tality o f entities that can be present within the world or as the region that at any time embraces these entities, but “ world” is con­ceived as that wherein the Dasein dwells. “W orld” for Heidegger is that in terms of which the Dasein refers itself; on the strength of which the mode of being of context or bearing (Bewandtnis) is possible. The being of W orld is thus dependent on Bewandtnis- zusanmienhang (frame of reference or bearing).

It is, therefore, clear that in Heidegger we find no world that apparently is separate from the self, only later to discover, as in Kant, that it is constituted by the self. Rather we find “world” de­fined in terms of Dasein, and once again we run up against the fiat nature of Heidegger’s argument. Yet it is also clear that the Dasein constitutes this world as so defined by Heidegger— for the very notion of Bewandtniszusammenhang is derived from the activity of the Dasein: in particular from its understanding. W e can only con­clude that such terms as “Dasein,” “world,” and so forth do not (like Kant’s conceptions of world, nature, self, and Understand­ing) represent the end product of Dasein in functioning and activ­ity. Rather they represent the way in which these terms must be understood in order to account for the fact that the Dasein does so function and is active in this way. For Kant, “world” is a concept that is a result of the categorical, constitutive nature of Under­standing as well as the result of the working of the Reason. But Kant does not, like Heidegger, ask what must be the bein£T-of-the- world and of-the-self in order that this very functioning may be possible.

This is the sense in which the work of Heidegger may be called ontologically transcendental or ontologically critical. Heidegger is seeking the ontologically necessary preconditions of all ontic or regional activity and function in man.

The “ transcendence problem” cannot be reduced to the question:how does a subject go out toward an object, whereby the totalityof objects becomes identified with the idea of world. The ques-

being. The term “ ontic” is a Heideggerean innovation and refers to the study of particular elements that have being. This parallels the distinction between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiende). The various sciences are, for example, ontic disci­plines because they deal with beings (animals, light waves, mathematical functions, etc.). There is a sense, then, in which every discipline except ontology is ontic.