GLOBAL ALERT

BOAZ GANOR

and the Challenge to the

The Rationality of Modern Islamist Terrorism

Liberal Democratic World

TO EACH AGE its challenges. Barely over half a century ago, the interna-

tional community grappled with fascism; less than half that time ago,

it seemed that communism would be the scourge to end all scourges.

The formation, dismantling, and re-formation of nations and nation-blocs

of the past century and a half have been accompanied by changes in the way

wars are fought, and in where and how they are fought. Although terror-

ism is not a modern phenomenon, it has in the modern age continued to

don and slough off various incarnations: from state terrorization of civilian

populations during World War II, through the anti-colonial campaigns of

the Viet Minh and EOKA, to the anarchistic and nationalistic terrorism

of the Red Brigades, IRA, and PLO. Recent years have seen an increase in

the religious-ideological terrorism of Islamist-jihadists, whose manipula-

tion of supportive civilian populations so as to wield violence against other

civilians whom they regard as infidels represents a “perfecting” of modern

terrorist strategies. Islamist-jihadist terrorism—a plague that has spread to

almost every corner of the world—creates painful dilemmas for the peoples

and decision makers who confront it. Its rapid, shape-shifting advance has

sometimes confounded efforts to comprehend its origins, motives, and aims.

Its sophistication in exploiting liberal values poses challenges and difficul-

ties for the Western world, and for liberal democratic states in general, in

INTRODUCTION

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attaining effective and balanced counter-terrorism policies. It is this gap in

the understanding of Islamist-jihadist terrorism, as an offshoot and devel-

opment of modern terrorism, that Global Alert wishes to bridge.

Chapter 1 begins the work of bridging the gap in understanding current

trends and challenges in countering Islamist terrorism by providing a his-

torical perspective on modern terrorism, as opposed to traditional warfare.

It proposes a definition of terrorism, which takes into account the difficulty

that the international community has so far had in reaching consensus on

such a definition. It also reviews the reaction of today’s terrorists—Islamist

terrorists among them—to liberal democracy, including their warped inter-

pretation of modern liberal democratic governance and attempts to under-

mine it to achieve their aims.

Chapter 2 expands on terrorism’s exploitation of liberal democracy and

explains the main dilemmas that this generates for the liberal democratic

state plagued by terrorism. The chapter also describes the tango danced by

terrorism and the liberal, free media, and explains how terrorist organizations

“spin” their actions to send different messages to different target audiences.

The tension created by the effort to devise efficient counter-terrorism

strategies while preserving liberal democratic values gives rise to yet another

dilemma, that of the proportionality of the response to terrorism. Chapter 3

addresses the conundrum of proportionality by first taking up the thread of

analysis presented in chapter 1, this time in light of international humani-

tarian law. Developed to provide a frame of reference—and liability—for

the excesses and atrocities of twentieth-century war, international human-

itarian law now struggles to define and address the infractions against it

committed by terrorists. Chapter 3 proposes a solution to this dilemma,

beginning with a redefinition of state and non-state actors, combatants and

non-combatants. The chapter presents and thoroughly explicates a unique

equation for assessing and planning proportional responses to terrorist acts,

for use by civilian and military decision makers—even in the field.

Chapter 4 tackles what is usually a less conspicuous aspect of the terror-

ist threat: state support for terrorism. It parses this support into its ideo-

logical, financial, and military components, and explains the advantages and

disadvantages to both the terrorist organization and the state sponsor of

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terrorism in maintaining a state/non-state relationship. Iran, which sup-

ports Hezbollah and other Islamist terrorist organizations, is presented as

a case in point.

It takes no great leap for a terrorist organization to go from accepting

state sponsorship and its attendant obligations to wielding political power

as part of a state apparatus, even as it continues to affect policy and poli-

tics by deploying political violence. The metamorphosis from “classic” to

“hybrid” terrorist organization is explored fully in chapter 5. The chapter

first explains how a “hybrid terrorist organization” thrives simultaneously in

the social-welfare, political, and military spheres, then illustrates this expla-

nation with an analysis of Hezbollah and Hamas, two consummate hybrid

organizations, and shows how these and other similar terrorist organiza-

tions utilize statecraft to expand their sphere of influence, without relin-

quishing terrorism.

Once a terrorist organization has begun to function as a political entity,

however, it must also grapple with the constraints and considerations that

it has heretofore manipulated. As chapter 6 reveals, the hybrid terror-

ist organization cannot forever exploit liberal democracy and governance

without also being “tainted” by them. In exploring the increasingly sophis-

ticated interaction between liberal democracy and modern terrorism, and

between specific liberal democracies and Islamist hybrid terrorist entities,

chapter 6 asks whether liberal democracy is the solution to the problem of

terrorism—and if so, why and how. The chapter concludes with a review of

recent U.S. counter-terrorism strategy as a possible response to the motiva-

tions and capabilities of increasingly complex terrorist organizations.

Chapter 7, at the heart of the book, explains the rationale that moti-

vates terrorist organizations in general, and Islamist terrorist organizations

in particular, and that fuels their determination to preserve their opera-

tive capability. Far from being irrational or depraved, terrorists are rational

actors who employ cost-benefit calculations in determining when and how

to exert their influence. Though incongruous to the West, their consider-

ations are sometimes marked by an internal logic that emanates from their

ideology and goals. This chapter and chapter 8 present an in-depth analysis

of the root and instrumental causes and goals underlying Islamist terrorism.

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To understand Islamist-jihadist terrorism in general, and the phenomenon

of suicide terrorism in particular, it behooves Western decision makers

steeped in liberal democratic values to take a step back and begin to view

the impetus for terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists themselves.

Chapter 9 demonstrates the rationale behind terrorism by explicating

why and under what circumstances a terrorist organization may choose to

use a given tactic. This chapter promotes a greater understanding of the

rational cost-benefit calculus of the modern Islamist terrorist organization,

which is so very necessary to decision makers who are charged with keep-

ing their states safe from terrorism. It also stresses that terrorist organiza-

tions are learning organizations, which constantly adapt to changes “on the

ground” in a race against their state rivals to retain primacy.

Hamas is an evolving example of this, as indicated by the timely explica-

tion in chapter 10. Hamas typifies both hybrid and Islamist terrorism, and

has proven to be unparalleled in its flexible adjustment to a volatile region—

and to counter-terrorism measures. The chapter describes Hamas’s root and

instrumental goals, methods, and decision-making processes, and elucidates

the challenges it faces as it tries to both persevere in its armed resistance—

the impetus for its founding—and to govern. The chapter also examines

how Hamas has been affected by the Arab Spring revolutions, the infiltra-

tion of radically extreme Islamist-jihadist elements into the Sinai Peninsula

and Gaza Strip, and Israel’s real-time responses to its vulnerabilities. In a

canny twist, the chapter concludes with the observation that Hamas, too,

now faces dilemmas of governance, no less than does its nemesis, Israel.

Chapter 11, which concludes the book, summarizes its main arguments and

presents concrete recommendations, based on lessons learned.

Global Alert provides a fresh perspective on an entrenched problem, one

that the twenty-first century has inherited from the twentieth century, and

that shows no sign of abating. By revealing the fundamental building blocks

of the terrorist organization, as well as the rationale behind Islamist terror-

ism, the book offers theorists, scholars, and decision makers an opportunity

to truly understand what is currently a pressing threat to Middle Eastern

stability and international security. Any attempt to curtail, if not vanquish,

this threat must begin with just such an understanding.

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Viewed in the context of modern terrorism, and particularly in light of

recent terrorist events in the United States, the United Kingdom, and West

Africa, Islamist terrorism cannot help but be seen as a problem that has

exceeded the geographic boundaries of the Middle East. While this book

is founded on the extensive experience of the State of Israel in countering

both nationalist and Islamist-jihadist terrorist organizations, its perspective

is applicable. Israel is a laboratory in which counter-terrorism efforts have

been honed through painful trial and error.

Thus, although a first glance may not uncover the relationship between

centralized hybrid terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah and

the penny-ante groups and offshoots of a decentralized (and, some claim,

devolving) Al-Qaeda Central, a closer look reveals that global and local

jihadist terrorism is increasingly following in the footsteps of “classic”

Middle Eastern terrorism. In the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions, this

has been borne out by the growing involvement of al-Qaeda offshoots and

followers in local politics—either directly or via Salafist front organizations

and parties—in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. As the adage states,

“All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”

Global Alert makes no predictions, but asks the reader to take a closer look.