances of Callao and Va lpara iso, aretaken into con sid era tio n; I think that not a doubt canremain in any mind whatever that the bom bardm ent of thislast port was an act, painful inde ed, but rendered necessaryin order to save our h on ou r; and this bombardment wasprov oke d solely and exclusive ly by the pride and obstinacyof the Republic of Chile.

I believe, gentlemen, I have demonstrated this ; and I willnext pass on to the reply which I ough t to make to thewords uttered by the Un der Secretary of State for F ore ignAffairs of Great Britain.

Th e first assertion wa s, that Spain, taking for an excuseand a pretext the delay which Chile had made in acceptingthe friend ly offices which had been tend ered to her, wishedto break off the neg otiation, and that Fr an ce and En glan dhad opposed this, and continued to treat.

Th e first thing I have to say with respect to this is , thatSpain had neither accepted arbitration or m ediation. Spainhad accepted friendly offices; only she was h er own mistress,and retained her freedom of action, if new events arose,without the F ren ch and E nglish Governm ents being in aposition to bind her to anything wh ich she migh t deem u n fitting.* Th e second is , that if the said friend ly offices were

* Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Book , No . 26. Earl Cow leyto Earl of Clarendon, Blue Bo ok , N o. 180 .


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16still spoken of until the last m om ent, it was because Spaindeemed it expedient to show, in a formal m ann er, that Chilehad refused them.

If Spain, at a later period, renounced the said friendlyoffices, it was in consequence of other considerations of whichI shall give an account to the Congress.

But it was highly fitting that it should be made patent thatChile had not accepted those good offices; and in effect,although they had been notified to her at the end of January,the whole of the months of February and March passedwithout her giving anything but evasive replies; alleging thatshe had to act in concert with her new ally the Re pub lic ofPeru, which in reality amounted to nothing more than anegative more or less cleverly disguised ; inasm uch as therehad been ample time during two months to have made severalreturn journeys between Lim a and Valp araiso, and viceversa.*

But yet further : it was of great importance for us to showconvinc ingly that Chile had not accepted the friend ly offices,because it was the intention of the Spanish Government, notwithstanding what had occurred with the " Co vad ong a," ifpeace had been concluded in accordance with the conditionsproposed by France and England, before the receipt byBrigadier Mendez Nunez of the new instructions, to haveapproved of it, out of a jus t deference to the two friendlynations, and in order not to appear undesirous of an accommodation.

* M r. Thompson to Earl Russell , Blue Book , N o. 33. Mr. Thompson to Ea rlClarendon , Blue Bo ok , N os. 147 , 158, and 209 . First official notification offriendly offices to Ch ile, 15th Janu ary. Arr ival of the n ew PeruvianMinister at Santiago, 3rd March. Bom bardme nt of Valparaiso, 31st Ma rch.


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17It was,then,important to show all this, in order that the

responsibility of ulterior events mightfall exclusively uponthatPower which should provoke them by her obstinacy.

Wewithdrew ourselves from the friendly offices for anotherreason, and thiswill afterwards furnish a reply to the second charge made against us by the English Under Secretary ofState. But how can Mr. Layard assert thatwehave with-drawn ourselves,and thatFrance and England have insisted,in spite of our withdrawal, upon continuing to exercise theirmediation 1 How can he say this,gentlemen,except from anincomprehensible failure of memory, when I hold in myhands a document from France which states precisely thecontrary\ A nd although I am aware that it is very tiresomefor Congress to have to listen to the reading of officialdocuments, yet I think notwithstanding this one ought to beread, as it is of thehighest importance.

On the 19th Apri l of the present year,theFrench Ministerfor Foreign Affairs wrote the following verbal no t e :

V B E B NOTE .1 April, 1866.

The Marquis de Lema has handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs thecopy o f a despatch, addressed hy His Excellency M . Bermudez de Castro totheAmbassador o f HerCatholic Majesty in London , in which , after referring t o the good understanding which had been established between the Govern-ments o f France and England, with the view o f bringingabout a conciliation o f the differences which had been raised between Spain and Chile, HerCatholic Majesty's FirstSecretary of State expressed the desireo f his Govern-ment to be made acquainted with the result of thesteps taken by the Frenchand English agents with theCabinet of Santiago.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot better reply to this communicationthan by relating what has passed.

The Imperial Government hastened to transmit to the Consul-General o fFrance at Santiago the memorandum which had been drawn up betweenFrance and England, as soon as the Spanish Government had notified itsadhesion to the said document . A t the same time i t enjoined the Consu l .General o f France to employ his good offices, in concert with his colleague

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18of Eng land, in order that the Chilean Govern men t migh t accept theconclusions.

This situation o f affairs was ver y speedily modified. On the one side H erCatholic Majesty's Ambassador informed the Minister of Fore ign Affairs thatin consequence of the measures of confiscation adopted in Chile againstSpaniards, of the issue of letters o f marque by the Governm ent of the Rep ublic,of the equipment of privateers, and finally of the unexp ected attack madeupon the Spanish schooner " Covadong a " by a Chilean corve tte sailing undercover of a neutral flag, the Spanish Cabinet found itself compelled to consultnoth ing but what her honour d ictated, and to obtain vengean ce for the bloodwhich had been shed.

On the other hand, the Gov ernm ent of Chile, re ndering justice to theintentions which had actuated France and England in the ir interventionbetwe en the belligerents, declared that by effect of the treaty entered intowith Pern a treaty to which the Repub lic o f the Equator and the UnitedStates of Colombia had just declared their adhere nce it was unable to enterinto any arrangement wh atever separately, and that consequen tly it con sidered any discussion of the co nditions formulated in the memorandum to beinoppo rtune . The G overnm ent of Chile further refused, for the same mo tives,to conclude an armistice wh ich, as a last resource, was proposed by Franceand England.

In th is state of affairs no other resou rce was left for the m ediatorial Po we rsbut to suspend their proceedings, and await more favourable circumstances.

As rega rds the Cabinet o f M adrid, it will assuredly ackn owled ge that theEm pero r's Govern men t has done every thing in its pow er in order tobring to a termination the war be tween Spain and Chile ; and tha t if theconciliatory action of France and Eng land has been interrupted, it has beenfrom the effect of circumstances which it was out o f the pow er of bothPowers to modify; and especially in consequence of the resolution announcedby the Cabinet of Ma drid, to ob tain, befor e all, reparation for the new offenceson the part of Chile.

Th is is the most conclusive reply which could be given toM r. L ay ard , to show that Spain had neither withdrawn he rself on account of the motive he imp utes, nor had Fra nce orEn gla nd insisted upon leading her in a direction in wh ichshe no longer desired to proceed.It w as likewise stated by M r. La yard that upon the BritishM inister at this Court presenting him self to me in con sequence of the rumours which had circulated relative to ordershavin g been forward ed to the Comm ander of the fleet to


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19bombard Valp araiso, I had been vague in my exp ress ion s; thatI did not conduct myself with due candour and fairness, andthat I led the Governm ents of F ran ce and En glan d into an erroror misconception, as they did not expect such a measure wouldbe adopted. W ell , the n, as I stated at the com me ncem ent,when the seizure of the " Cov ado nga " took place, new instructions had been issued to proceed with greater severity againstthe Re pu blic o f Chile ; bu t the Spanish G overnm ent, alwaysdesiring to proce ed in h arm ony with nations such as thoseof Fra nce and En glan d, to whom she is united by such agood understandinganxious not to take a single step without their previous kn ow ledg e, as was due after we had ac cepted their good officeshastened to give an account ofthe new aspect affairs had assum ed, and of the cond uct itpropo sed to follow in view of the events w hich hado c c u r r e d *

I have the comm unication here, gentlem en. It is somewhatlength y, and I am afraid it would be deemed tedious by theCong ress if I were to read it entire, however impo rtantits contents really ar e, and however m uch it would serveto throw ligh t upon the question . Re ally, gentlem en, I amalmost afraid to read it entire, it being so long.

[Several Dep uties : L et it be read .]On the 26th of Janu ary instru ctions were sent to the

Comm ander of the squad ron, and on the following day, the27th, this circular was sent to H.M's. Ambassador at Paris,and to the Ministers in London and Washington :

* Sir J. Crampton to Earl of Clarendon, Blue Boo k, N o. 124. Earl ofClarendon to Sir J. Crampton, Blue Book, Nos. 125 and 128.

c 2


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20To the Representatives of H. M. in Paris, London & Washington.

Madrid, 27t?t January, 1866.MOST EXCELLENT S IB , T h e circular of the 7th August last, and the other

papers referring to the Chilean question, which were published in the OfficialGazette, and subsequently submitted to the Cortes, have made your Excel,lency acquainted with the origin of the lamentable conflict which has takenplace with that Republic; and the extreme care with which the Governmentof the Queen has endeavoured, within the limits of the decorum due to itself>to avoid a definitive rupture with the Cabinet of Santiago.

All these efforts, and its constant good will, were unfortunately notsufficient to attain the noble end which it proposed; yet, notwithstanding, when the tenacious resistance of the Chilean Governmenthad rendered necessary the employment of ccercive measures to obtain thereparation which was refused to the voice of reason and justice, the Spanishsquadron confined itself to the establishing of the blockade of some of theChilean ports, observing, in effecting this, the greatest possible lenity andmoderation, with the approbation of H. M.'s Government, which was solicitousto exhibit the moderation of its conduct, divesting all its proceedings towardsthe Republic of Chile of every character of animosity.

This was the state of the question when the Governments of the twofriendly nations to which we are bound by relations of mutual sympathy andreciprocal regard, prompted by the warmest desire to bring about a pacificsetttlement of these differences, made the tender to H. M.'s Governmentof their good offices, in order to bring about so desirable a result. TheSpanish Government was deeply grateful for this pledge of friendship, andaccepted them at once, without hesitating a single instant in so doing. Ithad not to make any sacrifice of passion or resentment, for it entertained noanimosity whatever against Chile; but rather deplored the necessity in whichit saw itself placed, in having to exact by force of arms what it had in vainsought after by the pacific means of diplomacy.

On the other hand, and while this was occurring in Europe, the Government of the Republic, interpreting as a want of energy what was the consequence solely of our ideas of moderation and temperance, continued tofollow an unjustifiable course of proceeding, in notable contrast to our own,and which it would not be too venturesome to ascribe to the stimulus of thatpartiality which the proceedings of the Diplomatic Corps residing at Santiagohave revealed from the commencement.

It may perhaps also be attributed to the influence produced in the mind ofthe Chilean Government by acts such as those of the Commander of the Englishfrigate " Mutine," who received on board his ship, with military honours,the Authority of a blockaded port, while within its waters, and in the verypresence of the blockadcr who had allowed his ship to enter. Emboldened by


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2 1these facts and others o f a not less significant chara cter, or else yield ing to aninexplicable sentiment o f animosity against their forme r metrop olis, t heChilean Government has replied with violence and passion to the generosity andmoderation observed by the Government of Spain.

W hile th e hostilities of our force were very far from assuming a d irectlyaggressive character, the blockade being of the least possible severity, themo st arbitrary measures were ad op ted in Ch ile against unoffending Spanishsubjects, wh o, by their industry and w ealth, had powerfully contribute d tothe prosperity of the Re pub lic, and wh o are now forced to see the fruit oftheir labour ruined and their persons injured and outraged, solely on accountof their nationality.

Age nts were sent to Eur ope and Am erica, provide d w ith letters of marqu e,for the purpose of equipping vessels to hunt down and destroy our commerce,while Spain has desisted from employing similar aggression, although itwas in her pow er and righ t to do s o ; and lastly, a Chilean vessel of war, thecorvette " E sm eralda ," usurping a neutral flag, and having recourse to meansmore suitable for corsairs and pirates than a military marine endued withthe smallest sentiment of honour and self-respect, made an attack upon theSpanish schooner " Co vad on ga," which be ing very inferior both in tonnag eand arm am ent, was cap tured , and her officers and crew made prisone rs,after an engagement as unequal as it was obstinate.

Spanish blood has been the first shed, not in fair fight, but in consequence of an attack of an almost piratical character, attended with circum stances wh ich can not be justified by the laws of hono urable warfa re, andwhich , having nevertheless been approved, applauded, and even gloriedin by the Go vernm ent o f Chile, have brou ght about a new situation of affairs,which does no t adm it of the furth er exercise of those considerations hithe rtoobserved.

The death of General Pareja has left Spain w ithout a Plenipotentiaryinvested with full powers to carry into execution the settlement agreed uponwith France and Eng land when accepting their g ood offices, under circu mstances certainly very different from those at present existing.

Yo ur E xcellency will accordingly endeavour to convince the Gov ernm entto w hich yo u are accredited that while always grateful for the proofs o ffriendship and deference We owe to the said two nations, it has becomeimpossible for us, at the time of conferring new powers upon the Commanderof the squadron, to ignore the situation of affairs which has been createdby the conduct o f the Chilean G ov er nm en t; nor is it possible at presentto effect a peace with out aven ging the blood which has been shed, and theinsult which has been received by our flag.

W e have no t now to treat of offences of a mo re or less serious character,which by their nature wou ld allow o f nego tiation, or be susceptible ofarrangement as to the satisfaction to be received. T he go od offices, which out ofdeference toward s the tw o Govern men ts te nder ing th em , and in orderto furnish a pr oo f of the re ctitud e of her in tention s, had been accepte d by


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2 2Spain, can no long er be entertained , un less a state of affairs similar t o tha twhich existed when the proposals for a settlement were presented by Englandand Fr ance , shall be again esta blishe d; that is to say, no t until t he stainshall have been washed out, and the indisevibable act of aggression com mit tedby the " Esmeralda" corvette duly chastised.

It is in this spirit that the orders which have been this day communicatedto th e chief of the Spanish squad ron have been dic tated , and he has beenespecially enjoined that, ceasing to observe those measures of moderation andlenity which have been used up to the present tim e, refusing to listen anylonger to those generous sentiments which are so little understood, and so il lrequited by the Gov ernment of Chile, and solely bearing in mind the duty ofpreserving the dignity of the Spanish flag at the heigh t it m er its ; he is t oemploy every description of hostility authorized by the law of nations, carryin gout those measures to the utm ost limit allowed by the laws of wa r, and nobsuffering any of those considerations which up to the present time have keptthe Spanish forces from attackin g the Chilean ma ritime fortresses t o be anobstacle hindering the emp loymen t of any description whatever of militaryope ration s; inasmuch as the responsibility of the consequences must fall uponthe Gove rnmen t of the Re pu blic, which by its unjustifiable proceedings hasprovok ed a situation in w hich those indulge nt considerations which we hadwith so much g ood faith hither to observed have no longer room for existence.

In this conjuncture H er Ma jesty's Go vern me nt the wh ole of whose actsrelating to th e conllict arisen in Chile, have been previou sly anno unce dto the Cabinets of friendly Pow ers in proo f of the rectitud e o f the viewsby which it is actuated, is desirous that the Government of the countrywhere you reside should be made fully aware of the particulars I haveexpressed. W ith this end in view , it is Her M ajesty 's wish that you shouldinform the Minister of Fo reig n Affairs of the cou ntry in which you reside ofthe eonteuts of this despatch, taking care that he shall be entirely convincedof the right which exists on the part of Spain to justify her adop tion of a lineof action different from that she has hitherto observed.

The Governm ent of Chile has com mitted the first sanguinary aggr essio n;the first lives sacrificed have been those of Sp ania rds ; th e forces whic h, by asemi-piratical attac k, have driven us to seek for reparation at wh atever cos t,were Ch ilean; those gove rning Pow ers which, by rashly sacrificing the benefits of peace upon the altars of their unbending pride, have rendered a pacificbolution of the conflict impossible, have been likewise Chilean. Th e Que en'sGo vernm ent would therefore fail in the most sacred of its duties were it notto endeavour t o wash entirely aw ay e very stain wh ich could cast a stigmaupon the honour of her arms.

Tow ards this o bjec t it directs its en de avo ur s; b ut it is anxious in the firstplace to make it patent that the respo nsibility of the evils w hic h may arisetherefrom rests exclusively upon the Government of the Republic, which provoke s and compels us to a sanguinary w ar ; and that the Go vernm ent of Spainfaithful and constant to its ever frank and loyal polic y, makes k now n her


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23intentions beforehand, setting forth the causes which justify them , in order toprec lude the possibility of objects unsuitable to the uprightness of hercharacter ever being imputed to her.

Notw ithstandin g all I have above stated, your Exce llency can assure theMinister of Fore ign Affairs of the country to which you are accredited, thatwhen once an equal footin g shall have been re-established b y means of anhonourable and indispensable reprisal, the Govern ment of H er Majesty theQueen will find itself again disposed as before to enter into pacific relationswith the Rep ublic of Chile, should that G overnmen t desire it.

(Signed) M. B E B M U D E Z D E CASTEO.Is it possible to announ ce in a clearer or m ore decisive

manner the intention to have recourse to every class of hostility, and that the bom bardm ent of maritime places wasabout to be ensue %

It will be now necessary for me to read the replyreceived from the Marquis de Molins, Her Majesty'sM inister in L on do n, giving an account of the conversationheld by him with Lord Clarendon, Minister for ForeignA ffa irs , upon the occasion of m aking his Lo rds hip acquaintedwith the above de spatch, upon the 3rd Fe bru ary :

H. M.'s Minister in London to the Minister of State forForeign Affairs.

London, February 3rd, 1866.# * # # #

I will now inform your Excellency that at two o 'clock I called to have aninterview with the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and to communicate to himthe contents referred to in the Royal Order, No. 34.

His E xcellency a ttributed great importance to this comm unication, andappeared to be de eply ail 'ected by its tenor, and (in the course of our int erv iew ,enqu ired] whether it meant to say that supposing the goo d officss should beadopted and a treaty stipulated in consequence, and according to the tenor o fthe same, the said treaty would not obtain its ratification from Spain.

I p rotested that I neither could or ought to enter upon any such hyp othese s;that the scope o f m y comm unication was limited to a ma tter which, ind epend ently of its being imperative on me to submit, appeared to me to beo f a comm on sense chara cter, nam ely, that since the acceptance of the


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2 4friendly offices, fresh and serious e vents had o cc ur re d: such as insults tonatives of Sp ain ; the equipment of privateers ; pro vo catio ns; combats underextraordinary circum stanc es; seizure o f vess els; killed and wounded, andcapture o f p risone rs: that the whole o f these aggressions had come fromthe side of Chile, and that they had con stituted a n ew situation to wh ichanterior solutions wer e no long er applicable. That, nevertheless, our desirefor peace was the same, our gratitude to Prance and England had undergoneno chan ge, and that our favourable disposition to enter into pacific relationswith the Republic continued to exist in the same form.

The noble lord made no change in his argument, not did I in mine; but helame nted th e deplorable results w hich, and with reason, he stated he hadforeseen from the beginning, in which I hastened to coincide; requestinghim to take notic e, notw ithstanding, that the respon sibility rested entirelyupon the Republic, which had never done or accepted anything whatevertowards an accomodation.

(Signed) THE MAEQTTIS OV M O L I N S .

Another new proof that the English Government was fullyacquainted with our determination is furnish ed by the fo llowing despatch addressed to me by the M arquis of M olins ,under date of 23rd Ap ril, from which it appears that L or dClarendon, speaking on the subject of the bom bardm ent ofVa lpara iso, expressed his opinion that that event would notterminate the war, but only envenom it:

London, 23rd April, 1866.# # # # #

Scarcely, in fact, had Lo rd Clarendon expressed to m e his thanks for thefriendly disposition and diligence exhibited by Her Majesty's Governmentin the said affair, wh en, chan ging the conv ersation , he told m e that somebad news had just been comm unicated to him, of which he had had no previousinformation himself, neither did he suppose I was in possession of any, namely:that orders had been given to Mendez Nunez to bombard Valparaiso, andreturn immediately. " Hav e you been told anything abo ut this of late ? " hisLordship enquired.The question having been placed by the Minister on the footing I desired,I re pli ed : " I am no t aware, in effect, wh ethe r such instructions have b eenrecently issued; but I do remember, and we spoke on that very subject in aconference I held with you , that towards the end of January the Chiefof our squadron had been commanded to destroy that of the enemy at anyco st ; and that if the latter should a rtfully w ithdraw itself out of our reach,


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25then he was to bombard any of the enemy 's ports, including that of Valparaiso,endeavouring to inflict the least possible damage upon neutral residents, andgiving them previous notice of host ilities; for ," I added on ray own accoun t," t h e time has now arrived to term inate in one way or the other a question inwh ich we have the righ t on our side, and w herein the enemy only seeks togain time."

Lo rd Clarendon only repl ied to m e : " But that would not terminate thewar, it would only embitter (envenimerait) i t . "

At this mo me nt a porte r en tered to announce the arrival of a large num berof Members of Parliament.The Minister rose, makin g me an ap ol og y; and when standing, observedto me, that his communication concerning friendly offices had been misunderstood at M ad rid ; that Chile had neither accepted or rejected them, b ut hadreferred to Peru.

Bein g aware that it w a3 not his Excellenc y's design to e nter into a discussion upon the subject of m y visit, I did not attem pt to length en it ; andwithou t being able to amplify upo n the tw o points of which he had spokento m e, nor to refer to the matter o f the torped oes, which I was anxious to do ,I politely took my leave.

(Signed) T H E M A B Q U I S D E M O L I N S .

Th e Cong ress has now before it the mann er in wh ich, asfar back as the month of Feb ruary , the change of instru ctions and our intention to have recourse to every measure ofhostility, without regard to any species of consideration, andwithout allowing the obstacles wh ich had hitherto detainedus (wh ich arose from our excessive respect for neutralinterests) to hinder us in future from attacking the enemy'ssea-ports, was annou nced to the British Go vernm ent, and I donot think it can be called ambiguous or doubtful to say thatthe phrase to attack the enem y's sea-ports is equivalent inmeaning to that of attacking them with gu ns. A n d thus,when M r. Cram pton, H . B. M 's. M inister at this Court, cameto ask me whether it was true that a Cabinet c ourier hadbeen despatched by the G overnm ent to Ne w Y or k , bearingorders for the bombardm ent of Valp araiso, I replied thatit was utterly false , for the Gov ernm ent was accustomedto forward its orders by the direct rou te, which was the


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2 6Isthm us of Panam a ; that the statement that such a courierhad gone to Ne w Yo rk was without foundation ; and I addedthat L ord Clarendon was aware what were the instructionsand intentions of the Spanish Government, inasmuch as theyhad been communicated to him by our Minister in London.I had nothing more to say. Fr om when ce, then, does M r.La yard draw the inference that I have been deficient infran kn ess, and that by my equivocal and a mb iguous repliesI had led Fra nce and En gland into an error, after thedespatch which I have just read, and which was communicated by the Spanish Minister to the Secretary for Fo reig nAffairs of Great Britain on the 3rd of Feb ruar y ? Couldanything be clearer ?

I thin k, gentleme n, it is unnecessary for me to say morein order to prove that Mr. Layard has either committeda lamentable mistake or he has not a sufficiently intimateacquaintance with what passes in the Foreign Office.

Th ere is one other p oint, g entlem en, on which I have totouch , and it is the last. Th e Un der Secretary of State ofGreat Britain, at the same moment that he acknow ledgedthat in the bombardment of Valparaiso we had done nothingmore than exercise a right given to us by the laws of w ar,declared that it was an act of the greatest barba rism theseare the actual wo rds an d altogether unw orthy of a greatcivilized nation. I have shown , gentleme n, that it was a ne ces sary act; I have shown and stated what I believe must be theconscientious conviction of every one, that the exercise of aright can never be termed a ba rba ris m ; such a right itselfmigh t be a barbarism . Th e barba rism , if su ch exists, mustconsist in the right which all Europe acknowledges, andwhich she has not yet struck out of her co de , as she hasdone with others. Th at, indeed , would be a barbarism


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2 7which separated itself from the rights of nations and thelaws of warfare, and this is what we have not done.

It is always usu al, gentlem en, for persons who occup y anofficial position to be very sparing in characterizing the actsof friendly Governments ; but now that M r. L ayar d hasbroken through this custom by qualifying in such severeterms those of the Sp anish Go vernm ent, I may ask in m yturn: Is England a power entitled to comment in thisgrave and severe manner upon certain acts which are very farinde ed from resembling others which she herself has com mitted in the course of her relations with other nations 1

It is not my wish to speak either of the bombardment ofCopenh agen or of the capture of our frigates during a timeof full pea ce. A l l this I look upon as appertainingto history gone b y. L et us come to fact s of wh ich we haveall been eye-witnesses, which mu st be present to the mem oriesof even the youngest of the Deputies who sit on these benches.W ha t did Eng land do in that very South Am eri ca, in theyear 1844, with the city of Arica, the second in importance ofP eru , under the pretence of an insult comm itted upon theBritish Consul % Without previous notice, without a declaration of war, she bombarded that defenceless place. What wasdone by her in the Canton river in 185 6, on accoun t of theChinese having taken p ossession of a vessel which withou tany right whatever was ca rrying the British flag % W itho utanything beyond a previous notice of some hourswithout aprevious declaration of warshe bombarded Canton, andlanded the B ritish ma rines, who p roceed ed to set on fire aquarter of the city and the V icer oy's palace. How did En gland act a few years back at Djed da h, a port on the R ed Sea ?A vessel presented herself there dem anding the execution of


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28certain criminals; the Turkish local authority replied that ithad not power to decree life or death , and that it wasawaiting orders from the Grand Sultan to conce de what wasdemanded; yet notwithstanding, Djeddah was bombarded,and without declaration of war.

N ow all these acts, gentlem en, have been ca rried into effectagainst international law, for in neither case had theybeen preceded by a declaration of w ar. Is it ju st that weshou ld be called an uncivilized people , or is it fair to say wecommit acts of barbarity, when, in a war which has beenregularly d eclared and carried on , we mak e use of a rig htwhich is not denied to be ours, and which we exert assparingly as possible %

L et this show you , gentlem en, of what contrad iction andinjustice men are ca pa bl e; and I think the lesson we oug htto derive from it is that we shou ld be only united the m oreclosely together, to cast from us imputations which we do notmerit.

I believe I have rep lied at leng th to the questions o f M .Salazar. A ll that remains for me to do is jus t to say a fewwords, wh ich doubtless M essieurs the D eputies will be gladto hear, relative to our future conduct in America.

W e desire peace ; we are always disposed and decided uponaccepting it in terms suitable to the decorum of the nation ;but, at the same time, if the A m er ica n Re pu blics in alliancewith Chile continue to exh ibit hostility and anim osity wh ichthey have hitherto done, we consider that the honourand d ecorum of the nation dem and that we should stillpursue an energetic policy, and not suffer the injuries whichhave been inflicted upon us to pass with impunity.

A fte r a rectification made by M- Salazar y Ma zarre do,


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2 9Th e M inister of F oreig n A ffairs (Berm udez de Castro) said :

I promise M. Salazar y Mazarredo to hear in mind the observations ma de by him , and I will endea vour to have all thedocuments which interest Spain printed in some foreignlanguage.


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O F F I C I A L D O C U M E N T SR E F E R R E D T O B Y H I S E X C E L L E N C Y .

To Her Majesty's Representatives in Foreign Countries.Ma drid, 2it7i Ma y, 1866.

Alth ou gh Her Ma jesty's Go vernm ent has justified superabundantly andopportu nely the righ t which rests with it in the questions occurrin g w ith t heRe pu blic of Chile and her a llies, and does no t con sider it necessary to givean especial account of the resolutions it may adopt in pursuance of itslegitimate rights; yet, in order to render still more clear the uprightness andgenerosity of its con duc t, it conceives it to be conven ient to show th at ,when not actuated by any motive of impatient rancour, but compelled by thepressing necessity of aven ging the outrage done to the national hon our , ithas had recourse to the extreme measure o f b om barding th e po rt and city o fValparaiso.

A succinct and exact account of the circumstances wh ich have precede d andgiven origin to this determination, will suffice to convince you that thesecircumstances had arrived at such a pitch that no possible terms remained bywhich it could be either suspended or avoided.

Spain, notw ithstanding the tenacious refusal on the part o f Chile to affordher the mod erate satisfaction she demand ed in the shape o f re paration andcompensation, confined her first hostile demonstration to the blockade of theChilean por ts, wh ich was effected in the least rigorous m an ne r; as may beprove d b y the testimony o f various foreign naval and diplom atic officials.N o one can b e ignoran t that our squadron avoided as far as possible everydescription of injury to the interests of n eu tra ls; that it consented to t heentrance into the blockaded ports of the English Company's steamers, havingon board not mere ly the mails, but even the agents of the enem y's Gove rnme nt ; and that this indulgence on our part w as carried to the extre me p oint ,not only of returning some vessels which had been legitimately captured, butlastly, to the restriction of th e original l imits over which the blockade e xtendeditself.


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32W hile hostilities in the Pacific were being thu s reduced , Spain, wa iving

her rights, accepted the friendly offices which were at that junc ture simultaneously proposed to her by France and England; and in consequence thereofconsented to admit a form of conciliation which , in the opinion of those tw oPow ers, was conceived in terms equally honourable and decorous for bot h o fthe contending parties.

In the same man ner, affording a fresh pr oof of her m oderation and go odfaith, she had agreed , in accordance with a suggestion from the Un itedStates, not to exercise, immediately, hostilities of a stronger nature, in orderto afford tim e to the Repr esentative of th e Union to counsel the Go vernment of Santiago in a conciliatory sense.

In this way Spain has from the comm enceme nt furnished p roof of th esincerity of her intentions, which have been exempt from all unjust irritation ;neither the desire to humiliate her adversaries or to occasion needless annoyances having ever entered into her designs, and without her adm itting eventhe bare possibility of a departure from established usages,by causing annoyanceunder any pretence whatever to the natives of the enemy's country residingin the Peninsula, wh o have throu gho ut en joyed, and continue to enjoy at thepresent moment, the corapletest l iberty and security.

This noble and generous behaviour has been responded to by Chile fromthe very commencement with a constant and implacable animosity.

The Government of Chile began by forbidding Spanish subjects to leave theRe pub lic, and, contrary to the custom observed by civilized nations, obligedthem t o take up their abode in the interior, prohibiting at the same time anydisposal o f the large amount of their prop erty and funds, from wh ich causethe ruin of many am ongst them naturally ensued. N ot conte nt with thisunusually rigorous measure, she sent out emissaries in all directions in orderto stimulate the fitting out of cruisers to prey upon our co m m er ce ; purchasedtorpedoes and combustible materials to be employed in the destruction of ourfleet, occasioning th ere by the num erous ex plosions wh ich have caused so manydisasters in To bago , Colon, and San Francisco de Ca lifornia; provok ed us inthe most unqualifiable m anner by the treacherous seizure of the "C ov ad on ga ;"de-naturalized the question by g iving to it an American character which it cou ldnever posse ss; and either by using threats against some o f the weaker Go vernme nts, or by offering her m aterial aid to unpopular ones, succeeded in inducingthree Rep ublics with wh om we were maintaining friendly relations to declarewar against us without any motive whatever, and, to our serious injury, closeagainst us th e ports of the Pa cif ic; and finally, the Gove rnm ent of Santiago,instead o f l istening to the counsels p rom pted by a be nevolent impar tiality, re fused for the space of tw o months to accept the friend ly offices of Fran ce andEn gland , and to admit their proposals, availing itself of dilatory pretences toobviate givin g a categorical reply , and in order to prolo ng the intolerablesituation of affairs.

Each and all o f these separate acts o f hos tility wo uld have afforded jus tground for the imm ediate em ploym ent of violent me asur es; but m ore than


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33"by any other means has th e natu re of th e conflict been seriously cha nge d bythe capture of the "C ov ad on ga ." Afte r an aggression of this description, itbecame absolutely necessary to apply a prom pt remedy t o these provoc ationstmd offensive a cts, wh ich could consist in not hing less than the obta ining acorrespon ding reparation at any price . In this view our Gov ernm ent, as soonas it received intelligence of the event, com mu nicated its instructions to the"Commander of the squadron; and in consequence thereof our naval forces setout in search of the enem y, wit h the intention of bring ing on an open anddecisive eng age m ent. Th e attac k against the squadron of the allied R epu blicswas entrusted to the charge of two frigates on ly ; but the intention w asrend ered fruitless, for our adversaries concea led their vessels in a loc alit y safeand inapproachable to our forces, and from which a second attem pt did notsucceed in drawing them out .

N o other resource now remained bu t to have recourse to a bom bard m ent,as the last and only means of render ing effectual the employm ent of forc iblemeasures. The situation had becom e absolutely insupportab le. A t the end ofsix month s' duration of an ineffectual block ade, it was neither possible, or jus t,or dignified, to continu e indefinitely to preserve a disadvantageou s attitu de, no rto suffer from day to day fresh insults on the part of an enemy who systematical ly evaded an engagem ent. But even when this extremity had arrived,the ch ief of the squadr on, before poin ting his gun s against Valparaiso, stillfaithfully interpreting and even carrying to their utmost limits the conciliator y wishes of the Gove rnm ent, made the offer to Chile, not once bu t on tw ooccasions, of an honourable means of averting the attack, by the acceptance o fthe identical proposals wh ich , under v ery different and m uch less seriouscircumstances, had been made by England and France.

Th e definitive answer given by Chile to this chivalrous offer, was the despatch of a disgraceful challenge, equivalent to a fresh insult, at the ver ym om ent when the threatened blow was imm inent. N ot a single admissiblepretenc e remained therefore for the suspension of the bomb ard m ent; and, beingplaced in the inevitable alternative t o choose betw een an ignominious end urance or the adoption of a measure of chastisement more than sufficientlyjustified , the Comm ander of the squadron w as unable to vacillate for a m om ent, and directed the fire to be opened, yet not with out previously adop ting every due precaution in favour of humanity and the interests of neutrals.

The Chilean Governm ent had, n o doub t, imagined that by disarming theforts upon her coasts, and by evading engagem ents calculated to brin g thepow er o f its arms to the test, noth ing was to hinder its being allow ed toinsult and com mit hostilities against us wit h imp unity , secure under the shelterof its own weakness.

It is very easy to comprehend that should the principle of the inviolabilityof unarmed places be once adm itted, weak and defenceless nations would beenabled, with out any responsibility, to comm it outrages upon others, and layaside the most sacred obligations which justice imposes.

I t results the n, that in whatever way the ma tter be considered, Spain has,D


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34In adopting the determination to bombard Valparaiso, only proceeded underthe obligation of necessity, and at the same time upon the basis of a rightwhich no one assuredly will dispute being fully hers.

With regard to the immediate consequences of the bombardment, Spain isthe first to lament the losses accruing thereon to subjects of friendly nations;but at the same time she is conscious that these are only evils inherent towar, and to which foreigners established in belligerent countries are unavoidably exposed.

The vain efforts she has employed to prevent such injuries are well known,and on the other hand none have had to suffer greater or more direct onesthan the subjects of Spain who are detained in Chile.

I conceive it to be unnecessary, after pointing out the foregoing facts, toinsist upon demonstrating upon which side are reason, legality, generosity,and the greatest sacrifices, and which party is chargeable with obstinacy,rancour, and bad faith; but I must not conclude without the reiteration ofa solemn protest, which, under actual circumstances, will confirm conclusively the loyalty of our views. Spain sincerely deplores the necessity inwhich she has been placed to proceed with all rigom* against the ChileanGovernment; persists in declaring that neither the desire for revenge norhatred inspires her with any animosity whatever against the Republicswhich have become her adversaries, and that she has always been disposedto conclude an honourable peace j but at the same time everts her justright by establishing once for all, that inasmuch as the blind, obstinacyevinced in the conduct of Chile and her allies has prevented the re-establishment of peace, and provoked inevitable measures of coercion j and inasmuchas her pride and tortuous designs, not less than the slight consideration paidby her to friends and enemies, are the true origin of the injuries which havebeen occasioned, ancl have caused the war to become disastrous in its consequences to all, it is upon Chile and her allies exclusively that the blame andthe responsibility of all its consequences must fall.

(Signed) M . BEBMTOEZ DE CASIBO.

To H. M.'s Plenipotentiary in Washington,Commandancy-General of H. Ik's Squadron in the Pacific.

MOST EXCELLENT S IR , I n order that your Excellency may be enabled toform an exact idea of the different events which have occurred within the lastfortnight, I have the honour to communicate a resume of the most recentevents; the pressure of time preventing me furnishing your Excellency, as Icould wish, with a full copy of the despatches I am about to transmit to theMinisters of State and Marine.


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35On the 17th of last month I was invited to dine with Commodore Rodgers,

on board his f lag-ship. Du ring th e dinner the Com modo re expressed to mehis ardent wishes for the termination of our differences with Chile, giving meto understand that if I were invested with full powers he did no t consider itwo uld be diff icu lt; and upon m y answering that such powers had beenconferred upon ine, he told me that he was immediately about toplace himself in com mu nication with his Minister to see whether betweenthem they could succeed in brin ging about a peace. Acco rdin gly, a fewdays afterwards I received a visit from the Com modore, accompanied byGeneral Kilpafcrick; both appeared to be animated by the best feeli ng s; the yinvited me to have an interview with them , which although it was to bedeemed private a nd confidential, m igh t perhaps result in the termination ofthe war.

I assented. Th e Am erican M inister inform ed m e that althou gh the con ference w as to be deem ed stric tly confidential, and in no w ay official, th eRepu blican Min ister for Fore ign Affairs was aware of the step which wasbein g taken , and that he was as much interested in brin ging abou t theobjec t proposed as the Com modore, who had taken the initiative.

Th e Commodore set forth a series of observations in order to dem onstratethe inconveniences which , in his jud gm en t, would result to Spain from theprolongation of the war, insinuating that an unforeseen embarrassment wouldarise should it be proposed to bombar d Valparaiso, and suggested wha tin his opinion m igh t be considered equally honoura ble to bo th belligerents,v i z . : the suspension of hostilities; the presentation of my credentials; afresh examination of the various charges against Chile, with th e previousaffirmation of peace by a recip rocal salute of 21 gun s, in th e follo win gm an ne r: Th e Spanish and Chilean flags having been hoisted on board theflag-ships of the English and American squadrons, would be saluted by the gunsof b o t h ; a Chilean fort and the Spanish squadron to jo in in the same salute,in such a way that amidst the smoke and the noise it would never he know nwho had fired the first shot.

As your Excellen cy may suppose, I at once rejected this arra nge m ent ; atthe same time ackn owled ging the good feeling with which it had been proposed,and stating in the first place that the instructions of my Governmen t wereso positive that wh atever mig ht be the difficulties I should have to ove reom ejI w ou ld either obtain from Chile the satisfaction she owe d us or perish in theattem pt, inasmuch as my Govern men t had ordered me to prefer sinking in thewaters of the Pacific to returning dishonoured to Spain.

Notwithstanding, as I felt animated by the sincerest desire for reconciliation, I venture d to take upon mys elf the immense responsibility ofdemanding no further satisfaction than that set down in the arrangementproposed by France and England and accepted by Spain (with which I presume your Excellency to bo acquainted ); only adding the return of the" Cov ado ng a," with her flag, arms, and crew , in exchange for the prizes and


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36prisoners which I had in my possession. I m ade kno wn at the same timethat if, by eight in the morn ing o f th e 27th, I had not received a replyaccepting the proposed arrangem ent, I would transmit to the Dip lom aticCorps a manifest, fixing a final period for opening fire upon Valparaiso.

Bot h the Minister and the Com modore deemed m y proposals hon ourab le.General Kilpatrick undertook to labour unceasingly with the object of bringingthe Chilean Govern men t to a ccept them , informin g me that, strange to say,his predecessor, Mr. Nelson, had been the pereon wh o had been most op posedto any concession being made to us, in consequence of which u npleasant word shad been exchanged betw een them . On the followin g day he left for Santiago,animated by the best wishes and no few expectations.

On th e 27th , before eight o'clock in the m orn ing , General Kilp atric k, incompany with Com modore Rodge rs, presented themselves on board H erMa jesty's ship in w hich I write, to comm unicate to me the result of th eirproceedings, as they had both spontaneously undertaken to do.

The ir negotiations had been fruitless. Th e Governm ent of Chile protes tingagainst the short delay gra nte d, declared t ha t it was ma terially imp ossibleto call together and consult the accredited Representatives of the alliesin Chile. In consequence of this reply I represented to the Min ister of th eUnited States that, in accordance with the intention I had expressed, I wouldtransmit the manifest to him after the expiration of an hou r. Th e Com mod orethen explained to me, with greater clearness, what was meant by theunforeseen embarrassment to which he had alluded in our former intervie w,stating that he would probab ly be unable to remain a passive spectatorof the destruction of a defenceless town ; that he might perhaps have to opposeit b y force , adding that he tho ugh t the comm ander of the naval forces of G reatBritain would co-operate with him for a similar object ; to which I i m m e diately replied I should feel great regret in coming into collision with personswh o, like himself, exhib ited an interest on beh alf of Spain and her agen ts ;bu t that regret should not preven t me from carrying in to effect the ordersof my Gov ernm ent. H e praised my decision, entreating me that w hatevermight be the consequences of the conflict, I should ever believe in his constantfriendship and esteemwords which were repeated by General Kilpatrick.

One hour afterwards I forwarded m y manifest to the Am erican M inister, inorder, that throu gh h im, it migh t come to the know ledge of the ForeignDip lomat ic body . I enclose a copy of the said document for your Excellency'sinformation.

On the 29th th e Am erican Com mo dore again visited me , accompanied bythe Secretary o f Lega tion, with the ostensible ob ject of handing to me theanswer to the m ani fest; and upon doing so he informed me that he hadentertained the intention to oppose by force the bomb ardme nt of Valparaiso,inasmuch as he had been under the impression that Spain had no righ t toproce ed to such extremity , justice bein g on the side of Chi le; but that he hadsince convince d bimself that ju stice as well as moderation and dignity restedentire ly on the side of Spain ; on which account, he would not only not act


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87in opposition, but would leave the waters of the bay free, from whence it washis purpose to depart at eight o'clock on the morn ing of the 31st.

Upo n my representing how ve ry painful it was to me to find mys elf und er'the necessity of em ploying extreme m easures, he stated that he ba d stillone plan to propose , wh ich was that I should issue a man ifest ann oun cing,that inasmuch as there was nothin g to preven t my bom barding the city, Ipardoned it ; that he believed such an act of generosity on m y part wou ld boappreciated by the Government of Chile, which in its turn would declarethat in return for the magu aminity displayed by Spain it agreed to accedeto her demand.I replied, that notwiths tanding my responsibility wou ld be enormous, stillI accepted the proposal on beha lf o f pe ac e; provide d always a mem ber of theGovernm ent would personally guarantee to m e, in the presence of the R ep re sentative of the United States, that my procedure wou ld be appreciated andreciprocated.

M y acquiescence in the project of the Com modo re ha ving been con veyedon shore, was rudely rejected, and, in exchange, another proposed to me of soridiculous a nature th at it only excited the laughter of the Commanders ofthe naval forces of Eng land and the Un ited Sta tes ; for what it proposed wasan international duel, couched in the most insulting and digraceful terms, tothe effect that inasmuch as I did no t dare ventu re to proce ed to Ch iloe insearch of their ships, they wo uld send out a force to fight with one equal instrength , in the opinion of Com modore Ro dg er s; and that the result of theduel would be the termination of the war, without however stating what thatwas to be . I at once comprehended that so ridiculous a pretension could onlyplace me in a false position , and was solely for the purpose of furnish ingsensational matter to the public prints. M y only answer was to authorizethe American Comm odore, as bearer of the com mun ication, to state in m ynam e that proposals of such a description did no t even merit a reply.I have the satisfaction of kno win g that both the Com modore, as well as'the English Adm iral, approved of my answer. Indeed, the disagreeable im pression produced on th e min d of the Adm iral, when made acquaintedwit h the condu ct of the Governm ent of Chile, induced him to lose hisprudent reserve, and declare to m e " Brigadier, the letter yon have jus treceive d is sufficient in itself t o jus tify the step you are abou t to ad opt .You have acted in the most dignified and proper manner, and your generosityhas been very ill responded to on the part of the Governm ent of this co un try ."

On the 29 th of March Adm iral Denman also came to see m e ; he repr esented to me that he h ad been informe d by the Am erican Com modore of myinterviews with the M inster of the Un ited St at es ; that the rules of war didno t authorize the destru ction of defenceless place s, inhabited almost e xclu sively by foreigners; that it would be impossible for him to stand by passively;that he w ould have to adopt measures, but he did not kn ow what theymig ht be, and. he be gg ed . me not to comm ence my operations before


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38the arrival of the mail from Eur ope. I represented to him that the questionof r ight w as for m y Government t o d ec ide ; but as a military man I wouldobey the orders I had received j and that w hatever m igh t be the attitudeadopted by the naval forces Btationed in th e bay, and however powerful the ym igh t b e, although w ith great pain to myself, I should make no hesitation inthe fulfilment o f my du ty. I have the satisfaction of kno wing that theAdmiral was capable of appreciating m y se ntim en ts; for, pressing m y han d,he assured me as the American Comm odore had already don e I mig htalways rely upon his friendship and esteem.

On the 21st of March the Representatives of Eng land and Prance came onboard my ship. These gentlem en, instead of presenting them selves in thecharacter of friendly and completely neutral adjusters, exhibited on thecontrary the utm ost partiality in favour of C hi le; observing that the bri efperiod granted to the Govern men t wherein to accept m y proposals made itappear as if it were acting under the pressure of fo rc e; besides, that ithad no t had time to pu t itself in harmon y with its allie s; that theythough t a longer period of t ime should be gi ve n; concluding by observingtha t they h ad serious motives for apprehension that the lives of the Spaniardsnow detained in Santiago would be endangered from the mom ent on whichthe bombardment should commence.

I represented to them that six mo nths had now elapsed since the co m mencement of the w a r; and that the Government of C hile , which now com plained of the short space of time, had not occupied itself until thepresent mo men t in presenting any project of arrang eme nt, which led t othe presumption that it did not desire i t ; that the proposals subm ittedby me were those of their own respective Go ver nm en ts; and that fearlest a savage butchery of Spanish subjects m igh t be com mitted should no tdeter me from the fulfilment of m y du ty. Such a massacre, should it everoccu r, wou ld be chastised by a fresh and terrible measure of severity. Th eycoldly took their leave.

On the 30th I received from the same agents a pro ject of arrangem ent, inwhich they suggested the suspension of hostilities, the withdraw al of thesquadron under my command, and the presentation of my credentials; pr ojects entirely inadmissible, as your Excellen cy is aware, and which prove i na very strong manner the little earnestness of the wishes animating theRepresentatives of En gland and Fran ce, to contribu te to an arran gemen t.

Upon the 31st, at eight o'clock a.m., the foreign vessels of war having putto sea, the bay was left free. I fired tw o cannon sh ots w ith ou t ball from t hisship, annou ncing, as was agreed u pon , that one hou r afterwards I should openfire upon the town.

A t a quarter past nine the " B lanca " frigate open ed fire upon the Cu stomHou se depots and a small fort, and she was imm ediately followed by thefrigate " Vil la de Madrid."

A t the same tim e the schooner " Vencedora " directed her fire upon th e


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39Intendencia, and the " Resolucin" frigate upon the Railway Station, all beinggovernment buildings. After two hours' firing the Custom House became amass of flame; the fort had suffered considerable damage, and the Intendencia and the Railway Station were more or less injured. The flamesspread to the town in consequence of a grenade rebounding from theIntendencia and exploding in the interior of a druggist's shop.

The Chilean Government had resolved not to adopt any measures of defence,and consequently issued positive orders that not a shot should be fired.They reckoned that the squadrons of England and the United States wouldforcibly oppose the bombardment; and also believed that our fleet wouldon no account dare to open fire against the town.In consequence of the Chilean Government refusing to accede to the desireof the foreign merchants to withdraw their goods from the Custom House, aclaim has been sent in by them for remuneration for damag

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