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Bolivia’s Maritime Claim: Alternatives to solve a centenary dispute

1. Background information and definition of the problem

Bolivia and Chile fought the War of the Pacific in 1879; the war began after Chile invaded

Antofagasta because Bolivia did not comply with the Boundary Treaty of 18741.

After the War, Bolivia signed the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in 1904, and in its position as

the defeated nation, resigned to its access to the Pacific Ocean.

Since 1910 in many occasions Bolivia has unsuccessfully tried to regain sovereign access to the

sea through different diplomatic efforts. After negotiations failed in 1978, Bolivia severed

diplomatic relations with Chile. Today Chile is the only country in America with which Bolivia

does not have diplomatic relations.2

Bolivia fought different wars through its history; however the only one that left a deep

psychological and political effect on its population is the War of the Pacific. This can be seen by

the following examples:

Bolivian Gas Conflict (Guerra del Gas): In October of 2003 people in Bolivia took to the

streets to protest against a possible decision of the government to export Bolivian gas to the

Mexican and Californian markets via a Chilean port. 67 people died, more than 150 were injured

and the elected president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was expelled out of the country.3

Bolivian gas referendum: In July of 2004 Bolivia held a referendum to decide on its natural gas

resources. Five questions were asked to the population, one of them related to Chile, asking

whether or not a citizen agrees with President Carlos Mesa's policy of using gas as a strategic

resource to achieve a sovereign and viable route of access to the Pacific Ocean. 56% of the 2.7

million Bolivians that participated in the referendum answered with “yes” to this question.4

New Bolivian Constitution: A new Constitution entered into force in February of 2009 enacted

by President Evo Morales. Article 2675 proposed a new element that was not before in the

1 Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico: De Antofagasta hasta Tarapacá (Valparaíso: Sociedad Imprenta y

Litografía Universo, 1911), 121. 2 Presidencia de la Republica de Bolivia, Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano (La Paz: Dirección de

Informaciones de la Presidencia de la Republica de Bolivia y Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 2004), 15. 3 Carlos Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2008), 249.

4 Ibid., 260.

5 Constitución Política del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, (Congreso Nacional, 2008). Capítulo cuarto.

Reivindicación Marítima, 61.

Artículo 267. I. El Estado boliviano declara su derecho irrenunciable e imprescriptible sobre el territorio que le dé

acceso al océano Pacífico y su espacio marítimo.

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Constitution, and it is related to the right of Bolivia to regain sovereign access to the Pacific

Ocean.

Two attitudes are derived from this “tattoo on the soul of Bolivia”6 after the War of the Pacific:

The first is a strong nationalism7, the feeling that the whole nation is identified with the injustice

occurred to Bolivia. Former Bolivian President Carlos Mesa explains this feeling in his book.8

During primary and secondary education and military service children are taught about the loss

of more than 120,000 km2 of territory to Chile. Later on young generations learn from older

generations the following:

a) Chile has transformed Bolivia into a landlocked country, b) it is Chile’s fault the fact that

Bolivia is underdeveloped since Chileans reduced Bolivia’s opportunities of international

commerce, c) Chile is continuously seeking to extract Bolivia’s natural resources. d) Currently

Chile wants to take Bolivia’s water, gas and minerals with little benefit to Bolivians.

The second attitude perceived in the population is that Bolivians grow up with the belief that the

“whole problem of Bolivia becoming a landlocked country is because Bolivia has been a victim

of a long series of deceptions from Chile”9. Montenegro mentions that the fact of “feeling the

victim” of the situation causes the risk that leaders of the country forgot to analyze Bolivian

shortcomings before, during and after the War of the Pacific and do not get prepared for future

negotiations on this matter. Also in his book he says that leaders who negotiate with Chile expect

that Chile solves the problem, and Bolivia does not propose its own alternatives.

A good example of this attitude, is President Morales’ recent statement about the past five years

of negotiations with former President Michelle Bachelet and President Sebastian Piñera; Morales

said “Chile me tendio una trampa” (Chile set a trap for me), explaining to the general public, the

6 “Tatuaje en el alma” is the expression former President Carlos Mesa uses to describe Bolivians deep feelings about

the maritime cause”. See: Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 246. 7 “Nationalism is a celebration or assertion of national identity that commonly finds political expression in the claim

of a right of self-determination and self-government.”. See: Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A.Welch, Understanding

Global Conflict and Cooperation (Boston: Pearson Longman, 2010), 329. 8 “El mar se convirtió en el gran cohesionador espiritual del país, un tema que nadie pone en cuestión y que además

fue el eje de aglutinamiento de la idea fuerza que tenemos y que alimenta el patriotismo”. See: Mesa Gisbert,

Presidencia Sitiada, 246 9 Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas: Bolivia y el Mar (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1987),

190.

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reason why negotiations with Chile were unsuccessful. He also said that he asked President

Piñera to present a written proposal stating how to solve Bolivia’s Maritime Claim.10

Defining the problem for Bolivia:

Despite more than 100 years of diplomatic efforts between Bolivia and Chile, Bolivia is still a

landlocked country and part of the reason that it remains underdeveloped is because its “cualidad

maritima”11

is limited. Therefore Bolivia will claim for a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean

until it gains fully access with no restrictions to the sea.

Factors that affect Bolivia’s reduced “cualidad maritima" are a weak foreign trade and the

dependence of Chile in terms of compliance of agreements such as the free transit through

Chilean territory and administrative decisions for the export and import of goods that utilize the

sea as mean of transportation.

Bolivians’ strong nationalism hinders possible solutions to the problem; this was the case that in

2003 Bolivia preferred not to export gas to North America if it was to be exported through a

Chilean port.

This paper will review the history from 1879 to 1987; the current situation developed since 2002

until today, and will propose policy options to the Director of the recently created Maritime

Claim Commission, Ruben Saavedra Soto12

(former Minister of Defense).

Finally the paper will conclude recommending two options that are considered the most realistic

and could produce the desired outcomes for Bolivia.

10

“En las últimas reuniones que tuve en Brasil, junto con el canciller David Choquehuanca y el ministro de Defensa

(Rubén Saavedra), presionamos (a Chile y sostuvimos que) queremos saber una propuesta formal escrita, que será

una base de negociación. Y el Presidente de Chile me dice: esta reunión es informal. Cuando exigimos ¿dónde está

la propuesta?, ¿por dónde va ser la soberanía? no hay, entonces, ¿qué nos toca?, también apelar a los tribunales

internacionales”, explicó.” See: El Presidente dice que Chile le tendió una trampa, La Razon, March 31st., 2011

http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=127810&EditionId=2484&idp=&ids=&page=12& (accessed April

1st., 2011). 11

Author’s note: For Bolivians “cualidad maritima” means: access to the sea that allow Bolivians to build and use

ports, warehouses and any other needed facility, also the rights of owning marine fleet and having marine military,

using marine natural resources and having Bolivian legislation in the area next to the ocean.” 12

Designan a Rubén Saavedra como titular de la Dirección Estratégica Marítima, Los Tiempos, April 5, 2011

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110405/designan-a-ruben-saavedra-como-titular-de-la-

direccion-estrategica_120243_239737.html (accessed April 6, 2011).

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Part I: History and Current Situation

2. History

The War of the Pacific 1879: Chile invades Antofagasta on February 14 of 1879. Bolivian

President Hilarion Daza announced from his balcony to the citizenry that: “Two Chilean

warships with 800 men have taken over our defenseless ports of Antofagasta and Mejillones”.13

Bolivia defended its Littoral with help from Peru, since these both countries signed a Treaty of

Defensive Alliance in 1873. In the treaty they committed to support each other in case one of

them would be invaded by a third party.

1883: Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancón, Peru temporary cedes the province of

Tarapacá, in which Tacna and Arica were located.

1884: Bolivia and Chile signed the Treaty of Truce. Bolivia looses the department of Littoral.

Chile takes the administration and funds of the Bolivian customs as war payment.14

“Chile defeated Peru and Bolivia, and acquired territories that contained vast deposits of sodium

nitrate, a leading fertilizer. Chile’s export tax on nitrates later accounted for at least one half of

all government revenue”.15

1895: Chile's government commits to transfer Tacna and Arica to Bolivia if Chile would acquire

dominion and sovereignty on those territories and if not Chile commits to transfer the creek of

Vitor or another equivalent, so that Bolivia can satisfy its maritime needs.16

The Bolivian

congress criticized the offer. Because of lack of determination and vision of Bolivian leaders at

that time17

, Bolivia lost this opportunity to avoid the enclosure.

1904: Bolivia’s coast was under Chilean military occupation. By then Bolivia was not able to use

ports, and its customs administration was in Chilean hands. Bolivia accepts to sign the Treaty of

Peace and Friendship with which Bolivia buried its maritime aspirations by recognizing the

absolute and perpetual right of Chile to the territories obtained from Bolivia in the War of the

13

Gonzalo Bulnes, Guerra del Pacifico: De Antofagasta hasta Tarapacá, 165. 14

Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 8. 15

Richard Sicotte et. al., The fiscal impact of the War of the Pacific, Cliometrica, 3 no. 2 (2009): 97. 16

Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas, 36. 17

The opposition did not agree with the offer and made a press campaign against it. See: Walter Montenegro,

Oportunidades Perdidas, 44.

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Pacific. In return, Chile agreed to concede Bolivia free transit to reach the sea, to pay 300,000£

and to build a railroad from Arica to La Paz that would be under Chilean administration.18

1910: Bolivia begins diplomatic efforts to recover sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.

Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs writes to Chilean and Peruvian counterparts a letter in

which he states “Bolivia cannot be isolated from the sea. Now and always will do all the possible

efforts to posses at least a port in the Pacific Ocean, La Paz can offer compensations to Santiago

or Lima in the case any of them would open the issue.”19

1929: Peru and Chile signed a new treaty to solve the temporary cession of territory of the

province of Tarapaca. In this new agreement they decided that Peru recovers Tacna and Chile

stays with Arica. The Treaty signed had a Supplementary Protocol20

, because of which in

different occasions after 1929 Bolivia and Chile could not find reconciliation in the dispute.

Solutions proposed were in areas in Arica, and Peru has not consented to agreements between

Bolivia and Chile that involve Arica. Details of each situation will be presented later on in this

paper. It is worth nothing that although Arica stayed as part of the Chilean territory, Chile does

not possess absolute sovereignty21

in Arica.

1950: The proposal of 1950 was to obtain a strip in Arica and a port for Bolivia in exchange of

water of the Titicaca Lake. Chilean President Videla was interested to use Bolivian water

resources for irrigation of the desert areas of the north of Chile and for power generation. U. S

Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that his government would be willing to provide the

funds needed for building the port, irrigation works, power generation and other economic

projects to promote regional integration. Unfortunately before agreements were accomplished

and made public, the Chilean Press in its magazine “Ercilla” in June of 1950 published an article

describing the negotiations. At that time the public opinion of the involved countries was not yet

ready for the news. In addition, Peru was not yet included in the conversations and after the note

18

Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 9. 19

Ibid. 10. 20

“Article 1: Neither Chile nor Peru could cede to a third state any of the territories over which they were granted

sovereignty in the treaty without the prior agreement of the other signatory.” See in Ronald, Bruce St John, Chile,

Peru and the Treaty of 1929: The final settlement, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (2000), 92. 21

“Sovereignty: Within its borders the state or government has an entitlement to supreme, unqualified, and

exclusive legal authority.” See: Anthony McGrew, “Globalization and Global Politics” in The Globalization of

World Politics: An introduction to international relations, ed. John Bayles and Patricia Owens, (New York: Oxford

University Press 2008), 23.

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in the Chilean magazine, the Peruvian government announced that would not consent to the use

of the Titicaca Lake waters, which are shared by Bolivia and Peru.22

1962 Lauca River: In 1939 Chilean President Pedro Aguirre announces his intentions to use the

waters of the bi-national river to irrigate areas of the Azapa Valley. The Lauca River is a river

that begins in Chile and flows into Bolivian territory. Since 1939 Bolivia has expressed its

opposition to the use of this water source by Chile, because it would mean the deviation of the

waters that could have consequences to Bolivia’s natural habitat. Chile argues that it is not a

deviation of the waters; it is only the use of them from its natural flow. Even without reaching

an agreement Chile built a damp on its side of the river. Bolivia took the case to the Organization

of American States (OAS), which approved a resolution that practically implied a denial to

Bolivia’s allegations.23

This year Bolivia severs diplomatic relations with Chile for the first time.

1974 – 1978: Representatives of both military governments the one of General Augusto Pinochet

(Chile) and the other of General Hugo Banzer (Bolivia) worked together in a series of diplomatic

efforts before the historical meeting of Chara a in 1975, in which Bolivia reassumes diplomatic

relations with Chile. During the meeting both Presidents committed to work together in solving

the Bolivian Maritime Claim. In August of that year Bolivia proposes Chile to obtain sovereign

access to the Pacific Ocean in Arica, in this period of negotiations Peru was informed from the

beginning. Chile requested in exchange of the territories i) an equivalent territory as the one

Bolivia could gain after negotiations including the territory on the sea (which was to be

determined), ii) the authorization to use all the water of the Lauca River and iii) Bolivia’s

commitment to avoid military presence in the assigned territory.

Before both countries could further advance the negotiations, Chile was required to ask for

consent to Peru complying with the Supplementary Protocol of the Treaty of 1929.

Peru answered in favor of ceding territory to Bolivia for building a port in Arica, however added

a new variant to the negotiations, Peru suggested converting Arica into a tri-national territory

with shared sovereignty among the three countries. Chile considered the suggestion inadmissible

and denied the possibility. After Peru’s proposal Chile did not propose any other alternatives to

22

Jorge Escobari Cusicanqui, El Derecho al Mar, (La Paz: Librería Juventud, 1964), 117 – 120. 23

Carlos Bustos, “Dos siglos de Relaciones Chileno – Bolivianas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza Rouxel

and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 210-212.

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Bolivia. For that reason in 1978, President Banzer decided to severe diplomatic relations with

Chile once again and that status has not changed until today.24

1979 The Maritime Claim obtains multilateral relevance: The General Assembly of the

OAS declares: “That it is of continuing hemispheric interest that an equitable solution be found

whereby Bolivia will obtain appropriate sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean”.25

Since that year

Bolivia reports on its Maritime Claim every year to the General Assembly.

1987 Bolivia proposed Chile, to accede to an enclave26

by different alternatives: either through

Arica or between Caleta Camarones and Pisagua, between Tocopilla and Cobija, and between

Caleta Michilla and Mejillones. Chile rejects the Bolivian proposition because would affect its

territorial sovereignty.27

3. Analysis of the current situation

3.1. 2002 – 2003 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada – Guerra del Gas

In 2002 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada from the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)

became Bolivia’s constitutional president for the second time. He won the elections with 22.46%

of the vote and later formed a coalition with Jaime Paz Zamora from Movimiento de la Izquierda

Revolucionaria (MIR), who came in fourth place during the elections with 16.31% of the vote.

The coalition was difficult since it did not have the support of neither Evo Morales, who became

second with 20.94% of the vote nor Mamfred Reyes Villa who became third with 20.91% of the

vote.28

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada began his presidency with a lot of challenges to face such an

economic crisis and the decision to sell Bolivian gas to North America via either a Chilean or a

Peruvian port. The Peruvian port option was $600 million dollars29

more expensive than the

24

Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia:133-146. 25

Organization of American States, Certified Text of the Resolutions, Ninth Regular Session, (La Paz – Bolivia,

October, 1979), AG/RES. 426 (IX-O/79), 55.

http://www.oas.org/dil/general_assembly_resolutions.htm (accessed March 14, 2011). 26

“Enclave is a portion of territory within or surrounded by a larger territory whose inhabitants are culturally or

ethnically distinct.” Defined in: The New Oxford American Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2008), eBook

Location 268695. 27

Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia:146-147. 28

Porcentajes y totales parciales obtenidos por los Partidos Políticos a nivel nacional, Resultados Nacionales (La

Paz: Corte Nacional Electoral, 2002).

http://www.cne.org.bo/proces_electoral/eg2002.aspx (accessed February 12, 2011) 29

Juan Forero, Lingering Feud With Chile Threatens Bolivia's Pipeline Plan, The New York Times, July 8, 2002.

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/08/international/americas/08BOLI.html?scp=1&sq=Lingering%20Feud%20With

%20Chile%20Threatens%20Bolivia%27s%20Pipeline%20Plan&st=cse (accessed April 3, 2011)

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Chilean port option. In any other country with a different history the decision may have been

straightforward, but for Bolivia’s public opinion was not easy to accept to sell Bolivian gas

through Chile. At that time Edward Miller, president and general manager of British Gas Bolivia,

a subsidiary of one of the three companies involved in the project said to the press that “If the

Bolivian government would give us $600 million dollars, we would be happy to consider Peru,

all the risk right now falls to the private sector, and for our money, Peru is not the option.''30

The situation escalated when former President Sanchez de Lozada announced that the Chilean

port option was more viable.31

Gas Conflict (Guerra del Gas)

A series of unattended issues by the government originated the Gas Conflict; some of those were

the severe economic crisis, the lack of trust to President Sanchez de Lozada because of the

measurements he took while privatizing Bolivian national companies in his previous

administration (1993-1997) and the decision about the selection of the port to export Bolivian

gas32

. The last one had to do with the Bolivian resentment towards Chile. The chronology below

was obtained from one of the Bolivian newspapers with the largest circulation “El Diario”. The

chronology details the events of the Gas Conflict and in particular it gives an idea on how Evo

Morales as leader of Moviemiento al Socialismo (MAS) (Movement Towards Socialism) pushes

for the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada and together with leaders of grassroots

organizations he stops the project to export Bolivian gas in 2003.

Gas Conflict Chronology:33

September 17, 2003: Evo Morales, a congress representative and leader of MAS announces the

beginning of the Gas Conflict.

30

Ibid. 31

"Ahora estamos estudiando si lo podemos sacar por Perú o por Chile. Preferimos el Perú, por razones obvias.

Ningún boliviano quiere que salga por Chile, pero el gran problema es que puede ser que tenga que salir por Chile,

para que pueda ser viable económicamente” See Ana María Copa: Goni ve más viable sacar gas por Chile, El Deber,

March 23, 2003.

http://www.eldeber.com.bo/anteriores/20030331/nacional_4.html (accessed March 25, 2001). 32

Luis Maira and Javier Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia: Dos visiones (Santiago:

Taurus 2004), 159. 33

The chronology in this section is based on author’s free translations of publications from the periodicals of

El Diario, (from September 20 to October 17, 2003).

http://www.eldiario.net/hemeroteca/?2003 (accessed April 5, 2011).

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September 20, 2003: “Social-movements” call upon thousands of people to protest against the

Chilean port option. The “social-movements” are conformed of various grassroots organizations

and are led by Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) (Bolivian Workers Union).

October 6, 2003: Principal Bolivian roads are blocked by “social-movements” in protest against

the Chilean port option.

October 8, 2003: Political leader Filemon Escobar of MAS announces that in September of 2003

the government of Bolivia had already requested a loan from the World Bank to finance the

export of Bolivian gas through a Chilean port.

October 10, 2003 16 people are wounded in the localities of Ventilla and Senkata in the city of

El Alto.

The same day the Bolivian Government announces that it would not discuss the gas conflict with

neither Evo Morales nor Jaime Solares (leader of the COB).

October 12, 2003: Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada orders the military control of the city of El Alto.

October 14, 2003: Congressman and leader of the Movimiento al Socialismo, Evo Morales, tells

Radio Cooperativa of Santiago – Chile, that there is a possibility that his country would reach

the civil war because of the repressive measures taken by the government of Gonzalo Sanchez de

Lozada and that his resignation is the only way out of the conflict

October 17, 2003: Sanchez de Lozada leaves the presidency in the hands of the Congress as a

consequence of strong social pressures, which resulted in deaths and wounded people. The Gas

conflict threatened to have unpredictable consequences.

3.2. 2003 – 2005 Carlos Mesa

After Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation, his Vice-president Carlos Mesa assumed the

presidency. Carlos Mesa explains his foreign policy towards Chile in his book “Presidencia

Sitiada”: he decided to stop the expansion of the Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE

22), which in his opinion it was no beneficial to Bolivia, he decided to insist in the case of the

Silala34

waters and he called for a dialogue with President Lagos. The Bolivian maritime cause

was Mesa’s central point of his foreign policy.35

34

Chile and Bolivia currently have a dispute on the bi-national watershed of the Silala. Chile currently utilizes the

waters with no payment to Bolivia because it argues that the Silala is a river, and as per international law the waters

of a river are shared therefore Chile would not have to pay to Bolivia. For Boliva the Silala is a spring and per

international law the owner of the water should be the country in which the spring originates 35

Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 251.

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In his memorials36

President Mesa cites his declaration at the Especial Summit of the Americas

in Monterrey in 2004, during which he had convoked President Lagos and the Chilean

Government to search together with Bolivians for a definitive solution to the sea-coast claim.

The Bolivian Head of State acknowledged that a solution to Bolivian’s Maritime Claim would be

beneficial not only to the two nations but also to the whole region. A demand that had no other

objective than to recover a “quality”, that would allow Bolivia “useful access to the Pacific

Ocean”.

In 2005 the gas protests organized by the “social-movements” resumed. MAS insisted that the

new hydrocarbon law had to increase royalties on transnational petroleum profits from 18 to 50

percent; however Carlos Mesa knew that this was impossible without paying high value fines to

the transnational companies for not complying with contracts37

.

Mesa was pressured to leave with road blocks and hunger strikes, resulting in his resignation in

March and June 2005.

3.3. 2006 – 2011 Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo Government

The “social-movements” leads by Evo Morales were composed of native Bolivians, miners,

union leaders and coca farmers. As per Bolivia’s constitution, a few months after Carlos Mesa’s

resignation elections took place Evo Morales, leader of the Movement Toward Socialism,

became President of Bolivia.

It is worth noting that the role of Evo Morales in both conflicts related to Bolivian gas; one

caused the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and the other caused the

resignation of President Carlos Mesa. Evo Morales gained more popularity leading protesters as

the head of the coordination of the “social-movements” during the gas and other conflicts.

Two days after winning the elections, Evo Morales announced that any negotiation with Chile

would include conversations about the Maritime Claim.38

3.3.1. Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet

President Evo Morales and Michelle Bachelet improved the bilateral relations between Chile and

Bolivia. Together they have initiated a series of conversations to work on topics of common

36

Ibid., 256-257. 37

Jeffery R. Webber, “Carlos Mesa, Evo Morales, and a divided Bolivia (2003-2005)”, Latin American Perspectives

37, no. 3 (2010): 62. (accessed February 28, 2011) doi: 10.1177/0094582X10364033 38

“Si Chile quiere diplomacia, si quiere gas, si quiere energía o quiere comercio, tiene que haber mar para Bolivia.

Estamos dispuestos al diálogo, a buscar soluciones”. See: Futuro gobierno empieza a delinear política exterior, El

Diario, December 21st., 2005.

http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2005/2005_12/nt051221/ (accessed February 15, 2011).

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11

interest. The public believes that this approach was originated because of the leftist ideology of

both. In relation to the Maritime Claim, Bolivian press published recently that Michele Bachelet

was about to concede Bolivia a territory next to the Pacific Ocean with no sovereignty. The press

explained that Bachelet left the final decision to President Piñera, who considered that giving

Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean as Bachelet have thought would have been “too much”.39

Both presidents Morales and Bachelet created “The agenda of the 13 points, without exclusions”

which means “without excluding the Bolivian Maritime Claim from the conversation”. For the

first time after 132 years of the War of the Pacific, Chile agrees to include the Maritime Claim in

the Agenda. The Agenda also included other areas of negotiation. From 2006 to 2010 both

countries had conducted twice a year “Political Consultation Mechanisms” in which they

analyzed and monitored the advancement of each of the 13 points.

The last Political Consultation Mechanism took place in La Paz in July of 2010. The minutes of

the meeting reflect the then positive environment of the two delegations and detail that he Head

of the Delegation of Bolivia highlighted the progress in the last years of constructive dialogue,

reflecting the closer ties between both countries.40

The 13 points both countries worked on included the following items:

1) Mutual Trust Development, 2) Border integration, 3) Free Transit 4) Physical Integration 5)

Economic complementation, 6) Maritime Claim, 7) Silala and other water resources, 8)

Instruments in the fight of poverty 9) Defense and security 10) Cooperation for the control of

illicit drugs, traffickers and essential chemicals 11) Education, science and technology 12)

Culture, 13) Other topics of mutual interest.41

The Bolivian press also informed that Chile and Bolivia had agreed to a territorial exchange after

declarations of Chilean congressman Ivan Moreira to a Bolivian radio42

. However the minutes of

the last Consultation reflected that the possible territorial exchange was not official and little

advancement had been achieved in five years of consultations in regard to Point VI of the

39

Con Evo, 13 puntos y una efímera opción de enclave, Los Tiempos, March 23, 2011.

http://www.lostiempos.com/especiales/edicion/especiales/20110323/con-evo-13-puntos-y-una-efimera-opcion-de-

enclave_118278_235259.html (accessed March 23, 2011). 40

Free Translation from: Acta de la XXII Reunión del Mecanismo de Consultas Políticas Bolivia-Chile (Sala de

Prensa del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Julio 2010)

http://www.minrel.gov.cl/prontus_minrel/site/artic/20100715/pags/20100715165143.php (accessed March 18, 2011) 41

Ibid. 42

Senadores analizan petición de informe a Cancillería sobre tema mar, Erbol February 21, 2011

http://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia.php?identificador=2147483941085 (accessed April 3, 2011).

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

12

Agenda. Concerning this point, the minutes of the last consultation, reflect the encourage of

keeping the dialogue but nothing more concrete than that, as can be understood from the

following translation of the section that refers to Point VI: “Maritime Claim: Both vice

chancellors stressed the importance of the bilateral dialogue as a mechanism of understanding

between governments. Reaffirming that the process reflects a policy of agreement by both

governments and considering the achievement of high levels of mutual trust in the meeting, they

confirmed to preserve this positive climate that encourages bilateral dialogue to address the issue

of Point VI of the Agenda. The dialogue proposed is intended to achieve concrete solutions that

are feasible and useful to this issue in the next and successive meetings of the Political

Consultation Mechanism”.43

3.3.2. 2011 Evo Morales and Sebastián Piñera

Since President Sebastian Piñera enter into power in March of 2010 the pace of the negotiations

had slow down in comparison to the one during Bachelet’s administration. Both Presidents and

their Ministers of Foreign Affairs have conducted meetings to dialogue on issues of common

interest during last year and the beginning of 2011 without positive outcomes for Bolivia in

relation to Point VI of the bilateral agenda. Piñera and Morales administrations established a

High level Bi-national Commission, chaired by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and

Chile, David Choquehuanca and Alfredo Moreno. This Commission is further composed of Vice

Chancellors; however as of today no positive outcome for the Maritime Claim of Bolivia resulted

after the conversations.

Every March 23rd

Bolivians remember the War of the Pacific in a national holiday, this year

President Morales set the 23rd

of March as a deadline of five years of negotiations with Chile. He

asked President Piñera to propose a concrete solution to the Bolivian Maritime Claim. After it

was clear that no proposal from Piñera’s administration would be made, Evo Morales announced

43

Free translation of Point VI of Acta de la XXII Reunión del Mecanismo de Consultas Politicas Bolivia-Chile

“Tema Marítimo. Los vicecancilleres destacaron la importancia del diálogo bilateral como un mecanismo de

entendimiento entre los gobiernos. Reafirmaron que el proceso refleja una política concertada entre ambos gobiernos

y, considerando los altos niveles de confianza mutua alcanzados en la presente reunión, confirmaron preservar este

clima de modo que estimule el diálogo bilateral a fin de abordar la temática del punto VI (...) y proponer así cómo

alcanzar soluciones concretas, factibles y útiles en las próxima y sucesivas reuniones del Mecanismo de Consultas

Políticas”.

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

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in a speech during the “Day of the Sea” holiday, that he would seek international mediation

through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.44

In response to President Morales’ announcement President Piñera said that Bolivia cannot expect

that Chile would continue with the dialogue if Bolivia pretends to seek changes of current

treaties at the International Court of Justice or other International Organizations. For Piñera the

change of the Bolivian diplomatic strategy is inadmissible.45

On April 11 of this year President Evo Morales has invited five former Bolivian Presidents46

to

create and Advisory Council that will support President Morales’ plans to take the Maritime

Claim to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

After Bolivia's decision to attend an international demand, the dialogue was suspended. President

Sebastian Piñera announced that Bolivia could not use two strategies at the same time: the

bilateral dialogue and the international litigation. He stated that Chile would prepare Chile’s

defense in the case Bolivia takes the Maritime Claim to the ICJ.47

3.4. Other initatives and factors

3.4.1. Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE22)

Bolivia and Chile signed an Economic Complementation Agreement (ACE22) in 1993.

The balance of trade between the two countries shows the asymmetry in the trade relations

favorable to Chile48

. Because of that in 2002 both countries intended to improve Bolivia’s deficit

with a free trade zone. But in 2004 Mesa’s administration decided to stop negotiations to expand

the (ACE22) after concluding that the free trade zone would increase the asymmetry against

44

“El anuncio fue efectuado ayer por el presidente del Estado, Evo Morales, quien cambió de discurso diplomático y

ahora abre la posibilidad de que Bolivia haga respetar su reclamo de soberanía sobre tierras usurpadas ante

instancias judiciales internacionales como la Corte de La Haya”. See: Bolivia acudiría al arbitraje para resolver

reivindicación marítima, El Diario, March 24, 2011.

http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2011/2011_03/nt110324/2_01plt.php (accessed March 25, 2011). 45

Declaración del Presidente de la República sobre Bolivia, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, March

24, 2011.

http://www.minrel.gov.cl/prontus_minrel/site/artic/20110324/pags/20110324101224.php (accessed March 26,

2011). 46

Guido Vildoso (1982), Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-93), Jorge Quiroga (2000-01), Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) y

Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (2005) 47

Bolivia sigue "esperando" propuesta de Chile sobre salida soberana al mar , El Mercurio, April 19, 2011.

http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=477024 (accessed, April 20, 2011) 48

“El Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (IBCE) informó que el intercambio comercial con Chile en el 2010

arrojó un récord en exportaciones (83 millones de dólares) pero también el segundo déficit comercial más alto de la

historia para Bolivia (221 millones de dólares). See: Déficit comercial con Chile supero los 1,600 millones de

dólares entre 2000 y 2010, Notas de Prensa de IBCE , (E-259/2011), March 21, 2011.

http://www.ibce.org.bo/noticias/nota_completa.asp?id=305 (accessed March 26, 2011).

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Bolivia. Tensions between Chile and Bolivia worsen after Bolivia’s government decided that

“not even a gas molecule would be sold to Chile”.49

Bolivian President Eduardo Rodriguez, who was a transitory President between Mesa’s and

Morales’ governments, initiated a series of negotiations with Chile and in December of 2005 La

Paz and Santiago extended the (ACE22) for most Bolivian product exempting them of tariffs and

reciprocity requirements.50

In addition to that both countries agreed that Bolivia could yearly

export 6,000 tons of sugar to Chile tariff-free.51

Other areas of work of the (ACE22) include permanent cooperation between ProChile (Export

Promotion Bureau) and Bolivia Promueve (Bolivian Promotion Center), Customs Cooperation

Agreement and other agreements between Bolivian and Chilean entities.52

3.4.2. Interdependence between Bolivian foreign trade and tourism and Northern

Chilean Economy

“Interdependence refers to situations in which actors or events in different parts of the system

affect each other. Interdependence means mutual dependence. The benefits of interdependence

are sometimes expressed as a zero-sum situation, your loss is my gain and vice versa. In a

positive-sum situation, we both gain; in a negative-sum situation we both lose”.53

Bolivia and Chile are interdependent in a positive-sum situation. On one hand Bolivia needs to

export and import goods through the Pacific Ocean, therefore Bolivia needs free transit through

Chilean territory as well as port infrastructure that is given in Chilean Ports, the most used port

by Bolivians is Arica. On the other hand the main costumers in Arica, which has the lowest

average income of all regions in Chile54

, are Bolivian business as well as tourist, thus northern

Chile depends on Bolivian commerce and tourists and Bolivian business depend on northern

Chile’s port infrastructure and free transit. The following numbers illustrate the interdependence:

49

Horst Grebe Lopez, “Las Relaciones entre Bolivia y Chile. Situación y perspectivas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed.

Mario Artaza Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 184. 50

Lorena Oyarzun Serrano, “La agenda regional y sus posibles efectos” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza

Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 312. 51

Enrique Cepi Di Lecco, “Estado de las relaciones económicas y como avanzar en ellas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed.

Mario Artaza Rouxel and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 345. 52

Ibid. 53

Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 246. 54

Ministerio de Planificación de Chile, “Tabla Ingreso promedio de la ocupación principal por sexo según región y

edad (2006)”, Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional, CASEN (2006).

http://www.mideplan.gob.cl/casen/Estadisticas/empleo.html (accessed April 4, 2011).

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

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1. Zona Franca de Iquique (Zofri SA), is a free trade complex in Iquique, where Bolivia is

the first buyer, in 2010 46% of sales of Zofri S.A went to Bolivia.55

2. Port of Arica, Bolivian cargo accounts for 74% of the load circulating in this port.56

3. Tourism

“134.709 Bolivian tourists visited Chilean regions I (Tarapaca) and II (Antofagasta) in

2004. In the same period in 32.353 Chilean tourists visited Bolivia.”57

4. Distances from Arica to main economic areas of Bolivia and Chile:58

Arica - La Paz 487 km

Arica - Santa Cruz 1.102 km

Arica - Santiago 2.075 km

3.4.3. Peru and Ilo port

In 1992 while in office President Jaime Paz Zamora and President Alberto Fujimori signed a

contract in which Peru concedes 5 km of coastline for Bolivia in the Peruvian city of Ilo. Even

after having this option Bolivia has not utilized the territory to expand its use of the Pacific

Ocean. This initiative is called Boliviamar. In Ilo Bolivia could build a port, warehouses, an

industrial and a touristic complex, however this area is not a sovereign territory of Bolivia, the

sovereignty remains of Peru.59

In 2010 President Evo Morales and President Alan Garcia met in Peru to re-launch the

agreement for the use of Ilo and the Boliviamar initiative. After the re-launch Bolivia has

obtained substantial advantages for the handling of import and export cargo through the port.60

Reasons why Bolivia has not taken advantage of Boliviamar are explained by the Peruvian

ambassador in Bolivia Manuel Rodríguez Cuadros and a Chilean newspaper, Estrella de Arica.

The Peruvian ambassador explains that Ilo was not utilized by Bolivia in almost 20 years

55

Zofri S.A. Memoria Anual 2010, 22.

http://www.zofri.cl/images/stories/pdf_pruebas/ZOFRI%20S.A.%20MEMORIA%202010.pdf (accessed March 2,

2011) 56

Empresa Portuaria de Arica, Memoria 2009, 6. “Durante el año 2009, en particular, fuimos el puerto del Pacífico

más importante de todo el comercio exterior para Bolivia. Además, cabe destacar que, del total de carga movilizada

por nuestro Terminal, el 74% corresponde a carga boliviana.”

http://web.puertoarica.cl/archivos/memoria_2009_3.pdf (accessed March 2, 2011). 57

Alberto Zalles, “Bolivia y Chile: Los imperativos de una nueva época”, Nueva Sociedad, 207, no. 34 (2007): 42 58

Ibid. 59

“No quiero tu salida: Bolivia busca caminos alternativos a Ilo para obtener su salida al mar”, Perú Económico

32, no.9 (2009), 5. 60

José Guillermo Tórrez , La cualidad marítima de Ilo, Los Tiempos, April 21, 2011.

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/opiniones/columnistas/20110421/la-cualidad-maritima-de-

ilo_122431_244940.html (accessed April 21, 2011).

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

16

because “The agreement was very general, it only expressed the intentions of the states, but for

the practical application a regulation was required. For example, issues that need to be cleared

are the levels of investment, tax exemptions, how to manage customs and free transit, etc.

Additionally it was not expected that investors had access to the property, making it difficult for

investment.”61

Estrella de Arica estates that the infrastructure of Ilo does not compete with the ports of Arica or

Iquique, it says in the short term is not an option for Bolivian exporters since it needs a multi-

million investment in order to build the required port capacity to satisfy the Bolivian demand, not

only the infrastructure must be built but also the services need to have the same level of quality

as the ones currently provided by Chilean ports.62

In conclusion, for Ilo to be an option for the Bolivian international trade there is a need of high

investments in order to improve the infrastructure of the port. To compete with Arica road

improvements are needed, as well as railways that connect Ilo with the main Bolivian cities.

3.4.4. Bi-oceanic corridor

Despite Bolivia and Chile have a pending issue with the Bolivian Maritime Claim, this issue was

not an impediment to expand regional initiatives that could benefit both states as well as a third

one in the region. The bi-oceanic corridor is a highway of about 5.451 km63

, which will connect

Arica and Iquique in the Pacific coast of Chile with Santos in the Atlantic coast of Brazil

crossing through the Bolivian departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Santa Cruz and the states of

Mato Grosso del Sur and Sao Paulo in Brazil. This project initiated in 2007 was planned to be

finished in 2010, however in 2011 there are still portions of the highway that are under

construction64

.

61

Acuerdo de Ilo expresa una política de Estado, Diario La Primera, October 21, 2010.

http://www.diariolaprimeraperu.com/online/politica/acuerdo-de-ilo-expresa-una-politica-de-estado_72655.html

(accessed April 21, 2011). 62

Las falencias de Ilo que aprovecha el puerto de Arica, Estrella de Arica, December 19, 2010.

http://www.estrellaarica.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/20110109/pags/20110109054648.html (accessed April 2, 2011). 63

Falta construir un 17% del tramo boliviano de corredor, Los Tiempos, September 19, 2010.

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20100919/falta-construir-un-17-del-tramo-boliviano-

de_90292_173658.html, (accessed February 28, 2011). 64

Comisión trinacional trabaja en corredor Bolivia- Brasil- Chile, El Diario, March 19, 2011.

http://www.eldiario.net/noticias/2011/2011_03/nt110319/2_02plt.php (accessed March 22, 2011).

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

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Agreements in terms of transit of goods and people are still under negotiations among the

countries. On March 17 and 18 of 2011 a Technical Working Group65

with members of the three

states met to coordinate the role of the three countries in this international project.

The topics of the meeting were the physical capacity of the corridor, the rules governing transit

and trade benefits for Bolivia in particular, since it is the only landlocked country among the

three. Bolivia needs to use this opportunity to provide goods and services to users of the

highway, as well as to negotiate trade benefits. Otherwise there is a risk that the bi-oceanic

highway turn to be a free transit zone for both Brazil’s and Chile’s freight only.

4. Actors

For more than 100 years Bolivia claims the right to a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean

through Chilean territory. Bolivia and Chile currently do not have diplomatic relations after

Bolivia broke them off for the second time in 1978.

The principal cause of the disagreement is that each side has a position that is very different from

the other and they do not agree on the definition of the dispute. Both positions have more to do

with a strong nationalism than with the practical access to the Pacific Ocean.

4.1. Bolivia

Bolivian position (Strong nationalism):

Chile invaded Bolivia and took away by force 400 km of coastline on the Pacific Ocean66

Lack of access to the Pacific and high tariffs imposed by Chile are one – if not the main –

cause of Bolivia’s lack of economic development.67

To resolve the issue, Chile needs to cede territory to provide Bolivia with sovereign access to

the Pacific Ocean.68

By participating in various negotiations and by offering some sort of access in 1895, 1950

and 1975, Chile recognizes implicitly that Bolivia has a right to access.

Frequent and occasionally violent public protests against Chile.

65

Ibid. 66

ElLibro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 4. 67

“La mediterraneidad de Bolivia originada en el conflicto bélico con Chile tuvo y tiene implicaciones significativas

en el desarrollo económico y social del país.” See: ElLibro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 28. 68

“Bolivia sufrió muchas desmembraciones, pero solo una la del Litoral la privo de un atributo de soberanía, que

únicamente se puede alcanzar con la restitución de ese atributo” See: Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo

Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 162.

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

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Current diplomacy

Bolivia has severed diplomatic relations with Chile since 1978, Bolivia has repeatedly

announced its intention to establish diplomatic relations with Chile, but conditioned to

advancement in the negotiations to its request for sovereign access to the sea69

.

Bolivia has announced to take the Maritime Claim to the International Justice Court. In order to

do that Bolivia has created the Maritime Claim Comission (Dirección de Reivindicación

Marítima) to prepare the cause.70

4.1.1. Government

Governments have used the conflict with Chile to rally domestic support, particularly when

governments came under pressure due to facts unrelated to the issue.

During the first term of President Morales (2006 – 2009) the Maritime Claim was not part of

the main newspaper headlines, this could be because of the improved relations and advanced

negotiations with former Chilean President Michel Bachelet. From 2011 during a severe food

crisis and domestic problems between the government and one of its main allies, the COB,

president Morales decided to take a new approach (take the case to the IJC) apart from

dialogue with Chile.

Typically requests Chile to propose a solution instead of proposing alternatives. In a recent

interview Bolivian vice chancellor Juan Alurralde said that “We are waiting, because the ball

is on the side of Chile, we are waiting for that useful and concrete proposal of Chile, we are

open to that possibility”.71

Bolivian government has not proposed a concrete alternative to

solve the issue currently it is waiting for a Chilean proposal.

4.1.2. General Public and Civil Society

Strong nationalism – not considerations about what is the national interest (see Guerra del

Gas).

69

“La reanudación de las relaciones diplomáticas es un deseo que Bolivia tiene vehemente, y que por supuesto se

concretara en el momento en que se haya resuelto definitivamente el problema de nuestra soberanía”. See: Mesa

Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 257. 70

Demanda marítima contra Chile: Congreso boliviano ratificará tratado para recurrir a La Haya, El Mercurio

March 24, 2011

http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=471979 (accessed March 25,

2011). 71

Bolivia sigue "esperando" propuesta de Chile sobre salida soberana al mar, El Mercurio, April 18, 2011.

http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=471979 (accessed April 22, 2010)

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

19

Bolivians want to regain access to the Pacific Ocean, however as a nation Bolivians have not

yet define what alternative would be sufficient to substitute the lost Litoral72

.

A survey conducted in Bolivian major cities in March 2011 shows that 79% of Bolivians

believe that Chile would not give full access to the sea.73

In recent years Bolivian and Chilean civil society have initiated different exchange activities,

such as academic74

and cultural exchanges.75

“Social-Movements” met in March with President Evo Morales to support his new Maritime

policy to take the issue to international courts in order to resolve the hundred years old

demand.76

4.1.3. Business

Bolivia and Chile do not have diplomatic relations since 1978, however there is an actor that

never stopped bilateral relations, that actor is the “business sector”77

. A good example of this

continuous effort to improve businesses relations between Bolivian and Chilean companies was

the last Business Roundtable that was organized by Promueve Bolivia78

and Pro Chile in 2010

with the result of $1.7 million79

of sales for Bolivian manufactures of home and construction

products. Business relations were not affected by any result on the negotiations between these

two nations and there is no reason to believe that this will change in the future.

72

Walter Montenegro, Oportunidades Perdidas, 191. 73

Pesimismo local sobre soberanía, La Razon, March 23, 2011.

http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=127363&EditionId=2476 (accessed March 25, 2011). 74

Consejo de Rectores por la Integración de la Subregión Centro Oeste de Sudamérica. CRISCOS

Es un organismo subregional; sin fines de lucro; dedicado a la integración y colaboración interuniversitaria, estando

constituido por universidades del noroeste de Argentina, de toda Bolivia, del norte de Chile y sur del Perú.

http://www.campus-oei.org/guiauniv/red005.htm 75

Bolivia y Chile suscriben programa de intercambio cultural, Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile,

November 2010.

http://www.agci.cl/que-es-agci/apuntes-destacados/noticias/bolivia-y-chile-suscriben-programa-de-intercambio-

cultural/ (accessed April 2, 2011). 76

Movimientos sociales respaldan política marítima de Morales y piden elaborar la mejor estrategia, Los Tiempos,

March 28. http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110328/movimientos-sociales-respaldan-

politica-maritima-de-morales-y-piden_119006_236983.html (accessed March 30, 2011). 77

Máximo Quitral Rojas, “Chile y Bolivia: Entre el abrazo de Charaña y sus relaciones económicas, 1975 – 1990”,

Revista Universum Universidad de Talca 25, no. 2: (2010), 150. 78

Promueve Bolivia is an Agency of the Ministry of Productive Development and Plural Economy 79

Rueda de Negocios Bolivia – Chile cierra con más de $US 1,700.000. Noticias del Ministerio de Desarrollo

Productivo y Economía Plural, Agosto 02, 2010.

http://www.produccion.gob.bo/content/rueda-de-negocios-bolivia-chile-cierra-con-m%C3%A1s-de-us-1700000

(accessed March 5, 2011).

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20

4.2. Press

Bolivian Press has contributed to the public opinion about Chile, one of the newspapers with

highest circulation in the country El Diario has a permanent link80

to a page that wants to inform

Bolivians and the international community how unjust is that fact that Bolivia lost its access to

the Pacific Ocean. The page reflects a strong nationalism; it is designed with pictures of Bolivian

Army, poems to the fatherland and it is evident that the page does not provide space for the

Chilean or regional view of the conflict.

4.3. Chile

Chilean position81

The delimitation of the boundaries of Latin American countries does not have to do with the

limitation of the territories occupied by its native people. The Bolivian argument that the

Tiahuanacu civilization had access to the Pacific Ocean is not relevant.

Some Chilean historians deny that the Audiencia of Charcas (former Bolivian territories

during the Spanish colony) had a Littoral, however some other Chilean historians provide

evidence to the contrary.

A few years before the War of the Pacific, most population occupying the area in dispute

were Chileans”.

It is necessary to leave the accusation that in the time of the War of the Pacific Chile was a

warlike country that sought confrontation with the whole coast.

Between Chile and Bolivia there are no pending territorial or boundary issues, only the

aspiration to the sea of one of the sides. The handling of this issue is bilateral exclusive to

Bolivia and Chile.

Current diplomacy

There are two instances in which Chile’s diplomacy periodically talks with Bolivia, one is the

Mechanism of Political Consultations in which vice chancellors and other officials of both

Ministries of Foreign Affairs discuss different issues of common interest, since 2006 those issues

are outlined in the “13 points Agenda”. In January 2011 both Ministers of Foreign Affairs have

decided to create a second instance called a High Level Commission led by both of them since

80

Link to the page “Demanda Maritima Bolivia” http://www.wix.com/libroazul/retorno-al-mar#!quienes-somos 81

Los fundamentos de la Postura Chilena in Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y

Bolivia, 25-38.

Vanya Candia SIS-687 Proseminar: International Affairs II vanya.candia@gmail.com

21

they have acknowledged that the Mechanisms of Political Consultations were not sufficient to

move forward in the conversations.82

4.3.1. Government

“The solution to the problem is not only determined by Chile but also by the fact that Bolivia

is a very instable country, in 120 years it had more 192 different governments. President

Lagos had conversations from 2000 to 2004 with 4 different Bolivian Presidents.

Bolivian crisis in respect to Chile are auto regulated. Normally a strong Bolivian demand of a

solution to the Maritime Claim is placed after internal institutional adjustments. The

resulting governments after these crises have strong citizenry support and take the Maritime

Claim to international encounters. However after little time of negotiations the domestic

problems re-appear as central preoccupation of the government and the Maritime Claim is set

aside. For Chileans this cycle is recurrent and part of the Chilean policy is to let the cycle

flow.”83

According to the former Chilean consul in Bolivia (1979-1980) Carlos Bustos, despite the

good will of Chilean governments they lacked a “State Policy” to solve the issue with

Bolivia. Similar to the case that Bolivia has not identified what it exactly wants as a State,

Chile has not identified how far it can go in terms of concessions.84

4.3.2. Population

The “Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario”85

conducted between June 14 and July 20, 2010

showed that 43% of Chileans believe that Chile should not give Bolivia neither access to the

sea nor benefits to export their products. According to experts the results show that Chileans

see territory as a fundamental part of its identification with the Nation. 35% agree to give

Bolivian economic benefits at the time they use Chilean ports, 13% agree to give Bolivia

sovereign access to the sea and 9% have no preference.86

82

Bolivia y Chile crean comisión y fijan agenda, Los Tiempos, January 11, 2011

http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20110118/bolivia-y-chile-crean-comision-y-fijan-

agenda_109084_214209.html (accessed January 30, 2011). 83

Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 37-38. 84

Carlos Bustos, “Dos siglos de Relaciones Chileno – Bolivianas” in Nuestros Vecinos, ed. Mario Artaza Rouxel

and Paz Millet Garcia (Santiago: RIL 2007), 231. 85

Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile-Adimark, 2009-2010

http://www.uc.cl/sociologia/encuesta_05.html (accessed March 27, 2011) 86

Ibid.

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22

Most recently a survey conducted by El Mercurio on April 9 this year indicates that 64.2% of

Chileans agree to facilitate access to the sea to Bolivia, but without offering sovereignty over

the territory it lost in the war of 1879.87

4.3.3. Arica

In the case Bolivia and Chile would negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean via Arica, the local

government, as well as the people living there would need to be consulted, since any decision

on Arica’s territory will directly affect their lives.

After Bolivia’s proposal of 1987 a National Committee of Sovereignty was organized in

Arica, in a few hours the Committee obtained the participation of 2,000 members who were

for the defense of the national territory and who were disgusted by the possibility that Bolivia

could obtain a strip of territory in northern Arica88

. All of this despite the fact that Bolivian

shipping is already major contributor to economy.

4.3.4. Press

The Chilean press also contributes to Chile’s strong nationalism with arguments such as “there is

no conflict with Bolivia”, “any border issues were solved with the Treaty of Peace and

Friendship in 1904”, “under any circumstances Chile should cede territory”, etc. The following

statements appeared in the Chilean press after Bolivia proposed a solution to the Maritime Claim

in 1987.

“It is not Chile’s duty to satisfy again the Bolivian aspiration. We did it in the past in (1866 and

1874) and the sister republic of Bolivia deceived the naive intentions of the Chilean authorities

of that time that wished to promote Americanism”. (El Mercurio, May 25 1987) 89

“In the issue with Bolivia all Chileans feel that territory cession is unacceptable, this should not

even be asked.” (El Mercurio, May 25 1987)90

4.4. Peru

Since 1873 until today an important factor in this dispute has been Peru. In 1873 Bolivia and

Peru ally to defend their territories in case other nation would invade them. From 1879 to 1883

87

Evo Morales: Encuesta chilena sobre salida al mar de Bolivia es "un avance", El Mercurio, April 9, 2011.

http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=475111 (access April 9, 2011).

Author’s note: There is no information in the article of El Mercurio in regard to the number of people that

participated to the survey or the types of questions. 88

Fernando Hormazabal Diaz, El Libro Blanco de Chile: , (Santiago: Ediciones

Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2005) 365. 89

Fernando Hormazabal Diaz, El Libro Blanco de Chile, 325. 90

Ibid.

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23

both countries fought against Chile in the War of the Pacific. In 1929 Peru recovers Tacna and

cedes Arica to Chile under the condition that if Chile would want to cede former Peruvian

territories to a third nation, Peru may need to be consulted. In 1950 Chile and Bolivia intended to

swap territory with water resources from the Titicaca Lake; however Peru and Bolivia share the

lake and Peru opposed to that alternative. From 1975 to 1976 President Pinochet and President

Banzer tried to solve the Bolivian Maritime cause, Chile offered Bolivia a strip in Arica but

because of the Treaty of 1929, Chile consulted Peru whether they would agree with that option,

Peru answered by proposing to convert Arica into a territory with shared sovereignty among the

three countries, Chile objected and again Bolivia remained landlocked. Finally in 2002 when

Bolivia was about to decide whether to use a Chilean or Peruvian port to export gas to North

America, Peruvian Ambassador in Bolivia Hernan Coutier offered Bolivia to extract gas in a

cooperation between the state-owned petrol company of Bolivia (Yacimientos Petroliferos

Fiscales Bolivianos YPFB) and the Peruvian CAMISEA gas consortium utilizing a Peruvian port

for the exports, although for many experts this option was unviable due to the not yet developed

capacity of CAMISEA, the role of the Peruvian ambassador was to convenience the general

public in Bolivia that a Peruvian port was the best option. He stated in an interview that if Chile

wanted to do a better offer, Chile should offer Bolivia sovereign access to the sea.91

Part II: Policy Proposal

5. Discussion of policy options

For each of the alternatives described below the expected outcomes are going to be projected. 92

Outcomes that interest Bolivians can be grouped as:

1. Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, widely explained in this document.

2. Improve the Bolivian “cualidad matitima”93

3. Improve interdependence; this outcome refers to the liberal and realist view of

interdependence and conflict. “Liberals argue that the natural effects of commerce lead to

91

Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 81-82. 92

See Annex 1 based on: Eugene Bardach’s Outcome Matrix, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, (Washington

DC: CQ Press, 2009), 50. 93

See definition of “cualidad maritima” in note 11

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peace, two nations that trade together become mutually dependent: if one has an interest

in buying, the other has an interest in selling and all unions are based on mutual needs”94

Chile and Bolivia have trade agreements in place nevertheless Bolivia has a high deficit

in the balance of trade with Chile.95

Not only does Bolivia buy much more from Chile

than Chile from Bolivia, but the main products that Bolivia buys from Chile are strategic

products to guarantee stability in the country, which are fuel and medicines.96

In contrast

the main products that Chile buys from Bolivia are not relevant when it comes to

guarantying stability those products are soybean and sunflower cakes.97

Realists oppose the liberal view by saying that “gains from trade often do not accrue to

states proportionate and the distribution of these gains can affect interstate power

relations. If one partner depends on a trading relationship much more heavily than

another partner, the costs associated with attenuating or severing the relationship are

lower for the latter than for the former”98

. This is exactly the case of the trade relationship

between Chile and Bolivia. Consequently it is in Bolivia’s interest to be less dependent

on trade with Chile and to make Chile more dependent on trade with Bolivia. The policy

to be recommended will be the one that has more possibilities to secure this outcome.

5.1. Policy Option 1: Sovereign Access

5.1.1. Swap of territory

i) Chile exchange territories in north Arica: The success of this option will depend on

early negotiations with Peru and on the information provided to the public opinion of the

three countries. Also will depend on how public officials will convince the benefits to the

citizenry in Arica. A professional and well organized marketing campaign is needed.

ii) Chile exchange territories in former Bolivian areas: This is a more realistic option and

does not require the consent of Peru. The risk of this option is in the handling of the

Chilean public opinion since they are reluctant to divide Chilean territory. The proposed

94

Brian M. Pollins and Edward D. Mansfield, “The study of interdependence and conflict: Recent advances, open

questions, and directions for future research”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.6 (2001): 836. 95

Relación Comercial Bolivia – Chile, Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior, March 21, 2011

http://www.ibce.org.bo/ibcecifras/ed12_ibce_cifras_relacion_comercial_Bolivia_Chile.html (accessed March 28,

2011). 96

Ibid. 97

Ibid. 98

Pollins and Mansfield, “The study of interdependence and conflict: Recent advances, open questions, and

directions for future research”, 836.

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Bolivian territory would be located in between two Chilean areas. Similar as in the first

option the success will depend on how effective are Chilean and Bolivian authorities in

communicating to the general public on the benefits of this alternative. Those benefits

could be the regional integration, increased tourism, increased commerce, etc.

The risks on these alternatives for Bolivia are i) the backlash if natural resources should later be

found in the territory Bolivia will offer in exchange. Possible areas to be exchanged border with

Chile and are known for their richness in natural resources, such as water and minerals. ii) High

investments will be needed for Bolivia, the construction of a port, warehouses, rail and road

infrastructure.

Recent polls show that 45% of Bolivians would agree to swap territory with Chile in exchange

for an outlet to the Pacific Ocean99

.

Expected Outcomes

Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

5.1.2. Other compensations different than territory

This option intends to improve the model proposed in 1950 in which Chile was prepared to cede

territory in the north areas of Arica in exchange of water of the Titicaca Lake that would be used

to generate hydroelectric power.

For this alternative Bolivia could negotiate territories in Chile that are located in former Bolivian

areas in exchange for water or gas.

Currently there is already a dispute regarding the water resources of the Silala and the Lauka

River, Chile uses that water with no compensation to Bolivia and an arrangement of the use of

these and other water resources from the border department of Potosi could be met in exchange

for territory.

Bolivian Gas is another resource that interests Chile. Chile imports most of its gas from

Argentina100

. In 2010 Gas Atacama has proposed the Bolivian government to be a “strategic

partner” of Bolivia to transport Bolivian gas to Chile under Bolivian conditions.101

99

Un 45% de los bolivianos aceptaría cambiar tierra por mar a Chile, La Tercera, February 27, 2011.

http://latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/02/674-347853-9-encuesta-45-de-los-bolivianos-aceptaria-cambiar-tierra-

por-mar-a-chile.shtml (accessed March 04, 2011). 100

British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, Natural Gas Section, 2010, 31.

http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energ

y_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/natural_gas_section_2010.pdf (accessed March 25, 2011).

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26

The risks on this alternative are i) the high investments needed to transport water or gas ii) the

political instability in Bolivia that can be a threat for foreign investors that may be needed for

the project.

Expected Outcomes

Sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

Balance of interdependence

5.2. Policy Option 2: Quasi-sovereign access

5.2.1. Autonomous access

This option intends to gain similar conditions as the ones obtained for Ilo-Peru. The autonomous

area requested could be in former Bolivian territories; because infrastructure is already given in

Arica it would be in the interest of Chile that Bolivia invests in developing a port in areas where

there are no ports yet or where ports are not being utilized at their maximum capacity. The

autonomous port area will be granted a concession of operation for 99 years. With this option

Bolivia intends to improve free transit conditions, where Bolivians could store goods with no

restrictions, obtain a customs agency, a berth as well as eliminate the costs of passing the border.

All of these are high costs currently incurred by Bolivians.102

Chile has privatized the services in its ports103

, for this option Bolivia could negotiate to obtain

the administration of one of the ports that are not yet fully utilized such as the one of Tocopilla.

The benefits for Chile in this option could be that all infrastructures would remain in Chile, with

no need to cede sovereignty on its territories and as well as increase commerce and tourism in

the designated areas. In this option high costs in infrastructure are required. Another risk is the

decision of the Bolivian government in respect to which public or private entity would

administer the port and facilities.

Expected Outcomes

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

101

Gas Atacama muestra interés por entrar al mercado de gas Boliviano, La Tercera, November 19, 2011. http://latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2010/11/655-308689-9-gas-atacama-muestra-interes-por-entrar-al-mercado-

del-gas-boliviano-y-presenta.shtml (accessed February 09, 2011). 102

Libro Azul: El problema marítimo Boliviano, 23. 103

Ibid.

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5.2.2. Zona Economica Especial (Special Economic Zone)

This option is based on a proposal elaborated by former Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Gustavo Fernandez. He proposed to regain first “cualidad maritima” and with the time

sovereignty in two phases:

“Phase 1. Permit the Bolivian gas exports through a Chilean port in Patillos (former Peru) or

Mejillones (former Bolivia). Secure an exclusive territorial area with an area of 1,000 hectares

and 15 longitudinal km. In this area a treatment plant to liquefy gas would be installed. The

construction of port facilities and the construction of a complete petrochemical industry were

also part of the proposal. Bolivia would have “functional sovereignty”, and it would have its own

autonomous administration. Bolivian labor and tax legislation would be applicable, as well as

Bolivian police would protect the area.

Phase 2. Over time Bolivian presence would secure the sovereignty”104

In order for this option to be viable funding for infrastructure will need to be obtained in

advance. In addition the success of this option will depend on a marketing campaign in both

countries. The marketing campaign should be carefully elaborated for Bolivia, where the

“social-movements” prevented the exports of Bolivian gas in 2003.

Expected Outcomes

“Functional” sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

Balance of interdependence

5.2.3. Shared sovereignty

i) Use the model of Ecuador and Peru conflict resolution of 1998: “The oldest

continuing border dispute in the hemisphere105

ended after an agreement was reached in

October of 1998. The peace making process of the Upper Cenepa Valley conflict

involved the work of guarantors who were representatives of four countries (Brazil,

Argentina, Chile and the United States). The Guarantor Presidents’ letter formulated a

proposal to end the conflict (Article 2) granting Ecuador one square kilometer of

Peruvian territory as private territory. The transfer took place free of charge; property

104

Maira and Murillo de la Rocha, El Largo Conflicto entre Chile y Bolivia, 80. 105

David Scott Palmer, “The Search for Conflict Resolution: The Guarantors and the Peace process in the Ecuador-

Peru dispute” in Security cooperation in the western hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru conflict, ed. Richard,

Downes and Marcella Gabriel, (Miami: North South Center Press, 1999), 21.

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would not be subject to expropriation by the government of Peru. The Ecuador

Government, as owner, would enjoy all rights conferred under the laws of Peru for

private property excluding the right to transfer that property.”106

Applying this model Chile could grant territory to Bolivia in areas next to the Pacific

Ocean free of charge in exchange of non-territorial resources. Those territories could

enjoy all rights conferred under the laws of Chile for private property and Bolivia could

agree with Chile on conditions based on the Ecuador-Peru conflict resolution model.

ii) Use the model proposed by Peru to make Arica a tri-national area: In 1976 Peru’s

proposal included the idea of making Arica a tri-national area. The Arica Port should be

managed under tri-national administration, an example of regional integration. 107

. At that

time globalization108

was not as prevalent as it is today; Bolivian and Chilean markets

were just beginning to become more open. Probably if this proposal is further developed

in today’s context in which, for example Chile, Bolivia and Peru are members of regional

initiatives such as UNASUR this option can become feasible.

Expected Outcomes

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

5.3. Policy Option 3: Bolivia circumvents Chile as main access to the ocean (Ilo)

In order for this option to be real Bolivia needs large investments in Ilo. Currently Arica’s

infrastructure is better than the one in Ilo for Bolivia’s foreign trade. It is in Bolivia’s interest to

reduce the dependence of Chilean ports. For this reason the investments in Ilo would need to be

part of Bolivia’s trade policy even if Bolivia succeeds in improving its “cualidad maritima” via

Chilean territories. Additionally there is more interdependence between Bolivia’s foreign trade

and the northern part of Chile than Chile as a whole. Consequently if Bolivia would reduce the

use of the Port of Arica and the consumption in the free trade zone of Iquique, domestic pressure

could lead the Chilean government to consider the other formulated options.

Expected Outcomes

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

106

Appendix C. The Guarantor Presidents’ Letter in Security cooperation in the western hemisphere: Resolving the

Ecuador-Peru conflict, ed. Downes and Gabriel, 247. 107

Ricardo Anaya, Arica Trinacional, (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1987) 76. 108

“Globalization is often associated with a “borderless world” in which the old Westphalian order no longer

exists.” See: Ian Clark “Globalization and the post-cold war order” in The Globalization of World Politics: An

introduction to international relations, ed. Bayles and Owens, 569.

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Balance of interdependence

5.4. Policy Option 4: Status quo

This option intends to leave the situation as it is today; Bolivia keeps using Chilean Ports and

negotiates better conditions of free transit and trade, does not export strategic natural resources to

Chile and remains an active member of regional initiatives. Bolivia waits confident that

objectives of regional initiatives such as the ones of UNASUR become a reality.109

Over time

this could improve the foreign trade negative balance with Chile and the economic situation in

general.

Expected Outcomes

Improve the Bolivian “cualidad maritima”

Balance of interdependence

6. Conlusion

Chile and Bolivia fought a War from 1879 to 1883. Both signed the Treaty of Peace and

Friendship in 1904, but in 2011 it is evident that “between these two nations there is Peace but

not Friendship”.110

One century of diplomatic efforts were not sufficient to solve the issue. Reasons for the failure

could be: i) Not informing Peru early on about the negotiations, ii) not preparing the general

public in the three nations before negotiations became public, iii) not defining what Bolivia

wants as a state policy (including the opinion of the opposition, press, business, as well as other

actors such as civil society), iv) strong nationalism in Bolivia and Chile. On one hand Bolivians

believe that because of the injustice that happened to them 132 years ago Chile should cede

territories with no compensation to repair the caused damaged. On the other hand Chile’s

unwillingness to review the Treaty of 1904, with which Bolivia became a landlocked country.

Chile also argues that ceding territories affects its sovereignty. But in times when globalization

is as prevalent as it is today, which countries have an absolute right to rule on its territories,

economy and society? The answer is definitively not Chile, because Chile needs the consent of

another state when it comes to territorial decisions in Arica.

109

South American Union of Nations Constitutive Treaty: UNASUR objective: Intends to build, an integration and

union among its peoples in the cultural, social, economic and political fields, prioritizing political dialogue, social

policies, education, energy, infrastructure, financing and the environment and reduce asymmetries within the

framework of strengthening the sovereignty and independence of the States

http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/csn/treaty.htm (accessed April 16, 2011). 110

Carlos Mesa Gisbert, Presidencia Sitiada, 254.

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For Bolivia strong nationalisms impedes the possibility to accept other options that could bring

more relevant outcomes than sovereignty in territories. Bolivia is one of the least developed

nations in the hemisphere and currently possesses sovereignty over areas reach of natural

resources such as gas, water, lithium, iron and others but cannot yet extract them and create

industries due to the lack of funding and capacity. Not only that, Bolivia obtained an area next to

the Pacific Ocean in Ilo-Peru almost 20 years ago and did very little to improve its “cualidad

martitima” because of the lack of resources. Therefore territories next to the see would not

immediately turn into economical development if high investments in infrastructure and in

human capital do not take place.

Additionally, considering both the liberal and realist view about interdependence and conflict, it

is in the interest of Bolivia’s national security, to provide Chile with strategic natural resources.

Doing that, Bolivia could reduce the negative balance in trade and create more Chilean

dependence on Bolivia. Those resources are not sunflower and soybean cakes, but gas and water.

For the reasons exposed, this paper recommends the Maritime Claim Commission to retake

conversations on the Special Economic Zone. The paper recommends that Bolivia provides Chile

with gas for the northern regions of that country. The proposal of Gas Atacama can be a first step

to begin negotiations.

The second foreign and trade policy recommended to the Bolivian government is to invest in Ilo,

the expected outcomes for this policy are the improvement in the “cualidad maritima” since Peru

has offered this areas free of charge, to be used for building ports, warehouses, touristic areas, as

well as for military presence, such as the Bolivian marines. Another outcome of this alternative

is that the Bolivian dependence of Chilean ports will be balanced between Chile and Peru. Chile

would see the reduced Bolivian foreign trade in the north and could reconsider to offer other

solutions to the Martime Claim.

All recommendations depend in a well elaborated and effective marketing campaign, targeting

citizens in the three countries. In particular younger generations, who should not only learn about

battles and who took what from whom?, but also why it did happened?, which were the

shortcomings?, and how to avoid them in the future?. More intercultural activities are needed so

that Chileans, Bolivians and Peruvians could learn from each other and could get better prepared

for the challenges that affect the world with no distinction of nationality.

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ANNEX

Policy options

PROJECTED OUTCOMES

Regain

Sovereignty

Improve Maritime Quality Balance of

interdependence

Sovereign Access

by Swap of

Territory Yes. But

improvable

Maybe, highly depends on

Bolivia’s possibilities to invest

in infrastructure and human

capital

Maybe: Only if Bolivia

takes measurements in

order to sell a wider variety

of products especially

strategic ones

Sovereign Access

by other

compensations

different than

territory (based on

model of 1950)

Yes. But

improvable

Maybe, highly depends on

Bolivia’s possibilities to invest

in infrastructure and human

capital

Maybe: Only if Bolivia

accepts to give strategic

resources in exchange

Autonomous

access (based on

model of Ilo) no

Investments are needed, but

could be shared with Chile

Yes, because Bolivia will

be able to sell to other

markets can become

member of APEC

Special Economic

Zone (based on

model of 2003)

“Functional

sovereignty”.

Over time

Bolivia can

acquire full

sovereignty.

Investments are needed but

could be shared with Chile or

private companies interested to

export Bolivian gas

Yes, because Bolivia will

be able to sell to other

markets can become

member of APEC.

Additionally Bolivia will

sell Chile resources that

affect its security such as

gas and water

Shared

Sovereignty

(based on model of

Ecuador and Peru)

no

Depends on Bolivia’s

possibilities to invest in

infrastructure

Only if Bolivia takes

measurements in order to

sell a wider variety of

products especially strategic

ones

Shared

Sovereignty

Tri-national Arica

(based on model of

1976)

no

Depends on the conditions and

Bolivia’s possibilities to invest

in infrastructure and human

capital

Somewhat but still this

option does not secure the

possibility of Bolivia to

provide Chile with strategic

resources in this option Peru

could also sell gas to Chile

Circumvent Chile

and develop Ilo

(future)

no

Depends on Bolivia’s

possibilities to invest in

infrastructure and human

capital. But investments can be

shared with Peru

Yes, because Bolivia will

be able to sell to other

markets can become

member of APEC.

Additionally Bolivia will

become less dependent on

Chilean ports.

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Status Quo no

Depends on the effectiveness of

regional initiatives

Too much dependence on

decisions of other nations

Depends on the

effectiveness of regional

initiatives

Too much dependence on

decisions of other nations Self elaboration based on: Eugene Bardach’s Outcome Matrix, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, 2009,

50.

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