BMPI vs. Casas G.R. No 200898 June 15, 2015

Brion, J. Facts: Maria Rosario M. Casas was the VP for Finance and Administration of BMPI, a member of ALC Group of Companies. The case sprung from the dismissal of Casas from BMPI. Casas aver that on January 5, 2007, BMPIs company president and ALCs VP for Central Human Development met with her and told her not to report to work anymore starting January 8 upon the instruction of ALCs Chairman Emeritus. After the meeting, she took her belongings and left the office. She further claims that the reason for Abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her. BMPI on the other hand alleged that Casas was not dismissed but she merely abandoned her work. The company avers that when certain administrative complaints were filed against her, she requested a graceful exit from the company on the Januray 5 meeting; and that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an administrative investigation. Casas no loner reported for work on January 8. BMPI on the other hand issued her a Clearance and Quitclaim. After several months, Casas sent a letter asking for reconsideration of her dismissal but to no avail. To this, Casas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA: Ruled that Casas was not illegally dismissed but she instead abandoned her work. The LA then ordered that she be reinstated. NLRC: Reversed LAs finding. It ruled that Casas was illegally dismissed. CA: Affirmed NLRCs ruling and held that it did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed. Held: Yes. In determining whether an employees dismissal had been legal, the inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his right to substantial and procedural process. An employees right not to be dismissed without just or authorized case as provided by law, is covered by his right to substantial due process. Compliance with procedure provided in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes the procedural right of an employee. Absence of the first, renders the dismissal invalid, and thus entitling the employee reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, privileges and full backwages. While absence of the second, does not invalidate the dismissal but obligates the erring employer to pay nominal damages to the employee. Respondents dismissal is without procedural due process. Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that two written notices are required before dismissal can be made. The first notice must state the particular acts and omission constituting the grounds for the employees dismissal. The same rule requires that the employer should afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself. The second notice then must notify the employee its decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. There can be no doubt that procedural requirement has not been complied in the present case as shortly after the meeting, Casas took her belongings from the office this showed that she was summarily dismissed. BMPI also failed to show any written notice was provided to Casas in conformance with the above Rule.

And even assuming arguendo that respondent abandoned her work, BMPI still had the duty to give her a written notice of the grounds leading to her dismissal. Respondents dismissal is without substantive due process. Just cause must be proven with substantial evident at the time of the dismissal. Due process in the Labor Code is different with that of Constitutional due process as ruled in Agabon. However, despite the difference in origin and application between constitutional due process rights and statutory requirements of the Labor Code, concepts implementing constitutional due process to the statutory due process requirements of the Labor Code may still be applied. In the same way that the crime charged against the accused must first be prven before his or her right to liberty is taken away, so too must just cause against an employee be proven before he or she may be deprived of a means of livelihood. Otherwise, the employees right to substantive due process would be violated. As no sufficient substantial evidence of just cause was given, it must be concluded that there was no merit with respondents dismissal.

MILAN vs. NLRC

GR. NO. 202961, FEBRUARY 4, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners are respondent Solid Mills, Inc. (Solid Mills) employees. They are

represented by the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), their collective

bargaining agent. As Solid Mills employees, petitioners and their families were

allowed to occupy SMI village, a property owned by Solid Mills. According to Solid

Mills this was out of liberality and for the convenience of its employees and on

the condition that the employees would vacate the premises anytime the

Company deems fit. In September 2003, petitioners were informed that effective

October 10, 2003, Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business

losses. NAFLU recognized Solid mills closure due to serious business losses in the

memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003.

The memorandum of agreement provided for Solid Mills grant of separation pay

less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th

month pay to the employees. Solid Mills filed its Department of Labor

Employment termination report on September 2, 2003. Later, Solid Mills, through

Alfredo Jingco, sent to petitioners individual notices to vacate SMI village.

Petitioners were no longer allowed to report for work by October 10, 2003. They

were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim

before their vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and separation pay

would be released. Employees who have signed the memorandum agreement

were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of

the constructed houses inside as condition for the release of their termination

benefits and separation pay. Petitioners refused to sign the documents and

demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay.

Hence, petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-

payment of separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay.

They argued that their accrued benefits and separation pay should not be

withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice.

Moreover, the 13th month pay is based on law, specifically PD. No. 851. Their

possession of Solid mills property is not on accountability that is subject to

clearance procedures.

On the other hand, Solid Mills argued that petitioners complaint was premature

because they had not vacated its property.

LA: Ruled in favor of petitioners. According to the LA, Solid Mills illegally withheld

petitioners benefits and separation pay. Petitioners right to the payment of their

benefits and separation pay was vested by law and contract. The memorandum of

agreement stated no condition to the effect that petitioners must vacate Solid

Mills property before their benefits could be given to them. Petitioners

possession should not be construed as petitioners accountabilities that must be

cleared first before the release of benefits. Their possession is not by virtue of any

employer-employee relationship. It is a civil issue which is outside the jurisdiction

of LA.

NLRC: Ruled that because of petitioners failure to vacate Solid Mills property,

Solid Mills was justified in withholding their benefits and separation pay. Solid

Mills granted the petitioners the privilege to occupy its property on account of

petitioners employment. It had the prerogative to terminate such privilege. The

termination of Solid Mills and petitioners employer-employee relationship made

it incumbent upon petitioners to turn over the property to Solid Mills.

CA: Ruled that Solid Mills act of allowing its employees to make temporary

dwellings in its property was a liberality on its part. It may be revoked any time at

its discretion. As a consequence of Solid Mills closure and the resulting

termination of petitioners, the employer-employee relationship between them

ceased to exist. There was no reason for them to stay in Solid Mills property.

Moreover, the memorandum of agreement between Solid Mills and the union

representing petitioners provided that Solid Mills payment of employees benefits

should be less accountabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners benefits were properly withheld by Solid Mills

HELD:

Yes. As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages from

employees. The Labor Code also prohibits the elimination or diminution of

benefits. However, our law supports that employers institution of clearance

procedures before the release of wages, as an exception to the general rule that

wages may not be withheld and benefits may not be diminished.

Accountability in its ordinary sense mean obligation or debt. The ordinary

meaning of the term does not limit the definition of accountability to those

incurred in the worksite. As long as debt or obligation was incurred by virtue of

the employer-employee relationship, generally, it shall be included in the

employees accountabilities that are subject to clearance procedures.

It may be true that not all employees enjoyed the privilege of staying in

respondent Solid mills property. However, this alone does not imply that this

privilege when enjoyed was not a result of the employer-employee relationship.

Those who did avail of the privilege were employees of respondent. Petitioners

possession should therefore be included in the term accountability.

The return of the propertys possession became an obligation or liability on the

part of the employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus

respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold petitioners wages and benefits

because of this existing debt or liability. The law does not sanction a situation

where employees who do not even assert any claim over the employers property

are allowed to take all the benefits out of their employment while they

simultaneously withhold possession of their employers property for no rightful

reason. Withholding of payment by the employer does not mean that the

employer may renege on its obligation to pay employees their wages, termination

payments and due benefits. The employees benefits are also not being reduced.

It is only subjected to the condition that the employees return properties properly

belong to the employer. This is only consistent with the equitable principle that

no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.

For these reasons, we cannot hold that petitioners are entitled to interest of their

withheld separation benefits. These benefits were properly withheld by

respondent Solid Mills because of their refusal to return its property.

LEUS vs. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE

G.R. No. 187226; January 28, 2015

PETITIONER: CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS RESPONDENTS: ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB PONENTE: REYES, J. DOCTRINE: Facts: RESPONDENT St. Scholasticas College Westgrove (SSCW) is a Catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, it hired petitioner Cheryll Santos Leus as an assistant to SSCWs director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. She engaged in pre-marital sexual relations with a boyfriend, resulting in her pregnancy sometime in 2003. Subsequently, the father of her child married her.

In a letter dated June 11, 2003, respondent Sr. Edna Quiambao, SSCWs directress, informed petitioner that her employment with SSCW was terminated, citing as a ground Section 94(e) of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS) on disgraceful or immoral conduct. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Quezon City against SSCW and Sr. Quiambao. Does her case prosper?

Ruling: Yes.

Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing norms of conduct, the petitioners conduct cannot be considered as disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.

To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the petitioners dismissal. The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the circumstances surrounding the petitioners pregnancy and its supposed effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the petitioners conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing norms of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals respective haphazard evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the Court will rectify.

x x x

Contrary to the labor tribunals declarations, the Court finds that SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the petitioners indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Other than the SSCWs bare allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that would convincingly prove that the petitioners conduct indeed adversely affected SSCWs integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for. The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCWs students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant her dismissal. (Reyes, J., SC Third Division, Cheryll Santos Leus vs. St. Scholasticas College Westgrove and/or Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015). Bearing a child out of wedlock is not a just cause to terminate an employee even if the employer is a faith-based institution. This was the ruling of a Supreme Court (SC) division in the case of Cheryll Santos Leus, who sued her former employer, St Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), for unjust dismissal.

Leus elevated the case to the High Court after the Court of Appeals affirmed her dismissal. On Tuesday, February 24, the SC announced that the 23-page decision, penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, draws the line between religious and public morality.The school fired Leus, citing the 1992 Manual of Regulation for Private Schools (MRPS), which lists "disgraceful or immoral conduct" as a ground for a workers' dismissal.

Leus married the father of her child before SSCW fired her, but her earlier pregnancy was seen by SSCW as scandalous to the school. The SC division said that "when the law refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and not religious morality."

"[F]or a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or immoral, it must be 'detrimental to those conditions which depend [on] the existence and progress of human society' and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other," the decision read. Security of tenure or a workers' protection from termination without just cause and due process is a right enshrined in the Constitution. (READ: House panel tackles job security bills)

This right cannot be impaired "unless for cause under the Labor Code and other laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS," the SC said.

Catholic schools SSCW is a Catholic institution under the order of Saint Benedict. SSCW did not provide evidence showing that Leus's conduct adversely affected its reputation in promoting its moral doctrines among its students and beyond, the SC division ruled.

At the time of Leus' dismissal, there was no school policy either which regulated the conduct of its employees regarding sexual relations and any resulting pregnancies out of marriage. The institution itself acknowledged this in the case, the SC said.

Appeals court ruling reversed. The SC ruling on Leus' case, promulgated on February 17, reversed an appellate court's decision that affirmed her dismissal. While the Court of Appeals sided with SSCW, the Supreme Court Third Division ruled that pre-marital relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and consequently conceiving a child out of wedlock" is not disgraceful or immoral under MRPS.

"[T]here is no law which between two unmarried persons," it explained. "Such conduct is not denounced by public and secular morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law," it added.