(CHAPTER V

BILATERAL ISSUES CONFRONTING REGIONAL, CO-OPERATION -

A CASE STIIJDY OF INDO - PAK RELATIONS

(Kashmir, Nuclear Arms Race and Cross Border 'Terrorism, Siachen)

From Colonialism to Independence

Kashmir Issue

Accession of Kaslunir

Crisis in East Pakistan and Emergence of Bangladesh

Nuclear A r m s Race

Impact of Arms Build-up on Development

Cross-Border Terrorism

The New Phase - Post-Pokhran Development

Dialogue Process in the Post-Nuclear Phase

Lahore Bus Diplomacy

Kargil Issue

Siachen Dispute

Though South Asia has been treated as a different region in the world,

it has been in fact, very late in understanding the necessity of regional

co-operation. It was only in bIay 1980 that the idea of a r e ~ o n a l forum for

South Asian States was officially floated by late President Zia-U1-Rahman of

Bangladesh. Within a short !:pan of time, SAARC has gained enough

strength and importance after the first summits of South Asian Heads of

governments, held on 7-8 December 1985. Within the brief period, SAARC

has developed a respectable network of technical and action committees

consisting of technical experts imd policy administrators. This network now

covers more than a dozen areas >f activity.

The present political configuration of South Asia is the product of the

process of decolonization that f~ rmed by the end of the Second World War

in 1945. The colonialist, imperialist interests very tactfully divided region

and sowed the seeds of balkanization. The countries responsible for the

advent of SAARC are the products of composite cultural ethos, which in turn

has been the result of multifarious socio-economic, linguistic, ethnic and

religio-philosophic strains evolved through the millions of years. It is the

bilateral issues that confront the regional co-operation. A united, integrated

and homogeneous region is bourtd to emerge. Let us examine bilateral issues

confronting regional cooperation between India and Pakistan.

5.1 From Colonialism to Independence

"South Asia is the classic :lome of western imperialism."' The western

powers did not want to colonize the whole of South Asia and perhaps,

I Myron Weiner, 'The Politics of South 4siq" in Gabriel A. ;Umor1d &lames S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of ihe Developing Areas (hew Jersey Princeton Uruversity Press, 1971 ) p. 16

wanted to do it in selected areas. However, in terms of size and population,

they left a very small part of the region u~icolonized, Bhutan and Nepal were

not colonized as these Himalayan Kingdoms did not offer them in terms

material gains, nor was Maldives is very attractive for this purpose. But it

has become a protectorate of British as early as 1887 and this status

continued till the independence in 1965.' Real colonies were India and Sri

Lanka. In the beghung of colonialism, India comprised Pakistan and

Bangladesh; Pakistan was made out of India in the year 1947. East Bengal

was then part of Palastan. Easl: Pakistan (East Bengal) became independent

country as Bangladesh on 16 December 197 1, after waging a struggle for

independence against its Pakistmi rulers.

East India came into instance in 1600 as a commercial company,

gradually captured political power in areas, which they termed as British

India, entered into different kinds of political relationships with princely

states. Their political sway continued till 1857 mutiny. The British crown

took over the governance of India in 1858, as a result of 1857 mutiny, whlch

is also called the first war of independence. Gradually, India became an

independent and sovereign state on 15 August 1947. Even after partition,

India and Pakistan have been pursuing diametrically opposite policies on

many issues of common concexn. The partition has left deep wounds in both

the nations psyche. "A major cff shoot of British imperialism in South Asia

was the growing bitterness and distrust between the core-nation India and

Note: Most of the South Asian Countr~es that have become independent have adopted western model of liberal democracy, as there had been no alternative.

other peripheral nations, especially ~akistan."' Political leadership of

Pakistan has gained maximuni benefits out of the South Asian tension.

Talung advantage of thls, Palustm has taken maximum military and economic

aid from the U.S.

The communal riots that followed partition gave birth to series of

human tragedies and created er~ough suspicion and distrust even among the

people. Pakistan leadership, ins:ead of removing that suspicion and mistrust,

made these aspects as the foundation of their foreign policy. The Indo-Pak

war that began within weeks oi'partition over the Kashrnir issue made both

the countries hostile to each other and the hostility still continues. Palustan

joined SEAT0 and CENT0 - both now defunct bodies saw the U.S.

connection as prospective umbrslla against "Indian e ~ ~ a n s i o n i s m . " ~ It would

be ideal to mention here that it was not the Indian threat, which guided them

to take this policy either. Pakistim joined these American sponsored alliances

mainly due to their own internal political imperatives. Pakistani leadership

made use of this "Inhan phobia" not only to consolidate the bases of their

power but also denied masses tc~ participate in a democratic polity. Thls kind

of opportunism is still the p;ut of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistani

leadership,to divert the attention of the people from the internal problems of

Pakistan very successfully uti1iz:s "Indian Phobia."

Prarnod Kumar Mishra, South .Isia in International Poiihcs (New Delhi: UDH Publications: 1948) p.2.

4 M.R. Shelly, Emergence of n New Nation in a Mi~ltipolar World, (Bangladesh: Dhaka University Press, 1979) p. 1 12.

134

While Pakistan became .'America's most allied ally in ~ s i a " ' India

went towards the Soviet Union due to geopolitical compulsions. This

polarization reached its climax when India and the Soviet Union signed

the Indo Soviet Treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation whch was

signed on August 9, 1971, in anticipation of the Bangladesh liberation war,

which broke out in December 11971. As such, superpowers were dragged into

South Asian politics due to the mutual suspicion of the ruling elites of these

two countries.

Kashmir issue has been behind the major conflicts between India and

Pakistan. To the old dispute over Kashmir, emergence of Bangladesh has

added new dimensions in regard to mutual allegation of interferences in each

other's internal politics.

5.2 Kashmir Issue

It has been argued in the last chapter that Kashmir is not an issue at

all. It is just like the Kerala, Antihra or Punjab. India is a nation-state, which,

the concept had developed in Ehrope. When a nation- state emerges out of

historical development and political factors, other nearly located countries

can also join to this new entity, if they want to do so. In fact, as mentioned in

the last chapter, Kashmir has joined voluntarily and therefore, the question

of dispute and issue do not arise at all6

M.A. Kahan, Friends, NotMasten (London: Oxford Un~vessity Press, 1969) p. 130. Note: The present Kashmir dispute hls half a celituly old. Intellectuals, politicians, statesmen and the United Nations ctc . . . have made efforts but no worthwhile result came out of it.

Jammu and Kashmir wa:3 the biggest of all the Indian states, prior to

independence. The adrninistriitive division of Kashmir symbolizes its

conspicuous heterogeneity even though physiographic, demographic and

cultural elements have provide:d only a few political boundary lines. The

princely state of Jammu and Kashmir comprises the Kashmir valley, Jammu,

Poonch, the remote dependencies of Gilgit, Baluchstan and the isolated

province of Ladakh or "little ~ i l~u t . " ' Their size and area almost matched the

total area of England, Wales ant1 Scotland.'

Geographically speaking the Kashmir valley is an epitome of real

dstinctiveness. At the time of partition, at least 90% of the valley's

population was Muslims. Jammu is the Hindu majority area. Poonch a

Muslim majority area, the Ladztkh is mainly Mongoloid in racial character,

Tibetan in language and Buddhist in religion. The politico religous

affiliations with Tibet through s~llegiance to Dalai Lama are still in evidence

and the economic life is mainly (dominated by the Lama series.'

From the cultural perspe:tive, there is no other state in India, which

has so much racial heterogeneity as K a s h r . It is a multi-racial, multi-

lingual and multi-relipous state. The first Dogra Ruler, Gulab Singh's

dominion produced a strange 1Jnion of Hindus, Pathans, Sikhs, Tibetans,

Buddhists and Muslims in a st3te whlch had no unifying basis in cultural

tradition or political history. The earlier Kashmiris had suffered terribly at

7 Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: .4 Politzcal Analysis (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967) p.38.

8 Walter Lawrence, 7he Valley ofKmlvnir (London: Oxford University Press, 1955) p.285. 9 M.C. Feer, "India's Himalayan Froiltier," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 11, October,

1953, p.140.

the hands of the invaders, especially those from the West and South West.

As a result, they developed an attitude of distrust towards all outsiders. Such

distrust can be seen in the moc.ern struggle for the rights of the Kashmiries

as a Nationality. l o

"Kashmir has traditionaly been an enormous economic liability to

~ndia."" Geographical location has always been a crucial factor in its

strategic and political importance.'2 Moreover, the major aspects on the

Kashmir problem are the images and the ideas that India and Palustan had

created on the eve of the

5.3 Accession of Kashmir

In June 3, 1946, a cabinet mission memorandum stated that: "the

rights of the states which flow fi-om their relationship to crown will no longer

exist and that all rights surrendered by the state to the paramount power

will return to the state^."'^ It ha; also mentioned that every princely state had

the option of either joining Intlia or Pakistan. When many of the princely

states joined Indian Union, the .-uler or Kashmir did not take any decision in

this connection. However, the: Maharaja of Kashmir made a standstill

agreement with Pakistan by the exchange of telegrams on August on 12 and

16, 1947. Before the conclus~.on of a stand still agreement with India,

Pakistan cut off communications and stopped the supply of essential

lo See, Nithyanand Sharma, ''I<;Lshrmi; A Geo-Political Analysis," Geographical Observer, 25 March 1966, pp.54-61.

I I Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmit. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) p.3 19. 12 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir-A Study in India-F'akistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing

House, 1966) p.77. 13 Ibid, p.32. 14 Cabinet Mission Memorandum: Ccinmand f'aper No 6855, May 12, 1946

commodities (grains, clothes, kerosene, salt and sugar) for forcing Kashmir

to join ~akistan." On October 22, 1947. fully armed tribesmen from North-

West Pakistan and other Pakistani nationals penetrated Kashmir in order to

march towards the capital of the state to occupy it." The tribesmen lulled

Hindus and Muslims indiscriminately." They committed arson, loot, pillage,

plunder and violence in many towns and villages. Pakistani officials

supported the raiders, perhaps to divert the tribesmen from supporting their

own "Pushtunistan ~ o v e m e n t . " ' ~ Unable to control the situation, Maharaja

Hari Singh requested that the state of Jarnrnu and K a s h should be

permitted to join the Indian Union. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the

instrument of accession of Jammu and Kashrnir on October 26, 1947 and it

was accepted by the Governor General of India on October 27, 1947.

The Indian constitution, ,which came into existence on 26th January

1950, included in its Articles 370 which has been regulating central-state

relation^.'^ In the year 1951 State Constituent Assembly was constituted

which re-elected Sheikh Abdullah as the Prime Minister. The same year, the

constituent Assembly passed legislations abolishing monarchy and the

legislation was signed by young Prince, on behalf of this father Hari Singh,

who lived in exile in Bombay

I S An agreement in regard to communication and supply arrangements, which had always been inter-linked with British India

l6 Lord Bird Wood, India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides (New York: Frederick M. Praeger, 1954) p.77.

17 Sisir Gupta, Op. cit, p. 1 10. 18 E. Odell, "Afghamstan and the North-West Frontier," Contemporary Review, Vol. 173,

No. 4, April 1948, pp.240-44. 19 Note: The Kashrnir issue was or1 the top of the list of disputes between India and

Pakistan at the 1971. But after ths: India - Pakistan war 1971, it was relegated to the background.

State Chief Minister re~~laced constitutional amendment made in the

year 1965 the post of Prime Minister. The Jammu and Kashmir constitution

was enacted in the year 1056 during the regme of Bakshi Gulam

Mohammed. With the acceptance of accession Mount Batten wrote on

October 27, 1947: "In the case of any state where the issue of accession

has been a subject of dispute, tlie question of accession should be decided in

accordance with the wishes of ,he people of the state, it is my government's

wish that as soon as law and or'ier is restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared

of the invaders, the question of the states accession should be settled by a

reference to the people."2o Instead of helping the state to resolve its crisis,

Pakistan created more proble~ns in two ways: (a) Pakistan government

stopped the essential supplies to Kashmir state, (b) Pakistan instigated the

Kashrniri people to revolt against the government of India and tried its

best to create communal riots in the state. The purpose was to demoralize the

administration and to terrorize the Maharaja to accede the state into

Pakistan. When Pakistan failed it began to argue l o ~ c a l l y that Kashnur

belonged to Pakistan. Two dif5:rent arguments provided for this argument:

(a) Palustan claimed that rel i~c,us affinity of the majority of the Kashrniris

made it potentially a Pakistani province. (b) The state of Kashmir had a

longer boundary with Pakistan than with India. Indian political leadership

did not agree with the arguments raised by Pakistan. Indian government

20 White Paper on Jamrnu and Kashrnir (New Delhi: Publicat~on Division of the Government of India, 1948) pp. 47-48.

argued that it is not the religious majority or affinity that constitutes a

state. But, it is the general will of the people that make a state to exist."

On the other hand, the Indian leaders argued that the strength and

integrity of new nation-state of India that came into existence on August 15,

1947 would largely emerge frorn the pluralist India's capability to adjust sub-

national loyalties of caste, language, religion and other very ancient

primordial loyalties. It would be very ideal to remember here that the

leadership of modem India, through its constitution has declared India as a

secular state. Throughout history, India has been a federal polity with secular

and dominant values, which have not, perhaps, existed in any other civil

societies of the world.

While Kashmir's accession to India would create a strong, powerful,

consensus based on secular and federal polity, it would be very hlghly

dangerous if, Pakistan gets K-ashrnir. This would threaten not only the

integrity and the federal polity of India, but it would also demoralize and

threaten the very existence and unity of South Asian countries. The real

problem behind is that Pakistan is based on religious fundamentalism and the

very ancient Indian federal sec~~lar polity is based on fundamental doctrines

of secular and dominant values.

The whole question that comes out is why Pakistan another nation-

state would prefer accede Jan~mu and Kashmir to their fold. This is an

incorrect and artificial argumeni, which goes against the very ethics and the

Refer, Rousseau's concept of General Will as being enshrined in the major writings. According to Rousseau, it is the Gt:neral Will that creates a consensus for the inhabitants to stay in a particular society

140

fundamental doctrines of natic'n-state that had emerged in Europe, a few

centuries back, in the wakl: of Renaissance, Reformation and the

Geographical discoveries. Kashmir's association with India has been an

important point in her efforts to develop more intimate relations with Central

~ s i a . ~ ~ Jawaharlal Nehru briefly summed up the Indian interests in Kashrmr

in the Indian constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947 in the following

words: "We were of course, vitally interested in the decision of the state

would take: Kashmir, because of her geographical position with her frontiers

marching with three countries, namely the Soviet Union, China and

Afghanistan is intimately comected with the security and international

contacts of India. Economically also Kashrmr is intimately related with

India. The caravan trade routes firm Central Asia to India pass through

Kashmir state."23

It may be mentioned here that it would be very difficult to defend

Ladakh and the North West Frontier regons without effective control over

Kashrmr. At the same time, Kashmir is also very significant for the security

of the country as a whole in the context of the increasing military pressures

from the ~01th. '~

22 Note: Kashmir issue symbolises the incomplete p a t of the partition of India and Pakistan.

23 Jawaharlal Nehry India's Foreign Polrcy. Selecfrd .Speeches, 1946 (Deh : Publication Division of the Government of India, 1961) p.443

24 See, Kashrnir: Krishna Menon's Speeches in the Security Council on the 3 - 4 May 1962. Information Service of India, New Dell, 22nd June 1962.

The main problem with Pakistan in its approach to K a s h , is her

search for security against India. Another interest of Pakistan in Kashmir

is economic.25 The prosperity of agriculture in West Pakistan depends on the

six rivers, three of whch pass through ~ a s h m i r . ~ ' Pakistan also claims that it

has no great sources of minerals, hydroelectric energy and forest, wealthy

alternative to ~ a s h m i r . ~ '

Besides these, if Kashmir is acceded toPakistan it would ensure a

sense of completeness among the Pakistanis and it would g v e a complete

and perfect meaning to Palustani nationalism, based on Islamic religious

fundamentalism. It would also make a power centre based on Islamic value

system. Pakistan's claim for K.ashmir is based on geographcal and socio

economic conditions of the relgion. To quote Zafarullah Khan, "It is well

known that every factor, on lhe basis of which the question of accession

should be determined: Populati~m, Cultural and religious bonds, the flow of

trade, the economic situations, communication, the geographical position,

strategic considerations, point:; insistently in the direction of accession

of Kashrnir to ~ a k i s t a n . " ~ ~ But, Neutral Observer, a member of the team of

UN Representatives for India & Palastan observed that, "The State of

Jammu & Kashmu is not really a unit demographically or economically. It is

agglomeration of territories brought under the political power of one Maharajah.

25 Pakisthani Interests and claim:; for i(ashm!r were elaborately dealt with, by the Pakisthan's Foreign Minister Sir Zafal-ullah Khan in the Security Council, See United Nations Security council Oficial R.ecords (SCOR)

26 Ibid. *' Ibid. 28 Pakistan's representative to UN, Clr Zafarullah Khan's speech m the Security Council

during the discussion on India - Plklstarl Quesllon, 61h March 1951. See, SCOR, 534, 6" March 1951, pp.1-33.

That is the unity it possesses."29 This statement backs India's legalistic claim

for Kashmir, based on the politico-strategic position of Kashmu and

economic aid and development by India.

Indian leadership wants I:O accept the changed context in K a s h , the

Chinese military threat from across the border, the build up of the armed

strength of Pakistan by the Wec:t, the internal pressures in India and Pakistan

and economic progress achieved by Kashmir as a part of the Indian Union.

Indian leadership also affirms tiat the Kashrmr constituent assembly and the

subsequent election have confirmed the Maharajah's decision to join India

and secondly, the continued a:;sociation and interaction of the state as an

integral part of the Indian Union is to be taken into consideration while

looking at Kashmir as an islrue, problem or anything for that matter.

According to Pakistan, Kashmir is the most explosive dispute between India

and Pakistan. In the words of Z.A.Bhutto: "One can't divorce Kashmir from

India and Pakistan re~at ions ."~~ To Pakistan, Kashmir is a tenitorial dispute

emerging from the non-implementation of the doctrine of self-

determination. According to tke Indian leadership, it is situation brought

about by Pakistans aggression and its related tactics, which openly question

India's right to define the integrity of her territory. India and Pakistan have

also been criticizing each others conduct in subsequent years on political,

moral and legal grounds as the issue has been raised by Pakistan since the

29 United Nations Representative for [ndia & Pakistan. 0. D~xon in its report submitted to the President, Security Council, 15th September 1950, See SCOR, Suppl: September - 1950, pp.24-52 (S11791 incorporating Sl1791 Add 1).

30 As quoted in, Rajendra Sareen, "South Asla: Indo Pakistan Relations- A Case Study," South Asian Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1976, p.108.

days of partition. Indian leadership feels that Pakistan had violated the U.N.

when she sent her troops to Kashmir. Moreover, Pakistan's efforts to

integrate Azad Kashmir with I'akistan and treat Azad Kashmir as Pakistani

temtory violate the U.N resolutions and even the people who inhabit t h s

area are not allowed to have any say in any matter. Thudly, Pakistan has not

withdrawn her troops from certain disputed areas; apart from that it has built

up the strength of its Anned Forces and military bases in Azad Kashmir

in violation of the UN Conunission for India & Pakistan (UNCIP'S)

resolutions. Fourthly Pakistan has miserably failed to create a peaceful

atmosphere and in fact, it has been encouraging lawlessness in the state.

Finally, Pakistan continues to tight with India and sends 'mujahids' across

the border.

According to Pakistan, India violated the U.N. resolution when the

government of India integrated Jarnmu and Kashmir into the Indian union,

through a process of consensus and peace. Pakistan holds the view that India

has been following the same i r ~ the state of Jammu and Kashmir since its

inception into India; secondly, India has rejected all U.N. suggestions for

parallel demilitarization. Pakistim says that India has built up her military

strength in Kashrnir on the pretext of in la~nary threats from China. Thirdly,

India has refused arbitration on issues and problems in regard to Kashmir.

Finally, to Pakistan, India has withdrawn from the international commitment

of a plebiscite she had accepted ; ~ t the United ~a t ions . "

3 1 Various Claims and charges by the Ind~an &. Pakistan side have been made on Kashmir during the debates in the UN Security Council by thelr representatives.

According to Pakistan leadership "India is a known colonial country

......... of the worst type. What they are doing in Kashrnir today in the 2oth

century, no white colonial power ever did."32 Each accuses the other of

creating instability in the region. India is of the view that efforts to re-agitate

or to unsettle Kashmir are grit:vous political blows to the stability of the

region. Kashmir has been one of the main terrains of contention between

India and Palustan, which Nehn~ termed as "Pandora and Ayub Khan

,,34 " called it "time bomb what was a simple domestic problem has moved

into the sphere of International affairs", according to a member of the U.N.

Commission for India and ~ a k i s t a n . ~ ~ The lack of domestic conflict

settlement mechanism is one o:F the features of this conflict, said Bhabani

Sen ~ u ~ t a . ~ ~

Moreover, the efforts made by the super powers did not have any

effect on this issue. It may be mentioned here that Pakistan viewed it

with acute suspicion. The American attempt to get India to reach a

settlement with Pakistan in the wake of the Sino-Indian war was perceived

by India as an effort for the purpose of taking advantage of the country in its

moment of weakness. Soviet effi~rts irt 'Tashkent created a situation, where in

32 Speech by Feroz Khan Noon, National, 8th March 1958 (See, Pakistan National Assembly Debates: 1958, Vol: 1-20, pp. 1035-36).

33 The Hindu, Madras, 10th October, 1960. 34 The Pakistan Times, Islamabad, 12th October, 1960. 35 Quoted in article entitled: "Unsett1t:d Kashmir," New Statesman and Nation, Vol. 38,

No. 982,3 1 December 1949, p.773 36 Bhabati Sen Gupta and Amit Gupta, Changing Patterns of Regional Conflicts in South

Asia. Also in, Bhabani Sen Gupttr (ed.), Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, Vol. l(New Delhi: Soulh Asian Publishers, 1986) p.49.

145

Ayub Khan had to face a consi'ierable public outcry at home for having sold

Pakistan under Soviet pressure. The internal dynamics of the region brought

about the solution after the 19'71 war and the Shimla Agreement made both

the countries agree not to umilat.erally try to change the status quo in Kashmir

by military might.

Indian leadership holds the view that it is imperative for peace and

stability in South Asia that nothing should be done in Kashmir that would

affect the unity and integrity of the country. Pakistani leadership is of the

view that a solution of the Ks~shrnir problem is the fust step necessary to

restore Indo-Pakistan re1atior.s to normalcy through which peace and

stability of the region can be hoped for. When it comes to bilateral matters,

especially Kashmir, all the political and personal difference among the

Pakistani political elite takes a back seat. Pakistani leadership always

stressed that Kashrnir has been the main issue between India and Pakistan. It

can be concluded that the diplomatic objective of Pakistan has been to

counter the dominant position of India in the South Asian region. To settle

scores with India over the Kaslmir issue, Palustan opted for a foreign policy

of alignment and polarization of forces with any and every power, which

had over, or latent hostility touwds India. Pakistan's involvement in alliance

system has transformed the tilateral conflict in the sub-continent into a

proxy war.

5.4 Crisis in East Pakistan and Emergence of Bangladesh

The bond between East and West Pakistan was not ~ord ia l .~ ' They

were separated by 1200 Kilometers of Indian territory as well as by

languages, e t h c composition. civilization and outlook.38 They had in

common Islam, a short history and the same central government.39 Islam had

been the only cementing factor but its utility proved short-lived.40 After the

advent of Pakistan in 1947, the East Bengalis did not get much benefit from

the association other than a limited sense of s e c ~ r i t y . ~ ' The compulsions of

economic development were too strong to be side tracked by the slogan of

Islamic solidarity and brothe::ho~d.~~ Available records show that the

economic and political interest of the East Pakistanis were systematically

subordinated and marpnalized to those of west Pakistanis.

The crisis of the then East Pakistan was behind the conflict in 1971.

The crisis was manifestation of the simmering discontent of the Bengalis. It

was the result of long period of economic exploitation, political deprivation,

cultural aggression and linguistic arrogance that found vent in the demand

for autonomy of East Pakistan It IS historical fact that the contradictions

between East and West Pakistan led to their final break up. It is a general

37 Stephen Margrin and Gustav P. Pa~enek, History of Economic and Political Domination of East Pakistan, in Bangladesh Docu~nents, Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of Extemal Affairs, Go*. of India, 1971) p.5.

38 Hans J. Morgenthau, "Military Illusions", The New Hep.puhlic, Vol. 134, No. 1256, 19th March 1956, pp.14-16.

39 Stephen Margrin, Op cit, p.5. 40 Genesis of the Crisis: Factual Bzckground, in Bangladesh Documents, Vo1.l (New

Delhi: Ministry of Extemal affairs, Govt. of India, 1971) p. 1 41 Stephen Margrin, Op cii, p.5. 42 Genesis of the Crisis, Op cit, p. 1

belief, that the emergence of Bangladesh was the failure of national

integration concept mooted b> Pakistanis leadership.43 In fact, East-West

imbalance was the root cause of the crisis, which could not hold together

structure of the Pakistani state.

Richard Weeks called Pakistan "a double country.'*4 The geographical

separation between East and West Pakistan made communication and social

mobility between the two parts difficult and an expensive process. Besides

this, it has to bear in mind that, "gven the importance of capital site and

political clientele in the developing countries, geographical separation

further means that where the capital is not situated it is an economic and

administrative di~advanta~e."~: ' Moreover, their geographical separation

created two disparate economic and social life-styles. "To weld a nation out

of such a divergent elements in a geographically divided context was a

task, that given the most sagacit~us leadership, would have proved extremely

f~ rmidab le . "~~ The flow of irm~grants to West Pakistan contributed to

West Pakistan's higher rate of ~rbanization and economic development but,

on the contrary, the new imrni;yants did not compensate the exit of Hindu

elite from ~ a s t . ~ ~ This change left crippling gaps in the local economy of

East Pakistan

43 See, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

44 Richard Weeks as quoted in Roun2.q Jahan, Ibrd., p. 10. 45 Ibid. 46 Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrarnaniyam, The Liberation War (New Delh: S . Chand

and Co. 1972) p. 1. 47 Rounaq Johan, Op. cil. p. 12.

148

The demographic difference between the two sides was further

accentuated by the linguistic arrogance of West Pakistan. This difference

hindered the development of 3 lingua fianca. -4s a result, none of the

languages had general acceptance in both the sides. The Quaid - i -Azam

talked of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan; but he did not specify

any time frame for the achievement of this objective. Option was gven to

East Pakistan to decide its own language. It may be mentioned here that the

Palustani leadership did not consider the deep feelings of Bengali's and

without taking into consideratioil of thls fact, Pakistan declared Urdu as the

official language - National Language. In the words of Jahan: "They initially

rejected the Bengali's claim for recognition as a National language and

attempted to make Urdu - a minority language - the only National language."'

As a result of all these de,velopments, there emerged in East Pakistan

over the language question, which was not accepted by the central

government of Pakistan. This greatly hurt the racial -regonal pride of the

Bengalis and this also brought about an imbalance in the distribution of

power among various sub-natio:lal identities and loyalties. As a result, the

Punjabis or Pakistan, who had a long bureaucratic tradition, monopolized

civil and military bureaucracy tliere by limiting Bengali participation in the

national-power structure. The policies initiated by central government of

Pakistan towards East Pakistan vias conlpletely discriminatory and it brought

about total domination of west over East wing. Even after some years of

the creation of Pakistan, Bengalis accounted for barely 15 percent in

central government. Services a id less than 10 percent in defence services. In

the hierarchy of the Army and the civ~lian services, the representation of

East Bengalis was almost nil. If the 83 Muslim Officers of the Indian Civil

Service, who opted for Pakistan in 1947, only one or two were from East

Bengal. If these, 47 Officers were still in administrative service in 1965, but

not one of them was a Bengali 49 The dominance of West Pakistan was very

explicit in Defence Service. If all the Head Quarters of three services, and all

ordnance factories located in West Pakistan, the recruit was also confined to

West Pakistan. The military, like the civil service, did not adopt any

conscious policy to contract ths imbalance. The possibility of rebuilding and

re-structuring state power was almost closed down when Ayub Khan took

over and he removed the safety valves of parliamentary facade, which had let

off a lot of simmering Benglli dis~ontent.~' Apart from this led to the

institutionalization of the don~inance of the three wings of the Palustani

military which were completel~. foreign to the East Pakistan

In the sphere of econondc activities, the exploitation by the Pakistani

state apparatus was very acute and sharp. In fact, Pakistani economy showed

all the symptoms of economic ~:xploitation bordering on colonial exploitation

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said: "Even 200 years rule by the colonial British

could not exploit the people to such an extent as the unchallenged

exploitation of this wing (East Pakistan) of the country during the last 23

49 Khalid B. Sayeed, The Pulit~cal Svstem o,fPakistan (Boston: H . M . . 1967) p.156. 50 Mohammed Ayoob, India, Pahstan X 8angladesh Search for Relationship (New

Delhi: Indian Council of World affairs, 1975) p.5

years by the vested interests form West Pakistan."" The available sources

show that the entire political system of Pakistan and leadersh~p was ready to

exploit East Pakistan in every way possible. Arjun Sen Gupta rightly briefed

Pakistans two decades econo~nic policy as "a planning for disparity."52

Before 1970 election, East Pakistan had only third of the total development

expenditure spent by the central Government of Pakistan. It is something

very horrible to state that over 80 percent of the foreign aid was spent in

West Pakistan. It had also a great share of the imports into the country, when

as foreign in change earnlngs were mostly on account of products of East

Pakistan. Over 20 years, West l'akistan had imported goods worth more than

Rs. 3000 c r o r e ~ . ~ ~ According t~ the official report of Govt. of Pakistan, the

net transfer of resources korr East Pakistan to West Pakistan during the

period 1948-49 to 1968-69 amounted to 2.6 billion do~lars.~ ' In 1959-60,

West Palustan's per-capita income was 32 percent, higher than that of East

Pakistan, by 1967-70, it was 61 percent higher than that of East Pakistan. In

total, the increase was greater taan in percentage terms.55

The difference in per-capita income which had been Rs. 86 in 1960

was more than double i.e., R s 184 in 1970. It may be also noted here that

5 1 The Duwn, Karachi, 24 October, 971 52 Ajun Sen Gupta, "Planning for Disparity," in Pran Chopra (ed.), The ChaNenge of

Bangladesh: A Special Debate (Bombay: Popular, 1971) pp.79-101 53 Bangladesh Document, Vol 1 (New Delhi: Minishy of External Affairs. Govt. of India

1971) p.715. 5 4 Govt. of Pakistan: Planning Conmission Reports of the Advisory Panels for 4th Five

Year Plan 1970-75, Islamabad, V31. 1, Appendix 3, July 1970. 5 5 Ibid., p.2.

80 percent of defence expenditure to be allotted to West Pakistan. This

was an important aspect of expl2itation towards East pakistan.jh

The dissatisfaction and unrest fumed profusely in East Palustan due to

the antagonistic designs of W:st Pakistan. India on the other hand, was

eagerly waiting for this events and incidents to fish out of the troubled

waters. Mrs. Gandhi's timely interference in East Pakistan by supplying arms

and other assistance to the 'Muktibahinis', ultimately resulted the liberation

of East Pakistan fiom clutches of West Pakistan. Thus, the creation of a new

state, Bangladesh by the support of India has been a severe blow to Pakistan.

In short, the liberation of Bangladesh and its after effects has become one of

the prominent bilateral discords between India and Pakistan

5.5 Nuclear Arms Race

India and Pakistan now have entered into a competitive nuclear arms

race, "which has been learned as a race for Mutually Assured Destruction

(MAD), a cliche of the cold war days."j7 The plans were ready to carry out

the tests in 1983, during Mrs. (;andhi's regime, but they were subsequently

dropped under International pressures. The second attempt in 1995 was

abandoned after the U.S. intelligence gathered information regarding the

preparation for the tests and the U.S. administration persuaded India not

to go for the tests.58 "In the immediate aftermath of the tests, the craze to

56 East Pakistan used to blame West Pakistan on the following grounds. (a) Pakistan's resources plus foreign aid, are drected towards the development of West Pakistan @) East Pakistan's foreign earning are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.

'' Ashok K. Behuria, "In to the Nuc.leus of Relationship: Indo-Pak Relations Revisited," Journal of Peace Studies 3, Vol. 5, Issue 3, May - June, 1998

58 Ibid.

associate with the Nuclear tests and secrets related to it was so great that one

saw a whole lot of current and c:x-office claiming first hand knowledge of the

nuclear capacity and expressing their approval of the tests."s9 India became

an early beneficiary of the U.S. sponsored "Atoms for peace" programme

initiated in 1 9 ~ 3 . ~ ' Both the states had long been looked at as defacto nuclear

weapon states and neither had joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT)~' or such other legally binding nuclear non-proliferation instruments

as full scope international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards."

consciousness of the danger of nuclear weapon to peace and security has, in

the past, led to the idea of Indian Ocean as a Zone of ~eace.""

India had showed a nuclear weapon capability in May 1974, by

detonating a nuclear device, which they called "a peaceful Nuclear experiment."

Officially, India claimed, until 1998, that it did not possess nuclear weapon

capability and apart from that, :he country had no plans for nuclear weapons

programme. However, Inda talked of a nuclear weapons research programme

59 Ibid. 60 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. M.C. Donough: "Tracking Nuclear Proliferation" -

South Asia and East Asia. Note: When India went in 1998 fc~r testing a series of nuclear explosive devices on May 11 and 13th. it officially declued itself a new nuclear weapon power. These developments triggered Palustan':: Nuclear explosive testing response, two weeks later, suddenly, emerging on the world stage-to self declared non-NPT nuclear weapon state and radically challenging the efficacy of the nuclear non - proliferation regime. The profound international outrage over India's action was all the more stronger as there was no visible nuclear security threae to India a . a justification for its nuclear testing and also because, in the earlier days, India had shownaversion to nuclear weapons and its once prominent leadership seekinj: non- proliferation and disarmament measures. Other nations objected, saying that Indii.'s nuclear tests and self declaration ran counter to the prevailing world atmosphere of luclear arms reduction, the negotiated 1996 ban on nuclear weapon testing and accumulated nonproliferation successes in other region.

62 Krishan Gopal, Geo Political Relations and Regional Cooperation-A Stud)' of South Asia (New D e h : Trans Asia Publications, 1996) p. 124.

and a nuclear posture of ambiguity &om the early 1970's and actively

pursued the development of space launchers and Nuclear Capable Ballistic

Missiles for so many years. As a result, in the years between 1974 and 1997,

Inha was considered as a threshold nuclear weapons state that could go

nuclear on short notice. Almost all political parties, event the left kont,

totally agreed that 'the tests cculd take care of the National Security issues,

especially in the wake of the Gauri Missile launched by Pakistan on to April

1 9 9 8 ' . ~ ~

Since independence, many Prime Ministers state that Pakistan more

than China, has been a securiQr threat to ~ndia." But the sense of insecurity

increased as the B.J.P. led Go1.t. came to power at the centre. A study in to

the Pakistani Defence policy would reveal that Pakistani defence policy

is entirely India - specific.65 "On the face of it, it is difficult to explain the

plaintive mood of the Palustimi's vis-a-vis Indians, especially when the

Muslims could carve out a separate homeland for themselves from the

British India. The feeling of suscess against the insurmountable obstacles on

the path to the making of Pakistan should have been too great to sweep away

all sense of distrust and hostility from the minds of the ~ a k i s t a n i s . ~ ~

63 Ashok K. Behuria, Op. cit p.5. 64 Note: George Femandes, former Defence Minister, said that China posed a potential

danger to the security of India. The rationale for the tests was worked out in an indirect manner. The scientists were waitirg for a go-ahead signal from the P.M.O. since as early as the year 1983.

65 Note: What is important to note here is the public approval of the nuclear move. In the midst of rejoicing over the tests, the gallop polls showed that and over whelming 82 percent of the population approvec! of the idea of going for weaponisation.

66 Ashok K. Behuria, Op. cit p.8.

"The comer stone of Pakistani's strategic thinking with regard to its

rivalry with Indla was its desire to achieve parity in terms of military might

vis-a-vis New elh hi."^^ Since partition, Pakistan made enough efforts to

achieve parity with India, especially in terms of military might.68 Constrained

by its comparatively small size: and modest resources, Pakistan looked for

the achieving thls objective through extra- regional interactions and

contacts.69 It joined with the U.S in the cold war by forging bilateral security

through the process of joining 3 .S. sponsored military alliances. South East

Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO). The U.S. contributed Pakistani's arrangement programme very

cautiously within the limited sphere. China has been, comparatively, more

liberal in arms and military technology transfer. At the same time, its ability

to change the correlation of forces In South Asia was limited." Mr. Pervaiz

argues that Pakistani's efforts to achieve security was treated by India as

a dangerous pursuit with the sole purpose of distortion of the existing

regional balance. The author f u ~ e r points out that this kind of difference in

67 Note: An original sponsor of NPT doctrines, India, however refused to sign the document that came up from NPT negotiations in 1968- stating that it did not fulfil the original mandate. Atter that, India confmuously opposed regional Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) and other non-prolife:-ation proposals for South Asia, calling instead for global nuclear dismnament The same waj., India had long preached the evolution of a Global Test Ban Treaty and contributed positively to early drafts of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996, but finally rejected the CTBT as wen.

68 A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Indo-Pakistan Security Relationship and the Kargil Crisis", BIISS Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, p 243

69 Note: Some writers argue that the nuclear test bar, has been made to create public support for BJP in order to ensure the stability of a fragile coalition. Even if the coalition headed by BJP fails to survive, thls would bring about popular mandate for BJP in the days to come. Another argument is that the nuclear test as a BE' phenomenon is the result of its perception of showing Indian power with Hindutva ilavour

'O A.K.M. Abdus Sabur, "Indo-Pakistan Security Relationship and the Kargil Crisis", BIISS Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999, p.244

perceptions of each other's intrinsic aims explain the reasons why India went

for Soviet friendship." These developments result in the intensity of the

arms race in the region. Another factor that has contributed towards the arms

race is the mutual perceptions and misperceptions between India and

~akis tan.~ ' "Resisting pressures and penalties, Pakistan has retained and

developed the nuclear option."73 The author further points out that Pakistan

and India are to be persuaded in order to avert a nuclear arms race in

South ~ s i a . ~ ~

Jawaharlal visualized that atomic energy was a means for economic

development and rectifying the country's technological backwardness,

Nehru, the architect of India's defence and foreign policy establishment,

visualized India as one of the: World's fourth great powers. For pursuing

long-term objectives, India began to acquire a complete nuclear fuel cycle

under its own exclusive control, by obtaining the equipment and technology

fiom outside. The main contril~ution came from Canada in 1960 in the form

of research reactor, which -as specifically suited for the production of

" Note: "The acute sense of ins1:curity and helplessness during the earlier years of independence compelled Pakistan to move in to the arms of the West. Without giving much thought to its immediate geopolitical realities, it threw its lot whole- heartedly within the West to avert the pelceived Indian threat and to acquire the much needed economic and military a i d (Source, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Arms Build-up in South Asia: Impact on the Process of Peace arid Development in the Region", in copying with the contentious issues between India and Pakistan in South Asia.

'* Note: Pakistan followed a policy of nuclear abstinence until it was forced to undertake a painful re-appraisal after the 1971 debacle, when neither its conventional defence capacity nor the U.N. General ilssembly Resolubon proved effective to safeguard its territorial integrity and the country was dismembered as a result of the lndian military interventions in East Pakistan. Source- I b ~ r l

73 Abdul Sattar, "Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia," Regional Studies, Islamabad, VoI. XIU, No. I , Winter, pp 94-95,

74 Ibid.

weapon grade plutonium. "Not subject to adequate inspection by the suppliers

CIRCUS reactor, using U.S. supplied heavy water, enabled India to produce

and stockpile plutonium for its weapons Obtained on the

pretext of "peaceful uses, C1RC:US provided the plutonium for the peaceful

explosion in 1974 . "~~

5.6 Impact of Arms Build-up on Development

Defence is an important sector with affects a country's resources,

more especially in developing countries. While the purchase of weapons is a

costly affair, most of the develcping countries are faced with the problem of

resources. As such a develo3ing country would be spending a large

percentage of budgetary allocation. The choice of a certain level of defence

allocation is with the Government and the level of defence posture is decided

by the national priority. The prixity varies with the change of government in

respective countries. The pos~tion of priority on defence is quiet often

influenced by the threat perc.eptions of the incumbent government. In

democratic countries, the placement of defence on the national priority is the

75 Note: Meanwhile India had acquired sufficient plutonium for an estimated 100-plus Hiroshima - size bombs (lo), CII.CUS alone accounts for 400 of the over 500 kgs of weapon - grade plutonium necessary the purpose. The balance of the weapon - grade plutonium, India has generated ;at Dhruva, which replicated Canadian Technology. While highlighting the non-descriminatory aspects of the NPT, the Indian Govt. has allocated substantive resources to develop its nuclear programme. The comprehensive nature of India's nuclear programme and its accompanying strategies of accelerated accomplishment are directed to a~tain self sufficiex:ncy within the minimum time scale. Pakistan was singled out for pruticularly severe penalties when it began to acquire nuclear capability. The U.S. enacted a Nan-Proliferation Law ir, 1978 under which economic aid was cut off to F'akistan because i l started constructing a uranium enrichment plant. An escape clauije in the law exempted India and Israel from similar penalties. In spite of all these, Pikistan succeeded in building a uranium enrichment plant and acquiring the explosion t:chnology

76 Abdhul Sattar, 0p.cit.

result of prevailing consensus along with the govenunent's own preferences.

In all other cases, the choice lies with the prerogative of the ruling group or

the ruler himself.77 The choice of the amount to be spent for defence and in

which sector it should be spent a very difficult and complex task.

The final outcome of c.efence and national security, whtch in turn,

produces a sense of security arnong the citizens. The feeling of security puts

a man at ease and it also pr~~vides stimulus to increase productivity. As

opposed to the sense of security. insecurity creates discouragement and

disappointment, whtch, in turn, is not suitable to the healthy development of

the economy. In spite of the massive monetary inputs by the American

through Marshal Plan in Western Europe after the Second World War, the

Western European recoveIy programme did not take off until the American's

committed themselves to the c.efence of Western Europe through the North

Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This shows that a sense of security is very essential

to speed up the pace of economic development. Though the huge defence

expenditure is a necessary evil, the economic development will slow down

considerably in the absence of sense of security.

All South Asian countri,:~ indulge in the practise of hidden allocation

to defence. Another practise that is comixg among South Asian countries is

withholding directly related information. Besides India, which publishes as

annual defence report, all other countries avoid giving much detail in regard

to defence allocation.

77 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Op. cit.

5.7 Cross-Border Terrorism

The scourge of terrorism has haunted Indian Policy-makers since

independence. Violence and terrorism have resulted fi-om irrationality,

miscalculation, xenophobia, fanaticism and religous extremism. Historically

mankind has remained in a stat': of conflict and resorted to violence to bring

7 8 0 . . in changes in the society and in political systems. r l sn ofterrorism is lost

in antiquity. Terrorism and telror are as old as the human discovery that

people can be influenced by int~midation.

Terrorism, in it sirnplis:ic fbrm creates fear as a mean to achieve

political objectives. In Kashmir, the JKLF is the main militant group, around

which more than a dozen splinter groups have come up. They began their

work in a pamphlet form, which comprised the following phases of

terrorism. They are pven below in the footnotes.79 India consists of many

regions, ethnically and culturally different to each other. India's regional

culture has more ethnicity than an amalgamated civilization. Like the former

Soviet Russian Republics, we have differing reg~onal, religous, cultural,

language pulls and pressures.

The Pakistani ISI, on their part, began a well-designed propaganda

onslaught to separate Kashmir from India. Through its committed media

correspondents, informers, collaborators, they were able to project the darker

78 N.S. Jamwal, "Counter Terrorism Strategy," LYtratrglc Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 1, Jan- March 2003.

79 Note: It meant in joining in anti -Lrtdia demonstration, anti-establishment acts, boycon of Indian norms. It is also involved the tactis against Hindu minority. They have been forced to leave the valley, destabalise the administration and control the media.

159

side of the so-called anti-Indian Kashmiri rebellion. The media put out

distorted, fallacious and cooked-up stories that inflamed the Kashrmri Muslims.

Although we have been able to control such fissiparous tendencies, a

dangerous dimension has been added for the last two decades by the

involvement of Pakistan in aiding and abetting secessionism in Jammu &

Kashmir, North-East Punjab. Having failed in its attempts of annexing

K a s h r by force and realising the futility of carrying out an armed

adventure in the existing securiy scenano, Pakistan resorted to what can be

termed as proxy war and cross k'order terrorism.

The militancy in Punjab remained active for over a decade, broadly

kom 1980-1990. The conflict was caused due to a number of reasons

ranging &om various reasons both external and internal.*' During the period,

when military was at its peak, about 15,000 people died in the militant

attacks. Pakistan exploited the tlissatisfaction borne out in the state and gave

covert and overt assistance for their struggle.

In Kashrnir, there are historical reasons for whlch since 1947, some

Kashmiri Muslims have been oscillating in their demands for an independent

state or merger with Pakistar.. Unemployment amongst educated youth,

rampant corruption, and allege'j large-scale rigging of the 1987 election to

the State Assembly resulted in deterioration of the law and order situation.

A large number of unemployetf youth crossed over to Pakistan, which was

already on a look out to exploit any opportunity to its advantage, and

Palustan has since been actively providing diplomatic, political, moral,

80 Kanti Bajpai, Roots of Terrorism: 2002 (New Delhi: Penguin Books) p.58

financial and arms assistanc~: and becoming training to the militants.

Besides, many heinous crimes that terrorists commits daily, the attacks on

the Parliament and the State Assembly in J&K in 2001, many massacres of

innocent people including infants and woman of minority communities and

attacks on temples in J&K ;md outside are some of the horrific acts

perpetrated by terrorists aided and abetted by Pakistan, that defy any log~c.

The gravity of the situation spiralled out of control to the extent of

mobilization of forces of India and Palustan on the international border and

the two nuclear nations were at the brink of war. India has been involved for

many enclosed years in a costly, protracted battle against terrorism in the

valley. Islamic terrorism in Ka,jhmir has the active support of Palustan and

was further aided by Taliban. (General Pervez Musharraf had one occasion

April 1999 said that "India is a hegemonic power and low intensity conflict

(read terrorism) against it woultl continue even if Kashmir problem is solved

to our sat i~faction."~~

The goal of Pakistan-prclmoted terrorism is to affect India's national

integrity. Pakistan's efforts to disintegrate India were also echoed by the All-

Party Huniat Conference's (AI'HC) former Chairman, Gilani who had also

said in an interview to the 'Sunday observer' that if Indian soldiers could

play a role in the birth of Bangladesh, what is wrong in Pakistani soldier's

playing a role in the independence of Kashmir.

It is to be noted here vivtdly that, "it is not only J&K that Palustan is

aiming at, but the larger design of Pakistan is to ultimately work for the

81 The Tribune, Chandigarh, April 30. 1999

disintegration of India through the promotion of terrorism in the North East

areas and towards this objectiv,:~ IS1 is fi~lly supporting various secessionist

groups within India and outside ""

India is targeted for alleged violation of human rights in K a s h r and

the North-East by the national ;md international human rights watch groups.

Continuous fight against terrorism in Kashrnir and North East is expected

to weaken the nerves of the Indian Government. The Government of India

has been seeking a political solution to the problem and took a number

of steps towards such a solution. Like Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to

Lahore, Agra summit, unilateral cease-fire against militants, release and

rehabilitation of surrendered militants, internationally acknowledged free

and fair elections, exchange cf prisoners etc has not been produced the

desired positive resu~ts .~"

Finally, Pakistan-promoted terrorism questions the multi e t h c and

multi-religious Indian State's right to exist. Pluralism itself is under attack,

since terrorism, in its latest phase, after Musharraf took power, has been

presented as Jihad to liberate ~ : ~ s h m i r . ' ~

It was in this background, one could easily found that the above-

mentioned terrains of bilateral confTontations have been conspicuous in

preventing a smooth and cordial relationship between India and Pakistan

in South-Asia. It would be more relevant to realise these confrontations, if,

more a bit closely to have a glance in the even more complex situations

82 Muchkund Dubey, "Anatomy of Terronsm in South Asla-1 ," The Hindu, Januq 21,2003. 83 The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 1, 2003. 84 The Hindu, Madras, March 2 , 200.1.

between these two main countries in the region after the nuclear explosions

and the Kargil misadventure as the new phase.

5.8 The New Phase- Post - Pokhran Development

India-Palustan relations acquired an entirely new dimension with

India conducting its nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 and Pakistan

responding with its own nuclear tests on May 28 and 30. In the midst of

vigorous international criticism of both India and Pakistan and demands on

both that further test must be a~andoned and both countries sign the CTBT,

Pakistan did not hesitate to indulge in mudslingmg against India for having

raised the level of the arms rac:e in the regon and for not doing enough to

resolve the Kashmir question. India on the other hand, displayed

considerable understanding of the motives of Pakistani tests and offered a

No-First-Use Agreement. Pakistan whle rejecting the No-First-Use proposal by

India offered instead a Non-Aggression Pact which India described as

irrelevant because of the exi!;tence of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan's

continuous refusal to consider India's proposal pertaining to no-first-use of

nuclear weapons confirms suspicions that Pakistan considers nuclear

weapons as not merely means of deterrence but weapons of war, which it

would not hesitate to use if the need arose. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary,

Sharnshad Ahmad, during the Kargil crisis stated that, "We will not hesitate

to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial in tegr~ t~ ."*~

Pakistan in the post Chagai period actively tried to link the nuclear

tests with the Kashmir question, by suggesting that Kashmir being an

85 The News International May 3 1 , F'akistan

unresolved issue which has been the cause of frequent wars in the past is

now pregnant with the possibilities of a nuclear conflict in the subcontinent.

This has been projected by Pak~stan as a good enough reason for third party

mediation in the Kashmir dispute and Pakistan has been openly m h g a

bid for intervention by the United States, United Kmgdom, Chma, Japan

and other countries. India continues to take the position that Pakistan and

India between themselves are capable of resolving t h s dispute bilaterally,

also because this is the approach agreed upon by the two countries in the

Simla Agreement.

India has been emphas:sing the fact that both the countries have

succeeded in avoiding a war since 1972 despite the fact that Pakistan has had

a nuclear weapons capability since 1987 and India since about the same time

or later in 1990. There has been a view among senior military leaders in

Pakistan that once Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, this would neutralise

Indian conventional military superiority. It would then be possible for

Pakistan to snatch Kashmir from India through irregular warfare under the

nuclear umbrella without Indi ,~ being able to impose any punishment on

Pakistan for the acts. "A Pakist;mi nuclear capability would paralyse not only

the Indian nuclear decision, but also Indian conventional forces, and a bold

Pakistani strike to liberate Kashrnir might go unchallenged if Indian

leadership was inde~isive."'~ I:ormer Chief of Army Stiff (COAS) Aslam

Beg, stated in a seminar that in spite of the battle over K a s h r ragmg for

86 Stephan P Cohen, The Pakzslan Army (New Delh~ H~rnalayan Books, 1984) p 153

the past many years, "we h a ~ e nc, fear of war which has been possible

because of the nuclear deterrence which exists today in the ~ubcontinent."~'

The launching of the proxy war in Kashmir in 1988 following the acquisition

of the bomb and subsequent escalation of the militancy in December 1989

proved this assessment. When both the countries went overtly nuclear in

May 1998, Pakistan hoped that its nuclear weapons would deter India from

responding to any act of aggression by it in Kashmu. However, despite

Pakistan's nuclear weapons, India took on the Pakistani challenge in Kargil

and gave a befitting reply. In a sense, the Pakistani bluff was called and India

gave clear proof of its determi~iation that it will not brook any violation of

its borders, whether there are ;my nuclear weapons or not in the hands of

the enemy.

5.9 Dialogue Process in the Post-Nuclear Phase

It becomes important to 1:ake a look at the impact of the nuclear tests

on the process of dialogue betueen the two countries. In a climate of newly

created tension and suspicions in the wake of nuclear tests by India and

Pakistan, both countries felt the need to talk to each other at sufficiently hlgh

levels to find a meeting ground ;md to instil mutual confidence. The dialogue

process between India and Pakistan could not be resumed in June 1998 as

the two could not agree on the niodalities for talks. There was a difference in

the interpretation of the June 23, 1997 agreement, wh~ch was signed between

87 Farahat H. Syed (ed ), Nuclear Disarmament and Convenhonal Arms Control Including Light Weapons (Islamabad. Friends, 1997) p 449

165

the foreign secretaries of lndia and Pakistan, in Islamabad. This difference

occurred over whether the working groups were to address all issues between

India and Pakistan, or whether peace and security and Kashmir would be

discussed by the foreign secrc:taries themselves. The earliest opportunity

available after that was at the SAARC Summit in Colombo whlch was held

in end July 1998. However, the talks held between July 29 and July 30 ended

in a stalemate. Meanwhile, the inte~mittent firing exchanged between Indian

and Pakistani troops across ihe line of control during July 1998 and

beginning of August further vitiated the atmosphere between the two

countries. Hopes for meaningful interaction between Vajpayee and Nawaz

Sharif at Durban on the sidelines of the NAM summit came to naught as

Nawaz Sharif stayed away due i:o domestic compulsions. However, Palustani

Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz held fruitful talks with Indian Minister of State

for External Affairs, Vasundhara Raje, on the sidelines of the summit, and

on September 3, it was announc:ed that India and Pakistan had agreed on the

modalities for resumption of fo1.eig-n secretary level talks.

The deadlock in Indo-E'alustan relations was finally broken when

Vajpayee met Nawaz Sharif at New York on September 23,1998 during the

UN General Assembly session. The New York meeting also resulted in a

host of CBMs. For instance, telephone hotlines between the two prime

ministers were to be restored, t:ade and people to people contact were to be

enhanced, the railway link between Kokrapar (Pakistan) and Munnabao

(Rajasthan) was to be restartc:d. a direct bus service between Delhi and

Lahore was proposed, visa ~ ~ l e , j were to be relaxed, and efforts were to be

made to stop cross border firing."

The October round of talks ~n lslamabad did not achieve any major

breakthrough, except that the process of dialogue received an impetus. India

and Pakistan reiterated their known positions on "Kashmir, but agreed to

meet again and cany forward t h ~ dialogue at the next round of talks between

the two foreign secretaries T'le Indian s ~ d e proposed a no-first-use of

nuclear weapons agreement, ensuring reliable communication links and

greater transparency between the two sides through extending the hotline

between the two Directors Gene,ral of Military Operations to divisional and

sector commanders, reviving the hotline between the two foreign secretaries,

giving advance notice of missile tests of over 200 krn range and extending

the existing agreement on non-a.%ack on each other's nuclear installations to

cover economic and populatior~ centres, renewal of the invitation to the

Pakistani Army Chief to visit Inclia and exchange of officers between the two

National Defence Colleges The Pakistani side spoke of a non-aggression

pact, mutual nuclear and ballistic restraint whlle it remained cool to the no-

first-use proposal.89 The Noveml~er talks in New Delhi became bogged down

due to the usual accusations and counter accusations hurled by India and

Pakistan towards each other.

The New Delhi round of talks held in November 1998, included six

issues, which were Tulbul navigation project. Siachen, Sir Creek, trade,

88 The Indian Express, Sept. 24, 1998 89 The Pioneer, Oct.21, 1998

terrorism and drug trafficking and cultural exchanges. With regard to the

Tulbul navigation project, the Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman, Tariq

Altaf, on his return to Pakistan, accused India of trying to "justify" its

"violation" of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and rejecting Pakistan's move

to settle the dispute through During the talks, Pakistan rejected

India's proposal for a ceasefire in Siachen, wanting instead to address the

question of troop disengagement in the area. Pakistan, during the eighth

round of talks on Siachen in November, called for the "redeployment of

troops." According to Pakistar., troop pullback should be considered on the

basis of the 1989 "agreement". India proposed a package of confidence

building measures which would lead to a "comprehensive ceasefire" in the

Saltoro range region." India also wanted a ''freeze" on the ground positions

of troops from both sides to "immediately defuse tension and atmosphere of

confkontation in the area." Once the ceasefire had been agreed in principle

specific "modalities" which wwld make it durable could be discussed in an

"agreed framework." It was suggested by India that both sides could

establish a "bilateral monitorit~g mechanism." New Delhi did not agree with

the Pakistani proposal of placing an "international monitoring mechanism"

to supervise the ceasefire in the Siachen area.9'

India rejected Pakistan's bid to internationalise the Sir Creek issue,

reiterating that all differences between New Delhi and Islamabad after the

Simla Accord have to be resolved bilaterally. Wanting to arrive at an early

90 The Hindu, Nov. 1 5 , 1998 91 The Hindu, Nov. 7, 1998.

resolution of maritime boundaries, Indla proposed a new formulation, whlch

delinks the charting of maritime frontiers from fixing the land boundary in

Sir Creek. India proposed that the two sides should delimit the maritime

boundary from the "seaward" side. The two sides could proceed towards

land from the extremity of the EEZ limit to a "mutually acceptable limit."

Pakistan rejected this approacl~ and insisted that the determination of the

land boundary in the Sir Creel: area and fixing its maritime borders were

inseparable.92 India and Pakistan a wide range of economic and commercial

issues. However Palustan insi:;ted that progress in these areas would be

restricted till and environment of "peace and security" was created between

the two countries. The talks on bilateral economic cooperation were held for

the first time since 1989. The Indian side stressed upon the need to be

accorded MFN status by Pakistan, which is obligatory under the rules of the

World Trade Organisation. It was suggested that till this came about,

Pakistan could consider increa:jing the list of commodities importable from

~ n d i a . ~ ~ On the issue of promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields,

India put forth 22 detailed suggestions in the field of art, culture, youth

affairs, sports, information and media.

The November round oi' talks became bogged down due to the usual

accusations and counter accusations hurled by India and Pakistan towards

each other. In some situations 1:hey were not able to move beyond their often

stated positions. Pakistan s h o ~ e d its tenacity in trying to bring in third party

92 The Hindu, Nov. 10, 1998. 93 The Hindu, Nov. 11, 1998.

intervention into what should be bilaterally resolvable issues. However, the

effort on both sides to discuss a wide range of issues was itself commendable.

There was some amount of progress in the November talks, which can be

measured by a number of positive developments. Both countries set up

technical committees on the :;upply of surplus power to India. Certain

proposals by India to avoid dollble taxation were under consideration. The

Pakistani proposal for setting up a mechanism for quick information flows

on trade and investment was agreed to by India. Pakistan agreed to ensure

that visas were issued to Indian:. within six weeks and that there would be no

delay. Both countries agreed to set up a mechanism for regular meetings and

exchange of operational information between the Central Bureau of

Investigation and Federal Invesiigating Agency of Pakistan, "for expeditious

assistance to each other for combating various kinds of crimes including

counterfeiting of currency and cyber crime^."'^

5.10 Lahore Bus Diplomacy

The Next landmark in Inclo-Pak relation was the Indian Prime Mmister

Vajpayee's visit to Lahore on Feljruary 20-2 1, 1999 on the inaugural run of the

DebLahore bus service. There was an increasing relation on the part of

both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee that improvement of relations between the

two countries had to be a priority.

The Lahore Summit led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration by

the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India on February 2 1, 1999, the issuing

of the Joint Statement by India and Pakistan, and the Memorandum of

94 The Hindu, November 1 I , 1998

Understanding signed by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan. Both

the Lahore Declaration and the MOU referred to mutual adherence to the

principles of the UN Charter, as also contained references to the

implementation of the Sirnla ~ g r e e m e n t . ~ ~ Both the Lahore Declaration and

the MOU agreed to the resolution of outstanding issues, including that of

Jammu and Kashrnir. While New Delhi conceded simultaneity in terms of

bringing talks on Kashmir ontcl the agreed agenda, along with other areas of

mutual benefit, Islamabad conceded bilateralism. The reference to the

"composite and integrated" dialogue process implied that it would not be

hostage to any single issue.96

While hopes were high after the summit both sides had to come down

to earth soon. Nawaz Sharif could not be seen to be softening his stance on

Kashrmr in undue haste. Nawaz Sharif, barely a week after the summit in

Lahore, stated, "There would (come a time when the talks would have to be

superseded in case there is no concrete development in solving the Kashmir

issue."97 Palustani Foreign Selcretary, Shamshad Ahrned, stated, soon after

the meetings, that Pakistan is not to blame for the bloodshed in Kashmu.

This was in reaction to cornments by Vajpayee, who on returning to

New Delhi, on February 2 1, from Pakistan, said that relations between the

two neighbours could o d y improve when killings by Muslim separatists

95 The Hindu, Nov. 13, 1998. 96 Acwrdmg to Lahore Declaration: both the Prime Mimsters of India and Palastan were

"wmmitted to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the universally accepted principles of r~eaceful w-existence and they reiterated the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit."

97 The Hindustan Times, March 9, 999.

in Kashmir ended. The happenings in Indo-Pakistan relations after

Vajpayee's visit give an idea of the existing contradictions present in

relations between the two stat1:s. Nawaz Sharif brought up the "Kashrnir

issue when he made a statement that Mr. Vajpayee had agreed with

Islamabad's view's that the people of Kashmir should have the right of self-

determination. This statement was refuted by the Indian PM's office. Again

at Dhaka, where Nawaz Sharif had gone for the D-8 summit, he stated that

"a solution to Kashmir is a rnust for achieving peace in a nuclearised

South ~ s i a . " ~ '

The contradiction in Indcl-Pak relations became apparent again when,

Nawaz Sharif while visiting Rawalpindi stated that, "the Pakistan Army is

fully geared and equipped to fxce any eventuality."" His remarks came in

the wake of Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh's interview to

the Pakistani newspaper The hews, in which he ruled out any thlrd party

mediation on the Kashrmr issue and dismissed Pakistani demands to pull out

the army from the Valley as a ccnfidence building measure.

While the Lahore process was the culmination of Nawaz Sharif s

efforts towards taking Indo-Pak relations to a new hlgh, it is known that the

army in Pakistan was even then uncomfortable with this event, and had in

the meanwhile been planning the Kargil adventure. It was reported in July

1999, "Highly placed sources confirm that the decision to take over the

Kargil posts was taken in October last year and preparations started

98 The Times of India, March 2 , 1999 99 The Times ofIndia, March 3 , 1999

immediately after that."'0" In an article, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the

former Chief of Army Staff disclosed that the mujahideen's operation was

approved after briefings give11 to the Prime Minister at GHQ and IS1

*Headquarters as early as J a n u . q 1999.101 Another Pakistani commentator,

in an article published in July 1'399, stated that, "It is generally accepted that

Kargil was planned last year ar.d its execution began in February just about

the time of the Lahore ~ec1arat: ion." '~~ Afzal Mohamood, in his article asks

the question, "Why did (Palustan) fail to g v e the (Lahore) process a good

try which means reasonable time and opportunity to prove its worth as a

conflict resolution mechanism? First we accept the concept of bilateralism,

glorifL the Lahore process and take pride in opening a new chapter in Indo-

Pak relations and shortly the~.eafter embark upon a course of action-ill

thought out and rash - that brings us to an eyeball- to eyeball confrontation

with India.

The feeling of euphoria created by the Lahore Summit was completely

shattered due to Pakistan's aggre:rsion in Kargd, whlch marked an unanticipated

downturn in Indo-Pakistan relations.

5.11 Kargil Issue

It becomes meaningful to examine the implications of the Kargl war

over Indo-Pak relations. Kargil has to be seen in the context of the proxy war

conducted by Pakistan in the last decade. Kargl was in a sense the

culmination of the proxy war. The purpose of the Pakistani operation in

100 "Beating A Hasty Retreat," News ,:me, July 1999 10 1 Stated in an article by Afzal Mahmood, Dawn, July 18, 1999 102 M.P.Bhandara, Dawn, July 2 1, 1 9'19

173

Kargil is clear. Pakistan wanted to enlarge the conflict in Kashmir, and to

bring to the focus of the inte~national community, the danger of another

Indo-Pak war, one in which nu:lear weapons could be used. By fabricating

this kind of danger, Pakistan hoped for international intervention, whlch

would succeed in defieezing the Kashmir issue.

The roots of the Kargil episode can be traced back to Pakistan's

yeaning, to mastermind a people's revolt in Kashmir. The people of

Kashmir, despite being under duress due to terrorist activities, went in for an

elected government in 1996. Pakistan, realising the hopelessness of the

situation, opted for military action in Kargil, Pakistan disregarded the peace

initiative offered by India in Lahore. It deceived India by simultaneously

planning the Kargil operations in great secrecy. The Kargil conflict was a

great setback for the peace process and the confidence building measures

initiated in the year preceding tt:e Kargil intrusion. The Pakistani forces were

found to be composed of Pakistani army units, mercenaries and Afghan

war veterans.

A Pakistani commentator admits that, "Carried out with the help of

religious militants backed by the para-military Northern Light Infantry, the

plan, it appears, was to take control of the vacant Indian positions on the

Kargil heights, fiom where miiitary supply routes to Ladakh and Siachen

7,103 could be blocked. A survey of various articles written by a number of

analysts in Pakistan leaves no room for doubt that Palustan was directly

involved in the Kargil war. M.1'. Bhandara wrote, "We are told incessantly

103 Afsal Mahmood, See n. 90

that the Karpl freedom fighters are genuine Kashrniri freedom fighters.

However, is it reasonable to believe that freedom fighters can fight at 15,000

feet above sea level without Pakistani rations, cloth~ng, logistics,

ammunition and intelligence s ~ ~ p p o r t ? " ~ ~ ~ Ikram Sehgal stated that, though

belated we have begun to reco~pise the sacrifice and valour of the Northern

Light Infantry (NLI) No single unit of our army has inflicted such damage

on men, morale and equipment of the Indians in their history as the NLI has

done."'05 Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz visited New Delhl for talks

on June 12, 1999 but the Indian External Affairs Minister made it clear that

no negotiations could take place until P&stan withdrew all infiltrators

beyond the LOC. Jaswant Sin& also confronted Sartaj Aziz with a taped

conversation between two Paki:;tani Generals, which confirmed the Pakistan

army's involvement in the Kargil fighting.

India's stand was of course vindicated, by the immense international

support it received. During the Clinton-Sharif meeting of July 4, 1999,

Nawaz Sharif agreed, "that concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of

.,I06 the Line of Control in accordance with the Sirnla Agreement. Nawaz

Sharif by agreeing with Presidznt Clinton on this point, adrmtted not only

that Kargil constituted a violat~on of the Line of Control, but that it was in

Pakistan's power to undo this ~iolation. The implicit suggestion was that he

would withdraw his forces from Indian Kashmir, to the position, as it existed

before Pakistan's aggression in Kargil sector across the LOC. In a sense, the

'04 Zafar Abbas, "Who done it"? The Herald, August 1999 Io5 M.P. Bhandara, Dawn, July 21, 1'299. 106 Ikram Sehgal, Nation, July 3 1, 1999.

175

Palustani government accepted the sanctity of the LOC there by putting a

stamp of approval on its as forming-a-de facto boundary between India and

Palustan. According to report:;, General Zinni, the chief of US central

command, during his visit Islamabad in the last week of June 1999, received

a firm commitment from the F'akistani leadership that they were ready to

take concrete measures to de-i:scalate the situation. Faced with a serious

economic situation, Pakistan ccmuld not afford to antagonise the US, which

could have with held the 100 million dollar tranche of the IMF loan due in

July. The G8 countries condemned the infiltration and demanded withdrawal

of the intruders fiom the Indian side of the LOC. China stated that both India

and Pakistan must exercise restraint and should solve the Kargl problem

peacefully through negotiations.

India felt terribly cheated by Pakistan because India had invested a lot

of hope and faith in the Lahore process. That somethmg as disastrous as an

act of blatant aggression across the LOC in the Kargil sector could have been

done by Pakistan so soon after the Lahore Declaration came as a fatal blow

to India's hope about improvir~g relations with Palustan. Disappointment

turned into disgust when widespread stories emanated from Pakistan

suggesting that the army had specifically sought and obtained Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif s clearance with regard to intrusions in Kargil soon after

Nawaz had signed the Lahore ~c : c l a r a t i on . ' ~~

107 Text of the Joint Statement of President Clinton and Prime M~nister Nawaz Sharif at Washington on July 1999. Dawn. July 5 . 1999.

5.12 Siachen Dispute

This is also one of the major contentious issues between India and

Pakistan. Siachen Glacier has In the North Eastern part of Kashmir an area

where both the ceazefire line :md the line of control are ill-defined. To the

mouth of the Glacier lies the Karakoram Range which separates India and

China. Pakistan claimed that the Line of control runs directly to the Kara

Koram range from the point where the boundary was not demanded and that

the Siachen was not part of' India,Pakistan's argument goes like "the

inhospitable climatic condition of the regon. Prevented both India and

Pakistan from drawing up a detailed demarcation line is the part of t h s

issue."lo8 The Glacier is situat1:d in the Baltistan district, which is a part of

Pakistan's Northern Areas close to the border of Chma. India argued that

the Line of Control went beyyond the glacier, thus the glacier belonged

to 1ndia.lo9

Siachen came into the limelight in 1984 when India moved its troops

into the area. The Pakistan army quickly moved to check India's exercise

and the situation escalated violently. Heavy casualties reported after the

fkequent exchange of fire in the highest battlefield of the world. India's

interest in this snow-bound land is inspired by strategc motives. Inda wanted

108 There is controversy regarding the legal status of Northern areas. The Jammu and Kashrnir High Court has decl;ired that the Northern areas (Gilgit, Baltistan etc.) presently administered by Ministry of Kashmir Affairs m Islamabad is legally a part of Kashrnir. Most Pakistanis think it belongs to Pakistan because there was a revolt against Srinagar in 1947 and th: people of Gilgit and Baltistan 'liberated' themselves and joined Pakistan. See, editorial in The Fronfler Post, Peshawar, 1 1 March 1993

'09 Robert Wirsing, Pakistan's S ~ C U ~ T J J ~mder Zia (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1990) pp. 143-44.

to reach closer to the Karakoram Highway and the Pakistan-China border.

Indian strategists believe that in order to be Central Asian power, India

must manage to secure direct ~lrotected access to the Karakoratn~."~

Fighting over Siachen took place in late 1987 and early 1988. Palustan

and India have also held negotiations at Defence Secretary level to resolve

the issue. Five rounds of talks were held, starting from January 1986 and

ending in June 1989. At the end of the fifth round, both countries agreed to

work towards the settlement 0:- the Siachen dispute based on redeployment

of forces to the pre-Simla position in order to reduce the chances of

conflict. I '

Pakistan's stand has been that the troops should be withdrawn to their

position in 1972, before the Simla agreement, meaning thereby that New

Delhi must vacate the en~roac:hment."~ T h s was contradictory on India's

point of view that it meant partial withdrawal on both sides, just to avoid

armed conflict, thus leaving its~:lf in the advantageous position of controlling

the heights. In fact, S.K. Singh tlie Indian leader of the delegations, accordmg to

Newsmen had agreed to a compromise with Palustan with regard to

~ i a c h e n . " ~ The arguments arid counter arguments from both the sides

portrayed a contradictory picture in this regard and blamed each other by

holding the misinterpretation ofthe wordings of the joint statement.

110 Afzal Iqbal, "Stalemate Over Sia;hen," The Nation, 4 Dec. 1989 I" Palnstan Horizon, Vol. XLU, Nc.3, 1989, p.8 'IZ The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 'ebruary 1992.

The Hindu, June 1989.

However, spokesmen for the Pakistani government maintained that

India was changing her stand on Siachen. Earlier at the end of the meeting,

India had promised to withdraw its troops from the glacier area, and only

after that all other matters to be sorted out. The Pakistani officials involved

in the negotiations also, disclocied that the Indian side agreed that the troops

could be withdrawn from the g: acier and then only the delimitation would be

possible."4 The Indian side on the other hand blamed the Pakistani side for

not coming to a compromise. A. senior military participant in the negotiations

alleged that the Pakistan's proposal for redeployment was nothing but a

hood&. Pakistan, said nothlng with regard to the positions at the time of

Simla accord. Moreover, they ,#anted to control the glacier area by arguing

that it is coming under her territ~r-y."~ The sixth round of talks Defence

Secretary level was held in New Delhi in November 1992. The talks failed

because India insisted on the recognition of the onground realities, which

was not acceptable to ~ a k i s t a n . " ~ In fact, these talks were futile and at the

end of the negotiation both the sides accused each other for scuttling

the talks"' and both the countries are hesitant to withdraw that troops

from Siachen.

The political climate prevailing in the regon is not conducive to

the smooth and successful co-operation. The above-mentioned bilateral

constraints between India anti Pakistan overshadows all the efforts of

114 Robert Wirsing, no 5 1, pp.79-80 115 India Today, 1 5 July 1989. 116 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 February 1992 "' The Hindu, 27 June 1989.

economic co-operation and intzgration in the region. The small neighbour's

apprehension towards India, clue its size, potential resources and the so-

called hegemonir$2esigns and the confrontation between India and

Pakistan in the areas which tliscussed so far has become the stumbling

block against the effective regional co-operation in the regon of South

Asia. The relationship between the small neighbours and the big brothers

i.e. India and Pakistan is portrtyed in the next chapter.