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Construction and Application of State Prohibitions of..., 76 A.L.R.6th 543...

76 A.L.R.6th 543 (Originally published in 2012)

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The ALR databases are made current by the weekly addition of relevant new cases.

Construction and Application of State Prohibitions of Unfunded Mandates

Deborah F. Buckman, J.D.

Unfunded mandates are statutes or regulations requiring lower tiers of government to perform certain actions but failing to provide the necessary funding. A number of states specifically prohibit unfunded mandates on the state level thereby protecting local governments from being forced to expend funds for new activities or programs from their already limited budgets. Most such prohibitions are amendments to state constitutions which are then implemented by legislative enactments; in some cases, they are only enacted as statutes. In Adair v. State, 486 Mich. 468, 785 N.W.2d 119, 258 Ed. Law Rep. 709, 76 A.L.R.6th 767 (2010), the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a new state data collection and reporting requirement imposed an unfunded mandate upon school districts which was prohibited by the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution. This annotation collects and discusses the state court cases that have construed and applied state prohibitions of unfunded mandates.

TABLE OF CONTENTSArticle Outline

Index

Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules

Research References

ARTICLE OUTLINE I Preliminary Matters

§ 1 Scope

§ 2 Background and summary

§ 3 Practice pointers

II Held to Be Violation of Unfunded Mandate Prohibition

§ 4 Mandated expanded activities or new programs

§ 5 Imposed additional financial obligations

§ 6 Did not adequately fund mandated activities

III Held to Not Be Violation of Unfunded Mandate Prohibition

§ 7 Did not mandate new responsibilities or programs

§ 8 Did not mandate new expenditures

§ 9 Merely shifted costs between local entities

§ 10 Arose from voluntary act rather than state mandate

§ 11 Legislature did not specify mandate as unfunded

§ 12 Did not necessarily constitute a “mandate”

§ 13 Did not affect money from tax revenues

§ 14 Specifically exempted from prohibition

IV Requested Relief Not Available

§ 15 Monetary remedy not available

§ 16 No relief available because statute already revised

§ 17 Failed to pursue other avenues for relief

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.


Research References

INDEX Actual increased costs, absence of evidence of § 8

Additional financial obligations or expenditures § 5, 8

Adequately fund mandated activities, enactments failing to § 6

Administrative remedies, failure to pursue § 17

Affordable housing § 13

Airports, transfer of operational jurisdiction from county to airport authority § 7

Alcoholism, treatment for § 7

Arrested by city officers, charging of cities for costs of booking into county jails of people who were § 9

Arrest reports, forwarding of to Department of Revenue § 8

Assessment of shared expenses among towns in school district, revised § 14

Availability of requested relief § 15 to 17

Background and summary § 2

Booking into county jails of people arrested by city officers, charging of cities for costs of § 9

Breath analysis test results, forwarding of to Department of Revenue § 8

Cancer, presumption as to being occupationally related § 5

Carry concealed firearms, issuance of permits for persons to § 4, 16

Charter schools § 7

Clarification of existing law § 7

Classification of roads § 7

Class sizes in high poverty school districts § 11, 14

Commission on State Mandates, failure to pursue administrative remedies via § 17

Concealed firearms, issuance of permits for persons to carry § 4, 16

Constitution, law, rule, or regulation that implements provision of § 14

Cost of living increases, implied exception for § 7

County jails, charging of cities for costs of booking people arrested by city officers into § 9

Court reorganization § 7

Declaratory judgment as remedy § 15

Declared unconstitutional, availability of relief where challenged statute had previously been § 16

Deferred appropriation of funds § 6

Disposal of solid waste § 10

Domestic violence training for law enforcement officers § 7

Drop-off boxes for mail-in ballots at polling places § 7

DUI offenders, treatment for alcoholism § 7

Elections, cost of conducting § 7

Elections, primary, reduction in minimum voting age for § 7

Exempted from prohibition, challenged mandate as § 14

Exemption, declaration of § 15

Exhaustion of administrative remedies § 17

Expanded activities or new programs, mandating of § 4, 7

Financial obligations or expenditures, additional § 5, 8

Future, payment in § 6

Handicapped children, education of § 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, 17

Highway reclassification § 7

Identify challenged services as unfunded, legislature’s failure to § 11

Inadequate funding of mandated activities § 6

Indigent defendants, representation of when public defender has conflict of interest § 5

Inflation, implied exception for rate of § 7

Legislature not specifying mandate as unfunded § 11

Low and moderate-income housing § 13



Maintenance of roads § 7

Mandate, challenged action as not necessarily constituting § 12

Medically indigent adults, exclusion from state’s medical assistance program § 4

Mental health services for special education students § 11, 17

Minimum voting age for primary elections, reduction in § 7

Monetary remedy, availability of § 15

Money from tax revenues, challenged action as not affecting § 13

Municipal redevelopment agency required to allocate its tax increment financing on specific project § 13

National Voter Registration Act § 4

New expenditures § 5, 8

New programs or expanded activities, mandating of § 4, 7

Nominal funding § 6, 11, 15

Other avenues of relief, failure to pursue § 17

Other options, school districts having § 12

Overhead costs for office of Regional Conflict Counsel § 5

Pensions and retirement § 7

Permits for persons to carry concealed firearms, issuance of § 4, 16

Practice pointers § 3

Preliminary matters § 1 to 3

Preschool special education program § 4

Previously declared unconstitutional, availability of relief where challenged statute had been § 16

Public defender having conflict of interest, representation of indigent defendants § 5

Pursue other avenues of relief, failure to § 17

Recordkeeping and reporting requirements § 4, 8

Recyclable materials, exclusion from definition of solid waste § 10

Refund of pension contributions to former police officers § 7

Reimbursement, availability of § 15

Relief requested as not available § 15 to 17

Reporting and recordkeeping requirements § 4, 8

Requested relief as not available § 15 to 17

Residential school placement of handicapped student § 17

Retirement and pensions § 7

Revision of statute, effect on availability of relief § 16

Sanitary landfill, improvements to § 10

Schools and education § 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 17

Scope of annotation § 1

Segregation, state-mandated program to alleviate and prevent § 15

Separation of powers § 4, 6, 15

Shifting of costs between local entities § 9

Solid waste, disposal of § 10

Specifically exempted from prohibition, challenged mandate as § 14

Specify that challenged services were unfunded, legislature’s failure to § 11

Statute already revised, effect on availability of relief § 16

Statute of limitations § 15

Summary and background § 2

Tax increment financing § 13

Tax revenues, challenged action not affecting money from § 13

Two-tier voter registration system § 4

Unconstitutional, availability of relief where challenged statute had previously been declared § 16

Unemployment insurance § 7

Unfunded, legislature not specifying mandate as § 11

Voluntary act rather than state mandate, challenged action arising from § 10

Voter registration § 4, 7

Voting age for primary elections, reduction in § 7



Waste management § 10

Workers’ compensation § 5, 7

Writ of mandate, failure to pursue administrative remedies via § 17

Table of Cases, Laws, and Rules

CaliforniaCal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. See 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15

Cal. Const. Art. XIII, § 6. See 17

Cal. Educ. Code § 59300. See 12

Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 17500 et seq.. See 6, 13

Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 17500 to 17630. See 2

Cal. Gov’t Code § 17581(a). See 15

Cal. Gov’t Code § 17581(a)(2). See 11

Cal. Gov’t Code § 17612. See 15

Cal. Gov’t Code § 17612(c). See 15

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 33334.2 to 33334.3. See 13

Berkeley Unified School Dist. v. State of California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 350, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 314 (3d Dist. 1995) — 15

California School Boards Assn. v. State, 192 Cal. App. 4th 770, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 265 Ed. Law Rep. 347 (4th Dist. 2011) — 6

Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. California Dept. of Educ., 169 Cal. App. 4th 869, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 890, 240 Ed. Law Rep. 307 (3d Dist. 2008) — 17

Kinlaw v. State of California, 54 Cal. 3d 326, 285 Cal. Rptr. 66, 814 P.2d 1308 (1991) — 3

Los Angeles, County of v. State of California, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202 (1987) — 7

Los Angeles, County of v. Commission on State Mandates, 150 Cal. App. 4th 898, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (2d Dist. 2007) — 2

Los Angeles, County of v. Commission on State Mandates, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (2d Dist. 2003) — 7

Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 44 Cal. 3d 830, 244 Cal. Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 321 (1988) — 12

Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates, 55 Cal. App. 4th 976, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (4th Dist. 1997) — 13

Sacramento, City of v. State of California, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522 (1990) — 7

San Diego, County of v. State of California, 15 Cal. 4th 68, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 931 P.2d 312 (1997) — 4

San Diego, County of v. Commission on State Mandates, 2003 WL 22205626 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2003) — 4

San Diego, County of v. State, 164 Cal. App. 4th 580, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 489 (4th Dist. 2008) — 15

San Jose, City of v. State of California, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1802, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (6th Dist. 1996) — 9

State Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2013) — 4

Tri-County Special Educ. Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne, 123 Cal. App. 4th 563, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 192 Ed. Law Rep. 919 (5th Dist. 2004) — 11

Tuolumne, County of v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 2006 WL 165045 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2006) — 17

ColoradoColo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 1-8-113(1)(a). See 7

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 29-1-304.5(1). See 7

Gessler v. Doty, 2012 COA 4, 272 P.3d 1131 (Colo. App. 2012) — 7

FloridaFla. Const. Art. V, § 14. See 5

Fla. Const. Art. X, § 14. See 7

Fla. Const. Art. VII, § 18(a). See 5

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.511. See 5



Atwater v. City of Weston, 64 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) — 3



Lewis v. Leon County, 73 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2011) — 5

St. Petersburg, City of v. Remia, 41 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) — 7

Illinois30 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/1 et seq.. See 4

Orr v. Edgar, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 219 Ill. Dec. 355, 670 N.E.2d 1243 (1st Dist. 1996) — 4

MaineMe. Const. Art. IX, § 21. See 7

Wells, Town of v. Town of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 122, 775 A.2d 1174, 155 Ed. Law Rep. 1233 (Me. 2001) — 7

MassachusettsMass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C. See 2, 7, 14, 15

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 70, § 15. See 14

Sturbridge, Town of v. Tantasqua Regional School Dist., 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 68, 2006 WL 4114307 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006) — 14

Worcester, City of v. The Governor, 416 Mass. 751, 625 N.E.2d 1337, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 227 (1994) — 7, 15

MichiganMich. Const. Art. 9, § 29. See 2, 4, 7, 10

Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 32. See 3

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 21.231 et seq.. See 2

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 259.108 to 259.125c. See 7

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 388.1752. See 4

Adair v. Michigan, 302 Mich. App. 305, 839 N.W.2d 681, 299 Ed. Law Rep. 214 (2013) — 7, 9

Adair v. State, 486 Mich. 468, 785 N.W.2d 119, 258 Ed. Law Rep. 709, 76 A.L.R.6th 767 (2010) — 4

Department of Environmental Quality v. Worth Tp., 299 Mich. App. 1, 829 N.W.2d 31 (2012) — 7

Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 424 Mich. 364, 381 N.W.2d 662, 30 Ed. Law Rep. 870 (1985) — 2

Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v. State, 460 Mich. 590, 597 N.W.2d 113 (1999) — 7

Livingston County v. Department of Management and Budget, 430 Mich. 635, 425 N.W.2d 65 (1988) — 10

Riverview, City of v. Michigan, 292 Mich. App. 516, 808 N.W.2d 532 (2011) — 3

Wayne County Bd. of Com’rs v. Wayne County Airport Authority, 253 Mich. App. 144, 658 N.W.2d 804 (2002) — 7

Wayne County Chief Executive v. Governor, 230 Mich. App. 258, 583 N.W.2d 512 (1998) — 3

MissouriMo. Const. Art. X, §§ 16 to 24. See 7, 16

Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21. See 2, 4, 8, 15

Mo. Const. Art. X, § 23. See 3

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 50.535. See 4, 16

Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 160.400 to 160.420. See 7

Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 162.700, 162.975. See 4

Breitenfeld v. School Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 293 Ed. Law Rep. 1081 (Mo. 2013) — 4, 7, 9

Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. 2004) — 4, 16

Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 373 (Mo. 1995) — 15

Miller v. Director of Revenue, 719 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1986) — 8

Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. 2007) — 7

Rolla 31 School Dist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 78 Ed. Law Rep. 131 (Mo. 1992) — 4

School Dist. of Kansas City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 259 Ed. Law Rep. 930 (Mo. 2010) — 3, 7

Taylor v. State, 247 S.W.3d 546 (Mo. 2008) — 16

NevadaNev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354.599. See 2, 7

Savage v. Third Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Lyon, 125 Nev. 9, 200 P.3d 77 (2009) — 7

New Hampshire



N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a. See 5, 7, 10

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:27. See 7

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:17. See 5

Nashua School Dist. v. State, 140 N.H. 457, 667 A.2d 1036, 105 Ed. Law Rep. 578 (1995) — 7

Nelson, Town of v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transp., 146 N.H. 75, 767 A.2d 435 (2001) — 7

New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers’ Compensation Fund v. Flynn, 133 N.H. 17, 573 A.2d 439 (1990) — 5

Opinion of the Justices, 157 N.H. 265, 949 A.2d 670 (2008) — 7

Opinion of the Justices (Materials in Solid Waste Stream), 135 N.H. 543, 608 A.2d 870 (1992) — 10

New JerseyN.J. Const. Art. VIII § 2. See 14

N.J. Const. Art. VIII § 4 para 1. See 14

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 6A:13-3.1. See 14

Elizabeth Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 2011 WL 6260731 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) — 11, 14

I. Preliminary Matters

§ 1. Scope

This annotation collects and discusses the state court cases that have construed and applied state prohibitions of unfunded mandates. Some opinions discussed in this annotation may be restricted by court rule as to publication and citation in briefs; readers are cautioned to check each case for restrictions. A number of jurisdictions may have rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or legislative enactments directly bearing upon this subject. These provisions are discussed herein only to the extent and in the form that they are reflected in the court opinions that fall within the scope of this annotation. The reader is consequently advised to consult the appropriate statutory or regulatory compilations to ascertain the current status of all statutes discussed herein.

§ 2. Background and summary

Unfunded mandates are statutes or regulations requiring lower levels of government to perform certain actions but failing to provide the funding for doing so. They are an issue on the national level as between the federal government and states or local entities, and also on a state level, between state governments and cities or counties. This annotation focuses on unfunded mandates on the state level and on the prohibitions set up by some states to prevent the problem. Those states which passed constitutional provisions or legislation against unfunded mandates were at the time seen as part of a nationwide “taxpayer revolt” in which taxpayers attempted to limit both excessive taxation and government spending. 1

Taxpayers sought to preclude the state from shifting financial responsibility for carrying out governmental functions to their local governments, which had far fewer revenue resources than the state. In Michigan, for example, the Constitution’s Headlee Amendment, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 29, passed by that state’s voters in 1978, added the following section to the Michigan Constitution: “The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs.” The first part of this provision is described as the “maintenance of support” or MOS provision and the second part as the “prohibition on unfunded mandates” or POUM



provision. Shortly after the Headlee Amendment was ratified, the Michigan Legislature enacted legislation designed to implement it, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 21.231 et seq. California’s voters in 1979 adopted Proposition 4, adding Article XIII B to the California Constitution, to impose limits on governmental power to spend for public purposes. Section 6(a) of Article XIII B provides: “Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service.” In addition, in 1984, California’s Legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory and administrative scheme for implementing the new provision, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 17500 to 17630. Part of California’s scheme for implementing the constitutional provision was the creation of the Commission on State Mandates, tasked with hearing and deciding on claims by local entities of entitlement to reimbursement by the state for costs. It is designated as the first forum for addressing unfunded mandate claims, and judicial remedies may not be pursued until that avenue has been exhausted. If the Commission determines that reimbursement is justified, and the legislature fails to comply by appropriating money for a reimbursable mandate, local entities have two options. Under section 17612, a local entity may file an action for declaratory relief, to declare the mandate unenforceable and enjoin its enforcement. Alternatively, if the legislature specifically identifies the mandate and declines to fund it in the annual Budget Act, section 17581(a) relieves a local entity of the obligation to implement the unfunded mandate. The Commission is authorized as well to determine in the first instance whether a mandate is imposed by the federal government or by the State. That determination is sometimes required before the question of reimbursement or subvention under Article XIII B, section 6(a) may be addressed although the fact that a federal law may be involved does not necessarily make a mandate federal rather than state.2

Massachusetts voters in 1980 adopted Proposition 2-½, a tax limitation measure under the initiative process of that state’s constitution. One part of that proposition was the “local mandates” law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C: “Any law taking effect on or after January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-one imposing any direct service or cost obligation upon any city or town shall be effective in any city or town only if such law is accepted by vote or by the appropriation of money for such purposes, in the case of a city by the city council in accordance with its charter, and in the case of a town by a town meeting, unless the general court, at the same session in which such law is enacted, provides, by general law and by appropriation, for the assumption by the commonwealth of such cost, exclusive of incidental local administration expenses and unless the general court provides by appropriation in each successive year for such assumption …. Any city or town, or any ten taxable inhabitants of any city or town may in a class action suit petition the superior court alleging that … the amount necessary for such reimbursement has not been included in the general or any special appropriation bill for any year…. The superior court shall determine the amount of the deficiency, if any, and shall order that the said city or town be exempt from such general or special law, or rule or regulation of any administrative agency until the commonwealth shall reimburse such city or town the amount of said deficiency or additional costs.” In addition, in Missouri, the Hancock Amendment to the Constitution, Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21, provides that “[t]he state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs of any existing activity or service required of counties and other political subdivisions. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the general assembly or any state agency of counties or other political subdivisions, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs.” In Nevada, the prohibition against unfunded mandates was established through a statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354.599. It provides: “If the Legislature directs one or more local governments to: 1. Establish a program or provide a service; or 2. Increase a program or service already established which requires additional funding, and the expense required to be paid by each local government to establish, provide or increase the program or service is $5,000 or more, a specified source for the additional revenue to pay the expense must be authorized by a specific statute. The additional revenue may only be used to pay expenses directly related to the program or service. If a local government has money from any other source available to pay such expenses, that money must be applied to the expenses before any money from the revenue source specified by statute.” Other states with similar prohibitions, codified either in the constitution or in statutes, are Florida, Illinois, Maine, and New Hampshire.



Courts have found that legislative enactments violated state prohibitions of unfunded mandates in numerous cases. Most often, it was because they mandated expanded activities or new programs without providing the necessary funding ( § 4). In other cases, it was because they imposed new financial obligations on local governments (§ 5) or only minimally funded mandated activities (§ 6). In none of these cases, however, did the courts order the State to pay the amounts already expended by the local entities. In even more cases, however, courts have concluded that legislative enactments did not violate unfunded mandate prohibitions. Most often, this was based on their finding that challenged state actions did not actually require any new responsibilities, programs, or activities (§ 7). In other cases, it was because the alleged mandates did not require new expenditures (§ 8) or merely shifted costs between local entities (§ 9). Where challenged actions arose from local entities’ voluntary acts rather than from state mandates, courts found that they did not constitute unfunded mandates ( § 10). It has been held that an action required of local governments did not constitute an unfunded mandate where the legislature did not specifically designate it as unfunded (§ 11). Still, other decisions found that a challenged state action did not actually constitute a “mandate” (§ 12) or that it did not violate the prohibition because it did not affect money from tax revenues (§ 13). In addition, where an action of the legislature specifically exempts itself from the prohibition on unfunded mandates or where the state constitution provides such an exemption, the courts will not interfere with that exemption (§ 14). Often, plaintiffs challenging alleged unfunded mandates are denied the relief they request because it is not available. Generally, the remedy for an unfunded mandate is only a declaratory judgment so that plaintiffs cannot recover money damages or reimbursement (§ 15). No relief is available as well where a challenged statute has already been declared unconstitutional or otherwise was revised (§ 16). Further, it has been held that local entities must first pursue administrative remedies before turning to the courts as, for example, in California where challenges must first be presented before the Commission on State Mandates (§ 17).

§ 3. Practice pointers

In California, standing to bring an action claiming an unfunded mandate is afforded only to local agencies directly affected by a state mandate. Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that medically indigent adults and taxpayers, who challenged a state law allegedly shifting financial responsibility for health care to a county without providing funding, lacked standing to prosecute the action. The dissenting opinion in that case argued that the creation of a remedy for cities or counties should not preclude the right of citizens to enforce the constitutional provision as well.3

Other states, however, provide for standing by taxpayers alone. This is the case in Missouri, for example, where the Hancock Amendment, Mo. Const. Art. X, § 23 provides that “any taxpayer of the state, county, or other political subdivision shall have standing to bring suit in a circuit court of proper venue … to enforce the provisions of sections 16 through 22.” Applying this provision, the Missouri Supreme Court4 held that a school district did not have standing to challenge a statute because only taxpayers could bring Hancock Amendment claims. Similarly, Michigan’s Headlee Amendment, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 32, states that “[a]ny taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Sections 25 through 31, inclusive, of this Article ….” As to who may be a named as a defendant in an action alleging an unfunded mandate, it has been held in Florida that the state’s governor and other state officials were not proper parties to a suit. 5 The plaintiffs sued the governor, secretary of state, speaker of the state house, and president of the state senate, alleging that a statute governing growth management violated the constitution’s unfunded mandate provision. The court noted that the proper defendant in a lawsuit challenging a statute’s constitutionality is the state official designated to enforce the statute. Neither individual legislators nor the governor nor the secretary of state enforced the growth management laws. Rather, the court found, the secretary of community affairs appeared to be the responsible official as the department of community affairs was the state land planning agency. The court therefore reversed the summary judgment which had been granted by the trial court and remanded for dismissal of the complaint. Where money damages are not available in claims of unfunded mandates, courts which may address only monetary claims



lack jurisdiction. Thus, in Michigan, for example, it has been held that the court of claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Headlee Amendment claims because such claims cannot include claims for damages.6

II. Held to Be Violation of Unfunded Mandate Prohibition

§ 4. Mandated expanded activities or new programs

[Cumulative Supplement]

The courts in the following cases held that legislative enactments violated prohibitions against unfunded mandates because they required expanded activities or new programs without commensurate funding. In County of San Diego v. State of California, 15 Cal. 4th 68, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 931 P.2d 312 (1997) , the California Supreme Court held that the exclusion of medically indigent adults in the state’s Medical Assistance Program mandated a new program or service and therefore violated the constitutional ban on unfunded mandates. The plaintiff county sought reimbursement of the amounts it had paid for care of adult medically indigent persons (MIPs) who had been dropped from coverage under the state’s Medi-Cal program. The legislature had decided, effective in 1983, to exclude the population of MIPs, who had previously been covered by the program. The county asserted that the elimination of coverage resulted in an unfunded mandate to the county. The Commission on State Mandates denied reimbursement, the superior court reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision. The supreme court noted that Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 requires the State to “provide a subvention of funds to reimburse” local governments “whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service.” The legislature, it further noted, excluded adult MIPs from Medi-Cal with the knowledge and intent that the counties would be responsible to provide their medical care. This, the court held, was precisely what the constitutional ban on unfunded mandates was enacted to prevent. The legislature’s action was thus a mandate for a “new program” on counties, compelling them to accept financial responsibility for the provision of medical care to adult MIPs. It could alternatively have been viewed as mandating an increase in the services that counties were providing. The court held that section 6 prohibited the State from shifting to counties the costs of state programs for which the State assumed complete financial responsibility before the adoption of section 6. Concluding that the exclusion of adult MIPs from Medi-Cal imposed a mandate on the county within the meaning of section 6, it affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.7

In Orr v. Edgar, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 219 Ill. Dec. 355, 670 N.E.2d 1243 (1st Dist. 1996), an Illinois court held that the state’s two-tier voter registration system constituted an unfunded mandate with which local election officials did not have to comply. In an effort to comply with the requirements of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), the State had developed a two-tier system of voter registration, one for national elections and another for state and local elections. The NVRA required that every applicant for a driver’s license be given an application for voter registration. The State created dual and separate electorates for state and federal elections, registering persons under NVRA provisions to vote in federal elections only and requiring an additional registration for voting in state and local elections. In this challenge to the system, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that it constituted an unfunded service mandate in violation of the State Mandates Act, 30 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 805/1 et seq. The trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. It held that, until the state legislature provided the necessary funding for implementation, local election authorities were not obligated to implement the two-tier system. On appeal, the court noted that state mandates include “any State-initiated statutory or executive action that requires a local government to establish, expand or modify its activities in such a way as to necessitate additional expenditures from local revenues.” The State Mandates Act requires the state to reimburse local governments for at least 50% of the additional expenses which result from a “service mandate.” Where the General Assembly fails to make the necessary appropriations allowing reimbursement of expenses for a service mandate, local governments are relieved of the obligation to implement such mandate. The court rejected the defendants’ claim that the two-tier system was exempt from the State Mandates Act as having been required by a federal mandate since the NVRA did not require a two-tier system of registration. The court found that compliance with NVRA could have been accomplished without expansion of governmental services or additional expenditures from local revenues, but the State chose to implement a system imposing significant additional duties and increased costs on local election authorities. Concluding that the two-tier system of registration and voting constituted a



state service mandate for which no funds had been appropriated, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In Adair v. State, 486 Mich. 468, 785 N.W.2d 119, 258 Ed. Law Rep. 709, 76 A.L.R.6th 767 (2010) , the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a State’s requirement that school districts collect more detailed information than was previously required constituted an increase in the level of activity under the prohibition on unfunded mandates (POUM) of the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 29. That amendment was enacted in 1978 and the POUM provides that “[a] new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs.” For many years, the State required public school districts to report information such as pupil counts and financial data, but in 2000, the requirements for collection, maintenance, and reporting of data became more extensive under an executive order by the governor and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 388.1752. The evidence established that both the amount of information collected and the manner in which it had to be reported were significantly greater and more labor-intensive than before. However, no state appropriation was made to fund the implementation of the additional reporting requirements. The school districts were expected to take money from discretionary funds to cover the costs of meeting the data collection and reporting obligations. In response to the new law, this action was commenced by 456 public school districts and a taxpayer from each district, seeking a declaratory judgment that the State had violated the POUM. Twice, the State’s motion for summary disposition was granted. On the second remand, the court of appeals appointed a special master, who concluded that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements in the executive order and statute presented an increase in the level of activity required of plaintiff school districts beyond what was previously required and therefore violated the POUM provision. The court of appeals adopted the special master’s conclusion and entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the supreme court noted that, to establish a violation of the POUM provision, a plaintiff must show that the state-mandated local activity was originated without sufficient state funding after the Headlee Amendment was adopted or, if properly funded initially, that the mandated local role was increased by the State without state funding for the necessary increased costs. The court concluded that the new requirements for collecting large amounts of data and more detailed information than previously required constituted an “increase in the level of activity” and thus that the plaintiffs established a violation of the POUM provision. The State failed to identify any evidence to rebut that conclusion. There was a good deal of unchallenged testimony in the record to establish that the school districts incurred increased costs as a result of the new recordkeeping requirements. The school districts had to hire additional personnel, reassign existing staff to the task, and purchase computer software to enable compliance with the new rules. The court held that the districts did not have to show the specific amount of their cost increases. Rather, the burden was on the state to demonstrate that no state funding was required either because the requirement did not actually increase costs or because any increased costs were not necessary. The State produced no such evidence. Since the elements of a POUM violation were established, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment granting a declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs. It also rejected the arguments expressed in the dissenting opinion which contended that the court had erroneously interpreted the burden of proof necessary to establish a POUM violation. In Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. 2004), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Mar. 30, 2004), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the funding provisions of the State’s Concealed-Carry Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.094, violated the constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates. The plaintiff taxpayers alleged that the statute, which authorizes the issuance of permits for persons to carry concealed firearms, was both unconstitutional and in violation of the Hancock Amendment’s prohibition against unfunded mandates since it required expanded sheriff activity without providing additional financing. The Hancock Amendment, Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21, provides that a state-mandated program shall not be required “unless a state appropriation is made … to pay the county or other political subdivision for any increased costs.” The trial court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the statute was unconstitutional but rejecting the Hancock Amendment claim. The Supreme Court on appeal reversed the lower court as to the constitutionality of the Concealed Carry Act, upholding its validity. As to the funding provisions, the court noted that county sheriffs were to deposit the application processing fees into a special county sheriff’s revolving fund. The principal in that revolving fund, as stated in Mo. Ann. Stat. § 50.535, could “only be used by law enforcement agencies for the purchase of equipment and to provide training.” However, other expenses were involved in the permit process, and those were not financed by the statute. Thus, the court held, the statute contained an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment. Four counties presented evidence in this action concerning their added unfinanced costs, and the court concluded that the statute would be unenforceable in those four counties. Even though the same conclusion applied statewide to any county where the statute was being implemented, the court held that ripeness was to be determined on a county-by-county basis so that disposition of the case anywhere else was premature in the absence of specific proof of increased costs. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the



Hancock Amendment claims and entered judgment enjoining the State from enforcing the law to the extent it imposed an unfunded mandate on those counties. In Rolla 31 School Dist. v. State, 837 S.W.2d 1, 78 Ed. Law Rep. 131 (Mo. 1992), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the State’s imposition of a mandatory preschool special education program without specific funding violated the Hancock Amendment, Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21, and could be remedied with injunctive relief. The plaintiff school districts challenged the state’s department of education, which sent them all letters advising them that they were henceforth required to provide special education and related services for disabled three and four-year old children. The department was implementing the newly enacted Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 162.700, 162.975, which mandated that school districts in the state provide special education services to handicapped preschoolers beginning at age three. This legislation was motivated by federal laws offering additional aid to states that adopted such programs for preschoolers. Previously, state law had required such a program only for children five years and older. The plaintiffs alleged that this required them to provide educational services to a new population but without additional funds for doing so. The trial court granted the school districts’ motion for summary judgment and issued an injunction prohibiting the State from requiring the school district to provide new special education services “until the legislature provides a specific appropriation” to fund the State’s portion of the program. On appeal, the court rejected the State’s argument that court involvement in this question violated the legislature’s supremacy under the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. It further held that general, unrestricted funds paid to the school districts under another program could not be used to meet the Hancock Amendment requirements for this newly mandated program. The court interpreted the constitutional provision in section 21 as requiring that the legislature make a specific appropriation specifying that its purpose is to be used for the mandated program. Concluding that the State’s failure to fully fund the new program violated section 21, the court affirmed the trial court’s injunction.

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

In order to qualify for subvention under the constitutional provision requiring that state mandates be funded, the required activity or task must constitute a new program or higher level of service. Cal. Const. art. 13 B, § 6 State Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 220 Cal. App. 4th 740, 2013 WL 5632124 (2d Dist. 2013). Statute under which metropolitan public school district that had lost its accreditation was required to provide transportation for each pupil resident who attended an accredited school in another district of the same or adjoining county imposed a new mandate upon unaccredited district, for purposes of applying state constitutional amendment barring state from imposing unfunded mandates upon political subdivisions; statute’s transportation mandates altered existing general requirement of providing transportation “within” a school district, and new mandate was even more stark as applied to a metropolitan school district, which was exempt from the existing general requirement. V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 10, §§ 16, 21; V.A.M.S. §§ 167.121, 167.131, 167.231. Breitenfeld v. School Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013).

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[END OF SUPPLEMENT]

§ 5. Imposed additional financial obligations

The courts in the following cases held that legislative enactments violated prohibitions against unfunded mandates because they imposed additional financial obligations upon local governments. In Lewis v. Leon County, 73 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 2011), the Florida Supreme Court held that a statute requiring counties to fund



overhead costs for the office of regional conflict counsel (RCC), as created to represent indigent defendants when a public defender had a conflict of interest, violated the constitutional requirement that the state fund the overhead costs of all judicial offices that are not expressly listed as exceptions in the constitution, such as public defenders’ offices. While Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.511 created a new system of court-appointed counsel to represent indigent defendants, primarily in those cases where the public defender had a conflict of interest, under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 29.008, the RCC was placed within the public defenders’ offices, which were already specifically funded by the counties. Thus, the law effectively mandated that counties would pay for the offices of both the public defender and the RCC. Twenty-six Florida counties brought this action for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the statute because it required counties to fund the overhead costs for the RCC office. That would, they contended, violate the unfunded mandates provision, Fla. Const. Art. VII, § 18(a), which provided that “[n]o county or municipality shall be bound by any general law requiring such county or municipality to spend funds or to take an action requiring the expenditure of funds unless the legislature has determined that such law fulfills an important state interest.” The court agreed that the statute unconstitutionally shifted the funding responsibility for certain costs of court-appointed counsel from the state to the counties and failed to identify an important state interest justifying the transfer of such costs. The court noted that Fla. Const. Art. V, § 14, required that the state be wholly responsible for funding court-appointed counsel and related costs. The RCC and private registry counsel were legally identical, representing indigent defendants in criminal cases when a public defender had a conflict. The court found that the legislature had simply not considered any unfunded mandate issues when it enacted the statute. Concluding that the statute violated the unfunded mandates provision of the state constitution, the court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment for the counties. In New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers’ Compensation Fund v. Flynn, 133 N.H. 17, 573 A.2d 439 (1990), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a statute imposing a responsibility on local governments to provide benefits for illnesses not covered under prior law constituted an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The statute at issue was the most recent of many amendments to workers’ compensation legislation originally enacted in 1947. The original legislation envisioned a no-fault system whereby workers would be compensated for injuries solely on the basis of their employment relationship and without regard to negligence. This amendment, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 281-A:17, provided for “a prima facie presumption that cancer disease in a firefighter … is occupationally related.” It qualified the presumption by stating that “(a) A call or volunteer firefighter shall have the benefit of this prima facie presumption only if there is on record reasonable medical evidence that such firefighter was free of such disease at the beginning of his or her employment. It shall be the duty of the employer of call or volunteer firefighters to provide the required reasonable medical evidence. If the employer fails to do so, the call or volunteer firefighter shall have the benefit of the prima facie presumption regardless of the absence of said reasonable medical evidence. (b) A retired firefighter who agrees to submit to any physical examination requested by his city, town, or precinct shall have the benefit of the prima facie presumption for a period of 20 years from the effective date of such firefighter’s retirement.” The petitioner, a worker’s compensation fund, sought a declaratory judgment that the prima facie presumption violated N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a because it would increase the number of successful workers’ compensation claims even where cancer was not work-related. The superior court found the statute unconstitutional. On appeal, the defendant argued that the amendment did not mandate “any new, expanded or modified program or responsibility,” as proscribed by Article 28-a, because it merely required a procedural change in establishing eligibility for benefits under pre-existing workers’ compensation laws. The supreme court noted that the constitutional provision was intended to focus not only on whether a particular state mandate could be categorized as a new, expanded, or modified program but also on whether the mandate imposed on local government an additional financial obligation. The court accepted the petitioner’s evidence indicating that the number of claims would increase and therefore found that the amendment imposed a new fiscal obligation upon local governments. It rejected the defendant’s argument that Article 28-a permitted the legislature to make procedural adjustments to pre-existing legislation regardless of the financial burden imposed on local governments. The court concluded that section 281-A:17 imposed upon local governments a new responsibility within the meaning of Article 28-a and was unconstitutional where the State failed to obtain local government consent or provide the requisite funding.

§ 6. Did not adequately fund mandated activities

The following authority held that legislative enactments violated the prohibition against unfunded mandates because they did not adequately fund the mandated activities. In California School Boards Assn. v. State, 192 Cal. App. 4th 770, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 265 Ed. Law Rep. 347 (4th Dist.



2011), review denied, (May 18, 2011), a California court of appeal held that a State’s recurring practice of mandating actions by school districts but providing only nominal funding and indefinite deferment of full funding violated Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. The plaintiff state school board association, with a number of school districts, brought this action seeking declaratory, injunctive, and writ relief regarding mandates imposed on the school districts by the state legislature with only nominal funding. The California Constitution, in Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6, requires that “[w]henever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service ….” Nonetheless, the legislature had recently enacted numerous statutes requiring school districts to implement new programs and services but, due to budget difficulties, had deferred payment rather than paying the costs in full. Since 2002, as found by the Commission on State Mandates, there were 38 separate programs or services requiring reimbursement for each of which the legislature routinely appropriated only $1,000 rather than the full amount of the program costs. The State acknowledged that it did not provide full funding on an annual basis but maintained that its deferral practice complied with the constitutional requirement. Its intention was to pay the remainder, with interest, at some unspecified time in the future. The plaintiffs alleged that the unpaid costs incurred in complying with the mandates totalled more than $900 million. The trial court, finding that the State’s deferral practice violated the constitution and its implementing statutes at Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 17500 et seq., held that the plaintiff school districts were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief and also issued a writ commanding the state in the future to fully fund school district mandated programs. However, the trial court did not order the State to reimburse the plaintiffs for costs previously incurred to comply with previous mandates, concluding that such an order would violate separation of powers principles. On appeal, the court established that a deferred appropriation of funds was not equivalent to a funded mandate within the meaning of Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. The practice of deferring payment, it held, violated the language and intent of the constitutional and statutory provisions. By attempting to pay for the new programs with a “credit card” with no fixed date for full payment, the court opined, the State had shifted the actual costs of the mandates to the local school districts. The State’s claim of intent to eventually pay the full cost with interest did not eliminate the current cost burden on the local authorities. The court rejected the State’s arguments in support of a contrary conclusion. The court did find, however, that the writ granted by the trial court was improper because the school districts had an adequate remedy at law for any future attempts by the State to defer mandate payments. Subdivision (c) of section 17612 provides that “[i]f the legislature deletes from the annual Budget Act funding for a mandate, the local agency or school district may file in the Superior Court of the County of Sacramento an action in declaratory relief to declare the mandate unenforceable and enjoin its enforcement for that fiscal year.” It acknowledged that the remedy affords relief only prospectively, not as to funds previously paid out by a local agency to satisfy a state mandate. The proper interpretation of the statute, the court held, permitted a party to seek relief for nominal funding as well as for a complete lack of funding for a particular state mandate. The plaintiffs identified only one potential funding source for the payment of the outstanding $900 million debt, and the State responded that the source did not contain funds for this purpose. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present any facts showing a reasonable basis to believe that sufficient funds existed and that the funds would be related to the subject matter of this debt. Emphasizing that a court should not act in a budgetary and legislative role, the court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to order payment of expenses already paid. It further acknowledged that the State was experiencing an extreme budget crisis with a budget deficit estimated at more than $20 billion. Relying on the separation of powers under which only the legislature may determine where state funds should be directed, the court affirmed that portion of the trial court’s judgment. In addition, it affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the State’s payment of only nominal amounts for the mandates it imposed on local school districts violated the constitutional provision. However, it reversed the portion of the trial court’s judgment ordering injunctive relief, finding that to be in error.

III. Held to Not Be Violation of Unfunded Mandate Prohibition

§ 7. Did not mandate new responsibilities or programs


The courts in the following cases held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because the challenged action did not require any new responsibilities, programs, or activities.



In City of Sacramento v. State of California, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522 (1990), the California Supreme Court held that the requirement that local governments provide unemployment insurance for their employees did not constitute an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The plaintiff city filed claims with the state’s board of control for funding of the costs imposed on it by a statute extending mandatory unemployment insurance coverage to local governments. That statute had been enacted in response to changes in federal law. After the board denied its claims, a trial court overruled the board and found the cost reimbursable, and the court of appeal affirmed. On remand, the board determined the amounts due, but the legislature did not appropriate the necessary funds. The city then commenced a class action, on behalf of all the local governments in the state, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief barring enforcement of the statute in the absence of state funding. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State. The court of appeal reversed that decision. The supreme court on appeal noted that Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 requires state subvention of a local government’s costs of any “new program” or “increased level of service” imposed upon it by the State. This provision, however, does not make all local costs resulting from compliance with state law subject to mandatory reimbursement. Rather, the court reasoned, the intention of the provision was to apply to programs providing services to the public or laws imposing unique requirements on local governments that did not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state. Local governments’ costs of complying with a general statewide increase in the level of workers’ compensation benefits did not qualify under these standards. Here, by requiring local governments to provide unemployment compensation protection to their own employees, the State did not compel provision of new or increased services to the public at the local level. The court therefore concluded that the statute did not run afoul of Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. It further held that the local costs of providing unemployment insurance coverage were not subject to subvention or reimbursement under either the constitution or statutes. It reversed the judgment of the court of appeal. In County of Los Angeles v. State of California, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202 (1987), the California Supreme Court held that a general increase in workers’ compensation benefits did not constitute a reimbursable state mandate under Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. The petitioner cities and counties sought a writ of mandate to compel the state to approve the reimbursement claims of local government entities for their expenses in providing increased workers’ compensation benefits. Specifically, the action challenged legislation which increased the amounts which employers, including local governments, were required to pay in workers’ compensation benefits to injured employees and families of deceased employees. The state board of control had denied the petitioners’ reimbursement claims. The trial court, in two separate actions, denied the petitions, finding that the constitutional requirement of reimbursement for unfunded mandates was subject to an implied exception for the rate of inflation or cost of living increases. The court of appeal, concluding that increased costs were not tantamount to an “increased level of service” unless the increase exceeded that of the cost of living, affirmed one action and reversed and remanded the other for further findings. The supreme court noted that constitutional provision required the State to reimburse local agencies for the cost of any “new program or higher level of service.” Workers’ compensation, however, was not a new program, so the issue was whether higher benefit payments constituted a higher level of service. In no sense, the court found, could employers, whether public or private, be considered as administrators of a program of workers’ compensation or as providing services incidental to administration of the program. The court held that the intent of Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 was not to require the State to provide subvention whenever a newly enacted statute resulted incidentally in some cost to local agencies but only to require subvention for the expense or increased cost of programs administered locally and for expenses occasioned by laws imposing unique requirements on local governments that did not apply generally to all state residents or entities. Concluding that increases in the cost of providing these employee benefits were not subject to reimbursement as state-mandated programs or higher levels of service, the court held that the state board of control had properly denied the reimbursement claims. In County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (2d Dist. 2003) , a California appeals court held that a statute requiring special domestic violence training by local law enforcement officers did not mandate any increased costs for which a county was entitled to reimbursement. The Commission on State Mandates had denied the plaintiff county’s test claim for costs associated with a statute requiring local police to participate in two hours of domestic violence training. The county then petitioned for a writ of mandate, which the trial court granted, remanding the proceedings to the commission to determine the amount of costs actually incurred. On appeal, the county argued that neither local police officers nor their agencies were given any choice with respect to compliance with the law, and the training required the redirection of officers from their normal work to attend the two-hour training program. The county alleged that this substitution of the work agenda of the state for that of the local governments violated Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. On appeal, the court noted that, in order for a statute to impose a reimbursable state-mandated program, the statutory language



must obligate a task upon local government entities and the required activity or task must be new or it must create an increased or higher level of service over the former required level of service. The court found, however, that the imposition of the domestic violence training program did not mandate an “increased level of service.” In the case of an existing program, the court noted, an increase in existing costs does not result in a reimbursement requirement. Indeed, it held, for purposes of Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6, that every increase in a local government’s budget resulting from compliance with a new state directive does not amount to a “cost.” Rather, the constitutional provision prohibits only state attempts to divest itself of its responsibility for paying for a program or forcing a new program on a locality for which it does not have the funding. The State’s addition of a course requirement for policemen did not constitute a shift from the state to the county of a burden of state government. This statute merely required certain courses to be put into an already existing framework of training. Concluding that the loss of some flexibility in tailoring local training programs did not result in a reimbursable state-mandated program within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the court reversed. It directed the trial court to enter a new judgment denying the county’s petition for writ of mandate and reinstating the findings of the commission. It was held by the court in Gessler v. Doty, 2012 COA 4, 272 P.3d 1131 (Colo. App. 2012), that a requirement that counties pay the cost of conducting elections prevailed over an unfunded mandate statute such that the county, rather than the State, was required to bear the cost of providing drop-off boxes for mail-in ballots at polling places. In 2009, the General Assembly amended the State Election Code to permit voters personally to deliver mail-in ballots “on election day to any polling place in the county in which the elector is registered to vote” (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 1-8-113(1)(a)). No provision was made for whether the State or county would pay the cost of providing these drop-off boxes, and the county argued that to require it to supply the boxes would violate the unfunded mandate provision (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 29-1-304.5(1)). The court stated that while the statutes were irreconcilable, the requirement that counties pay election costs was more specific than the unfunded mandate statute, and the unfunded mandate statute did not express a manifest intent to supersede the existing election funding scheme. In City of St. Petersburg v. Remia, 41 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), a Florida appeals court held that requiring a refund of pension contributions to former police officers did not create an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. This action was brought under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.19, which provides that, “If any police officer leaves the service of the municipality before accumulating aggregate time of 10 years toward retirement and before being eligible to retire under the provisions of this chapter, such police officer shall be entitled to a refund of all of his or her contributions made to the municipal police officers’ retirement trust fund without interest, less any benefits paid to him or her.” The plaintiffs were former police officers who had left service prior to vesting in the city’s police pension fund. The city argued that requiring a refund created an unfunded mandate in violation of the constitutional provision. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the former police officers and the city and pension board appealed. A constitutional provision, Fla. Const. Art. X, § 14, provided that “[a] governmental unit responsible for any retirement or pension system supported in whole or in part by public funds shall not after January 1, 1977, provide any increase in the benefits to the members or beneficiaries of such system unless such unit has made or concurrently makes provision for the funding of the increase in benefits on a sound actuarial basis.” On appeal, the court held that the statute did not create a benefit or enhance the status of the officers but rather merely established an entitlement to a refund. Concluding that the former officers were entitled to immediate, full refunds of their pension contributions, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In Town of Wells v. Town of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 122, 775 A.2d 1174, 155 Ed. Law Rep. 1233 (Me. 2001), the Maine Supreme Court held that a statutorily revised school district funding formula did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unfunded state mandates, Me. Const. Art. IX, § 21. This action for declaratory judgment was brought by one town against another in the same school district, challenging the statutory revision. The new formula, based upon the number of public school students in each town rather than on a state valuation using other criteria, resulted in a greater funding obligation for the plaintiff town. Section 21 of Article IX provides that “the State may not require a local unit of government to expand or modify that unit’s activities so as to necessitate additional expenditures from local revenues unless the State provides annually 90% of the funding for these expenditures from State funds not previously appropriated to that local unit of government.” The trial court, finding that the new funding formula did not require the plaintiff town to expand or modify its activities, entered summary judgment declaring that the statutory revision was constitutional. On appeal, the court rejected the plaintiff town’s argument that its increase in the tax rate to meet the higher expenditure constituted a modification of its activities. Concluding that the new formula did not expand or modify the town’s activities so that it had to expend more local revenue for that expansion or modification, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.



In City of Worcester v. The Governor, 416 Mass. 751, 625 N.E.2d 1337, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 227 (1994), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that none of several challenged special education-related statutes and regulations constituted unfunded mandates. The plaintiff city had previously requested that the Division of Local Mandates (DLM) of the state auditor’s office review all the statutes, rules, and regulations concerning public education to determine whether they constituted unfunded local mandates within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C. The DLM determined that five of the statutes, rules, and regulations that it examined constituted unfunded local mandates, and it set a deficiency amount due to the city. In this action, the city requested a declaratory judgment that all of the statutes, rules, and regulations examined by DLM constituted unfunded local mandates. In one case, it contended that a regulatory amendment, expanding the definition of “substantial disability” for three and four year olds to include any conditions interfering with educational growth and development, greatly increased the number of children in that age group requiring special services. The court agreed with the State that, in fact, the amendment was only a clarification of existing law rather than a new law resulting in the imposition of a new service or cost. The city thus should have been providing special education services for the same children under the new law as under the amendment. The court therefore found that the amendment did not create an unfunded local mandate. In general, the court found, the city’s obligation to provide special education had not changed although the tuitions it paid had increased. It held that increased costs for services for services previously mandated did not constitute unfunded local mandates within the scope of section 27C. The court concluded that none of the statutes, rules, or regulations constituted unfunded mandates. In Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v. State, 460 Mich. 590, 597 N.W.2d 113 (1999), the Michigan Supreme Court held that a court reorganization act did not create an unfunded mandate in violation of the Headlee Amendment, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 29. The plaintiff city and county challenged an act which was designed to revise the organization and jurisdiction of the courts and provide a uniform funding mechanism. Specifically, they objected to the act’s imposition onto the city and county of the funding responsibilities for some reorganized courts, alleging that it placed funding obligations on them that they were not previously required to shoulder. The Headlee Amendment provides, “A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs.” The circuit court held that the act violated the Headlee Amendment and granted the city’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding inter alia that the act did not violate the Headlee Amendment. The supreme court emphasized that the Headlee Amendment only guarantees that the State will not reduce its proportion of the necessary costs of existing activities or services, and that the State will pay entirely for necessary costs when it mandates new activities or services or to the extent the State increases the level of an existing activity or service. It acknowledged that this particular city and county had not previously funded these courts. Nonetheless, many local units had been required to fund their local district or circuit courts. The court noted that the constitutional prohibition applied only to “new activities” imposed upon local units, and it held that a requirement that a particular local unit fund an activity that was previously locally funded, although not by this particular unit, would not constitute a “new activity.” Further, the court held, a requirement that a particular local unit fund an activity at the same level that another unit had previously locally funded it would not constitute an “increase” in the level of activity. Concluding, therefore, that the court reorganization act neither mandated a new activity nor increased the level of an activity on local units, the court affirmed that part of the court of appeals’ judgment. In Wayne County Bd. of Com’rs v. Wayne County Airport Authority, 253 Mich. App. 144, 658 N.W.2d 804 (2002), a Michigan appeals court held that an amendment to the State’s Aeronautics Code, transferring operational jurisdiction of two airports from a county to a statutorily created airport authority, was not an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The plaintiff county and county board of commissioners challenged Act 90, which amended the Michigan Aeronautics Code by adding a “public airport authority act,” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 259.108 to 259.125c, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The county had previously operated the airports. The plaintiffs claimed that Act 90 required new activities that were unfunded, thus violating the prohibition on unfunded mandates (POUM) of the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 29. Specifically, the plaintiff county challenged subsection 119(3) of Act 90, which required the county to contribute to the pensions of airport authority employees until the authority formed its own pension plan. The court found, however, that subsection 117(1)(d) provided that “the authority assumes unfunded obligations to provide pensions or retiree health insurance.” Thus, under this provision, the airport authority assumed and would be responsible for paying unfunded obligations relative to pensions. Finding no evidence to support the claim of an unfunded mandate, the court dismissed the complaint.



In School Dist. of Kansas City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 259 Ed. Law Rep. 930 (Mo. 2010) , the Missouri Supreme Court held that the State’s Charter Schools Act, Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 160.400 to 160.420, did not authorize an unfunded mandate in violation of the state constitution. This action was brought by a school district and three of its taxpayers, seeking a declaration that the statute violated Mo. Const. Art. X, §§ 16 to 24. This constitutional provision, commonly called the Hancock Amendment, was intended to protect taxpayers from the government’s ability to increase the tax burden above that previously borne by taxpayers. Section 16 provides, “The state is prohibited from requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to counties and other political subdivisions.” Section 21 prohibits the State from requiring unfunded new or increase activities or services. The Charter Schools Act authorized the creation of charter schools, or independent public schools, in metropolitan urban school districts. Where charter schools were operated by local educational agencies (LEAs) rather than by public school districts, the State provided funds, based on the number of students attending, directly to the LEAs and then reduced the funding to the school districts by an equivalent amount. The plaintiffs argued that the statute thereby created a new program of independent LEA charter schools that the State did not fund, constituting a new, unfunded state mandate. The circuit court rejected the claims that the statute permitted a local tax levy and placed an unfunded mandate on the district. On appeal as well, the supreme court found that the statute neither required any new or increased activity on the part of local school districts nor increased costs upon them for performing existing activities. It did not require the establishment of charter schools but only authorized them. The requirement upon the public school districts, to provide a free public education for all eligible students, remained as before the statute’s enactment. A public school district served no role in funding a charter school, and a charter school’s existence did not create or increase any mandate to the school district. The plaintiffs’ calculations included some discretionary expenditures, which were not mandated by the State. The court held that those figures were irrelevant for purposes of establishing a violation of the Hancock Amendment. Concluding that the statute did not authorize an unfunded mandate, the court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. In Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. 2007) (overruled on other grounds by, King-Willmann v. Webster Groves School Dist., 2012 WL 724788 (Mo. 2012)), the Missouri Supreme Court held that requiring a city to pay the full amount of contributions authorized by trustees to its police and firemen’s retirement systems did not violate the Hancock Amendment. Two separate actions were brought by the trustees for a city’s police retirement system and the trustees of the city’s firemen’s retirement system against the city, alleging that the city was required by statute to pay the entire contribution amounts authorized by the trustees. The defendant city argued that the Hancock Amendment, Mo. Const. Art. X, §§ 16 to 24, would be violated if it was required to pay the entire amounts because those amounts exceeded the amount it had previously paid. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff trustees, holding that the city was required to pay the entire amount of the authorized retirement contribution. On appeal, the court rejected the city’s argument, noting that, although it might be paying a higher dollar amount, the city’s requirements to pay were unchanged. There was thus no new or increased activity, as proscribed in the Hancock Amendment, and the city was not mandated to bear new responsibilities in relation to this activity. The court held that an unfunded mandate was not established where the same formula was used for funding a city’s police and firemen’s retirement systems as in the previous year. This was simply a continued responsibility for the city to fund an existing activity according to a previously existing formula. Concluding that this claim did not implicate the Hancock Amendment, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering the city to pay the entire amount certified. In Savage v. Third Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Lyon, 125 Nev. 9, 200 P.3d 77 (2009) , the Nevada Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484.37941, which permits third-time DUI offenders to apply for treatment for alcoholism, did not constitute an unfunded mandate. This action involved several petitioners applying for treatment pursuant to the statute. County courts refused to consider the applications, one in particular finding that the statute was an unfunded mandate. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354.599, if the state legislature were to direct local governments to “establish a program or provide a service, or increase a program or service already established which requires additional funding, and the expense required to be paid by each local government to establish, provide or increase the program or service is $5,000 or more, a specified source for the additional revenue to pay the expense must be authorized by a specific statute.” The court on appeal found, however, that section 454.37941 did not state or even suggest that the district court or the county was responsible for creating a program of treatment that would cost the county $5,000 or more. Thus, it held, the statute was not a prohibited unfunded mandate. The court concluded that the county courts abused their discretion in refusing to consider the applications, and it granted the petitions. In Opinion of the Justices, 157 N.H. 265, 949 A.2d 670 (2008), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a newly enacted



senate bill to reduce the minimum voting age for primary elections to 17 years of age did not create an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. This action was a request by the State House of Representatives for an opinion on the constitutionality of Senate Bill 436 which proposed to reduce the minimum voting age to age 17 for party presidential primaries or state primaries. In particular, the House wanted to know whether enactment of the bill would violate N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a because it would place specific responsibilities on local election supervisors maintaining voter checklists. Article 28-a provides that “The state shall not mandate or assign any new, expanded or modified programs or responsibilities to any political subdivision in such a way as to necessitate additional local expenditures by the political subdivision unless such programs or responsibilities are fully funded by the state or unless such programs or responsibilities are approved for funding by a vote of the local legislative body of the political subdivision.” The court found that the bill did not create any new program or require municipalities to accept any new responsibilities as they were in any case responsible for processing voter registrations. Thus, the court concluded, Senate Bill 436 did not unconstitutionally create an unfunded mandate for municipalities to accept new responsibilities with respect to voter registration requirements. In Town of Nelson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transp., 146 N.H. 75, 767 A.2d 435 (2001), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that a state highway reclassification did not constitute a constitutionally prohibited unfunded mandate. The plaintiff town challenged a reclassification by the defendant state department of transportation of two segments of a highway. The reclassification was necessitated by the construction of a new bypass over the highway, which served as the primary access route through the town. The town had earlier requested that the State continue to maintain the reclassified portions of the highway, even though they were no longer part of the highway. It argued that, if it were required to maintain those portions of the road, it would constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a, which bars the mandate of “any new, expanded or modified programs or responsibilities” to political subdivisions without full funding. The superior court held that the reclassification did not impose an unconstitutional, unfunded mandate on the town and thus ruled for the defendant. On appeal, the court noted that the classification of roads within the state was a constantly evolving process, predating the adoption of Article 28-a, which sometimes required movement of roads between the state-maintained system and the local system. The State, in deciding that a road which now served only local traffic would no longer be part of the state-maintained highway system, did not create a new or expanded responsibility or program. Maintenance of roads serving only local traffic was always a responsibility for the town. Concluding that the reclassification of the highway did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates, the court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. In Nashua School Dist. v. State, 140 N.H. 457, 667 A.2d 1036, 105 Ed. Law Rep. 578 (1995), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that including residential schools in the list of special education frameworks for which school districts were responsible did not create an unconstitutional unfunded mandate. The plaintiff school district sought a declaratory judgment against the State regarding the district’s responsibilities for the special education costs of students placed by the courts in residential schools. It claimed that a 1985 amendment to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:27, adding “residential school” to the definition of “home for children,” the costs of which local school districts paid, created an unfunded mandate in violation of N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a. The trial court found that the special education costs of students placed by the courts in residential schools had been paid by school districts prior to 1985 so that the legislative amendment did not transgress the constitutional ban against unfunded mandates. The court therefore dismissed the action. On appeal, the court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusions and it agreed that the amendment did not represent a new, expanded, or modified program or responsibility to the school district in such a way as to necessitate additional local expenditures. Concluding that the amendment did not create an unconstitutional unfunded mandate, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision.


Cases:

State did not violate constitutional prohibition on unfunded mandates by amending statutes governing teachers’ employment and tenure, since the amendments did not impose new or increased “activities” on school districts; amendments, including those requiring districts to implement an annual employee evaluation system for teachers and certain school administrators, allowing demotion of discharge of a tenured teacher upon a showing that the reason for demotion or discharge is not arbitrary and capricious, and adding new subjects that may not be topics of collective bargaining between a public school employer and a bargaining representative of its employees, merely modified existing protections to public employees. M.C.L.A. Const. Art. 9, §§ 25, 29; M.C.L.A. §§ 21.232(1), 38.101 et seq. Adair v. Michigan, 302 Mich. App. 305, 839 N.W.2d 681 (2013).



Trial court’s order requiring common-law township to take necessary actions to remedy failing private septic systems within its borders by constructing public sanitary-sewage system in compliance with the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA) did not violate the Headlee Amendment, which prohibited state from requiring any new or expanded activities by local government without full state financing, where NREPA did not impose a new burden on township, but rather required township to comply with legislation that had historically made units of local government responsible for the discharge of raw sewage that originated within its borders. M.C.L.A. Const. Art. 9, § 29(2). Dep’t of Environmental Quality v. Worth Twp, 299 Mich. App. 1, 829 N.W.2d 31 (2012). Statute requiring a public school district that lost accreditation to pay tuition for any resident pupil who attended an accredited school in another district in the same or an adjoining county did not impose “new” or “increased” activity or service on either district, as necessary to create an unfunded mandate in violation of amendment to state constitution; unaccredited district was already required to provide free public education to children of prescribed school age, and even if accredited district were to gain in its student population from enforcement of statute, statute did not change the level of services, i.e., kindergarten through twelfth grade, provided by that district. V.A.M.S. Const. Arts. 9, § 1(a), 10, §§ 16, 21; V.A.M.S. §§ 160.051(1), 167.131. Breitenfeld v. School Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013).

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§ 8. Did not mandate new expenditures

The following authority held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because the challenged action did not require any new expenditures. In Miller v. Director of Revenue, 719 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1986), the Missouri Supreme Court held that a statute requiring police officers to forward verified arrest reports and results of breath analysis tests to the Department of Revenue did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates where there was no evidence of actual increased costs. The plaintiff driver brought this action to challenge the suspension of his driving privileges for driving while intoxicated. The circuit court upheld the suspension. In this appeal, the plaintiff contended inter alia that the provisions of the law requiring municipal police officers to file certain reports with the Director of Revenue violated Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21. The court noted that a violation of the constitutional provision would exist if there were a new or increased activity or service required of a local subdivision and the subdivision incurred increased costs in performing that activity or service. In this case, the court found, there was no evidence of any increased costs from the rather minor reporting requirements. The court therefore affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.

§ 9. Merely shifted costs between local entities


The following authority held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because the challenged action merely shifted costs between local entities. In City of San Jose v. State of California, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1802, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521 (6th Dist. 1996), a California appeals court held that shifting costs from one local entity to another is not a reimbursable mandate under Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6.



The statute at issue authorized counties to charge cities for the costs of booking into county jails people who were arrested by city officers. The plaintiff city sued the State, alleging that counties functioned as agents of the state in terms of enforcing criminal laws. It contended that this statute was a classic example of the State attempting to shift to local entities the financial responsibility for providing public services. The State argued that the statute merely reallocated booking costs and was outside the rubric of the constitutional provision. The Commission on State Mandates ruled that the maintenance of jails and detention of prisoners were local matters and since cities and counties were both local entities, the statute did not create a reimbursable state mandated program. The trial court granted the city’s petition for a writ of mandate challenging the commission’s decision. On appeal, the court rejected the plaintiff city’s argument that the county acted as an agent of the state. It found that such a characterization was not supported by either case authority or the definitions in Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 and the legislation implementing it. The shift in funding in this case was not from the state to a local entity but from a local entity, the county, to another local entity, the city. The expenses of criminal detention and prosecution had traditionally been borne by the counties. Article XIII B treated cities and counties alike and thus it did not prohibit the shifting of costs between them. In any case, the court found, the statute at issue did not constitute a “new program or higher level of service.” Further, it was not “mandated” by the state because the terms of the statute were discretionary rather than mandatory. The court concluded that Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 did not prohibit the shifting of costs between counties and cities because it treats all local government entities similarly. It therefore reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed that it issue an order denying the city’s petition for a writ of mandate and enter judgment for the State.


Cases:

Funding scheme used by legislature to reimburse school districts for increased costs incurred in order to comply with certain recordkeeping mandates, reallocating otherwise guaranteed general per pupil foundation allowance allocation to a separate categorical funding allocation for the recordkeeping mandates, did not violate constitutional prohibition on unfunded mandates. M.C.L.A. Const. Art. 9, §§ 25, 29; M.C.L.A. § 388.1601 et seq. Adair v. Michigan, 302 Mich. App. 305, 839 N.W.2d 681 (2013). Statute requiring a public school district that lost accreditation to pay tuition for any resident pupil who attended an accredited school in another district in the same or an adjoining county did not shift a state tax burden to a local entity so as to violate constitutional amendment prohibiting unfunded mandates by the state; instead, statute shifted burdens among local entities in that it reallocated the existing educational responsibilities of the sending and receiving school districts. V.A.M.S. Const. Art. 10, §§ 16, 21; V.A.M.S. § 167.131. Breitenfeld v. School Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013).

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§ 10. Arose from voluntary act rather than state mandate

The courts in the following cases held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated where the challenged action arose from a local entity’s voluntary act rather than from a mandate by the State. In Livingston County v. Department of Management and Budget, 430 Mich. 635, 425 N.W.2d 65, 27 Env’t. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2250 (1988), the Michigan Supreme Court held that increased costs arising from a county’s voluntary act did not constitute an unfunded state mandate. The plaintiff county sought reimbursement from state agencies for its expenditures on improvements to a sanitary landfill, which it had built in compliance with the State’s Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA). The court of claims found for the county and the court of appeals affirmed. The Headlee Amendment to the



Michigan Constitution, Mich. Const. Art. 9, § 29, provides that “[a] new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs.” The parties presented contradicting interpretations of this provision. The court discussed whether it was intended to apply only to required and not optional activities or whether it applied whenever the State increased the level of any activity, whether optional or required, above the level required at the time of the amendment’s enactment. The court held that the Headlee Amendment was intended to apply only to increases in the level of those services and activities that state law mandated from the start. In this case, there was no ambiguity about whether or not the activity was required. The SWMA did not require counties to own and operate sanitary landfills, and thus, the construction of a sanitary landfill had been voluntarily assumed by the county and its operation was not a service or activity required by state law. Concluding that application of the provisions of the SWMA to the county’s sanitary landfill did not trigger the prohibition against unfunded mandates, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and held that the state had no liability to compensate the county for its increased costs. In Opinion of the Justices (Materials in Solid Waste Stream), 135 N.H. 543, 608 A.2d 870 (1992), New Hampshire’s Supreme Court held that a pending bill setting priorities of disposal of certain components in the solid waste stream and requiring towns to provide facilities to optimally manage the waste did not constitute an illegal unfunded mandate. The state house of representatives had adopted a resolution requesting the supreme court’s opinion on the constitutionality of a pending bill setting priorities for disposal of certain solid waste components. Specifically, the bill would prohibit the disposal, composting, or incineration of certain recyclable materials. The supreme court found that the proposed bill did not violate N.H. Const. pt. 1, Art. 28-a because it was not a “mandate” requiring the recycling of certain items and imposing responsibilities and expenditures on local subdivisions. Rather, the bill would prohibit disposal of certain items by the solid waste generator and prohibit the acceptance of those items by landfills, composting facilities, or incinerators for disposal. The current law in any case required every town to provide or assure access to approved solid waste facilities. Such facilities did not necessarily have to include recycling and towns were not required to provide their residents with the means to recycle. The proposed bill thus refined the definition of “solid waste” by excluding certain recyclable materials. The court therefore concluded that the proposed bill would not violate the constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates.

§ 11. Legislature did not specify mandate as unfunded

The following authority held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated where the legislature did not identify the challenged services as unfunded. In Tri-County Special Educ. Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne, 123 Cal. App. 4th 563, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 192 Ed. Law Rep. 919 (5th Dist. 2004), a California appeals court held that a special education agency was not implementing an unenforceable unfunded mandate by requiring a county to continue providing mental health services at its own expense. The plaintiff, a special education local plan area and county special education unit, sued the defendant county, seeking to force it to continue providing mental health services required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for persons with exceptional needs. The necessary state funding had been cut off when the legislature, for the 2002-2003 fiscal year, reduced its funding for IDEA mental health services from $47 million to $1,000 statewide. In response, the county had terminated its provision to special education students of the individualized services they needed. The plaintiff argued that it was thus left to provide the mandated services previously provided and paid for by the defendant county. The trial court held that the county had no duty to provide services under an unfunded state mandate. On appeal, the court rejected the county’s claim that it was not required to implement a mandate for provision of services where state funds were not provided. Rather, the court held, local governments were relieved from mandated duties only where the state legislature specifically stated that a mandate was not funded, citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 17581(a)(2). Thus, since the legislature did not identify these mental health services as unfunded, the legislature’s move to only nominally fund the mandate was not the functional equivalent of no funding whatsoever for the program. Further, the court held, until a court or the legislature would relieve a local government of this mandate, the local government continued to be obligated to perform the duties imposed by the mandate. The court therefore concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the county’s demurrers on the basis that the mandate was unenforceable because it was unfunded.



See In Elizabeth Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 2011 WL 6260731 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) , fully discussed in § 14, where the court, in holding that a regulation governing class sizes in high poverty school districts was not an unfunded mandate as the regulation fell within an exception to the unfunded mandates provisions of the constitution, also noted that the State Funding Reform Act, under which the regulation was promulgated, was designed to provide that every school district had the fiscal resources available for its students to meet the State’s educational standards and to this end the SFRA provided funding to meet these standards through the establishment of an adequacy budget, which was supported by a combination of State and local funds.

§ 12. Did not necessarily constitute a “mandate”

The following authority held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because, although the challenged action created a new program, it did not necessarily constitute a “mandate.” In Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig, 44 Cal. 3d 830, 244 Cal. Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 321 (1988), the California Supreme Court held that a law requiring school districts to contribute toward the education of severely handicapped students at state schools imposed a new program under the constitutional provision against unfunded mandates though it may not have constituted a prohibited “mandate.” This claim was filed to test the constitutionality of Cal. Educ. Code § 59300, which required school districts to contribute part of the cost of educating students from the district at state schools for the severely handicapped. School districts were sent invoices for their contributions; when they did not pay, the amount was deducted from the appropriations made by the State to the districts for general support of the schools. The plaintiff school districts challenged the law as imposing on them a “new program or higher level of service” for which the State would have to provide reimbursement under Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6. The Commission on State Mandates had determined that section 59300 did not impose a new program or higher level of service, after which the school districts filed a petition for writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and restitution. The trial court affirmed the commission’s decision, and the court of appeal affirmed that judgment. The supreme court noted that Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 was intended to preclude the state from shifting to local agencies the financial responsibility for providing public services, given the limited revenue resources of local entities. Because section 59300 shifted partial financial responsibility for the support of students in the state-operated schools from the state to the school districts, the court found, it did in fact call for the establishment of a new program within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Nonetheless, the court questioned whether the law “mandated” that school districts make these contributions. The Commission on State Mandates claimed that school districts were not compelled to contribute to the education of handicapped students and the state schools because they had other options for educating them, including the creation of local programs adequately suited to their needs. Holding that section 59300 did impose a new program or higher level of service, the supreme court reversed the court of appeal’s judgment but remanded to the Commission on State Mandates to determine whether the provision was state-mandated.

§ 13. Did not affect money from tax revenues

The following authority held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because the challenged action did not affect money from tax revenues. In Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates, 55 Cal. App. 4th 976, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (4th Dist. 1997), a California appeals court held that the State’s requiring a municipal redevelopment agency to allocate its tax increment financing on a specific project did not violate Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 and did not warrant reimbursement. In this action, a city’s redevelopment agency had sought reimbursement of allegedly unfunded mandated costs, pursuant to Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 and the statutes implementing it, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 17500 et seq. The disputed costs had arisen out of the agency’s transfer of money into its low and moderate-income housing fund as required by part of the Community Redevelopment Law, Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 33334.2 to 33334.3. The statute required a 20% deposit of tax increment financing for purposes of improving the supply of affordable housing. The agency claimed that the State’s control over allocations constituted a state-mandated new program or higher level of service, for which reimbursement or subvention of funds was



required. The Commission on State Mandates denied the agency’s claim, and the trial court denied its petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The court of appeal reasoned that tax increment financing was exempted from the constitutional provision, which historically applied only to costs recovered solely from tax revenues. The court noted that municipal redevelopment agencies have no independent powers of taxation. Further, it held, the State was not transferring any program for which it was formerly responsible. Thus concluding that the purposes of state subvention laws would not be furthered by requiring reimbursement when redevelopment agencies were required to allocate their tax increment financing in a particular manner, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

§ 14. Specifically exempted from prohibition

The courts in the following cases held that the prohibition against unfunded mandates was not violated because the challenged mandate was exempt either under the state constitution or by the statute imposing the mandate. Statute specifically provided for an exemption. In Town of Sturbridge v. Tantasqua Regional School Dist., 22 Mass. L. Rptr. 68, 2006 WL 4114307 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006), a Massachusetts court held that a revised assessment of shared expenses among towns in a school district did not constitute an unfunded mandate. The plaintiff town sued the defendant school district on various claims, including a request for a declaratory judgment that the town’s annual assessment for shared educational operating costs constituted an impermissible unfunded mandate. Under the State’s unfunded mandate law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C, “a law or regulation imposing new obligations on a municipality is not effective unless the Commonwealth provides by general law and any appropriation, for assumption by the [C]ommonwealth of such cost, exclusive of local administration expenses ….” The apportionment formula for sharing costs among the towns had previously been according to per capital enrollment. This was changed to a wealth-based formula, by which the plaintiff town now was apportioned a much larger payment. The court found that the funding arrangement was exempted from the unfunded mandate law. It cited Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 70, § 15, which specifically provides that “[t]his chapter shall apply to all cities, towns, and regional school districts, notwithstanding section twenty-seven C of chapter twenty-nine ….” The court therefore granted summary judgment to the defendant school district and to the commissioner of the department of education, who supported the defendant’s position. In Elizabeth Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ. of City of Elizabeth, 2011 WL 6260731 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) , the court held that a regulation governing class sizes in high poverty school districts was not an unfunded mandate as the regulation fell within an exception to the unfunded mandates provisions of the constitution. Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 6A:13-3.1, commencing with the 2008-2009 school year, high poverty school districts such as the district in the instant case were required to comply with state-mandated class size limitations. Responding to the argument that the class size requirement constituted an unfunded mandate, the court stated that a law or regulation constituted an unconstitutional “unfunded mandate” when: (1) the law imposed a “mandate” on a unit of local government; (2) direct expenditures were required for the implementation of the law’s requirements; and (3) the law failed to authorize resources, other than the property tax, to offset the additional direct expenditures on the unit of local government. Noting that the “unfunded mandate” amendment to the New Jersey Constitution expressly exempted several categories of laws, and rules or regulations issued pursuant to such laws, from the designation of “unfunded mandate,” the court observed that a law, rule, or regulation that “implements the provisions” of the constitution is not considered to be an “unfunded mandate” and is not subject to the unfunded mandate amendment (N.J. Const. Art. VIII § 2). The court concluded that the class size regulation was exempt from the unfunded mandates amendment to the constitution, finding that the constitution (N.J. Const. Art. VIII § 4 para 1) directs the legislature “to provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.” The court concluded that the regulation at issue in the instant case implemented the thorough and efficient education clause of the constitution. Moreover, the court determined that the State Funding Reform Act (SFRA), under which the regulation was promulgated, was designed to provide that every school district had the fiscal resources available for its students to meet the State’s educational standards and to this end the SFRA provided funding to meet these standards through the establishment of an adequacy budget, which was supported by a combination of state and local funds.



IV. Requested Relief Not Available

§ 15. Monetary remedy not available

The courts in the following cases held that the remedy for an unfunded mandate was not money damages or reimbursement but only a declaratory judgment. In County of San Diego v. State, 164 Cal. App. 4th 580, 79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 489 (4th Dist. 2008), a California appellate court held that counties were not entitled to reimbursement for the costs of providing unfunded state-mandated programs and services. The plaintiff counties brought this action seeking reimbursement for their costs of providing state-mandated programs and services from the 1994-1995 fiscal year through the 2003-2004 fiscal year. They alleged that by the end of fiscal year 2003-2004, one of them had expended more than $30 million and the other more than $110 million. The superior court ruled for the counties and ordered that the State appropriate funds over a 15-year period to pay the counties for the amounts owed for their previously incurred mandate costs. On appeal, the court found that this appropriation would violate the separation of powers doctrine. The court noted, however, that the counties were not left without a remedy for the legislature’s failure to fund state mandates. Under Cal. Gov’t Code § 17581(a), if a state-mandated program is specifically identified in a budget act as a mandate for which funding is not provided for that fiscal year, local agencies can choose not to implement the program during that fiscal year. Nonetheless, this relief is not available when a mandate is nominally, but not fully, funded as was the case with many of the mandates involved in this action. When the legislature provided only nominal funding for a mandate, a local agency’s remedy was to file an action under Cal. Gov’t Code § 17612(c) to declare the mandate unenforceable and to enjoin its enforcement for that fiscal year. The court therefore reversed the superior court’s judgment ordering a writ of mandate. In Berkeley Unified School Dist. v. State of California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 350, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 98 Ed. Law Rep. 314 (3d Dist. 1995), a California appellate court held that school districts waived the right to seek reimbursement for amounts expended on an unfunded state-mandated program by not pursuing the statutory remedy of seeking to declare the legislations unenforceable. The plaintiff school districts sought reimbursement for the costs of a state-mandated program to alleviate and prevent segregation. The legislature had deleted the funds from a local government claims bill to pay for the mandated costs. The trial court denied reimbursement. On appeal, the court noted that Cal. Gov’t Code § 17612 established the exclusive remedy for violation of Cal. Const. Art. 13B, § 6 and that was an action to stay enforcement of the further expenditure of mandated costs. The date the legislature deletes the funds also is the date upon which a cause of action accrues for reimbursement of state-mandated costs expended prior to that date. Concluding that because the districts did not use the remedy of section 17612 they waived any right to reimbursement for costs incurred thereafter and that the statute of limitations had run as to costs expended prior to that date, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In City of Worcester v. The Governor, 416 Mass. 751, 625 N.E.2d 1337, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 227 (1994), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that a municipality’s remedy for having incurred costs on an unfunded mandate is not reimbursement but rather a declaration of exemption. The plaintiff city had previously requested that the Division of Local Mandates (DLM) of the state auditor’s office review all the statutes, rules, and regulations concerning public education to determine whether they constituted unfunded local mandates within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 29, § 27C. The DLM determined that five of the statutes, rules, and regulations that it examined constituted unfunded local mandates and it set a deficiency amount due to the city. The city then brought this action in court, requesting a declaratory judgment that all of the statutes, rules, and regulations examined by the DLM constituted unfunded local mandates. The court found that none of the statutes, rules, or regulations constituted unfunded mandates. It then went beyond the necessities of this case to further state that, when a local government has incurred costs in implementing an unfunded mandate, it is not entitled to reimbursement but only to a declaration that it is exempt from the mandate. The court therefore concluded that the city was not entitled to reimbursement for its expenditures on those regulations which were unfunded mandates but only to a declaration that the mandates were ineffective. In Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 373 (Mo. 1995), the Missouri Supreme Court held that Missouri’s constitutional prohibition on unfunded mandates authorizes declaratory relief but not money damages. This action was brought by school districts and taxpayers, challenging the State’s failure to maintain sufficient state funding for special education. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and money damages. They alleged that, although they



received more money in special education aid than they had received 10 years earlier, the proportion of state reimbursement had been reduced. The circuit court entered summary judgment for the State. On appeal, the supreme court noted that Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21 prohibits the state “from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs” of mandated activities and from requiring local governments to begin new mandated activities or to increase the level of previously mandated activities beyond their level when the provision was enacted in 1980-1981 unless the legislature appropriates sufficient funds to finance the cost of the new or increased activity. Thus, the State would be in violation of Mo. Const. Art. X, § 21 if it did not appropriate sufficient funds to maintain the 1980-1981 proportion of its funding to local governments’ share for special education services. If the plaintiffs could present sufficient evidence to establish such a violation, however, they could not recover a money judgment because sovereign immunity protected the state from money judgments. The only available remedy would be a declaratory judgment. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

§ 16. No relief available because statute already revised

The following authority held that no relief was available for an alleged unfunded mandate where the challenged statute had previously been declared unconstitutional. In Taylor v. State, 247 S.W.3d 546 (Mo. 2008), the Missouri Supreme Court held that no relief was available for a challenge to a statute as an unconstitutional unfunded mandate where the court had already found it to be unconstitutional and it had been revised by the legislature. The plaintiff, an individual taxpayer, challenged the constitutionality of the State’s “Concealed-Carry Act,” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.094, which authorizes the issuance of permits for persons to carry concealed firearms. It further authorized counties, in Mo. Ann. Stat. § 50.535, to charge a fee for such permits, the money from which was to be deposited into a separate “sheriff’s revolving fund” to be used to pay “all reasonable and necessary costs and expenses for activities or services occasioned by compliance.” Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the statute violated Mo. Const. Art. X, §§ 16 to 24, known as the Hancock Amendment, which prohibits the State from “requiring any new or expanded activities by counties and other political subdivisions without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burdens to counties and other political subdivisions.” The circuit court entered summary judgment for the State. On appeal, the court noted that it had already addressed a similar challenge to the same statute in Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. 2004), as modified on denial of reh’g, (Mar. 30, 2004), and had found it unconstitutional, after which the legislature revised the statute to its current language. The plaintiff here sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional and also that any permits issued earlier were null and void. This, the court held, would not be an appropriate remedy for an unfunded mandate because voiding permits would not restore to the county or its taxpayers the money that had already been expended in issuing the permits. Since the court had already granted the permissible declaratory relief in its earlier decision, it held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief and it affirmed the circuit court’s decision.

§ 17. Failed to pursue other avenues for relief

The courts in the following cases held that local entities were not entitled to relief from alleged unfunded mandates where they had failed to pursue administrative remedies via a writ of mandate or, in California, through the Commission on State Mandates. In Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. California Dept. of Educ., 169 Cal. App. 4th 869, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 890, 240 Ed. Law Rep. 307 (3d Dist. 2008), a California appellate court held that pursuing claims in the Commission on State Mandates would not be futile and was required in order to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiff high school district sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant state department of education (DOE) in connection with alleged unfunded state mandates to pay the costs of mental health services for special education students. Previously, counties had provided mental health services for special education students, but when the state legislature slashed the funding for such services, this county obtained a court judgment that it no longer had to provide them because it was an unfunded state mandate. The DOE then required local school districts to absorb the costs of the services. In response to the plaintiff district’s suit for a declaration that it should not have to pay these costs, the defendant demurred. It argued that the plaintiff failed to



exhaust available administrative remedies because it did not first submit the dispute to the California Commission on State Mandates. The trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrer. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that it would be futile to pursue administrative proceedings in that commission. The evidence, however, suggested that partial reimbursement might be available for the mandate. The court noted that such determinations would be made in the first instance by the Commission on State Mandates. Further, the judiciary lacks any general warrant to compel appropriations or to declare a mandate unenforceable except after the commission finds an unfunded mandate. The court concluded that the plaintiff school district was not excused from exhausting available administrative remedies on the ground of futility. Holding that its failure to exhaust an available administrative remedy barred its complaint, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In County of Tuolumne v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 2006 WL 165045 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2006), unpublished/noncitable, a California appeals court held that a county could not avoid paying for residential school placement of a handicapped student by claiming that it constituted an unfunded mandate. Having been denied mandamus relief by the trial court, the defendant county was ordered to pay for residential school placement of a handicapped student pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Act and related state laws. The county argued that the order implemented an unfunded state mandate in violation of Cal. Const. Art. XIII, § 6. By statute, each county’s mental health service was responsible for the provision of assessments and services included in individual education programs (IEPs) for appropriate students. The primary funding for those services was supposed to be provided through state budget appropriations to the counties. The state legislature in 2002, however, appropriated only $1,000 for such services statewide. In response, the county’s board of supervisors unilaterally terminated its funding of mental health and related services under IEPs. One student’s parent obtained a hearing on the matter, and the hearing officer ordered the county to provide for services from that date forward. The trial court ruled that the county was not entitled to raise the unfunded mandate issue in a mandamus proceeding, but rather, its exclusive remedy was a petition for writ of mandate. The county had not pursued that remedy, nor had it sought relief from the Commission on State Mandates. The court of appeals concluded that the unfunded state mandate defense was not available to the defendant county in this case, and it affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

West’s Key Number DigestWest’s Key Number Digest, Schools 19(1)West’s Key Number Digest, States 111

Westlaw DatabasesJournal of Public Budgeting, Accounting, and Financial Management (JPBUDACFM)Office of Management and Budget Circulars (OMB-CIRCULAR)School District Budget Report (ONLNSDBR)WESTLAW® Search Query: “UNFUNDED MANDAT!”

A.L.R. LibraryA.L.R. Index, Budgets and Budgetary MattersA.L.R. Index, Municipal CorporationsA.L.R. Index, StatesWest’s A.L.R. Digest, States §§111Validity, Construction, and Application of State Constitutional and Statutory Balanced Budget Provisions, 82 A.L.R.6th 497Validity of Public School Funding Systems, 110 A.L.R.5th 293Implied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutions, 75 A.L.R.5th 619Treatment of surplus in making tax levy under budget, 126 A.L.R. 891Budget provisions of constitution or statute in relation to appropriation of state funds, 40 A.L.R. 1067

Legal EncyclopediasAm. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation § 58C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 744C.J.S., States § 312



Treatises and Practice AidsLocal Government Law § 3:4

Additional ReferencesAppellate Materials, Brief on Appeal—Appellees [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919826Appellate Materials, Defendants-Appellants’ Reply Brief [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919825Appellate Materials, Defendants-Appellants’ Brief on Appeal [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919824Appellate Materials, Defendant-Appellees’ Brief on Appeal [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919823Appellate Materials, Reply Brief on Appeal—Appellants [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919822Appellate Materials, Brief on Appeal—Appellants [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2009 WL 2919821Appellate Materials, Brief on Appeal—Appellees [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2003 WL 22705248Appellate Materials, Reply Brief on Appeal—Appellants [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2003 WL 22705247Appellate Materials, Brief on Appeal—Appellants [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2003 WL 22705246Appellate Materials, Brief in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants [Adair v. State of Michigan], 2003 WL 22705245

Footnotes

1 Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 424 Mich. 364, 381 N.W.2d 662, 30 Ed. Law Rep. 870 (1985).

2 County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates, 150 Cal. App. 4th 898, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (2d Dist. 2007).

3 Kinlaw v. State of California, 54 Cal. 3d 326, 285 Cal. Rptr. 66, 814 P.2d 1308 (1991).

4 School Dist. of Kansas City v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 259 Ed. Law Rep. 930 (Mo. 2010).

5 Atwater v. City of Weston, 64 So. 3d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

6 City of Riverview v. Michigan, 292 Mich. App. 516, 808 N.W.2d 532 (2011), appeal denied, 491 Mich. 885, 809 N.W.2d 581 (2012); Wayne County Chief Executive v. Governor, 230 Mich. App. 258, 583 N.W.2d 512 (1998).

7 It remanded to the Commission on State Mandates for determination of whether, and by what amount, the statutory standards of care forced the county to incur costs in excess of the funds provided by the State and to determine the statutory remedies to which the county was entitled. Thereafter, the court of appeals, County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates, 2003 WL 22205626 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2003), unpublished/noncitable, required the State to reimburse the county for the amount of the unfunded mandate.

End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.


Construction and Application of State P..., 76 A.L.R.6th 543 (Originally published in 2012)

Citing References (9)

Title Date Type Depth1. Validity, Construction, and Application of State Constitutional and Statutory Balanced Budget Provisions82 A.L.R.6th 497This annotation collects and discusses the cases that have addressed the validity, construction, and application of state constitutional and statutory balanced budget provisions....

2013 ALR —

2. Implied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutions75 A.L.R.5th 619This annotation collects and analyzes cases decided since 1971 in which the courts considered whether a right of action for a state constitutional violation may be implied, i.e.,...

2000 ALR —

3. Validity of Public School Funding Systems 110 A.L.R.5th 293This annotation collects and discusses the state and federal cases that consider the validity of public school funding systems. The annotation is limited to cases dealing solely...

2003 ALR —

4. Budget provisions of constitution or statute in relation to appropriation of state funds40 A.L.R. 1067There is but little judicial authority relating to the budget provisions of constitutions and statutes. It will be observed that the reported case (Baltimore v. O’Conor, ante,...

1926 ALR —

5. Treatment of surplus in making tax levy under budget126 A.L.R. 891The purpose of the present annotation is to discuss the cases which involve the treatment of an existing surplus of money or credit in making up a tax levy under a budget for a...

1940 ALR —

6. West’s A.L.R. Digest 360K111, 111. State expenses and charges and statutory liabilitiesWest’s A.L.R. Digest

2014 Other Secondary Source

—

7. West’s A.L.R. Digest 141EK219, 219. In generalWest’s A.L.R. Digest


—



Title Date Type Depth

8. 9 Witkin, California Summary 10th Taxation s 119, Requirement.Witkin, California Summary 10th TaxationUnder Cal. Const., Art. XIII B, §6(a), when the Legislature or a state agency mandates a new program or a ‘’higher level of service’’ for a local government, the state must...

— Other Secondary Source

—

9. Am. Jur. 2d State and Local Taxation s 58, Territorial limitations of powerAm. Jur. 2d State and Local TaxationThe right of a State to tax realty depends primarily upon its territorial jurisdiction over the area. Under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, any attempt by a State...


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Table of Authorities (64)

Treatment Referenced Title Type Depth Page Numbe

r— 1. Adair v. Michigan

839 N.W.2d 681, Mich.App., 2013EDUCATION - School Districts. School districts were not required to show specific amount of alleged underfunded mandate.

Case — 543+

— 2. Adair v. State785 N.W.2d 119, Mich., 2010EDUCATION - School Districts. Recordkeeping requirements imposed on school districts violated prohibition on unfunded mandates in state constitution.

Case — 543+

— 3. Atwater v. City of Weston64 So.3d 701, Fla.App. 1 Dist., 2011GOVERNMENT - Public Officials. Named defendants were not proper parties to suit.

Case — 543+

— 4. Berkeley Unified School Dist. v. State of California39 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, Cal.App. 3 Dist., 1995State Aid. School districts were not entitled to reimbursement for costs incurred due to state-mandated antisegregation program.

Case — 543+

— 5. Breitenfeld v. School Dist. of Clayton399 S.W.3d 816, Mo., 2013EDUCATION - Tuition and Fees. “Unaccredited District Tuition Statute” did not violate constitutional prohibition against an unfunded mandate.

Case — 543+

— 6. Brooks v. State128 S.W.3d 844, Mo., 2004GOVERNMENT - Concealed-Carry Laws. Concealed-Carry Act was unenforceable in four counties.

Case — 543+


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Treatment Referenced Title Type Depth Page

Number

— 7. Budget provisions of constitution or statute in relation to appropriation of state fundsBudget provisions of constitution or statute in relation to appropriation of state funds1926 WL 60014, 1926There is but little judicial authority relating to the budget provisions of constitutions and statutes. It will be observed that the reported case (Baltimore v. O’Conor, ante,...

Secondary Source

— 543

— 8. California School Boards Assn. v. State121 Cal.Rptr.3d 696, Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2011EDUCATION - Finance. Adequate remedy at law precluded mandamus relief to school districts for unfunded mandates.

Case — 543+

— 9. City of Riverview v. Michigan808 N.W.2d 532, Mich.App., 2011GOVERNMENT - Jurisdiction. Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction over city’s action against DEQ for violation of Headlee Amendment.

Case — 543+

— 10. City of Sacramento v. State of California266 Cal.Rptr. 139, Cal., 1990City brought class action seeking subvention from state of costs incurred in providing unemployment compensation coverage for its employees. The Superior Court, Sacramento...

Case — 543+

— 11. City of San Jose v. State of California53 Cal.Rptr.2d 521, Cal.App. 6 Dist., 1996GOVERNMENT - Unfunded Legislation. Statute authorizing counties to charge cities for costs of booking city arrestees into county jails did not create constitutionally reimbursable...

Case — 543+


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Number

— 12. City of St. Petersburg v. Remia41 So.3d 322, Fla.App. 2 Dist., 2010LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Public Employment. Former police officers who had not vested in pension were entitled to immediate, full refund of their contributions.

Case — 543+

— 13. City of Worcester v. The Governor625 N.E.2d 1337, Mass., 1994Local Mandates. None of statutes, rules, or regulations dealing with public education constituted unfunded local mandates.

Case — 543+

— 14. County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates58 Cal.Rptr.3d 762, Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2007GOVERNMENT - States. Commission on State Mandates had to determine if new pollution-related obligations on county and cities were subject to subvention requirements.

Case — 543+

— 15. County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates2 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2003GOVERNMENT - Public Safety. Statute requiring law enforcement officers to undertake specific training was not unfunded mandate.

Case — 543+

— 16. County of Los Angeles v. State of California233 Cal.Rptr. 38, Cal., 1987After State mandated increases in certain workers’ compensation benefits, cities and counties, as self-insured employers, brought action against State for reimbursement of required...

Case — 543+


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Number

— 17. County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates2003 WL 22205626, Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2003In County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, the California Supreme Court held the Legislature’s exclusion of medically indigent adults from the California...

Case — 543+

— 18. County of San Diego v. State79 Cal.Rptr.3d 489, Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2008GOVERNMENT - States. Counties were not entitled to a writ of mandate compelling prompt payment of reimbursement for state-mandated programs.

Case — 543+

— 19. County of San Diego v. State of California61 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, Cal., 1997SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES - Reimbursement to County. County’s obligation to MIP’s as provider of last resort following their exclusion from Medi-Cal resulted from reimbursable...

Case — 543+

— 20. County of Tuolumne v. Special Educ. Hearing Office2006 WL 165045, Cal.App. 5 Dist., 2006This is an appeal from a judgment denying mandamus relief to a county that has been ordered to pay for residential school placement of a handicapped student pursuant to the...

Case — 543+

— 21. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Michigan Education Association in Support of Plaintiffs-AppellantsDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools, and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellan...2003 WL 22705245, Mich., 2003Amicus Curiae, the Michigan Education Association, accepts as true the Statement of Facts set forth in the main Brief on Appeal filed herein by Plaintiffs-Appellants, This lawsuit...

Appellate Court Document

— 543


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Number

— 22. Reply Brief on Appeal -- AppellantsDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools, and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appella...2009 WL 2919822, Mich., 2009The School Districts rely on the Statement of Material Proceedings and Facts included within their previously filed brief on appeal. Certain representations that are a part of the...


— 543

— 23. Brief on Appeal -- AppellantsDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools, and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appella...2009 WL 2919821, Mich., 2009This case was brought as an original action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Const 1963, art 9, § 32. This Court has jurisdiction under MCR 7.301(2) to review by appeal the...


— 543

— 24. Brief on Appeal - AppelleesDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools, and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appelle...2009 WL 2919826, Mich., 2009This case was brought as an original action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Const 1963, art 9, § 32. This Court has jurisdiction under MCR 7.301(2) to review by appeal the...


— 543

— 25. Reply Brief on Appeal - AppellantsDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellan...2003 WL 22705247, Mich., 2003The plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter ‘’plaintiff-taxpayers’’) offer this Reply Brief in support of their position in this matter, pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court practice and...


— 543




Number

— 26. Brief on Appeal - AppelleesDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellan...2003 WL 22705248, Mich., 2003I. Whether resjudicata bars the claims of those plaintiffs who also were plaintiffs in Durant v State of Michigan, 456 Mich 175 (1997). II. Whether the claims of those plaintiffs...


— 543

— 27. Brief on Appeal - AppellantsDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellan...2003 WL 22705246, Mich., 2003The Michigan Court of Appeals had original jurisdiction over the present suit pursuant to Const 1963, art 9, § 32. This Court has jurisdiction to review on appeal the final...


— 543

— 28. Defendant-Appellees’ Brief on AppealDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellan...2009 WL 2919823, Mich., 2009I. Const 1963, art 9, § 32 awards costs incurred in maintaining a suit only where a taxpayer’s ‘’suit is sustained.’’ In the present suit, Plaintiffs raised 21 claims under several...


— 543

— 29. Defendants-appellants’ Brief on AppealDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellee...2009 WL 2919824, Mich., 2009I. The prohibition of unfunded mandates (POUM) clause in Michigan’s Headlee Amendment requires the State to appropriate money to a local unit of government for any ‘’necessary...


— 543




Number

— 30. Defendants-Appellants’ Reply BriefDaniel ADAIR, a Taxpayer of the Fitzgerald, Public Schools; and Fitzgerald Public, Schools, a Michigan municipal corporation, et al, Plaintiffs-Appell...2009 WL 2919825, Mich., 2009At issue in this appeal is the standard that the Court of Appeals announced for establishing a Headlee violation in a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to the prohibition...


— 543

— 31. Department of Environmental Quality v. Worth Tp.829 N.W.2d 31, Mich.App., 2012GOVERNMENT - Municipalities. Order requiring compliance with NREPA by constructing public sewage system did not violate Headlee Amendment.

Case — 543+

— 32. Durant v. State Bd. of Educ.381 N.W.2d 662, Mich., 1985Action was filed to compel state to fund public school system in same proportion that system was funded in 1978–1979. The Court of Appeals denied the writ of mandamus, 110...

Case — 543+

— 33. Elizabeth Educ. Ass’n v. Board of Educ. of City of Elizabeth2011 WL 6260731, N.J.Super.A.D., 2011EDUCATION - Finance. Appellate Division had jurisdiction over appeal from Board of Education decision that district violated class size regulation.

Case — 543+

— 34. Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. State896 S.W.2d 918, Mo., 1995Funding of Special Education Mandates. State Constitution required state to maintain same ratio of state financing to local financing of mandated special education in local school...

Case — 543+


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Number

— 35. Gessler v. Doty272 P.3d 1131, Colo.App., 2012GOVERNMENT - Elections. County, rather than state, was required to bear cost of providing drop-off boxes for mail-in ballots at polling places.

Case — 543+

— 36. Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. California Dept. of Educ.86 Cal.Rptr.3d 890, Cal.App. 3 Dist., 2008EDUCATION - School Districts. High school district was not excused from exhausting administrative remedies in connection with alleged unfunded state mandate.

Case — 543+

— 37. Implied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutionsImplied cause of action for damages for violation of provisions of state constitutions2000 WL 64965, 2000This annotation collects and analyzes cases decided since 1971 in which the courts considered whether a right of action for a state constitutional violation may be implied, i.e.,...

Secondary Source

— 543

— 38. Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v. State597 N.W.2d 113, Mich., 1999JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION - Judges. Court reorganization act neither mandated new activity nor increased level of activity on local government.

Case — 543+

— 39. Kinlaw v. State of California285 Cal.Rptr. 66, Cal., 1991Medically indigent adults and taxpayers brought action against State and director of Department of Health Services of State, alleging that State had shifted its financial...

Case — 543+


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Number

— 40. Lewis v. Leon County73 So.3d 151, Fla., 2011GOVERNMENT - Counties. Statute mandating county funding of court-appointed counsel violated state constitution.

Case — 543+

— 41. Livingston County v. Department of Management and Budget425 N.W.2d 65, Mich., 1988County brought action against Department of Management and Budget and Department of Natural Resources seeking reimbursement for expenditures for improvements to sanitary landfill...

Case — 543+

— 42. Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig244 Cal.Rptr. 677, Cal., 1988School districts filed petition for writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and restitution, seeking declaration that statute requiring local school districts to pay 10% of excess...

Case — 543+

— 43. Miller v. Director of Revenue719 S.W.2d 787, Mo., 1986Driver sought trial de novo of Director of Revenue’s suspension of his driving privileges for driving while intoxicated. The Circuit Court, Boone County, J.M. Pinnell, J., upheld...

Case — 543+

— 44. Nashua School Dist. v. State667 A.2d 1036, N.H., 1995School district brought declaratory judgment action against state regarding district’s responsibilities for certain special education costs. The Superior Court, Hillsborough...

Case — 543+

— 45. Neske v. City of St. Louis218 S.W.3d 417, Mo., 2007GOVERNMENT - Municipalities. City was required to pay entire contribution amounts certified for police and firefighter retirement systems.

Case — 543+


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Number

— 46. New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers’ Compensation Fund v. Flynn573 A.2d 439, N.H., 1990Petition was filed for declaratory judgment that statute, which created prima facie presumption that fire fighter suffering from cancer incurred disease while employed, violated...

Case — 543+

— 47. Opinion of the Justices949 A.2d 670, N.H., 2008GOVERNMENT - Elections. Proposed senate bill to reduce voter age to 17 for presidential and state primary elections violated constitutional requirement that individuals be 18 years...

Case — 543+

— 48. Opinion of the Justices (Materials in Solid Waste Stream)608 A.2d 870, N.H., 1992State House of Representatives adopted a resolution requesting that Supreme Court give opinion as to constitutionality of pending House bill setting priorities for disposal of...

Case — 543+

— 49. Orr v. Edgar670 N.E.2d 1243, Ill.App. 1 Dist., 1996GOVERNMENT - Elections. State’s implementation of two-tier system of voter registration, one for national elections and another for state and local elections, violated Illinois...

Case — 543+

— 50. Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates64 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, Cal.App. 4 Dist., 1997GOVERNMENT - States. State was not required to reimburse city redevelopment agency for its deposits into housing fund of its tax increment financing proceeds.

Case — 543+


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Number

— 51. Rolla 31 School Dist. v. State837 S.W.2d 1, Mo., 1992School districts sued state over financing of mandatory preschool special program. The Circuit Court, Cole County, Byron L. Kinder, J., granted summary judgment to both parties,...

Case — 543+

— 52. Savage v. Third Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Lyon200 P.3d 77, Nev., 2009CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Pretrial Diversion. Court had to consider merits of third-time DUI offenders’ applications for treatment for alcoholism.

Case — 543+

— 53. School Dist. of Kansas City v. State317 S.W.3d 599, Mo., 2010EDUCATION - School Districts. Charter Schools Act did not permit local tax levy to go to LEA charter schools in violation of state constitution.

Case — 543+

— 54. State Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates163 Cal.Rptr.3d 439, Cal.App. 2 Dist., 2013ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Clean Water. Stormwater sewer permit’s requirements were federal mandates exempt from subvention.‐

Case — 543+

— 55. Taylor v. State247 S.W.3d 546, Mo., 2008GOVERNMENT - Licensing. Taxpayer was not entitled to any relief in action challenging constitutionality of Concealed–Carry Act.

Case — 543+

— 56. Town of Nelson v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transp.767 A.2d 435, N.H., 2001GOVERNMENT - Highways and Roads. Reclassification of highway did not violate constitutional prohibition against unfunded mandates.

Case — 543+


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Number

— 57. Town of Sturbridge v. Tantasqua Regional School Dist.2006 WL 4114307, Mass.Super., 2006Plaintiff, Town of Sturbridge (“Sturbridge”), brought this action against the defendants, the Tantasqua Regional School District (“Tantasqua District”), which is comprised of five...

Case — 543+

— 58. Town of Wells v. Town of Ogunquit775 A.2d 1174, Me., 2001EDUCATION - Finance. Revised funding formula for community school district was constitutional.

Case — 543+

— 59. Treatment of surplus in making tax levy under budgetTreatment of surplus in making tax levy under budget1940 WL 70617, 1940The purpose of the present annotation is to discuss the cases which involve the treatment of an existing surplus of money or credit in making up a tax levy under a budget for a...

Secondary Source

— 543

— 60. Tri-County Special Educ. Local Plan Area v. County of Tuolumne19 Cal.Rptr.3d 884, Cal.App. 5 Dist., 2004EDUCATION - Alternative Education. Agencies had no cause of action to enforce county’s obligation to provide mental health services.

Case — 543+

— 61. Validity of Public School Funding Systems Validity of Public School Funding Systems2003 WL 21697205, 2003This annotation collects and discusses the state and federal cases that consider the validity of public school funding systems. The annotation is limited to cases dealing solely...

Secondary Source

— 543


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Number

— 62. Validity, Construction, and Application of State Constitutional and Statutory Balanced Budget ProvisionsValidity, Construction, and Application of State Constitutional and Statutory Balanced Budget Provisions2013 WL 709269, 2013This annotation collects and discusses the cases that have addressed the validity, construction, and application of state constitutional and statutory balanced budget provisions....

Secondary Source

— 543

— 63. Wayne County Bd. of Com’rs v. Wayne County Airport Authority658 N.W.2d 804, Mich.App., 2002TRANSPORTATION - Aviation. Airport authority act did not unconstitutionally impair county’s contractual obligations.

Case — 543+

— 64. Wayne County Chief Executive v. Governor583 N.W.2d 512, Mich.App., 1998GOVERNMENT - Counties. County was not entitled to seek money damages in action alleging violation of constitutional provision requiring state financing of local government’s...

Case — 543+


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blogs.edweek.org · Web viewMo. Ann. Stat. 162.700, 162.975, which mandated that school districts...

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Transcript of blogs.edweek.org · Web viewMo. Ann. Stat. 162.700, 162.975, which mandated that school districts...