Big Man Infiltration: The Cause of Failed Decentralization for Rural

Development in Papua New Guinea

by

BARCSON Benjamin Saimbel

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Development

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

NAGOYA UNIVERSITY

Approved by Dissertation Committee:

Wataru KUSAKA (Chairperson)

Yukiko NISHIKAWA

Yuzuru SHIMADA

Hideo YAMAGATA

Approved by GSID Committee: April 20, 2016

i

Acknowledgement ................................................................................

Table of Contents .................................................................................. i

List of Tables .................................................................................. v

List of Figures .................................................................................. vi

Abbreviations .................................................................................. viii

Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1

1.1 - Study Background 1

1.2 - Research Objective 5

1.3 - Research Questions 6

1.4 - Hypothesis 6

1.5 - Methodology 7

1.6 - Scope and Limitations of Research 8

1.7 - Structure of Dissertation 8

Chapter Two: Literature Review ........................................................................... 11

2.1 - Introduction 11

2.2 - Decentralization 12

2.2.1 - Defining Decentralization 12

2.2.2 - Types of Decentralization 13

2.2.3 - Why Decentralization is Pursued 16

2.2.4 - The Link between Decentralization and Rural Development 20

2.2.5 - Prerequisites for Decentralization to Enable

Effective Rural Development 22

2.2.6 - Problems of Implementing Decentralization and

Rural Development 24

ii

2.2.7 - Theoretical Arguments for These Problems 33

2.3 - Considering Informal Institutions as an Impeding Factor 36

2.3.1 - The formal and the Informal 38

2.3.2 - The Influence of Informal Institutions upon Decentralization 39

2.3.3 - Patron Client Relations 40

2.3.4 - Midgals Weak State Impact 43

2.3.5 - The PNG Bigman System 45

2.4 - Proposed Argument 50

Chapter Three: Hijacking of the Decentralization process at the sub national

level by Bigman infiltration 52

3.1 - Country Background 52

3.1.1 - Geography and Demographics 52

3.1.2 - Brief Colonial History 53

3.1.3 - Culture, Way of Life and Economy 55

3.1.4 - System of Government 57

3.1.5 - Development Challenges in PNG 60

3.2 - Decentralization in PNG 63

3.2.1 – Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940 - 1977) 64

3.2.2 - The Emergence of Provincial Government System 68

3.2.3 - Objective and Structure of the System 73

3.2.4 - Conflict and Tension in the Provincial Government System 77

3.2.5 - Weakening of the System by Bigman Influence 78

3.3 - Electoral Politics in PNG 80

3.4 - The game, the players and the Bigman Impact on the System 84

3.5 - Removal of the Provincial Government System 91

iii

3.6 – Phase III : The 1995 Reforms - The Current system 93

3.6.1 - The District Tier 97

3.6.2 - Funding Arrangements 100

3.7 - Decentralization Conclusion 101

Chapter Four: Study Site Findings …........................................................................ 104

4 - Introduction 104

4.1 - Background of Study Site 104

4.2 - District Organization and Operation at Study Site 111

4.3 - Research Procedures in Study Site 114

4.4 - Findings in Study Site 116

4.5 - Problems from the Officials Perspective 126

4.6 - Analyzing the Problems from Decentralizations Perspective 131

4.6.1 - Weak Administrative Decentralization 132

4.6.2 - Weak Fiscal Decentralization 142

4.6.3 - Weak Political Decentralization 148

4.7 - Conclusion of Study Site Findings 156

Chapter Five: The Impact of Bigman infiltration on rural development at

the district level ........................................................................... 157

5.1 – Bigman Impact 157

5.2 - Bigman infiltration in PNGs Decentralization Process 168

5.3 - Conclusion of the Impact of the Bigman Infiltration on

Districts Rural Development 171

iv

Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................. 172

6.1 - Purpose and Issues 172

6.2 - Key Findings 174

6.3 - Impact on Decentralization by Bigman values 175

6.4 - Policy Implications 176

6.5 - Future Research 178

v

List of Tables

Table 1: Types of Decentralization 14

Table 2: Approaches Undertaken 15

Table 3: Access and Reliability of Services Provided 124

Table 4: Participation and Accountability 125

Table 5: Categorizing the Problems 131

Table 6: Types of Funds Available to the LLG 143

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List of Figures

Figure 1: Local Government Discretion & Accountability Model 22

Figure 2: Patron Client Cluster & Patron Client Pyramid 41

Figure 3: Map of PNG 52

Figure 4: PNG Flag 52

Figure 5: Pre Independence Structure 67

Figure 6: The 1977 Provincial Government System 74

Figure 7: Increasing Number of Candidates Per Seat

from 1977 – 2012 83

Figure 8: 1995 OLPLLG Structure 94

Figure 9: The District Tier 98

Figure 10: Location of East Sepik Province in PNG 106

Figure 11: Location of study site in East Sepik Province 107

Figure 12: District Organization and Operation at Study Site 112

Figure 13: Access to Education Facilities 116

Figure 14: Reliability of Education Facilities 116

Figure 15: problems Identified (Education) 117

Figure 16: Access to State and Faith Based Health Facilities 118

Figure 17: Reliability of State Health Facility 118

Figure 18: Problems in State Health Facility 118

Figure 19: Reliability of Faith Based Facility 119

Figure 20: Problems in Faith Based facility 119

Figure 21: Access to Grid Electricity 120

Figure 22: Access to Piped Water 120

Figure 23: Local Economy Drivers 121

Figure 24: Problems faced in Local Economy 121

vii

Figure 25: Participation Level 122

Figure 26: Accountability Level 123

Figure 27: LLG & Ward Member Issues 127

Figure 28: District Officials Problems and Issues 128

viii

List of Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank

AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development

BMS Bureau of Management Services

CPC Constitutional Planning Committee

DFID Department of International Development

DSIP District Service Improvement Program

FPTP First Past the Post

GOFORDEV Governance for Local Development Index

HEO Health Extension Officer

IIJICA Institute for International Cooperation Japan International Cooperation

Agency

JDPBPC Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities Committee

JPPBPC Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee

LGC Local Government Council

LLG Local Level Government

LLGSIP Local Level Government Service Improvement Program

LPV Limited Preferential Voting

MP Member of Parliament

NCD National Capital District

NDB National Development Bank

OLPG Organic Law on Provincial Governments

OLPLLG Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government

OPV Optional Preferential Voting System

PNG Papua New Guinea

PNGDOE Papua New Guinea Department of Education

ix

PNGDOH Papua New Guinea Department of Health

PEC Provincial Executive Council

PSIP Provincial Service Improvement Program

SAGDPS Social Audit of Governance of Public Services

UNDP United Nations Development Program

1

Chapter One – Introduction

1.1 Study Background

In the course of this century, decentralization has become one of the most pursued

reforms in developing countries. It is estimated that more than 75 countries have undertaken

this reform process in search of ways to strengthen service delivery to their people (Ahmad et

al, 2005). Despite this, the reason behind decentralization's adoption into each country's

political and administrative machinery varies from political and economic reforms, to the

need for improving service delivery. On the other hand issues such as legitimizing the rule of

emerging revolutionists or a shift to democracy from authoritative states are also catalysts

that have prompted nations to undertake decentralization.

It has been argued that decentralization, through the allocation of levels of authority

to local tiers of government will strengthen good governance, increase local participation,

promote accountability and make local institutions more responsive to local needs and

demands (Rondinnelli and Nellis, 1986; Work, 2002). However, recent indicators in

developing countries that have carried out decentralization reforms, tend to show that the

outcomes hoped for from decentralization have not been forthcoming. Instead, those in rural

areas tend to have the poorest rural development outcomes, an indication that decentralization

2

has failed to deliver benefits to them. But results vary from country to country, which

suggests that there cannot be a one size fits all approach to decentralization. Rather, it must be

country specific, and fashioned to meet the particular problems of individual countries

(Litvack, Ahmad and Bird, 1998).

In the process of trying to understand the failures of decentralization in to address

rural development, numerous studies have been conducted in countries involved with

decentralization. Most studies have found that failures of decentralization are due to weak

institutional mechanisms such as: weak legislation, limited local powers, allocation of

functions without resources and the absence of other essential institutional elements that can

enable the institutional process of decentralization to function and work effectively. Besides

institutional mechanisms, other factors such as the capture of resources, by elites at the local

level and party alignments of sub-national politicians with national politicians have also been

raised as contributing factors to poor results from attempts to decentralize. Hence whilst

institutional mechanisms may prevent the implementation of decentralization, factors such as

political party alignment can also result in weakening implementation efforts. The capture of

resources by elites can take place when the power of local elites is strengthened by the

decentralization process. In the midst of this, weak institutional mechanisms become further

3

weakened by political interference or of local politics becomes dominated by local elites

with strong political links to metropolitan political parties.

Several studies have also suggested how decentralization could be best implemented.

One notable example is Falletti's Sequential Decentralization Theory. According to Falleti

(2004) decentralization is undertaken either from the national level or from the sub-national

or local level. In the former case Falletti stresses that administrative decentralization will

occur first, followed by fiscal and political decentralization. In this scenario, Falleti notes that

power granted to the sub-national level will be limited. In the second scenario, political

decentralization will occur first, followed by fiscal and then administrative decentralization.

In this case, Falletti argues that more power will be given to the sub-national levels. This is

because sub-national level politicians will be free from domination or manipulation as they

are locally elected and not appointed from the centre. As a result sub-national level politicians

are able to bargain more effectively for greater powers, and to demand faster fiscal

decentralization and eventually administrative decentralization. Falletti argues that the second

approach is better in in bringing about effective decentralization. The World Bank (2008) on

the other hand in its Local Governance Framework model says that a number of

preconditions are required to be in place, in order for effective outcomes to be delivered.

4

However the actual implementation and outcomes of decentralization can be very different

and a one size fits all approach will not work.

Most of the focus of studies of decentralization has been upon institutional

mechanisms and power arrangements and there has been a limited number of studies which

explain how informal institutions have influenced decentralization outcomes. A notable study

which does look at informal institutions is that of Migdal (1998) where he asserts that the

competition between formal and informal leaders will weaken a state if strong leaders are

reluctant to give up their powers. Migdal assumes that the position of strong local elites will

weaken formal institutions if tradeoffs have to be made between formal and the informal

leaders. However, Migdals tends to assume that there is an organized social order in every

traditional society. This leaves room to explore cases of those informal or customary groups

that operate outside the formal social order, such as the Bigman ‘system’ of PNG.

This study aims to contribute to studies of decentralization by making and

examination of the ability of informal or traditional forms of social order that operate outside

formal institutions to weaken the institutions involved in decentralization and to results in

poor rural development outcomes..

5

1.2 Research Objective

The study looks at the impact of informal institutions upon a formal decentralization

process which is resulting in poor rural development outcomes. It presents a case study

from Papua New Guinea's (PNG).Firstly, it describes how customary leaders who achieve

status locally, who are known as ‘Bigmen’, have infiltrated formal institutions and have

weakened the formal decentralization process. Secondly, it examines how Bigman infiltration

has hindered the implementation of rural development promoted by decentralized institutions

by capturing resources and using them for their own purposes.

It is possible to argue that informal institutions and patron-client relationships are not

new to studies of decentralization. But is argued that PNG's case offers insights into the

infiltration of informal customary institutions into formal institutions. Unlike most informal

institutions in the world, PNG's informal system is very fluid and is different from local

strong man, landed elites, religious groups, dynastical rule or oligarchs. This study looks at

how the fluidity of the big man system has thrived despite the absence of Powerful groups

found elsewhere in the world binding them.

6

1.3 Research Questions

Given this objective the study aims to answer three research questions;

1. Why is rural development in PNG stagnating under the current institutional structure

of decentralization?

2. Why has the Bigman politics been able to weaken institutional decentralization

structures at the sub-national level?

3. Why has Bigman politics prevented good rural development outcomes at the district

level in PNG?

It is hoped that through a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the failure of

decentralization in PNG to bring effective development to the rural majority will be brought

to light.

1.4 Hypothesis

The above sections have noted the assumption that weak decentralization outcomes

are due to institutional influences. The argument is put forward that informal institutions may

also be a major contributing factor to the weakening of formal decentralization institutions to

bring about rural development. Against this back ground this research proposes following

7

hypothesis; weak rural development outcomes under the decentralization process in PNG are

the result of the influence of informal institutions (the big man system) weakening the formal

decentralization institutions, which has contributed to ineffective rural development outcomes.

Hence, the problems affecting the implementation process are not purely grounded in

institutional processes. Rather they go deeper and are the result of the Bigman system

weakening the formal institutional decentralization system and preventing it from functioning

effectively, as big man values take precedence over rural development outcomes.

1.5 Methodology

The study utilizes both qualitative and quantitative approaches and secondary

sources of data. A quantitative approach was used in a survey which used the Social Audit of

Governance and Delivery of Public Services (SAGDPS) from Pakistan and the Governance

for Local Development Index (GOFORDEV Index) from the Philippines (UNDP, 2009). The

SAGDPS was used because it provides a framework to assess service delivery in rural areas.

The GOFORDEV Index, complements this approach by the provision of key themes to assess

the services themselves. Using the data from these surveys the author creates a PNG Rural

Development Index with which to assess outcomes in the study area. The qualitative

8

approach is followed with interviews with officials in the wards, district and provincial

headquarters to examine the problems from their perspective.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of Research

The main objective of this study is to look at how formal institutions have become

weakened by informal institutions leading to a hindering of effective rural development

outcomes. It was constrained by funding and time limitations. It was also handicapped by the

difficulty of obtaining up to date records, as the PNG bureaucracy has a very poor records

system in place. Some officials were also uncooperative. These handicaps are to a large

extent outcomes of the process being studied in which local Bigman and their clients in

formal institutions, kept very poor records and did not want anyone investigating their

activities. Despite these difficulties, the study has managed to achieve its main objectives.

1.7 Structure of Dissertation

Chapter one introduces the topic, and how the study was undertaken. Chapter two

reviews theoretical literature on decentralization and the main challenges facing

decentralization. The failure of many studies to include informal groups infiltrating formal

9

institutions is discussed The chapter ends by presenting the framework to be used in the study.

In this framework the author shall take the view that the informal system of Bigman fluidity

has been able to weaken the formal decentralization process in PNG because of close

interlinking traditional ethnic ties and values operating in a environment with limited

opportunities which political groups have manipulated to serve their own ends, thereby

further weakening the decentralization process and affecting rural development.

Chapter three: Hijacking of Decentralization Process. The purpose of this chapter is

to to explain how Bigman politics weakened sub-national level institutions which led to the

centralization of power in the hands of national Members of Parliament (MPs) which enabled

them to dominate local elites in any political competition. The chapter begins with a general

background of PNG. It then goes on to examine the decentralization process in PNG and how

it has been hijacked and weakened by Bigman. At the same time the fluidity of the big man

system and how it has shaped the political atmosphere leading to political competition is

discussed here. Finally the chapter notes how this led to disintegration of the sub-national

level and how national MPs roles have become more dominant over local elites with the

emergence of political organizational reforms carried out in 1995 by national politicians.

Chapter Four: Study Findings and Analyses. The focus of this chapter is the

10

outcomes of the case study surveys, the problems found and how they come about. .

Chapter Five describes how this situation impacts rural development at the district

level based on a case study of Dreikikir-Ambunti district. Falleti's theory is used to shows

that decentralization does not strengthen local elites like other cases, but has reinforced

national politicians’ roles over local elites due to the influence of Bigman influences in

politics. This has led to bad rural development outcomes Chapters four and five both aim to

answer the third research question.

Finally Chapter six concludes with a review of purpose, findings, policy implications

and room for further study and room for further study.

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Chapter Two - Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Most studies of decentralization have taken the view that decentralizations failures

are largely the result of institutional mechanisms. But this study takes the view that informal

institutions are also a significant factor in the weakening of formal decentralized institutions

and a contributing factor affecting rural development at the sub-national levels. Against this

backdrop the study seeks further to establish why informal institutions are able to do so in the

absence of strong ordered informal practices, such as strong man politics, religious affiliation

or landed elites which are often informal guidelines guiding informal system. Hence the study

looks at this perspective from the PNG case of the Bigman system. It is hoped that a better

understanding of the reasons behind poor rural development in PNG may be achieved which

could possibly lead to better policies being developed. Apart from this the study attempts to

contribute to the literature on how informal institutions can affect decentralization processes

in the absence of strong informal order. The literature review is therefore structured into three

sections; decentralization, informal institutions as impeding factors and the proposed

argument.

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2.2 Decentralization

2.2.1 Defining Decentralization

Decentralization is interpreted differently by different people and organizations.

According to Rondinelli (Conyers,1983:102) it is a transfer of "authority to plan, make

decisions and manage public functions" from the national level to any organization or agency

at the sub-national level. Turner and Hulme (1997:152) also define decentralization as "a

transfer of authority to perform some service to the public from an individual or an agency in

the central government to some other individual or an agency which is closer to public to be

served." Robertson Work (2002) on the other hand sees it as the transfer of responsibility for

planning, management and resource raising and allocation from the central government and

its agencies to lower levels of government. For the UNDP, (Work, 2002) decentralizing

governance is the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility

between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels. Finally the World

Bank sees decentralization as the transfer of political, fiscal, and administrative powers to sub

national units of government (World Bank, 2000).

The common feature in all these definitions is the transfer of power; political, fiscal

or administrative, to lower levels of government. For this dissertation the definition offered

13

by Work (2002), the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising

and allocation to the lower levels of government seems to be the most appropriate because of

the nature of PNGs decentralization process.

2.2.2 Types of Decentralization

Decentralization as a process is not precise and clear cut, but involves many different

shades of differentiation depending on the regime and purpose of implementation. However

Work (2002) notes that there are three main forms; Political, Fiscal and Administrative.

Decentralization is usually undertaken or implemented via four approaches; deconcentration,

devolution, delegation and divestment, also known as privatization. Each differs in varying

degrees of autonomy dispersed, with devolution being very high. For instance; high degree of

fiscal devolution implies that there is a significant degree of autonomy (possibly, political and

administrative as well) to the lowers levels of government.

14

Table1: Types of Decentralization

TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION

Political

Decentralization

The transfer of political power and authority from the central

government to the lower levels of government (sub-national). Obvious

examples of these are lower levels of representatives who are elected

and empowered. This may range from village councilors to regional

government officials.

Fiscal

Decentralization

The allocation and distribution of powers and functions over fiscal

matters to the lower levels of government from the central government.

This usually involves what revenue is retained or by the lower levels,

and may also enable them certain authority to raise loans. The most

significant element is the ability to raise their own revenue from taxes

and to make decisions on how to use it.

Administrative

Decentralization

The transfer of decision-making authority, resources and functions from

the central to lower levels of government (such as agencies and line

department offices) for the provision of certain services.

Deconcentration and Delegation are two notable forms of this.

Source: Created by Author from Robertson Work,20021

1Robertson Work,2002,Overview of Decentralization Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to improved Governance and

Human Development, 2nd International Conference on Decentralization, Federalism: The Future of

Decentralizing States? 25 - 27 July, Manila, Philippines

15

Table 2: Approaches Undertaken

APPROACHES UNDERTAKEN

Devolution

The transfer of authority, decision making, resources and revenue

generation to lower governments who be given considerable autonomy

from the central government except for matters of national interest.

Jurisdictions that elect their own representatives raise their own

revenue and possess considerable decision making autonomy, are

examples of devolved powers.

Deconcentration

The dispersal of responsibilities for certain services to sub-national

offices, while hierarchical authority and accountability of the central

government is maintained. No form of authority is actually transferred

to the lower levels.

Delegation

The distribution of authority and responsibility to local units of

government or semi-autonomous organizations which may not be

branches of the delegating authority. Some transfer of accountability

takes place but such bodies are still mostly accountable to the

delegating central authority

Divestment

The transfer of planning, administrative and other public functions

over to the private, non-governmental or voluntary institutions with

clear benefits to the public. Sometimes known as privatization. The

transfer of public sewage/electricity services from the state to the

corporate sector is an example of divestment.

Source: Created by Author from Robertson Work, 20022,

2Robertson Work, 2002,Overview of Decentralization Worldwide: A Stepping Stone to improved Governance

16

2.2.3 Why Decentralization is Pursued

Historically decentralization has undergone several phases and began as early as the

late 1800's (Arun Agrawal and Jesse C.Ribot,2002). During the mid-1900s there was an

upsurge in decentralization as the French and British colonial administrators began to prepare

their colonies for independence by slowly devolving responsibilities of certain programs over

to local authorities (Arun Agrawal and Jesse C. Ribot, 2002; Conyers,1983 and Futardo,2001).

The end of the post-colonial era gave rise to a lot of newly independent nations in the

developing world. These new nations were ambitious to demonstrate their new found

responsibilities and envisioned that they could deliver services more effectively to regional

areas which their colonizers had neglected (Conyers,1983 and Futardo,2001).

Decentralization was thus seen as a tool with which these objectives could be achieved.

In recent times decentralization has had different reasons for implementation..

Dominating issues such as good governance, increasing poverty and corruption began to

trouble the developing world, as the developing countries, most of which were former

and Human Development and Jenny Litvack, Junaid Ahmed and Richard Bird, 1998, Rethinking

Decentralization in Developing Countries, The World Bank Sector Study Series 2149

17

colonies, failed to achieve their post-colonial goals. Decentralization began to be seen as an

alternative mechanism with which such issues could be better addressed. The arguments put

forward by pro-decentralization advocates were several. Firstly, it was assumed that

decentralization would bring about increased efficiency. Secondly, it would make local

institutions more accountable. Thirdly, it would enable more participation by the citizenry at

the local level and fourthly, it would maintain national unity.

The decline of service delivery in many developing countries began to be viewed as

the inability of the central government to effectively deliver to its populace in remote

outlying rural areas.. Centrally planned efforts came to be seen as ineffective in the delivery

of services to regional and remote localities (Rondinnnelli and Ellis, 1986). This was the case

for Chile, Cote d' Ivoire, Bolivia and India where decentralization was aimed at addressing

the decline of basic social services(Ahmad et al, 2005; Faguet, 2006; Shubham Chauri,2006).

As a result decentralization of powers to local level tiers of government was envisioned to

increase its efficiency by bringing the authority closer to the people which would increase

government responsiveness and make it more efficient (Arun and Ribot, 2002; Omar ,

Kähkönen and Meagher, 2001;Treisman, 2000).This would also enable local governments to

accommodate to local needs and to customize services to local situations, unlike the central

18

government which was far from the scene and ignorant of such things (Brenton,1999).

It was also thought that decentralization would strengthen accountability because if

officials were closer to the citizens they would be more able to be held accountable for their

actions. The assumption was that since the duties and functions were with local officials, the

citizens could judge for themselves who was performing or where the problems lay

(Ahmad,et al , 2005; Zoe Scott, 2009). This would then force local officials to be more

accountable towards the citizens in their locality, as the people could identify who was the at

fault.

Since the centrally planned initiatives were deemed ineffective and unresponsive to

local needs, decentralization would also strengthen local participation. As the authorities

responsible were now closer to the people they would involve them in the decision making

process via local participation approaches (Brenton,1999; Arun and Ribot, 2002; Paul Smoke,

2003).

Maintaining national unity was also another factor for decentralization in states

where issues of secession and disunity persisted. This was the case in South Africa, Sri Lanka

and Indonesia where decentralization sought to address regional tensions and conflict

(Ahmad et al, 2005).The possibility of giving a certain degree of autonomy to control their

19

own affairs to people in such situations, was seen as a possible option to maintain national

unity. By devolving certain powers and functions to areas with high ethnic tensions and

enabling them to determine their own affairs, it was hoped to maintain harmony and political

unity(Pranab Bardhan, 2002; KatsiaouniOlympios,2003; Ahmad,et al,2005).

Finally the shift in political and economic systems were also motivating factors to

pursue decentralization. Evidence of these reasons can be seen in Eastern Europe, where the

countries emerging from the collapse of the former Soviet Union pursued decentralization as

part of the process to strengthen political institutions and economic reforms (Ahmad et al,

2005). China's decentralization was an attempt to strengthen the free market economy (Yifu,

Tao and Liu, 2006). Vietnam, Bolivia and Latin America offer further examples of shifts from

highly controlled, authoritarian regimes, to more democratic systems (Institute of Social

Studies, 2007; Baiocchi, 2006; Faguet, 2006). The Ugandan example on the other hand was

mostly an attempt to legitimize a military takeover by a revolutionary group; the National

Resistance Movement (Omar, Living stone and Meager, 2006).

Decentralization is thus driven by all sorts of including political and economic

transformation, transition to democracy, maintenance of national unity, improvement of

service delivery and legitimization of authoritarian rule. The World Bank argues that the real

20

reasons behinds decentralization reforms are most often politically motivated movements,

hidden under the guise of slogans like service delivery, national unity and local autonomy.

(The World Bank, 2008).

2.2.4 The Link Between Decentralization and Rural Development

Most developing countries implementing decentralization tend to have a large rural

based population. What then does rural development mean for such people. The Institute for

International Cooperation Japan International Cooperation Agency (IIJICA) notes that rural

development applies to more than developing the agriculture sector targets. It is the

development of "rural areas that includes health care, sanitation, social infrastructure

improvements and empowerment of community members"(IICJICA, 2004:5). To Chambers

(1983) "Rural development is a strategy to enable a specific group of people, poor rural

women and men, to gain for themselves and their children more of what they want and need.

It involves helping the poorest among those who seek livelihood in the rural area to demand

and control more of the benefits of development. This group includes small scale farmers,

tenants and the landless." (Chambers,1983:147)

Decentralization therefore very important for rural people because the local public

21

service is given direct responsibilities to look address their plight. of the way in which

decision making via public participation occurs, as well as the strengthening of local service

delivery and economic activity, now depends on the effectiveness of the local authorities. The

three elements of good governance noted by DFID (2006); Responsiveness, Capability and

Accountability are amplified in these setting and when applied correctly, the link between

decentralization and rural development becomes effective.

The challenge for the local government now becomes to effectively bring about rural

development. However, the Economic Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2000)

note that, simply establishing decentralization legislation is not enough. In order for the link

between decentralization and rural development to be strengthened, the rural people

themselves must be brought into the process. The link between decentralization and rural

development therefore can be seen in two of the main functions of local governments that

Kimura (2011) points out. These are, "local system/network for building local economic

development; and participation mechanism of citizens"(Kimura, 2011:220). The link between

decentralization and rural development is therefore unavoidable. Since decentralization is a

tool of the state to implement and rural development the end goal, both are strongly linked

together in the attempt to provide better services to the rural populace.

22

2.2.5 Prerequisites for Decentralization to Enable Effective Rural Development

In order to achieve good rural development outcomes, numerous arguments have

been put forward as to how best decentralization is to be implemented. One of such notable

arguments offered, has been done so by the World Bank in their Local Government

Discretion and Accountability Model.

Figure 1: Local Government Discretion and Accountability Model

Source: The World Bank, 2007b3

3The World Bank, 2007b:5, Local Governance and Accountability: A Local Governance Framework, pp: 5

23

The Local Government Discretion and Accountability Model first of all, argues that

certain prerequisites need to be in place; political, administrative and fiscal, in order for

effective decentralization to be effective. Secondly, it notes that there are two sides involved;

officials (supply side) and citizens (demand side). Each side has to play their part, in order for

good local governance outcomes to be achieved under decentralization.

For this to be achieved, decentralization must have good political processes

(elections, party systems etc.,) and politics must be clearly separated from administration.

Administrative decentralization must also enable local tiers of government to possess

adequate decision making powers over their local affairs. This involves powers of

procurement, regulatory decision making and hiring and firing powers for staffing issues.

Finally, fiscal decentralization should enable local governments to have control over

expenditure, to have local revenue independence and for there to be reliable efficient

intergovernmental transfers.

From the officials side a high degree of accountability towards the people is required.

The people must actively participate in monitoring and evaluation processes of the local tiers

of government. The World Bank argues that if all these criteria are met, the outcome will be

good for decentralized institutions at the local tier in their pursuit of successful rural

24

development..

2.2.6 Problems of Implementing Decentralization and Rural Development

The prerequisites needed for effective outcomes from decentralization are well

known and widely accepted. But decentralization has faced numerous limitations to its

delivery of effective rural development. Many critics have noted that decentralization has

failed to produce satisfactory results in the developing world, such as in Africa, Colombia,

Brazil and West Bengal (Wunsch,2008;Craig , 2001; Katsiaouni,2003). The failures have

been blamed on a range of reasons from corruption to poor capacity. The most common

reasons cited are, weak local capacity, weak legislation, poor central-local relations,

geographic location (remoteness), weak accountability, information barriers, the capture of

resources by local elites, politicization of service delivery, limited local participation and

unsynchronized decentralization. The factors involve both controllable and uncontrollable

factors. For instance it has been noted that geographic factors of remoteness have been a

major issues and create barriers to effectively reaching out via the decentralization process to

the remote rural populace (Wunsch, 2008). The majority of the developing world possesses

very rough geographic terrain and populations are dispersed unevenly in often inaccessible

25

locations.

On the controllable side of things, key legislation is required to put into place that

define the essential parameters and ceilings to guide operations, to define power and fiscal

sharing arrangements, intergovernmental transfers and so forth. As noted by the World Bank

(2001) the success of decentralization depends upon the quality and effectiveness of the rules

and regulations under which decentralization is implemented. Unclear legislation or

regulations have been attributed to creating chaos, disharmony and duplication of tasks and

functions (Smoke, 2003).This has often led to the lower levels of government possessing

limited authority, and gives them no clear sense of direction. Secondly, poorly defined

legislation on departmental parameters and functions have resulted in creating administrative

dysfunction at the local level, rather than enhancing service delivery (Wunsch, 2008; Owusu,

2004). Fford's (2003) Analysis of Long An and Quang provinces in Vietnam offers a good

example. There weak legislation has not established a good legal framework for

decentralization. Hence when the lines are blurry for power separation, functions, duties and

responsibilities as well as linkage between local and national tiers, chaos sets in which can be

manipulated by elites. Given such circumstances Work (2002) argues that decentralization

should be undertaken with very clear guidelines which define precise roles for each

26

respective tier of government and the operational links between them. The case of Burkina

Faso offers an example of this where each level is clearly defined with clear linkages to all

tiers (Work, 2002).

Clear legislation also affects the nature of relations between the central government

and local levels as it defines how the institutions will operate at each level. The way

institutions operate together can either deter or promote decentralization efforts. When

decentralization efforts are based upon heavy centralized authority from a central government,

local tiers of government are constrained. Secondly, the type of relationship, if politicized or

poor, may result in local tiers being neglected. This is often the case and has been a major

factor behind weak decentralization in developing countries (Arun and Ribot, 2002; Pranab

2002; Oyugi,2000).

Effective decentralization requires resources; fiscal, administrative and infrastructure

to be adequately provided at each level of government. Most decentralization efforts make

the resources provided to lower levels dependent upon the central government (Awal,

2000).A World Bank report provides many examples in which intergovernmental transfer of

grants and funds to lower level governments are unreliable and controlled by central

governments (The World Bank, 2001).A specific example is Mexico where rural development

27

initiatives faced great obstacles due unreliability of funding from the higher tiers of authority

(Cabellero, 2006). Vietnam's case offers another example of where lower levels of

government were politically and fiscally reliant on the central government. Local council

candidates have to be approved by the provincial authority and not locally. Furthermore they

are also fiscally dependent on the central government and the fiscal allocation is largely

dictated from the province to the local level with no room for locals to maneuver in(Institute

of Social Studies, 2007).

On the other hand, a capacity (fiscal, human resource and equipment)is required by

local governments to implement things, as more powers, functions, duties and responsibilities.

The question of whether or not they are capable to effectively implement all their new duties

and functions is now drawn into light. Numerous commentators have noted that in most cases

the lower tiers, such as provincial, district and local governments do not possess the required

capacity and are in fact unable to perform their new functions and duties. This often results

from an unsynchronized devolution of powers where training does not precede the granting of

powers (Awal, 2000, Litvack et al, 1998; Smoke, 2003; The World Bank, 2008; George

Owusu, 2004; World Bank, 2001). Administrative functions may be diverged but without the

fiscal component, or political function diverged without administrative functions. This results

28

in poor implementation capacity. In the end projects, service delivery and other functions.

become difficult to implement and coordinate (Smoke, 2003).

Examples of these challenges can be seen in several countries. Pakistan's efforts

were hindered by weak local control over decision making and a high dependency on central

government funding (Keefer, Narayan and Vishwath, 2006). China also had problems with

high central control, compounded with unequal intergovernmental transfers, lack of local

accountability to local citizens by officials and corruption that accompanied the lack of local

accountability. South Africa faced the issue of unclear legislation over designated functions

and responsibilities, resulting in confusion of who was responsible for what. Political

appointees were also a significant problem that affected the process. Furthermore the unclear

formula of intergovernmental fiscal transfers based on legislation which was to promote an

"equitable share" was not properly clarified and led to underfunded functions and revenue

shortfalls (Writtenberg, 2006: 349). Citizen participation was also limited. Finally, functions

were devolved with not enough capacity to implement them

In Latin America, Brazil faced problems related to unequal funding arrangements

which put large municipalities at an advantage over smaller ones, in relation to taxable

revenue (Baiocchi, 2006). Given their plight the smaller municipalities tended to be more

29

dependent on central government. Likewise the case of unclear legislation was also noted

here in relation to health and other social services. In Bolivia setbacks were faced in capacity

and local revenue at the local level. A comparative study involving two towns in Bolivia

(ibid) also noted that geographic location may also matter when developing local economic

activity (Faquet, 2006). In Africa, Uganda faced the challenges of unclear separation of

powers, unreliable funding, politicization of personal positions, limited capacity to implement

functions and weak accountability at the local level. Education services were also greatly

affected in Uganda (Kayabe, Asiime and Nakanda, 2014).

Coming to Asia, a study looking at forest management and decentralization in India,

Nepal and Senegal (Arun and Ribot, 1999) noted several common features. Firstly, there

seemed to be a limits to the performance of duties and functions in Kuman, India and Terari,

Nepal. Secondly all three countries faced the prospect of limited accountability at the local

level. Thirdly, all three countries also had a high dependency on central government funding.

Finally, was the absence of local level participation and involvement at the local level which

was largely absent. These were seen as major impediments to the process.

Amidst these challenges local government units often are handicapped fiscally and

lack human resources in a number of areas. Firstly, is the fact that the lower levels of

30

government possess few sources of revenue. Their tax base is usually low and as a result they

are heavily reliant upon central government funding (Wunsch, 2008). Secondly, the lower

levels of government have very few qualified staff. This is largely due to things like poor

remuneration packages, poor service delivery at local levels, hostility of geographic

environment and other factors that make it unattractive for qualified officials (Owusu, 2004).

Finally there is the lack of effective physical and material resources such as good

infrastructure (roads and buildings) and equipment to support the lower tiers of government

in their functions (Work, 2002). South Africa offers an example into this aspect where the

educational sectors in the lower level governments faced immense problems to meet certain

targets due to limited capacity to implement programs (Litvack, et al, 1998).

Poorly skilled workers are also a major challenges at the lower tiers of government

and administration, as there is generally a poor understanding of the systems and process of

government by people in general, as well as by elected representatives and public officials

(Joop de Wit, 2007). As a result it is not understood how public officials and elected

representatives should operate or function. This tends to create distrust by the people towards

local leaders and public officials. Due to weak accountability structures in these lower tiers,

as most of them possess. Accountability mechanisms and practices are very weak. Distrust of

31

officials and local leaders comes about when coupled with the limited understanding of roles

and functions, poor service delivery results, conditions decline and people become aware that

local officials are ineffective service providers. This occurs partly because the effective

development of accountability structures is not achieved. This includes the failure to

disseminate information to local /leaders on their functions, duties and responsibilities,

especially on how money should be managed and accounted for. Negligence like this has

created an ignorant populace who often view the local officials as corrupt, thus the distrust

them and refuse to support government sponsored development activities (Litvack, et al,

1998; Oyugi,2000; Ruben and Zhuravskaya, 2006; Devas, 2005).

Another issue raised in these studies is the ability of local elites to capture state

resources for their own benefits when those powers and resources are devolved to the local

level (World Bank 2008).As result, local institutions and resources become avenues for

political manipulation and theft of funds, rather than effective method of service delivery

(Hossain, 2000). Yasin (2014) notes that in most developing countries it is the norm for local

institutions to become controlled and manipulated by a minority in power, at the expense of

the mass of the people. Yasin (2014) indicates this dilemma to be very much the case of most

African decentralization efforts.

32

Resource capture by elites however may be associated with class systems, caste,

social-economic inequalities such as educational differences, other traditional factors, or

simply pure greed (Johnson, 2001; Kwame Badu Antwi-Boasiako, 2010; Rondineli,

1990).Capture of resources often takes place in an environment where local participation is

limited. Hence despite the purpose of decentralization to bring about more participation and

accountability of the local citizens, capture of resources severely constrains popular

participation and local accountability (Joop de Wit, 2007; Awal, 2000; Smoke, 2003; Fforde,

2003). There is therefore a need to develop avenues for this at the local level to strengthen the

local institutions effectiveness (Yasin, 2014). The case of Luawaka, in Poland, offers an

insight into how effective participation can be. In the Luawaka case a committee consisting of

public, private and other interested persons was established. This committee managed to

work effectively with the people to develop initiatives which saw improvement in living

conditions and increased economic development (Work, 2002). Other examples of effective

participation come from Brazil and Colombia, where it has developed more effective

responses towards local problems. In Colombia the local people provide labor and some

materials for designated projects whilst the local authorities meet other parts of the cost

(Litvack, et al, 1998). In Brazil’s Porto Algere municipality, the concept of Participatory

33

Budgeting, is a case where local participation via meetings between citizens and local

authorities was able to swing funding towards socially needed amenities that the communities

needed rather than non-essential projects (Baiocchi, 2006).Other examples from Nicaragua,

Argentina and El Salvador illustrate how involvement from the community was able to

increase the test scores for students as participatory approaches were developed within the

education sector at the local level (The World Bank, 2008). Public participation and local

accountability can therefore produce effective results if they are properly integrated into the

decentralization process.

2.2.7 Theoretical Arguments for these Problems

Numerous theories have been put forward as to the most likely causes behind the

challenges encountered in the implementation of decentralization. Parker (Sutiyo 2014) offers

what he calls Soufleés theory (based on the idea that soufleés often fail to rise when exactly

the right combination of eggs, milk and heat are not present) asserts that decentralization

requires an exact combination of inputs to meet each individual country's situation. The

soufflé' theory emphasizes that each country should design the decentralization process to

cater for its particular social, political and informal-formal practices. From the soufflé theory

34

perspective decentralization cannot be implemented under a one size is fit for all approach,

but requires careful consideration tailored to each country's needs due to differences in

characteristics such as culture, environment and other elements.

Falleti's (2004) Sequential Theory of Decentralization on the other hand argues that

decentralization is undertaken via a set of sequential processes. According to Falletti's view

the sequences are the stages of administrative, fiscal and political decentralization. His

Sequential Theory of Decentralization argues that, there are two ways in which

decentralization can proceed. If political decentralization takes place first, and is followed by

fiscal decentralization and then administrative decentralization. Falletti argues that

administrative decentralization should be initiated first, to be followed by fiscal

decentralization and finally by political decentralization. Falletti argues that if sub-national

levels of government are given political decentralization first, they will use this power to

bargain for more powers, which although it will eventually lead to fiscal and administrative

decentralization, it will also strengthen the political positions of sub-national leaders. In

scenario two if sub-national political power is not granted in the initial stages, and central

governments try to reduce national public spending by transferring some of it to sub-national

levels, this will mean that power will be retained by the central government rather than

35

devolved to sub-national levels. As a result Falletti argues that decentralization can take two

sequences, which she justifies from the cases four Latin American countries (Mexico,

Colombia, Argentina and Brazil) whereby Colombia followed the first approach whilst

Argentina followed the second one.

Majocci’s theory of Fiscal Federalism (Majocchi, 2008) emphasizes that economic

responsibilities should be allocated to different tiers of government in two main ways. The

central government should focus primarily on the delivery of public goods and services

whilst the sub-national governments would focus on those goods and services used by their

citizens within their local boundaries (Oates, 1999; Majocchi, 2008). In this scenario the

central government will be concerned with things like such the military and national

highways, which involve all citizens, whilst sub-national tiers will focus on local health

facilities, schools and local roads in their localities.

Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (Greco, 2003) asks if the central government

retains national fiscal responsibilities, what happens to groups that share common facilities,

while belonging to different jurisdictions at the sub-national level. Oates’ Decentralization

Theorem argues that local provision of public goods and services should be predetermined by

the central government for local governments to implement at a generally uniform level.

36

Oates bases his argument on the notion that since both the central and local governments are

working for the same purpose there is no reason why they should get into conflict. This

approach will reduce wastage and ensure uniformity in service delivery.

Finally Riker's Party Base Theory (Gordin, 2004) takes a different approach.

According to Riker, the outcome of decentralization is very much influenced by political

party alignments. In this instance officials as well as lower tiers of government are influenced

by which political parties they are aligned to at the national level. This in turn affects such

elements as funding allocations and decision making over certain issues which can determine

whether decentralization reforms work or not.

2.3 Considering Informal Institutions as an Impeding Factor

In the attempt to assess the challenges to effectively deliver rural development under

conditions of decentralization most studies have focused on the formal institutional

mechanisms issues. Weak legislation, fiscal transfers, power sharing arrangements and others

have been noted as the main reasons for poor implementation of rural development. The

theoretical arguments have provided an analysis of the processes of decentralization, like

Falleti’s arguments about the sequence of decentralization processes, or Riker’s arguments

37

about party politics.

But the possibility that informal institutions can be an impending factor is often

overlooked. As noted by Midgal (1988) most inquiries tend to focus on the formal

institutional aspects more than the informal rules that govern a society. In this aspect Midgal

emphasis that the manner in which informal societies influence or weaken states is

overlooked as "the operative rules [of informal institutions/societies] for people’s behavior in

these societies have not been established in state legislation or bureaucratic decrees"(Midgal

1988:266). In other words they are not governed by laws and regulations There is a

possibility that informal institutions are an important influencing factor that weakens formal

institutions, such as local decentralized institutions. This leads to poor rural development

outcomes.

What then are informal institutions? Informal institutions are for example social

norms, customs, families, landowning groups, and clans that operate in non-official settings

and are largely linked to social or customary rules with their own means of enforcing

compliance. Goldsmith and Brinkerhoff add further to this by saying that informal institutions

are largely grounded in "implicit and unwritten rules of understanding"(2002:1). As a result

they are influenced by social culture, locality and way of life in the shaping these rules that

38

govern the interactions between different members, of the group in the everyday life (Brie

and Stolting, 2012). As such they are less recognizable formal institutions with formal (legal)

sets of rules.

2.3.1 The Formal and the Informal

Informal institutions differ from formal institutions as their set of rules and

regulations generally consist of socially shared rules, which are largely undocumented

(unwritten) “that are communicated outside and enforced outside of officially sanctions

channels" (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). However governance in many developing

countries consists a duality, in which formal and informal institutions operate side by side

often with deep interlinking ties between them (Goldsmith, 2002). When there is a break

down in the nation building process, in the formal institutions, to the question should be

explored of whether the informal institutions are causing the breakdown by being resistant to

the formal rules(Dittmer, 2012). There may be a contradiction between the formal and

informal rules which cause conflicts between the formal and formal institutions. According to

Goldsmith the bedrock of traditional informal rules was in the social relationships "between

the ruler and the ruled" (2002:2) which has not been maintained with the emergence of the

39

formal institutions. As a result, practices now deemed as bad or corrupt in the formal sector

may not be seen in the same light in the informal institutions. This situation may be related to

expectations that emerge from hoped for services from formal institutions but are still trapped

in informal institutions. For example, a traditional society wants modern day developments

but cannot achieve their delivery effectively, because the institutions that have to bring about

the desired development remain bogged down by informal practices that people value and

continue to use. Helmke and Levitsky note that informal institutions "do in fact shape formal

institutional outcomes in significant and systematic ways" (2003:11).

2.3.2The Influence of Informal Institutions upon Decentralization

The influence of informal institutions on formal institutions may be either interactive,

substituting, accommodating or competing. They can either assist to solve problems in the

formal arena or create problems there (Helmke and Livitsky, 2003). I wish to focus on how

formal institutions are affected, I shall examine how informal institutions can create problems.

Migdal takes the view that states are not able to develop into strong states, in other words

create and maintain strong institutions because they have failed to take control over their

local societies. He appears to be suggesting that local societies have a greater influence on

40

formal state institutions than the other way around.

This is in contradiction to the assumption that the introduction of formal institutions

would be the solution to all problems (Lambach, 2004). Lambach goes on to note that this

approach, fails to realize that the State is part of a group of organizations (large and small,

formal and informal) that exist within its boundaries, rather than being the sole organization.

Formal and informal rules and regulations both determine the manner in which things are

done. Migdal (1988) comes to the conclusion that most developing countries constitute

networks between small, fragmented informal societies with their own particular sense of

order, led by someone who is usually a "local strong man, chiefs, landlords, rich peasants [or]

clan leader"(Lambach, 2004:6). Migdal sees the central basis of this relationship is structured

on a sense of reciprocal relations between the small informal groups and the formal State

institutions which occur through the informal group leader and so results in development of a

patron client relationship between the members of the informal groups and their leader.

2.3.3 Patron Client relations

Scott (1972a: 92, 1972b:8) defines a patron-client relationship as a type of

relationship between those that have some type of power or resources and the client who

41

wants to receive a share of resources from the patron. The main feature of this relationship is

the interlinking relations that demands reciprocity by both parties. Hence in return for the

benefits in the form of services and goods from the patron, political and other support for the

patron, is expected from the client. This establishes the fundamental nature of the

relationships between informal and formal institutions..

In a patron-client relationship that the patron’s power is sourced from the State and

its formal institutions (Scott, 1972a:92a, Scott, 1972b:767). But the manner that this power is

distributed is not uniform at one level at government. It may involve, a number of levels of

government in the decentralizing State. Scott says that there can be a Patron Client Cluster or

a Patron Client Pyramid. The diagram below showcases this point of view

Figure 2: Patron Client Cluster & the Patron Client Pyramid

(Source: Scott, 1972a: 97)

42

It is ultimately the sources of power of the patron that determines how the

relationship functions and how it issues rewards and punishments. The activity that takes

place around the patron’s source of power eventually determines the manner in which the

informal institutions behave. I have identified five main sources of power in patron-client

relations that influence the form taken by informal institutions and the social order in local

societies. These are: local strong man; land;, political party; religion; and state resources

(Barcson 2015).

In the Local Strong Man case, patronage is based on protection by the strong man of

his/her client. Examples of such cases are; the Cacique in Mexico (Villareal, 2002: 479), local

bosses in Philippines an Mafiosi (Sidel, 1989: 24;Sidel, 1997: 947). The local strong man

may inflict varying levels of coercive or force to extort client support. Those who have

control over land, particularly landlords, are most able to use power this to obtain political or

other support from their clients. A notable example of this situation is Brazil’s landed elites

who own large commercial farms (Valenca, 1999:8). Political parties have the support of

intermediaries who become clients but who in turn are themselves patrons of those at a lower

level of society. Examples of this can be seen in Bangladesh with certain dominant political

parties (Kochanek, 2000: 548), and in certain parts of Senegal (Schaffer, 1998:127). The

43

prime benefits here are the advantages that a political party can deliver based on its affiliation

and linkages.

In the case of religion it is primarily those who are religious leaders, who play the

role of patron via a patron-client pyramid structure. Religious leaders in these instances are

able to garner the support of their followers and play the role of the intermediary with those

higher up in formal state institutions. A good example of this can be seen in Marabouts where

an Islamic sect in Senegal was able to exert great influence to control peanut production for

its followers (Fatton, 1986: 64).

Finally, State Resources are a very large source of wealth that clients and patrons

attempt to gain access to. Access may take the form of grants, projects that are up for tender,

essential infrastructure or direct personal gains. Whatever the reason the objective is to get

access to those with best access to state resources. Patrons in most instances in these cases are

politicians and high ranking government officials.

2.3.4 Migdals Weak State Impact

What happens when informal institutions meet with formal state institutions. In most

cases they do not work well together when they come into contact. Certain values that may be

44

seen as essential in the informal institution may be seen as unacceptable in the formal

institutions. Hence when these two institutions meet one may erode the other. For instance, in

the local strong man case, elite capture of formal state benefits may take place at the cost of

the people served by a lower level government. On the other hand, as clan groups try to take

care of their own, the traditional concepts of communal needs and sharing and caring may

now be seen as corruption within formal state institutions. Hence the clash of these two

systems maybe be producing a negative effect on formal state institutions.

Against this backdrop Migdal (1988) argues that states are not able to become strong

if there is competition by local strong men, who are also leaders of their own customary

groups, which have evolved patron-client relationships. When traditional or other local

leaders resist state led formal institutions they weaken them through enclaves of local

dominance (Migdal, 1988). The leaders of formal institutions may realize the importance of

leaders of informal local institutions, leading to possible tradeoffs being made between

formal and informal leaders, in what Migdal refers to as the politics of survival. However, in

this instance it is important to bear in mind that Migdal assumes that all order is based on a

strong man type approach or a sense of established social order. In the instance where there is

no form of local hegemonic leader Migdal assumes that the clients will have to choose

45

between potential patrons with a varying degree of repercussions or benefits, hence the

choice in this instance will be a difficult one (Lambach, 2004: 4).

2.3.5 The PNG Big Man System

Migdal's arguments imply that informal societies are based upon traditional

guidelines, with organized forms of social order. However, the Bigman system in PNG

demonstrates that, that may not be always true, as informal leaders such as local strong man,

a person who has inherited chieftaincy or certain oligarchic leaders can operate in an absence

of rigid informal guidelines. In this case also there will be no difficulties in choosing a patron

as suggested by Lambach, given the fluidity of the system. Finally, the weakening of the state

in the Bigman instance, is not made because of tradeoffs between formal leaders and informal

leaders (local strong man). Rather it is the result of an informal infiltration into the formal

institution.

Traditionally very few societies of the Melanesian group of islands in the Pacific had

inherited chieftaincies. They had no formal order structures within their traditional societies,

except for small group social organizations which comprised moieties and descent groups

which were associated with exchange and the occupation of land (May, 2004). The traditional

46

Melanesian societies were largely egalitarian and communalistic based. In the midst of this it

was the Bigman system that offered a type of ad hoc order to the traditional Melanesian

communities of which PNG is part of. So what then is the Bigman system?

The Big Man System is a general unstructured order in society practiced amongst the

Melanesian group of islands in the Pacific Islands. In this system the Bigman’s status is

achieved via “personal achievements, and personal attributes such as bravery and strength,

persuasive and excellent oratory” (Peash, 1994: 3). A Bigman possessed these attributes as

well as knowledge of the genealogical descent of the families in his group and the oral history

of the group’s occupation of land and of conflicts with neighboring groups. Bigman did not

amass wealth for their personal use but organized the accumulation of wealth in the form of

food, pigs and shells, which were exchanged with ritual opponent groups in an on-going

struggle for status in the local area. Bigman assisted supporters and followers with their needs

or in times of emergencies. Sometimes Bigman achieved their status through being a strong

warrior or possessing significant powers such as sorcery (Salins, 1963: 489). This could also

be used to assist or protect followers. Using these set of attributes it was up to the aspiring

Bigman to utilize the other values based on his own pasin4. Charisma can then be generated

4 There is no actual English word that actually describes the Tok-Pisin word Pasin. However,

it basically means ones, attitude, ability to share, care, hate, protect, defend, and other traits

that form a person’s persona. In the Bigman scenario, charisma is generated from developing

47

through this approach when potential Bigman exercised good pasin. This was then used to

rally and mobilize supporters and followers who usually came through kinship ties and

families relations.

The system however was fluid as it was not inherited, and was a loose structured

social order in the society. Rather it was a system that utilized the Wantok System nature of

most traditional societies in PNG. Wantok System was basically a system where by people

from certain clans, tribes or, villages.. looked after each other. In the traditional PNG context,

it was a type of social safety net whereby caring for family members in times of need,

supporting them in daily activities, and other traditional social activities were enshrined in

this Wantok System5. Traditionally this approach proved very useful as it took care of widows,

orphans, the needy, and supported every member of a group, whether it be in their everyday

activities or to meet traditional obligations. This practice was of great value in the

communalistic oriented society in PNG. Amidst this setting the Bigman was expected to do

more than the average citizen.

However since the Bigman status was not firmly fixed as an organized form of order,

it could be acquired based on a range of different values, such as the ability to distribute

a good pasin towards fellow members towards tribal/clan/supporters. 5 Source:

http://www.infobarrel.com/Wantok_System:_A_Traditional_Social_Security_System_in_Papua_New_Guinea

accessed on 26/01/2016 at 5.41pm

48

wealth equally to supporters. Secondly, is the ability to contribute to traditional obligations

and ceremonies. There is an understanding that Bigman are supposed to contribute a bigger

share in such events than their supporters, clans men and family and so forth. Thirdly,

Bigman systems are largely based upon family and clan loyalties (Koim, 2013). As a result

possession of such a status is merely dependent upon one's ability to deliver benefits to

supporters. As a result it had no strong binding links to the Bigman and was very fluid.

Furthermore, no formal office actually was occupied by the big man and the only powers he

possessed depend on his personal attributes of leadership and personality.

The ability to maintain support was largely grounded in personal attributes and

character and included a wide range of unspoken values that were able to generate charisma.

For example, Ketan notes that, "only a true Bigman can demonstrate master craftsmanship in

cutting pork for distribution - without counting the number of people - [but still] ensure that

everyone receives a fair share" (Ketan 2013: 5). Such skills enable the Bigman to become

successful in ceremonial activities and to develop a support base, which demanded recurring

investments in good social relations to maintain. On the other hand the neglect of such

essential relations and activities can result in a loss of the Bigman status.

The PNG informal system of Bigman is therefore, unlike most countries in world,

49

very fluid and is based upon the benefits provided by the Bigman, such as protection, support

and traditional currencies that he accumulated because of his personal skills. Because there is

no established order each individual affiliates with those who can assist him the best and his

support is given in return. Affiliations are mostly concentrated via clan and tribal affiliations

(Salins, 1963; Brown, 1987). However, because of the fluidity there is also no guarantee or

hold over the client by the patron/ Bigman. Hence, while the fixed forms of patron-client

relations contain a degree of control over by the patron over the client such is not so in the

Bigman system. Instead it is a constant struggle to keep supporters loyal but without the

binding control as another Bigman may emerge within the group or near the group and attract

supporters away from the current Bigman. As Bigman age and become incapable of

continuing vigorous leadership, they lose their status, although they may maintain great

respect within the group.

Therefore, unlike the other forms of patron-client relations the Bigman system was

not grounded in a firm basis of order, such as local strongman's use of force, the ownership of

land by, religious affiliation and so on...This made the shifting of Bigman alliances a constant,

ongoing thing, as each Bigman strove to maintain his status. Secondly, the status never really

gave any form of actual power to the holder but was only something he could use to influence

50

things within his given society. Given this aspect consistent reliance on the support base was

essential. This would come to influence the formal system with the introduction of

decentralization when politics was played out whilst using the Bigman system to solicit

support. Therefore Migdal's assumption that there is a local strong man at the local level is

not so in the PNG case. Instead it has been how politicians have used the Bigman system to

mobilize and maintain support which has been a major factor behind the weakening of formal

state institutions in the absence of the local strong man and oligarchic rule.

2.4 -Proposed Argument

It is possible therefore that in PNG informal institutions can weaken formal

decentralization processes leading to poor rural development outcomes. This study attempts

to fill a gap in existing theoretical studies of decentralization to argue that even highly

unstable and fluid informal institutions without rigid control or offices of power, are still able

to weaken the formal decentralization process. The proposed argument is that , the informal

system of Bigman has been able to weaken the formal decentralization process in PNG

because of close interlinking traditional ethnic ties and values operating in an environment

with limited opportunities in which politics has been manipulated to serve the Bigman,

51

thereby further weakening the decentralization process and affecting rural development.

This assumption is therefore based on a simple premise that whilst the Bigman

system has been good for the traditional society it is now moved into in an environment

where other values, including cash values, are placing a huge strain on it. In the midst of this

the current socio economic environment lacking the basic opportunities to support the people

effectively has made them see the politicians as anew sort of Bigman. The politicians

therefore use this aspect of traditional societies to maintain personal support and to enrich

themselves, which has led to the weakening of the system hence poor rural development

outcomes.

52

Chapter Three: Hijacking of the Decentralization Process at the Subnational Level by

Bigman Infiltration

3.1 Country Background

3.1.1 Geography and Demographics

Papua New Guinea is the largest of the Pacific island countries located just below

the equator and several miles above Australia (UNDP, 2007).

Figure 3 : Map of Papua New Guinea Figure 4: PNG Flag

Source: vidiani.com6 Source: wikimedia7

PNG has a total land area of approximately 460 000 square kilometers (UNDP,

2007). This consists of mountainous terrain largely concentrated in the middle of the island

6 Source: http://www.vidiani.com/full-political-map-of-papua-new-guinea/ accessed on 06.08. 2015 at 1:36 pm

7 Source : https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Papua_New_Guinea.svg accessed on 07.08. 2015

at 10: 47am

53

nation, with other ranges in the northern part of the country. In relation to this the their big

islands; New Britain, New Ireland, Manus and Bougainville, that make up the country as well

several thousand smaller islands and atolls. Being a tropical country it has only two main

seasons; wet and dry seasons.

The population of PNG according to the 2011 census8 7, 059, 653 this however may

be more as there is no reliable sources of data to attest to this, hence an approximate estimate

by the UNDP (2007a) estimates it to reach 8 million in 2015. The population is largely

concentrated in the highlands regions, in the center of the island, with smaller dispersal of

concentrated areas thought the coastal regions (UNDP, 2007b). The UNDP (2007a) also notes

that amongst this composition 85% of the population are located in the rural areas. With the

remaining 15% spread out in the urban townships and cities.

3.1.2 Brief Colonial History

Colonization of PNG was initially under two colonial powers, British and Germany.

The southern part of the country which was known as Papua, was under the control of the

British since 1884 (United Nations, 2007b). The northern part of the country was known as

German New Guinea as it was under German influence. The area was purely strategic due to

8 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papua_New_Guinea accessed on 07.08. 2015 at 11: 35am

54

the game of power being played out in the European theater of political supremacy. As a

result not much development and investment was made into the area except for a handful of

agriculture plantations. This was later to change as findings in gold in the Wau area of current

day Morobe Province, saw a significant influx of foreigners arriving into the area in the

1920s9. All this however was basically confined to this activity with little investments or

development into the hinterlands and other areas. The loss of Germany in World War One

saw the entry of Australia into the German New Guinea as it had become a nation in 1906

(ibid). This however was short lived with the arrival of World War Two, which saw the

Japanese control over mostly the northern areas of the country. It was not until the end of

World War Two that Australia was able to reclaim back the area.

The area was then made a protectorate under the United Nations control. Australia

was then tasked to look after this protectorate. This period of time from the 1960s upwards

was also a great time for the world as influential movements demanding more equality,

independence and sovereignty of small colonized countries began to take sway. As result

colonies where beginning to be shunned upon. At that time also independence and self

government, free from colonial domination was seen as the pathway towards development.

9 Source:

http://www.mra.gov.pg/Portals/2/Publications/mining%20history%20in%20png%20final.pdf

accessed on 10.08. 2015 at 12: 30 pm

55

In the light of these new social movements the United Nations tasked Australia to begin

preparing the country for self government. This was eventually undertaken but at a time

where there was very limited infrastructure in place and educated elite. Most of the country

was still getting used to the idea of seeing a white man while this change was being

undertaken. Despite this independence was finally obtained from Australian control on the

16th of September 1975. However, Australian support would continue for years to come as a

major partner in PNGs development efforts.

3.1.3 Culture, Way of Life and Economy

PNG is multicultural society with numerous ethnic groups and hundreds of tribes

which are further broken down into numerous clans in villages and hamlets. Within these

communities communalism is very much preferred over individualism, hence communal

(tribal/clan/extended family) needs are emphasized rather than individual needs and desires.

Therefore protecting and caring for each other forms the basis of most villages throughout

PNG. A strong link to this is closely associated with the land tenure system in which land is

owned via customary land tenure alongside tribal/ clan group affiliation. This has been

closely linked to the Big Man system in most parts of PNG.

56

The language composition is also varied, with a total of 848 local languages10

spoken by these numerous tribes, which is also considered to be the largest number in any

country throughout the world. Despite this English, Tok-Pisin, Hiri Motu and Sign Language

are used as the four official languages. English however, is the language used in education,

government and business activities. Tok-Pisin, a mixture of pidgin English has become the

largest spoken language by the majority of the population, whilst Hiri Motu is confined

mostly to the southern region.

The PNG economy is composed to two parts; the formal economy and the informal

economy (ADB, 2012a: 6). The formal economy basically involves three main elements; the

resource extraction activities (minerals, fishing, forestry etc...), the public service and a small

industrial based activities. This however, whilst contributing to most of the state revenue

involves only a small percentage of the population. The informal economy on other hand

involves the majority of the population. Its contribution to the state revenue however is much

lesser than the formal economy. Since the majority of the people are located in the rural areas.

they tend to rely on "forest exploitation, fishing, hunting and subsistence agriculture" (UNDP,

2007a: 2). The main source of income for these people is derived from the production of

cash crops; cocoa, vanilla, copra, coffee, selling of fresh food and small scale poultry and

10 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papua_New_Guinea accessed on 07.08. 2015 at 11: 35am

57

piggery activities (Allen, Bourke and Macgregor, 2009: 285). There are two reasons as to

why this has a lower level of contribution to state coffers. Firstly, there is a lot of unregulated

activities going on here hence no tax revenue, a good example is the betel nut trade which

generates millions for those involved but is not regulated thus no tax revenue. Secondly, the

activities in which these people are involved is not supported with proper infrastructure and

support services, the good example of this is agriculture investment for rural people.

As a result of this the PNG economy continues to be supported by the mineral

resource sector and caters to 77% of all the exports leaving the country (ADB, 2012b: 9). The

remaining 24% is divided between the agriculture sector :17%, forestry products : 5% and

other areas 1%.

3.1.4 System of Government

PNG system of government is based upon the Westminster system of government. It

comprises of three parts; the legislature: which is elected via democratic elections, the

executive and the judiciary (Gelu, 2010: 162). The national parliament consists of a

unicameral national parliament (single house system) made up of 111 seats. Twenty one

of these seats are held by provincial Members of Parliament (MPs) with one being held by

58

the National Capital District (NCD) Regional MP as NCD is allocated a separate status. The

remaining 89 seats are held by MPs elected from smaller electorates within the provinces. To

better understand this a brief description is made of the electoral representation. PNG has a

total of 21 Provinces. A province in this case is similar to a state in the United States of

America or prefecture in Japan. Within each of these provinces are several smaller electorates,

who also elect their own MP. For example, let's say X is a province, within X province are

five smaller electorates. Therefore X province will have five electoral MPs (from the smaller

electorates) and one provincial MP. The provincial MP is also known as the Governor and is

elected by citizens from the whole province whilst the electoral MPs are only elected the

citizens in the electorate concerned. So in this case X province will have a total of six MPs in

parliament (One provincial MP/ Governor and five electoral MPs).

The Prime Minister is the head of government, whilst the head of state is the

Governor General as PNG is part of the Commonwealth. The Governor General is nominated

by the parliament, which is undertaken via a voting process as stipulated in Section 88 of the

constitution of PNG (Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 2000). The Prime Minister on

the other hand usually comes from the party with the largest number after elections.

PNG's electoral system is based on the Limited Preferential Voting System (LPV)

59

which was launched in the 2007 elections, prior to that, the first past the post system was

used (May, Wheen and Haley 2011: 193). After elections the party with the most winning

candidates is asked to form the government by the Governor General. As a result, the party

leader of the winning party often becomes the prime minister. In most cases governments in

PNG have consisted of coalitions between the numerous parties. Intense lobbying for

coalition partners usually follows elections in the lead up to government formation, as given

the multiparty nature there has been hardly an instance where one party has emerged

dominant from elections to fill over half the seats. As a result constant lobbying between

parties takes place. The government however can be removed via a vote of confidence. The

constitution of PNG in Section 145 however only allows this to take place only 18 months

after a government is formed and does not allow it 12 months before writs are open for next

elections (Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 2000).

The tiers of government are structured into three tiers of government, at the top is the

National Government, in the middle there is the provincial government and finally at bottom

are the Local Level Governments (LLGs). However only the National Government and LLG

are comprised of elected representatives whilst the provincial government is made up of the

same MPs, LLG Presidents/Mayors and other representatives. On the administrative front

60

there is also three tiers; national departments at the top, provincial departments in the middle

and numerous department officials in the district headquarters of each electorate in the

provinces.

3.1.5 Development Challenges in PNG

As a young nation the road to progress and change has not been easy. Numerous

challenges have greatly affected PNGs development efforts. Issues such as health delivery

issues continually plague the country and have declined in recent years (AUSAID, 2009;

World Bank, 2000: World Bank, 2004:33). Indicators by numerous development agencies

point out that PNG has the worst record in Asia Pacific Region (Asante and Hall, 2011;

PNGDOH, 2010). Access to medical doctors remains low, and is largely concentrated in

urban centers (Gerawa, M, 2015, Post Courier, 25th May, Doctors Needed).

In the education sector results are mixed and reveal a system that struggles to

effectively deliver amidst numerous obstacles. AUSAID (2014) note that the standard of

education in PNG largely falls behind other pacific island countries. The ADB (2012b) and

AUSAID (2009) note that it is difficult to access quality education cheaply. It is also

perceived that half of the older population are largely illiterate (Ravindier, 2011). Recent

61

years have seen further strain added to the struggling system with the introduction of the free

education policy of by Oniel Dion government. As a result more students are forced into

school with fewer resources to cater. On the other side staff issues, such as housing, teaching

materials continue to be a constant problem, especially in the rural areas (PNGDOE, 2004;

Howes et al; 2014).

In the midst of these challenges there has been a significant decline and deterioration

of roads in the bridges in PNG, as a result most of such infrastructure are in a very bad

condition (Word Bank, 2013; ADB, 2012b; Cammack, 2008). The ADB (2012b) note that

only 33% of roads are in a usable condition, however the ratio of provincial and feeder

roads in even in a more worsened condition. It was also noted that 85% of feeder roads are

also unusable during rainy seasons. The challenge to develop good roads has been made more

challenging by the terrain and population dispersal. Apart from this such utilities such as

electricity and piped water are nonexistent in most rural areas (ADB, 2012a; ADB, 2012b).

The ADB (2012b) places those with access to electricity as 1/10, even in the urban setting

only 70% are said to be able to access electricity with the remaining 30% missing out on,

whilst in the rural areas it is largely nonexistent apart from the use of portable generators and

solar panel kits. Piped water also faces similar predicament in the rural areas also and has

62

been the blamed for many water related illnesses related to poor quality drinking water.

The negative impact of poor infrastructure has further affected the local economic

activities of the people further contributing to poverty as the majority of the population

struggle to raise K100 (US$ 50) annually (Hayward- Jones and Campbell, 2009).

According to Chandy (2009) it is estimated that 37.5% of the population face extreme

poverty based on the US$1 a day measurement. However, the income indicator maybe

misleading, as poverty in PNG is not about hunger, instead it is about absence of

opportunities to income, education, health care, good water, transport and goods roads (ADB,

2012; Chandy, 2009; Hayward- Jones and Campbell, 2009). It is also noted that poverty

incidences are more concentrated in the rural areas rather than the urban areas which the ADB

(2012a) estimate to be 94% (Chandy, 2009; Rogers, Richard, Wala and CARE, 2011). Hence

poverty to this people involves the challenges in getting effective services, being able to earn

a good source of income, pay for children's school fees, enjoy good health and living

conditions such as piped water and electricity. This however, has not been forthcoming in fact

certain studies reveal that there has been no change to the living conditions of the rural people

since 1975, despite the recent economic growth ( Rogers, Richard, Wala and CARE, 2011;

World Bank, 2007; AUSAID, 2014).

63

Being reliant upon a cash crop economy has made things worse when the required

infrastructure and services needed are not there to support it. Instead the deteriorating

infrastructure, lack of the credit facilities and support extension activities have greatly

hindered those involved in the informal economy, particularly the rural citizens (World Bank,

2007; ADB, 2012a; Cammack, 2008; Allen, Bourke and Macgregor, 2009). This has also

been one of the major factors leading to high poverty rates from the fiscal aspect.

Against this backdrop the question of how effective decentralization has been is

raised. Why has decentralization failed to deliver to the rural populace of PNG? In order to

understand this one has to look at the manner in which decentralization was undertaken in

PNG and the challenges it faced that have shaped it and caused its failures.

3.2 Decentralization in PNG

This section of the thesis looks at the decentralization process in PNG and is

presented in three sections;

a) Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940s – 1977)

b) Phase II: Post Independence Decentralization: The Provincial Government System

c) Phase III: The 1995 Organic Law Reforms -The Current System

64

3.2.1 Phase I: Pre Independence Decentralization (1940s - 1977)

In early pre independence era, the administration was controlled and dominated by

expatriates. The prime objective was to usher in and develop formal state institutions in the

colony. Hence the main actors during this period were largely Australian expatriates operating

in the colony but, with control and authority being based in Port Moresby, overseen by a

Department of Territories and a Minister of the Australian Government, in Canberra. Since

the actors were expatriates the infiltration of the Bigman system hardly affected the system

during this era. The era was largely a period to establish formal institutions onto a largely

traditional and illiterate based population.

This period began effectively in the aftermath of the two world wars where PNG was

administered by the Australia, under the Trusteeship program of first the League of Nations,

after world war one and the newly formed United Nations after world war two. As a result

of this administrative control was largely centered in Canberra and undertaken with the help

of expatriate officers located in PNG (Peash, 1994). The greatest challenge in the effort to

establish formal institutions of governance was made more challenging with the fact that

there was no form of traditional government in place, as much of PNG practiced the Bigman

65

system. Due to this aspect there was no informal system to incorporate the new system into,

hence the pioneers of modern governance in PNG had to largely set up the system with no

"basis or links to traditional systems"(Peash, 1994: 6). The early colonial rule during this

period was enforced by expatriate officers as officers who manned Patrol Posts in the remote

area, often many days walk from the headquarters. They supervised the work of appointed

government delegates; the Village Constables in Papua and the Luluais, Kukurais and Tultuls

(first appointed by the German administration and adopted with almost no change by the

Australian administration) in New Guinea. This practice was maintained until the early 1950s

when a formal council system was introduced based on a British East African model These

systems of administration maintained law and order and provided basic service delivery in the

form of small local schools and aid posts manned by orderlies with very basic medical

training.

Political development was slowly initiated with the introduction of Local

Government Councils (which were closely supervised by the field officers) and later with the

introduction of the House of Assembly (the first parliament established at the time of

self-government. Control however administratively, politically and fiscally remained largely

centered in Canberra (Reagan, 1997). As a result department officials operating in PNG at

66

that time reported to Canberra regardless of the local structures in place. Administratively the

system of districts was later developed to cater to administrative needs of PNG. At the end of

1960s this amounted to 19 districts and they would become the provinces of independent

PNG all administered by expatriate officers (May, 2005).

In 1964 the Native Village Council Ordinance was replaced with the passing of the

Local Government Ordinance of 1963, No 16 of 1964 (Peash, 1994: 10). This event also saw

the establishment of another level of government in PNG, the House of Assembly (Reilly,

Brown and Flower, 2014: 18). PNG therefore now had two types of government level, the

House of Assembly, located in Port Moresby and the numerous LGCs in the districts in the

country. The composition of the House of Assembly was largely expatriate dominated but

there began to be an emergence of local politicians. This composition of the system would

last up till the late 1970s (after independence) when the system was removed and the

provincial government system introduced.

These initiatives were also to serve as preparation for ultimate independence and

self-government in the coming years. During this phases there were six hierarchical levels;

Canberra, Territorial, Regional, District, Sub District and Local Government Councils/ Ward

levels (Peash, 1994: 69). Figure 4 shows this hierarchical relationship.

67

Figure 5: Pre Independence Structure

(Source: created by author)

Expatriates dominated the administrative and political scene in these early years,

even in the newly established House of Assembly in Port Moresby. It was not until towards

the late 60s that Papua New Guineans, such Pita Simogun, Michael Somare, Albert Maori

Kiki and others began to emerge and compete for political representation. However, during

this period the Bigman infiltration was largely absent both in the public service and political

scenario. This can be attributed to the limited involvement of locals in the both areas.

68

3.2.2 Phase II: The Emergence of the Provincial Government System

The second phase of decentralization is quite important when analyzing the

infiltration of the Bigman on state institutions. This is because this is the period of time when

Bigman values begin to penetrate into formal the decentralization processes in PNG. The

process of decentralization that occurred eventually caused it to unravel in PNG. Important

events on the eve of independence had a profound impact on the process of decentralization

in PNG.

During this period there were also several actors that would come about to be very

much involved in the process. The first were the increasing number of local politicians

elected into the national parliament. The second, group of actors were the emerging educated

elites and local influential people, who would see the proposed provincial government system

as an avenue for accessing more powers and resources (Reagan, 1997). It was this latter

group who would eventually fill the ranks of the provincial government assemblies.

On the 16th of September 1975 PNG became politically independent. Self

government had been granted to the country in December, 1973 (Reilly, Brown and Flower,

2014: 18). The period from self government to political independence between 1973 and

1975 was a period in which the reins of power, administration and autonomy were slowly

69

released by Canberra to Port Moresby. This saw efforts to bring in local citizens to become

more active participants in the political and administrative sectors to prepare the country for

ultimate political independence. In the midst of this a growing group of elite local political

leaders were beginning to participate more actively in the once expatriate dominated House

of Assembly. A committee known as the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) was also

established, to write a constitution for the emerging nation. It was during this time that certain

events happened that greatly influenced the type of government and administrative structure

put into place in the post-independence era.

As this experiment with self government was going on, issues of secession by

several regions and groups begin to emerge. While the reasons behind each region’s or

group’s desire for secession were different, the common demand was for more autonomy for

the region or group. The most notable of these secession threats were from three particular

groups; Bougainville Province and the Gazelle area of East New Britain Province, Papua

Besenain Northern Province in Papua and the Highlands Liberation Front (May, 2004;

Reagan, 1997a; Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014).). The Bougainville cry unlike the other

areas was grounded in environmental abuse and lack of effective development in the area.

Unlike most of the provinces Bougainville Province was the host to the giant Panguna mine,

70

the income from which the Australians used to fund Independence. First, a whole generation

of younger people were missing out on the payment of royalties from the copper exports and

they became angry and frustrated and tried to sabotage the mine’s operations. Second, the

impact of environmental degradation caused by the mine became a cause of growing concern

on Bougainville.

These two factors prompted the Bougainville threats and calls for the then National

Government (House of Assembly) to conduct a referendum in 1968 allowing Bougainvillians

themselves to decide whether to separate from PNG or not (May, 2004: 71).

The Papua Besena group’s motive was different. They were against the idea of

Australian granting of independence to PNG. They were concerned that PNG was not yet

ready and needed more time. The group claimed to represent the Papua people located in the

southern half of PNG. They formally declared their own independence in March 1975 (May,

2004: 71). Their attempt however was not successful as it was not recognized by Australia or

any other country.

The concerns of the Highlands Liberation Front originated from fears of being

dominated by the coastal people in the political, economic and public service affairs of the

country. Unlike the coastal provinces the highlanders were late comers into the political and

71

administrative developments taking place in the country as a result many parts of the

highlands only being opened up in the 1950s and 1960s. This was due to the fact that

hinterlands of PNG of which the Highlands region makes up, was the last to be discovered

and settled. Even on the eve of independence there were still tribes, villages and hamlets in

isolated regions of the highlands that had never seen foreigners. Given these circumstances,

the highlander saw themselves at a disadvantage to their coastal peers. Their call therefore

was not towards ultimate secession or independence but that more political decentralization

should be given to the highlands region (May, 2004: 73). This would enable them to be in

control over their own affairs without fear of domination. Given these sporadic threats of

secession and demand for more autonomy the Gazelle area of East New Britain demanded

that the government try to establish a uniform policy to address these threats rather than do so

haphazardly by dealing with each case as it arose (Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014: 22).

To deal with these threats the CPC decided that more powers should be given to the

district (later the province) governments. The CPC argued this should be done via a

decentralized system of government which would allow greater participation and allow room

for local autonomy to calm down secessionist threats. It is important to remember that at this

stage all actors were supportive of increased decentralization. The national politicians greatly

72

supported this early phase of decentralization and saw it as a way to further develop

government institutions close to their home bases in the newly independent country (Reagan,

1997). Secondly, the emerging crop of educated elites also began to realize that such a

venture offered more options for them in their home provinces in terms of jobs and benefits.

This group of people had close connections to their areas at home. Finally, influential local

people who up till this time were largely involved in the local government councils in the

districts saw this as an opportunity to draw more fiscal resources and discretion to them. The

CPC however, wanted that decentralization to grant local autonomy while still maintaining

the unitary nature of the state (May, 2004). This eventually led to the amendment of the

constitution in March 1977 with Constitutional Amendment No 1 (Section 187A - 187)

introducing the Organic Law on Provincial Governments (OLPG) (May, 2005: 205; Peash,

1994: 10).

As a result decentralization was not part of the initial Constitution of PNG but was

promoted through an Organic Law which amended the Constitution. The introduced Organic

Law on Provincial Government (OLPG) enabled the provincial government system to come

into being and detailed their powers, functions, procedures and intergovernmental relations

with the various tiers of government (Peash, 1995:10). Thus began the second phase of

73

decentralization in PNG and as Reagan (1997) observes nobody predicted the future conflict

and struggle for power that would arise from these arrangements.

3.2.3 Objectives and Structure of the System

The decentralization planned for PNG in 1977 had the main objective of provincial

governments to be granted greater autonomy, but under a strong central government (Axeline,

1986: 153). The objective was to establish sub national tiers of government which would be

strong, reliable and able to negotiate effectively with the national government on issues that

needed redress to be effectively delivered to their localities (Reagan, 1997b: 22). The

institutions that emerged in this period were planned to engage greater participation and

involvement of the citizens in the administration. It was hoped that this would enable the

lower tiers of government to develop policies and strategies best suited for their areas. But the

national government would maintain authority over provincial governments so maintaining

the unitary nature of the system. Besides addressing of the secessionist ideas the

decentralization process had the object of addressing several other issues such as assisting

and facilitating the smooth transfer of powers from Canberra to Port Moresby, the

development of sound political institutions, the establishment of good public service

74

machinery, the development of a political culture and greater participation in the overall

political process (Axeline, 1986: 13). The roll out began in 1977 with the establishment of

"interim provincial governments in all provinces in 1977" (May, 2004: 26) with limited

functions and powers, with the further powers to be devolved later to particular provinces,

based on satisfactory performance of their administrations. The provincial government

structure took the form seen in the diagram below.

Figure 6: The 1977 Provincial Government System

Source: Created by author based on information from Reagan. A. J, 199711

This new system saw the emergence of a three tier political and administrative

system. At the top was the national government, with the provincial government in the middle

11 Reagan. A. J, 1997b, (pp: 9 - 55) The Operation of the Provincial Government System, in May. R.J, A.J.

Reagan and Allison Ley (ed), 1997, Political Decentralization in a New State - The Experience of

Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst

STRUCTURE STRUCTURE

75

and local level government councils at the bottom. On the administrative front the national

departments were at the top followed by provincial departments and officials located in the

districts.

The national government representatives were elected from electorates within

provinces also including one provincial member per province elected from provincial seats

from all provinces throughout the country. The provincial government system comprised of a

legislative arm, known as the provincial assembly, as well as an executive arm; the provincial

executive council. All members in the assembly were elected from smaller electorates within

the province. The head of the provincial assembly was the Premier, who was elected by the

assembly members (Reagan, 1997b). The provincial government also came complete with

government ministries for the provincial level (Reilly, Brown and Flower, 2014: 22). At the

Local Government Council level, ward members were to be elected in their wards and formed

the local government councils located in the districts. Each District had between –three or

four local government councils. The Local Government Councils were to be a voice for the

people. These political initiatives were seen as avenues to develop the participation and

involvement of the people in the political process and as well as in the decision making

process.

76

Administratively the provincial departments were to become extensions of national

departments. Hence, their duties were involved their respective departments roles and

functions; which ranged from day to day operations, extension activities, maintenance of their

respective infrastructure and facilities. However, since there was no clear cut guidelines

provincial staff tended to operate alongside national government laws rather than provincial

ones, as they were often times answerable to national departments. This was a loose

arrangement and allowed flexibility to contribute to the decentralization process (Peash,

1994; Reagan, 1997a).

To support these arrangements, numerous fiscal arrangements were made to give

grants to provincial governments to enable them to carry out their functions. Funding came

from the national government to provinces and into provincial departments. From the

provincial level it was allocated to provincial departments who used it to carry out their duties,

to maintain their services and infrastructure and to undertake outreach programs. The local

level government however functioned under each province’s administration.

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3.2.4 Conflict and Tensions in the Provincial Government System (Political

Competition)

As noted earlier, the call for provincial governments was met with open support by

national politicians, emerging educated elites and local influential people. It was these

emerging educated elites and local influential persons who filled these seats in the provincial

assemblies when the provincial government system was unrolled. It was then that problems

began to emerge that would create tensions within the system.

However as time went on very few provinces were eventually given the full powers

that OLPG promised. By 1979 only four provinces had been allocated full fiscal control over

their funds, with a number of recommendations never implemented (Reilly, Brown and

Flower, 2014; May, 2004). May (2004) further notes that this progress did not change very

fast, and by 1986 only one other province had joined the four, with the majority of the

provinces lagging behind. The reasons behind this slow development are many such as, weak

administrations lack of man power, lack of training and poor management. This reluctance to

devolve powers fully to the provincial governments however was rooted in the emerging

political competition that was slowly developing between national and provincial elected

representatives.

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Prior to the establishment of the provincial government system the national

politicians were the only politicians from the electorates with influence, and authority. They

had access to fiscal resources which they controlled and used in their electorates. With the

establishment of the provincial government system, smaller constituencies emerged within

the provinces which were filled by the emerging local elites and influential local people in

within each district. There began to be more than one political leader in a given area. For

example, the Ambunti Dreikikir Open Electorate which had only one national MP eventually

had five provincial members, all from the smaller provincial electorates, in competition with

the national MP who represented this electorate in the national Parliament. This became a

source of confusion and competition as each man claimed to be the instigator of

developments taking place in the electorate.

3.2.5 The Weakening of the System by Bigman Influence

So it emerged that national politicians began to face increasing competitors in

election times. These competitors were often taking advantage of, and the credit for, the

success of projects implemented by national departments, national MPs or even international

donor organizations. Their closeness to the people further reinforced their influence and while

79

they may have been free riding on other provincial MPs or the national MPs, they used this as

a political score card against political opponents. Unlike the previous system where national

MPs could claim all the credit for the things they did, or which resulted from other

development initiatives such as national departments or international organizations, they now

faced competition from their provincial members (Reagan, 1997b: 61).

An important factor that led to the dominance of provincial government members

over national MPs was the reluctance of national MP’s to participate in provincial affairs. For

example, even though they were given the opportunity to attend provincial assembly

meetings, very few of them did so (May, 1997). This would eventually be to the disadvantage

of the national MPs because they spent much of their time in the capital. National MPs also

came to see that this also enabled provincial politicians to use this as a political advantage to

compete against them for the national seat in the national elections. This however was not

how they had envisioned things to be prior to decentralization. They also realized they now

had fewer resources to compete with their provincial rivals emerging from the provincial

governments.

The most affected national MPs were the backbenchers, who had very limited

powers since they were not ministers responsible for any portfolio in the national government.

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This group of MPs began to realize that they were losing their powers to the provincial

politicians, to the extent that provincial members were yielding greater influence in the

province than them. This was particularly true for the Provincial Premiers12 who had much

more influence than most national MPs at the provincial level (Reagan, 1997b). In this

situation it was also a loss of influence as a Bigman in their area. Provincial politicians were

stepping in to dominate the scene resulting in a loss of Bigman status to national MPs. In

order to understand the impact of this on the decentralization system, we have to understand

the manner in which electoral politics is played in PNG. This will enable an understanding of

how this eventually led to the weakening of the decentralization process in the first phase

(1977 – 1995).

3.3 Electoral Politics in PNG

Part of the institutional development processes and aims had been to develop a

sound electoral party system. It was anticipated that a two or three party system would

develop from the process and dominate PNG’s political future. It therefore was anticipated

that voter support would then be aligned to these two or three dominant parties in the political

scenario. The party system however failed to develop, instead political support is rallied from

12 Provincial Premier is the head of the provincial government.

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family, kinship ties, ethnic groups and clans (May, 2004). This is where the Bigman values

come into play and created competition between the national politicians and provincial

politicians.

The cultural diversity in the PNG has influenced the way in which PNG people vote.

Political power tends to become a competition between tribes, ethnic groups and regional

groupings (Reilly, 2002:704). Given this situation most MPs often do not see themselves

representing their entire electorate but rather they restrict their benefit distribution to

particular ethnic affiliations from which their votes comes. Great efforts are made to mobilize

clansman, tribal links and ethnic loyalties to garner the political support to elect a candidate

into office (Standish, 2013). Against this background citizens also tend to vote for candidates

whom they associate themselves with and as someone who they can have easy access to, once

he is in political office. It now depends upon the MP’s Pasin13 to secure support. Little

consideration is given to the candidate’s party, policies, personal achievements, or public life

activities. As a result Papua New Guineans have interpreted the practice of elections in their

own way (Fergussion, 2011). This has led to a growing emergence of "cash for votes" where

huge sums of money are given away in an effort to entice potential voters to support a

particular candidate (Ladley and Williams, 2007). This is not limited to money only but also

13 The MPs Pasin plays a very important role here,.

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involves other material goods as well.

The fact that customary groups in PNG had no established form of fixed or ordered

traditional institutions has also had a huge impact upon the electoral process. What has

emerged is the Pasin blo MP14 mentality (the way of the MP). This concept is largely based

on features of the Bigman values of sharing, caring, protecting ones supporters but has

become adapted to the electoral process. Candidates frequently confuse the elections process

of asking people to vote for them via such assistance, or acts which are somewhat bribery or

at least blatant pork barreling as they attempt to distribute wealth, power and other benefits to

their potential voters. This has repercussions as voters tend to view the political office as one

with infinite resources and see politicians as being in possession of abundant wealth. Voters

try to vote to get those with whom they have close customary or ethnic links to, into office to

enable them to access these huge resources from a successful candidate (Strathern, 1993).

Once an MP is in office voters expect to be rewarded by him. Barcson (2015) calls this the

Vote Base dilemma where expectations of the voters on the MP become a serious constraint to

effective electoral development.

But given the nature of the Bigman system in PNG, MPs are forced to behave in this

way or face the possibility of losing potential supporters. As a result MPs are placed in a

14 The MP’s Pasin

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harsh dilemma, as often unrealistic demands are thrown at them but they also "acknowledge

the fact that they cannot maintain their power base without the support of their kinsman"

(Ketan, 2007:16). A simple realignment of supporters to a potential rival candidate from

within the area, tribe or ethnic group is often enough to see a candidate fail. Over the years

the number of candidates has been steadily increasing as more and more candidates seek

access to the state resources. This growing number of candidates can be clearly seen in Figure

7.

Figure 7: Increasing Number of Candidates Per Seat from 1977 - 2012

Source: Stephen Howes, 201215,

15 PNG’s elections: the most expensive in the world, and getting worse -

http://devpolicy.org/pngs-elections-the-most-expensive-in-the-world-and-getting-worse-20140512/29.08.2015 at

7.53pm

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The attraction of the wealth that public office brings has attracted increasing

numbers of candidates, further strengthening the claim to maintain Bigman practices to

consolidate the voter base required to win public office. This Bigman mentality to consolidate

votes based on the MP’s Pasin has been a significant factor behind the competition between

national and provincial government politicians.

3.4 The Game, the Players and the Bigman Impact on the System

In order to understand this development, one has to understand the actors that are

involved and how this affected the outcome of the provincial government system in PNG.

There were three main groups of actors. In the first group was the national MPs, in the second

group was the emerging elites (local influential persons, successful businessman etc..) and the

final group was the citizens (Reagan, 1997a). The first group of actors prior to the creation of

the provincial government system had access to considerable monetary resources which they

used this to maintain voter support via the Bigman values noted above.

With the emergence of the provincial government, the second group emerged. This

second group, which was the emerging elites, however had closer links to the voters in the

districts and local places. With the introduction of the provincial government system they saw

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an opportunity in which they could capitalize on and enhance their local status by drawing on

Bigman values to soliciting support by the Gutpla Pasin approach16. This aspect was further

strengthened by fact that within the provincial government system, most of the rural

development project funds were now allocated and controlled by the provincial governments.

This became a bitter issue amongst the national MPs and the new provincial members.

So, as explained earlier, credit was not given to where it was due, and credit was

manipulated by those provincial MPs against the national MPs to draw the people to favor

them in elections. Now the real dilemma that gave rise to this was based on the forces "which

influence and reflect the distribution and use of power and the effect of this on resource use

and distribution"(Reagan, 1997a: 57). Now that significant resources were concentrated in the

provincial governments, provincial politicians were now able to use this to develop their own

Bigman status in their smaller provincial electorates, whilst at the same time also claiming

credit for the tasks being undertaken by the national government. This led to the decline of

national MP status, especially those occupying the back benches. Reagan (1997b) observes

that provincial Premiers in particular exhibited this aspect as they now exercised much more

power and influence at the provincial level than the national MPs.

How is this linked to Bigman politics? As noted earlier, the whole nature of securing

16 Maintaining a good Pasin approach

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re-election in PNG requires maintaining support from the clan and is ultimately determined

by an MP’s Pasin (way of the MP). Previously the national MPs were able to establish

support without opposition or resistance. Furthermore they had more resources. As a result

they could cater to a lot of their supporters in this manner. But with the introduction of the

provincial government, factions from within their electorates began to emerge to lure their

supporters away as the nature of the Bigman system primarily depended on who was able to

give them benefits. In this case the new emerging leaders were able to do so much more than

the existing national MPs. Unlike the early system, the Bigman values of securing support via

Gutpla Pasin, was not that much active. However, with the emergence of the provincial

government system it became entrenched especially where strong inter clan/ethnic group

rivalries played out. Hence, the competition to maintain support via these values by both the

national politician against the provincial government politician became a struggle of who

could attract more supporters using the Bigman values of attracting people. On the other hand

the resources needed to attract people now had shifted from traditional valuables of shells,

pigs, women and food to modern day currencies of cash and material goods (often beer and

purchased imported food like rice and tinned fish). This was the main factor behind the desire

of national politicians for more control over fiscal resources which they were losing out on.

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If this situation is examined more intensely it can be seen that the introduced

decentralization system failed to foresee that this would occur. Since the Bigman system was

fluid it had no fixed operating structure. When examining the fluidity of the Bigman system,

it is essential to understand that there was no binding grip by the patron (the MP or the

candidate) on his clients (the voters). In order to understand the fluidity of the Bigman system,

one has to understand three fundamental aspects of it. The author has developed an approach

called the three W’s approach to further explain this. These three Ws are; what, where, and

when the Bigman activity takes place.

Going to the first W; what is the Bigman system? As explained earlier it was a system

based on achievements and not on a fixed order in the society. It was not inherited, but

instead it was achieved. Now going on to the second W, of where does this takes place? To

understand where this takes place one has to look into the fabric of PNG societies. As noted

earlier the PNG society is structured upon communal values where communalism is pursued

over individual needs. Against this backdrop, there is no element that binds the supporters

to the Bigman. Unlike other parts of the world where the patron has a hold over clients

through the control of land, religious affiliation, or the use of force, the Bigman does not

possess these powers. His power depends on how he can continue to provide help and

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resources to his clients. His support will enable him to also achieve the benefits of assistance

in terms of what he needs to maintain the support, but there is no binding element here. As

a result this makes it very fluid from the people’s perspective, as they are free to realign to

another Bigman without fear of repercussions from him, their the patron. Thus the patron

strives to maintain this status quo at all times. This brings us to the final W of when. When

does the patron need to demonstrate this? He needs the support of close followers to help him

meet his basic social obligations so the Bigman struggles to maintain this continuously.

Now since the PNG society is one in which almost every adult male owns the land,

and it was one which was traditionally not controlled by any religion, or by a local strong

man, the most common binding elements of patron-client relations is absent. Where the

Bigman must demonstrate his ability is locally when meeting the needs and social obligations

of his clan and larger affiliated customary group, such as at clan pig exchanges, bride price

ceremonies, gardening and hunting activities, funerals or other issues where his supporters

may require his support and his experience, wealth and oratorical skills. In the current day

scene the obligations are translated to the cost of a vehicle, plane tickets, school fees, funerals

costs, medical costs and other things which are beyond the capacity of the ordinary villager to

afford.

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As a result a new Bigman may emerge to lure away the current supporters with his

own assistance to spend and distribute more than the current one, to win over support. People

will support whichever Bigman can provide them with the most benefits. It is vital to

remember that most times support will also be influenced strongly by ethnic, clan and family

alignments. To a westerner this may seem to be quite limited. But from the PNG perspective

this can extend to cover a significant area and a number of people because family ties are

maintained for many generations from both the paternal and maternal side of families so may

cover a large area, depending on the Bigman’s genealogical connections and his ancestor’s

places of residence.

Therefore when the competition arose between national and provincial MPs, the

provincial government members were able to use the Bigman system of values to their

advantage as they were closer to their supporters, and could constantly assist them. This in

turn developed their Pasin, which was vital to being successful in elections. As noted by Fr.

Dambui the Premier of East Sepik Provincial Government in 1979, “my people believe in

village leadership [and] not party politics’ (May, 1997: 240). Dambui’s notion of village

leadership referred to the manner in which politicians maintained support of his/her people

through the Bigman values based on the agendas described above. They now also had the

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resources to do this. This proved to be a sore element to the national MPs who were at most

times away from their districts which were left to be manipulated by the provincial MPs in

various ways and commonly saw them defeated at election times.

In the fixed ordered systems, there is always a guarantee that the client will be forced

to support the patron because the patron will be able to make conditions for the client very

unpleasant. But the PNG Bigman does not possess this ability. Instead he has a constant

struggle to maintain supporters, especially when he has a rival within a same ethnic group. It

is therefore here that the persons Pasin in the PNG context is of utmost value and importance.

Numerous examples of candidates at election times in PNG attest to this fact when candidates

emerge from the same area or ethnic groups. As a result the provincial MP’s were able to do

so with the resources they had gained from decentralization (provincial governments), much

to the unhappiness of the national MP’s. And since it was fluid with no binding element,

realignment also depended on the candidates Pasin which led to very high turnover in sitting

members at election times (May, 1997).

Therefore the struggle for power depended on Bigman approaches to achieve

political victory in the new modern political system. However, as the system had not

originally been designed to cater for this, citizens would always gravitate towards their ethnic

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kin who was able to demonstrate the attributes of Bigman but with the use of modern forms

of wealth, beer, cars, women and money. As result of this the new system created conflict

between the two groups of leaders (provincial and national MPs), as they attempted to

maintain their Bigman influence with the people in order to secure seats in election times.

3.5 - Removal of the Provincial Government System

Given these circumstances numerous attempts were made by national leaders to

remove the provincial government system, that is to undo what had been done in the name of

decentralization. For example, Prime Minister Michael Somare attempted to remove the

provincial government system on several occasions between 1982 - 1984 (May, 2005). This

was greatly opposed by the Provincial Premiers and as a result of threats of secession, had to

be shelved.

In 1990 however a parliamentary committee named the Hesingu Parliamentary

Committee was tasked to evaluate the system. It recommended that provincial governments

be abolished and Local Government Councils be brought under the control and support of the

national government (May, 2005). This of course did not go down well with the Provincial

Premiers who once again reacted by countering a Premiers Sub Committee to evaluate

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provincial governments.

In 1992 Prime Minister Paias Wingti came into power. Wingti attempted to replace

the provincial government system with the Village Services Program (May, 2005). The aim of

this initiative was to purposely by pass provincial governments and go direct to the district

centers. Wingti also stressed that the membership of provincial assemblies be reduced as it

was a huge drain on finances. This culminated in a proposal to abolish the system in October

1992. Like previous attempts this was met with opposition by the provinces, even to extent of

possible formation of a separate state by the island provinces to be known as the Federated

Melanesia Republic (May, 2005). Wingti therefore reconsidered his approach and

established a Bi-Partisan Committee to undertake a review of the system, which made a

report in August 1993 to restructure the system. The committee proposed a restructured

system comprised of provincial authorities and national MPs. This again was rejected by the

Provincial Premiers with threats of secession. Finally in 1994 Prime Minister Julius Chan got

fed up with this political stalemate and took a hard stance on provincial governments. Chan's

decision was to threaten to charge those who opposed the removal of provincial government

system with treason. This was the final blow which removed the provincial government

system and ushered in the Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments

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(OLPLLG) in (May, 2004: 193).

3.6 Phase III: The 1995 Reforms -The Current System

With the termination of the provincial government system, the main actors became

limited to the national MPs. Through this process the power of the national MP was also

consolidated, strengthened and also become merged with the public service administration.

The 1995 Reforms were justified as a means to bring better service delivery to the

provinces (Kalinoe, 2009). However, the underlying reasons were more politically

motivated and were a way of removing political competition from the national members. This

was to have a profound impact upon the new reforms structure and organization (Reilly,

Brown and Flower, 2014: 23). Under this new system, the MPs sought to remove all potential

rivalries from the provincial government system. The prime objective was to consolidate the

powers of the national MPs and to allow them to maintain their Bigman status in their

electorates without opposition. Two notable changes implemented to address this were, (a)

the termination of provincially elected members in the provincial legislature and (b) the

establishment of joint committees as coordinating bodies. Figure 8 below shows the new

structure.

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Figure 8: The 1995 OLPLLG Structure

Source: modified by author from Edmiston.K.D,200217,.

Upon the establishment of the reforms all elected members of the provincial

assembly were terminated. As a result approximately 300-400 of the provincial electorates

were abolished along with it their members.

The membership of the provincial assembly was to now be comprised of the

17Edmiston.K.D,2002,Fostering Sub national Autonomy and Accountability In Decentralized Developing

Countries: Lessons From The Papua New Guinea Experience, Public Administration and Development.

Vol:22, pp:221–234 and Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Governments, Consolidated to No 29

of 1998

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provincial MP (also known as Regional member or Provincial Governor), national MPs, LLG

heads in the province, a certain number of paramount chiefs where chieftaincy system exist,

one female representative and three other members appointed by the assembly when

necessary. The provincial MP is also the chairman of the assembly (OLPLLG, 1998, Section

10 3A).

The removal of the provincial government system also saw the abolishment of the

provincial department system. Permanent working committees were now created to replace

the provincial ministries. Each provincial government could setup as many committees as it

needed to undertake its functions.

The Provincial Executive Council now comprises the Governor (the provincial MP),

Deputy Governor (elected from the LLG heads in the provincial assembly) and the chairman

of each permanent committee, who are also appointed by the Governor. The main function of

the Provincial Executive Council is to implement legislation made by the assembly as well as

national government policies and laws at the provincial level (May, 2005; OLPLLG 1998,

Sect 23). An important role of the Provincial Executive Council is that it is now responsible

for establishing the Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee (JPPBPC),

which had been set up in the reform process (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 25).

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The JPPBPC consisted of the chairman of each Joint District Planning and Budget

Priorities Committee (JDPBPC – hereafter referred to as the District Joint Committee) or

someone they appointed, three representatives where necessary and the chairman who is to be

appointed by the governor. The main purpose of the JPPBPC is to supervise all the planning

and budget processes in the provinces, which also involves submissions to the national

government for fiscal considerations. It is also tasked with allocating spending priorities in

the province, approving government budgets, preparing five year development plans for the

province as well as reviewing it (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 25).

From an administrative aspect, all government departments within the province

reverted back to their respective national departments. They therefore became basically

extension of the national government departments. However their operations at the provincial

level now fell under the supervision of the provincial administrator, who was now the

administrative head of the province, replacing the former provincial secretary (May, 2005).

The provincial administrator is appointed by the National Executive Council (PNG’s cabinet)

based upon three nominees nominated from the PEC. The provincial administrator’s role and

duties, apart from being the administrative head of the province, is to ensure the smooth

delivery of all public service functions within the province via supervision and monitoring

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processes. The provincial administrator is also responsible for planning, implementation and

maintaining strong relations and accountability between the district and LLGs in the province

(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 74).

3. 6.1The District Tier

At the district level certain changes also emerged. A notable change was the change

of name from Local Government Council to Local Level Government (LLG). A new

byproduct of the reforms saw the LLG heads now being elected by the people rather than

elected by their respective council members. Secondly, with the district tier also saw an

inception of the Joint District Planning and Budgeting Committee to be responsible for

district tier for overall planning, monitoring and allocation of fiscal resources in the district,

and to be chaired by the District MP. The new district tier structure is resembled in figure 7.

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Figure 9: The District Tier

Source: created by author.

At the district level there was an average of three to four LLGs. Each LLG is to have

an elected head, elected by the people and local members representing the people from the

council wards. Urban LLGs however are allowed representatives from certain groups such as

PNG trade unions, employers and women's representative OLPLLG 1998, Sect 26).

The District Joint Committee is now responsible for all planning, budget priorities

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and fiscal estimates to provincial and national government. In relation to this it is responsible

for the approval and allocation of the budgets for LLGs. The membership of the District Joint

Committee consists of the district MP; who is the chairman, all LLG heads in the district, and

three nominated representatives appointed by the MP after consulting with LLG councilors.

The district administrator is the chief executive officer of the District Joint Committee

(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 33A). The District Joint Committee is also given significant role in

maintaining infrastructure, which had previously been a departmental function. As result the

departmental roles have became mostly confined to service delivery and consultation and not

maintenance for service delivery as the JDPBPC are now to look after this.

The district administration is to be under the administrative leadership of the district

administrator. Unlike the provincial administrator, the district administrator is appointed

following appointment procedures relating to appointment of public service officials in PNG.

The precise manner and practice is yet to be formally addressed via an Act of Parliament

(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 73). The role of the district administrator apart from being the

administrative head in the district is to ensure smooth delivery of services in the district,

implement provincial administrations functions when required to do so in the district, lead the

planning, policy formulation, and implementation of LLG policies (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 33A

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&106). In line with this it is the responsibility of the district administrator to implement any

resolutions undertaken and deliberated in JDPBPC meetings. It is the administrator’s duty to

also hold a District Management Team meeting with his/her respective heads of department

heads at the district level and convey their problems to the JDPBPC to deliberate on. On a

general note the administrative structure has basically extended the arms of the national

governments agencies down to the district level. Hence a single structured public service has

been formed but with different supervisors at each level. As a result most operate according

to departmental guidelines and objectives where applicable to their level.

3.6.2 Funding Arrangements

In order to be able to implement the newly developed functions several types of

grants were to be made available to the provincial and district level of governments and

administration18. Most of these grants provide for administrative costs, salaries and daily

operations. Development projects, maintenance of facilities were now to be funded from the

support grants allocated to the provinces, districts and LLGs in the forms of Provincial

18 These main types of grants are;(a) provincial and local level grants, (b) provincial infrastructure development

grants, (c) local level grants and village services grants, formulated according to population and features such as

land and sea area, (d) town and urban services grants, (e) provincial and local level staffing grants, for

administrative and salaries of public service grants were added later officials but controlled in the Port Moresby

(e) derivation grant, based the value of exports produced in a province (e) Provincial/ District Support Grants

and finally(e) supplementary grants, which could be allocated in times of emergency. Provincial, district and

LLG support

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Service Improvement Program (PSIP) and District Service Improvement Program (DSIP)

which are mostly aimed at new projects in each of their respective areas. In 2011 the LLG

Service Improvement Program grant (LLGSIP) was introduced for LLGs in the country.

The development support grants (PSIP/DSIP) for the province and district however

have a somewhat biased allocation format. For instance, it is required that half of these funds

be paid to the JPPBPC/JDPBPC and the other half to the MP responsible for spending at his

discretion within the guidelines of fund usage. May (2005) notes that this has been abused in

most instances by most MPs with only a very few merging it with the general

JPPBPC/JDPBPC allotment for it to be allocated to projects.

3.7 Decentralization Conclusion

The decentralization process in PNG basically underwent three main phases. The

first phase involved an introductory process of setting up these institutions, in the second

phase independence and emergence of social forces threaten to split the newly emerging

country apart resulting in the provincial government system being rapidly unrolled. This

created political competition between national and local politicians for the political

supremacy in local areas, fueled by the infiltration values of the Bigman system into the

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electoral politics of PNG. Given this emergence national MPs began to seek the abolition of

the provincial government system to remove the political rivalries posed by provincial MPs.

Given this situation the system sought to establish the role of national government

MPs, rather than provincial politicians over provincial politicians by placing them in key

positions of power at the district level in their electorates. This approach greatly weakened

the system, enabling the same person to be involved at all three tiers of government in PNG.

At the same time it sought to bring the national MPs into the administration process, thereby

merging politics into administration, and further weakening the fundamentals of effective

service delivery in which politics should be separated from politics.

The impact of the Bigman system onto the decentralization process was therefore

rooted in electoral politics and the need for political support at the local levels in their

electorates. Since the system was fluid and not rooted in any binding forms of patron client

relations, it was easy for the people to realign with emerging potential candidates whom they

could get the most benefits from. This essential factor posed a great threat behind the political

competition and resulted in the abolishment of the provincial government system. The

national governments MPs were successful in reasserting their position in the new system,

which has made them more dominant, influential and powerful at all levels of government,

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but has not put in the necessary powers of participation for local participation, monitoring and

accountability to keep them in check. The new reforms have made the national MPs very

powerful but the election values that brought them into office are still the same and are very

much grounded in Bigman values. This weakened system has produced little results and has

had a profound and negative impact upon rural development across PNG as will be

demonstrated in Chapter four.

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Chapter Four: Study Site Findings

4 Introduction

In Chapter Three an overview was made of the decentralization process. In the

course of doing so, it threw light onto the new system of decentralization that emphasizes the

role of national politicians across all three tiers of government. This is not only in politics but

also in the administrative arena as well. This chapter shows how these changes have played

out in a case study site, Dreikikir sub district. This will lead up to a discussion and analyses in

Chapter Five to demonstrate how the district tier has become affected by Bigman infiltration,

leading to poor rural development outcomes.

This chapter is structured into four sections. Section 4.1 is a background of the study

site, Section 4.2 summarizes the district operations and structure, Section 4.3 explains the

research procedures at the study site; and Section 4.4 describes the problems found during the

research at the study site.

4.1 Background of Study Site

The sub-district of Dreikikir is located in the Ambunti-Dreikikir Open Electorate in

East Sepik Province. The sub-district of Dreikikir was chosen as the case study area as it

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offers a good insight into how the decentralization reforms are not achieving effective rural

development given the plight of the current plight of the people for several reasons. Firstly,

the district is classified as one of the least developed districts in PNG (National Economic

Fiscal and Fiscal Commission, 2004:23). Secondly, the Dreikikir sub-district is a rural district,

and it is not located near any large scale industrial projects, commercial activities, resource

extraction activities (mining, oil, etc ...) or large scale agriculture enterprises such as palm oil

plantations. Finally all the LLGs located in the sub district are rural LLGs and not urban or

located inside metropolitan areas. As result this offers a good test to analyze the reasons why

the 1995 decentralization reforms are failing to deliver effectively to such rural populace. The

sub-district is also where the author was born and went to primary school, which facilitated

access to individuals working in different parts of government.

Geographically the electorate consists of two different types of physical

environment.

106

Figure 10 - Location of East Sepik Province in PNG

Source: Maphill 201519

19 Source: http://www.maphill.com/papua-new-guinea/simple-maps/political-map/political-shades-outside/

accessed on 26.01.2015 at 6:29 pm

107

Figure 11 - Location of Study Site in East Sepik Province

Source: Sjroe, 201520

The Ambunti-Dreikikir Electorate was created in 1995 as part of the Organic Law

reforms. It is symptomatic of the poor administrative outcomes that resulted from the reforms

in many places, and is evidence that the reforms had political rather than administrative

motives. The electorate contains two small administrative centers, Ambunti and Dreikikir

(both formerly Australian patrol posts), which are not connected by road. Ambunti, is a small

administrative centre located on the Sepik River. It is surrounded by a largely swamp area,

and the Sepik River. It is not accessible by road, but by the Sepik River in canoes or motor

20 Source: http://www.sjroep.org/category/mainpage/page/14/ accessed on 26.01.2016 ed on 26.01.2015 at

6:00 pm

108

powered boats. The surrounding population is culturally distinct from those at Dreikikir as a

Sepik River people. Dreikikir on the other hand is located in hill country positioned along the

middle of the Torricelli coastal mountain range (Ambunti Dreikikir District Office, 2008).

The Sepik Highway (a national road) runs from Wewak to Lumi via Maprik, and passes

through the middle of the sub-district. Most people in the sub-district live within an hour’s

walk of a road. The population live in small villages of around 500 people and are shifting

cultivators, depending on yams, bananas and sweet potato as staple foods. To travel from

Dreikikir to Ambunti, a person must take a vehicle to Maprik, then another vehicle to Pagwi

on the Sepik River. Then a canoe or a motor boat to Ambunti. This study is based on the

Dreikikir area and not Ambunti.

The sub district of Dreikikir covers an area of 1200 square kilometers with a

population of approximately 35,000. The average population density is approximately 3.6

persons per square kilometer (ibid). The daily lives of the people rotate around subsistence

agriculture which is their main source of food via shifting cultivation practices, producing the

main staple crops. Like most areas in PNG land is owned via customary land tenure by

patrilineal dominated descent groups. Land is not surveyed and nor is ownership registered.

Access to land is administered within families at the village level via customary means.

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Cash income is earned from the production of cash crops and the sale of fresh food

in small local markets. Cash crops are the export crops of cocoa, Robusta coffee21, vanilla,

betel nut and mustard chewed with betel. The sale of fresh produce in small road side stalls

and small scale livestock activities such as chickens and pigs are important sources of cash

for women.(Hanson et al 2001:213). Dependency on the export crop sector, earnings are not

reliable and are very much dependent on international commodity prices which from the

point –of-view of smallholder growers, vary unpredictably. In the recent past for example,

vanilla prices peaked causing a short lived boom in vanilla production. Prices then fell below

that which most people see as making the labor of producing vanilla worthwhile. As result

most of the people incomes of less than a K150 ($US75) a year (Hanson et al 2001:209). A

small number of people operate small village businesses such as trade stores and less

commonly, public motor vehicles (PMVs) for transporting people. The largest commercial

activity in the area is cocoa drying facilities, usually owned and operated by clan groups, but

sometimes by families or individual business men. The recent introduction of the cocoa pod

borer has seen a decline in cocoa production. As a result income from cocoa has drastically

declined.

21 Robusta coffee is a lowland growing species of coffee. The price of Robusta coffee is

significantly lower than that for Arabica coffee which is grown in the PNG highlands, and for

cocoa. Hence, coffee production at Dreikikir is now moribund. Cocoa production varies,

depending on the international price. Cocoa pod borer has affected production negatively.

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In the Dreikikir villages there is very limited access to services such as piped water,

reliable electricity and roads which can be travelled on in wet weather. Most people fetch

water from springs to which animals also have access with only a limited number using water

catchment tanks. The area has a distinct dry season when the tanks can go dry for some

weeks and springs must be used again. Village electricity is provided by portable generators

for special occasions. Solar kits are becoming more common. A government administered

diesel powered generators operates only at night time when there is fuel to power it.

The road network in the area largely consists of the main Sepik Highway and four

rural feeder roads and. The Sepik Highway maintenance is the responsibility of the national

government, but the feeders roads are supposed to be maintained by the district LLGs. The

feeder roads have deteriorated into mere bush tracks which when wet become muddy bogs.

The Sepik Highway is usually trafficable. Access to roads depends on the location of the

communities in relation to the roads. Most live within an hour’s walk from a rural road but as

most rural roads are impassable after rain their condition is a deterrent to service delivery to

villages (Ambunti Dreikikir District Office, 2008: 27).

The people of the sub district of Dreikikir live lives that are largely traditional. Their

food is produced solely with hand labor, but now with the use of modern tools such as bush

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knives, axes and spades. Some villages operate mobile saw mills to produce sawn timber.

Income obtained from cash crops is seasonal. Access to utilities such electricity and water is

very limited and irregular. Finally, the very poor quality of rural roads severely constrains

access to services and markets.

4.2 District Organization and Operation at Study Site

The administrative splitting of the electorate by the 1995 reforms has been described

above. As a result certain offices, such as the District Treasury and their public service

officers are located in Ambunti while others such District Education Office and the Education

Advisor, is located at Dreikikir.

112

Figure 12: District Organization and Operation at the Study Site

Source: Created by author

The 1995 reforms placed the JDPBPC at the top of the administrative system. Under

the JDPBPC was the district administration. This comprised the district department heads

who oversaw the functions of the national departments at the district level. These departments

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became extensions of national government departments and as a result they were hired and

paid for by the national departments. But administratively they now came under the control of

the district administrator. The District Joint Committee became responsible for all planning

and budget priorities in the district. This included allocation of funds to LLGs and the

maintenance of essential infrastructure.

The district department heads supervise the numerous public servants positioned

throughout the district. Health and education officials (teachers) make up the greatest number

of public service officials located outside the district headquarters, with teachers being the

largest group. The other department officials are largely located in the district headquarters

and are much fewer in number.

The LLGs are more dependent on the district administration and the District Joint

Committee for funding than the departments, where personal salaries are paid from the

national headquarters. Each LLG has a support staff of about five people22. Each LLG has a

manager who is the administrative head of the LLG

Under this arrangement, the main function of the district departments located in the

districts is to perform the national functions, services and extension activities at the district

22 Source: Rowen Nim, June 24th 2015, email message, Department of Provincial and Local

Level Government, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

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level. In the study site case this involves four main departments at the district level; Health,

Education, Police, and the Department of Agriculture and Wildlife. This includes of the

delivery of these functions into LLGs where required.

4.3 Research Procedures in Study Site

The first part of research involved a survey to determine the problems with service

delivery. A questionnaire was used, based on the framework explained in the methodology

review section. The survey was based on the PNG Index for Assessing Service Delivery,

Local Economy, Participation and Accountability at the local level in PNG. This was created

by the author by adapting two framework tools; Social Audit of Governance and Delivery of

Public Services from Pakistan and Governance for Local Development Index. The survey

aimed to make an assessment of the four main indices in the index created by the author. The

four main themes in the index are;

a) A rural development index which assessed service delivery of four sectors; health,

electricity, education and good drinking water. This had two indices, (a) accessibility

and (b) reliability;

b) A local economy index which assessed two things (a) the main driver of the local

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economy (b) problems faced;

c) A participation index which assesses the level of involvement (participation)which

citizens have in the district administrative, local level government and ward decision

making processes;

d) Accountability index which assesses the level of accountability towards citizens by

the district administration, local level government and ward officials.

The survey was undertaken in eleven wards23 in Dreikikir LLG and involved 110

participants. This involved ten participants per ward, of 40 % were males, 40% females and

20% local entrepreneurs involved in local business activities. The primary objective of the

survey was to assess service delivery outcomes from the citizens point of view and establish

what the problems in service delivery existed, as well the participation levels and

accountability practices.

From this, interviews were also conducted with eleven ward members from the

wards, as well as officials in the district and the provincial headquarters to establish why the

problems exist and how they came about. The results of this enquiry are presented in the

analytical section of the chapter after the findings from the survey are presented. This will

then go on to reveal how these problems are similar to those found in many parts of PNG

23 Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 28 and 30

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resulting from the current reforms.

4.4 Findings in Study Site

This reveals the general access to services based on the survey undertaken.

Rural Development Index: Education, Health, Roads, Electricity and Piped Water.

Figure 13: Access to Education Facilities

Source: Created by author

Figure 14: Reliability of Education Facilities

Source: Created by author

117

Figure 15: Problems Identified (Education)

Source: Created by author

In the education sector, 100% of those surveyed had access to schools. But only 49%

of those surveyed thought the delivery of services was reliable. The problems identified in the

schools can be categorized into five; teachers do not teach properly, shortage of teachers,

teachers absent for no reason, poor school infrastructure and non- payment of school fees. Of

the five, more informants thought the problem of teachers not teaching properly was the

worst problem,, followed by poor infrastructure, shortage of teachers, high teacher absentee

and finishing with non-payment of fees. While there is reasonably good access to schools

more than half of the people interviewed think they do not perform their educational roles

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reliably.

Within the health sector there are two agencies offering health services to villagers;

government or State services and faith based or Church health services. Wards 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7 and 28accessed the state operated facility whilst Wards 8, 9, and 30 accessed the faith based

managed facility.

Figure 16: Access to State and Faith Based Health Facilities

Source: Created by author

Figure17: Reliability of State Health Facility Figure18: Problems in State Facility

Source: Created by author Source: Created by author

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Figure 19: Reliability of Faith Based Health Facility

Source: Created by author

Figure 20: Problems in Faith Based Facility

Source: Created by author

The survey revealed that the faith based operated health facility is more seen to be

more effective in terms of service reliability than the State health facility. The greatest

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problem identified by the survey participants in the state managed health facility was

“unreliable workers” followed by poor infrastructure, not enough staff and shortage of

medicines. In contrast to the State managed health services, the greatest problem identified in

the faith based health facility services was poor infrastructure followed by a lack of support

from district and LLG administrations, not enough staff, unreliable workers, shortage of

medicines and lastly land disputes over the land their facilities are built on.

The performance of workers is ranked third in the faith based health services

problems but is first place in the state health services. But poor infrastructure and not enough

staff are amongst the top three common problems identified in both the faith based and state

operated health services

Figure 21: Access to Grid Electricity Figure 22: Access to Piped Water

Source: Created by author Source: Created by author

The survey predictably, found access to electricity is largely nonexistent with only

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one percent having access to grid electricity which is unreliable as it operates for a limited

period during the night only. As for access to piped water there is no access to piped water in

the survey area apart from water catchment tanks and traditional water wells.

In this part of the index the main driver of the local economy which forms the basis

of those surveyed will be identified as well as the problems they face in their local economic

activities.

Figure 23: Local Economy Drivers Figure 24: Problems faced in Local Economy

Source: Created by author Source: Created by author

122

The main driver of the local economy is the selling of cash crops and fresh food,

with only a very limited involvement in small business activities and livestock rearing. A lack

of regular extension activities was the major problem identified by the participants, followed

by no proper venue to sell export commodities, bad roads, limited credit facilities and no

skills development

Figure 25: Participation Level

Source: Created by author

The survey found that there was a very high level of participation within wards. That

is the citizens and their individual ward representatives on the LLG have a high level of

interaction. Participation in this sense refers to their involvement in the decision making

affairs in the wards. This is to be expected as they live in the same small villages. At the

village level people participate fully in the decision making processes that govern their affairs

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at the ward level. But there was no participation of the people in the LLG or in district affairs.

In fact most district administration decision and outcomes are hidden from LLG councilors

which results in no participation in district affairs of the ward representatives on the LLG.

Figure 26: Accountability Level

Source: Created by author

The accountability index (the degree of accountability towards the people by their

ward members) reveals similar results to that of the participation index. Accountability in this

context refers to the disclosure of the expenditure of public money in the wards, LLGs and

the district. There is no accountability from the LLG to the people or from the district to the

LLG. LLG Ward members interviewed said that the district administration rarely informs

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them of such matters. But they said they try to inform citizens in their wards about funding

matters discussed at LLG meetings.

The overall results of the survey are summarized below

Table 3: Access and Reliability of Services Provided

Source: Created by author

SERVICES

Accessibility Reliability

Education 100% 49 % Yes / 41 % No

Health 100%* 16 % Yes / 84 % No

Grid Electricity 0% 0%

Piped Water 0% 0%

Good Roads 100% * 37% Yes /63% No

Local Economy: Income

100 %

(Agriculture Based) Seasonal : Low and not steady

* Varied by distance from a road

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Table 4: Participation and Accountability

Source: Created by author

From the above results of the survey it can be seen that there exists a serious

problem in terms of delivering effective services in health, education, electricity and piped

water. High incidences of unreliability of the health workers and teachers highlight a problem

that is affecting service delivery to the people. Secondly, poor infrastructure in these

institutions is also affecting their effective functioning which is compounded by lack of

government support to faith based services are said to be more reliable than the state operated

services.

In the local economy the problem of weak extension activities, absentee staff ,

PARTICIPATION & ACCOUNTABILITY

Participation Accountability

Ward 100% 100%

LLG 0% 0%

District 0% 0%

(a) Only Administrative Accountability no Social Accountability

(b) No real participation in decision making process

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limited market access, poor transport infrastructure and limited credit access are the common

barriers identified. Finally the case of extremely limited accountability towards the citizens

and their lack of participation in the overall decision making processes is a serious cause of

concern.

The situation revealed in the survey from the study site however is not limited only

to the study site and is similar to that in many parts of PNG. As noted in section 3.1.4

(development challenges in PNG) of chapter three, there has been a great challenge in the

implementing good development outcomes to the majority rural citizens of PNG..

4.5 Problems from the Official’s Perspective

In section 4.4 problems in service delivery and accountability and participation were

identified from the peoples’ point of view. These problems have been categorized into five

main categories by the author; staffing, poor infrastructure and supplies, limited

administrative support, no participation and accountability to the people and finally poverty.

These problems are however from the people’s point of view.

In order to understand the impediments that enable these problems to thrive, the

views and opinions of the public service officials involved in the lowers of administration and

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local level government must be taken into consideration. Hence the interviews conducted

with them sought to establish these. Based on the interviews, the following problems were

seen as the main factors contributing to these problems. Figure 27 shows the most likely

issues that to hinder the LLG and Ward officials.

Figure 27: LLG & Ward Members Issues

Source: Created by author

128

Figure 28: District Officials Problems and Issues

Source: Created by author

Figure 27 and 28 suggest that several problems affect ability of service deliverers to

effectively address problems with service delivery. The Dreikikir LLG Ward Members

identified ten major issues which they see as the problems affecting the five areas noted by

the people. These ten areas are; reliance on the district administration, unreliable LLG

funding from the District Joint Committee, unproductive district officials, a lack powers to

hire and fire local staff, administrative politics, lack of cooperation between wards, , limited

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understanding of formal government practices at LLG, district and District Joint Committee

levels, insufficient staff, misuse of funds by district officials and no skills training of ward

members.

In contrast, the district officials interviewed identified twelve main problems which

they think affect the district performance in these matters. These twelve are; administrative

politics, administrative nepotism, weak operational structures, manipulation and control of

outcomes by the MP, the small revenue base, unreliable grants and dependence on the MP,

District Joint Committee for funds, dependence on provincial and national government grants,

limited staff capacity, diversion of funds by District Joint Committee to unplanned projects,

environmental constraints and no power to hire and fire local staff.

It can be seen that many of these problems are beyond the control local level elected

officials like LLG councilors. Some problems, such as abuse of funds by district officials, is

not only within their control, but is the outcome of their actions. Therefore in order to

understand these problems and the causes, the author developed a table that looks at the

problems from the people to administration and the likely reasons behind these problems.

Refer to Appendix 2 for the full table. In this table several key factors have been noted as

those responsible for the failures identified by ward members and district officials. These

130

factors are categorized into six main categories which are;

1) weak legislation,

2) fiscal dependency on higher tiers of government, administration, JDPBPC

3) corruption and elite capture,

4) weak operational structures,

5) patron client politics; cronyism, manipulation and party politics and,

6) natural environmental constraints

These six categories can be categorized into, two main areas; controllable and

non-controllable. On the non-controllable side there is the fact that natural the environment

(terrain and weather) is a constraint to the decentralization efforts. The former

Ambunti-Dreikikir MP, Judah Akesim explained how this affected his development

attempts24. On the controllable side the problems can be looked at from the three areas of

24In a discussion with former MP Judah Akesim it was revealed that one of the greatest challenges that he faced as

an MP was the challenge of delivering to different geographic areas (the Sepik River and the foothills) with same

funds as other MP's. On a country wide scale natural environment problems has been a great challenge to both

the districts and LLGs to implement projects across the country. Evidence of this can be seen in numerous

literature such as the ADB (2012b), AUSAID (2009),UNDP (2007a) and others noting the challenges to develop

infrastructure , move equipment and logistics across the length and breadth of PNG.

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decentralization.

4.6 Analyzing the Problems from Decentralizations Perspective

The remaining five factors; weak legislation, weak operational structure, fiscal

dependency on higher tiers of government/administration, corruption and elite capture and

politics; cronyism, manipulation can be categorized as problems within the three areas of

decentralization. That is they are either problems in administrative, fiscal or political

decentralization as noted below in table 5.

Table 5: Categorizing the Problems

Source: Created by author

CATEGORY PROBLEM

Administrative

Decentralization

(a) Weak Legislation

(b) Weak Operational Structure

Fiscal

Decentralization

(c) Fiscal dependency on higher tiers of

government/administration/JDPBPC

Political

Decentralization (d) Corruption and elite capture

(e) Patron client politics; politics, cronyism, manipulation

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4.6.1 Weak Administrative Decentralization

In administrative decentralization, the enabling legislation is the main source of

power that establishes public institutions. This is because the legislation establishes the

parameters in which institutions may operate, details functions and powers, and the financing

arrangements and other essential mechanisms required by institutions to function effectively.

In the case of Dreikikir sub-district several problems of effective administrative

decentralization are related to weak legislation. First is the responsibility over staff engaged

in the district and the manner in which they are appointed. Second, is the process by which

they are to be monitored and what is to happen if they are found to be not performing, for

example can they be replaced by local employees. Third, are the participation and

accountability mechanisms from the district and LLG towards the citizens. This mechanism

will be explained in the section on weak operational structures. Finally, is the limited power

of ward members to influence things at the district level.

In case of staffing the survey identified that there was a significant problem with

unreliable staff who were seen by the people as often times not present at their places of work.

Ward members and district officials explained that they were unable to deal with this issue as

they had no powers to manage staffing. This is because the staff are national government staff,

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employed, hired and paid for by the national government. The 1995 Organic Law on

Provincial and Local Level Government, Section 75 reads, “the staff of a district shall consist

of - (a) the officers of the National Public Service assigned to the Province for the purposes

by the Departmental head of the Department responsible"(Independent State of Papua New

Guinea, 1995:48). The management of these officers within the district is the responsibility of

district and provincial administrators respectively, as set out in Section 74 Section of the 1995

Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government, which states that the provincial and

district administrator are "responsible for the efficient management in the province [and

district]; (d) shall maintain supervision and direction, in accordance with an Act of Parliament,

over officers and employees assigned or otherwise employed to carry out the functions of the

National Government" as well as provincial and local level governments. Because these staff

are part of the National Government they fall under the responsibility of their respective

Departmental Heads. In this case the 1995 Public Service Management Act section 24

makes it clear that the responsibility of the department head shall be to oversee the well-being

of the department which includes the personal well-being of staff. The Provincial

Administrator can move officers around within a province or a district but only after

consultation with the department headquarters in the capital (Section 66, 1995 Public Service

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Management Act).

Against this back drop it is ironic that Section 59 Clause A of the 1995 Public

Service Management Act reads, “the function of a ... local level administration in a province

(a) [is] to effect the administration required by the Organic Law of Provincial and Local

Level Government". In this case both the 1995 Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level

Government and the 1997 Local Level Government Administration Act stress a certain

amount of duties of which the local level government and local level administrations are

required to perform but none of them relate to how they are to monitor, hire or fire their staff.

Instead the power is placed in the hands of either the district administrator ,who also cannot

hire or fire but recommends to the provincial administrator who after consultation with the

respective departmental heads, can decide whether to hire or fire (Section 76 Clause 2, 1995

Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level Government; Section 66, Public Service

Management Act). In addition to this is fact that several key areas of staffing have not been

clarified. On the contrary they are waiting for an act of Parliament to be made to determine

and clarify matters relating to officers at the district level, which has been not been

undertaken so far. A good example of this is the case of teachers in districts in Section 76

Clause 3 of the 1995 Organic Law of Provincial and Local Level Government.

135

As result the local administration and LLG is quite powerless to deal with staff who

do not perform because there is no enabling legislation detailing the structure and operation i

which will enable them to hire or fire. It instead makes them dependent on higher tiers of

government. The Dreikikir Finance and Administration Officer25 pointed out that the district

administration only makes recommendations for potential appointees to the provincial

administration and it is up to them to deliberate on the recommendations and to confirm them

with the district office. This has made staffing positions vulnerable to cronyism by provincial

level authorities. A good example of this is the current Dreikikir LLG Project Officer who is

poorly educated and lacks the appropriate skills for the position but is the son of a high

ranking provincial officer. The Dreikikir Health Extension Officer26commented that there was

shortage of qualified manpower in the district but the provincial and national departments had

not identified them nor allocated them to the district. As result many of those holding

positions were old timers, past their retirement age who could not be retrenched because their

replacements had not been identified.

Another example of weak administrative decentralization which comes about

25 Dreikikir District Administration Finance and Administration Officer, October 2013,

Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 262626 Dreikikir Health Extension Officer, October 2013, Dreikikir Sub Health Center, East

Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

136

because of weak legislation is the manner in which the District Administrator is appointed.

The legislation is not clear how appointments to this position are to be made. Section 61 of

the Public Service Management Act notes the Department Head of the Department of

Personal Management is responsible for coordinating this appointment, should there be a

vacancy or the possibility of an upcoming vacancy in the District Administrators position.

The person making the appointment should be guided by the 1995Organic Law. But the

Organic Law is itself not specific about this procedure. It states in Section 75 Clause 3 only

that, the "District Administrator shall be appointed in the manner and following the same

procedures as applicable to appointment of officers of the public service", which in this case

refers back to the 1995 OLPLLG by Section 61 of the Public Service Management Act. This

Act has no clearly defined rules and regulations. Section 75 Clause 5 of the 1995 OLPLLG

states that “... an Act of Parliament shall make provisions for the selection criteria and

procedures of appointment". No such Act has been passed.

Weak operational structures due to weak legislation within administrative

decentralization are another issue. The way in which a administrative level is designed is will

sooner or later affect the operational outcome of an agency or department. In the case of the

Dreikikir sub-district it has been noted by both the Ward Members and district officials the

137

ineffective operating structure, seems to be caused by weak legislation, ineffective

implementation and lack of proper insight into what is needed. Three features can be noted:

first there is a weak operational link between the JDPBPC, the district administration, the

LLGs and their wards where participation and accountability are particularly non-functioning

Secondly, reliable agencies for the delivery of drinking water and electricity services are

non-existent. Also absent is any organization responsible for the promotion of the local

economy.

Section 33A Subsection 3 of the OLPLLG, made the JDPBPC the responsible agency

for overall primary planning and allocation of funds . But this requires effective coordination

between the district, LLGs and their wards, to produce effective plans and proposals that are to

be submitted to the JDBPC for planning approval and implementation. The ward members say

this is not happening. There has been no effective participation or involvement of the ward

members with district officials for formulation of. Although the Dreikikir District Finance and

Administration Officer said that the people were often consulted about projects in the district,

the survey found otherwise and revealed that there was in fact no participation by the people.

The very great majority of ward members said independently that district officials never

consulted them on issues affecting development at the ward level.

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The origin of this problem is the complete lack of a proper avenue or structure that will

allow the people and the ward member to participate in the planning and development process

because there is no legislation to require this to happen. The only procedure stipulated in the

law relates to Ward Development Committees which are responsible for creating plans at the

ward level. Only one ward of the 11 wards surveyed at Dreikikir had a Ward Development

Committee. Ward members interviewed also indicated only a limited understanding of formal

government procedures, like the role and function of JDPBPC and said they had not received

any form of skills training from the LLG or the district (refer to figure 27). The Ward

Development Committee is the only link between the wards, the LLGs and the District and the

JDPBPC yet it and any form of development plans is absent in most wards. A way for citizens

and their ward representatives to interact with higher tiers of government as partners for

effective participation is missing from the district tier.

Very poor local accountability is also the outcome of poor organizational structures.

Whilst structural and functional accountability are maintained there is no social accountability

towards the ward members and citizens by the district officials.

At the district level a major issue is the absence of electricity and water supply. The

reasons for this is a lack of funding and a lack of qualified people to implement village water

139

and electricity supply projects. It is not even clear which district agency these two public

utilities fall under. The OLPLLG Section 44 Subsection E and F gives power to LLGs to make

laws over these services. Likewise the 1997 Health Administration Act Section 19 subsection

B gives the power provincial government to implement rural water supply projects. So there is

confusion as to who should be the rightful implementer.

Piped water supply requires basic engineering skills as well as significant funds for

implementation. The absence of a designated agency to take on this work has left a gap. In the

case of Dreikikir there has been several initiatives to launch a water supply project by a faith

based agency. But the district been unable to support an initiative by a faith based NGO

working at the LLG level. Such weak linkages are also seen in the case of faith based health

service haus marasin (medicine house) concept. In this case most ward members surveyed said

there was a failure of support between the LLG and district for the NGO, leading to the NGO

giving up on the implementation. A second example of this can be seen in the case of a rice

growing project initiated by IIJICA. In this case the rice a model farmer, Moses Taptehei27, said

that although the project itself was good and had the support of many people , the project died

when IIJICA funds were exhausted and no district or LLG support was offered to pick from

27 Moses Taptehei, Rice Model Farmer Dreikikir, 10th November 2014,Ngawih Village

Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

140

where IIJICA left off. Smallholders were interested in growing rice but they had no milling

equipment and so were reluctant to grow rice because of the cost to transport their harvests to

mills located in Maprik. This is another example of how weak organizational structure fails to

respond to opportunities for local development. In reality, these projects rely on the MP to

initiate or to support initiatives because of the complete lack of any implementing agency at the

district level. If the MP is not interested or wishes to spend funds available to him elsewhere,

the projects fail.

Another example of a weak operational structure can be seen in the poor local

economy. The study site is rural one and depends on the sale of cash crops But people face

significant problems from the lack of agriculture extension services, marketing facilities, bad

roads and a lack of access to credit facilities. The Department of Land, Agriculture and Wildlife

(DALW) is only partly responsible because their role is restricted to extension activities and

does not apply to provision of credit, or export marketing. Road maintenance falls national

and local roads. At Dreikikir the Sepik Highway runs through the district and is a national

highway so is the responsibility of the national government. However the feeder roads in the

district are the responsibility of the district, but no agency looks after them or funds their repair,

so it falls back to the MP to take care of them. Mr Save Enade, Acting Provincial Transport

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Bureau Plant Manager28, explained, it is up to the MP to use his JDPBPC funds to maintain and

repair feeder roads, and whether they get repaired or not depends on his personal whims. Mr

Enade cited the case of several electorates in his home province of East New Britain which had

been able to implement an excellent road maintenance policy with the enthusiastic support of

MPs.

Coming back to the matter of limited access to capital and market venues, it has been

explained that the local district and LLG has no effective agency responsible for these issues.

The case of marketing lies with the Investment Promotion Authority located in Port Moresby

and not the District. Secondly, the absence of capital facilities at the local level has left MPs

again shouldering the burden. As noted by Mr Rapheal Urugu 29 , Manager of National

Development Bank (NDB), Wewak Branch, rural Papua New Guineans generally lack a

savings culture and as result most of them had very little savings so had very limited access to

capital for agriculture projects. Now the NDBs role was to assist citizens to access funds from

loans but as most had limited savings, they had no equity to contribute towards the loans and so

were often refused credit by the banks.

28 Save Enade, Acting PTB Plant Manager, Works PTB Plant, Wewak, 15th October 2014, Dreikikir

East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 29RaphealUrugu, Manager National Development Bank, Wewak Branch, 14th October 2014, Dreikikir

East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

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These examples demonstrate that both the LLG and district administration are not

empowered to find markets nor provide credit. The 1995 reforms has not given them the

administrative powers or the responsibility to do so.

4.6.2 Weak Fiscal Decentralization

Effective fiscal decentralization is a key ingredient in the implementation of

effective decentralization outcomes. However from the case study findings it can be seen that

there is weak fiscal decentralization. Instead there a fiscal dependency on the higher tiers of

government, administration and particularly within the District on the JDPBPC, as both the

district and LLG do not have the capacity to generate their own revenue.

When looking at the local revenue base, the 1995 OLPLLG allocates only certain

areas in which LLGs can collect revenue. It is stated in Section 87 of the OLPLLG that LLGs

may collect five main types of taxes and fees; community service taxes and fees, taxes on

entertainment venues, general trading licenses (excluding banks), local animal licenses,

corporation and personal head tax and other taxes allocated to it by the national or provincial

government. In this case districts and LLGs often times do not collect many of these taxes

because the local economy is often weak and unreliable as a source of significant funds. The

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case of Dreikikir LLG offers a good example where most revenue collected is from trade store

licenses, animal fees and other small scale business activities such as selling of second hand

clothes or fuel30. Evidence of this can be seen in Table 6.

Table 6: Types of Funds Available to the LLG

REVENUE SOURCE 2012 2013 2014

Locally Generated Revenue

(Trade Store Licenses,

Rental of Assets, Village

court fines)

K 23,200.00

(15.88 %)

K 20,100.00

(18.22 %)

K 23,400.00

(21.13 %)

Provincial Grants (PSIP) K 100,000. 00 K 100,000.00 K 100,000.00

National Government

Grants (LLG Grants) K 195,100. 00 K 196,200. 00 K 321,100. 00

District Grant (DSIP) K 50,000. 00 K 50,000. 00 K 50,000. 00

TOTAL K 368,300.00 K 366,300.00 K 494,500. 00

Source: Dreikikir LLG Records, obtained from the Dreikikir LLG Manager, June, 2015

30 Dreikikir LLG Manager, November 2014, Dreikikir LLG Council Chambers, East Sepik

Province, Papua New Guinea

144

This revenue however is not adequate for any large scale projects but only for basic

stationary equipment and assisting with ancillary staff payments from time to time. Another

interesting case noted by also here was the inability to recuperate certain revenues from the

LLGs investments due to local power relations. In this case some buildings owned by the LLG

and its staff houses have been used for some time now by a former council Project Officer.

Request to make payments has not been responded to for two reasons. Firstly, a former Project

Officer attached to the LLG had generated significant debts with the occupants of the LLG

rented facility, so that when the officer left the LLG without repaying the debts, the creditors

moved into the LLG staff house and would not move out. They also stopped paying rent for the

LLG building they were using, citing that they were retrieving the debt owed to them by the

former project officer. The LLG Manager was hesitant to insist on payment because he came

from another area which was weaker in terms of sorcery, whilst the occupants of the LLG

rented facility came from an area which was known for powerful sorcery. As result this local

power relations affected effective collection of the revenue.

Most of Dreikikir LLG revenue comes from government grants and the JDPBPC and

not from locally generated revenue. It comprises less than 22% of the yearly revenue for three

consecutive years, and the grants are three times the value of revenue raised locally.

145

Two of the grants originate from the provincial and the national government whilst the

third comes from the district. In the case of the provincial and national government grants, the

main problem has been the unreliability of the grants, which often arrive late or in reduced

amounts. This was also raised as a problem by both the LLG Ward Members and district

officials interviewed (refer to figure 27 & 28). On the other hand the district funded DSIP

grants follow no fixed formula for allocation to the LLG but it is allocated on an adhoc basis by

the district and the JDPBPC to the LLG and the amount being decided seemingly on the whim

of the MP.. In the case of district allocation to LLG, the Finance Administration Officer for

Dreikikir District31said that it should be based upon resolutions made in LLG meetings and

submitted to the district as planning proposal. But if there is no proposal submitted to the

district there is no grant allocation to the LLG. The case of the JDPBPC allocation on the other

hand is accorded to it by law, Section 33A, Subsection B which gives the JDPBPC the power "

to determine and control budget priorities for Local - level Government" and Subsection D

which is "to approve Local-level Government budgets for presentation to the Local-level

Government and make recommendations concerning them" (Independent state of PNG, 1995:

21).

31 Finance and Administration Officer Dreikikir, November 2014, Dreikikir District Office,

East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

146

All over PNG the LLGs depend upon higher tiers of government for funding. For

example, nearby Maprik LLG in July complained to a national newspaper that it had yet to

receive its LLGSIP grants for the 2013 (K 500,000.00), 2104 (K 500,000. 00) and 2015 (K 100,

000. 00) totaling to approximately K 1.1 million (The National, Wednesday, July 1st 2015).

The LLG President for Maprik LLG said this affected their l plans and performance in service

delivery. In another case Kutubu LLG President John Kila in Southern Highlands Province,

told a national television news program that the decrease of the LLGSIP funding by the

National Government from K 500,000. 00 to K 100,000. 00 was affecting their performance in

essential areas such as agriculture as they focused on more essential needs (Bridgette

Komatep32, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby).

The District is entirely dependent on governmental funds. Since it is mainly and

administrative body comprised of extensions of national government departments it depends

entirely on intergovernmental transfer of funds and does not have any form of local revenue

provisions in the law unlike the LLGs. Thus is often subjected to untimely arrival of funds and

32 Bridgette Komatep32, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby)

http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Kutubu-LLG-President-Increase-LLG-Funds& accessed on

29.09.2015 at 6.45 pm

147

the JDPBPC discretion.

When looking at the general PNG picture it can be seen that the LLGs in general

depend upon higher tiers for funding. For example, Maprik LLG in July noted that it had yet to

receive its LLGSIP grants for the 2013 (K 500,00.00), 2104 (K 500, 000. 00) and 2015 (K 100,

000. 00) totaling to approximately K 1.1 million (The National, Wednesday, July 1st 2015).

The LLG President for Maprik LLG has noted this affected their general plans and

performance in service delivery. In another case Kutubu LLG President John Kila in Southern

Highlands Province, raised the issue that that decrease of the LLGSIP funding by the National

Government from K 500, 000. 00 to K 100, 000. 00 was affecting their performance in essential

areas such as agriculture in LLG as they focused on more essential needs (Bridgette Komatep33,

Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby).

Dependency on the higher tiers of government has created problems of poor

infrastructure, broken down equipment, a shortage of equipment and so forth. Furthermore this

shortfall is largely linked to fiscal issues faced in the LLG and district administration. The

33 Bridgette Komatep33, Wednesday, 20th May 2015, EMTV News Port Moresby)

http://www.emtv.com.pg/article.aspx?slug=Kutubu-LLG-President-Increase-LLG-Funds& accessed on

29.09.2015 at 6.45 pm

148

manner in which the JDPBPC has emerged as an overseer for development planning, and

allocation of the DSIP development funds has further weakened Districts and LLGs. As noted

by Kalinoe (2009) based on survey covering six provinces, the emergence of the JDPBPC has

resulted in a diminished role for the LLGs. Kalinoe also notes that both the Districts and LLGs

suffer from unreliable funding and politicization of funds. As a result most LLG's and District

operate on a hand to mouth basis.

4.6.3 Weak Political Decentralization

The political decentralization undertaken in PNG is paradoxical. It can be seen that

political decentralization has been dominant. It has reinforced the role of national MP's in the

decentralization process, particularly at the District tier. Evidence of this can be seen in several

forms. Firstly is the manner in which the JDPBPC has been structured (refer to figure 12). of

the merging of the political in to the administrative is unclear and open to interpretation.

Secondly, the role of the JDPBPC as main planning and financial controlling body in the

District with the MP's as the designated chair by law give s the MP a great deal of power to

direct benefits within the electorate at his will. Finally the control over the DSIP grants, of

which 50% are MPs discretionary funds, further increases the powers of the MP. Political

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decentralization has been weakened by this development because the strengthening of power of

MPs has come without the proper checks and balances. National MPs have much greater

powers than any local political figures with a district, such as LLG Chairs..

This dilemma is significant in the voting behavior in PNG where Bigman status is a

key ingredient. MP's have used their new powers to exploit the weaknesses in administrative

and fiscal decentralization to direct resources to their supporters within the electorate.

Evidence of this can be seen in several cases.

Firstly, in order to manipulate outcomes both in the JDPBC and the district tier there

is a need for a District Administrator who is aligned politically with the weaknesses in the

administrative decentralization in regards to legislation over the hiring of staff, particularly

the District Administrator has allowed MP's to appoint a District Administrator of their

choice.

In the case of Dreikikir District there are two examples of this, in the first34 a local

public service official who was linked to a former MP through family ties was appointed as

the District Administrator, on recommendations from political cronies. This man later

misappropriated a significant portion of the district development funds and fled to his home

34 Interviewee confidential, November 2014, Dreikikir, East Sepik Province, Papua New

Guinea

150

province. In the second case, which is currently pending, two District Administrators have

been appointed in Ambunti-Dreikikir, one appointed by the local MP and other appointed by

the provincial administration (The National, Wednesday March 11th, 2015, MP Warns Public

Servants). In this case the District Administrator appointed by the provincial administration

was a former political opponent of the current MP. This man refused to carry out the MPs

allegedly illegal directions leading to the MP to appoint his own District Administrator. The

man appointed by the MP appointed has allegedly been linked to significant abuses of district

funds. The blatant attempts to manipulate the appointment process by the MP can be seen

clearly in this case.

Such incidences are not limited to Dreikikir with examples from other parts of the

country. The appointment of two provincial administrators in Rabaul, East New Britain

Province by two different MPs, the Regional MP and a local MP who was serving as Governor,

as the Governor was serving as the Deputy Prime Minister and hence was ineligible for the

position of Governor (Mapun Pidian, PNG LOOP, 24.07.2012, Bureaucratic Mess in East New

Britain Province). Numerous other situations exist in PNG where MPs have appointed

administrators both district and provincial taking advantage in weaknesses in the legislation.

The politicization of key personal such as district administrators helps MPs to control

151

and use the fiscal resources of the district. Since there is a strong fiscal dependency by LLGs

and the district on the JDPBPC, the funding of individual LLGs becomes prone to

manipulation, politicization and abuse. Evidence of this can be seen in the politicization of

funds affecting the budget allocation to LLG and districts. This has been noted by several

district officers and is one of the highest factors noted by the problems identified by district

officers in figure 25. Such a view is strongly supported by former Dreikikir LLG President35

who notes that the JDPBPC is only good at making resolutions but not at implementing them.

Instead we have cronies receiving funding for proposed projects, he said. The District Finance

Administration Officer36 also said that some projects are allocated funds without discussion by

the JDPBPC and the allocation of funds is based on cronyism and nepotism. Evidence of this

can be seen in allegations that cronies of the MP received JDPBPC funds more than once to

establish a trucking business.

In another example 37; a District Administrator acquired a significant portion of the

district funds, (the exact figure is not known, but it is estimated to be over K 100 000.00

(US$ 30 000.00)). The district administrator had previously been appointed on the basis of

35 Mr Leo Manarip, Former Dreikikir LLG President, October 2014, Dreikikir Station, East Sepik

Province, Papua New Guinea 36 Finance and Administration Officer Dreikikir, November 2014, Dreikikir District Office, East Sepik

Province, Papua New Guinea 37 Interview Confidential, Tumam Village, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua

New Guinea

152

cronyism ties. Up acquiring of funds he fled to his home province where he is said to have

started his own private business from the funds obtained. In another example an LLG Manager

stole LLG Funds ranging between K 30 – 40, 000. 00 (US $ 10 – 20, 000.00). In this case an

LLG President intervened and sacked the LLG manager but the funds were never recouped38.

In yet another example another district administrator was also accused of stealing significant

development funds. When he failed to make proper acquittals the former MP had to intervene

to facilitate his removal from office. Finally, we have the case of a local DALW Field officer39

who has misused approximately K 50 – 60, 000.00 (US$ 15 – 20, 000.00) of funds that should

have been spent on district development. The officer later fled the district to the provincial

capital and resides there now for fear of retribution from citizens in the district. In all this cases

significant development funds were stolen, or directed into personal accounts for personal gain,

at the expense of the people. When this happens the district and LLG are unable to deliver their

planned programs. Infrastructure is not maintain, roads become impassable. ,. The crimes can

be linked to poor local accountability and failed participation structures. The lack of proper

legislation on how to recuperate such monies has made it an easy pick for local officials.

38 Ward One Ward Member, Tumam Village, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua

New Guinea 39 Interview Confidential, Dreikikir Station, November 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua

New Guinea

153

Such incidences are not isolated to the study district. A good example of such

abuse can be seen in the case of Madang District Project Officer who misappropriated a

significant portion of development funds from two districts; Madang and Kiriwina. The officer

was found to be guilty of 11 charges out of a total of 19 (Sally Pokiton, 14 April, 2015, PNG

Loop). In another instance an LLG President of Albigles Mamblep in Maprik

misappropriated approximately K 500,000.00 of LLG funds for personal gain resulting in his

LLG and Wards being affected greatly40.

Misuse of funds is not restricted to public servants. In a recent case the Governor of

Gulf Province, Havila Kavo was alleged to have misused K130,000.00 (Post Courier,

September 14, 2014, Gulf Governor found guilty of misusing K 130 000. 00 of trust funds).

Examples of abuse by funds MPs are many and can be found throughout the length and breadth

of PNG. However it is the elite capture of benefits that also restricts the much needed funds for

the local tiers of government, particularly the district and LLG sector. In this scenario the

absence of proper local accountability structures and the poor monitoring approaches by

national government agencies have led to wide scavenging of public funds.

Weak operational structures in administrative decentralization has also further opened

40 Rowen Nim, June 24th 2015, email message, Department of Provincial and Local Level

Government, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

154

up opportunities for MPs to pursue Bigman politics instead. Because there is no proper agency

for funding roads, electricity, or water supply at the district tier, it becomes the responsibility of

the MP as the chairman of the JDPBPC to provide funds. This has been the case in East Sepik.

Zaza Zibe41 a Senior Lines Inspector at PNG Power Provincial Headquarters in Wewak says

that rural electrification programs depend upon MPs initiatives. Mr Zibe noted that LLGs and

districts alone could not implement this as they lacked the funds required whilst the MP could

do so as he was in charge of the JDPBPC. This was demonstrated in the Yangoru Sausia

electorate where the former MP Peter Wararu initiated a rural electrification project which was

later carried on by the current MP, Richard Maru. An interesting point in this example is that

because of the absence of local implementing agencies the MPs took charge from initiation to

implementation. The MPs did not call for tenders and accept the lowest tender, but used their

own private contractors which leaves them open to accusations of kickbacks to the MPs from

the contractors.

Another example is credit schemes offered by the District joint Committee in the case

study area. Mr Raphael Ururu42, has described how the District joint Committee stepped in to

41ZazaZibe, Senior Lines Inspector, 14th October 2014, PNG Power Provincial Head Quarters,

Wewak East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 42RaphealUrugu, Manager National Development Bank, Wewak Branch, 14th October 2014, Dreikikir

East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

155

assist people to access micro credit loans as there was no proper agency to deal with this at the

local level. As a result MPs took steps to use development funds to set up a credit assistance

schemes to provide for this equity to enable people to access loans. When this was done it came

down to drawing up the details between the JDPBPC and the bank. However the bank manager

argued that it was best to leave the overseeing of the loans to the bank and not the politicians

which the MPs resisted.

At Dreikikir the recipients of the credit scheme were mainly from the same ethnic area

as the MP whilst the majority of loan applicants missed out. The majority who missed out

allege did so because they were from areas that were not politically aligned to the MP. They

say the MP was using this loophole to manipulate the District joint Committee to serve his

interests. I label this sort of actions as the maintenance of Bigman status.

Therefore basically the decentralization process had led to the reinforcement of the

role of the national MP at the local level. These weaknesses in administrative decentralization

allow the MP to manipulate the district administration, to access funds via the District joint

Committee and to maintain his status as a Bigman which is essential if the MP is to be

re-elected. But such actions also greatly disadvantage the development outcomes in the district

and LLGs.

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4.7 Conclusion of Study Site Findings

This chapter has revealed a wide array of problems associated with decentralization at

the district, LLG and ward levels. The problems can be categorized into three; political, fiscal

and administrative I have tried to show that that weak legislation has contributed to creating a

weak administration system in terms of administrative organization. Apart from this weak

legislation has also made the district and LLG fiscally dependent on higher tiers of funding,

particularly on the District joint Committee. From the political aspect, it can be seen that the

role of national politicians has become more reinforced at the district level, and given them

more control over key institutions, such as the District joint Committee and the control of fiscal

resources in the District joint Committee. Furthermore this has blurred the line between politics

and administration, with the District joint Committee becoming the head of the district

administrative structure since most of its members are political figures but they have become

responsible for administrative control of, planning and the allocation of funds. This has created

a problem in the electoral process because, given the nature of electoral politics in PNG and its

relationship with Bigman behavior, the use of resources to attract voters will have a drastic

impact upon rural development initiatives at the district tier

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Chapter Five: The Impact of Bigman Infiltration on Rural Development at the District

Level

5.1 Bigman Impact

The prime objective of this dissertation has been to analyze why rural development is

failing under the current decentralization reforms in Papua New Guinea. The dissertation takes

the view that the reasons behind such weak outcomes cannot be attributed to institutional

failures only, as informal institutions may have contributed to the weak outcomes. So the

dissertation looked at how the system of administration emerged from its early colonial days up

till now to showcase how the Bigman values led to hijacking of the decentralization process.

This hijacking has made national MPs very dominant at the local tier. However, the

reforms also had certain problems from the three sectors of decentralization as noted in Chapter

Four. These have had a profound impact upon desirable rural development outcomes when

Bigman politics has been played at the district level by MPs to maintain on-going political

support.

Since the Bigman system has no binding ties, political alignment to any MP becomes

fluid. Whilst most political localities “revolve around clan, local or ethnic divisions” (May,

158

2004: 46), there is no guarantee that supporters will be still loyal when the next elections come

around, due to the absence of the binding element between MP and supporters. So whether or

not an MP can maintain influence depends on his Pasin, that is how he/she can maintain

Bigman ideals of helping with school fees, funeral costs, and other minor matters which

supporters raise to him/her.

Given the situation that the 1995 Reforms have serious defects in them from the three

aspects of decentralization; political, administrative and fiscally, this has enabled the MPs to

become dominant and manipulative at the district level with much ease. This has led to poor

rural development outcomes in the districts. How have the MPs done this? They have

dominated and controlled the activities of their respective District Joint Committees. The

District Joint Committees were to be the main planning agency, for development affairs in the

district. This meant that such aspects of maintenance of infrastructure, decision making of

projects were to be implemented and the allocation of funds to respective sectors and projects

became the main function of the District Joint Committees, chaired by the MP. The roles of the

public servants in the districts have become largely confined to consultative purposes only.

However, in the absence of proper organizational structure linking all parties in the district

(district, LLG and Wards), weak legislation governing recruitment and termination of public

159

servants, as well as reliance on higher tiers of government for almost all funding, and the fact

that there is very limited participation and involvement by the people and accountability to

them, has allowed the MPs to become controlling of their respective District Joint Committees.

As a result the MPs firstly, frequently utilize the weak legislation on hiring and firing

to hire their own district administrators to enable smooth facilitation and control over fiscal

resources that should be controlled by the District Joint Committee. Evidence of this can be

seen in the following examples, where MPs themselves appointed key positions and district

administrators both from within the study site and other areas in PNG.

In the study district a former MP had a son who served as his secretary defying the

laws disallowing family members to be employed by the MP. In example two, another former

MP appointed certain under-qualified persons to be on his staff. In this case the staff came from

the same region as the MP. The same MP was also noted for appointing two district

administrators who later abused significant portions of the district development funds. The

ongoing situation described above, with two district administrators in the study district offers

yet another example of this politically manipulated administration. Finally in a recent political

move, LLG managers were 43moved within the district, with Dreikikir LLG manager going to

43 Former Ward 30 Ward Member, Dreikikir Station, October 2014, Dreikikir East Sepik Province,

160

Kawanga LLG whilst the Kawanga LLG manager was moved to Dreikikir LLG. This

happened because the Dreikikir LLG manager was not politically supportive of the current MP

so he wanted the Kawanga manager to be up at Dreikikir to ensure particular projects were

implemented there. In fact as Dreikikir LLG manager was neutral as a public servant should be,

whilst the Kawanga one was aligned with the MP. The MP believed the neutral Dreikikir

LLG manager would work together with the district administrator appointed by the province

rather than follow the directions of the MP. When such key positions as the district

administrator can be appointed by the MP, the District Joint Committee is easily subverted to

the MP’s will.

The manipulation of the District Joint Committee becomes much easier when

politically aligned public servants are in place. But why do the MPs want to manipulation the

District Joint Committees? Because the fluid nature of the Bigman system demands constant

support from the MP who will use state resources to ‘buy’ votes in parts of the district. MPs are

seen by the people as in possession of unlimited “state resources and money which they can

distribute to their local political supporters in their electorate. [As a result] Electoral

Development Funds and other forms of slush funds are invested in personal networks to secure

Papua New Guinea

161

support”(Reilly, 2014: 11). All this is done to maintain the MPs Pasin of behaving like a

Bigman and sharing wealth (not his own) and caring for one’s supporters. When this is done

development priorities take a back seat to the maintenance of the Bigman status by the MPs.

Hence it is not uncommon to hear supporters of the MP describe him in such terms as bikplaboi,

bikplamangi44in reference to his ability to help them when they are in need.

Evidence of this manipulation of the District Joint Council by the MP can be seen in

several examples. The Finance and Administration Officer for Dreikikir45says that projects

tend to be allocated in the JDPBPC according to political cronyism, without proper discussion

and consultation of all the members involved. In the study district there are several examples

of this in play. In the first example46 a former MP used his discretion within the District joint

Committee to allocate funds for a credit scheme to supporters from his area. But the credit

was only made available to people who supported the MP, who received startup capital from

the District joint Committee, whilst other areas missed out. As a result a large number of men in

the favored area were able to establish transport businesses known in PNG as Public Motor

44bikplaboi, bikplamangi in tokpisin, basically refers to a person who is greater or has some

kind of great skill, ability, power or wealth. Usually seen as an influential figure in his own

area. 45 Finance and Administration Officer, Dreikikir District Administration Office, Dreikikir

Station, 9th October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea 46 Interviewee confidential, Dreikikir Station, October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province,

Papua New Guinea

162

Vehicles (PMVs). The majority of these businesses failed, and the banks took back the PMV

vehicles when those who received the credit could no longer meet loan repayments. In the

second, example the same former MP allocated a significant portion of funds for a particular

road into his area. But this road was never completed and went only a few kilometers and was

never graveled. What happened to the huge amount of funds spent on this project is not clear

but the contractor was paid even though the road was not built. In another example47some

students were allocated funds from the District Joint Committee for university tuition fees, but

the fees were paid into the account of a political crony of the MP. As a result the student’s fees

were never paid because the crony used the money for his own purposes. Finally in another

case, a local coffee extension officer involved in coffee revitalization projects in the area

48noted that he had consistently requested the District Joint Committee for a water tank but this

request had not been heard, whilst other requests from strong supporters of the MP for

non-essential services were supported by the District joint Committee.

Similar examples are found throughout PNG. One is offered by a happening in

Wewak Open Electorate where the local MP, Moses Manwau, distributed DSIP cheques during

47 Interviewee confidential, Dreikikir Station, October 2013, Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua

New Guinea 48 Mobile Extension Officer, Dreikikir District Administration, Dreikikir Station, 11th October 2013,

Dreikikir East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea

163

the 2012 campaign period, which had never been approved by the District joint Committee

(PNG LOOP, 2012). In another incidence in Morobe Province the MP for Kabwum, Bob

Dadae, also allocated cheques ranging from K50 000 - K100 000 to certain groups in his

electorate (Post Courier, 15th June, 2012, ‘MPs should Show five year activity report’). In

another case Gulf Governor Kavilo was charged with using his development funds for a

purpose other than an effective development purposes ( Post Courier, April 16th 2015, Gulf

Probe will continue). Another MP,Bogia MP John Hickey, who has also been arrested in a

similar incidence. In fact it has been noted that 17% of MPs in the current government have

been implicated in corruption cases with misuse of their DSIP grants (17 % of MPs Implicated,

PNG Loop, March 15, 2015). In this case several of them have been jailed, whilst others have

stalled their cases via legal avenues and others have their cases still pending.

This abuse by MPs of funds allocated to the District joint Committee and to them

directly for electoral gains is closely linked to the big man culture. MPs try to maintain their

presence and their Pasin via ceremonies, cash giving, and support of local events to maintain

support. The MPs become responsible for these benefits and not the officers as it is the MPs

Pasin that ultimately determines their support base. Bigman needs to give benefits to

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supporters which are deciding the development objectives of districts, rather than real

development needs..

It has to be understood that the voting culture in PNG places emphasis not on merits,

previous positions held or developments achieved but simply on descent, ethnicity, family ties,

social relations and benefits received. Given these traits, people tend to vote along these lines

rather than along party lines. A good example of this can be seen in the recent by election for

West Sepik Regional Seat. In the early stages of the counting, candidates from the Nuku Lumi

electorates led by a margin of between 4000 - 5000 votes. But the Nuku-Lumi area had a

number of candidates standing for election. The winning candidate did not do well in

Nuku-Lumi because it was not his ethnic area. He was from the Telefomin area. Although he

was initially under the 1000 vote margin in the first few counts, this all shifted when the

counting of the ballot boxes moved towards the Telefomin area, Then the current MP, Amkat

Mai, leapt ahead from 1000 to approximately 30 000, which is almost twice as much as his

nearest competitor. Amkat was the sole candidate in the Telefomin area and had all their votes,

while the Nuku-Lumi candidate’s votes were split among a number of candidates.

In PNG political support also comes mainly from funds made available as

development funding grants through the District joint Committee. One of the most notable

165

studies of this is by Ketan (2007) who explores the complex but interdependent relationship

forged between the MPs and their ethnic vote base. Barcson (2015) calls this as the vote base

dilemma, because the support offered to MPs in election times returns to haunt them. In the

traditional sense this was seen as the big man distributing wealth to maintain a support base but

in the current modern situation this is seen as corruption. The dilemma has become greater with

the decentralization reforms which have reinforced the roles of MPs as chairs of their District

Joint Committees to has resulted in the wide spread abuse of development funds in the districts.

This is unlike other areas of the world where patron-client relations stem from some

form of guarantee which binds the patron to the client such as; land, use of force, or religion.

PNGs Bigman patron-client relations primarily originate from cultural links, familial ties and

ethnic identities. However, since they do not possess any form of binding link they create a

constant need by the MP to plunder state resources to maintain political support.

In this predicament MPs are seen by citizens as a Bigman who is responsible for their

needs. This situation is exacerbated by the low level of district economies, which keeps people

in near poverty. People find it very difficult to pay expenses such as school fees, funeral

expenses, or food during a food shortage, and expect to receive cash hand outs from their MPs

in times of need. To maintain his role as an MP the MP must behave as a new form of Bigman

166

and meet these demands. So the traditional Bigman ideals have been incorporated into the

modern political culture of maintaining political support. It is also important to note that

because there are no local elites or local strong-men the MPs have a direct interaction with the

people. This has developed an expectation from the people towards their local MP for cash

handouts and material benefits, rather than for sound development projects. Hence state

resources are constantly plundered to through manipulation of District Joint Committee.

Evidence of this in play is seen in numerous examples. For example, in the study site a

former MP purchases large amounts of beer, as well as the giving cash to dominant supporters

his area whenever he arrives in the district (he does not reside there). In another example,

former MP Jeffrey Nape "Upon returning home from Mt Hagen in his red, four-wheeled drive

Nissan Patrol station wagon [would give] K5 or K10 to people to purchase cigarettes, beer,

biscuits, kerosene or whatever their needs of the day" (Yegiora, 201449). From the Western

Province, is another example of the Governor, Ati Wobiro, who was found guilty of

misappropriating K 7 million (US$2.5 million) of PSIP funds. The media report of the court

49Source: Yegiora Bernard, 2014, Pork-barrelling Jeffery ‘Santu’ Nape - saviour, giver &Nimai

ninja,inPNGAttidue,asssopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2014/02/pork-barrelling-jeffery-sant

u-nape-saviour-giver-nimai-ninja.html , accessed on 15.01. 2015 at 1:27 pm

167

case stated, "Governor Wobiro gave written instructions to pay Century Hotel with clear

instructions for Century Hotel to pay 100s of his supporters’ cash" (PNG Blogs, 201550).

Finally, the Limus Structure undertaken by a former New Ireland Governor is one of the best

demonstrations of this behavior (Kalinoe, 2010). In this case the Governor involved created a

hausboi (men’s house) system based on the clan system in his electorate. All funding priorities

were made via key local representatives who represented the ethnic political loyalties in the

Governors electorate. This approached bypassed the formal administration processes and cost

the New Ireland Provincial dearly with the wastage of deprivation grants. Sadly, a great

percentage of these funds were used for the material benefits of ethnic supporters rather than

sound development projects.

These examples indicate MPs desire to maintain their Bigman status within his

electorate. As the relationship between the MP and his supporters is a reciprocal one,

demanding a vote cast in return for the benefits paid out, the MP’s Pasin, which is very much a

determining factor in his Bigman status as an MP, must be demonstrated whenever possible, to

50 Source: Png Blogs, 2015, Western Province Governor AtiWobiro& 2 Others Committed To Stand Trial

Over K7 Million in PSIP Funds, http://papua87.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=7046137&item=743,

Accessed on 18.08.2015 at 10:19 pm

168

maintain both his Bigman status and to retain his political support. PNG local does not involve

tradeoffs with local elites but between the MP himself and the people who he needs to support

him. The Bigman system creates a very destructive behavior which requires the constant

plundering of state resources to maintain it.

As a result essential decision making for sound district development becomes

affected. Bigman values are pursued to maintain the 'Bigman Pasin', resources are siphoned off

and allocated to particular supportive groups and away from non-supporting regions. Evidence

from this is firstly apparent in the examples cited above from the Dreikikir study area, as well

as those from other areas of PNG. The consequences are that district development efforts

become difficult to achieve when fiscal resources are misused for unsustainable and irrational

projects or are given away as cash to individuals. As a result infrastructure deteriorates,

extension activities decline, and rural electrification and water supply systems are not built.

5.2 Bigman Infiltration in PNG's Decentralization Process

PNG's road to effective decentralization has become hijacked by this practice. The

essential prerequisites noted by the World Bank (2007b), in chapter two have not been

169

implemented. Instead due to the political competition over the same political space in which

both provincial and national leaders were competing for to establish their Bigman status via the

Bigman Pasin approach needed to secure political victory, a weak decentralization design was

established.

This conflict between national leaders and local leaders that emerged at the local level

brought about a situation unlike other cases of decentralization elsewhere in the world.

Whereas the other cases of decentralization tended to reinforce local elite domination, PNG's

case has been the opposite, and has led to the domination of national leaders who come from

local area, and who use national resources to maintain local control.

So PNG's decentralization process has not led to effective decentralization as defined

by Falleti's Sequential decentralization theory. Despite political decentralization occurring first,

the conflict between national and leaders created by competition between them at the local

level, led to a disruption of the decentralization process. Falletis’s approach therefore does not

take into account informal factors which may affect the political and administrative

institutional arrangements. But this has been the case in PNG's decentralization process.

170

Finally, PNG's Bigman infiltration has created a situation where the politics of

survival involve a tradeoff between the leader and the citizens themselves. The tradeoff diverts

the essential decision making processes for sound development outcomes in the districts. A

culture of plundering state resources via the District Joint Committee has evolved because

there is no strong binding tie between the patron and the client. In the Bigman system the

fluidity of his status leads to the need to constantly maintain support. This is in contrast to

Midgal’s argument that tradeoffs are made between political leaders and local elites or strong

men within a patron-client environment where there exists a strong binding link. In Midgal’s

model, support is always guaranteed, due to the patron-client link and order is established

because it is fixed. In Migdal’s situation, the plundering of state resources would be limited or

less severe, because there the binding link controls the client. The PNG example

demonstrates a different case, where the fluidity of the Bigman system has enabled MPs to

exploit the weaknesses in the processes to maintain their Bigman values to secure and maintain

political support. In combination with conditions of widespread poverty, or relative poorness,

local MPs have used a handout mentality in which the modern day leader can only maintain

Bigman status by diverting the funds from sound development project in the district to

handouts to supporters.

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5.3 Conclusion of the Impact of Bigman Infiltration on Districts Rural Development

The district problems persist because the MPs see no priority to address them. On the

contrary resources are put to other purposes to maintain Bigman values which are needed for

political survival making local economies even worse. This situation has proliferated due to the

weaknesses within the institutions that were brought into being by the 1995 Reforms. PNG’s

experience in decentralization been different in several ways to those experienced in other parts

of the world. As a result its effectiveness at the district level is lagging behind. This therefore

calls into question its reliability. Perhaps it is time that PNG develops a decentralized structure

that looks at the Bigman issue and incorporates it into its institutional machinery.

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Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 - Purpose and Issues

This dissertation strives to understand why reforms of the decentralization processes

have failed to deliver effective rural development to the people of PNG. The literature on

decentralizations issues revealed that most studies focused on the formal institutional

mechanisms that affected the decentralizations efforts. The author wondered whether there

was a possibility that informal institutions also contributed to the failure of decentralizations

reforms. As a result the thesis was developed to explore two sub-questions on whether

informal institutions have weakened decentralization in PNG and secondly how informal

institutions themselves have affected effective rural development in the district tier.

Some other scholars have sought to explain the impact of informal institutions upon

formal institutions. The case of Migdal is used in this study to show case this. However

Migdal’s argument assumes that the tradeoff is made between the state and established orders

of informal institutions, such as local strong men, landed elites and others who have an

organized or fixed order in which patronage is underplayed and is grounded in the links that

ultimately bind a patron to his client and ensures compliance or support from the client. It is

against this background that the Bigman system is put forward as being different from other

173

patron-clients systems because it is so loose and fluid because it is based upon kinship values

with no form of stronghold or binding link over the client. Rather the Bigman patron, has to

continuously maintain the support of the clients from his own or some other resources.

When these informal values became the basis on which politicians became elected in

PNG, they brought about a change in the modern political system in PNG Political

competition developed between two levels of politicians (national and provincial) leading to

the eventual weakening of the existing system and the creation of a new one through reforms

enacted by the national politicians, which disadvantaged and disempowered the local

politicians. The new system gave national MPs a great deal of control over budgeting and

planning in the districts, where most of the fiscal resources came from the centre and could

not earn at the local level in the district.

The reforms have had significant unforeseen consequences. The MPs have had to

manipulate the administrative committees set up to plan and budget district development in

order to constantly maintain their Pasin, which is the way, or the fashion, in which a Bigman

is expected to behave. Bigmen politicians are elected on the basis of their Pasin. The outcome

of the diversion of development funds by MPs to maintain their Pasin, has led to the very

poor rural development outcomes in the district tier. Resources are used to satisfy political

174

goals based on the Bigman support system. Because the system is fluid with no ties binding

the Bigman to his followers, there is a constant need to maintain support by the distribution

of resources. This outcome is amplified because the clients or followers are almost all very

low income earners. The Bigman values are expected of the MP, who is seen as a Bigman

by his followers..

The answer to the overall research question is that decentralization is struggling in

PNG because of the political values which have evolved out of the Bigman system. This has

led to an abuse of the system for political ends because the fluidity of the Bigman system

requires the distribution of resources by the MP to supporters at a level which is well beyond

his personal capacity. So he diverts funds out of the district development grants, most of

which are nationally sourced.

6.2 - Key Findings

In the course of trying to understand these reasons, this study has noted two notable

findings. Firstly, Fallettis Sequential Decentralization theory, which assumes that political

decentralization will lead to administrative decentralization and eventually fiscal

decentralization, does not hold in PNG. There, decentralization has created political

175

competition rather than given more power to local elites. Secondly, and this is the most

important finding, is the absence of a binding link in the Bigman system which makes it very

fluid. This, fluidity has been the source of political support and the main cause for political

competition developing between the provincial and national MPs. This in turn has, led to the

empowering of national politicians over local leaders, unlike in other cases of

decentralization elsewhere in the world, where the power of local elites area has been

strengthened at the local level. Furthermore, this fluidity has made the constant plundering of

state resources by MPs, essential if they are to maintain support over the long term. This is

much more destructive than the fixed order of patron-client relations found else wherein the

world, where a binding link exists between patron and clients. The Bigman system is not

based on an established order, as perceived by Migdal, where power eventuates from an

organized form of social order, to weaken the centralized system.

6.3- The Impact on Decentralization by Bigman values

Bigman values have proven to be very persistent in the modern era of PNG

governance. It has largely flourished because of the limited socio economic opportunities

available to the people. As a result effective rural development outcomes have been greatly

176

negatively affected, especially when the system has loopholes or weak legislation which can

be abused.

There is therefore a need to seek ways to address this issue. While it is impossible to

do away with the modern systems and go back to traditional systems, there is still hope that

this informal system can be of use in the formal arena. Hence a system should be developed

to address this.

6.4 - Policy Implications

Given this dilemma the author suggests one major change in policy. It can be seen

that the clan/ kinship ties prove strong here amidst the weak socio economic conditions which

has led to strong mobilization in political elections. In an overall restructure of government

the clan or descent group must be brought into the government process.

The restructure of government levels therefore should go down one more level to

form Ward governments comprised of the clan leaders within the ward. Above them there

should be the LLG, made up of the Ward representatives and above that, a district government,

made up of all the LLGs in the district. The district administration should be the public

177

officials of this district government. Ward governments would have to be allocated funds to

operate with, and they will need help to plan how to develop their localities in their own way.

It can be seen that by giving too much power to the national MPs has had a severe

negative impact. Power therefore, must be taken away from the MP in the restructure and

limit the MPs role to a legislative role. The challenge will be how to do so. Effective

training must also support these ward governments as well as the fiscal and other necessary

resources to enable them to carry out their functions. The District Joint Committee must be

removed and replaced with a more effective organization, which should be a district

government. Politics must not be merged with administration as demonstrated in the District

Joint Committee scenario.

Since a basic cause of the present situation lies in the need for better opportunities

for people, opportunities should be given to those at the ward level to think, plan and allocate

resources for their benefit as decided by them, in the ward government. Since the breakdown

has stemmed from electoral politics deeply embedded in the Bigman system, it must be

addressed via a solution that can give the resources to the people themselves to control and

direct rather than being controlled by one man.

178

6.4 - Future Research

Given this proposal there is therefore a need to conduct further research into how

best to develop a clan based government at the ward level as well as developing a good

district government. Secondly, though the research attempted to identify why Bigman were

affecting the system there is further need to understand why the Bigman system has been able

to survive for so long without any established order. Finally, decentralization in PNG has

proven to be difficult to achieve. Therefore it is worthwhile to study further into ways on how

to develop a good decentralization system that can effectively incorporate all these from the

national level down to the lowest tier.

179

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Appendix 1: New Found Powers of LLGs Based on the 1995 Reforms

a) labour and employment (but not industrial relations)

b) labour or community industries

c) self help and tokples schools, but not curriculum

d) cemeteries

e) provision of water supply

f) provision of electricity

g) improvement of villages, towns, cities and communities

h) maintaining peace, good order and law through consultation, mediation and

arbitration and community forums

i) dispute settlement

j) town, city, village and community planning

k) cottage industries

198

l) social services

m) bride and groom wealth

n) general licensing

o) community sport, recreation, culture and industrial shows

p) local environment

q) local tourist facilities and services

r) housing

s) domestic animals, flora and fauna

t) human settlements

u) census and village community records

v) traditional barter system

w) control on consumption of use of alcohol, betel nuts and betel nut related products

or any other marketable items

x) hygiene and sanitation

y) local trading (not mobile)

z) the protection of traditional sacred sited

aa) community day work or service programs

199

bb) the imposition of fines for breaches of any of its laws

cc) village communities

dd) local aid posts and clinics

(OLPLLG 1998, Sect 44). (OLPLLG 1998, Sect 42).

200

Appendix 2: Table of Problems and Causes at the District Level

PROBLEMS

(Survey)

LEVEL OF ADMINISTRATION

REASONS

WHY (Power

Dynamics,

legislation

etc...)

Local Level Government

(Ward Members)

District

Administration

STAFFING

(a)No Power to Hire &

Fire Staff

(b)Administrative Politics

(a) No power to

hire and Fire

(b) Administration

Politics

(c ) Weak

Operational

Structure

(d) Administrative

Nepotism

(a) Weak

Legislation

hire and fire

powers,

operational

structure

(b) Political

cronyism;

appointments

(c ) Nepotism;

hiring in

provincial level

Unreliable workers,

shortage of workers

POOR

INFRASTRUCTUR

E & SUPPLIES

(a) Reliant on JDPBPC,

District, PG and NG for

funding.

(b) Misuse of funds by

officials

(c ) Unreliable Funding

(a) Diversion of

Funds by JDPBPC

(b) High

Manipulation of

JDPBPC

(c ) Small revenue

(a) Fiscal

dependency on

JDPBPC, PG &

NG funds

(b) Patron

client politics

Deteriorating facilities,

staff houses,

201

classrooms etc…

No electricity, piped

water. Shortage

of basic equipment

and medicine.

base

(d) Unreliable

grants

(e) Dependent on

JDPBPC, PG and

NG funds

(f) Weak

operational

Structure

(c ) Weak

Legislation;

Operational

structure for

water/electricity

(d) Political

manipulation of

funds in the

JDPBPC for

patron client

reasons

(e) corruption

(f)

Environmental

constraints

LIMITED

ADMINISTRATIVE

SUPPORT (a) Lack of

involvement(participation

) and cooperation between

ward members, district

officials and JDPBPC

(a) Administrative

Nepotism, politics

(b) Weak

operational

structure

(c ) Unreliable

grants

(d) Small revenue

base

(e) Limited human

(a) Fiscal

dependency on

JDPBPC, PG &

NG funds

(b) Weak

Operational

structure

No reliable support

activities, absence of

credit facilities,

limited market venues.

Lack of District and

LLG support to ward

202

and health based

facilities. Land dispute

resolution.

resource capacity

(f) Environmental

constraints

NO

PARTICIPATION &

ACCOUNTABILITY No participation by the

people or accountability

to the people

Weak operational

structure

(a) Weak

Legislation

-for operational

structure No participation and

accountability to

people

POVERTY

(a) Insufficient human

resource

(b) No power to hire and

fire

(c ) Unreliable Funding

(a) Limited human

resource

(b) Small revenue

base (c )

untimely grants

(d) dependent on

JDPBPC, PG and

NG funds

(a) Fiscal

dependency on

JDPBPC, PG &

NG funds

(b) Weak

Operational

structure

Not enough money for

fees (Weak local

economy)

(Source: created by author)