Chapter 1: The Conception of Things in Themselves in the Critical Philosophy:

Exegetical Issues

Introduction

Within recent years Immanuel Kant's conception of things in themselves has been at the

center of a highly contentious debate regarding the proper meaning and import of Kant's

transcendental idealism, that is, what, properly speaking, transcendental idealism is, or what it

amounts to. Henry Allison made this point in a relatively recent article entitled “Transcendental

Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism” (which was largely devoted to this very

issue), when he says that “The debate regarding the interpretation of Kant's idealism is usually seen

as turning on the best way to understand his transcendental distinction between appearances and

things in themselves.”1 What this suggests is that one cannot advance an interpretation of Kantian

transcendental idealism without first advancing an interpretation of the transcendental distinction

between appearances and things in themselves (TD), since how one interprets the former is a direct

result of how one interprets the latter. That is, how one interprets Kant's TD directly governs how

one understands the fundamental character of Kantian transcendentalism. So, in light of the

centrality of the TD to the controversy surrounding Kant's transcendental idealism as a whole, it is

not surprising that one of the aims of this thesis is to come to terms with that very issue, of how best

to understand the idea of things in themselves within the context of Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Not only is this far from an easy task to begin with, but it is compounded by the fact that, since

there is obviously no consensus on exactly what Kant meant with his formulation of the TD, or on

exactly what the TD ultimately amounts to, multiple schools of thought have arisen for the sole

purpose of tackling that very issue. With this basic understanding that there is no easy answer to the

question of what exactly Kant intended his formulation of the TD to mean, it becomes clear that, as

we attempt to arrive at the heart of what the TD really consists in, we must first come to grips with

exactly what these various exegetical schools of thought have to say about the TD, of how it must

be understood within the broader context of Kantian transcendentalism: for it is only then that will

we be in a position to sufficiently address the concerns, textual as well as systematic, that have

arisen in reference to the particular Kantian concept under consideration.

As I noted, there are many different interpretations of the precise meaning of Kant's TD,

ranging (as we will see) from straightforward ontological interpretations which paint Kant as a

1 Henry E. Allison, “Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism,” Kantian Review 11 (2006): 1.

1

traditional, Berkeleian metaphysician for whom the external, mind-independent world is nothing

over and above a series of our mental representations, to more revolutionary2 interpretations which

see Kant not as an “honest-to-goodness, old fashioned” idealist who doubts the existence of the

external world, but rather as a bona fide direct realist for whom there really are external objects – in

this case, appearances, not things in themselves – which causally “affect” us in a straightforwardly

empiricist sense. Each of these interpretations will therefore be dealt with in the forthcoming stages

of this thesis; it must also be noted here that common-sense suggests that they cannot carry an equal

amount of exegetical weight, either in regards to their textual consistency or in regards to their

architectonic plausibility for that matter, and the most important implication this has for our

purposes is that we will eventually have to decide which readings, if any, do justice to the

fundamental import and significance of Kantian transcendentalism. Moreover, since there is

obviously no conceivable way I can establish exactly what the TD amounts to within the context of

Kantianism proper in a vacuum, as it were, independent of the various exegetical schools of thought

which have as their concern the TD, as I see it, the simplest way of dealing with the exegetical

issues related to Kant's TD is simply to pose the all-important question: is there a reading of the TD

that fits the texts, and remains true to the more fundamental philosophical concerns of Kantianism

in general? This question will no doubt form the basis of the first part of my thesis, which is

concerned with finding, within contemporary philosophical studies on Kant, a prima facie plausible

reading of the TD.

This chapter will consist of three parts. In part 1, I will introduce the two conceptions at the

heart of Kant's doctrine of the TD, appearances and things in themselves, with particular emphasis

on the latter. In part 2, I will introduce the various interpretations of Kantian idealism in relation to

the TD, each of which will then (in part 3) be considered in relation to the texts.

Part 1: An Introduction to Kant's Conceptions of Appearances and Things in Themselves

As I indicated above, in the first part of this chapter I will introduce, by way of explication,

the two central Kantian concepts at the heart of the aforecited question, which we saw forms the

basis of our critical and exegetical evaluation of the meaning and import of Kant's TD. The concepts

to which I here refer are nothing other than appearances and things in themselves. So, to that end,

we should now consider these two concepts within the Critical context of transcendental idealism

itself. 2 See Graham Bird, The Revolutionary Kant: A Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago: Open Court,

2006), xii-xiv, where Bird first introduces his distinction between traditionalist and revolutionary accounts of Kantianism.

2

Early on in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” at A20/B34 Kant provides us with a definition of

the notion of appearances (Erscheinungen), or rather “things that appear,” one of the most important

conceptions of his entire “Critical” framework, in terms of the idea of a spatio-temporal object of an

empirical intuition; simply put, appearances, in other words, can best be understood as things or

objects as we experience them under the a priori conditions of a possible experience. As we come

to learn in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), an appearance is something that conforms to the

formal-categorial structure of a possible experience, which essentially means two things: in the first

place, it means that appearances are objects that conform to the basic a priori forms of space and

time, or to put it differently, appearances are spatio-temporal objects; secondly, it means that

appearances are objects that are made intelligible by means of the most basic concepts of our human

understanding, the categories, which is to say that they are objects that can be made sense of in

terms of such concepts as unity, plurality, reality, negation, and the like. Another way of putting this

is by saying that Kant takes the concept of appearances to signify nothing over and above the

ordinary empirical constituents of our shared, spatio-temporal reality, with the result that

appearances can include, on the one hand, such mundane spatio-temporal items such as tables,

chairs, and computers, that is, items with which we are all intimately familiar, but it also means that

they can include such things as atoms, neurons, and supernovas, for instance, items of modern

scientific discovery with which we are not so intimately familiar. In the end, what is important for

our purposes is that, because appearances conform to both the subjective a priori forms of our

empirical intuition, as well as to the most basic a priori (and thus once again subjective) categories

of our understanding, appearances are obviously things that factor into our knowledge-claims about

the state of reality, and it is for that reason that we can say of them that they are things that are

ultimately cognizable by us. Crudely put, the concept of appearances is the concept of things that

we can know.

Additionally, one must remember that, beginning at A22/B37 of CPR, Kant draws a

distinction between inner sense on one hand, and outer sense on the other, each of which becomes

associated with its own corresponding form of empirical intuition; the form of time becomes

associated with inner sense, whereas the form of space becomes associated with the form of outer

sense. Kant asserts that,

By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space. In space, their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time. Time cannot be

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outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us.3

Laying aside the fact that this distinction will soon prove to be crucial in the following chapter, for

our present purposes what this implies is that spatio-temporal appearances include, among other

things, inner, and therefore wholly mind-dependent, mental items, the contents of which form the

basis of our most complex thoughts and emotions, as well as outer, wholly material, items like

computers, cell-phones, and cars, for instance. The reason this is important is because this is where

Kant first begins to distance himself from Berkeley or a Berkeleian-type phenomenalism, the latter

being a metaphysical and epistemological position which doubts the existence of anything and

everything that is not immediately perceived or perceivable by us. And, as we will come to learn in

the next chapter, many accounts of the TD will suffer for just that reason: they fail to account for

this fundamental distinction between inner and outer sense, which, as we just saw, plays an

important role in Kant's account of the nature of appearances.

There is no doubt that, in comparison with Kant's account of the conception of appearances,

which we have already considered in some detail, his account of the conception of things in

themselves (Dinge an Sich) is much more complex and nuanced. To begin with, as we will shortly

see, we cannot even say with absolute certainty that things in themselves actually exist, that is, that

there really is something, to be exact, a non-spatial, atemporal, and non-categorial form of being to

which the concept of the thing in itself refers. Nevertheless, we can say with a considerable degree

of certainty that the concept of things in themselves (or things as they are in themselves) is, very

generally, the concept of something, let us say once again, a form of being, that exists completely

apart from, independent of, and without any reference to, our experience, and the consequent result

is that things in themselves thereby essentially become understandable in terms of a form of being

that fails to conform to any of the a priori subjective conditions of a possible experience. More

specifically, things in themselves refer to a form of being that exists outside the empirical realm of

spatio-temporal reality, and for that very reason they denote a form of being to which the a priori

forms of space and time cannot apply; furthermore, they cannot be subsumed under, conform to, or

in any sense be rendered intelligible by means of, the subjective a priori categories of our

understanding such as substance/attribute, cause and effect, unity, and reality, naming a few. The

important point is that, by virtue of the status of things in themselves as prima facie mind-

independent items of some mysterious non-spatial, atemporal, and non-categorial sort, the concept

of things in themselves is the concept of a thing that is fundamentally unknowable to us; simply put,

if things in themselves were to exist, they would be so different from anything we have ever

3 CPR, A22-23/B37.

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experienced (or for that matter, could ever experience) that we would not be in a position to know

anything about them.

Despite the fact that we are in no position to make any substantive pronouncements about

the precise meaning of the TD, of what it amounts to and how it can best be understood in light of

Kantian idealism proper, one can nevertheless see key themes emerging in many contemporary

accounts of the TD, particularly with respect to Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Let's be

clear, though: I am certainly not saying that all of these themes or theses are entirely

unobjectionable; in fact, we will shortly see that some contemporary Kantian interpreters reject the

very first and most basic thesis, the thesis that things in themselves actually exist, that is, that the

concept of such things refers to something that really exists. However, what I am saying is that most

Kantian interpreters attempt to do justice to these theses in some way. Even though we have already

touched upon most of them, it is certainly important at this stage to make them as clear and explicit

as possible. To that end, then, I have provided a list of them, viz., a list of what many take to be the

four essential features or elements of Kant's commitment to the conception of things as they are in

themselves, which can be encapsulated in terms of the following four theses, and which I have

entitled the existential thesis, the non-formal, non-categorial thesis, the discursivity thesis, and

finally, the inscrutability thesis, respectively.

1. Things in themselves exist [See CPR, Bxx].

2. Things in themselves are necessarily non-spatial, atemporal things of some kind,

which cannot be understood in terms of the pure a priori concepts of the

understanding (i.e., the categories) [See CPR, A30/B45 and A39/B56].

3. Human cognition is discursive, meaning that it requires both sensible intuitions, as

well as concepts [See CPR, A51-52/B75-76].

4. (From 1, 2, and 3) Things in themselves cannot be known by us [See CPR, Bxxvi,

A30/B45, and A44/B61].4

To be sure, the first two theses are metaphysical in character and import, whereas the final two are

epistemological, where the conclusion logically follows the combination of the first three theses. In

the end, all I want the reader to take from this philosophical outline at this point is that, once we

4 Cf. Rae Langton, Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7-14, and James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 135. It must be noted that both Langton and Van Cleve outline what they take to be the essential theses or elements of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. The major difference between theirs and mine is that they both assume that the noumenal realm of things in themselves somehow causes or affects us, “giving rise to the representations through which phenomena are represented and constituted,” as Van Cleve says. The causal thesis, as I call it, is a controversial claim, and one which I do not particularly accept. Now, even though we will come to see that it is not the only thesis with respect to Kant's doctrine of things in themselves that I reject, it is simply too controversial a claim to include it in my list of the essential theses inherent to Kant's doctrine of things in themselves.

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combine the fact that things in themselves supposedly exist in some metaphysically-robust sense of

term, with the additional facts that they can be neither formal nor categorial – as both the a priori

forms of intuition as well as the pure a priori categories of our understanding apply only to objects

of sense that are immediately given to us – and that our knowledge is discursive in that it requires

both sensible particulars as well as general concepts, it follows that things in themselves are things

of a fundamentally inscrutable sort.

However, there are of course fundamental problems with the above account, the first of

which centers round the conclusion, the inscrutability thesis, according to which things in

themselves represent a form of being of which we cannot obtain any determinate knowledge. For,

so the argument goes, if things in themselves were genuinely inscrutable to us, common-sense says

that we certainly could not know that they exist, and we certainly could not know that they exist in

such a way that they do not conform to either the a priori forms of our empirical intuition or to the

pure a priori categories of thought. Another way of putting this point is to claim that, insofar as one

accepts the veracity of the conclusion above, one thereby rejects the veracity of both premises 1 and

2, for one might ask: on what grounds can we claim that things in themselves exist, and exist in

some non-formal, non-categorial way, moreover, if we cannot even claim to have any determinate

knowledge of such things in the first place?

Now, at least in my mind, there are some relatively simple ways of rebutting this criticism,

where the most common is to claim that it is only synthetic claims about things in themselves that

Kant rejects as illegitimate, which essentially means that we are free to make as many analytic

claims about the status and/or character of things in themselves as their concept warrants. The

implication here is that, notwithstanding claim 1, which says that things in themselves exist, all of

the aforementioned claims listed above, meaning claims 2 and 3, as well as the conclusion 4, are

wholly legitimate because they express merely analytic truths about the status and/or character of

things in themselves. With this understanding that many of the above theses can be derived purely

from the concept of things as they are in themselves as such, some Kantian scholars have sought to

dispel the worry noted above by effectively claiming that, since the concept of things in themselves

is nothing more than the concept of a non-spatio-temporal, non-categorial object of some sort, to

claim that we cannot obtain any determinate knowledge of things in themselves is to state a merely

analytic truth about such things. Now, while I agree with this line of argument as far as it goes, the

problem becomes compounded once we take into account the second major issue in respect to the

above account, which is in a very important respect a more forceful expression of our current

problem.

A far more serious critical issue arises, however, when we recall that things in themselves

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are supposed to be things that lie wholly beyond the categories of our thought, that is, the a priori,

and therefore most fundamental, concepts of the human understanding by means of which the

external, mind-independent world is made intelligible to us. According to Graham Priest,5 one of the

implications of the Kantian theory that the categories can only be employed within the field of a

possible experience, and can therefore only be applied to objects within that field (viz.,

phenomena), is not just that we cannot know things in themselves (or noumena) – what Priest refers

to as being beyond the limit of cognition – but more importantly, and more controversially, that

neither can we make meaningful statements about things in themselves nor form coherent thoughts

(or ideas) of such things – in this latter sense, things in themselves are beyond both the limit of

expression as well as the limit of conception.6 In order to adequately understand the rationale

behind Priest's view that we can neither say anything meaningful about, nor even form coherent

thoughts (or ideas) of, Kant's notion of things in themselves (or noumena), we must first explore

exactly why he thinks we cannot know them. As we can see here, there is a close connection

between the way in which things in themselves are beyond the limit of our cognition on one hand,

and the way in which they are both beyond the limit of expression as well as the limit of conception

on the other hand.

Very basically, the reason things in themselves (or noumena) are unknowable, in Kant's

eyes, is that their status as non-categorial things or objects of some kind logically prohibits them

from factoring into any putative knowledge-claim. That is, to know such and such about x is to

make a claim or a judgement regarding x, and to make a claim or a judgement regarding x is to

implement (at least some of) the various categories, thereby rendering x intelligible to us. Even the

most basic – or what some might call the most “primitive” – form of cognitive awareness requires

the implementation of the categories, for even the most basic form of cognitive awareness requires

us to make meaningful judgements about the objects of that awareness. So, with this in mind, the

thought, it seems to me, is that, if things in themselves are non-categorial in the respect that they

exist outside the field of the logical employment of the categories, it follows that we cannot even

obtain the most basic form of knowledge of them – whatever that might amount to – for the simple

reason that we cannot even make a meaningful statement about them. For, to make a meaningful

statement about them would be to implement the various categories, which is impossible.

5 See Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 88-91. 6 Things in themselves (or noumena) are also beyond the limit of iteration, according to Priest – which we shall not

concerns ourselves with here. Priest defines the limit of the iterable as “some operation that is applied over and over again as far as possible.” The most notable case of something being beyond the limit of the iterable, according to Priest, is the mathematical (ordinal) infinite. Very basically, as far as I understand it, the thought seems to be that the mathematical infinite is at the limit of the iterable given that it is always possible to add something to our conception of an infinite totality. But I'm afraid I cannot say much more on this here. See Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, 79-113, for more on this.

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Having already explained why things in themselves are beyond the limit of our cognition, it

is not too difficult to see why some might argue that they are beyond the limit of expression as well

– the idea that we cannot say (or express) anything about them. So the argument goes: if we cannot

make meaningful statements about things in themselves without employing any of the categories,

and if things themselves are things which are outside the categories in some respect, then it follows

that we cannot make any meaningful statements about things in themselves. As such, Kant's notion

of things in themselves is beyond the limit of the expressible.

Yet, I would argue that the central argument Priest uses to illustrate the contradictory – or

rather incoherent – nature of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves in relation to some of the

broader theoretical concerns of CPR itself is not in terms of the idea that we cannot make any

meaningful statements about things in themselves, but rather in terms of the idea that we cannot

even form any coherent thoughts, ideas, or concepts of such things, of what things in themselves

may ultimately be like. In this way, Priest alleges that the Kantian notion of things in themselves is

beyond the limit of conception. In short, the reason Kant's doctrine of things in themselves is

ultimately incoherent, according to Priest, is that even the notion of a (negative) noumenon as a

merely problematic concept our understanding forms in relation to non-sensible modes of intuiting

things – that is, a concept which refers to a problematically instantiated object – violates the non-

categorial thesis of things in themselves. For, as Priest puts it:

But to say that there are (or even may be) things about which we cannot judge is to make a judgement about them; specifically, it existentially quantifies over them, and so applies the Category of plurality. The 'legitimate' notion is therefore just as illegitimate as the illegitimate one … Hence Kant is caught squarely in the contradiction inherent in the limits of thought. And let me emphasize again: this is not a contradiction of the kind of which one finds so many in the Critique: a result of carelessness or of changes of view; it is a contradiction which is occasioned by the very objects of the theory.7

If it is incoherent, based on Kant's own theory of the categories, for one not only to make any

meaningful statements about things in themselves – that such things are non-formal, non-categorial,

and that we cannot obtain any knowledge of them – but for one to entertain even the barest

possibility that such things may in fact exist, that there may be certain things which do not relate to

our sensible form of intuition, then Kant's doctrine of things in themselves is incoherent lock, stock,

and barrel. One might object to Priest's account of the Kantian doctrine of things in themselves on the

grounds that, as evidenced in various parts of CPR, Kant insists that, provided our thoughts do not

logically contradict themselves, there are very few restrictions on what one might “think,”

7 Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, 91.

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“conceive,” or even “hypothesize.” For example, in the “Transcendental Doctrine of Elements,”

Kant makes his famous remark that: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without

concepts are blind.”8 For our present purposes, what is noteworthy about this passage is that Kant

never says that thoughts without content are logically contradictory or impossible, only that they are

empty, meaning, devoid of any putative reference. Most importantly, this is not to say that we

cannot have such thoughts, that we cannot have the thought of a merely “problematically”

instantiated item; but it is to say that such a thought is vacuous in the ordinary sense of the term in

that it does not refer to anything within the field of a possible experience, and as such, it does not,

as Kant would say, refer to an object which is actually given to us. My view, in the end, is that this

passage is evidence of Kant's considered view that, in the event that our concepts (or thoughts) do

not objectively refer to anything within the field of a possible experience, they are nevertheless still

coherent thoughts, they are still thoughts of possible objects – barring, of course, any logical

contradictions inherent in those thoughts. This is exactly what Kant is saying in the following note

to CPR, Bxxvi where he remarks:

To know an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a possible thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept, even though I may not be able to answer for there being, in the sum of all possibilities, an object corresponding to it. But something more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility is merely logical. This something more need not, however, be sought in the theoretical sources of knowledge; it may lie in those that are practical.9

Kant's suggestion here is just that so long as our concept of the thing in itself, of a negative

noumenon that is, is the thought of a possible object in the respect that it does not logically

contradict itself, the concept of the thing in itself is by no means impossible, and the consequent

upshot for the Kantian is that there is no contradiction in us entertaining thoughts about such things.

As such, Kant's doctrine of things in themselves – which turns out to be the doctrine of negative

noumena, as we will see – is not in any way embroiled in the logical contradictions and

incoherences that Priest alleges.

As we have seen, the major problem with Priest's account of how Kant's notion of things in

themselves violates the limit of conception stems in large part from a misunderstanding, on Priest's

part, of the complexities and nuances of Kant's theory of judgement in relation to the categories of

thought. Essentially, in restricting the field of the possible employment of the categories within that

of a possible experience, Kant in effect thereby implicitly leaves open the (logical) possibility that 8 CPR, A51/B75. 9 CPR, Bxxvin.

9

we may think whatever we please, provided, of course, our thought of a possible object is a

coherent thought in that it does not contradict itself. To quote Robert Hanna at this point:

By contrast, all judgments that are not objectively valid are “empty” (leer) or truth-valueless. Nevertheless it must be noted that for Kant empty judgments can still be rationally intelligible and not nonsensical, if all the concepts contained within them are at least logically consistent or “thinkable” (Bxxvi n.) In this way, e.g., some judgments containing concepts of noumenal objects (things-in-themselves, or real essences) or noumenal subjects (rational-agents-in-themselves, or persons) are anthropocentrically empirically referentially meaningless and truth-valueless, hence empty, yet also are rationally intelligible and even essential both to Kant's theoretical metaphysics (A254-255/B309-310, A650-654/B678-682) and to his metaphysics of freedom and morality (A530-558/B566-586).10

In the end, then, Priest's account of the contradictory nature of Kant's conception of things as they

are in themselves largely fails as an interpretation of the real, Critical Kant, for, as I have said, it

fails to do justice to the complexities and nuances of Kant's theory of judgement, of whether it is

possible to think a merely “problematic” object without at the same time employing the forms of

judgement, and in turn the various categories. Since Kant remains committed to the view that it is

possible for us to entertain such thoughts, for us to have the thought of an object that may only

“problematically” exist, it is certainly by no means unintelligible or incoherent for him to advance a

theory of the TD in which things in themselves are necessary only in the regulative sense in

marking off the territory of the knowable.

We have therefore considered, in a preliminary way, how Kant introduces the concept of

things in themselves, and how this does not immediately fall foul of a fatal difficulty – though of

course many puzzles still remain, as we will come to as we proceed. But first I will set out the main

ways in which Kant's TD have been understood.

Part 2: An Enumeration and Explication of Four Transcendental Construals of Kant's TD

As I understand it, there are only four possible interpretations of what Kant's TD can be said

to amount to; and in what follows, I will enumerate them in chronological order, that is, according

to the temporal order in which they were formulated in response to the problematic surrounding the

TD, of what the TD means, and how it can be understood. In chronological order, these

transcendental construals are: first, the traditional ontological construal (which includes both the

two-object view as well as the two-worlds view); second, the methodological construal; third, the

10 Robert Hanna, “Kant's Theory of Judgement,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (July 2004), accessed April 4, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/

10

two-aspect construal; and fourth, the intrinsic nature construal11

Immediately following the publication and release of the first edition of CPR in 1781, there

were questions regarding the precise character of Kant's TD, of whether or not the Kantian notions

of appearances and things in themselves, which are so integral to the Kantian enterprise of

transcendental idealism itself, are coherent in the light of Kant's revolutionary program in

metaphysics.12 Kant's revolutionary program, as I here refer to it, is the metaphysical and

epistemological program according to which the central task of the metaphysician is no longer one

of simply making necessary claims regarding objects based on the insights of pure reason, but is

now one of uncovering the necessary a priori epistemic conditions of our knowledge of objects, that

is to say, of what is needed for us to have any determinate knowledge of objects in the first place.

So in light of these concerns, philosophers such as Eberhard and Jacobi asked: how, if at all, can we

make sense of the TD? What I am trying to convey to the reader here is simply that critical and

exegetical issues have surrounded Kant's TD, especially his conception of things in themselves,

ever since transcendental idealism was originally formulated in the latter half of the eighteenth

century by Kant himself in north-eastern Germany. It is not a dispute which arose only within the

past few decades among Kant scholars; it stems from the very foundation of transcendental idealism

as such.

Yet, for our purposes, what is important is that most of Kant's contemporaries, including all

of the above, subscribed to some form of what I herein referred to as the traditional “ontological”

construal of the TD, whereby things in themselves represent the matter or the content of our

empirical intuitions, which in some sense is meant to give rise to or simply cause our spatio-

temporal representations of objects. In an important sense, things in themselves can thus can be

seen to act, on the ontological models of the TD, as some sort of metaphysical ground (“Grund”) of

11 Here, it is important to convey to the reader that, for the most part, there is no set chronological order in which these readings appeared. For, within the context of the debate regarding the meaning and import of Kant's TD, it is important to note, first, that the traditional ontological reading came onto the philosophical scene first – as it has its roots in the writings of Kant's own contemporaries, as we have already discussed. And, secondly, the methodological reading came next, for it was a direct reaction against the ontological interpretation, and what some Kantian commentators had then perceived to be its most unfair treatment of Kantian idealism. Accordingly, there is considerable lee-way with respect to the order in which we present the remaining interpretations of Kantianism, namely, the aspect reading and the intrinsic nature reading. The reason for this is that both of these views have been formulated within the past twenty to thirty years as alternatives to both the ontological reading as well as the methodological reading of the TD.

12 See Hoke Robinson, “Two Perspectives on Appearances and Things in Themselves,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 3 (1994): 411-412, where Robinson notes that the very first review of the first edition of CPR to appear in 1781 expressed a concern that the Critical philosophy was a kind of Berkeleian idealism according to which the stuff (or matter) of the world is nothing but a species of representations. And, to be sure, the TD was at the center of these concerns, for this is where (so it was thought) the Berkeleian Kant begins to reveal himself. All I am trying to convey here is the thought that the controversy surrounding the TD goes as far back to the very publication of CPR itself. One could also see Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), for more on this.

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our experience, the metaphysically-ultimate foundation or set of elements our experience is to have

if it is to be the kind of experience it is. Moreover, as we will come to see, once we accept the

thesis, universal among metaphysical accounts of the TD, that things in themselves act as the

metaphysical ground (“Grund”) of our experience, this leads to a sort of “one-to-one”

correspondence theory in which Kant's TD acts as a philosophical correlate for that age-old

metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality, a contrast of “how things merely appear to

us” on one hand, as opposed to “how things really are” on the other.

This furnishes us with a model of the TD according to which its basic import and

significance is fundamentally metaphysical or ontological in character, and this is tantamount to

claiming that the TD represents a straightforward ontological distinction between two mutually-

incompatible classes of thing or object (viz., the two-object view) or two non-overlapping spheres

of being entirely (viz., the two-world view), each of which has its own distinct set of properties.

According to this view,13 then, in the first place, there are appearances, or spatio-temporal objects of

sense, the existence of which Kant accepts, and which, moreover, are made cognitively accessible

to us through the use of the most basic concepts of our faculty of understanding, the categories. On

the other hand, though, there are things in themselves, or non-spatio-temporal objects of pure

reason, the existence of which Kant also (in some sense) accepts, which obviously cannot be

rendered intelligible to us by means of any formal, categorial imposition. Now let me explain: on

the ontological reading (as we will come to see more of later on), there is a certain sense in which

appearances or representations are appearances (or representations) of things in themselves (or

better yet, things as they are in themselves) – the latter being that which underpins the former as its

Ground (“Grund”). It is in this way that objects of perception, or phenomena as Kant calls them, are

constituted in some sense by the way things are “in themselves” – the other of course being the a

priori structures our minds employ to represent or intuit objects external to us. As Priest remarks:

“For Kant, a horse is a spatio-temporal representation of an object; but what the representation is a

representation of (which the rest of us might call a horse) is neither perceived nor in space and

time.”14 That, I take it, is how the ontological theorist conceives of Kant's TD, in this case

specifically the relation between our empirical representations on one hand, and that which these

empirical representations are representations of (viz., things in themselves) on the other hand. Even

though Kant never denies the actual existence of this latter type of object on the ontological reading

– that which our representations purport to be representations “of” – he nevertheless claims that 13 I take both the two-object view and the two-world view as ontological views of Kant's TD. 14 Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, 83. It must be noted that all metaphysical readings of the TD construe the

distinction between representations and things in themselves in these basic terms, in terms of the idea that our spatio-temporal, categorial representations are in some sense representations “of” intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial things in themselves.

12

knowledge of such objects is impossible. One final remark: one must note that the traditional

ontological reading accepts each of the three essential theses, which I had outlined earlier as

constitutive of the Kantian doctrine of things in themselves basically conceived, with the proviso

that things in themselves, which act as the source of our sensations, affect our sensibilities in some

fashion, and it is that which explains the way in which the manifold of empirical intuition is

constituted.

Clearly, what I have said thus far relates only to what I have herein referred to as the

traditional ontological interpretation of Kant's TD – the reading which claims that Kant's TD is

meant to denote a basic ontological distinction between two different classes of entity: appearances

or phenomena, and things in themselves or noumena. And, even though there are still some

traditionalists, among whom include F. H. Jacobi and G. W. F. Hegel in Kant's time, to P. F.

Strawson and James Van Cleve in our own, I think it safe to say that the majority of Kant scholars

today are anti-traditionalists, or what Bird famously calls the “revolutionaries.”15 Among this latter

group of revolutionaries, I obviously include Bird himself, as well as Gerold Prauss, Henry Allison,

and Robert Pippin, to name a few others. More specifically, all of these revolutionaries subscribe to

some form of what is generally termed the methodological16 reading of the TD, alleging that this not

only represents a far more charitable interpretation of Kantian idealism and of Kant's TD but also a

far more accurate interpretation of the intended meaning of the TD itself.

The methodological reading of Kant's TD is at bottom a formal interpretation of the meaning

and import of Kant's TD that does not recognize any sort of implicit metaphysical implications the

TD has for Kantianism in general. According to these merely formal or conceptual readings of the

TD, Kant's metaphysics admits the existence of only one kind of thing or object, namely, spatio-

temporal objects of experience which conform to both the subjective a priori forms of our

empirically-sensible intuition, as well as to the pure a priori categories of thought. It is important to

15 Any Kantian philosopher who accepts some sort of metaphysical interpretation of Kantianism according to which the TD is meant to denote two existent things, regardless of the way in which they are understood, I class as a traditionalist. On the contrary, however, anyone who rejects the metaphysical interpretations of Kantianism, whose central idea is that things in themselves necessarily exist in some manner, in favor of a merely formal or conceptual interpretation of Kantianism, which emphasizes the centrality of the a priori epistemic conditions for best understanding Kant's TD, I class under the “revolutionary” label. Very simply put, metaphysical interpreters are traditionalists, since they accept the existence of things in themselves, whereas methodological or epistemological interpreters are “revolutionaries,” since they do not. But, of course, this will all become clearer in the stages to come.

16 It is important to note at this time that some philosophers refer to Allison as a “two-aspect” theorist, in the respect that he subscribes to what they term the “two-aspect” reading of the TD. Indeed, even Allison himself tends to think of himself in just this way. But, as we will see, to think of Allison in these terms is highly misleading for the simple fact that neither Allison himself, nor any other “methodological” theorist for that matter, actually argues that Kant's TD should be understood in terms of a distinction between different “aspects,” “features,” or “sets of properties” of one and the same object. It is, rather, a purely conceptual position whereby the TD is meant to denote two different ways of considering one and the same object of experience; that is all. As such, it has no underlying metaphysical implications, as the reader will recognize in due coarse.

13

remember that, just because there is only one type of existent thing we can know of, this does not

preclude us from thinking about these things in various, and oftentimes conflicting, ways. More

specifically, the methodological reading stipulates that we can think of spatio-temporal objects of

sense in one of two ways: either we can think of them in terms of the empirical objects of sense that

they are, in which case they are necessarily subject to the a priori, and thus wholly subjective,

conditions of a possible experience, or we can think of them in the illusory terms of purely

intelligible objects of reason, which can be accessed by means of a pure intellect alone, and in

which case they are not subject to the a priori subjective conditions of a possible experience Kant

identifies in the forms of our empirical intuition (space and time) and the pure categories of our

understanding. Whereas in the former case we are considering the object as a mere appearance, in

the latter case we are considering the object as a thing in itself; moreover, it is this latter way of

considering things that denotes the transcendental, as opposed to the merely empirical, represented

in the former, level of discourse. As we will see, this latter method of considering things is also

rejected by Kant as wholly illegitimate and therefore intrinsically problematic. With this

understanding that methodological theorists do not even accept the most basic tenet of Kant's

doctrine of things in themselves that things in themselves exist, it becomes clear that the

methodological conception of things in themselves is such that it severely, and some would even

say to the point of “triviality,”17 minimizes the role the thing in itself plays in the architectonic of

Kant's Critical system.

To adequately understand the methodological reading, specifically how it understands the

relation between appearances as mere representations on one hand, and how these appearances qua

representations stand in relation to things as they are in themselves on the other, one must first note

that, on the formal, methodological line of thought, our spatio-temporal representations are in no

way constituted by the way things are in themselves as they are on each of the metaphysical

readings. As such, our representations cannot be said to be representations “of” things in themselves

in any meaningful way at all. In line with this, whenever Kant claims that appearances are mere

representations,18 he is not claiming – as some traditionalists have supposed19 – that all objects of

sense are mental representations, and for that reason, have no independent existence outside our

17 See Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 333, and Langton, Kantian Humility, 8-9.

18 See CPR, A101, A104, A190/B235, A191/B236, A369, A370, A372, A375, A375n, A377, A383, A386, A390, A390, A392, A490-491/A518-519, A492/B520, A493-494/B522, A498/B527, A507/B535, A563/B591, A793/B821. This list is by no means exhaustive. These are only those passages in CPR in which Kant makes most explicit the identification of appearances with representations (or vice versa), not those in which such an identification is merely suggested or inferred.

19 See P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, 1966), 238; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 335; and Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 136-137.

14

thoughts; rather, what he is claiming is that, as mere representations, appearances must first

conform to the a priori subjective conditions of a possible experience, and then to the various

phenomenal/empirical laws governing and regulating that very experience20 – the latter of which

being set out in Kant's transcendental theory of experience, which includes: the “Axioms of

Intuition,” the “Anticipations of Perception,” the “Analogies of Experience,” and the “Postulates of

Empirical Thought in General.” It is in this way, then, that the methodological reading of Kant, as

opposed to the various metaphysical readings, escapes the unfortunate charge of Berkeleian

phenomenalism traditionally associated with Kant's TD in particular, and the theoretical aspect of

his Critical philosophy in general. However, I'm afraid I must now pass on to more pressing matters,

the first being to offer a more comprehensive explanation of this view's particular understanding of

Kant's conception of things in themselves.

As I noted, it is important that I expound upon the basic themes or elements of the

methodological reading of Kant's TD a bit further here, for one might be concerned that I have not

been as clear as I should be on exactly what the TD consists in, and how best it can be understood.

One might ask: what does it mean for the methodological Kantian to claim that, in addition to

considering things in terms of the things they are, as spatio-temporal objects of an empirical

intuition rendered intelligible with the aid of the categories of thought, we can also consider those

very things in terms of something that they most assuredly are not, namely, as non-spatio-temporal

objects of reason accessible through the use of a pure reason alone? For one thing, the

methodological theorist relies on the chapter of CPR entitled: “The Ground of the Distinction of All

Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena,” where Kant outlines the terms in which the

notion of things in themselves are to be understood, not only for the purpose of lending support to

his preferred interpretation of Kantian transcendentalism, but more importantly, for the purpose of

making their preferred interpretation of things in themselves intelligible. What is important is that

here Kant explicitly identifies things in themselves with the idea of a noumenon, or an intelligible

object of reason. At CPR, B307 Kant explains the difference between the two different forms or

conceptions of the noumenon: the positive sense and the negative sense. Whereas the former,

positive sense of the noumenon denotes anything of a specifically non-sensible (and, by

implication, wholly intelligible) form of intuition, the latter, negative sense denotes a thing only

20 See Arthur Collins, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: University of California Press, 1999), 31-60, where he attempts to repudiate the traditionalist notion that Kant was an “honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned” idealist by claiming, in effect, that he was a robust, empirical realist for whom the existence of the mind-independent world, that is, the field of appearances in general, was never in question. One of the principal tactics by which Collins attempts to corroborate his non-idealistic (and thus wholly realistic) “revolutionary” reading of Kant was by undermining the idea that, as a mere species of our (mental) representations, appearances consist of nothing over and above our transient, mind-dependent contents, contents which cannot exist unperceived.

15

insofar as it is not an object of our sensible form of intuition, with the added caveat that the former

conception is to be rejected, Kant alleges, on the grounds that it illegitimately and erroneously

presupposes a non-sensible form of intuition, the logical possibility of which is in doubt. We also

come to learn in this chapter, the methodological theorist argues, that Kant putatively identifies his

conception of things in themselves with his related conception of the negative form of the

noumenon, and this means that a thing in itself is just anything that bears absolutely no relation to

the form of our (sensible) intuition.

Earlier, I noted that Kant's concept of things in themselves, or negative noumena, is, very

basically, a concept which refers to nothing other than those intelligible objects of reason

(“intelligibilia”) which are accessible by means of a pure reason alone; essentially, the thought here

is that the concept of things in themselves, on the methodological reading, represents a mere

concept, nothing more, for it is a concept our minds inevitably form in relation to a certain kind of

thing or object. I cannot fail to note that, in the very same chapter cited above, Kant also associates

negative noumena, things which are not to be thought of as objects of the senses but as objects

(things) in themselves, with three essential, oftentimes related, features or characteristics. They are

necessary, problematic, and finally, limiting, concepts of our human understanding. First, noumena

are necessary for they:

prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge. The remaining things, to which it does not apply, are entitled noumena, in order to show that this knowledge cannot extend its domain over everything which the understanding thinks.21

Second, noumena are problematic for they “are not in any way contradictory. For we cannot assert

of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition.”22 Third and finally, noumena are limiting

concepts as they function “to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it [their concept] is therefore

only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the

limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.”23

What we have just said indicates, among other things, that the methodological conception of things

in themselves is, in a very important sense, a mere abstraction, for it can only be attained, or arrived

at, by means of a process whereby we consider an ordinary object of sense, and then abstract from

that ordinary object of sense the a priori epistemic conditions under which it is represented and

cognized by us. Concluding our discussion of the methodological reading, then, it is important to

recognize that, in constructing a plausible reading of the TD, methodological theorists such as

21 CPR, A254-255/B310. 22 CPR, A254/B310. 23 CPR, A255/B311.

16

Allison and Bird appeal to the discursive nature of our cognition, and thus to the importance of the

subjective a priori epistemic conditions of a possible experience – as the specific epistemic

conditions of that discursive intelligence – for the purpose of understanding Kant's position with

regards to the TD rather than to any metaphysical theory regarding the way in which our cognition

must “causally” interact with transcendent realities in order for us to have determinate experience of

objects.

I think we are now in a position to take stock of a few things. In order to be as clear as

possible about how the methodological reading conceives of the TD, and of how they conceive of

the idea of things in themselves in particular, I think it would be most beneficial to return to the

philosophical outline I noted earlier in part I. We saw that traditional ontological readings of the TD

basically conceive of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves as it was therein presented, with very

few modifying details, and so can be understood in the following way:

1. Things in themselves exist (as objects).

2. Things in themselves are necessarily non-spatial, atemporal things (objects, or even

spheres of reality) of some kind, which cannot be understood in terms of the pure a

priori concepts of the understanding (i.e., the categories).

3. Human cognition is discursive, meaning that it requires both sensible intuitions, as

well as concepts.

4. (From 1, 2, and 3) Things in themselves (as objects) cannot be known by us.

However, the situation changes considerably in the event that we adopt the methodological reading

of the TD, in which case it looks something like the following:

1. Things in themselves do not necessarily exist (qua things), rather it is only our

thought about such things that is necessary.

2. The concept of things in themselves refers to those things, which (if they were to

exist) would be non-spatial, atemporal things of some kind, and which would not be

comprehensible in terms of the pure a priori concepts of the understanding (i.e., the

categories).

3. Human cognition is discursive, meaning that it requires both sensible intuitions as

well as concepts.

4. (From 1, 2, and 3) The concept of things in themselves is the concept of an

unknowable thing.

This gives us a clear indication that there is considerable disparity between the way in which the

traditional ontological reading interprets Kant's doctrine of things in themselves on the one hand,

and the way in which revolutionary methodological accounts interpret the very same doctrine on the

17

other.24 Having considered the two most widespread ways of reading the TD, which, as we have

seen, are in direct opposition to each other, it is now time to consider the two remaining

interpretations of the TD in relation to this very framework. The first we shall consider is the

reading that is oftentimes conflated with the methodological reading to which both Allison and Bird

subscribe.

The third reading of the TD, which we will now consider, is what I term the “two-aspect”

reading; as its name implies, the two-aspect reading conceives of the TD simply in terms of two

mutually-opposed “aspects,” “spheres,” or “fields” of our reality, one of which we cannot

experience as it lies outside (what Kant deems to be) the bounds of a possible experience, the other

of which we can certainly experience as it lies within the very field of a possible experience, and

within our very experience as such. Moreover, the two-aspect reading, unlike the revolutionary

methodological reading considered above, is without doubt thoroughly metaphysical, and therefore

traditionalist, as it emphasizes the hidden metaphysical dimension to the conception of things as

they are in themselves by accepting, however implicit, the actual existence of such things. That is

what makes it metaphysical in import and significance; regardless of the exact manner in which

they are understood, the point is that the two-aspect reading in no way denies the metaphysical

thesis that things in themselves exist, and exist necessarily for that matter.

Furthermore, the two-aspect reading has its roots in the writings of Lucy Allais, who, in

addition to Paul Guyer, is one of the most prominent aspect theorists today. Notwithstanding Allais's

agreement with certain facets of the methodological approach, specifically, with the way in which

such readings emphasize the importance of the a priori epistemic conditions of our knowledge for

adequately understanding Kant's TD, especially why we supposedly cannot obtain knowledge of

things in themselves, she nevertheless argues that there is still a way “things are in themselves,” a

way that is wholly removed from the subjective a priori epistemic conditions of any possible

experience, and which is therefore intrinsically unknowable to us. Evidence of this can be found in

the following passage, where Allais remarks that:

from the facts that Kant is not committed to the existence of intelligibilia and that he is not a Berkelean idealist, it does not follow that he is not committed to there being a way things are in themselves, which we cannot cognise, or that he is not committed to appearances being genuinely dependent on our minds in some (non-Berkelean) sense. And while the claim that we cannot know things in themselves is of course an epistemic claim, this does not mean that it involves no metaphysical commitment –

24 Since these two interpretations are by far the most common interpretations of Kant's TD, in order to highlight their fundamental differences, I have here outlined the contrasting ways in which these readings conceive of the essential theses of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Let it be known, however, that going forward, I will generally refrain from outlining this philosophical account in relation to the particular transcendental reading under consideration mainly because each of the readings we have yet to consider bears a close resemblance either to the ontological interpretation or to the methodological interpretation of the above account.

18

such as a commitment to the existence of an aspect of reality which we cannot cognise … Kant is committed to the claim that the things we cognise have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a nature that is independent of us, which we cannot cognise.25

Now, with respect to Kant's doctrine of things in themselves in particular, this suggests that the

concept of things in themselves, or more appropriately, “things as they are in themselves,” very

basically, denotes nothing more than mind-independent reality, meaning reality outside the field of a

possible experience, and thus by implication outside the a priori subjective conditions of that very

experience. This is why the aspect reading is an aspect reading: as we saw, it conceives of the TD in

terms of different “fields,” “spheres,” or “aspects” of our reality, corresponding to the mind-

dependent sphere of appearances on the one hand, and to the mind-independent sphere of “things as

they are in themselves” on the other. Finally, the only difference between the aspect reading of the

TD, and the ontological reading of the TD, is that the former conceives of things in themselves in

terms of a mind-independent aspect of our reality, which is intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, and

non-categorial, and which we thus cannot cognize, whereas the latter conceives of things in

themselves in terms of super-sensible, non-spatio-temporal things of a kind we cannot cognize (i.e.,

“intelligibilia”).

But, before I proceed to the third metaphysical reading of the TD, viz., the intrinsic nature

reading, I think it is important for us to note exactly why Allais endorses such a view. Apart from

considerations of the texts, one reason Allais gives for formulating, as well as endorsing, the two-

aspect reading of the TD is that, in spite of Kant's manifest opposition to traditionalist procedures in

metaphysics, of attempting to derive a priori knowledge of the nature of God, the immaterial soul,

human freedom, etc., Kant is nonetheless committed to the view, according to Allais, that the things

we cognize have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a way they are in themselves that is

independent of the former, and as such, independent of the way we experience them. The suggestion

is that, although Kant abhors some forms of metaphysics, especially those which purport to derive

knowledge of super-sensible realities by means of pure a priori concepts of reason, this does not

mean that Kant abhors all forms of metaphysics. And, this is why Allais argues that methodological

models of the TD, as advanced in the writings of Allison and Bird, among others, are fundamentally

inadequate as putative explanations of Kant's TD: they do not justice to the implicit, but not

necessarily minimal, sense in which the TD is a metaphysical distinction between different types of

thing, or as she alleges, “aspects” of things. Just because the a priori epistemic conditions of

knowledge are invaluable for understanding the basic meaning of Kant's TD, and his doctrine of

25 Lucy Allais, “Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Kant's Commitment to Things to Things as They are In Themselves,” Kant Yearbook 2 (2010): 2-3.

19

things in themselves in particular, that does not mean that Kant's TD is solely an epistemological, or

even meta-philosophical position according to which there is no putative instantiation of things as

they are in themselves, there is no way things are in themselves. Even though I certainly cannot

evaluate the prima facie strength or weakness of this argument yet, it is still important for us to

make note of it here as it demonstrates that not every Kantian scholar is satisfied with the traditional

“either/or” approach to interpreting the TD, and why some scholars have felt this way, why

interpreting the TD either as a straightforward ontological distinction between two kinds of thing, or

even realms of being, on one hand, or as a merely epistemic, meta-philosophical distinction

between the various ways in which things (empirical objects) can be considered on the other are

downright inadequate as explanations of what Kant's TD ultimately means.

At least on the face of it, the intrinsic nature reading of the TD bears a striking resemblance

to the reading just considered, the two-aspect reading. To begin with, the intrinsic nature reading

was originally formulated by Rae Langton in her (relatively recent) book Kantian Humility. The

reason why there is a prima facie close affinity between the two-aspect reading and the intrinsic

nature reading is that the latter reading can be said to be as much of an aspect interpretation of the

TD as the former. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that the Kantian conception of things in

themselves, on the intrinsic nature reading, denotes a substance, specifically a substance that has

intrinsic, non-relational, non-causal powers, whereas phenomena are nothing more than the

extrinsic, and thus wholly relational, properties of these very substances. The suggestion here is that

Kant's TD once again functions as a distinction between two different “aspects” of things (empirical

objects), in this case the aspects of things are conceived specifically in terms of their contrary sets

of properties, features, or characteristics: the intrinsic and non-relational, as opposed to the extrinsic

and relational. There are thus two non-overlapping aspects of everything, of every spatio-temporal

empirical object: first, the intrinsic aspect of things (or more appropriately, substances), which

corresponds to things as they are in themselves, and there is also the extrinsic, phenomenal aspect of

things, corresponding to things as they appear to us (what Sellars would call their “manifest

image”26), each of which has its own distinct realm of being and discourse. To conclude, then, the

only significant difference between the two readings, between the two-aspect reading and the

intrinsic nature reading is that the latter is in a sense a more determinate version of the former:

whereas the former remains relatively agnostic about the precise character of things as they are in

themselves, or mind-independent reality, the latter makes a lot of additional claims about things as

they are in themselves (as well as about things as they merely appear to us) by claiming that they

26 See Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in Robert Colodny, ed., Frontiers of Science and Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962), 35-78 passim.

20

correspond, respectively, to the intrinsic, non-relational properties of substances on one hand, and to

the extrinsic, relational-causal powers of these very same substances on the other.

To repeat what I said earlier: the intrinsic nature reading is a metaphysical reading of the TD

– since it in no way denies the existence of things in themselves – according to which Kant's TD is

understood in terms of an aspect distinction between the intrinsic, non-relational properties of

substances on one hand, and their extrinsic, causal powers on the other. More needs to be said here;

but, instead of outlining the intrinsic nature reading's conception of things in themselves in terms of

the philosophical outline, noted above, which most accounts of Kant's doctrine of the TD attempt to

do justice to, as we did both in the case of the ontological reading and the methodological reading, I

will outline it in a somewhat different fashion by drawing on what Langton herself had perceived to

be the most important theses for making sense of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves in relation

to Kantian idealism proper.

At least as Langton conceives of the intrinsic nature reading, the four essential theses to

Kant's doctrine of things in themselves are not what we had termed earlier as the existential thesis,

the non-formal, non-categorial thesis, the discursivity thesis, and the inscrutability thesis, but rather

what she terms as the receptivity thesis, the distinction thesis, the irreducibility thesis, and fourth

and finally, the humility thesis, respectively. They can be understood in the following terms:

1. Receptivity: Human knowledge depends on sensibility, and sensibility is receptive:

we can have knowledge of something only insofar as it affects us. “In other words,

the basis of our knowledge are relations that consist in the way in which things affect

us.”27

2. Distinction: Things in themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties;

phenomena are the real, albeit relational, properties of substances.

3. Irreducibility: “Relational properties, and in particular causal powers, do not

supervene on intrinsic properties and are hence not reducible to intrinsic properties.

Consequently, if substances affect us, they do not affect us by means of their intrinsic

properties.”28

4. Humility: We have no knowledge of the intrinsic (i.e., noumenal) properties of

substances.29

The significance of these claims lies in the fact that they collectively point to the nature of our

sensibility as that which determines what we can and cannot know about things in themselves or

substances; or, in other words, one might say that, because the relational properties of things are the 27 Michael Esfeld, review of Kantian Humility. Erkenntnis 54 (2001): p. 400. 28 Ibid. 29 Cf. Esfeld, review of Kantian Humility, 400.

21

only properties of things that affect us, and because we can obtain knowledge of things only insofar

as things affect us, it is only the relational properties of things (i.e., substances) that we can know as

they are the only properties that factor into our empirical experience. This also explains the non-

overlapping nature of these two types of properties: the relational, causal powers of things on one

hand, and the intrinsic, non-relational properties of things on the other. They are non-overlapping

precisely because we can cognize only one of them, that is, the former, while the other (the latter)

remains forever outside the scope of our cognitive apparatus.

Additionally, if we keep the aforementioned theses in mind, it becomes clear that the

inscrutability thesis, the idea that “we cannot know things as they are in themselves” can be re-

translated simply in terms of the idea that “we cannot know things (“substantia noumena”) as they

are in themselves (or as they are intrinsically and non-relationally) rather than the way these things

(substances) are extrinsically and relationally.” In fact, Kant's inscrutability thesis can be

understood not as the theory that we cannot know anything at all about things in themselves, but

rather as the theory that we just cannot know how things in themselves are constituted independent

of, or apart from, the empirical-causal relationships in which we ordinarily experience them and in

which they (at least in part) inhere. Basically, the aim of the intrinsic nature reading, according to

Langton, is to provide an interpretation of the TD, specifically the inscrutability thesis, which is, at

least on the face of it, intuitively attractive in a way that the methodological reading does not. Now,

let me explain: the intrinsic nature reading combines the receptivity thesis mentioned above, the

thesis that we can only cognize things insofar as they affect us, with a thesis of the irreducibility of

relations according to which relational, causal powers (the realm of phenomena) are not reducible

to the intrinsic properties of substances (the realm of things in themselves) to yield an interpretation

of Kant's famous inscrutability thesis that cannot be said to suffer from the charge of “triviality” –

in the way that (we will come to see) the methodological reading of this thesis arguably does. In the

end, it must be noted that this view does not in any way claim that we cannot apprehend things in

themselves at all, but rather that we cannot apprehend the intrinsic natures of things, viz., how they

are “in themselves;” it is thus only the “in itself” or, indeed, the noumenal aspect of reality that we

cannot in any way apprehend.

To recapitulate: there are four possible readings of Kant's TD in relation to the broader

theoretical context of Kantianism proper. In no particular order, some readers of Kant (e.g. Jacobi,

and Van Cleve) see him as a traditional Berkeleian metaphysician, at least in the formal idealist

sense, for whom the realm of appearances is nothing but the realm of our inner, transient, mental

contents, or in more Kantian terms, mind-dependent representations which cannot exist

unperceived, in which case the TD becomes a straightforward ontological distinction between the

22

realm of “mere appearances” on one hand, and the realm of “reality,” as it were, on the other – viz.,

things as they merely seem to be to us, as opposed to things as they really are “in themselves.”

Other philosophers, such as Allais, reject the (for them unfortunate) idea that Kant was nothing but

an “honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned” idealist for whom the external, mind-independent world

(viz., the realm of appearances) is nothing over and above the realm of our mental representations,

but who nevertheless retain the sense in which Kant's TD is at least partially a metaphysical

doctrine about the nature of penultimate empirical reality on one hand (the realm of appearances),

as opposed to the nature of metaphysically-ultimate, mind-independent “reality” on the other, in

which case the TD becomes a simple “aspect” distinction between the two fundamental aspects of

reality as such: mind-dependent reality, and mind-independent reality. By contrast, other

philosophers, like Langton, will keep the Allaisian sense in which Kant's TD functions as an aspect

distinction between the penultimate sphere of appearances on one hand, and the metaphysically-

ultimate sphere of things in themselves on the other, yet add substantive content to the way in

which the latter sphere can be understood by claiming that the realm of things in themselves is the

realm of substances, the underpinning substrate of our experience. In this case, the TD transforms

itself into a property-type distinction between intrinsic, non-relational properties on one hand, and

extrinsic, relational causal powers on the other. And finally, still other philosophers (e.g. Allison,

Bird, and Collins) see Kant as a robust empirical realist for whom the realm of mind-independent

objects – in this case empirical objects of sense (or appearances) – actually exist, and which

impinge upon our senses in such a way as to “stir-up” or “arouse” our faculty of sensible intuition

into action, thereby giving rise to our spatio-temporal representations (of mind-independent

objects); in this case, the TD becomes a merely formal contrast between either contrasting

conceptual “considerations” or “perspectives” within the confines of our very experience, rather

than within a transcendent realm instantiated somehow over and above our experience. These are

the four most significant readings of Kant's TD, and I will now consider each of them on the basis

of the texts.

Part 3: An Examination of the Texts in Relation to the Four Transcendental Construals of Kant's TD

As I said, I will now consider each of the four possible readings of the TD in relation to the

texts; but before I proceed to the textual evaluation portion of this chapter, I must note that, instead

of adopting a chronological order of explication with respect to the various interpretations of the

TD, as I had done previously, I shall now adopt what I think is a more intuitive order of explication

at this point, beginning with the traditional ontological construal, followed by the aspect construal,

23

the intrinsic nature construal, and ending with the methodological construal – the only formal

reading of Kant's TD. One of the reasons why the traditional, ontological reading of the TD has had its fair share

of supporters, both in Kant's time as well as in our own, is that some Kantian scholars have thought

(if not assumed entirely) that the concept of things in themselves, first and foremost, refers to

something that exists – for, after all, if things in themselves do not exist, then how can they exist as

things? And, in order to corroborate this claim – which is presupposed in all metaphysical accounts

of the TD – ontological theorists of all stripes have typically relied on the following passages, the

first of which is taken from the preface to the B edition of CPR at Bxx, where Kant famously says:

This situation yields, however, just the very experiment by which, indirectly, we are enabled to prove the truth of this first estimate of our a priori knowledge of reason, namely, that such knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us.30

Likewise, just a few paragraphs further on, Kant says:

But of further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.31

It is these passages, among others, that form the (textual) basis on which the traditional ontological

account of Kantianism rests. Simply put, the reason for this is that these passages seemingly

commit Kant to the wholly metaphysical view that things in themselves exist in some sense, exist as

objects, exist as worlds, or exist as aspects of things. Yet, I would argue that, in neither case do

these passages commit Kant to such a view, as I will now show.

Let us take each of these in turn. Even though some methodological proponents32 have

claimed that at CPR Bxx Kant is not insisting that things in themselves actually exist, I find it rather

hard to reject that notion. All I can do at this point, then, is to bite the bullet and claim that once we

step-back and take a holistic perspective of CPR, this passage is an anomaly; it is the only passage

in the entire CPR itself in which Kant seems to commit himself to the actual existence of things in

themselves. On the other hand, in line with the methodological interpretation of Kant's TD, in the

second passage listed above, Kant commits himself to the notion that it is the thought of things in

themselves that is necessary, not their actual existence. In other words, as Kant claims therein, even

though we cannot know things as they are in themselves, we must still be able to think of them in

that way, namely, in terms of purely intelligible objects of reason, which are neither formal nor

30 CPR, Bxx. 31 CPR, Bxxvi-xxvii. 32 See, for example, Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 210.

24

categorial, and which are thus unknowable – that is all; Kant never says that things in themselves

exist in that way. Now, to the more controversial claim made in the second clause that the denial of

the mere conceivability of things in themselves is by implication the denial of the existence of

appearances – the thought being that we would have appearances without anything that appears! – it

is far from clear that it is the actual existence of things in themselves that Kant is positing here,

rather than, as I said above, their mere conceivability. All Kant is claiming here is that the existence

of appearances entails the mere “conceivability and meaningfulness of references to things in

themselves,”33 as Bird claims. For, as the transcendental correlate of appearances, the notion of

things in themselves is entailed by the notion of appearances; in very crude terms, the existence of

things of a sensible faculty of intuition, which therefore conform to the a priori forms of our

intuition, and which are thereby rendered intelligible with the aid of the a priori categories of the

understanding, entails the thought that things may be other than they are, that there may exist

certain things that have no relation to the form of our empirical intuition, and as such, are neither

formal nor categorial in the manner just outlined.

At the same time, though, if the traditional, ontological reading of the TD is to get off the

ground, it still needs to be shown not just that things in themselves exist – for all metaphysical

readings make this assumption – but that things in themselves exist as “things,” “objects,” or even

“worlds” of some sort. Typically, ontological theorists have appealed to passages such as the

following, which is taken from the chapter of CPR entitled: “The Ground of the Distinction of All

Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena:”

Now we must bear in mind that the concept of appearances, as limited by the Transcendental Aesthetic, already of itself establishes the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and so of the world into a world of the senses and a world of the understanding (mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis), and indeed in such manner that the distinction does not refer merely to the logical form of our knowledge of one and the same thing, according as it is indistinct or distinct, but to the difference in the manner in which the two worlds can be first given to our knowledge, and in conformity with this difference, to the manner in which they are in themselves generically distinct from one another.34

According to James Van Cleve, Kant is here arguing against the Leibnizian position that we can

apprehend things as they really are, or are “in themselves,” even if only in a confused, distorted

manner.35 In other words, here Kant is simply reaffirming his famous “Restricktionslehre” which

essentially says that no matter how acute our senses and/or sense faculties may be, no matter how

33 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 210. 34 CPR, A249. 35 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, p. 146.

25

much knowledge of empirical reality we may in time acquire, we are never going to be able to

cognize things as they are “in themselves” for the two are totally distinct from one another. Our

cognition is thus completely and thoroughly cut-off from knowledge of things in themselves.

Regardless, the crucial point, for Van Cleve, is that, as this passage suggests, Kant sometimes

“expressly repudiates the notion of a single domain of objects to which we have two modes of

access,”36 which, by implication, is to say that there are two domains of objects – only one to which

we have cognitive access.

However, this passage is by no means decisive with regards to the fundamental import of

Kant's TD: for I would argue that Kant's above characterization of the realm of phenomena and the

realm of noumena as a division between a “world of the senses” and a “world of the

understanding,” respectively (“mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis”), is a merely rhetorical device for

what (as we will see) is clearly a methodological view. I am certainly not of the opinion that we

should take this characterization seriously because, as we will also see, Kant will also use language

equally suggestive of the merely formal, methodological reading of Kantianism.

In addition to the passages just cited, one might argue that the entire “Transcendental

Aesthetic” itself, whose primary purpose is to map, in accordance with Kant's transcendental topic,

the most basic elements of our experience belonging to our faculty of sensibility, is essentially

nothing but an implicit affirmation of the ontological interpretation of Kantian idealism, which, to

repeat, claims that the TD is at heart an ontological distinction between two numerically distinct,

and thus mutually opposed classes of thing, object, or worlds. In line with this, one could say that

Kant's “Aesthetic” contains unequivocal expressions of the ontological thesis that things in

themselves exist not merely in the conceptual sense in that they exist in our minds as thoughts of

possible objects, but rather in the metaphysically-robust sense in that they exist qua things, and are

thus instantiated in the manifold of intuition.

The passages one might look to in this context are those where Kant explains what he

means in designating space and time, the a priori forms of our empirical intuition, as being

“transcendentally ideal.” More specifically, these passages are contained at the end of the

“Aesthetic,” in a section entitled the “Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space,” the first

of which reads as follows:

(a) Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another. That is to say, space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains even when abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of our intuition. For no determination, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to

36 Ibid.

26

the existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori.37

At first glance, one might think that this passage corroborates the traditional, ontological view of

the TD according to which Kant's conception of things in themselves is more than a mere concept,

and as such, denotes entities of an intrinsically inscrutable sort, comprising an ontologically-

distinct sphere of reality independent from that which we can and do cognize. But, as we all know,

things are not always as they appear because, on closer inspection, this passage actually exhibits a

far more methodological reading than one might have imagined. In fact, pace the ontological

interpreter, Allison even goes so far as to argue that, when Kant claims that space is not a property

of things in themselves, all he means is that space – as one of the subjective conditions of our

intuition – cannot attach to things independent of the subjective conditions of intuition; and as

such, “the representation of space does not contain any properties (including relational properties)

that can be predicated of things qua considered in this manner.”38 That seems to be enough for

Allison to conclude at this point that things in themselves are things considered in abstraction from,

or independently of, the subjective conditions of our empirical intuition. All that I hope to have

shown here is that, contrary to the traditional, ontological theorist's assumption, it is certainly

possible to read the most ontologically-suggestive passages in the “Aesthetic” – the above in

particular – in such a way that is not only prima facie wholly compatible with, but in fact actually

lends support to, the methodological reading of the TD – the details of which have already been

outlined above. However, if the methodological account of the “Aesthetic” is to hold much water,

then it is safe to say that it must be able to do full justice to any other passages in the “Aesthetic”

that could be said to be equally suggestive of the ontological interpretation of Kantianism. In what

follows, I hope to show that this is the case.

Kant's second main point with regards to the transcendentally ideal status of space can be

seen to follow directly from his first point. To begin with, we saw above that the first thing Kant

establishes in regards to the form of space is that it is a merely subjective condition of our

experience, and as such, it can neither represent a property of, nor a relation among, things as they

are in themselves. Having already established the subjective nature of our empirical representation

of space, Kant now purports to establish its status as an a priori condition of our experience – an a

priori condition for intuiting things outside of us – by showing how the latter follows directly upon

the former, how the subjective character of the form of space entails its status as an a priori

condition of experience. The passage reads:37 CPR, A26/B52. 38 Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 2004), 119.

27

(b) Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions; and so exist in the mind a priori, and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain, prior to all experience, principles which determine the relations of these objects.39

On the character of space as a merely subjective condition of our experience, Kant is here merely

claiming that space is not an actual thing, it is not an object per se, but rather it is an a priori form

or mode by means of which we, or to be more precise, our faculty of sense, represents things

external to us. And, in the end, the reason why space is an a priori condition of our experience,

rather than an a posteriori condition derived from experience, is that the form of space necessarily

precedes our empirical intuitions of particular objects, and in that way, is necessarily presupposed

by our experience as such. But, the important point as regards to the above is that there is nothing

in Kant's remarks about the form of space, here outlined in terms of a merely subjective (and thus a

priori) condition of our experience, that lends support to the ontological reading of the TD.

Furthermore, since Kant does not mention anything about the character of space in relation to

things as they are in themselves, or even in relation to things as they appear to us, I would argue

that, although this passage is significant in that it outlines the basic a priori subjective nature of the

form of space, it contributes very little to the debate regarding the TD.

But surely this is not the case when we consider the concluding sections of the “Aesthetic,”

which I would argue do far more to advance the formal methodological interpretation of

Kantianism than they do to repudiate it. To be specific, at CPR A26-27/B42-43 Kant clarifies

exactly what the doctrine of the transcendentally ideal status of space actually means when he

claims that (the a priori form of) space is real only insofar as we consider space (as well as the

form of time for that matter) from the finite human perspective, in which case space is taken as

nothing more than a merely subjective form of our empirical intuition – an a priori condition of a

possible experience – and not from some putative “God's-eye-perspective,” in which case space

would be taken for more than it really is, that is, as a necessary ontological condition that attaches

to things in general independently of their actually being given. In this way, space cannot be said to

represent an objective property of, nor an objective relation among, things as they are in

themselves, and thus for one to claim that the form of space is ultimately real, rather than merely

penultimately real, as many of the rationalists clearly would, is highly misguided, according to

Kant. He explains:

39 CPR, A26/B42.

28

It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever. This predicate can be ascribed to things only in so far as they appear to us, that is, only to objects of sensibility.40

As far as I understand it, the meaning of this particular passage is in complete accordance with the

formal, methodological reading rather than with any of the metaphysical readings. For, what is

significant here is that Kant is not claiming that space represents a merely apparent, as opposed to a

real, property or determination of things, which is what, I imagine, Kant would be claiming in the

event that he espoused some form of the ontological model of Kantianism, in which case the TD is

reducible to a straightforward ontological contrast between distinct entities. Rather, Kant's claim is

simply that the form of space is wholly real, albeit real only from a certain predetermined

perspective, namely, the finite human perspective which takes into account the nature of the forms

of our empirical intuition, and by implication, the importance of these very forms for any putative

attempt at acquiring knowledge (of objects).

But this is only the tip of the iceberg, for when Kant finally concludes his thoughts on the

transcendental concept of space at CPR A28/B44, when he explains how the a priori form of space,

a mere form of our empirical intuition, can be both transcendentally ideal and empirically real, he

explains it in such a way that it lends credence to the formal methodological interpretation of

Kantianism, saying that:

Our exposition therefore establishes the reality, that is, the objective validity, of space in respect of whatever can be presented to us outwardly as object, but also at the same time the ideality of space in respect of things when they are considered in themselves through reason, that is, without regard to the constitution of our sensibility. We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality – in other words, that it is nothing at all, immediately we withdraw the above condition, namely, its limitation to possible experience, and so look upon it as something that underlies things in themselves.41

Again, the thought here is that space, as a mere form of our empirical intuition, is real only insofar

as it is considered in respect of things from our finite, “man's-eye-view” of things according to

which things are presented to us outwardly as objects, as Kant says himself, and thus it is ideal

when it is considered from that “God's-eye-view” of things, in which case we consider space, as

well as the things to which it belongs, in abstraction from any consideration of the particular form

of our (empirical) intuition, which is just to say that we disregard the manner in which things are

given to us. To my mind, the reason this passage is significant from the standpoint of the debate 40 CPR, A26-27/B42-43. 41 CPR, A27-28/B44.

29

regarding Kant's TD is that the meaning of this passage is once again in complete accordance with,

rather than in utter opposition to, the formal methodological reading of Kantianism. On the reality

of the a priori form of space, it is not that space is real only in respect to a certain (instantiated)

domain of thing or object, that is, in respect to things in themselves (or noumena) which exist over

and above empirical objects of sense; rather, space is real only insofar as it is thought or

“considered” in a certain way, namely, in a way that does justice to the sensible nature of our

empirical intuition, which requires the object being given to us prior to any putative attempt to

acquire knowledge of it.

Moreover, to further corroborate the thesis that the “Aesthetic” is actually an expression of

the formal methodological interpretation of Kantianism, in which case the TD is a merely formal or

conceptual distinction between ways of considering things (empirical objects), emphasizing the

necessity of the epistemic conditions for the possibility of our experience, one need only note that

Kant's conclusions with regards to the our empirical intuition of space, therein contained, are in

complete accordance with his conclusions regarding the a priori form of time, also therein

contained, as the following passage demonstrates: This, then, is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of time. What we mean by this phrase is that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves (apart from their relation to our intuition) in the way either of subsistence or of inherence. This ideality, like that of space, must not, however, be illustrated by false analogies with sensation, because it is then assumed that the appearance, in which the sensible predicates inhere, itself has objective reality. In the case of time, such objective reality falls entirely away, save in so far as it is merely empirical, that is, save in so far as we regard the object itself merely as appearance.42

One could just as well read the second sentence of this paragraph as follows: “What we mean by

this phrase is that if we consider it in abstraction from the subjective conditions of sensible

intuition, time is nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves (apart from their

relation to our intuition) in the way either of subsistence or of inherence.” Much like the passage we

considered before it, this passage highlights the sense in which Kant's ideality thesis (here with

respect to the form of time) can only be understood in conceptual terms as a formal contrast

between different ways of considering things, in this case space, as well as spatial things – which is

exactly what one would think if the formal reading of Kant's TD were true! In the end, with the

abundance of textual evidence in favor of the formal methodological reading of the TD, I find it

very difficult to put much stock in the traditional ontological reading of the TD as well as any of the

(textual) arguments advanced on its behalf.

42 CPR, A36/B52-53.

30

At the beginning of my examination of the texts in connection with the ontological reading

of the TD, I pointed out that one might be prone to argue that the primary import and significance of

Kant's “Aesthetic” for his theory of things in themselves is thoroughly metaphysical or ontological,

in the respect that Kant's thing in itself is there said to represent a second class of object numerically

distinct from ordinary things or appearances, that is, the objects which factor into our everyday

knowledge-claims. In showing that the “Aesthetic” can be read methodologically, with its emphasis

on the status of space and time as mere forms of our sensible intuition rather than putative

properties of, or relations which obtain among, things as they are in themselves, and how these facts

about our cognitive apparatus preclude us from ever obtaining knowledge of things in themselves,

what I have essentially shown is that the “Aesthetic” is anything but an expression of the

ontological reading of Kant's TD; in fact, almost all of the passages we have considered here, which

the casual, uninformed reader may take as confirmation of the traditional ontological picture of

Kantianism, whereby the TD becomes reducible to a distinction between mutually opposed types of

thing or object, are in fact representative of the purely formal reading of Kantianism, the

methodological reading. For, even if the passage at A26/B52 of CPR could be interpreted in an

ontologically-suggestive way (which I wholeheartedly reject), one has to take into account the

broader theoretical context of the “Aesthetic” as a whole, which I have shown is downright formal

and epistemological rather than ontological or metaphysical. To be more specific, in interpreting the

meaning and import of the “Aesthetic,” one must keep in mind the way in which Kant explains the

transcendental ideality (as well as the empirical reality) of the forms of our intuition, and more

specifically, the way in which these conceptions are inextricably tied to, and must be understood in

terms of, the various ways in which space and spatial things can themselves be considered, or

simply thought. And, by doing so, it becomes easy to see why one might reject, as I have done here,

the argument, made on behalf of the ontological interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy, that

the “Aesthetic” corroborates this interpretation, and why I therefore reject all traditional ontological

readings of the TD.

In the previous section, I addressed the textual arguments put forward in support of the

ontological interpretation of Kant's TD. And, what we saw is that many of these arguments stand on

very shaky grounds. For, in contrast to the traditionalist's belief that the “Aesthetic,” one of the

most important sections of the entire CPR itself, in which Kant is said to map the a priori elements

of our experience, can be read as an affirmation of the ontological reading of the TD, we have seen

that the “Aesthetic” can actually be read in a way that is not only ultimately compatible with, but in

fact even downright lends credence to, the formal, methodological reading of Kantianism, which

(as we have also seen) highlights the centrality of the epistemic conditions of a possible experience

31

for the Kantian conception of things in themselves. Now we must address some of the other

metaphysical readings of the TD in this connection, starting with the two-aspect reading: for even

though the case made on behalf of the ontological line of thought has herein been shown to be

textually inadequate, this is not to say that all of the other metaphysical readings of the TD, the

aspect reading included, are equally inadequate as interpretations of the basic meaning of Kant's

TD. But it is to say that, if the aspect reading is to have much force, it still has to be shown that

there is an important sense in which the TD is fundamentally ontological in import, in the respect

that things in themselves are more than “just” a conception of things, which is just what Allais, one

of the leading aspect theorists, attempts to do. The task before us then is to see whether she is

correct on this score, whether there is evidence to suggest that Kant's TD is not just ontological in

the sense that the conception of things in themselves refers to something that exists, and can

therefore be classified as a metaphysical or ontological entity in the fullest sense of the term, but

more importantly and specifically, that things in themselves, as this existent “something,” represent

an “aspect” or “realm” of reality that we cannot in any way cognize, in which case the aspect

reading can be said to hold water.

We saw that Allais is of the view that a close reading of CPR suggests that Kant's TD is

fundamentally metaphysical in character and import, and that things in themselves represent that

“aspect,” “set of properties,” or simply “realm” of our reality that we cannot in principle cognize.

There are two claims here: first, the claim that the TD is metaphysical in the straightforward sense

according to which things in themselves (as well as of course appearances) exist, and second, the

claim that things in themselves can roughly be understood in terms of an “aspect” of our reality, an

aspect, moreover, which is intrinsically non-spatio-temporal and non-categorial. The reason I point

this out is that, in order to accurately assess the textual situation with respect to the aspect

interpretation of the TD, I will examine whether there is any prima facie evidence for either of

these two claims, beginning with the claim that things in themselves exist.

Apart from those passages in both the B preface as well as in the “Aesthetic” that suggest

that things in themselves exist, and that things in themselves exist as “objects” or “worlds,” there

are others which suggest, with some qualification of course, much the same thing. In particular,

Allais essentially claims that, taking into account the sheer frequency with which Kant asserts that

things in themselves “cause,” “underlie,” or even “ground” the empirical realm of appearances, one

cannot deny that Kant's commitment to things as they are in themselves is at least partially

metaphysical in the respect that Kant believes in the “real” existence of things in themselves,

regardless of the manner in which they are understood. The use of the idea that things in themselves

act in some obscure metaphysical sense as a “cause” or “ground” (“Grund”) of the realm of our

32

ordinary experience thereby effectively allows Allais – as well as any other supposed “aspect”

theorist – to make the case in her favor that Kant's doctrine of things in themselves is at least

partially metaphysical in that things in themselves are said to be necessarily instantiated in some

fashion. In support of this idea, Allais turns to the following passages, the first of which comes

from Kant's Prol, where he says:

In fact, if we view the objects of the senses as mere appearances, as is fitting, then we thereby admit at the very same time that a thing in itself underlies them, although we are not acquainted with this thing as it may be constituted in itself, but only with its appearance, i.e., with the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. Therefore the understanding, just by the fact that it accepts appearances, also admits to the existence of things in themselves, and to that extent we can say that the representation of such beings as underlie the appearances, hence of mere intelligible beings, is not merely permitted but also inevitable.43

And, in the second passage, this time coming from CPR, Kant makes much the same point,

claiming that:

But if we consider that the two kinds of objects thus differ from each other, not inwardly but only in so far as one appears outwardly to the other, and that what, as thing in itself, underlies the appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character, this difficulty vanishes, the only question that remains being how in general a communion of substances is possible.44

Even the most fervent methodological theorist such as myself finds it difficult to argue against the

wholly metaphysical claim that these passages suggest that the TD is fundamentally ontological in

nature by manifesting Kant's overarching commitment to the actual existence of things in

themselves. For example, in the first passage listed above, taken from Prol, Kant seems to be

claiming that, underlying the realm of appearances there exists a realm of “real,” mind-independent

objects (things in themselves) of which our appearances are said to be “appearances of.” Thus,

insofar as the idea of a Grund is interpreted in a traditional metaphysical sense, it represents the idea

that there is a certain “realm” of our experience – which cannot be derived from that experience, yet

nevertheless can be said to inhere in that experience – providing our experience with a safety-net, so

to speak, against the skeptical idea that we cannot be sure there is anything “out-there” to which our

representations actually correspond. This view finds further support in the second passage when we

consider, first, Kant's claim, made therein, that the thing in itself underlies the appearance of matter,

and second, his claim that these two entities, viz., things in themselves and appearances, may

43 Prol, 4:314-315. 44 CPR, B427-428. See also CPR, A537/B565, A538-539/B566-567, A379-380, A494/B522-523. The one notable

difference between the passages I quoted in the body of the text and the ones I list here is that in the latter Kant seems unsure about what exactly it is that functions as the “cause” or “ground” (“Grund”) of our (immanent) experience, which is evidenced in Kant's manifest oscillation between the idea of the thing in itself as this Grund on one hand, and the idea of the transcendental object as this very same Grund on the other.

33

ultimately not be as different from one another as one may have assumed.

But there is no doubt a problem here, for a closer examination of CPR as a whole reveals

that, contrary to the way in which I outlined it above, where it was assumed that the Grund of our

experience represents the notion of a metaphysically-ultimate “realm” of our experience, thereby

securing that experience from a thorough-going skepticism which regards the existence of the

external, mind-independent world either as doubtful, or as an impossibility altogether, a strong case

can be made on the formal Kantian's behalf that Kant was merely committed to the idea of a Grund

of our experience, not to an actual Grund per se. After all, at CPR A681/B709 Kant says:

We misapprehend the meaning of this idea if we regard it as the assertion or even as the assumption of a real thing, to which we may proceed to ascribe the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground which eludes our concepts may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined; the idea is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to reason and so beneficial to the understanding, can be further extended. In short, this transcendental thing is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, extends systematic unity over the whole field of appearance.45

The suggestion here is simply that, as a regulative principle by means of which our faculty of reason

“structures,” “orders,” and “unifies” the field of appearances, the notion of a Grund of our

(immanent) experience is not a constitutive principle, and so cannot be said either to necessarily

“refer” to or “determine” any “object” or “realm” of our experience as such. It is simply an idea,

which, insofar as it is used in reference to the empirical realm of sensible objects, renders that

empirical realm intelligible to us in a manner which we can all understand, viz., by subsuming

empirical objects under certain necessary concepts, such as that of an “event” or of an “objective

time order,” without which our experience would be impossible for us.

Again, the thought seems to be that Kant's notion of the Grund of our experience is a

problematic concept, the existence of which is by no means a given; by virtue of the fact that, as a

mere transcendental idea of reason, viz., a necessary concept of reason for which no corresponding

object can be given, some46 have argued that the notion of a Grund is equivalent to the notion of a

negative noumenon. Now, while I agree with this argument as far as it goes, I cannot defend it here.

The point of this discussion has been to show that, in spite of the fact that the thing in itself

functions as the necessary metaphysical Grund of our experience in some sense, Kant does not

necessarily commit himself to the actual existence of the thing in itself qua Grund, as Allais has

supposed. This is because there are equally legitimate reasons to believe that Kant was committed

merely to the (“regulative”) idea of a Grund of our experience, the function of which is to 45 CPR, A681/B709. 46 See Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 752-756.

34

systematically “order” and “unify” the field of a possible experience under necessary principles of

reason without which our experience would be impossible for us, rather than to the constitutive

principle according to which there really is a thing or an object “out-there” corresponding to our

idea of a Grund. So, in the end, Allais's use of the notion of things in themselves as the Grund of

our experience for the purposes of advancing her so-called “aspect” interpretation of the TD is a

questionable strategy at best.

Within the context of our assessment of the degree to which Allais's “two-aspect” view of

the TD can be said to fit the texts, we have seen that, in order to make a strong textual case for this

view, Allais needs to have established two things: (1) that Kant was committed to the actual

existence of things in themselves; and (2) that there is a further sense in which things in themselves

represent a putative “aspect” or “realm” of reality which we cannot cognize. What our previous

discussion primarily illustrated was that Allais largely fails to establish (1) that Kant was committed

to the actual existence of things in themselves, for the tactic by means of which she attempted to

establish this claim could just as easily be said to establish its exact opposite, the claim that Kant

was only committed to the idea of things in themselves qua Grund of our experience, in a purely

conceptual way that gives structure and order to the field of our experience, rather than to any

putatively instantiated Grund of our experience per se. I am half tempted to conclude my discussion

of the texts in relation to Allais's aspect interpretation right now; but so as not to unduly prejudice

my investigation, I will still consider whether there is any evidence to suggest that, insofar as we

grant Kant's commitment to the existence of things in themselves, there is a way in which such

things can be said to represent a prima facie “aspect,” “realm,” or “sphere” of our reality as such

that we cannot in any wise cognize.

One could make the argument – which is just what Allais does – that the basic terms in

which Kant uses to define the TD, or better yet, the way in which Kant contrasts appearances with

things in themselves, is meant to suggest that the TD is at root an “aspect” distinction between the

way in which things appear to us on one hand, and the way in which these very same things are “in

themselves” on the other. More specifically, Allais thinks it is Kant's frequent use of the “as”

locution to contrast the two conceptions that gives weight to her “aspect” argument. That is to say,

since Kant so frequently refers to a thing as it appears to us, and then contrasts this notion with the

idea of that very same thing as it is “in itself,” Allais is of the view that Kant is not just speaking

about one and the same thing – an uncontroversial claim – but that he is speaking about the

mutually contrasting metaphysical “aspects” or “features” of one and the same thing – a much more

controversial claim. In this connection, Allais would quote the following:

But if our Critique is not in error in teaching that the object is to be taken in a twofold

35

sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself; if the deduction of the concepts of understanding is valid, and the principle of causality applies only to things taken in the former sense, namely, in so far as they are objects of experience – these same objects, taken in the other sense, not being subject to the principle – then there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and is therefore free.47

Later on, Kant makes much the same point, when he claims:

For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself.48

In these passages, Kant's thought – so Allais would argue – is not just that there are various ways of

considering the object – either considering it as an appearance or as a thing in itself – but that these

considerations correspond, in the fullest metaphysical sense that is, to the various ways in which the

object is actually constituted. This means that, to consider what something is like as it appears to us

is to consider that thing in terms of the conditions under which it is given to us, whereas to consider

what something is like “in itself” is to consider that thing in terms of the way that it really is,

independent of the conditions under which it is given to us. Or, otherwise put, there is a way that

things appear to us, and a way that these very same things are “in themselves,” each of which can

only be considered on its own terms, according to Kant.

But there is a fundamental problem here, and one that should not be too difficult to spot. For,

even though the above passages demonstrate that Kant's TD is largely a conceptual distinction

between the various ways that things can be considered or conceived, there is almost nothing to

suggest that the TD is anything more than that. To explain: we have seen that Allais not only has to

establish that things in themselves exist, but that things in themselves exist in the metaphysical

terms of a fundamental “aspect” or “realm” of our reality, an aspect that we can by no means

cognize. However, what I am saying here is simply that there is nothing to corroborate this further

wholly metaphysical claim that the “as” locution has the secondary, and entirely implicit function of

denoting the various ways that things exist, the various forms or determinations of being, as it were.

There is thus nothing to suggest that the TD is a contrast between modes of being in the fullest

metaphysical sense, only that it is a contrast between modes of considering things in the merely

formal terms, underscored in the methodological view of the TD. So, in the end, there is very little

evidence to suggest either that things in themselves exist, or equally importantly for Allais's

47 CPR, Bxxvii-xxviii. 48 CPR, B69.

36

purposes, that such things exist in such a way that they can be understood to denote mind-

independent reality, reality as it is outside the cognitive imposition of both the a priori forms of our

intuition as well as the pure a priori categories of thought. The aspect reading, much like the

traditional ontological reading, thus stands on very shaky textual grounds.

Now that we have examined the textual situation with respect to both the ontological

reading and the two-aspect reading of the TD, we come now to the intrinsic nature reading. Again,

as a metaphysical interpretation of Kant's TD, the intrinsic nature reading presupposes the actual

(indeed the necessary) existence of things in themselves; bearing this in mind, it becomes clear that

it falls squarely on the shoulders of the advocates of such a view to show that Kant is prima facie

committed to there necessarily being a way things are in themselves independent of the way they

appear to us. Since, in various connections, we already saw that there are major issues with this line

of thought, I do not wish to rehash them here, concluding that the intrinsic nature view is therefore

just as improbable an interpretation of the meaning of Kant's TD as the other metaphysical views

proved themselves to be.

Yet, for the sake of argument, let us grant the veracity of the above claim, namely, that

things in themselves actually exist. Given this, it still needs to be shown (1) that the TD is at root a

metaphysical distinction between the two essential “aspects” of things: first, the way things appear

to us (which one might call their “as-appearance” aspect) and second, the way they are “in

themselves” (which one might refer to as their “in-itself” aspect), each of which, by implication, is

endowed with it own unique set of properties. In addition, it needs to be shown (2) that there are

only two kinds of properties: the intrinsic/non-relational on one hand, and the extrinsic/relational on

the other, with the latter being irreducible to the former. And finally, it needs to be shown (3) either

that the former corresponds to their “in-itself” aspect, in which case the latter is thereby implicitly

proven to correspond to their “as-appearance” aspect, or that the latter corresponds to their “as-

appearance” aspect, in which case the former is thereby implicitly proven to correspond to their

“in-itself” aspect – to establish the one is by implication to establish the other, its opposite. Once

these three claims can be corroborated, it could then be shown that Kant's TD could best be

understood in terms of what Langton called the distinction, that is, the notion that things in

themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties; phenomena being the relational properties

of these substances.

Let us take claim (1), the claim according to which Kant's TD can best be understood in

metaphysical terms as at heart an “aspect” distinction between the way things appear to us on one

hand (their “as-appearance” aspect), as opposed to the way these very same things are “in

themselves” on the other (their “in-itself” aspect). The passages from CPR which Langton

37

emphasizes in this connection are dubious at best. This is because the meaning of those passages

can be interpreted in a way that undercuts, rather than supports, the intrinsic nature view to which

Langton herself subscribes. Take, for example, the following sentence from the “Aesthetic,” which

reads: “This object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself.”49 According

to Langton, this is meant to demonstrate, in some metaphysically-robust sense of the term, that

things have two essential “aspects,” “features,” or “sets of properties:” first, an “as-appearance”

aspect, and second, an “in-itself” aspect.

However, the major problem with this passage is that Langton fails to account for the

broader theoretical context within which the passage itself occurs, for as I will show, read in its

entirety, the passage suggests a purely formal, epistemic distinction between the various ways

things (empirical objects) can be considered. On the one hand, objects can be considered in terms

of the relation they bear to our sensible form of intuition, in which case they are subjected to the a

priori epistemic conditions of a possible experience; but, on the other hand, objects can also be

considered in abstraction from, or independent of, the outward relation they bear to our sensible

form of intuition, in which case they are considered apart from, and without any reference to, the a

priori conditions of a possible experience. Kant says:

When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself.50

The “this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself” locution to

which Kant here refers is nothing more than a conceptual way of considering objects of a possible

experience; it expresses the necessity (which is bound up in the very nature of our faculty of reason

as such) to “think” or “contemplate” things (empirical objects) independent of the way they “affect”

us. It is a clear indication that Kant's use of the “as” locution in this passage is not intended to

convey anything metaphysical with respect to the TD; it is not meant to suggest that there really is a

way things are “in themselves,” which is independent of the way they appear to us. To reiterate, it

denotes a purely formal, epistemological contrast between the various ways in which objects can be

considered; that is all.

There are other issues, however. For, an essential part of the intrinsic nature reading, and of

49 CPR, B69. 50 CPR, B69.

38

the distinction thesis in particular, is the thesis that noumena represent the intrinsic, non-relational

properties of things (or of what is the same, substances), whereas phenomena represent the

extrinsic, relational properties of these very same things. But, in order for this claim to get off the

ground, it needs to be shown, very generally, that there are only two “sets,” “classes,” or “types” of

properties: intrinsic, non-relational properties on one hand, and extrinsic, relational ones on the

other, with the former being irreducible to the latter. And, this brings us to claim (2). To support this

more general claim that everything is endowed with two non-overlapping types of properties,

Langton points to the following passage from the “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection,” where

Kant says: “Concepts of relation presuppose things which are absolutely [i.e. independently] given,

and without these are impossible.”51 In the first place, not only does this sentence fail to support the

intrinsic nature view's claim that there are only two types of properties: the relational and non-

relational – for Kant seems to be referring here to concepts of relation(s), not to that which stands

under these concepts; but more importantly, there is a fear that the passages which Langton quotes

from the “Amphiboly” (this one included) do not even represent Kant's own views, but rather the

Leibnizian views Kant explicitly rejects.52 The passage most often quoted in connection with this

issue is the passage at CPR A274/B330, where Kant says: “Substances in general must have some

internal nature, which is therefore free from all outer relations, and consequently also from

position. The simple is therefore the basis of that which is inner in things-in-themselves.”53 In light

of these difficulties, my claim is just that claim (2) has little to no foundation.

Furthermore, there are issues with claim (3), with the claim that both phenomena and

noumena are not things, but rather the properties things have. The most important of these issues is

raised by Bird,54 who acknowledges that, even though Kant sometimes refers to phenomena as

relations/relational properties, he also refers to them as “objects,” as “objects of experience,” and as

“objects of the senses.” I am in full agreement with this view, for one of the passages Langton uses

to lend credence to her theory that phenomena are not objects, but the relational properties of

noumena, is the following, which reads: “The understanding, when it entitles an object in a

[certain] relation mere phenomenon, at the same time forms, apart from that relation, a

representation of an object in itself, …”55 According to Langton, this passage means that “we must

distinguish between a thing as it is in relation to something else, and a thing as it is 'absolutely,' or

51 CPR, A284/B340. 52 See, for example, Lucy Allais, “Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant,” Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research LXXIII (2006): 143-169; Graham Bird, review of Kantian Humility. The Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 105-108; and Ralph Walker, review of Kantian Humility. Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy 111 (2002): 136-143.

53 CPR, A274/B330. 54 See Bird, review of Kantian Humility, 105-108. 55 CPR, B306.

39

(with Kemp Smith's gloss on schlechthin) 'independently' of that relation.”56 Essentially, Langton

believes that the only way to save the passage at CPR B306 from gross incoherence is to read it

metaphysically in terms of the idea that, by an “object in itself,” Kant means to denote a type of

thing which actually exists, and which exists independently of all outward relations.

In relation to the issue of incoherence just noted, to be sure, the passage at CPR B306

conveys the incoherent idea that an object can exist in a certain relation to something else, and apart

from this very same relation at the same time. And, this is what motivates Langton's claim that there

are certain things, substances that is, that exist apart from, and independent of, any outward

relation(s) to other things; it is what motivates her claim that certain things can exist all on their

own, and as such, the existence of such things is compatible with the idea of loneliness, that is, the

idea that certain things can be the only things there are. But to combine the idea of a thing existing

“in a certain relation” with the idea of that very same thing existing “apart from that relation” is

anything but incoherent; the “apart from that relation” locution expresses nothing more than the

conceptual or logical necessity, inherent in our faculty of reason itself, to “think” or to “consider”

what an object may be like if it were to exist outside the (sensible) relation in which it inheres, and

to which Kant refers at B306, in which case it would no longer be considered an object of

knowledge for us. There is nothing incoherent here.

But, before I conclude my discussion of the texts in relation to the intrinsic nature reading, I

must make one final point. Central to the intrinsic nature reading of the TD is the claim that the

Kantian notion of things in themselves is equivalent to his notion of the substantial, in which case

things in themselves are thereby rendered intelligible in categorial terms, and this presents us with a

host of conceptual issues, as we will come to see in the next chapter. Regardless, it is curious that

Langton cannot point to a single passage from CPR that supports this claim. In her search for such a

passage, moreover, she has to go entirely outside CPR to a relatively obscure set of reflections

entitled Reflexionen zur Metaphysik (R), to find the following claim: “The substantial is the thing in

itself and unknown.”57 Yet, if we are to take Langton's distinction thesis seriously, and more

particularly, if we are to take the notional equivalency of things in themselves and substances

(bearers of properties) seriously, then surely we need a more concrete expression of these theses

than that which Langton here relies on, as it seems implausible that Kant ever would have put forth

a theory regarding things in themselves without ever expressing it in CPR. This no doubt is a

serious problem, and one which Langton never addresses. It is for all of the above reasons, then,

that I cannot regard an intrinsic nature reading of the TD as textually plausible.

56 Langton, Kantian Humility, 17. 57 R, 5292.

40

Let us now turn to the methodological reading, the only formal reading of Kantianism I

have here considered, so as to see whether it is textually plausible. Recall that, as a merely formal

interpretation of the nature and import of Kantian idealism, the methodological reading conceives

of Kant's TD not as a distinction between two ontologically distinct types of item, but rather as a

distinction between two different ways of considering one and the same item, the empirical objects

of a possible experience. Evidence of this interpretation can be found in the following passage from

the “Preface to the B edition” of CPR, where Kant famously says:

But if our Critique is not in error in teaching that the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself; if the deduction of the concepts of understanding is valid, and the principle of causality therefore applies only to things taken in the former sense, namely, in so far as they are objects of experience – these same objects, taken in the other sense, not being subject to the principle – that there is no contradiction in supposing that one and the same will is, in the appearance, that is, in its visible acts, necessarily subject to the law of nature, and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and is therefore free.58

Kant's use of the phrase “in a two-fold sense” in the above passage effectively allows him to leave

open the merely hypothetical possibility that, insofar as we consider ourselves independent of the

empirical realm of nature and its necessary causal laws, we thereby consider ourselves as being

causally free agents entirely immune from the law of causality and its necessary regularities. He is

not claiming that we really are free in some respect, that our noumenal self is wholly free with our

phenomenal self being causally determined, only that we must be able to “think” or “conceive” of

ourselves as being free in some respect, which is another way of saying that the idea of freedom

must be non-contradictory. Kant explains:

Morality does not, indeed, require that freedom should be understood, but only that it should not contradict itself, and so should at least allow of being thought, and that as thus thought it should place no obstacle in the way of a free act (viewed in another relation) likewise conforming to the mechanism of nature.59

In this way, Kant shows that a merely formal reading of the TD, one in which Kant's conception of

things in themselves denotes a way of considering things – in this case whether we are ourselves

bound by the same necessary causal laws as everything else in the phenomenal-empirical world of

appearances – suffices to leave open the conceptual (logical) possibility that we may not be

58 CPR, Bxxvii-xxviii. See also CPR, Bxxvi, Bxxvii, B69, and B307 for additional passages where Kant refers to objects of experience, and the various ways in which such objects can be “considered” or “conceived,” namely, as appearances and as things in themselves. It is Kant's repeated use of the “as” locution that is offered as a rejection of an attempt to view the TD in any straightforwardly metaphysical sense. And at CPR A38/B55, even though Kant does not explicitly use the “as” locution, the passage is nevertheless clear evidence of the formal methodological reading of the TD.

59 CPR, Bxxix.

41

similarly bound by such laws, and in the process lends support to the methodological reading. It is a

clear indication that the TD is at heart nothing more than a formal contrast between considering

things in relation to the epistemic conditions of a possible experience on one hand (viz., as an

appearance), and apart from these very same conditions on the other (viz., as a thing in itself).

Another key feature of the methodological reading of the TD, however, is that it construes

Kant's conception of things in themselves in such a way that it is held to be equivalent to,

synonymous with, and thus understood in terms of, his related conception of negative noumena –

anything not of our sensible intuition. Consequently, a key exegetical issue for the methodological

theorist concerns the extent to which evidence can be found for the above equivalency, that is, of

the view that things in themselves are nothing more than Kant's negative noumena, and as such, are

merely problematic concepts our minds necessarily form in relation to that which bears no relation

to our sensible form of intuition. All of the following passages come from the chapter of CPR

entitled: “The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena,”

which represents Kant's most comprehensive attempt to articulate exactly what the TD, especially

his doctrine of things in themselves, amounts to. The first passage gives us what we need by

identifying noumena with things in themselves, which thereby supports the methodological

interpretation of the TD offered here. Kant says:

The concept of a noumenon – that is, of a thing which is not to be thought as object of the senses but as a thing in itself, solely through a pure understanding – is not in any way contradictory. For we cannot assert of sensibility that it is the sole possible kind of intuition. Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge … The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.60

To offer more prima facie evidence for the view that things in themselves just are negative

noumena, as well as how the concept of a negative noumenon acts to limit our faculty of sensibility

(as well as understanding) by restricting the sphere of the legitimate employment of the

understanding and its pure categories, Kant notes that:

What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the title of an

60 CPR, A255/B310-311.

42

unknown something.61

Kant reinforces his putative identification of things in themselves with noumena in the following

passage when he remarks:

Now whence, I ask, can the understanding obtain these synthetic propositions, when the concepts are to be applied, not in their relation to possible experience, but to things in themselves (noumena)?62

My claim is a simple one and can be summarized in the following terms: once we consider these

passages in conjunction with what we have already seen in relation to the other (metaphysical)

readings of the TD, it becomes increasingly difficult to reject the methodological view that Kant's

TD is at heart a merely formal distinction between the various ways in which things (empirical

objects) can be considered.

From a textual perspective, in order to understand why I reject all non-methodological

attempts at understanding the nature and import of Kant's TD, one must take into consideration not

just those passages, cited above, that lend support to the methodological thesis whereby Kant's

conceptions of noumena and things in themselves seem to be notionally equivalent, but many of the

passages traditionalists would argue support their entirely non-methodological, and thus

intrinsically metaphysical, accounts of Kant's TD as well. Firstly, in connection with our

examination of the traditional ontological reading, for example, we saw that a purely

methodological interpretation of Kant's conception of things in themselves was operative in his

account in the “Aesthetic” of the status and/or character of space and time as the a priori subjective

forms through which our cognitive faculties intuit things, rather than as objective forms or

determinations which attach to objects themselves independently of their being given. Only insofar

as the “Aesthetic” is read methodologically, then, can one make sense of the theory that space and

time, as merely a priori forms of our empirical intuition, are neither things in themselves nor

represent an objective relation which obtains among things in themselves, and so they are mere

modes or ways by means of which our faculty of intuition “intuits” or “represents” objects external

to us. Secondly, in connection with our textual examinations of both the two-aspect reading as well

as the intrinsic nature reading, for example, we also saw that the notion of a Grund of our

immanent experience could just as easily be interpreted in a purely conceptual way as it can in

more of a traditional metaphysical way. On such an account, it no longer functions as that ultimate

metaphysical foundation on which our experience is secured from what both Kant and Hegel would

call an “idle skepticism,” which doubts (or rejects entirely) the existence of the mind-independent

61 CPR, A256/B312. 62 CPR, A259/B315.

43

world, but rather simply as the basic conceptual elements on which our experience is itself based;

one way of putting this is to say that, without these basic a priori (conceptual) elements, without

this Grund of our experience, our (immanent) empirical experience would not be the kind of

experience it is, and as such, it would not be an experience in which things (or more appropriately

ideas) like an “objective time order,” a “temporal sequence of events,” or even “objects” as we

know them would themselves be possible.

To sum up, what this demonstrates is that wherever one may turn in CPR, from the

“Aesthetic” where Kant maps, in accordance with his transcendental topic, the most basic (a priori)

elements in relation to our faculty of sensibility, and where he speaks about space and time as not

attaching to objects (“in themselves”) independently of their being given, to the chapter on

phenomena and noumena where Kant articulates what the notion of things in themselves (and by

implication noumena) ultimately consists in, and finally to the latter stages of CPR such as the

“Antinomy of Pure Reason” where Kant uses the concept of a Grund of our experience in a number

of ways, there is compelling evidence of the methodological reading. It is quite clear that the

methodological reading, then, fits the bill of what it means for a particular interpretation of the TD,

and of Kantianism in general, to be said to fit the texts.

Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, I posed the question of whether it is possible to construct a

transcendental reading of the TD which can be said to both fit the texts, and yet remain

philosophically plausible, in which case much of the modern-day ambivalence and even ignorance

with respect to Kantianism in general can be written off as a failure on the part of the particular

Kantian scholar involved to properly understand the essentials, both theoretical (and one might also

say practical), of Kantian transcendentalism. Now, at least in reference to the former (textual) aspect

of this question, the answer, as I have shown here, is an emphatic “Yes,” and for various reasons.

The first, and most significant of which, is that the positive evidence is far more in favor of the

solely formal, epistemological reading of the TD, namely, the methodological reading, than it is in

favor of any of the metaphysical/ontological readings of the TD. With respect to the former (viz.,

the positive evidence in favor of the methodological reading), it cannot be denied that Kant states

over and over again that there is only one type of existent object, empirical objects of sense which

are rendered intelligible by means of the forms of our empirical intuition, together with the most

basic concepts of our understanding (i.e. the a priori categories), and the various, contrasting ways

in which such objects can be “considered,” “conceived,” or simply “taken” – to use the word Kant

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most often uses himself. It is with the use of these merely formal, epistemic terms that the

methodological theorist constructs a plausible reading of the TD, in contrast to the more robust

metaphysical terms in which traditionalists (of all varieties) have constructed their preferred

interpretation of Kant's TD, one which commits Kant to the actual existence not merely of our

concepts of things in themselves, but of things in themselves per se, i.e., objects of a non-sensible

form of intuition – (e.g. Platonic forms, Cartesian souls, Leibnizian monads, and the like) – which

can be accessed by means of a pure reason alone. With respect to such readings, I would

characterize the positive evidence in their favor as sketchy at best, and this for the simple fact that

there is but one passage in the entire CPR which might be characterized as an unequivocal

expression of the view, central to all of the various metaphysical readings of Kant's TD, that things

in themselves (or noumena if you like) can legitimately be said to exist. This is the famous passage

at Bxx where Kant says that such things are “indeed real per se, but as not known by us.”63 And yet,

at least for Graham Bird, this passage can in fact be interpreted methodologically in a way that

advances, rather than repudiates, the methodological account according to which things in

themselves represent nothing more than a conception of a certain type of thing or object, an object

which we cannot be sure actually exists. This leads to the second reason why the methodological

reading is the only (textually) plausible reading of Kant's TD, which we will now discuss.

As we saw, there is very little definitive evidence in favor of the metaphysical readings of

Kant's TD. Moreover, we also saw that many of the most metaphysically-suggestive passages in

CPR, particularly those that come from the “Aesthetic,” lend themselves far more naturally to a

purely formal, methodological reading of the TD, one which emphasizes the importance of the

epistemic conditions in constructing a plausible rendition of Kant's theory of the TD, and how Kant

can seemingly commit himself to the view that certain things exist which we cannot obtain even the

most rudimentary knowledge of. Once we combine this fact – in addition to the one mentioned

above – with the equally devastating fact for the metaphysical readings that Kant repeatedly asserts

that his metaphysics is one which includes only one type of item, empirical-phenomenal objects of

sense, – “objects such as buildings, countries, and stars; and events such as the extinction of the

dinosaurs, plane journeys, and the death of Hegel”64 – a fact, moreover, which is evidenced in

Kant's careful and thus non-arbitrary placement of the “as” locution within his discussions of the

TD, two things become clear: the first is that the metaphysical readings universally fail as textually

plausible readings of Kantianism, and secondly, and by implication, the formal, non-metaphysical

reading of the TD, that is, the methodological reading, is the only survivor of our exegetical critique

63 CPR, Bxx. 64 Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, 82.

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with regards to Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. In the next chapter, we will consider

whether it is also the only survivor of our critical assessment with respect to Kant's doctrine of

things in themselves.

46

Chapter 2: The Conception of Things in Themselves in the Critical Philosophy:

Critical Issues

Introduction

In the first chapter of my thesis, in order to come to terms with the contemporary debate

with regards to the basic meaning and import of Kant's doctrine of the TD, I posed the all-important

question: is there a reading of Kant's TD that can be said to fit the texts, and yet remain

philosophically or systematically plausible? Moreover, in that chapter, I addressed only the former,

textual aspect of that question, leaving aside any considerations that might be brought to bear on the

latter issue of whether any of the transcendental readings, as I had formulated them here, might also

be seen to be systematically plausible. Needless to say, it is now time to address those

considerations against the backdrop of the four most significant transcendental interpretations of

Kantianism, which are, as I have termed them, the traditional ontological reading, the two-aspect

reading, the intrinsic nature reading, and finally, the methodological reading, the last of which is the

only formal, epistemological reading of those I considered. Simply put, having already examined

the textual grounds on which each of these readings rests, in this chapter, I will examine the

systematic grounds on which they rest in order to see if any of them can justifiably be characterized

as being systematically or philosophically plausible. For, in the event that there is one, and in the

event that it is the methodological reading, this would certainly demonstrate that Kant's

transcendental idealism is a perfectly plausible, acceptable metaphysical and epistemological

position in contemporary continental philosophy.

Further, it might be asked: what exactly does it mean, or more appropriately, what exactly

would it mean for one of our transcendental construals to be philosophically plausible? Well, the

simplest method for assessing philosophical plausibility, in my view, and the method which I have

adopted here, is to begin by outlining the various objections, be they metaphysical, epistemological,

or even methodological, that have traditionally been associated with each of the four transcendental

readings; then I will see whether any of those objections can be averted or perhaps even rejected

entirely. For, only then will I be in an adequate position to assess the overarching plausibility of

each of the transcendental readings I have formulated. Only if a legitimate case can be made that the

criticisms associated with the particular transcendental reading under consideration do not have

much argumentative force – regardless of the reason – can that reading legitimately be said to be

philosophically plausible.

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This chapter will consist of four main parts, each of which takes a different transcendental

interpretation of Kant's TD and examines it within the theoretical (viz., metaphysical and

epistemological) framework of the Critical philosophy, where these are taken in the following order:

the ontological reading, the two-aspect reading, the intrinsic nature reading, and the methodological

reading, adopting the approach outlined above.

Part 1: A Critical Assessment of the Ontological Construal

1.1. Metaphysical Extravagance

It shouldn't be too surprising for one to learn that all of the transcendental readings of Kant's

TD suffer from certain critical issues if they are examined against the backdrop of the major

metaphysical and epistemological themes of Kant's Critical system. This fact manifests itself

nowhere more acutely than when we consider what I have termed the traditional ontological reading

of the TD, the reading whereby Kant's TD is conceived in straightforwardly ontological terms as a

distinction between two numerically distinct, and thus mutually-opposed classes of object or

worlds. One such issue concerns the extent to which this reading makes a mockery of the Critical

enterprise as a whole, which is one of establishing the a priori conditions of a possible experience

(of objects) prior to, and independent of, such objects being given to us. Essentially, Kant's primary

concern was to reject the traditional program in metaphysics and epistemology according to which

the basic philosophical issue was a skeptical worry of whether, and if so to what extent, our

representations, or perceptions of objects can be seen to “match-up” with, and thus correspond to,

how those objects are “in themselves,” independently of the way in which they are “represented” or

“perceived” by us by in effect determining what it means for us to have knowledge of objects in the

first place. And, the problem for the ontological theorist, as I see it, is one of reconciling the very

minimalist metaphysical – one might even say downright epistemological – nerve of the Critical

enterprise on one hand, with the intrinsic, metaphysically-robust character of the ontological

reading of the TD on the other. My claim, simply put, is that the ontological reading is

metaphysically extravagant once we consider the finer details of Kantian transcendentalism. To

illustrate the exact sense in which the traditional ontological model of the TD contradicts the

epistemological nerve of the Critical philosophy as a whole, and so can be regarded as painting a

metaphysically extravagant picture of Kant's Critical philosophy, I will offer an account, however

brief, of Kant's famous Copernican turn in metaphysics, and then examine what implications this

so-called “Copernican turn,” as it has been called, has for Kantian metaphysics proper and for the

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ontological reading in particular.

In the early stages of the “Preface to the B edition” of CPR, while Kant is bemoaning the

state of the study of the science of metaphysics in his own time, in particular, why the field of

metaphysics has not so much as gained an inch of territory in its advance as a speculative science,

he formulates his famous Copernican turn in metaphysics, which, when properly understood and

implemented, Kant no doubt believes will resolve many (if not most) of the underlying problems

associated with the study of metaphysics. The solution, Kant tells us, lies in putting metaphysics

back on the secure path of a science. If metaphysics is to regain her throne as the “queen of all the

sciences,” according to Kant, she must take her place alongside mathematics and the natural

sciences on the sure road to truth; this is to say that we, as metaphysicians, must fundamentally

change the way in which we conceive of the discipline of metaphysics, and in particular the

methods we use to obtain metaphysical (synthetic a priori) knowledge of objects. In other words, if

we hope to achieve any progress within the field of our a priori knowledge of objects, we must seek

to determine the necessary, a priori, epistemic conditions of any possible experience – in short,

what cognitive structures enable us to have knowledge – of objects (and thus of an objective

experience) in the first place. Kant explains:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progressin explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest.65

Just as Copernicus transformed our attitudes in thinking about the heavenly bodies, Kant bids us to

re-think our metaphysical attitudes concerning the manner in which we obtain knowledge of

objects. To this end, we should no longer conceive of this latter process as proceeding from the

object to the subject but rather the other way around, namely, from the subject to the object. For, in

order to achieve a priori cognition of objects we must, contrary to the standard practice, treat

objects in the world as conforming to our cognition of them. The only way we can make “objects

conform to our knowledge,” and thereby attain knowledge of them a priori, is if we reformulate

metaphysics in a way that assures us that a priori knowledge is always within our reach by

65 CPR, Bxvi-xvii. See also Bxxiin.

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emphasizing the conditions for the possibility of cognition. In other words, only a metaphysics

which has at its aim an uncovering of the epistemic conditions for cognition (whatever those may

be) is on the sure path of a science, because this is the sole route by which to establish something in

regard to them a priori. That, I take it, is the underlying message of Kant's Copernican turn in

metaphysics.

But why might this pose a problem for proponents of either the two-object or two-worlds

variation of the traditional ontological construal of the TD, for how these Kantians interpret not

only the TD but Kantian idealism as a whole? What implications does our above analysis have for

the way traditionalists generally conceive of Kant's TD, and the doctrine of things in themselves,

specifically? I already answered this question when I said above that it is prima facie difficult to

reconcile two such disparate interpretations, namely, the anti-metaphysical, and thus wholly Critical

philosophy on one hand – highlighted in Kant's famous Copernican turn in metaphysics – with the

metaphysically robust character of the ontological reading, a reading which posits, in addition to the

ordinary furniture of the universe, an ontologically separate, and thus super-sensible realm of

intrinsic non-spatio-temporal things in themselves on the other. The two not only seem to be at odds

with one another, but to be downright contradictory to one another. Let me explain: if Kant's sole

aim was to reject the traditional rationalist approach in metaphysics, of attempting to acquire

unconditioned knowledge of objects through the use of nothing else but our faculty of pure reason

and its pure a priori concepts, in favor of a far more modest Critical one of attempting to establish

the a priori epistemic conditions of any possible experience (of objects), and in the process

emphasizes the necessity of those epistemic conditions, then it seems highly implausible that a

central feature of his transcendental idealism would have been a thoroughly rationalist commitment

to the existence of a class of super-sensible object beyond the realm of appearances, and therefore

beyond our knowledge.

Of course, this isn't the only interpretation of Kant's proposed Copernican turn in

metaphysics. In fact, as a staunch ontological theorist, James Van Cleve has argued66 that the most

natural way to read the Copernican turn is not to read it methodologically, epistemologically, or

even meta-philosophically in the respect outlined above, in which case Kant's aim is interpreted

much more modestly as one of simply emphasizing the necessity of the epistemic conditions for our

knowledge; rather, we should read it in more of a traditional idealistic light, whereby Kant's aim is

to show that we can only obtain metaphysical (synthetic a priori) knowledge of objects by

supposing that the basic features of objects are due not to the way in which those objects themselves

are constituted, but to the way in which they interact with our cognitive faculties, and thereby factor

66 See Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 5-6.

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into our representations. According to this latter interpretation, then, when Kant bids us to suppose

that objects must conform to our knowledge of them, he is not making a modest Critical

recommendation that we should attempt to establish the epistemic conditions of a possible

experience prior to any first-order claims into the state and/or nature of that experience as such.

Instead, he is claiming that our representations of objects accounts for the way those objects really

are (“in themselves”). In this way, Kant is advocating a thoroughly Berkeleian position with respect

to objects of our experience in that their very being – not just their secondary properties – is a direct

result of the existence of the subject perceiving or representing them. Objects of our experience are

thus said to exist only insofar as they are represented as objects by us, only insofar as they conform

to the epistemic conditions.67 Just as Copernicus

sought to explain the motions of the planets not by ascribing them to the bodies themselves as their real motions, but by supposing them to be apparent motions generated by the motion of the earthbound observer, … Kant seeks to account for many of the traits we observe in objects by supposing them to be traits at least partly due to the activity or constitution of the human spectator.68

Given this underlying picture of the aim of Copernicus's primary hypothesis, what this means for

our present purposes is the following: in interpreting the Copernican turn in the ontological terms

noted above, according to which Kant's proposed solution for making progress within the field of

metaphysics is to assume, in accordance with a thorough-going phenomenalism, that objects of

experience are existentially reducible to our transient, mental representations of them, Van Cleve is

by no means contradicting its meaning when he endorses a straightforwardly ontological view with

regards to Kant's TD – being that the two, as one can readily see, are in complete accord with one

another. Here, the upshot for the ontological theorist consists in the fact that the basic thrust of the

Copernican turn is certainly not incompatible with his preferred reading of the TD, contrary to what

we may have originally thought.

But this is not to say that Van Cleve's thoroughly idealistic approach to uncovering the

meaning of Kant's proposed Copernican turn in metaphysics is the correct one. Central to Van

Cleve's account of the meaning of the Copernican turn (as we saw) was the claim that, in attempting

to account for the motions of the heavenly bodies, Copernicus hypothesized that these perceived

motions are nothing more than that, perceived or merely “apparent motions generated by the motion

of the earthbound observer,”69 and are thus, at least in the mind-independent sense of the term, not

67 Robinson characterizes this position nicely when he says that, in the case of idealism, “the objects are dependent on the representations, in that they exist by virtue of the fact that their representations meet the epistemic conditions; as a result, the ontological conditions just are the epistemic conditions.” See Robinson, “Two Perspectives on Appearances and Things in Themselves,” 423.

68 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 5. 69 Ibid.

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fully real. However, this is not how Graham Bird interprets the Copernican turn. He claims that the

aim of Copernicus's hypothesis was much more modest in that it explained the motion of the planets

merely by taking into account the perspective of the human observer, and it is in this way that

synthetic a priori knowledge of objects is possible. Accordingly, he says:

The Copernican example, after all, does not reduce planetary motion to the observer's consciousness in an idealist way. It is rather that the physical motion of the observer is an essential part of the explanation of his conscious perception and of the real world of the solar system. The parallel would be not that Kant proposes to reduce objects, or the rules they obey, to a subject's consciousness, but that he treats the latter as a vital part of the explanation of the former … The envisaged “revolution” is a change in our conception of philosophy as well as in that of science; it is a radical change in our way of thinking which offers to reverse traditional philosophy.70

This is an explicit rejection of Van Cleve's idealist interpretation of Copernicus's primary

hypothesis, and of how a proper understanding of this hypothesis may help us to make further

progress within the field of metaphysics, thereby resolving the current predicament within that field.

As we can see, this is essentially a restatement of my interpretation I offered above in which I

claimed that the underlying meaning of Kant's Copernican turn was wholly methodological,

epistemological, or meta-philosophical in that it attempts to account for our synthetic a priori

knowledge of objects by suggesting that we must first identify what is necessary for us to obtain

knowledge of objects, and thus of an objective experience, in the first place and thus before we

attempt to acquire any knowledge of reality as such.

So far I have offered two main accounts of the primary aim and meaning of Kant's proposed

Copernican turn in metaphysics; the first of which focuses on the necessary status of the epistemic

conditions for any putative attempt at acquiring a priori knowledge of objects by essentially

claiming that the only way the desired form of progress can be made within the field of metaphysics

is to identify what these epistemic conditions are before we make any first-order knowledge-claims

of objects, whereas the second attempts to account for the aforementioned metaphysical knowledge

of objects by supposing that their fundamental traits are literally imposed on them by us. Against

this second, more traditional and therefore Berkeleian idealistic interpretation of Kant's Copernican

turn, which takes the famous Kantian “mind-making nature” doctrine to the literal extreme, I

responded by offering a far more modest account of what, properly speaking, Kant's so-called

“Copernican turn” amounts to within the field of metaphysics, specifically of how Copernicus's

primary hypothesis can serve as a corrective for what Kant deemed to be the then pitiful state of the

science of metaphysics. While I certainly favor Bird's interpretation over that of Van Cleve's, since

70 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 31.

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Kant is somewhat ambiguous in his remarks on the Copernican turn at CPR Bxxvi-xxvii, I cannot

decide the issue here. Seeing that no decisive resolution can be found on this score, I must therefore

now pass on to other more pressing concerns.

1.2. Phenomenalism

Apart from the charge that the ontological reading of the TD is metaphysically extravagant,

another of its shortcomings is that it is generally committed to construing Kant as a phenomenalist,

and so faces what I will call the problem of phenomenalism – whereby spatio-temporal

appearances, as a mere subset of our wholly “mental” representations, are essentially reducible to

nothing over and above the transient, mind-dependent contents of our thoughts, and which therefore

cannot exist unperceived.71 This problem is more than just the difficulty that, as a matter of fact,

many traditional ontological interpreters do associate the Critical philosophy with a traditional

Berkeleian idealism or more modern forms of phenomenalism.72 I would argue, in agreement with

Allison,73 that there is a necessary (one might also say conceptual) link between the two, viz.,

71 See, for example, Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), 44, where Audi says that phenomenalism is the thesis that spatio-temporal objects are constructions out of sense-data, or phenomena. He also says of phenomenalism that it is a “kind of idealism, since it construes physical objects as ideal, in the sense of being composed of 'ideas' (an old term for sense-data) rather than material stuff that would exist even if there were no minds and no ideas.” For the purposes of this discussion, I take Audi's definition of phenomenalism as standard, and so all that I mean when I say that ontological theorists of either the two-object or two-world persuasion tend to identify Kant as an “honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned idealist” is just that they ascribe to Kant the view that it is wholly illegitimate to talk meaningfully about outer objects, as well as any “objective” experience in general, precisely because outer objects are ontologically reducible to constructions of mere sense-data, or “ideas” which thus cannot be said to exist independent of our thoughts of such things.

72 See, in particular, Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 238; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 335; and Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 136-137. Although Guyer is more of a two-aspect theorist than either a two-object or two-worlds theorist (in short, an ontological theorist) like either Strawson or Van Cleve, he nevertheless shares their belief that certain aspects of Kant's Critical epistemology are intrinsically idealistic (or phenomenalistic) in the sense noted above.

73 See Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, 46. Allison's basic claim on this issue is a relatively simple one: once we accept the theory that claims regarding things as they are in themselves are held to be equivalent with claims regarding things as they really are, it is difficult, if not impossible, not to regard claims made about things as they merely appear to us to be equivalent with claims made about things as they merely seem to be for us, specifically for creatures with the kinds of cognitive faculties we possess. While I agree with Allison as far as the ontological readings (viz., the two-object and the two-world view) of the TD are concerned, there are no doubt exceptions to this rule. For example, the intrinsic nature reading, while it regards claims made about things as they are in themselves to be synonymous with claims made about things as they really are, still regards claims made about things as they merely appear to us as claims made about the real, albeit the relational, properties of these very same objects. As we saw, on the intrinsic nature reading, there is no idealism, just what Langton characterizes as an epistemic humility with respect to the intrinsic, non-relational properties of substances. Moreover, as we also saw, there isn't anything prohibiting us from taking a similar view on the two-aspect readings, for on this reading, we can consistently maintain that claims regarding things as they appear to us are equivalent to claims made about the real properties of things, but depending on the particular view to which we espouse, these real properties can mean any number of things. Ultimately, my view is just that there is a very strong link between the ontological reading of the TD and the belief that Kant was an idealist for whom the external, mind-independent world is nothing but a species of our representations, and for that reason the world does not actually retain a mind-independent status after all; however, as I just pointed out, it seems to me to be the case that this is the only metaphysical reading of the TD in

53

between understanding Kant's TD in a traditional ontological way in which appearances and things

in themselves represent two mutually exclusive classes of thing or object, and the belief that Kant

was at heart a closet Berkeleian for whom the realm of appearances was essentially nothing over

and above the realm of quasi-real, “virtual”74 objects, which we can fully know, but which cannot be

said to exist outside our knowledge, specifically our representations, of them.

The charge that Kant's Critical epistemology is phenomenalistic is by far one of the major

obstacles to reading Kant's TD in a traditional ontological fashion, as I would argue that, to ascribe

to Kant theses, principles, or views of an outwardly phenomenalistic sort can be seen to be a gross

violation of many of his most basic epistemological and metaphysical principles. My claim is that

any view of Kant that can be characterized as outwardly “phenomenalistic” directly contradicts the

underlying realistic thrust of pivotal sections of CPR such as the “Refutation of Idealism,” or even

the “Analogies of Experience,” for example. In order to fully understand why there has been such a

reluctance among Kant scholars in recent years to understand the Critical epistemology within the

framework of a traditional idealism or a more recent phenomenalism and its program of a normative

epistemology directed at a traditional (and, for Kant, “idle”) skepticism about our knowledge of an

outer world, I will consider Kant's official refutation of Berkeleian idealism at B69. In so doing, I

hope to overturn the notion that Kant was an “honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned” idealist in any

meaningful sense at all, and in the process I will also be undercutting the grounds on which the

ontological reading of the TD ultimately rests, a key tenet of which is that very phenomenalist

ascription mentioned earlier.

As I just noted, the passage at B69 constitutes Kant's official rejection of Berkeleian

idealism, that is, the position he will come to define in the “Refutation” as the position according to

which the existence of objects in space, as well as everything of which the latter serves as a

condition, is not just taken to be “doubtful” or “indemonstrable,” but “false” and “impossible,” and

so it is in this way that Berkeleian idealism regards outer spatial objects as “merely imaginary

entities.” It reads:

When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself. Thus when I maintain that the quality of space and of time, in conformity with

which such a connection exists. 74 I am referring to Van Cleve's characterization of appearances as “virtual objects” noted above. See Van Cleve,

Problems from Kant, 136-137 for this characterization.

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which, as a condition of their existence, I posit both bodies and my own soul, lies in my mode of intuition and not in those objects in themselves, I am not saying that bodies merely seem to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion.75

When Kant warns us in this passage not to confuse his view with a view that takes the existence of

outer spatial objects to be mere illusion, he is attempting to distance himself from being associated

with Berkeleian idealism. He then goes on to corroborate his view, inherent to transcendental

idealism as such, that space and time cannot be found in objects “in themselves,” independent from

the way in which they are given to us, by reflecting on the absurdities in which such a view is

involved, such as the notion that two infinite things, which are neither themselves substances nor

anything inhering in substances, could not only continue to exist in the absence of all other existing

objects, but function as a necessary condition for the existence of those very objects. But the

ultimate significance of this passage lies in the fact that it no doubt constitutes Kant's most explicit

rejection of Berkeleian idealism, and it can therefore be used against any theory, such as that of the

ontological reading of the TD, of Kant's idealism that aligns it with a traditional, Berkeleian

idealism whereby empirical reality is taken to be illusory, or at the very least not fully real.

1.3. Affection

In my initial exposition of the ontological reading of the TD in chapter 1, we saw that such

views carry with them the notion of the thing in itself as some sort of ultimate metaphysical “cause”

or “ground” of our immanent experience. This view gets its exegetical force from such passages as

the following, taken, respectively, from the “Aesthetic,” as well as the “Analytic,” specifically the

“Deduction,” where Kant infers, suggests, or even sometimes downright asserts, that the thing in

itself (or in some instances, the transcendental object) acts in some robust metaphysical sense as the

non-sensible “cause” or “ground” of our experience, a “cause” or “ground,” moreover, which

somehow “affects” the mind, giving rise to our spatio-temporal representations of objects.

In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only in so far as the object is given to us. This again is only possible, to man at least, in so far as the mind is affected in a certain way.76

All representations have, as representations, their object, and can themselves in turn

75 CPR, B69. 76 CPR, A19/B33.

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become objects of other representations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representation, which in turn have their object – an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x.77

With this understanding that Kant's conception of things in themselves is meant to act as the

metaphysical Grund of our experience, it isn't difficult to see how the traditionalist view arose

whereby our phenomenal representations are said to be representations of something, oftentimes

construed as the thing in itself or the transcendental object = x. Otherwise put, one of the underlying

assumptions of the traditional ontological view of the TD is that Kantian representations constitute

the subjective, mind-dependent element in our immanent experience – what cannot exist

independent of the existence of the cognitive subject – whereas things in themselves (or even

sometimes the transcendental object), on the contrary, constitute the objective, and thus wholly

mind-independent element in our experience, that is, mind-independent reality itself, or more

crudely, what remains when all else vanishes. A prime example of someone who endorses just such

a view of the relation between representations and things in themselves (or what some have thought

to be the same thing, the transcendental object = x), is Graham Priest, and can be evidenced in the

following claims he makes about representations. He claims:

The phenomena or representations perceived are a result of something contributed by the things in themselves … but also of the a priori structure our mind employs to constitute the representations (intuitions). In particular, space and time are not features of things themselves, but are the most important such structures. For Kant, a horse is a spatio-temporal representation of an object; but what the representation is a representation of (which the rest of us might call a horse) is neither perceived nor in space and time.78

As we will see, this interpretation, even though it may be regarded as the most natural or intuitive

way of understanding the relation between Kantian representations and what these representations

are supposed to be representations “of,” it is clearly subject to criticism, which I now comment

upon.

The account just offered of the relation between phenomenal representations and the objects

of such representations – what our spatio-temporal representations purport to be representations

“of” – turns on the ontological equivalency of the thing in itself as a metaphysical Grund of our

experience. Once the notion of a Grund of our experience is explicable in metaphysical terms as an

absolute foundation of sorts upon which all of our immanent experience is based, securing our

77 CPR, A108-109. 78 Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought, 83.

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experience from any robust form of skepticism, it seems inevitable that some type of causal process

is introduced in order to explain the determinate relation between such things, viz., between our

representations on one hand, and the objects of such representations on the other. That is to say, the

ontological theorist's use of the notion of a Grund of our experience is problematic in the context of

an examination of the critical issues with regards to the ontological view precisely because it

introduces onto the critical scene a highly dubious causal process by which transcendent things in

themselves are said to “affect” or “impinge upon” our sensibilities, thereby giving rise to our

representations. This is exactly what occasioned Jacobi's famous outburst “without that

presupposition [noumenal causation by means of things in themselves] I could not enter into the

system, but with it I could not stay within it.”79 This brings us to the well-known problem of

affection, or what I will also refer to as the problem of noumenal causation by means of things in

themselves.

Allow me to explain more clearly how Jacobi's problem, just noted, arises. The problem

with taking what I have just outlined as the most “natural” or “intuitive” approach to the relation

and meaning of our spatio-temporal representations of objects, and appearances and things in

themselves, – the two obvious candidates for what our representations are representations “of” –

can be summarized in the following terms: if we assume, as Jacobi obviously did, that the Kantian

concept of things as they are in themselves denotes a discrete type of object or thing, independent of

the realm of appearances and its respective constitutive principles, and which is somehow

responsible for securing our experience from a sustained skeptical critique (qua Grund of our

experience), then it seems that we are constrained to think of the causal process by which we

represent or intuit such objects in terms of transcendent things in themselves “affecting” our

(immanent) receptive cognitive faculties, thereby producing the relevant spatio-temporal

representations in us. Simply put, it is problematic (as we will see) for it is a causal, temporal

process which holds between transcendent objects and our immanent representations of those

objects. As representations cannot be responsible for producing other representations, the thing in

itself enters the picture at this juncture to do the job of accounting, in however minimal a sense, for

the spatio-temporal character of our experience and its constitutive representations. Returning to

what Jacobi said: “without that presupposition [noumenal causation by means of things in

themselves] I could not enter into the [Critical] system.”80

But as Jacobi was also no doubt well aware – evidenced in his further remark that “with it

[noumenal causation by means of things in themselves] I could not stay within it [the Critical

79 PW, p. 336. 80 Ibid.

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philosophy]”81 – this position is fraught with a number of issues, foremost among which is the

problem of affection. As I noted, for the ontological theorist to posit things in themselves as the

ultimate cause of our representations directly violates Kant's view as regards to the proper

immanent employment of the categories; that is to say, by virtue of the fact that the proper

employment of the a priori categories is immanently within the field of a possible experience, the

law of cause and effect is objectively valid only insofar as it is said to hold between objects within

that realm. So the ontological assumption whereby transcendent things in themselves constitute or

structure our empirical representations of objects implicitly violates the Kantian limitation with

regards to the proper employment of the a priori categories within the empirical realm of sense by

effectively appealing to a super-sensible process of causation by means of which such a structuring

can occur. Essentially, Jacobi's frustration emanates from his realization that he is no better off once

he has entered into the Kantian system, with the doctrine of noumenal causation by means of things

in themselves in hand as it were, than he was before, considering that he has effectively violated a

core epistemological principle of the Critical philosophy itself, namely, the principle which says

that the a priori categories are objectively valid only insofar as they are employed (immanently)

within the field of a possible experience.

As I noted in connection with the above discussion, as soon as the ontological theorist (in

this case, Jacobi) attempts to go beyond the field of a possible experience and posits non-sensible

things in themselves (or transcendental objects) as the causes of our representations – as he must do

since representations cannot give rise to other representations – the ontological theorist throws

himself into a Critical predicament of sorts. To be sure, it is only within the field of the empirical

that the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories), such as causality (among others), have

application. In the B edition of the “Transcendental Deduction,” Kant says:

Even, therefore, with the aid of [pure] intuition, the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle experience. Our conclusion is therefore this: the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience.82

And again,

In the end, therefore, the categories have no other possible employment than the empirical.83

The primary import of these passages is simply that the categories cannot be employed outside the 81 Ibid.82 CPR, B147-148. 83 CPR, A146/B185.

58

confines of the conditions of a possible experience. In other words, apart from the way in which the

human discursive mind structures, by means of the a priori forms and categories, the empirical

realm of spatio-temporal appearances, categories like causality, substance, community, unity,

plurality, etc. do not have any objective validity (or reality) at all, in the sense that they do not

apply to actually (or really) existing objects. Now, as we will shortly see, this is not to say that,

outside the phenomenal-empirical realm, the categories are utterly meaningless; but it is to say that

they constitute, refer, or rather determine objects only insofar as those objects exist (immanently)

within the field of a possible experience. So for the ontological theorist to maintain that things in

themselves in some sense cause, affect, or even impinge upon our receptive sensibilities – by

means of a causal process, of course – prima facie violates the core Kantian epistemic principle

that the use of the categories cannot extend beyond the sphere of the necessary a priori conditions

of a possible experience.

Be that as it may, can't one respond on behalf of the ontological reading and its adherents

that the above line of criticism holds only insofar as the account of Kant's categories and the proper

employment of those a priori categories is one which deals only with the “schematized” use of the

categories, leaving out any mention of the “pure” or the “unschematized” use of the categories?

For, isn't it correct for one to argue that it is only the categories that have been subsumed under

some universal rule (or transcendental schema), that enables them to apply (universally) to things in

the first place, and that thereby furnishes them with an empirical and wholly finite scope? This line

of response correctly notes that, on Kant's part, to employ the categories outside the necessary a

priori conditions of a possible experience in an “unschematized” fashion is not, properly speaking,

completely meaningless; for in such an event, the categories would still retain a purely logical

meaning. Kant explains:

If we omit a restricting condition, we would seem to extend the scope of the concept that was previously limited. Arguing from this assumed fact, we conclude that the categories in their pure significance, apart from all conditions of sensibility, ought to apply to things in general, as they are, and not, like the schemata, represent them only as they appear. They ought, we conclude, to possess a meaning independent of all schemata, and of much wider application. Now there certainly does remain in the pure concepts of understanding, even after elimination of every sensible condition, a meaning; but it is purely logical, signifying only the bare unity of the representations.84

But what exactly is this purely logical meaning of the category of causality, according to Kant? Van

Cleve takes it to mean nothing more than the abstract relation of ground to consequent. He says,

“The upshot so far is that Kant is free to talk of things in themselves as causes, as long as causation

84 CPR, A146-147/B186.

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is understood abstractly as the relation of ground to consequent, a relation that can hold between

nontemporal items.”85 So the argument goes: the ontological theorist's use of Kant's notion of the

“unschematized” employment of the categories in attempting to provide a non-categorial account

of the way in which transcendent things in themselves causally interact with our receptive sense-

faculties effectively thereby allows him to formulate a prima facie plausible account of affection.

And it is in this way that Jacobi can remain within the Critical system.

Since it really doesn't tell us much about the relation between transcendent things in

themselves and our empirically instantiated representations of those things, other than to say that, if

we are to remain true Kantians, such a relation must be understood as the purely logical relation

between ground and consequent, one could legitimately argue that the ontological theorist's

response to Jacobi's famous dilemma is hardly a satisfying one. Although I agree with this line of

thought as far as it goes, I'm not sure it's necessarily a decisive one against the ontological theorist's

attempt to offer an “unschematized” use of the categories in making sense of the relation between

our spatio-temporal representations and that which these representations are representations “of”

(viz., things in themselves). All I can say at this time, therefore, is that, much like our discussion of

the metaphysical extravagance criticism, and the meaning of Kant's proposed Copernican turn in

metaphysics, there is no obvious, ultimately decisive objection against the ontological position. In

the case just mentioned, what this means is that there is nothing to say that the Copernican turn

could not be interpreted in an intrinsically ontological way; now, what this means in the present

case of Jacobi's famous dilemma associated with the problem of affection (viz., noumenal

causation by means of things in themselves) is that there is once again nothing to suggest that

Jacobi could not have entered into the system and stayed there. We have seen that, by incorporating

the notion of the “unschematized” use of the categories, a use which does not rely on any of the

forms of our intuition, the ontological theorist offers a perfectly plausible account of the relation

between representations and things in themselves, specifically of whether it is possible to retain

some semblance of the theory that the latter acts to ground the former.

To conclude our discussion of the ontological reading (viz., the two-object and the two-

world view) solely on the basis of systematic considerations at this point, it is obvious that such

readings might be said to suffer in three important respects. One of which is that they seem to paint

a picture of Kantian metaphysics that is not just at odds with, but downright contradicts, the

underlying epistemic thrust of the Critical philosophy, particularly the epistemic thrust inherent in

Kant's famed Copernican revolution. Secondly, they also undoubtedly fail to do justice to the sense

in which Kant's transcendental idealism is wholly compatible with a robust form of empirical

85 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 138.

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realism, made explicit in the “Refutation of Idealism,” that outer experience is the only immediate

form of experience we possess. And third, ontological readings encounter philosophical difficulties

as they attempt to offer an adequate, non-contradictory account of the way in which transcendent

things in themselves can causally “affect” and “impinge upon” our sense faculties, thereby

contributing something to our spatio-temporal experience, all the while remaining wholly removed

from just such an experience. As for whether these criticisms are successful, we saw that only the

second one survives unscathed, and this for the reason that there seems to be an essential

connection between ontological readings, and the notion that Kant was an “honest-to-goodness,

old-fashioned” idealist, a notion that is undoubtedly at odds with Kant's expressed views on the

subject. Given the fact that ontological readings of the TD seemingly contradict such an essential

component of Kant's theoretical philosophy as the B69 passage, it is difficult for me to entertain the

idea that it constitutes a philosophically plausible position with regards to Kantianism proper.

Part 2: A Critical Assessment of the Aspect Construal

2.1. The Mysterious “Third” Thing

Interestingly, many of the critical issues associated with the two-aspect reading of the TD

have traditionally been raised in connection with the purely formal, methodological construal. This

can be explained from the fact that many contemporary Kantian commentators conflate the purely

formal methodological reading put forward by Graham Bird, Henry Allison, and others, with the

thoroughly metaphysical reading of Kantian idealism I have here labeled as the two-aspect

reading.86 Given this, it is not particularly surprising to learn that a number of problems, critical as

well as exegetical, typically associated with the methodological reading do not actually apply to the

methodological reading of the TD as such; instead, they apply to the two-aspect reading of the TD,

and in what follows we will discuss each of them at length.

One of these criticisms is commonly labeled as the problem of the mysterious third thing.

Very basically, in formulating Kant's TD in the metaphysical terms of a distinction between two

86 See Robinson, “Two Perspectives on Appearances and Things in Themselves,” 419-428. As we will come to see, due to a basic misunderstanding of what the methodological reading properly consists in, Robinson mistakenly associates problems with Allison's methodological (what he misleadingly calls the two-aspect reading) that can only hold against the actual two-aspect reading as such, viz., the thoroughly metaphysical view of Kant's idealism which says that the TD is, very simply, a metaphysical distinction between two discrete sets of properties, features, or characteristics of one and the same object, each of which has its own unique qualities: spatio-temporal, categorial properties on one hand, and intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial properties on the other. As I have explained in some detail in the past, while the former corresponds to the thing's “as-appearance” aspect, the latter corresponds to its “in-itself” aspect.

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mutually opposed and mutually exclusive sets of properties, features, or more appropriately,

“aspects” of one and the same underlying entity, the two-aspect reading implicitly raises the

question of what exactly it is that these sets of properties, features, or aspects are sets of properties,

features, or aspects “of.” Since it doesn't seem plausible to postulate either appearances or things in

themselves in the role of this third thing – seeing that an aspect of an appearance cannot be another

appearance, nor an aspect of a thing in itself another thing in itself – this third thing must be

something totally different from both Kantian appearances as well as things in themselves. As we

have seen in various connections in the past, according to the two-aspect account of Kant's TD as a

metaphysical distinction between two different aspects of one and the same entity, the things that

we are immediately aware of in our experience – or one might just as well say reality as a whole –

thus seem to have two components: a spatio-temporal, categorial appearance component, and an

intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial in itself component. As I noted above, since the third

thing cannot be associated with either the former or with the latter, it falls upon the aspect theorist to

devise an alternative thing or entity of some sort which could plausibly function as the thing of

which the aforementioned two components are components of. This is exactly what Bird is driving

at in the following passage, where he says:

If we take the label “two aspects” seriously then it will be necessary to ask what these two aspects are aspects of. It seems that they can't be aspects either of appearances or of things in themselves, since those are the aspects. We may consequently be led into the position of wondering what mysterious third thing, itself neither an appearance nor a thing in itself, these might be aspects or features of.87

In just what sense there is a quandary associated with the two-aspect reading of the TD arising

from the dual-aspect character of the reading itself, which I have here termed the problem of the

“mysterious third thing,” has now become more clear. It is in virtue of the fact that this reading

conceives of the TD in metaphysical terms as a distinction between different aspects of one and the

same entity, an “as-appearance” aspect, and an “in-itself” aspect, and the further fact that aspects of

a thing must be different from that which they are aspects “of” – an aspect of a chair cannot be the

chair itself, but its size, shape, color, etc … – that the entity of which the aforementioned two

components are components “of” cannot function either as an appearance or a thing in itself,

raising the question of what this third thing ultimately is.

Might this third thing be the transcendental object, though? This is basically what Allison

suggests on the issue of what the mutually opposing, non-overlapping properties of the thing, viz.,

the “in-itself” properties and the “as-appearance” properties, are properties of when he says:

The resources of CPR can provide only one conceivable answer: the [third] thing

87 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 41.

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must be characterized as a “transcendental object = x.” What this suggests, however, is not the rejection of any connection between the thing in itself and transcendental object, but rather the necessity for a further distinction between the thing in itself simpliciter, which for us (as finite discursive intellects) can be thought merely as a transcendental object = x, and the thing considered as it is in itself, which is thought through pure categories. The basic difference is that the former must be characterized as “= x” because it remains inaccessible to all of the resources of a discursive intellect, while the latter, as involving independence merely from sensible conditions, can at least be thought problematically.88

By introducing the further distinction between the thing in itself simpliciter, which, as Allison says,

is removed from all of the resources of a discursive intuition, and the thing considered as it is “in

itself” apart from merely the sensible conditions of a discursive intuition, Allison is essentially

trying to argue for the identification of the thing in itself (in this case, the thing in itself simpliciter

not the thing considered as it is in itself) and the transcendental object. Now, if I understand

Allison's own position correctly, this issue is not one he actually has to address, as the

methodological view is not committed to any such “third thing.” For, on the position Allison

adopts, we have seen that Kant's TD merely denotes two ways that things can be considered, but

does not thereby attribute to them two types of properties.89 Nonetheless, we can still consider how

far his suggestion might prove helpful to the two-aspect theorist. There is thus no question of an

underlying third thing of which these properties are properties of, and which can neither be an

appearance nor a thing in itself. On the more important issue of what this means from the

perspective of the problem of the third thing in relation to the two-aspect reading of the TD, and

whether it proves decisive against the latter, it must be noted that Allison has effectively opened the

door to the idea that Kant's transcendental object can plausibly function as the mysterious third

thing of which appearances and things in themselves are aspects of, and which forms the basis of

our present inquiry.

In assessing whether Kant's transcendental object is a plausible candidate for the mysterious

third thing, perhaps it may be worthwhile for us to consider in more detail exactly what the

transcendental object is, according to Kant. Arguably, Kant's most concerted effort to explain what

the concept of the transcendental object consists in occurs in the A edition of “The Ground of the

Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena,” where he says:

All are representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some object; and since objects are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental object; and by that is meant a something = X, of which we

88 Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16. Brackets mine.

89 Ibid., 14-17.

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know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought. Consequently it is not in itself an object of knowledge, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general – a concept which is determinable through the manifold of these appearances.90

The transcendental object, I take it, is the completely indeterminate thought (viz., the thought of an

unknown something = x) of the object of our representations on the transcendental level of

discourse, meaning apart from the way in which such objects factor into our determinate, spatio-

temporal, categorial experience. I believe this is Allison's thought when he proclaims,

the concept functions as a kind of transcendental pointer, which serves to define the philosophical task by indicating that the commonsensical and transcendentally realistic concern with the “real” nature of objects must be replaced by a critical analysis of the conditions of the representation of an object.91

It is in this sense that the concept of the transcendental object serves as the transcendental correlate

of the unity of apperception, the thought of the non-formal, non-categorial, and thus objectively

“real” ground of our representations; it is for just those reasons that the transcendental object = x

cannot be an object of knowledge for us. Granted, Kant's account in CPR of the role and meaning of the transcendental object in the

Critical philosophy is clouded in some obscurity. In an important sense, this proves somewhat

advantageous in the present context in deciding the extent to which the transcendental object is a

plausible candidate for the mysterious third thing, because there is nothing to suggest, in the

account provided, that the transcendental object can't function as the mysterious third thing, the

thing of which the “as-appearance” and “in-itself” aspect of things are ultimately supposed to be

aspects “of.” One can therefore see that one of the major issues confronting two-aspect views of the

TD has here been dispelled, if not in whole then at least in part.

2.2. Sameness

There is not just an issue with identifying what this third object, which is neither appearance

nor thing in itself, but which in some mysterious sense has each of their respective sets of

properties: “as-appearance” properties and “in-itself” properties, there is the further issue

90 CPR, A250-251. 91 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 60-61.

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concerning the character of this mysterious third thing and how it can have such apparently

contrary features as those specified above. To put it in these terms: if this third underlying thing, of

which both Kantian appearances and things in themselves are supposed to be aspects, cannot itself

be either an appearance or a thing in itself, but must in an important respect have each of them as

its attributes, it must also in an important respect have properties of both these types, meaning that

it must have both “as-appearance” properties or features as well as “in-itself” properties or features,

the former consisting of the spatio-temporal relations in which things inhere, as well as the

categorial properties that relate to the concepts of the understanding by means of which the things

themselves are made intelligible to us, whereas the latter consist of intrinsically non-spatio-

temporal, acategorial properties. This is to say that the character of this third thing must be such as

to be both spatial and somehow non-spatial, temporal and atemporal, substantial and yet non-

substantial, causal and interactive, yet non-causal and non-interactive, and so on. But, the obvious

question is: how can something have both of these sets of properties, when these properties are so

radically different from each another as the spatial and non-spatial, temporal and atemporal, modal

and non-modal, etc … ? In the words of Hoke Robinson, “we need an explanation as to how the

same thing can have both as-appearance and in-itself aspects, where these involve apparently

contrary features.”92

As far as I understand him, the main reason for Robinson's conclusion that Allison's “aspect

view” cannot possibly account for some non-vacuous sense in which objects of sense (phenomena)

and objects of the understanding (noumena) can be said to be “aspects” of one and the same thing is

that he does not believe that the precise characters of the two things under question are ultimately

compatible at all, and in that sense are incapable of inhering in one and the same object; in fact, his

claim is that they are mutually contradictory in the metaphysical respect that being endowed with

one of them excludes being endowed with the other. Furthermore, Robinson claims that it thus lies

squarely on the shoulders of the Allisonian “aspect” theorist to explain how appearances and things

in themselves can both be “aspects” of one underlying thing, and Robinson's view is that they

obviously cannot. He says:

We would not, for instance, accept the possibility of a round square on the suggestion that we distinguish methodologically the consideration of it as round from the consideration of it as square; we would want some demonstration that the two considerations are nonvacuous, and that the same thing can have both round and square aspects. Thus the original criticism remains unanswered: we need an explanation as to how the same thing can have both as-appearance and in-itself aspects, where these involve apparently contrary features.93

92 Robinson, “Two Perspectives on Appearances and Things in Themselves,” 422. 93 Ibid.

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To the crucial point of how one and the same thing can function both as an appearance and as a

thing in itself, and as a consequence can be said to have spatio-temporal, categorial properties in

one respect, and intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial properties in another respect,

Robinson's central claim in the above passage is that this would be equivalent to the idea of

positing a round-square, something that can have the property of being square and also of being

round. Robinson then concludes, on the basis of this example, that it is metaphysically

inconceivable for one thing to have both “as-appearance” and “in-itself” properties, and the

corollary claim is that it is thus metaphysically inconceivable for appearances and things in

themselves to be discrete “aspects” of one underlying thing. Just as it is impossible for us to think

of a round-square, according to Robinson, it is equally impossible for us to think of something that

can be both spatial and non-spatial, temporal and atemporal, causal and interactive, and yet non-

causal and non-interactive, etc … as one and the same thing cannot have each of these mutually-

incompatible types of properties.

Robinson's argument regarding the sameness of the object having each of the

aforementioned properties, the “as-appearance” and the “in-itself” properties, consists in the claim

that, if the Allisonian “aspect view” is to escape the charge of incoherence, it must offer an

explanation as to how one and the same thing can have such apparently contrary features as the

“as-appearance” and the “in-itself.” Allison attempts to defuse the thorny metaphysical implications

any such “aspect view” is commonly thought to have by underlining the formal methodological of

the aspect view (which is really just the methodological view), arguing in effect that the

methodological view, when it is properly understood, does not thereby ascribe two sets of

properties to one and the same object, whatever this object may be; however, Robinson is not at all

convinced, claiming that:

Normally, a consideration of a thing under some aspect or respect A would be vacuous if there is no sense in which the thing has, or is A: I can consider the Pietà as a great work of art, a lump of marble, an expression of religious faith, or a valuable commodity, but to consider it as a rocket or as a mathematical formula is just to be mistaken. Thus if the two considerations are to be nonvacuous, we must ultimately deal with the aspects to which the considerations are directed, and hence with the original question, that of the sameness of the object having the two aspects.94

According to Robinson, the inevitable problem Allison needs to resolve in this context is that he has

to provide a coherent account of the way in which Kant's TD can be reduced to a distinction

between two “aspects” of one and the same thing, which entails providing a non-vacuous

characterization of the two aspects, which you can't do if they are incompatible. In the event that 94 Ibid., 421.

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Allison fails to provide such an account, which is exactly what Robinson concludes, it would then

seem to be the case that the sameness worry is unresolved on an aspect reading.

Clearly, this issue can be seen to turn on whether, and if so to what extent, “as-appearance”

properties and “in-itself” properties are as opposed to one another as Robinson supposes with his

example, just mentioned, of a round-square, and the answer is by no means obvious. For, on the one

hand, one might be prone to argue against Robinson that for something to have formal, categorial

properties as well as non-formal, acategorial properties is ultimately no different from something

having both a shape as well as a color – the computer on which I type, for example, is a black,

rectangular object with numerous additional features. However, on the other hand, it is equally easy

to see how one might agree with Robinson in the respect that for something to have formal,

categorial properties, together with non-formal, acategorial properties is tantamount to the case

above of imputing both square features and round features to one and the same object, and so to

claim that such apparently contrary features can inhere in one object is a metaphysical absurdity.

Admittedly, I cannot decide this issue here, and can only respond with the observation that, even

though our intuitions may initially lie with Robinson on this front, this is certainly not to say that his

argument is decisive in that respect. I'm certainly not saying that Robinson is wrong here, but I am

saying that he doesn't adequately demonstrate that ascribing phenomenal properties such as

spatiality, temporality, substantiality, etc … in addition to noumenal properties such as non-

spatiality, atemporality, non-substantiality, and the like, to one and the same object is not analogous

to ascribing to one object a determinate shape and a determinate color – in the case of my computer,

this would amount to claiming it is both rectangular as well as black, among other things.

2.3. Isomorphism

There is another, related problem in addition to the sameness objection, and it is one which

can quite easily be confused with the sameness objection. This is the problem of isomorphism, and

it concerns the precise relation between objects as they appear to us (phenomena) on one hand, and

objects as they are in themselves (noumena) on the other. More specifically, the problem of

isomorphism (or sameness of structure) is, as I understand it, the conceptual problem associated

with the question of how we are to make sense of the precise relation between the object as it

appears to us in space and time, and the object as it really is outside of space and time. Given the

nature of the “as-appearance” aspect of objects as one which includes spatio-temporal properties in

relation to their “in-itself” aspect as one which includes intrinsically non-spatio-temporal properties,

it becomes difficult, if not altogether impossible, for us to comprehend the way in which the object

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is given to us in space-time in relation to the way in which this very same object is independent of

the space-time framework. It arises from the fact that, on an aspect view, every object as it appears

to us is required to have an additional “in-itself” aspect with substantive non-spatio-temporal

characteristics, and this means that “since objects as appearances are individuated by their

spatiotemporal characteristics, so would be the underlying thing in its in-itself aspect, contrary to

the Kantian doctrine of the non-spatiality of things in themselves.”95 Robinson's aim in bringing in

the notion of the individuating function of space-time, and the consequence that the objects existing

in space-time are individual things as such – and can thus be understood to be individual things as

such – is just that it is difficult to comprehend the connection between the spatio-temporal,

phenomenal aspect of the object on one hand, and the non-spatio-temporal, and thus non-

individuated noumenal aspect on the other hand. One way of putting it is to ask: how can we can

say that there is a noumenal aspect for every phenomenal object if we cannot even identify the

former in any meaningful sense as an individual thing as such, as one individuated aspect? The

point Robinson is trying to convey, even if he doesn't say it explicitly, is that it therefore seems to be

the case that the only way we can possibly make sense of the relation between the two aspects is in

terms of a one-to-one correspondence theory between the “as-appearance” (or the phenomenal)

aspect, and the “in-itself” (or the noumenal) aspect, that is, the object as it appears to us under the

sensible conditions as opposed to the object as it is “in itself,” independent from those sensible

conditions.

At the same time, though, as anyone familiar with Kant's theory of the categories very well

knows, such a correspondence theory must be rejected on the grounds that it employs the category

of unity and can thus legitimately be said to violate the Kantian stricture that the categories cannot

be employed beyond the field of a possible experience, and so cannot be used in connection with

things as they are in themselves beyond that very field. Alternatively, we also cannot say that things

in themselves exist in terms of a plurality since plurality is once again one of the categories of

quantity. So with this general background, it becomes apparent that we can neither make sense of

the noumenal realm of things in themselves as a realm of one un-individuated single thing, and in

that respect as the realm of the thing in itself, nor as a realm of many individuated things, and in that

respect as the realm of things in themselves, for in the former case we are employing the category

of unity transcendently and thus beyond the realm of their proper immanent employment, and in the

latter case we are employing the category of plurality in that same transcendent sense as well.

James Van Cleve provides a way out of this paradox when he suggests that, instead of

thinking of the determinate correlation between the two aspects of object as one of a one-to-one

95 Ibid., 425.

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correspondence between the phenomenal and the noumenal, between an intrinsically spatio-

temporal aspect on one hand, and an intrinsically non-spatio-temporal aspect on the other, one

might think of it in terms of a correlation between phenomenal objects and noumenal facts. For, in

the event that there is only one undivided noumenon, which Van Cleve admits is a real possibility,

there is still going to be a plurality of facts involving this one undivided noumenon, as he says here:

perhaps, indeed, there is only one noumenal object, but there will surely be a plurality of facts involving this noumenal object. The needed correlation could then hold between phenomenal objects and noumenal facts. Compare for a moment the relation of the many modes to the one substance in the system of Spinoza: the existence of mode 1 (a wave in the ocean) correlates with God's being F (undulating under the attribute of extension), the existence of mode 2 with God's being G, and so on. Such a correlation opens the way for various possible isomorphisms; for example, it might be that God's being F is the immanent cause of his being G iff mode 1 is the transeunt cause of mode 2, and so on. In an analogous way, isomorphism might be possible for Kant.96

While Van Cleve admits that there may not be any way of specifying the determinate correlation

between the “as-appearance” and “in-itself” aspects of things – which raises the question of whether

this conception of isomorphism might be a vacuous one97 – we could still say that, for every given

relation which holds among phenomena, there is a corresponding relation holding among noumena.

At the very least, this shows that our original worry that it is prima facie incoherent to posit one and

the same entity which has both spatio-temporal properties as well as intrinsically non-spatio-

temporal properties may have been a bit misplaced. Even if we are constrained to speak of the

noumenal realm as one undivided, un-individuated, singular noumenon, there are still ways of

conceiving how such a realm might be said to “match-up” with our spatio-temporal representations

of individuated phenomena, which is to claim that the two aspects might be isomorphic after all.

2.4. Affection (again)

Moreover, the two-aspect view faces the further familiar difficulty (already discussed in

previous connection with the ontological readings of Kant's TD) commonly referred to as the

problem of affection (or noumenal causation).98 To start with, since I already explained why the

problem of affection presents issues for the Kantian, specifically in connection with the traditional

ontological interpretation of Kantian idealism, and how the traditionalists of this type can

ostensively escape the crux of the issue itself, it would be entirely superfluous on my part if I were

96 Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 158. 97 See Van Cleve, Problems from Kant, 156-159. 98 See Robinson, “Two Perspectives on Appearances and Things in Themselves,” 422-428.

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to explain this problem again in considerable detail. Therefore, all I will do here is explain why the

problem of affection putatively reappears on an aspect view of the TD.

First of all, we know that, on an aspect construal of the TD, things as they are in themselves

act in some sense as the metaphysical ground (“Grund”) of things as they appear to us, or as we

experience them under the conditions under which they are given to us. And even though the notion

of things in themselves qua Grund of appearances looks at least prima facie ambiguous, one way

we can understand this “ground” is in terms of a non-formal, and thus wholly mind-independent,

metaphysical foundation of an unknown kind “underlying” or “underpinning” the objects of a

possible experience, securing that experience from an idle skepticism. But, once again, the problem

of affection is found lurking in the background. Hoke Robinson is well aware of this when he

remarks: “If what exists as appearance is of what exists as thing in itself, the thing in itself must

affect us causally, contrary to the Kantian restriction of causality to appearances.”99 So it seems to

be the case that, if the thing qua appearance is an empirical manifestation in some sense of the thing

qua thing in itself, one can make the argument that the latter still functions as the “ground” or

“cause” of the former in the respect that the way we experience things, or the way things appear to

us, can in part be explained by the way things as they are in themselves affect us. Or, in a similar

vein, in the present case, the problem of affection can be reduced to the thesis that, because things

as they are in themselves appear to us to be in space and time, things as they are in themselves

affect us in such a way that they appear to us to be in space and time. In light of these formulations,

I cannot see how the aspect theorist can avoid the troubling thesis that the way our experience is

constituted, viz., the way things appear to us, arises as a direct result of the way in which things in

themselves, noumenal entities outside of space and time, affect us. As I said, we have already seen

how an affection thesis of this sort presents problems for the Kantian interpreter, but to briefly

reiterate, it is because the law of causality has objective validity only within the empirical realm of

the objects of experience, and for the aspect theorist to claim that such a causal process can

somehow hold between transcendent things in themselves and the immanent objects of a possible

experience violates a central thesis of Kant's theory of the categories.

Nevertheless, as part and parcel of our earlier discussion, we also saw that there is a way out

of the affection impasse for traditionalists of either the two-object or two-worlds persuasion; by

appealing to the “unschematized” use of the categories, the ontological theorist can thereby render

intelligible, even if only to a minimal degree, the way in which transcendent entities such as things

in themselves can be said to causally “impinge upon” or “affect” our sense faculties, giving rise to

our spatio-temporal, categorial representations but without violating Kant's doctrine on the purely

99 Ibid., 422.

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immanent use of the categories, and thus the non-categorial nature of things in themselves. Let me

repeat: essentially, the problem is such that any epistemological or metaphysical thesis purporting to

account for the receptive nature of our sensitive faculties by incorporating a doctrine of noumenal

causation (or affection) by means of things in themselves prima facie violates the central Kantian

restriction of the immanent use of the categories (specifically causation) in our cognition of things;

but, by appealing to the purely logical use of the categories mentioned above, the ontological

theorist is able to avert the charge that Kant's doctrine of noumenal causation by means of things in

themselves contradicts some of the key epistemological and metaphysical theses of the Critical

philosophy itself, thereby preserving the coherence of the ontological view as such. Since there is

no good reason yet to think that the aspect theorist can't reply on the basis of similar considerations,

it is therefore entirely justified to conclude at this point that, just as the ontological theorist can

escape the conceptual and/or philosophical issues associated with Kant's affection thesis in the

manner outlined above, the aspect theorist can escape it in that manner as well, and the important

implication this has for our purposes is that it shows that the aspect construal as such preserves most

(if not all) of its architectonic plausibility.

In summary, in our assessment of the conceptual and/or philosophical problematic

associated with the two-aspect reading of the TD, we encountered four main criticisms: first, the

criticism of the mysterious third thing, second, the criticism having to do with the sameness of the

object having both “as-appearance” as well as “in-itself” aspects, third, the criticism of

isomorphism, and fourth and finally, the criticism of affection, each of which, moreover, the aspect

theorist is able to avert, if not in whole then at least in part. Let us take stock of how this was

accomplished. First, in attempting to alleviate the charge that the aspect reading raises the question

of what the “as-appearance” and “in-itself” components of things are components of, which is not

itself an appearance or a thing in itself, we were able to appeal to the transcendental object as that

which the aforementioned components can prima facie be said to be components “of.” Secondly,

Robinson provided little or nothing against the theory that aspects as different from one another as

the “as-appearance” and the “in-itself” can't be aspects of one and the same object. Thirdly, in order

to make sense of the relation between appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves

(noumena), when the former is entirely spatial, whereas the latter is not, I appealed to Van Cleve's

example, taken from Spinoza, on the many different attributes of the one all-embracing God, or

Substance, and the way in which these attributes correlate with one another when they differ from

each other as the spatial and the non-spatial do in the case before us of the phenomenal and the

noumenal (i.e., the “as-appearance” and the “in-itself”). In the end, this proved advantageous for the

aspect theorist because it showed that the correlation between the phenomenal and the noumenal

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may not be nearly as incomprehensible as we may have first thought. And finally, I briefly noted

that a strong case can be made that the problem of affection is just as much a problem on an aspect

reading of the TD as it is on either a two-object or a two-worlds, in short, on an ontological reading

of the TD. The result, in this context, is the same as it was earlier in connection with our discussion

of it in relation to the ontological reading, which is to say that it doesn't hold much water given the

viability of the strategy on the part of the Kantian to draw on the notion of an “unschematized” use

of the categories in an attempt to render intelligible the causal process by which transcendent things

in themselves causally “affect” our faculty of sensibility, thereby giving rise to our determinate

spatio-temporal representations themselves, all the while preserving the important sense in which

noumena do not conform to the a priori categories of our understanding. Considering that none of

these criticisms ultimately retain much force, it is safe to say that the aspect view as such fits the bill

of what it means to be a systematically plausible interpretation of Kantian idealism.

Part 3: A Critical Assessment of the Intrinsic Nature Construal

3.1. Metaphysics of Intrinsic Properties

As we have seen, central to the intrinsic nature reading is the claim that there are not two

classes or types of thing, as there are on either form of the ontological view, but rather that there are

two sets of properties every individual thing is supposed to have: the extrinsic, relational ones,

which we can know, and the intrinsic, non-relational ones, which we cannot know. As one

commentator has put it: “The claim of her [Rae Langton's] book is that, according to Kant, we can

know only the relations in which things stand to each other and to us, but not their intrinsic nature

… In this perspective, there is no idealism in Kant, but what Langton calls epistemic humility. Kant

is a realist. His whole point is that our knowledge is constrained by a limited accessibility of

things.”100 But, as we will come to see, there are clearly some critical problems with this view, one

of which concerns the underlying supposition that everything comes ready-made with two, non-

overlapping sets of properties: the intrinsic, non-relational, and the extrinsic, relational.

I am not concerned at this juncture with the issues related to Kant's irreducibility thesis, that

is, with whether there might be any good reasons to question Kant's claim that things in themselves

are unknowable; my concern lies with Kant's assumption that there is an obvious metaphysical

entailment from a metaphysics of relations to that of intrinsic, non-relational properties. One might

well wonder whether it is not erroneous for Kant to assume that there exists a non-relational (and

100 Esfeld, review of Kantian Humility, 399-400.

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for him thus unknowable) set of properties in addition to the relational ones of which things are

obviously constituted. Or, to put it in the form of a question: why isn't it metaphysically possible for

things, and in particular the relata – the things which stand in the relations – to be constituted of

nothing over and above the relations in which they themselves stand? Let me put it this way: the

implicit assumption, inherent in the intrinsic nature position as such, is that, embedded within the

spatio-temporal causal framework, exists individual things (or relata) standing in determinate

spatio-temporal relations with other individual things, and the thought is simply that such things

must have some intrinsic nature independent from the relations in which they stand. It is just this

assumption that many Kantian commentators have found problematic in the light of what modern

physical theory tells us about the intrinsic nature of reality as such. For example, as Michael Esfeld

notes:

… if there are space-time points, one can maintain that all the qualitative properties of any space-time point consist in relations to other space-time points. There is no need for an intrinsic nature space-time points. (The same is arguably true of numbers). Imagine a world in which all physical properties are realized as geometrical properties of space-time points. In such a world, we can in principle know all the types of physical properties, they are all relational, and there is no need for intrinsic properties, because the relata are space-time points. In fact, such a position was proposed as a further development of Einstein's physics of general relativity under the name of “geometrodynamics.” Furthermore, a similar argument can be set out with respect to the quantum correlations of entanglement: there is no intrinsic nature beyond the correlations that quantum systems exhibit … in this case, there is no conclusive argument for an intrinsic nature of which we are ignorant. Hence, the argument from relations to an intrinsic nature of the relata does not seem to be a question of metaphysics, but depend on which physics is true of our world.101

Esfeld's basic claim is a simple one, which is that there is nothing incoherent in advocating a

metaphysical theory which posits the existence of relata, and the relations within which relata

themselves stand, provided, of course, we are operating on the assumption that everything exists

within a shared, spatio-temporal framework that consists of nothing over and above individual,

spatially located points. In this way, every qualitative property is reducible to the quantum

correlations which hold among individual space-time points with other individual space-time points.

It is thus not a (physical) requirement that things have intrinsic properties in addition to their purely

relational properties, and it is just this thought that presents some rather troubling issues for

Langton's Kant.

However, one might reject the above analysis on the grounds that, intuitively speaking, there

has to be something other than the relata, (i.e., the things standing in the relations) and the very

relations within which those relata stand, given that, for the relata to be something other than the

101 Esfeld, review of Kantian Humility, 401-402. See also Walker, review of Kantian Humility, 142.

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relations, they have to be composed of some non-relational, and thus intrinsic properties. Otherwise,

it wouldn't be possible for us to make sense of the idea that there exists individual relata

ontologically distinct from the relations in which they stand – there would just be relations, no

relata as such. Or, to put it in these terms: for there to be individual things as such, things which are

the subject of the predication of properties, without they themselves being predicated as properties

of other things, it is then necessary that some kind of non-relational type of property is needed, and

it is at this point that intrinsic properties are brought into the picture; simply put, one could thus

argue that intrinsic, non-relational properties function as a necessary ontological condition of what

it means for something to be a thing distinct from the relations in which it itself stands. If that is the

case, and we need to posit intrinsic, non-relational properties as part of our ontology of things, it

thereby effectively lends support to the Langtonian dualistic interpretation of Kant for whom there

exists, in addition to the relational phenomenal powers of things, intrinsic, non-relational properties,

which we cannot know.

Esfeld is all too aware of this, though, and this is evidenced in his treatment of what it means

for something to count as an individual thing as such. As he explains it, there are many different

ways of defining what it means for something to be a thing. To all intents and purposes, for

something to qualify as an individual thing, it must meet one of three possible conditions. It must

(a) be the “subject of the predication of properties, including relational properties (relations),

without being itself predicated as a property of something,”102 or (b) be distinguishable from all the

other things by means of the predication of properties of some qualitative properties, or even (c)

have a primitive thisness (haecceity).103 According to Esfeld, as long as something can meet any one

of these three individually necessary and sufficient conditions of thing-ness, – of what it means for

something to be a thing – then that something qualifies as being an individual thing as such.

Accepting that relations require things which stand in the relations does not commit one to the view that these things are bare particulars. It simply means taking into account that properties, including relations, are predicated of something; this does not imply that there is more to the related things than standing in the relations. There are metaphysical problems here, but there is nothing which poses a particular difficulty for the position under consideration. If one does not endorse primitive thisness, one may say that a thing is a bundle of properties (or tropes); how a thing can be a bundle of relational properties is no more – and no less – a problem than how it can be a bundle of intrinsic properties.104

The crucial point here is that, regardless of the way in which one defines something's ultimate

102 Michael Esfeld, “Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties?: A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations,” Metaphysica: International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4 (2003): p. 10.

103 Ibid. 104 Ibid., 10-11.

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thing-ness, of what it means for something to be an individual thing as such, it does not seem to

make any difference from the standpoint of modern physical theory whether a thing is conceived of

in terms of a bundle of relational properties (or tropes) or a bundle of intrinsic properties (or tropes).

One is thus not constrained to conceive of an individual thing, standing in various relations with

other individual things, to be anything over and above the relations in which it stands. Again,

returning to Esfeld, “it seems metaphysically possible that all the qualitative properties of a space-

time point consist in the spatio-temporal relations in which it stands.”105 With this view of the

distinction between relations and the relata which stand in those relations, what this tells us is that

there is no good reason to believe that a metaphysics of intrinsic properties follows directly and

inexorably from the claim that there exists relata, individual things construed as space-time points,

and the relations in which those individual relata stand.

However, even if the intrinsic nature theorist cannot base their case on the direct

metaphysical claim that relations require relata with non-relational properties, it could still be

argued that Kant held this view, and so the intrinsic nature account is still an exegetically plausible

reading of Kant's TD. That is to say, even if the theory according to which the existence of relations

and relational properties implies the existence of some set of non-relational, and thus for Kant

intrinsic properties, is questionable from the standpoint of the findings of modern physical theory,

this really doesn't amount to much of an argument against the notion that Kant in fact held just such

a theory. For example, we all know that Kant held a purely Euclidean theory of geometry, a theory

which, as we also know, is at odds with much of modern-day studies in geometry. So what this tells

us, to be sure, is that the truth or falsity of a position, especially in fields such as physics and

geometry, ultimately has no bearing on whether or not Kant in fact endorsed that position after all.

Another way of putting this is to say that, since all indications point to the effect that Kant had

endorsed a problematic geometrical theory, there is no good reason yet to think that he also couldn't

have endorsed a problematic metaphysical theory as well, to be specific, the theory which says that

the existence of relational properties logically entails the existence of non-relational, intrinsic

properties. So, even if we grant the aforementioned criticism, the central claim of which is that the

metaphysical theory of the sort Langton ascribes to Kant is mistaken, it doesn't follow that Kant

necessarily believed it to be false. Moreover, since I haven't found anything to suggest that imputing

to Kant a metaphysics of intrinsic properties would somehow go against other key aspects of his

philosophy, it is difficult to put much stock in the aforementioned criticism. In the end, we're

concerned with what Kant believed, not with what particular metaphysical theory has the support of

modern physics, and so it is not unlikely that, on this issue as well on other issues, Kant may just as

105 Ibid., 11.

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well have endorsed a mistaken metaphysics of intrinsic properties.

3.2. Internal Contradictions

However, I will now argue that there are also reasons internal to Kant's thinking that make it

unlikely that he supported an intrinsic nature view. For, a second critical issue with respect to

intrinsic nature readings of Kant's TD stems directly from the fact that they paint a picture of Kant's

TD that seems to be at odds with a key aspect of his doctrine of things in themselves generally

considered, namely, the non-formal, non-categorial thesis of things in themselves. As we have seen

in chapter 1, according to this thesis, as its name implies, Kant's notion of things as they are in

themselves is supposed represent a certain class or type of thing – or, if we hold a methodological

view, a concept of a certain kind of thing – which is intrinsically non-formal and non-categorial,

meaning that it does not conform either to any of the forms of our empirical intuition, or to any of

the various pure a priori categories of thought. The reason a good case can be made that intrinsic

nature readings violate this thesis is that they explicitly claim that the Critical notion of things as

they are in themselves can best be understood as a kind of substance, specifically a substantia

noumenon, and so in an important respect, they define the thing in itself in terms of the substantial,

and thus in terms of the category of “substance/attribute,” thereby violating the non-formal, non-

categorial thesis of things in themselves.

Let me explain how the notion of a substantia noumenon implicitly violates Kant's theory of

the categories more clearly here. To begin with, one of the central claims of that theory, as we have

seen elsewhere, is that the categories can only be used in reference to objects that exist within the

field of a possible experience, and not in reference to any putative objects existing beyond that field.

Once removed from the conditions of their empirical employment, then, the pure concepts of the

understanding (the categories) no longer have objective validity simply because the former, as the

objective conditions for the realization of the latter, in effect thereby allows the categories to be

realized in our experience, and in the process acquire objective validity. So, the crucial point to

remember here is that anything which exists outside the conditions of the empirical employment of

the categories cannot therefore be rendered intelligible by means of the use of those very categories.

Moreover, since things in themselves (or noumena) exist outside the empirical confines of the field

of a possible experience, the thought is that they cannot be rendered intelligible through the use of

those categories. But to claim that things in themselves can be best understood in the categorial

terms of the substantial, or more appropriately, in terms of the category of “substance/attribute,” as

the intrinsic nature theorist does, is essentially to violate the Kantian restriction of the proper

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empirical employment of the categories by using them transcendently, and thus beyond their proper

scope. Or, to put it otherwise, to impute to Kant a theory of the TD according to which things in

themselves can be made intelligible by means of the use of the categories, specifically that of

“substance/attribute,” is in effect to impute to Kant a theory of the categories which he never

endorsed.

Moreover, this isn't the only tenet of the Kantian doctrine of things in themselves that the

intrinsic nature reading seems to violate. In addition to the non-formal, non-categorial thesis,

inherent in the doctrine of things as they are in themselves as such, one could make the case that the

intrinsic nature view prima facie violates the inscrutability thesis – to repeat: the thesis whereby

things in themselves are said to be unknowable or inscrutable to us. The major reason I believe this

charge to be justified is that the intrinsic nature reading simply makes too many claims about the

character of things in themselves. Reduced to its key aspects, the intrinsic nature reading makes the

following claims with respect to the TD: first, the nature of things in themselves is, very broadly,

best understood in terms of the category of “substance/attribute;” second, these underlying

substances are property-bearers of two, non-overlapping sets of properties: phenomenal causal

powers, and intrinsic, non-relational properties; and third, as a result of our knowing the character

of our cognitive faculties as well as that of the properties of substance as such, we know that some

of the properties of substance can be known by us, namely, the relational, causal powers of things,

while the others, the intrinsic properties, are beyond the reach of our cognition. One can now see

that a commitment to the intrinsic nature view entails more than a commitment to just one or two

relatively anodyne epistemic claims about the limits of our cognition in relation to things as they are

in themselves; rather, it requires us to make three quite specific, substantive claims about the status

and character of things in themselves, and how such things can best be understood in the light of

our discursive intelligences. Now, this is not to say that, by making such claims about the character

of things in themselves, and the character of such things in relation to our cognition, intrinsic nature

views outwardly violate the inscrutability thesis of things in themselves. But it is to say that, by

making such claims, the intrinsic nature view of the TD violates the spirit of the inscrutability thesis

as such. My basic claim is just that, if we are to take the inscrutability thesis of things in themselves

seriously, then it seems rather implausible that Kant would have advocated a view of the TD that

requires us to say so much about the nature of things in themselves qua substantia noumenon. If

things in themselves genuinely are inscrutable entities of some sort, then why would Kant say that

we can know so much about them – such as what they are, how they are constituted, and how their

constituent parts relate to our discursive cognitive faculties?

Isn't there a way, however, that we can avert both of the aforementioned issues, at least to

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some extent, by reformulating the intrinsic nature view a bit more modestly? To adequately

understand what an intrinsic nature reading, modestly formulated, looks like in comparison with it

as it is currently formulated, we must return to what we have said about the two-aspect view, for as

I have noted in the past, the intrinsic nature view of the TD can be understood as a more robust two-

aspect view, to be more precise, it is an aspect view which specifies what the aspects consist in by

claiming that they amount to two mutually non-overlapping sets of properties: the intrinsic, non-

relational on one hand, and the extrinsic, relational on the other. That is to say, once we strip the

intrinsic nature view of the TD of all its talk about matter qua substratum, about the two non-

overlapping sets of properties such substrata have, as well as about the causal being irreducible, and

thus not supervening, on the intrinsic, what we are ultimately left with is essentially an aspect view

of the TD. By doing so, the intrinsic nature view – which has now effectively become an aspect

view – is thereby able to avert both the charges noted above, which, in sum can be summarized as

the charge that the intrinsic nature view violates central key theses, inherent in the Kantian doctrine

of the TD itself, most notable of which are, first, the non-formal, non-categorial thesis, and second,

the inscrutability thesis. This is because the aspect view remains relatively agnostic about the actual

character of the “in itself” aspect of reality as such by not claiming that it can roughly be understood

in terms of the category of “substance/attribute,” and by not claiming that substances (substantia

noumena) are underlying property-bearers of two mutually exclusive sets of properties. In this way,

a more modestly formulated intrinsic nature reading – which has effectively become a two-aspect

reading in the tradition of Allais and Guyer – can no longer be said to violate, however indirectly or

implicitly, two of the central theses of Kant's doctrine of things as they are in themselves.

But this is not to say there aren't problems with this strategy. The first is that, insofar as we

abstract from the intrinsic nature reading all talk of the underlying substratum of our reality, the

different kinds of properties such substrata have, as well as the extrinsic causal powers of objects

being irreducible to their intrinsic natures and the like, the intrinsic nature reading effectively

thereby becomes reducible to nothing other than a straightforward aspect view of the TD, in which

case it no longer constitutes an independently viable position with respect to Kant's TD. That is, in

the event that we reformulate the intrinsic nature view a bit more modestly along the lines noted

above, then it seems that there would no longer be any good reason to think that what we are

advocating here is an intrinsic nature reading itself, for, inherent to those very readings, are just

those substantive claims concerning the nature of things in themselves qua substrata noted above,

which we have already rejected on independent grounds. We thus have a dilemma: either we can

reformulate the intrinsic nature view more modestly in terms of a straightforward aspect view of the

TD, or we do not, and simply leave it as it is. In the event that we take the former course of action,

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then we run the risk of trivializing the intrinsic nature reading to the point whereby it no longer

constitutes an independently viable position with regards to Kant's TD, for it would then be no

different from the aspect reading as such – indeed, it just would be the aspect reading as such!

However, in the event that we take the latter course of action, we have already seen what types of

problems inevitably befall us; to repeat, we would thereby be violating the letter of the non-formal,

non-categorial thesis, in addition to what I have characterized as the “spirit” of the inscrutability

thesis, no small problems when we consider what it would mean for a position to be critically

plausible given the framework of Kantian transcendental idealism. My conclusion, therefore, is just

that for the intrinsic nature theorist such as Langton to attempt to avert this charge whereby the

intrinsic nature reading is said to violate some of the key themes, inherent in the Kantian doctrine of

things in themselves as such, by reformulating that reading a bit more modestly in straightforward

aspect terms is not a very effective strategy given the particularly thorny problem associated with

that very strategy we considered in detail earlier. Hence, one can only conclude that our original

worry that the intrinsic nature view is in direct violation of certain key theses (central to the Kantian

doctrine of things in themselves as such) has yet to be adequately dispelled.

To conclude our discussion of the critical issues associated with intrinsic nature views of

Kant's TD, we have seen that there are essentially two problems here. First, there is a key critical

issue with regards to the intrinsic nature theorist's supposition that a metaphysics of relations

implies a metaphysics of non-relational, intrinsic properties. We saw that there is no logical

entailment from a metaphysics of relational properties to one of non-relational, intrinsic properties.

But, we also saw that this doesn't prove decisive against intrinsic nature readings of the TD for the

simple fact that Kant may very well have endorsed a mistaken metaphysical theory of relations and

relational properties just as he had endorsed a mistaken Euclidean theory of geometry. Another

issue with intrinsic nature readings is that some of their most basic claims seem out of place in the

light of the Kantian doctrine of things in themselves in general, the details of which we considered

earlier in chapter 1. These include both the non-formal, non-categorial thesis, as well as the

inscrutability thesis in respect to the idea of things in themselves. Taking the former, intrinsic nature

views construe Kant's concept of things as they are in themselves in a way that contradicts the non-

categorial character of things in themselves by equating such things with the notion of the

substantial. That is, they understand the thing in itself in terms of a substantial property-bearer, and

thus in terms of the category of substance, thereby violating the sense in which things in themselves

exist outside the field of the proper empirical employment of the categories – the non-categorial

aspect of the non-formal, non-categorial thesis. Now, taking the latter, intrinsic nature views make a

lot of substantive claims about Kant's things in themselves, such as what they are, how they can best

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be understood, and whether we can know them given the discursive nature of our cognition, thereby

violating the sense in which things in themselves are genuinely unknowable or inscrutable after all.

It is only this latter criticism that we were not able to dispel, and as a consequence of this, I would

argue that a relatively strong case can be made on behalf of the critic's argument that such readings

are not as plausible as Langton, for one, has supposed.

Part 4: A Critical Assessment of the Methodological Construal

4.1. Metaphysics or Epistemology?

As we saw in chapter 1, the methodological construal of the TD was the first (and indeed the

only) so-called non-traditionalist, revolutionary reading of Kant's TD to come onto the

contemporary philosophical scene for the sole purpose of reformulating the TD in a way that is

more conducive to the details of transcendental idealism as an epistemic, rather than a wholly

metaphysical, philosophical position. In short, instead of claiming that the TD is meant to denote

two existent classes of object, or two existent realms of being, “revolutionary” methodological

theorists (most notable among whom are Allison and Bird) claim that Kant's TD is most

appropriately understood as a methodological or conceptual contrast between two different ways of

considering things, ways that are exclusive to, necessarily bound up with, and thus inherent in the

very nature of, our discursive form of understanding. We saw that, to consider something (an

empirical object) as a thing in itself, rather than as an appearance, means to consider something as it

would be (or may be) for an understanding different from our own, an understanding for which

there is no meaningful distinction between intuitions and concepts, which is to say an understanding

which could be given something as soon as it is thought. Conversely, to consider something as an

appearance is simply to consider it as it is for creatures like us with our sensible, and thus

discursive, form of understanding, an understanding for which there is a meaningful distinction

between an object that is given to us on one hand, and an object that is merely thought on the other.

In construing the TD this way, then, methodological theorists thought that they were construing it in

a way that remained truer to the more modest metaphysical (or what is the same, epistemological)

core of the Critical philosophy, and its merely epistemic or methodological principles.

However, it is just this more modest epistemological interpretation of the core of the Critical

philosophy that some have rejected on the grounds that it fails as a credible interpretation of Kant's

own understanding of his transcendental idealism, and this explains why they do not think it

presents an accurate view of the meaning of the TD. Otherwise put, so the argument goes, by

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construing the TD more modestly in terms of a merely formal or conceptual distinction between

two distinct ways of considering things, namely, as an appearance, or as a thing in itself, those who

favor a more traditional ontological reading of Kant's idealism would argue that this understanding

fails to do justice to (what they perceive to be) the underlying ontological nerve or significance of

the Critical philosophy. Representative of this view are Karl Ameriks and Sebastian Gardner, among

others. In what follows, I first explain what this charge consists in by drawing on the arguments of

both of these philosophers, and then consider some responses to it.

In the first place, as I just noted, one might argue that methodological readings suffer from

their patent inability to incorporate the sense, clearly intended by Kant, that the realm of things in

themselves has superior ontological reality, which thus makes it more “real” than the realm of

appearances. Both of the aforementioned philosophers hold this view, and so they both make similar

claims as part and parcel of their arguments against methodological interpretations of Kantianism.

Let's consider the arguments of Ameriks first. Essentially, Ameriks's claim is that, in giving what he

refers to as an “epistemic and non-specific” definition of the doctrine of transcendental idealism,

Bird, Nagel, and Walker, all of whom are explicitly methodological in persuasion, mistakenly

interpret the “transcendentally real” in such a way that it no longer has any special ontological

significance in relation to what is merely “transcendentally ideal.” In this way, the “transcendentally

real,” as Ameriks notes, may very well be an entirely empty category, in that it may not consist of

anything beyond our human form of understanding, and its respective inherent principles and

concepts. Similarly, when Ameriks considers Allison's methodological interpretation in particular,

which he believes constitutes a variant on that of Bird's, Nagel's, and Walker's interpretations, he

makes the following claims:

The disadvantage of his explanation is that it still adheres to an epistemic reading of Kant's idealism. On that reading there is still no reason to think that the non-ideal has a greater ontological status than the ideal. Here the ideality of the forms of space and time indicates simply their necessary structuring function in our experience, and it does not say that the non-spatio-temporal domain has any greater reality for Kant than does the spatio-temporal. To say that something is transcendentally ideal on this view is to say that it is relative to our sensible forms, but that is not necessarily to say that these forms are themselves relative.106

Ameriks objects to this purely formal interpretation on the grounds that “it does injustice to the fact

that Kant clearly does believe in and speak of (which is not the same thing as making particular

theoretical assertions about) the absolute reality of things in themselves with substantive non-

spatio-temporal characteristics.”107 An essential feature of Kant's idealism is therefore not just the 106 Karl Ameriks, “Kantian Idealism Today,” in Karl Ameriks, Interpreting Kant's Critiques (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

2003), 98-111, 104. 107 Ibid.

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epistemic claim that human knowledge is governed by certain sensible conditions, according to

Ameriks, but the stronger ontological claim that there really are things with substantive non-spatio-

temporal, non-categorial properties which genuinely do not conform to the sensible conditions of

human knowledge, and the consequence is that any purely formal, epistemological reading of

Kant's TD, such as Allison's or Bird's, ultimately fails as an interpretation of Kantian idealism in

that it cannot do justice to the second, “stronger” of these claims.

Gardner is of a similar mind in this respect. He takes issue with the fact that, on a merely

methodological or epistemological reading of the TD, claims made about things as they appear to us

no longer contrast with claims made about things as they really are, as they do on more of a

traditional ontological reading, with the result that Kant's TD no longer serves as a philosophical

correlate for the metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality. Consequently, there is no

good reason for regarding claims made about things considered as they appear to us as in any way

inferior to claims made about these very same things as they are in themselves; in short, on this line

of interpretation, neither sort of claim should be privileged over the other as the former sort are

putatively reducible to claims made about things considered in relation to the a priori subjective

epistemic conditions of a possible experience, whereas the latter sort are reducible to claims made

about these very same things or objects in abstraction from, and thus entirely independent of, the

subjective a priori conditions of a possible experience. Gardner says likewise:

It [the methodological view] detaches the contrast of appearances and things in themselves from that of appearance and reality: 'thing in itself' no longer incorporates the sense, clearly intended by Kant, of having greater reality than appearances (of being 'real per se,' Bxx). The tendency of the methodological approach is to imply that 'thing in itself' just means 'thing considered apart from our knowledge of it,' and while this is certainly part of its meaning for Kant, it is not all of it. Like the atheistic interpretation of transcendental idealism considered earlier, this account loses touch with Kant's view of the inferior reality of appearance.108

Here, Gardner is arguing that the methodological view of the TD suffers due to its patent inability

to account for the sense in which appearances are “less real” than things in themselves, which is

the reason for his reluctance to endorse it as an adequate view with regards to the fundamentals of

Kant's theoretical philosophy. However, Allison, as a strong supporter of the methodological view,

does not see it this way. As a matter of fact, when it comes to the finer details of the Critical

philosophy, he contends that it is far more problematic to accept the veracity of the

appearance/reality metaphor to the TD than it is to reject it. But, before I examine Allison's reasons

for saying this, I first want to discuss the evidence there is to support this metaphor, both in CPR

and elsewhere.

108 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Routledge, 1999), 294.

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As Allison points out, this ontological view is not without its support; there are both

theoretical as well as practical reasons why one might favor it as a reading of Kant. Let us consider

the theoretical evidence for this view first. To begin with, there is a legitimate argument to be made

on behalf of an ontological reading of the TD that “mere appearance” talk is meaningful only

insofar as it is contrasted with talk about “things as they really are.” It is in this way, then, that

Kant's TD is meant to act as a philosophical correlate or substitute for the age-old metaphysical

distinction between appearance and reality. If, in comparison with the realm of things in

themselves, the realm of “mere appearances” is not intended to denote a domain of ontologically

inferior objects, then the question is raised of what exactly is it intended to denote, and why does

Kant so often refer to them in those terms, as “being only appearances?”

In response to these queries, I would argue that, just because Kant so often refers to

appearances, or spatio-temporal objects of our experience, as the realm of “mere or only

appearances,” that is not enough to conclude that this has any metaphysical implications for the

actual meaning of Kant's conception of things in themselves, let alone that the TD is to be read in a

thoroughly ontological manner after all. My claim is that locutions such as these are in fact meant

to underscore certain key aspects of Kant's residual empiricism, not his underlying commitment to

a transcendent realm of objects (viz., things in themselves) with distinct non-spatio-temporal

properties. Or, in other words, as far as I understand it, Kant's “mere appearance talk” is not used to

reinforce the inferior ontological reality of appearances in relation to that of things in themselves,

but to reinforce his fundamentally empiricist notion that there are certain epistemic limits to our

knowledge, limits which are inherent in the very nature of our discursive form of cognition as such,

and which are therefore tied to the sensible component of that cognition as a faculty of knowledge

requiring an object being given to us before it can become an object of knowledge for us. What

provides the impetus for this argument is the fact, evidenced in the following passage, for example,

that the “mere appearance” locution oftentimes occurs within a broader epistemological context

than most are willing to admit. Kant asserts:

It is, therefore, not merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all outer and inner experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, and that in relation to these conditions all objects are therefore mere appearances, and not given us as things in themselves which exist in this manner.109

All Kant seems to be asserting here is the view that there are certain necessary sensible conditions

of our cognition, in the sense that objects must conform to the a priori forms of space and time, as

the necessary a priori conditions of our sensibility, if those objects are ultimately to become objects

109 CPR, A48-49/B66.

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of knowledge for us. This is of course in stark contrast to the traditional rationalistic assumption

that there are no such (sensible) conditions, and that we can acquire knowledge of objects by means

of pure a priori concepts alone, concepts, moreover, which are exclusive to a faculty of pure reason.

I think it would be a mistake if we were to attach ontological significance to passages, and more

specifically locutions, which express what is clearly an epistemological view. Even though I have

only considered one particular passage in confirmation of this theory, I take the meaning of the

above as typical of the rest in light of the fact that, generally speaking, wherever Kant's “mere

appearances” locution can be found, it can be found within a context which is prima facie

epistemological, and so very similar to that of the above.110 It is for those reasons, then, that I fail to

see the evidence for the argument whereby it is an open and shut case that Kant uses this phrase to

underscore the inferior reality of appearances in relation to things in themselves, which have a

metaphysically ultimate status.

But what about the practical side of this issue? Aren't we forgetting that, in addition to the

fact that there is theoretical evidence to lend support to the ontological view that Kant's TD is

meant to function as a philosophical correlate for the appearance/reality metaphor, there are also

practical reasons for supposing that this was Kant's considered view? Allison argues111 that Kant's

famous pronouncement of denying knowledge in order to make room for faith affirms Kant's belief

in the primacy of practical over theoretical reason, which he says serves as an “entrée” from the

practical to the same ultimate reality Kant had foreclosed to speculation. What Allison is claiming

here, and what he comes to explain in more detail further on, is that Kant's transcendental theory of

freedom requires that we really (transcendentally) are free, and only seem to be empirically

determined. So, if we pursue the appearance/reality metaphor within the context of Kant's practical

philosophy to the fullest, specifically as regards to his doctrine of transcendental freedom, there is a

very important sense in which our noumenal (or intelligible) selves really are free, whereas our

phenomenal (sensible) selves only seem to be empirically determined according to nature's causal

laws.

But there are of course complications with just this view, as Allison himself notes112: either

it paints a view of Kant's doctrine of two selves (or “aspects”) that cannot be reconciled with the

sense, forcefully proclaimed by Kant, in which transcendental idealism is compatible with a robust

empirical realism on the one hand, or it presents an incoherent view of two selves on the other.

110 The list of passages within which Kant's “mere appearances” locution (or some other variant thereof) occurs, each of which, I would contend, elicits a similar interpretation to that above, are as follows: CPR, A45/B62, A45/B62, A45/B63, A45/B63, A46/B63, A49/B66, A370, A371, A372, A372, A374n, A493/B522. This list is by no means exhaustive.

111 See Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 46. 112 See Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 47.

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Since the latter doesn't require too much explanation, I will concentrate exclusively on the former

here. If, as I said above, the ontological reading of the TD is true, and the latter really does act as a

metaphor for the appearance/reality correlate, then it seems impossible to understand Kant's notion

of transcendental freedom in any other way than in traditional idealistic terms according to which

we only seem to be empirically determined, whereas we really (transcendentally) are free. In short,

whatever the TD ultimately consists in, it cannot consist in the theory that the realm of appearances

is the realm of mere illusion, which is just what the aforementioned ontological view suggests. As

Kant explicitly says in the following passage:

When I say that the intuition of outer objects and the self-intuition of the mind alike represent the objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, I do not mean to say that these objects are a mere illusion. For in an appearance the objects, nay even the properties that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given. Since, however, in the relation of the given object to the subject, such properties depend upon the mode of intuition of the subject, this object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself. Thus when I maintain that the quality of space and of time, in conformity with which, as a condition of their existence, I posit both bodies and my own soul, lies in my mode of intuition and not in those objects in themselves, I am not saying that bodies merely seem to be outside me, or that my soul only seems to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion.113

To be sure, Kant is explicitly arguing against the view that appearances, or the ordinary, spatio-

temporal objects of a possible experience, really aren't spatio-temporal after all in virtue of their

status as mere forms of our empirical intuition, and so do not signify independently real things.

Kant goes on to say at CPR A37/B54 that, rather than being an independently real thing of some

kind, space (as well as time) are the real modes of our representations of things. Now, regardless of

whether space and time are independently real things, or merely modes or ways by means of which

we represent to ourselves such things, it doesn't change the fact that, from Kant's perspective,

things really are formal and categorial, meaning spatio-temporal, substantive, causal, interactive,

and so forth, and so Kant's basic claim in this context is simply that any view of Kant's theoretical

philosophy (or any aspect thereof) that degrades the reality of empirical objects of our experience,

and by implication the actual forms of space and time themselves, is to be rejected on the grounds

that it thereby makes those objects seem illusory – which is obviously a view Kant abhorred.

In response to the ontological account of Kant's theory of freedom, which, as we saw,

ascribed to Kant a doctrine of two selves according to which our “real” noumenal self is wholly

free, while our “illusory” or “somehow-less-than-real”114 phenomenal self only seems to be

113 CPR, B69. 114 If it has not been clear thus far, the reason ontological accounts necessarily degrade empirical reality and our

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empirically determined according to nature's laws, I raised the objection that this degrades

empirical reality to such an extent that it goes against Kant's claim of being a robust empirical

realist for whom empirical objects “really” are spatio-temporal, categorial, and so forth, and,

moreover, that we can know such things immediately and without inference. However, there is a

further, and perhaps more grievous, issue with this account, which is that it doesn't seem justified

from a consideration of the texts. Let me briefly explain: we have already seen that some Kantian

commentators have supported the use of the appearance/reality metaphor in order to better

understand Kant's TD on the practical grounds that they believe Kant really was committed to an

ontological theory of freedom whereby we (transcendentally) really are free, and only seem to be

empirically determined. The thought seems to be that, if this metaphor holds within the practical

realm of Kant's theory of transcendental freedom, then it obviously holds within the theoretical

realm of Kant's account of the meaning and import of the TD as well. Now, having already outlined

some of the troubling systematic issues with this line of thought, I will now turn to some textual

ones. Before I proceed any further, however, let me just say that I do not presume to do justice to

Kant's theory of transcendental freedom in so short a space; my chief aim, in what follows, is

simply to show that there are good textual and systematic reasons for reading Kant's theory of

freedom in a methodological light as there are for reading it in a purely ontological or metaphysical

light, and I will accomplish this by focusing on a key section of Kant's GMM.

In section 3 of GMM 3, where Kant's primary concern is to establish the objective validity

of our conception of the moral law by providing a deduction of just such a law – a proof that the

moral law “is not merely a chimerical idea or phantom of the brain,”115 to use Allison's words –

Kant encounters a snag, so to speak, in the form of a circle or cul de sac, while attempting to

provide just such a deduction. And it is Kant's introduction of the notion of an intelligible world of

the understanding as a proposed solution to this very snag that one might think indicates an

overarching commitment, on Kant's part, to an unknowable realm of things in themselves. As I

noted above, what Kant is attempting to do in this particular section of GMM is to demonstrate that

the presupposition of the moral law, or what is the same, the presupposition of the principle of the

autonomy of the will itself (viz., freedom of the will) is not a mere figment of the imagination, in

empirical selves in this context is simply because they insist, despite very little evidence in their favor, that the realm of things in themselves, the realm of the non-ideal, has a greater ontological status than the realm of objects of our experience, the realm of the ideal. They cannot have it both ways; they cannot chastise methodological views for their failure to do justice to the aforementioned inferior reality of the realm of spatio-temporal objects in comparison with the metaphysically ultimate reality of things (in themselves) with substantive, non-spatio-temporal properties, and at the same time, when it comes to Kant's theory of freedom, posit a phenomenal self and a noumenal self that are ontologically on par with one another.

115 Henry E. Allison, Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 301.

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the respect that it holds universally for all rational beings as a condition under which alone they can

act. That is to say, he is attempting to derive a quid juris justification for the assumption that we, as

thinking, willing, rational beings as such, are free simply in the sense that our actions, or our wills,

are immune from the phenomenal-empirical order of things and its necessary causal laws. Kant

summarizes the situation thus:

There appears at this point, one must freely admit it, a kind of circle from which, as it seems, there is no escape. We take ourselves to be free in the order of efficient causes so as to think ourselves under moral laws in the order of ends, and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of the will; for freedom and the will's own legislation are both autonomy, and hence reciprocal concepts; but precisely because of this one of them cannot be used to explicate the other or to state its ground, but at most only to reduce to a single concept, for logical purposes, representations of just the same object that appear dissimilar (as different fractions of equal value are reduced to their lowest terms).116

Seeing that we have laid out the basic terms within which the problem of freedom is to be decided –

how one and the same individual act can be both subject to nature's necessary laws, and so in an

important respect causally determined, and yet immune from those very laws in another no-less

important respect, that is, in the respect that we are rational beings endowed with wills whose

actions are, at least on the face of it, not necessarily explicable in accordance with the laws of nature

– we must now turn to a consideration of Kant's proposed resolution of this very problem.

This brings us to Kant's formulation of the two standpoints from which human beings, and

the actions of such beings, can be considered. And it is within the context of Kant's introduction of

these two standpoints that he incorporates his doctrine of the TD in order to understand how the two

standpoints can be brought to bear on the problem of freedom. He says:

all representations that come to us without our choosing (like those of the senses) enable us to cognize objects only as they affect us, while what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us; and hence that, as far as representations of this kind are concerned, even with the most strenuous attentiveness and distinctness that the understanding may ever add, we can achieve only cognition of appearances, never of things in themselves. Once this difference has been noticed … it follows of itself that one must concede and assume behind the appearances something else that is not appearance, namely the things in themselves; even if – since they can never become known to us, but only ever how they affect us – we of ourselves rest content with being unable to get any closer to them or ever to know what they are in themselves. This must yield a distinction, however rough, of a world of sense from the world of understanding, the first of which can be very dissimilar according to the dissimilar sensibility of many kinds of observers of the world, whereas the second, which is its foundation, always remains the same.117

116 GMM, 4:450. 117 GMM, 4:451.

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Even though there is much in this passage to suggest either the two-object or the two-worlds

variation of the “received” ontological view of the TD, such as Kant's assertion that we “must

concede and assume behind the appearances something else that is not appearance, namely the

things in themselves,”118 as well as the distinction between the world of sense (Sinnenwelt) and the

world of the understanding (Verstandeswelt) generally, Allison argues119 (and I am in full agreement

with him here) that it would be a mistake to take it this way. This is because, taken literally, the

passage is either “incoherent or confusingly redundant.”120 As he explains it, the problem is simply

that, if we take “things in themselves” to refer to a distinct set of non-spatio-temporal entities

underlying the spatio-temporal entities (or appearances) of our experience, then Kant's claim seems

unintelligible given the related claim that we cannot know anything at all about such things, not

merely as they are in themselves. For Allison, Kant's claim is intelligible only insofar as “things in

themselves” is taken to refer “to the things that appear to us, qua considered as they are in

themselves, that is, as they are independently of the conditions under which they appear.”121

Basically, what Allison is attempting to do here is to undercut the grounds on which an ontological

reading of the passage from GMM 3 rests, thereby lending support to a purely formal

methodological reading of this passage of the sort he favors. In what follows, I will attempt to

demonstrate why Allison is correct on this count.

To begin with, I would argue that a thorough consideration of the texts on the matter leads

one to the view that it is the methodological reading of the TD, and not the ontological reading, that

is operative within the relevant passages from GMM 3 quoted above. What this demonstrates is that

Kant's putative use of the TD is meant merely as a heuristic device to underscore the sense in which

the discursive nature of our cognition leads to a dual-conception of ourselves as both empirically

determined according to nature's laws on one hand, as well as empirically free from these very

same laws on the other hand. It is not meant to denote an ontological distinction between two

distinct selves (a phenomenal self and a noumenal self) in any meaningful sense at all. The key is to

be found in later passages of GMM 3, such as the following:

On account of this a rational being must view itself, as an intelligence (thus not from the side of its lower powers), as belonging not to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; and hence it has two standpoints from which it can consider itself, and recognize laws for the use of its powers, and consequently for all its actions: first, in so far as it belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy), secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws that, independent of

118 GMM, 4:451. 119 See Allison, Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 322-323. 120 Allison, Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 322. 121 Ibid.

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nature, are not empirical, but have their foundation merely in reason. As a rational being, hence as one that belongs to the intelligible world, a human being can never think of the causality of his own will otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for independence from the determining causes of the world of sense (such as reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. For now we see that, when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves as members into the world of understanding, and cognize autonomy of the will, along with its consequence, morality; but if we think of ourselves as bound by duty we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the world of the understanding.122

Moreover, Allison's claim is that, for Kant, the human being's possession of a theoretical faculty of

reason, a faculty which, unlike that of the understanding, does not require any sensible contribution

from our sensibilities as such, justifies the conception of ourselves as belonging to what Kant refers

to above as the world of understanding. As I see it, it is not that each of us somehow exists in each

of these ontologically distinct worlds or realms of being, but rather that the way in which our

cognitive faculties operate leads us to “think” of ourselves, in this case, in relation to the problem

of freedom, in two different ways, that is, either in relation to, or in abstraction from, the conditions

under which things appear to us; in so doing, we are thus fully justified in “thinking” of ourselves

as belonging to one of two possible worlds, namely, the world of sense, and the world of the

understanding, but on this basis alone one cannot conclude that Kant actually thought that we

belonged to each of these worlds. To put the point this way indicates that Kant's reference to the

notion of two possible worlds by means of which we can consider ourselves as either free or not

free suggests that those locutions, however ontological they may seem at first glance, are ultimately

nothing more than rhetorical devices for what is clearly a conceptual view. As I see it, then, there is

not a hint of an ontological view of freedom here, despite the fact that an uninformed reader may

take Kant's distinction between a world of sense, and a world of understanding in just that way. The

end result is a view of Kant's theory of freedom that is once again prima facie compatible with, if

not deeply suggestive of, a purely formal methodological interpretation of Kantian idealism.

With this discussion of Kant's account of the nature of freedom in GMM, particularly with

whether there is a quid juris justification for thinking that we, qua human beings, are free, my aim

has just been to show that there are legitimate reasons to question the general sentiment among

ontological theorists that Kant's theory of freedom requires a non-formal, and thus wholly

metaphysical, reading of the TD. I have done this by focusing on a particular passage in GMM,

which many would say provides strong (if not indisputable) evidence for a purely ontological view

of Kant's doctrine of the TD, and in the process shown that there is no more reason to think this

particular aspect of Kant's philosophy supports the ontological view of the TD over the

122 GMM, 4:452-4:453.

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methodological view any more so than any other aspect of his philosophy. In fact, if anything, we

saw that Kant's theory of freedom requires just such a methodological view of the TD, whereby the

relevant contrast is between two ways of considering things, and not between two distinct classes

of thing as such, if it is to remain true to the text of GMM itself.

In light of the fact that we have now considered the evidence, both theoretical as well as

practical, for the thoroughly ontologically-minded view that the realm of things in themselves is

meant to have a superior ontological status than that of appearances, as well as the responses to it, I

must stay true to my word by reiterating, however briefly, just why Allison considers this view so

problematic. In brief, as we already saw in connection with his rejection of the ontological

interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom according to which our phenomenal selves only seem to

be empirically determined, whereas in reality, and at the transcendental level of discourse, our

noumenal selves really are free, Allison made it known that he cannot countenance any view of

Kant (or any aspect of his philosophy for that matter) that cannot account for the sense in which

Kant believed his transcendental philosophy to be compatible with a robust empirical realism, and

the important implication is that this is just why he cannot countenance any view of Kant's TD that

incorporates into its conception of the TD the famous appearance/reality distinction. Simply put,

the appearance/reality metaphor must be rejected as an analogue for the TD, according to Allison,

precisely because it yields (for him) the unfortunate consequence that the realm of appearances,

and thus the realm of our ordinary empirical experience as such, is illusory in the respect that in

reality things may be entirely different from the way in which we experience them, viz., empirical

objects only seem to be spatio-temporal, categorial, and so on, whereas in reality they are not; they

are anything but spatio-temporal, substantive, causal, interactive, and the like.

a straightforwardly ontological reading of the sort Ameriks (and many others) favor founders over the problem of empirical realism. As we have seen, once statements about things considered as they are in themselves are taken as claims about how they really are, it becomes difficult to avoid taking statements about appearances as claims about they merely seem to us to be. And this, in turn, is hard to reconcile with any robust form of empirical realism. One obvious way of preserving this realism is Guyer's proposal to jettison the idealism altogether. But this is to throw out the baby with the bath water. Short of that, however, there appears to be no solution available within the framework of Kant's philosophy, save somehow deontologizing the transcendental distinction. Whatever it may be, it cannot be a distinction between how things seem to be to beings like us and how they really are.123

Allison's basic claim is simply that, if we accept the relevance (indeed the applicability) of the

appearance/reality distinction for the purposes of making sense of Kant's doctrine of the TD, we

thereby adopt a view of that very TD that, as he says, “is hard to reconcile with any robust form of 123 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 46-47.

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empirical realism.”124 Or, to put it differently, in his attempt to provide what he thinks amounts to an

intelligible, and one might also say intuitive, interpretation of the meaning of Kant's TD, the

ontological theorist uses the concept of the age-old metaphysical distinction between how things

merely seem (or appear) to be to us on one hand, as opposed to how they really are “in themselves”

on the other in a way that presents conceptual problems in terms of the theoretical details of the

Critical architectonic; in other words, it is just this usage of the concept of appearance vs. reality

that is the locus of the problem, according to Allison. This is because Kant explicitly rejects the use

of just that concept for that exact purpose at B69, which I quoted at length earlier, where he asserts

that objects really are spatio-temporal (as well as categorial), and so for him it's not as though we

merely imagine them to be that way. That, I take it, constitutes Allison's foremost objection to any

putative use of the appearance/reality metaphor in understanding Kant's TD.

4.2. “Anodyne-ness”

In addition to the charge, which we just considered, that methodological views, as purely

formal interpretations of the nature of Kantian idealism, violate the sense, explicitly intended by

Kant, in which his unique transcendental brand of idealism is meant to have downright

metaphysical implications, the most frequently leveled charge against such views is that they

supposedly provide “anodyne,” “trivial,” or even “innocuous” interpretations of Kant's idealism.

Characteristic of this approach are the views of Paul Guyer and Rae Langton, both of whom seem to

think that the trivial nature of the revolutionary, methodological approach to the TD rules it out as a

philosophically credible position with regards to just that doctrine.

With the rise in the late 1970s of the methodological view of Kantian idealism as put

forward by Henry Allison and Graham Bird, Guyer comments125 that such views have come to seem

not merely harmless but indeed salubrious recommendations of epistemological modesty. Now,

because Guyer does not adequately explain his reasons for saying that Birdian, methodological

views of the TD are harmless and salubrious, but instead moves on to sharply criticize Kantian

idealism for being overly dogmatic in its insistence that spatio-temporal properties cannot also be

properties of things as they are in themselves, independent of our representations of them, in what

follows, I will concentrate almost exclusively on the arguments of Langton, setting those of Guyer

aside for the time being.

Langton's views on this matter can be outlined as follows. According to her, any credible

124 Ibid., 46. 125 See Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 333.

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position with respect to Kant's philosophy in general, and his transcendental idealism in particular,

has to account for the following three claims, the first two of which (K1 and K2) are metaphysical

in nature, while the third and final one (K3) is epistemological.

K1. Things in themselves exist.

K2. Things in themselves are the causes of phenomenal appearances.

Langton believes these two claims, taken in conjunction, yield (for reasons we will not discuss) the

problematic K3, which can be understood in the following epistemological terms. K3. We can have no knowledge of things in themselves.

K1-K3 represent, for Langton, a traditional, metaphysical, (and with some minor variations,

“correct”) approach to Kant's TD. Against this metaphysical framework, Langton reinterprets these

three claims in the light of Allison's epistemological view of the TD, which she claims results in the

following three “anodyne theses:”

A1. We can consider things 'in themselves,' i.e. in abstraction from the conditions of our

sensibility.

A2. Things considered in abstraction from the conditions of our sensibility can be

considered only as something that affects the mind.

A3. Things considered in abstraction from their relation to our sensibility are things

considered in abstraction from their relation to our sensibility.126

The locus of Langton's charge of “anodyne-ness,” as I understand it, is first and foremost the

general methodological claim that Kant's conception of things in themselves is no longer meant to

denote a discrete entity with substantive non-spatio-temporal properties, as it was on a more

traditional metaphysical view, which has obvious implications for each of the premises noted above,

but rather a mere conception of just such a type of thing, a thing which bears no relation to the

forms of our sensibility. More specifically, Langton sees an issue with the basic transition from the

conjunction of the first two premises (A1-A2), expressive of merely formal considerations, to the

epistemological conclusion of A3 that “things considered in abstraction from their relation to our

sensibility are things considered in abstraction from their relation to our sensibility.”127 Otherwise

put, Langton seems to be bemoaning the fact that the epistemological conclusion of K3 that we

cannot know, or even make statements about, things in themselves, becomes, on a methodological

view of the sort Allison proposes, the “anodyne” A3, which is a mere analytic consequence of the

conjunction of A1 and A3. One might put it this way, for Allison, as well as for methodological

126 Langton, Kantian Humility, 7-9. 127 Ibid., p. 9.

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theorists in general, we cannot know things in themselves because to consider a thing as it is “in

itself” is necessarily to consider that thing independent of the conditions under which it appears to

us (viz., the a priori epistemic conditions of a possible experience), and thus to consider it outside

the very conditions under which we can know it. We can now readily see that Langton's central

argument against methodological views, in this context, concerns the nature of Kant's famed

inscrutability thesis, in particular the extent to which just such a thesis can be said to become, on a

revolutionary, methodological reading of the sort to which Allison and others subscribe, an

“anodyne” or “trivial” representation of a central aspect of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves

in toto. For example, Langton explicitly says: “Allison's approach makes it analytic that we have no

knowledge of things in themselves. To consider things in themselves is simply to consider things in

abstraction from the conditions of our knowledge: K3 has become the tautological A3.”128

But, what is so horribly wrong with analyticity, for Langton? What is so horribly wrong with

the idea that there are certain indispensable a priori elements in our empirical experience (of

objects), and for one to consider a thing in abstraction from, and thus without any putative reference

to, these elements (or conditions), necessarily amounts to the epistemological claim that, so

considered, we cannot know such things? Further on in her account of the various problems

associated with Allison's methodological position, outlined above, Langton identifies two main

problems with analyticity in this context. First, there is a sense in which Kant thought that our

patent inability to venture outside the realms of the sensible in the hopes of acquiring absolute

mind-independent, and thus unconditioned knowledge of things as they are in themselves represents

a profound discovery in the field of modern epistemology. As Langton puts it:

When Kant tells us that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, he thinks he is telling us something new and important. The truth of K 3 is a major philosophical discovery. Moreover, it is not just a discovery with a definite, non-trivial content. It is a depressing discovery. Kant thinks we are missing out on something in not knowing things as they are in themselves. Kant speaks of our yearning for something more, of our doomed aspirations, he speaks of 'our inextinguishable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the bounds of experience' (A 796/B 824). It is not easy to see how this inextinguishable desire could be for the falsity of A 3 … I say that it is inconceivable that we could have a yearning for the falsity of A 3 – it is inconceivable that we could have an 'inextinguishable desire' to consider things abstractly without considering things abstractly. I think this is reason enough to reject Allison's anodyne interpretation.129

The latter part of this passage points to the second reason Langton gives for rejecting Allison's

methodological approach on the grounds of analyticity. That is, it is not just that Kant believes he is

128 Langton, Kantian Humility, 10. 129 Ibid.

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making some grand epistemological pronouncement in claiming that, however acute our sense

faculties may in time ultimately become, we can never obtain any determinate knowledge of things

as they are in themselves (as in the inscrutability thesis in general); it is also that the very idea that

we could have knowledge of such things is held by Kant to be ridiculous. In line with this, a few

passages following the above, Langton claims: “the question of how anyone or anything could have

knowledge of things in themselves would be nonsense.”130 According to her, then, it is absurd for us

to think that we can ever have knowledge of such things, of things considered in complete

abstraction from their relation to our sensibility, and thus entirely independent of the a priori

epistemic conditions under which things (or objects) are given to us.

Of course, at first glance, the tautological A3 is wholly anodyne, and that is just to say it is

tautological: in this way, Langton bases her criticism of “anodyne-ness” on her own view of A3 as a

tautology, which raises the question of whether the methodological interpretation of K3 really is a

tautology, and whether it really is anodyne. Nevertheless, the forthcoming discussion will show that,

when it is properly understood in the light of the details of Kant's idealism, A3 is anything but a

tautology and therefore anything but anodyne. I now explain my reasons for this view by focusing

on the issues with Langton's treatment of the methodological A3, which becomes, on closer

inspection and contrary to Langton's assumption, not something that can be translated into the

merely tautological principle that, to consider something in abstraction from its relation to our

sensibility is to consider something in abstraction from its relation to our sensibility, but rather the

non-tautological, non-trivial epistemic principle that, to consider something in abstraction from its

relation to our sensibility is necessarily to consider that something in abstraction from the

conditions under which it is intuited by us, and so considering something in this manner furnishes

us with no objective knowledge of it qua thing. I turn now to the two points Langton raises against

the methodological A3 and how her failure to understand such a thesis correctly governs her

(mistaken) view of the methodological position with respect to things in themselves in a way that

fails to do justice not just to the view itself, but to Kant's considered views on the subject.

To Langton's first point that Allison's methodological position cannot do justice to the sense

in which Kant thinks he is making a profound epistemological pronouncement when he claims that

we cannot have knowledge of things in themselves, I would question whether there is anything

more profound in postulating entities that are inherently unknowable than there is in postulating a

non-sensible, and thus highly abstract, way of considering things that furnishes us with no genuine

knowledge of objects. She takes it, on the basis of a mistaken reading of a single passage from the

“Transcendental Doctrine of Method,” that it is somehow more profound to claim that there exists a

130 Ibid.

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transcendent class of entities, with distinct non-spatio-temporal properties, than it is to claim that we

cannot have knowledge of things considered in abstraction from the way in which such things are

given to us, that is, independent of the conditions under which they appear to us, but there are

certainly issues with this account, which I outline here.

First of all, contra Langton's interpretation of the passage, when Kant speaks of “our

inextinguishable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the limits of experience”131 at

A796/B824, he is certainly not bemoaning the fact that our preferred “Critical” metaphysics does

not involve a postulation of a realm of transcendent things in themselves beyond our experience.

Langton clearly forgets that in the early stages of the “Doctrine of Method,” Kant is summarizing

the results of the previous sections of CPR, and so when Kant refers to the “inextinguishable

desire,” he is referencing that central, misguided aspiration he criticized earlier in the “Dialectic” of

assuming, in accordance with our faculty of reason's necessary function of systematizing and

unifying our concepts under ever-increasing laws of generality, that we are justified in postulating

such things, that is, things beyond the limits of our knowledge.132 So, in other words, Langton's

claim that any theory of the TD that fails to incorporate the sense, evidenced in the claim at

A796/B824, that Kant clearly did believe in, and make substantive claims about, things with

intrinsic non-spatio-temporal characteristics is not only deeply misguided from a general

architectonic perspective, but is based on a fundamental misreading of the passage at A796/B824.

Secondly, there is also a sense in which Langton just assumes, without any prior warrant, that a

metaphysics of transcendent entities (viz., things in themselves) is somehow less-trivial than a

metaphysics which rejects such entities, and it is this which one might call into question. Moreover,

her assumption that the former is in some important respect less-trivial than the latter stems, I

believe, in large part from a basic misunderstanding of what Kant's transcendental idealism amounts

to in comparison with earlier positions in both epistemology and metaphysics. Recall that

transcendental idealism is essentially a hybrid philosophy in that it takes what is true (but of course

not what is false) from the empiricist, idealist, and rationalist traditions and then incorporates these

into a single, unified philosophical position (what one might even call a “meta-philosophical”

position) which, as such, is neither wholly empiricistic, idealistic, nor rationalistic, on the nature of

our experience, and of what it means for us to have a genuine experience itself. This is reflected in

Bird's characterization of Kant that:

He is evidently anti-Platonist, antirationalist, antiempiricist, anti-idealist, antiskeptic, and antidogmatist, and this may suggest that his positive views are quite uninfluenced by the tradition he rejected. But throughout his discussion Kant

131 CPR, A796/B824. 132 See Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 741.

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recognizes some underlying truth in virtually all the theories he rejects and offers reconstructed versions of them.133

Especially in the light of this general account of the nature of Kant's idealism, one could make the

case that A3 is non-trivial, in the sense that it reflects a residual empiricist commitment to the notion

that there are certain indispensable, sensory elements to our experience without which our

experience would not be the type of experience it is.

One of the implications of Kant's arguments from the “Aesthetic” – encapsulated in the

famous remark further on in the “Logic” at A51/B75 where Kant proclaims: “Thoughts without

content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” – on the status of space and time as the a

priori forms of our empirical intuition is that there is an implicit reference to sense within any and

every putative knowledge-claim. We cannot obtain knowledge of objects independently of the

sensory element(s) Kant has found to be necessarily constitutive of our empirical experiences itself.

For, Kant's conclusions in the “Aesthetic” can now be said to reflect what can be characterized as

the broadly empiricist view that there are certain necessary, and thus indispensable, sensory

elements to our experience, and so what Kant is taken to be claiming in A3 – the claim that we

cannot obtain knowledge of things in abstraction from their relation to our sensibility – is that, in

virtue of the discursive nature of our cognition, for one to consider a thing in abstraction from just

these necessary sensory elements is not only erroneous, but empty as it furnishes us with no genuine

knowledge of objects. Given the Kantian conception of things in themselves as things considered

apart from the manner in which they are given to us, and thus entirely removed from any putative

reference to sense, Kant's conclusion that we cannot acquire knowledge of such things can now be

viewed as an unequivocal expression of an underlying hostility to rationalism, and in turn an

implicit endorsement of empiricism, in that he is voicing his rejection of the rationalist belief that

one can acquire knowledge of objects by means of pure a priori concepts of reason alone, meaning

without any contribution from our sensibilities. With this understanding, it is not at all difficult to

see why some, myself included, might regard just such a notion to be a highly profound claim in

epistemology. Allison's A3 can now be seen to be anything but anodyne in the sense required by

Langton's argument at this juncture.

As for Langton's claim that, in the event that A3 had in fact represented the views of the real,

Critical Kant, the notion that we ever could have knowledge of things as they are in themselves, in

the sense defined in A3, would thereby in effect become inconceivable and non-sensical, it must be

noted that some of the most eminent philosophers, both in Kant's time as well as in our own, clearly

don't share Langton's sentiment in this regard. Some philosophers clearly did think that we can

133 Ibid., 757.

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obtain genuine knowledge of things in complete abstraction from any contribution from the senses,

or what is the same, in abstraction from their relation to our sensibility. For example, one of the

commonly-held beliefs, associated with the rationalist school of thought, particularly that of Leibniz

and Wolff, is that we can obtain full and adequate knowledge of objects by means of pure concepts

of reason alone, absent any contribution from the senses. Kant makes it clear in various places in

CPR, specifically in his criticisms of Leibniz in the “Analytic of Principles,” that the basic

rationalist fallacy is one which rests on a misunderstanding of the distinction between objects of the

senses (phenomena) and objects of the understanding (noumena). In the case of Leibniz in

particular, this failure can in large part be explained by the fact that he did not have a transcendental

outlook on the basis of which such a distinction can be drawn. With this misunderstanding that

Leibniz had no adequate transcendental outlook as his guide, he mistakenly thought that the former

and the latter are the same things, and therefore erroneously claimed that phenomena, objects of the

senses, are somehow merely confused representations of noumena, objects of the understanding.

Indeed, this is exactly why Leibniz believed that we can obtain knowledge of the inner natures of

things by comparing objects merely in the understanding. In the “Amphiboly of Concepts of

Reflection,” Kant claims:

Having no such transcendental topic, and being therefore deceived by the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system of the world, or rather believed that he could obtain knowledge of the inner nature of things by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and with the separated, formal concepts of its thought … He compared all things with each other by means of concepts alone, and naturally found no other differences save those only through which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another. The conditions of sensible intuition, which carry with them their own differences, he did not regard as original, sensibility being for him only a confused mode of representation, and not a separate source of representations. Appearance was, on his view, the representation of the thing in itself.134

[This] misled even one of the most acute of all philosophers into a supposititious system of intellectual knowledge, which undertakes to determine its object without any assistance from the senses. For this reason the exposition of the cause of what is deceptive – occasioning these false principles – in the amphiboly of these concepts, is of great utility as a reliable method of determining and securing the limits of the understanding.135

As Bird informs us,136 the general errors spoken of above, as well as the specific ambiguities these

errors inevitably lead to, illustrate just what is wrong with Leibniz's theory of the identity of

134 CPR, A270/B326. 135 CPR, A280/B336. 136 See Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 544.

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indiscernibles, “and more generally how he comes to conceive of a world of intelligibilia accessed

not through sense experience but solely through reason.”137 Unfortunately, I must lay aside for the

time being any in-depth consideration of how Leibniz's misunderstanding of the basic distinction

between objects of the senses (phenomena) and objects of the understanding (noumena) inevitably

led to a mistaken view concerning the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.138 My aim, after all,

has simply been to show that not everyone thought, as Langton clearly does, that it is absurd, or to

use her phrase, “non-sensical,” to think that we can obtain knowledge of objects solely through the

use of pure concepts of reason alone, which is to say in abstraction from, and thus without any

reference to, the epistemic conditions under which they are given to us in sense experience. With

this background of Leibniz's philosophy, it is now easy to see why Kant's philosophy, on a

methodological reading that is, is once again anything but anodyne in the present respect required

by Langton's argument.

Thus far I have sought to reject any objection to the methodological reading of Kant on the

grounds that it is an “anodyne” or “trivial” representation of the principles of Kantian idealism by

focusing on the arguments of Rae Langton, who presents in her Kantian Humility (what I take to be)

the most complete and systematic formulation of just this charge. In the end, she concludes, on the

basis of this charge, that the methodological reading of the sort ascribed to by Allison, in particular,

cannot represent the views of the real Kant in that it “trivializes” his idealism to the point where it

no longer becomes credible. However, as we saw, I rejected her account on two main grounds,

corresponding to the two respects in which “triviality” or “anodyne-ness” can be said to present a

problem for the methodological view of Kant. First, Langton claimed that “anodyne-ness” is a

problem because Kant took his thesis that we cannot have any knowledge of things as they are in

themselves (the inscrutability thesis) to represent a ground-breaking achievement in epistemology,

and to a lesser extent, metaphysics. Second, in the event that the methodological view is correct,

and we cannot have knowledge of things as they are in themselves because we cannot have

knowledge of things considered in abstraction from the conditions under which they are given to us,

then it is absurd to think that we ever could have knowledge of such things, thereby making it

impossible to ascribe such an “obvious” view to Kant. I rejected the first on the grounds that a

consideration of the empiricist nature of Kant's idealism, expressed in the conclusions on the status

of the forms of empirical intuition in the “Aesthetic” first and foremost, directly governs our

understanding of Kant's idealism to the point where the inscrutability thesis in particular no longer

appears as “uninspired” or as “superficial” as it originally appeared. I rejected the second on the

137 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 544. 138 Ibid., 544-545.

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grounds that the inscrutability thesis is anything but “obvious” in light of the fact that some of the

most eminent philosophers of Kant's day (e.g. Leibniz) clearly did think that we could acquire

knowledge of objects independent of sense experience, and thus through the use of pure a priori

concepts of reason alone, absent any contribution from the senses. Just like the case of our first

criticism of the methodological view, whereby such views fail to do justice to the “ontological”

significance of Kant's idealism, the charge that Allisonian-type methodological views are “anodyne”

rests on very shaky ground indeed. The corollary of which is the claim that methodological views in

general become wholly plausible interpretations of Kant and of Kant's doctrine of the TD.

Conclusion

My aim, in this chapter, has been to examine each of the four transcendental readings of

Kant's TD – the ontological, the two-aspect, the intrinsic nature, and the methodological reading –

solely on the basis of the finer “Critical” details of Kant's theoretical philosophy. Of the first three

metaphysical interpretations, only the aspect view can be said to be plausible in this respect, given

the critical issues confronting both the ontological and the intrinsic nature readings. Taking the

former, the main issue with the ontological reading is that it construes Kant, unjustified from a

consideration of the B 69 passage as well as the “Refutation of Idealism,” in an outwardly

phenomenalistic and thus idealistic, way. Simply put, one of its implications is that it degrades

Kant's conception of empirical reality to such an extent that the Critical program becomes virtually

indistinguishable from that of a traditional idealism or straightforward phenomenalism, and it

thereby loses exegetical credibility given Kant's repeated, explicit rejections of just such a doctrine.

Now, taking the latter, viz., the issues confronting the intrinsic nature reading, I find it difficult to

endorse a reading of the TD that goes against the thrust of two central components of Kant's

doctrine of things in themselves: the non-formal, non-categorial thesis and the inscrutability thesis:

by claiming that Kant's concept of things in themselves denotes the “substantial,” underpinning the

field of our experience as its necessary metaphysical Grund, intrinsic nature views thereby in effect

violate (1) the sense in which things as they are in themselves are beyond the field of the proper

employment of the categories by using the category of “substance/attribute” in comprehending the

thing in itself, and (2) the sense in which things in themselves are unknowable, inscrutable entities

which we cannot make any substantive claims about by saying things, like that of the above, about

such things. In this way, intrinsic nature views violate each of the theses noted above, and to claim

that such views are inherently plausible is, in my mind, a bit of a stretch. Finally, with regards to the

only formal, epistemological reading of the TD, the methodological reading, my conclusion has

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been that, by virtue of its ability to escape the two foremost charges to which it is most frequently

subjected – the charge that it isn't metaphysical enough, and the charge that it is an “anodyne” (or

“trivial”) recommendation of epistemological modesty – methodological readings can be made

perfectly compatible with the underlying epistemological nerve of the Critical philosophy and its

necessary formal, epistemological principles and theses. However, a consequence of this discussion

is the rather unfortunate one that we now have two plausible readings of the TD; so what are we to

do?

Well, in order to resolve this matter, we must return to the basic claims and conclusions of

chapter 1, where we saw that, of the four transcendental readings I have formulated and assessed

there, the only plausible one from a purely exegetical standpoint was the methodological view,

which, to repeat, takes Kant's TD as a merely conceptual distinction between the two possible ways

of considering things (empirical objects) entailed by the very nature of our faculty of cognition as a

fundamentally discursive one requiring both sensible particulars as well as general concepts. What

we saw in chapter 1 showed that this is the only view of the TD that can legitimately be said to

align with Kant's considered views on the subject. He clearly did not believe in, nor posit as a

necessary, entailed as a commitment of his transcendental idealism, any dualistic view whereby

there are said to exist two discrete types or classes of object, the ordinary spatio-temporal objects of

our experience, which conform to, and are thus governed by, the necessary empirical laws and

principles of our experience, as well as a distinct, mercurial set of non-spatio-temporal objects,

ontologically independent from the objects of our experience, and which consequently cannot be

said to conform to the necessary empirical-causal laws regulating and governing that experience.

There is just one type of object, according to Kant, the objects of our experience, and the two,

mutually incompatible ways these objects can be considered. In one way, which Kant rejects and

finds erroneous, they are considered as objects “in themselves,” in abstraction from the a priori

epistemic conditions under which they appear to us, and as a consequence they are considered to

exist independent of the spatio-temporal framework and its necessary causal laws governing our

experience (of objects) in the manner noted above. In another way, which Kant accepts as

legitimate, they are considered as the ordinary empirical items of a possible experience, in which

case they are considered in relation to, rather than in abstraction from, the necessary empirical-

causal laws structuring and governing our empirical experience of objects. More specifically, Kant

rejects the former mainly on the grounds that it reflects a pre-Critical, rationalist procedure in

metaphysics with regards to the objects of our experience, of attempting to derive a priori

knowledge of objects by means of pure concepts of reason alone, and thus independent of any

reference to sense-experience, and he then accepts the latter on the basis that it resolves many of the

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metaphysical and logical issues believed to be associated with the former, rationalist procedure

paradigmatic of taking things as “things in themselves” instead of as “mere appearances.” It must

also be noted that Kant would then go on, in various sections of CPR, such as that of the

“Dialectic,” (which lie beyond the purview of this dissertation) to diagnose the inevitable

metaphysical and logical errors associated with the former, erroneous way of considering things,

viz., as objects “in themselves,” independent of our experience of them, and how the latter serves as

a philosophical corrective and therapy for those very errors. In saying this, what I have been

attempting to show here is that this merely formal, methodological way of understanding Kant's

theory of the TD, and of his idealism more generally, is the only way of doing justice to the

underlying epistemic, and by implication non-metaphysical, thrust of the Critical program, and so it

is unsurprising why some (like myself) would say of the methodological reading that it can

legitimately be said to fit both the texts as well as the finer details of Kantian idealism.

With this methodological view that what Kant's TD ultimately consists in is not a distinction

between different modes of being, but rather between different modes (or ways) of considering the

ordinary empirical constituents of our reality, which I have argued constitutes the only proper way

of reading Kantian idealism, we must now consider whether such a view of Kant succumbs to

perhaps the most extensive, the most systematic, and some might even say the most successful,

critique of the Kantian Critical system to date, viz., Hegel's critique of Kant. In the next chapter, I

begin by setting the stage for what will become my eventual assessment of Hegel's critique of

Kant's notion of things in themselves by outlining the most basic features of this critique, excluding

those relating to Kant's things in themselves. We will see that what I have done thus far in relation

to Kant's TD, advocating a methodological Kant at the expense of all such metaphysical readings, is

crucial insofar as an assessment of the overall plausibility of Hegel's critique is concerned, for many

of Hegel's chief criticisms of both the Kantian transcendental philosophy in general, as well as of

things in themselves in particular, can be seen to turn on how exactly one understands Kant's

theoretical philosophy in this respect. But, this, to be sure, will become increasingly evident as we

proceed.

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Chapter 3: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy: An Overview

Introduction

One might say that it is only natural, if not inevitable, for any philosopher studying the

theoretical philosophy of Kant – regardless of the particular aspect – to follow up his or her

discussion with a consideration of Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy, which is

arguably the single most thorough and systematic critique of the Kantian theoretical philosophy to

date. In the previous two chapters, I have dealt with a single Kantian concept, that of things in

themselves, which has proven not just within recent years, but from the time of the publication of

the first edition of CPR in 1781 itself, to be open to various interpretations and as a consequence

various objections as well. It is not surprising, then, for the reader to learn that I am now moving on

to a consideration of this very concept in relation to Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy

in general. So in the next few chapters, I will be considering the “methodological” Kant,

specifically the methodological Kant's view of things in themselves, against the background of the

Hegelian critique. But, of course, before I set out on this course of evaluating the plausibility of the

“methodological” conception of things in themselves on the basis of Hegel's foremost objections to

it, I must first outline the basic themes of Hegel's critique of the theoretical component of Kant's

transcendentalism in general, and that is exactly what I will do here in this chapter. This chapter,

unlike the ones that will follow, will have, as its exclusive subject-matter and focus, Hegel's critique

of Kant's theoretical philosophy, excluding his critique of Kant's things as they are in themselves,

which I will need an entirely separate chapter (i.e., chapter 4) in order to do it justice. I do not,

however, assess the merits of Hegel's arguments and claims with respect to the former; since my

interest lies exclusively with outlining Hegel's critique of the latter, it would be well beyond the

purview of this chapter, indeed my entire dissertation itself, if I were to examine each and every

Hegelian argument against the Kantian philosophy so as to see whether or not it can be said either

to (a) apply to the real “methodological” Kant, or (b) crudely put, constitute what might be said to

be a “good argument” on the matter in its own right.139

Very briefly, let me point out why this is important here. In earlier chapters, we have already

139 See Sally Sedgwick, Hegel's Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Kenneth Westphal, Hegel's Epistemological Realism: A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's Phenomenological Spirit (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989); Paul Guyer, “Thought and Being: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy” in Frederick Beiser, ed., The Cambridge Campanion to Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 171-211; and Karl Ameriks, “Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1985), 1-35.

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seen exactly how and why the Kantian conception of things in themselves plays such a central role

in any critical evaluation of the merits of Kant's idealism, and so it shouldn't be difficult to

understand why the TD needs to be evaluated from the stand-point of Hegel's critique if we are to

come to any reasonable assessment of Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy in general. If

one takes the view (held by Allison, and one I share) that Kant's transcendental idealism turns on

how the TD is to be best understood, then it seems to follow that Hegel's critique of that idealism

turns on that very TD as well. And, even though I do not assess that aspect of Hegel's critique here,

leaving it aside until the next chapter, I am nevertheless concerned to set the stage for that

assessment here in chapter 3 by outlining the major theoretical themes and components of the

Hegelian critique broadly conceived, and it is to this task that I must now turn.

But, unfortunately this critique is by no means reducible to a single, fundamental argument,

thesis, or claim, and so it obviously cannot be found within a single work; Hegel's response to Kant

has a number of non-overlapping aspects or components, spanning a variety of works published

over a number of years.140 This makes the task before us all the more difficult in that we have to

begin by disentangling these various, non-overlapping aspects or components so as to have a single,

unified picture of just what exactly Hegel found so troubling, and even sometimes incoherent, about

what was then perceived to be Kant's ground-breaking “Critical” philosophy, and how the mistakes

of Kant can be overcome, in Hegel's mind. Generally speaking, I would argue that the basic,

underlying themes and arguments of Hegel's critique of the Critical philosophy can be seen to fall

under one of either three headings: first, those which concern Kant's methodology, specifically his

“Critical” method; second, those which concern Kant's epistemology or theory of knowledge; and

third, those which concern Kant's metaphysics. However, before I list which Hegelian criticisms fall

under which category(-ies), let me inform the reader that this classification is by no means perfectly

non-overlapping, since, as we will learn, although some of these criticisms may uncontroversially

be classifiable under only one of these three headings, that does not mean that a criticism which,

say, is outwardly methodological, cannot also have underlying epistemological or metaphysical

implications. But, I must set this aside for the moment.

This chapter, therefore, consists of three main parts, which, respectively, deal with the

methodological, the epistemological, and finally, the metaphysical components of Hegel's critique

of Kant's theoretical philosophy, broadly conceived.

140 I do not recognize any meaningful distinction between what might be characterized as Hegel's “early” criticisms of the Kantian Critical philosophy on one hand, and his “late” criticisms on the other, because I don't think Hegel's view of Kant changed fundamentally from the early period onwards.

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Part 1: Methodology

To start, within the context of Hegel's views on Kant's Critical methodology, Hegel sees

three major issues. The first concerns the basic aim of the Kantian Critical program, and the second

and third concern what can be regarded as the most troubling underlying assumptions and

implications of this Critical program. In what follows, I first explain each of these in turn.

In order to understand the first criticism (in fact, all of the above) we must first turn to the

nature and aim of Kant's “Critical” project itself. We have already seen in previous discussions that

the overarching aim of Kant's Critical philosophy was to identify the indispensable grounds or

conditions of our knowledge, of what it means for us to have determinate knowledge of things, and

not necessarily to make any first-order, substantive claims into the nature of reality as such; in this

way, the “Critical” philosopher thereby investigates the nature and structure of our cognitive

faculties, the means by which we acquire knowledge of things, rather than the nature or structure of

reality itself. Kant's belief, as Hegel understands him, is that the former must be investigated before

the latter because, for all we know, we may not even to be able to acquire any determinate

knowledge of objects in the first place; knowledge may be entirely beyond our cognitive reach. So,

with that said, one of Kant's fundamental methodological principles, according to Hegel, is thus the

idea that, if we wish to be fully “Critical” philosophers, we must first investigate the nature of our

cognition before we can investigate reality as such in order to see if our cognition is after all capable

of succeeding upon the course for which it is set, viz., the path of objective knowledge, which is no

doubt the aim of all philosophers. As Hegel summarizes the aim and nature of the Critical project in

Lectures on the History of Philosophy (LHP), he asserts:

In the second place the philosophy of Kant is likewise called a critical philosophy because its aim, says Kant, is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge; for before obtaining knowledge we must inquire into the faculties of knowledge. To the healthy human understanding that is plausible, and to it this has been a great discovery.141

Likewise, in Faith and Knowledge (FK), Hegel claims:

The whole task and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but the cognition of this subjectivity. In other words, it is a critique of the cognitive faculties.142

Even the most cursory reading of these passages makes it clear that Hegel is insistent that a central

feature of Kant's Critical program and its methodology is the belief that, if we are to make any

significant progress within the field of metaphysics and its (synthetic a priori) knowledge, then we 141 LHP, 428. 142 FK, 68.

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must first inquire into the nature and function of our cognition before we make any systematic

inquiry into knowledge per se.

But it shouldn't be too surprising for the reader to learn that Hegel did not agree with Kant

on this matter, and his argument can best be understood in terms of the claim that a procedure

whereby we attempt to offer an examination into the grounds of our knowledge, instead of

attempting to acquire any actual first-order knowledge of reality as such, is ultimately self-refuting

and inherently contradictory. To claim that we must inquire into the nature and function of our

cognitive faculties in order to see if they are up for the task for which they are set prior to, and

independently of, any substantive inquiry into the nature of reality as such, according to Hegel, is

contradictory for the simple fact that the initial investigation into our cognition is itself an epistemic

investigation of some sort, to be specific, it is an epistemic investigation into the nature and function

of our cognition, into what it takes for us to obtain knowledge of objects. Therefore, the two cannot

be so neatly separated as Kant imagines, and as such it is impossible for us to undertake an

examination of our cognitive faculties if we are not already capable of undertaking an examination

of the nature of reality itself – or at least, there is no good reason to think the former is somehow

less problematic than the latter:

And a further claim is made when it is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know. For to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them; but how are we to know without knowing, how we are to apprehend the truth before the truth, it is impossible to say. It is the old story of the σχολαστικός who would not go into the water till he could swim. Thus since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing, it cannot in Kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already – it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself; the same thing happens as happened with the Jews, the Spirit passes through the midst of them and they know it not. At the same time the step taken by Kant is a great and important one – that is, the fact that he has made knowledge the subject of his consideration.143

And elsewhere, in Encyclopaedia Logic (EL), he claims:

By contrast, the Critical philosophy set itself the task of investigating just how far the forms of thinking are in general capable of helping us reach the cognition of truth. More precisely, the faculty of cognition was to be investigated before cognition began. This certainly involves the correct insight that the forms of thinking themselves must be made the ob-ject of cognition; but there soon creeps in, too, the mistaken project of wanting to have cognition before we have any cognition, or of not wanting to go into the water before we have learned to swim. Certainly, the forms of thinking should not be used without investigation; but this process of investigation is itself a process of cognition.144

143 LHP, 428-429. 144 EL, §41Z, 82.

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The claim, in each of these passages, is much the same: in the event that all inquiries into the nature

of reality itself are prohibited from us from the outset, then any inquiry into the nature and/or

function of our cognitive faculties is likewise prohibited to us for the simple fact that this is just one

more type of epistemic inquiry, specifically it is a second-order inquiry into the character of our

cognition, and whether our cognition is capable of grasping what Hegel terms as the “Absolute,”

and what Kant calls the world of noumena. There is thus something utterly incoherent in the

Kantian project of a critique of pure reason, viz., a critique of our faculty of reason itself and its

basic character and function undertaken prior to, and independent of, an examination into reality as

such, according to Hegel.

It is worth pausing for a moment here in order to draw the reader's attention to a noteworthy

idea that appears throughout Hegel's critique of Kant, and it is in some sense the product of the aim

of the Critical program itself, abstractly conceived, which, as we just saw, amounts to the notion

that we must first inquire into our cognitive faculties before we make any first-order inquiry into the

nature of reality as such. The idea I am referring to here is Hegel's notion that, on a Kantian

“Critical” view of knowledge, our knowledge is akin to that of an instrument, or a medium by

means of which we can acquire knowledge of things. In the following passage from LHP (some of

which I have quoted previously), Hegel suggests that any examination into the grounds of our

knowledge is thereby to take the view that our knowledge is analogous to an instrument, where he

claims:

In the second place the philosophy of Kant is likewise called a critical philosophy because its aim, says Kant, is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge; for before obtaining knowledge we must inquire into the faculties of knowledge. To the healthy human understanding that is plausible, and to it this has been a great discovery. Knowledge is thereby represented as an instrument, as a method and means whereby we endeavour to possess ourselves of the truth. Thus before men can make their way to the truth itself they must know the nature and function of their instrument. They must see whether it is capable of supplying what is demanded of it – of seizing upon the object; they must know whether the alterations it makes in the objects are, in order that these alterations may not be mixed up with the determinations of the object itself. This would appear as though men could set forth upon the search for truth with spears and staves.145

The thought, it seems to me, is that, in examining the nature of our cognition, and by implication of

what it means for us to have knowledge of things, the Critical philosopher is in an important sense

taking the view that our cognition is like an instrument in the way that a scientist examines his or

her instrument before putting it into use. If our knowledge really is akin to an instrument as Kant

imagines, then it only makes sense that we examine it beforehand for it may not be capable of

145 LHP, 428. Brackets mine.

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accomplishing the task for which it is set, which is the cognition of reality as such. 146 As we will

come to see, this notion that our knowledge is like an instrument of sorts can consequently be seen

to lead to some rather troubling issues for the Kantian.

I noted earlier that it can be argued that the second major methodological issue Hegel had

with Kant's Critical philosophy can be seen to arise from the inherently troubling nature of the

Critical program itself; for an underlying assumption of the Critical procedure of first investigating

our cognition, of establishing the necessary, indispensable elements of our immanent experience, is

that there are such necessary conditions of our experience, that there are certain a priori elements

every experience has to have if it is to be the sort of experience that is possible for us, and so for all

intents and purposes, for it to be an experience as such. The troubling implication here, according to

Hegel, is that it leads to the view that our knowledge is not condition-less, or unconditioned, that

there are certain elements which have to be realized in our experience if we are to obtain genuine

knowledge of objects. In this way, the Critical philosopher assumes from the outset, which from

Hegel's standpoint is unjustified, that there are, after all, limits to our knowledge, limits to what we

can and cannot know, which raises the question of whether it is possible for us to put in place limits

to our cognition of things without in the process transcending those very limits. Hegel's view is that

it certainly does, and his claim is that, in order to establish the limits of something, we necessarily

have to go beyond that thing, seeing it from the outside as it were, so as to establish the exact point

at which our cognition of reality stops. If true, Hegel's argument would effectively undermine

Kant's Critical methodology, indeed the Critical program itself, by illustrating another way in which

the Critical philosophy, a principle of which is the claim that we must investigate our instrument,

our cognition, before we put that instrument into play, is internally incoherent. It would be

incoherent as the Critical philosopher would thereby be positing a transcendent reality (what Hegel

refers to derisively as an “inaccessible beyond”) to which we must also have access, in order to set

limits to our knowledge – which is the very sort of reality the Critical philosophy not only warns us

against positing (and in the “Dialectic” provides a therapy for) but rules out from the outset.

The third and final issue Hegel perceived in the Critical philosophy is tied to the notion,

mentioned above, that our knowledge is akin to an instrument of some kind, and so in order to lay

out what the criticism as such consists in, we must return to that notion. If we take the view that our

cognition is like an instrument, a medium standing between us and the “real” (whatever that may

amount to) through which the “real” can be apprehended by us, then this seems to suggest that our

146 For a helpful discussion of how a critique of pure reason, that is, a critique of our cognitive faculties, and correlatively an examination into what it takes for us to obtain knowledge of things, seems to entail the view that our knowledge can be understood in terms of an instrument, see W. H. Walsh, “The Idea of a Critique of Pure Reason: Kant and Hegel,” in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 119-135.

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cognition, like that of any scientist's instrument, for instance, may distort reality in such a way that

we can no longer be said to be apprehending things as they are really are. But, in Hegel's mind, for

Kant to assume that our cognition functions as an instrument, a possible barrier of sorts on the path

of objective knowledge, standing between us and the object of our knowledge, and distorting that

very object, is unjustified and presents a mistaken view of epistemology. As Hegel puts it in

Phenomenology of Spirit (PS)

To be specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated from it, and yet is something real; or in other words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth.147

To assume from the outset that our cognition acts as a possible barrier on the path of objective

knowledge, as Kant does, rather than as a means of acquiring such knowledge, is thus unjustified,

for there is no more reason to think of our cognition in the former “Critical” way than there is to

think of it in the latter Hegelian way. Hegel's view, whether it is correct or not, is that Kant does not

provide an adequate justification for this instrument view of knowledge whereby knowledge of the

“real,” the “Absolute,” the realm of noumena, is made questionable from the outset. Essentially,

Hegel is here criticizing Kant's “Restriktionslehre,” that is, the notion that our knowledge might be

restricted solely to the realm of appearances and not to that of things in themselves, on the grounds

that any such restriction violates Hegel's view that we can in fact apprehend the “Absolute.”

There are thus three major issues, from a Hegelian perspective, with Kant's Critical

methodology. The first can be found most prominently in PS, and LHP, where Hegel's central

argument consists in the claim that Kant's Critical program of attempting to inquire into the

character of our cognitive faculties prior to, and independent of, any first-order knowledge-claims

as such, so as to see whether or not they are adequately suited for the task for which they are set, is

self-refuting. To proceed down the path of objective knowledge by inquiring into the nature and

scope of our cognitive faculties prior to any actual epistemic examination into the nature of things

as such is self-refuting since the former, higher-order inquiry is itself nothing but an independently

undertaken epistemic examination itself. The second issue is tangentially related to the Critical

program of inquiring into the adequacy of our cognition prior to, and independent of, any inquiry

into knowledge as such, in that it concerns the outcome of this prior, independently undertaken

epistemic examination which is that there are certain necessary limits to our cognition of things.

147 PS, §74, 47.

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The problem the Critical program faces in this regard is whether these epistemic limits, whatever

they may be, can be put in place without in the process transcending those very limits, for if they

cannot, then the Critical program is itself contradictory. And finally, Hegel rejects the notion, central

to the Critical program itself, that our cognition is akin to that of an instrument, a medium standing

between us on one side and the real on the other through which reality could then be distorted, as it

prejudices one's view of knowledge and our relation to it in a way that Hegel finds objectionable.

Again, it must be noted that this is certainly not to say that Hegel's views on these matters, or on

any others so far discussed, are correct; all I am doing here is outlining the central issues Hegel had

with Kant's theoretical philosophy, particularly those concerning his Critical methodology. I turn

now to what Hegel perceived to be the most serious critical issues with Kant's Critical

epistemology.

Part 2: Epistemology

Arguably, Hegel's most significant objection to the Critical epistemology is what I would

like to refer to as the charge of “subjectivism,”148 the idea that Kant's transcendental brand of

idealism is nothing over and above a subjective idealism, and as such, it fails to provide us with

knowledge of things as they really are, objects as such. In Hegel's account of the subjectivism

charge, there are three main grounds on which he bases such a criticism: first, he bases it on the

grounds that our cognitive faculties, that is, both sensibility and understanding, have a merely

subjective rather than an objective status; second, he bases it on the grounds that the categories, and

thus the starting-point of the Critical system itself, are likewise subjective in origin and status; and

third and finally, he bases it on the grounds that, according to Kant's transcendental idealism, we

cannot obtain knowledge of things as they are in themselves, and the unfortunate implication this

has, for Hegel, is that we are thus inextricably cut-off from ever obtaining knowledge of reality as

such.

To begin with, as I just stated, one of the main grounds on which Hegel bases the charge of

subjectivism is that Kant classifies the two main faculties of human knowledge, sensibility and

understanding, as subjective rather than objective faculties, and this leads to the rather unfortunate

view that transcendental idealism is a subjective form of idealism in that it prohibits us from ever

obtaining genuine knowledge of objects. By characterizing the status of our faculties of sensibility 148 For a helpful discussion of the charge of “subjectivism,” see Stephen Priest, “Subjectivity and Objectivity in Kant

and Hegel,” in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 103-119; Sedgwick, Hegel's Critique of Kant, 70-97. My treatment of the subjectivism charge parallels Priest's in that he outlines the way in which the charge can be seen to trade on the various conceptions of the subjective/objective distinction by defining three senses of each term.

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as well as understanding as “subjective,” and not “objective,” which Hegel reserves for cognition of

the thing in itself, Hegel's claim is that Kant is thereby effectively degrading these cognitive

faculties to such an extent that the knowledge we acquire by means of them is not genuine

knowledge at all, and is in some sense a merely illusory form of knowledge. Appearing in such

works as LHP, EL, and FK, the charge of “subjectivism,” as it has come to be known, can best be

understood as turning on the status of our cognitive faculties, sensibility and understanding, as

“subjective” rather than “objective,” and so to offer an adequate explanation of it, I will now further

explain the rationale behind this characterization.

So, what does Kant mean by his claims in the “Aesthetic” and elsewhere, that the two

indispensable faculties for human knowledge, viz., sensibility and understanding, retain a

“subjective” and not an “objective” status? How are we supposed to make sense of the

subjective/objective distinction when it comes to our cognitive faculties? Well, Hegel's analysis

trades on three different conceptions of the subjective/objective distinction, and so in order for one

to understand his claim (as well as Kant's) that our cognitive faculties are ultimately subjective, I

have to lay out each of these conceptions. The first of which I would like to call a common-sense

view of subjectivity vs. objectivity. On this view, what is subjective is taken to denote anything

which cannot exist independent from our experience or knowledge of it, whereas what is objective

is taken to denote anything which does exist independent of both our experience and knowledge of

it. “In ordinary language,” Hegel writes, “to be objective is to be present outside us and to come to

us from outside through perception.”149 And correlatively, Hegel would say that, to be present within

us and to come to us through introspection is what it means to be subjective. If we take this view of

the subjective/objective distinction, it isn't difficult to see why both of our faculties for cognition are

subjective since both the a priori forms of our sensibility as well as the a priori categories of

thought are in some sense mind-dependent, and inextricably bound up with the character of our

cognition itself. One way of putting it is to say that the forms (and the categories) are what they are

because our cognition is the way it is – they are the product of the subject, not the product of the

object per se – and so for Hegel to claim that they are subjective is just for him to underscore the

sense in which they depend on us for their being the way they are. If our cognitive apparatus were

to inexplicably change somehow, the forms and the categories would no longer be what they

currently are, in which case we would thus no longer be representing things under the forms of

space and time, nor thinking things under the categories of substance, unity, plurality, etc …

Ultimately, Hegel's claim is just that the forms, the categories, and the respective faculties to which

they both belong, are subjective for they are not completely mind-independent; they owe both their

149 EL, §41Z, 82.

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being, as well as their determinate natures, to our being and our determinate natures (the natures of

our cognition to be precise). So, at the level of ordinary consciousness, which Hegel is operating on

here, neither sensibility nor understanding are objective faculties of knowledge as their respective a

priori forms and categories depend upon the nature of the cognitive subject for their characters.

Again, the important point is that the way that we intuit things, and the way that we make sense of

things, is a product of us and not of the things per se.

On a second, and perhaps more significant, interpretation of the subjective/objective

distinction, subjectivity corresponds to whatever is presented to us from the senses, and in this way

is taken to denote what is fleeting, transient, and not self-abiding, whereas objectivity is taken to

denote what is thought, what is independent and primitive in Hegel's mind, in short, the universal

and necessary element(s) of our experience. Here, Hegel praises Kant for his perspicacity in

regarding our thoughts, our intellects, what is self-standing, and eternal as opposed to what is

merely fleeting and transitory, viz., the sensibly perceptible, as the objective element of our

experience. So, in contrast to the first sense of the subjective/objective distinction outlined above,

where it was concluded that both of our cognitive faculties were completely subjective, if we use

this notion of subjectivity vs. objectivity, it is clear that our cognition, at least insofar as the faculty

of understanding is concerned, which includes the realm of self-abiding, primitive, and eternal

thoughts, can be classified as an objective faculty and in this way provides us with objective

knowledge of reality as such. For example, in the case of art, Hegel informs us that judgements of

works of art should be “objective” and not “subjective,” where this is taken to mean that our

judgements should not be based on our “contingent, particular feelings, or moods of the moment,

but should keep in mind the points of view that are universal and grounded in the essence of art.

When dealing with something scientifically, we can distinguish between an 'objective' and a

'subjective' concern in the same way.”150 It is in this way that the notion of objectivity corresponds

to the universal and the necessary, while subjectivity corresponds to what is merely momentary and

contingent.

There is, however, a very important caveat here, which brings us to the third and final

conception of the subjective/objective distinction Hegel has in mind. His claim is that, although

Kant rightly recognizes that “what measures up to thought (the universal and the necessary)”151 is

objective, Hegel notes that there is still a sense in which our thoughts are subjective in form, as he

says:

according to Kant, thoughts, although they are universal and necessary determinations, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is in-

150 EL, §41Z, 83. 151 EL, §41Z, 83.

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itself by an impassible gulf. On the contrary, the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at the same time the In-itself of things and of whatever else is ob-jective.152

This is the famous Hegelian criticism that, on a Critical view of knowledge, the nature of our

categories, our thoughts, are such that they do not (indeed cannot) reach the in-itself aspect of

things, viz., the way things really are, and it is in this way that we are unable to know the intrinsic

nature of reality. This gives us a glimpse into Hegel's remark, just a few sections further on in EL,

that “the categories, therefore, are unfit to be determinations of the Absolute, which is not given in

perception; hence the understanding, or cognition through the categories, cannot become cognizant

of things-in-themselves.”153 If we take the Hegelian view that there is only one objective element in

our experience, the thing in itself, combined with the Kantian view that our categories can never

reach the “in-itself” nature of things, one can easily understand the rationale for Hegel's claim that

the Kantian philosophy was incapable of throwing off the shackles of the subjective. Hegel's point

at this juncture is a simple one: while Kant shares with Hegel the view that our intellects represent

an objective faculty of knowledge in that it furnishes us with objective knowledge of objects, when

this is taken to mean universal and necessary thoughts as opposed to merely contingent, fleeting

impressions, Kant nevertheless remains firmly within the realm of the subjective for these thoughts

cannot reach the intrinsic nature of reality. If it isn't knowledge of the thing in itself, then it isn't

knowledge as such, for Hegel. It should now be clear in just what senses Hegel regards the faculties

of sensibility and understanding as “subjective” rather than “objective,” and why one might

therefore criticize, in line with Hegel, Kant's transcendental idealism for being nothing more than a

“subjective” brand of idealism.

A second reason for Hegel claiming that Kant's transcendental idealism is a “subjective”

idealism, and thus for his latent hostility to the Critical philosophy on just these grounds, lies in the

Kantian theory that the categories, the universal and necessary thought-determinations of being

itself, have as their source the ego, the self, and not the nature of the object as such. To put it more

simply, it seems to me that Hegel's worry here is that the original synthetic unity of apperception is

what grounds the categories, and this inevitably seems to lead to a subjective view of the categories

whereby they are said to exist merely in us, rather than in the nature of the object as such. If the

categories of unity, plurality, substance and accident, etc … have a subjective origin, then this gives

us reason to question whether, when we attempt to make sense of reality in terms of the categories,

what we are ultimately making sense of is reality as such, and not just some figment of our

imagination, something which exists only in us. If, that is, the starting-point of our knowledge, of 152 EL, §41Z, 83. 153 EL, §44, 87.

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experience itself, namely, the transcendental unity of apperception, has its source in the ego, then it

seems to follow quite naturally that there are good grounds for doubting that we ever have objective

experiences as such. “Thus the Ego is, so to speak, the crucible and the fire through which the

indifferent multiplicity is consumed and reduced to unity.”154 All that Hegel is commenting on here

is the fact that the unity necessary for all of our experience is a product of us, and this becomes a

problem for those (Kant himself included) who want our experiences to retain some semblance of

objectivity.

In Hegel's eyes, Kant's mistake was neglecting the possibility that the categories may not

just be our thought-determinations but determinations of the objects themselves as well, i.e.,

determinations of being itself. Hegel is here reiterating Trendelenburg's famous objection known as

the “neglected alternative,”155 which famously said that Kant mistakenly thought that the forms of

space and time must be either mere subjective forms of our sensibility or real existences which

attaches to the objects themselves independently of their being given. Hegel is talking more about

the categories than the forms of intuition in this context, and his claim is just that, since the

categories can arguably be said to apply both to objects of sense, as well as to objects “in-

themselves,” our knowledge may not be strictly confined to the realm of appearances as Kant had

supposed, and so we might be able to know things in themselves after all. In EL, Hegel makes this

point when he claims:

That the categories are to be regarded as belonging only to us (or as “subjective”) must seem very bizarre to the ordinary consciousness, and there is certainly something awry here … Now, although the categories (e.g., unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of ob-jects themselves. But, according to Kant's view, this is what is supposed to be the case, and his philosophy is subjective idealism, inasmuch as the Ego (the knowing subject) furnishes both the form and also the material of knowing – the former as thinking and the latter as sensing subject.156

Before, when I noted that Hegel objected to the fact that the starting-point of the Kantian system

was an ultimately subjective one, what I meant was just that the categories have their source in the

subject, in us, rather than in the object itself outside us, and it follows from this, in Hegel's mind,

that Kant's philosophy is a subjective idealism which rules out from the outset objective

experiences as such. Any epistemological theory which cannot give us objective knowledge is one

which Hegel cannot endorse.

154 EL, §42Z, 85. 155 For a helpful discussion of Adolf Trendelenburg and his “neglected alternative,” see Gardner, Kant and the Critique

of Pure Reason, 107-111. 156 EL, §42Z, 85-86.

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But there is one final reason why Hegel regarded the Kantian transcendental system as a

thoroughly subjective one, and this is that Kant assumed that the sum of our experience, our

cognition as such, is a cognition merely of appearances rather than of things in themselves. But

before I explain this any further, I must point out that, although I have already discussed this issue

in relation to Hegel's critique of Kant's philosophical methodology, I believe it still deserves to be

mentioned here simply because it was arguably the primary motivation for Hegel's charge that

Kant's theoretical philosophy was an utterly subjective one. Nevertheless, the pertinent point now is

to explain why Hegel thought that the charge that Kant's philosophy was a subjective one follows

directly from Kant's famous inscrutability thesis – viz., the thesis that things in themselves remain

forever inscrutable or unknowable to us and thus our knowledge has to do solely with the realm of

appearances, and not with things in themselves. In essence, Hegel thought that knowledge is

necessarily knowledge of what is the case, of reality, rather than knowledge of what merely seems

to be the case. Another way to put it is in terms of Kant's TD itself: if knowledge is only knowledge

of how things appear to be for us, as opposed to knowledge of how things really are “in

themselves,” then it is not genuine knowledge at all, according to Hegel, precisely because

objective knowledge is forever banished to the realm of things in themselves. More concisely put, if

we don't have knowledge of things in themselves, for Hegel, then we don't have knowledge at all.

This is what Hegel means in the PS, where he claims that:

This conclusion stems from the fact that the Absolute alone is true, or the truth alone is Absolute. One may set this aside on the grounds that there is a type of cognition which, though it does not cognize the Absolute as Science aims to, is still true, and that cognition in general, though it be incapable of grasping the Absolute, is still capable of grasping other kinds of truth. But we gradually come to see that this kind of talk which goes back and forth only leads to a hazy distinction between an absolute truth and some other kind of truth, and that words like 'absolute,' 'cognition,' etc. presuppose a meaning which has yet to be ascertained.157

Along these lines, he says in EL that the “Critical philosophy extends the antithesis in such a way

that experience in its entirety falls within subjectivity; i.e. both of these elements together are

subjective, and nothing remains in contrast with subjectivity except the thing-in-itself.”158

Essentially, what Hegel is saying is that Kant operated with an antithesis of what is the case (reality)

on one hand, and what merely appears to be the case (appearances) on the other hand, and since one

of the main tenets of the Kantian philosophy is the idea that the realm of knowledge is the realm of

appearances, the Critical philosophy is a philosophy which falls entirely on the side of the latter. At

the same time, though, such an antithesis is wholly faulty, according to Hegel, precisely because the

157 PS, §75, 77-78. 158 EL, §41, 81.

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ultimate goal of philosophy is knowledge of “the Idea,” which is, as Hegel says in FK, the

“Absolute suspended-ness of the anti-thesis:”159 what he means by this is just that the proper

epistemological view is one which, like his Absolute idealism, takes human knowledge not to be

confined strictly to the realm of appearances, but extends into the realm of things in themselves.

But what exactly does Hegel mean by the “Absolute suspended-ness of the antithesis?” Is

this just a highly fanciful and obscure way of saying that Kant's philosophy falls entirely on the

subjective side, and that Hegel's preferred Absolute form of idealism somehow offers a solution to

the age-old antithesis of appearance vs. reality? Basically, I think this is correct, and although

pursuing this line of thought is inevitably going to plunge us much deeper into the abyss of

Hegelian Absolute idealism, I believe such a course of action is necessary in order for us to fully

understand why Hegel persistently levelled the “subjective” charge against Kantian transcendental

idealism, and how he thought Absolute idealism attempts to overcome such a charge. In broadest

outline, then, when Hegel says that the goal of philosophy is knowledge of the Idea, or the Absolute

suspended-ness of the antithesis, he is merely saying that Absolute idealism has as its object of

knowledge, what Hegel famously referred to as the Idea, the sum-total of things coming to know its

inherent nature. But this is only achievable insofar as appearances and reality are united into a

single, all-encompassing Whole. The antithesis is thereby suspended, according to Hegel, because

neither side of it is opposed to the other, but can only exist as different properties, aspects, or

moments, of the Whole. And this Whole is not something which exists outside of, or beyond our

reality, rather it is exhibited only immanently within our reality; indeed, it is reality. Another way of

putting it is to say that, since the antithesis between appearance and reality is suspended, it is no

longer meaningful to speak of appearances or reality. There is just the sum-total of things, the

Whole, reality as such, and nothing more. To assume otherwise would just be to regress backwards

to a Kantian dualism whereby the two are seen in utter opposition to each other, rather than as

existing for one another. True idealism, or Absolute idealism, Hegel asserts, “is idealism because it

does not acknowledge either one of the opposites as existing for itself in abstraction from the other.

The supreme Idea is indifferent against both; and each of the opposites, considered singly, is

nothing.”160 He then goes on to praise Kant in that the Kantian philosophy is idealistic in at least one

crucial respect: “neither the concept in isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all; that

intuition by itself is blind and the concept by itself is empty; and that what is called experience, i.e.,

the finite identity of both in consciousness is not a rational cognition either.”161 But the feelings of

admiration Hegel expresses here for Kant are no doubt short-lived, for afterwards he immediately 159 FK, 68. 160 FK, 68. 161 FK, 68.

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says that the problem with Kant was that he denigrated cognition to the side of the finite, and

because of this, the transcendental philosophy cognizes not the Absolute, but rather subjectivity

itself. Instead of having as its object the Absolute, the Idea, Kantian idealism has as its object the

cognitive faculties.

Now that I have offered an account of the “subjectivism” charge – Hegel's main objection

against the Critical epistemology – I now turn to consider the putative issues he had with Kant's

formulation of the synthetic a priori. For, in addition to the charge of subjectivism just explained,

another Hegelian criticism of Kant's epistemology concerns Kant's formulation of the synthetic a

priori.162 In order to flesh this criticism out, I have to explicate the issue as Hegel sees it; in other

words, I must first explain how Hegel understands Kant's formulation of synthetic a priori

judgements, and only then will I be able to provide a detailed explanation of the inherent tensions

Hegel sees in Kant's very famous, yet controversial, notion that there exist a type of judgement

which is a priori, and also synthetic. My research shows that this criticism is contained most

prominently in the LHP and FK, and for that reason, in what follows, I will be relying most heavily

on those works.

Hegel begins his discussion of Kant's formulation of the synthetic a priori judgement by

focusing on how Kant answered what he deemed to be the all-important question for metaphysics:

“How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?” So, how are such judgements possible? – Hegel

asks, and he responds in the following way:

This problem expresses nothing else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgement are identical in the a priori way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is the universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical. It is Reason alone that is the possibility of this positing, for Reason is nothing else but the identity of heterogeneous elements of this kind.163

Presumably, Hegel is doing nothing more here than reinforcing the principle, implicit within

synthetic a priori judgements, that the subject, s, and the predicate, p, are a priori identical. So,

162 Clearly, there is no easy way to classify this criticism. On the one hand, one might characterize Hegel's criticism of Kant's formulation of the synthetic a priori as epistemological by virtue of the fact that, in claiming that there are certain judgements, propositions, or truths which are synthetic and yet somehow a priori, Kant is in a sense making a very important knowledge-claim by saying that there are certain things that we can know independent of our experience, but which are universally and necessarily true with respect to our experience. However, on the other hand, one could just as well say that this criticism is more metaphysical than epistemological simply because Kant thinks that the central concern of metaphysics is to furnish an answer to the question: “How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?” The only reason I have here opted for the former interpretation is that I think, in claiming that there exists synthetic a priori judgements, Kant is making more of a contribution to his epistemology than to his metaphysics. But, either way, I don't think we can go wrong. For an interesting discussion of the synthetic a priori in Kant, see Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

163 FK, 69.

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adopting one of the standard Kantian examples of the synthetic a priori, when we say that

“5+7=12,” we thereby state a synthetic a priori truth by claiming that the subject, “5+7” is a priori

identical with the predicate, “12.” In other words, when we think of “5+7,” we necessarily think of

“12.”164 He says elsewhere, in the LHP, which I believe underscores the line of interpretation

advanced here, that:

Synthetic judgements a priori are nothing else than a connection of opposites through themselves, or the absolute Notion, i.e., the relations of different determinations such as those of cause and effect, given not through experience but through thought. Space and time likewise form the connecting element; they are thus a priori, i.e., in self-consciousness.165

What I take Hegel to mean by referring above to “a connection of opposites through themselves”

[or sometimes even to “the original, absolute identity of the heterogeneous”166] is the a priori

identification, mentioned earlier, of the subject with the predicate. And it is the pure, a priori forms

of space and time which, on Kant's account, supposedly enable us to think this identification a

priori, i.e., independent of our experience. As I said earlier, I do not take Hegel to be expressing

anything too outlandish here, as he is simply expressing, in typical Hegelian language, Kant's

explanation of the possibility of the synthetic a priori.

So now that we have established how Hegel understands the central concern of metaphysics,

the synthetic a priori judgement, as well as Kant's attempt at an explanation of their possible

existence, the logical, indeed, far more pertinent question is: how did Kant's purported resolution of

the issue(s) related to how synthetic a priori judgements can exist go horribly awry, for Hegel?

Well, it's very simple: for Hegel, there are no such judgements; there are analytic a priori

judgements, there are synthetic a posteriori judgements, but there is certainly not a third class of

hybrid judgement which Kant famously refers to as a synthetic a priori judgement. For example, in

LHP, after Hegel discusses the nature and status of our a priori intuitions of space and time, he

makes it abundantly clear that synthetic a priori judgements, specifically those which Kant so

characterized, such as “space necessarily has three dimensions;” “the shortest distance between two

points is a straight line;” and “5+7=12,” are in point of fact all very analytic. 167 In claiming (contra

Kant) that these judgements are analytic rather than synthetic a priori,168 Hegel is calling attention

164 It is not at all obvious whether Hegel thinks all synthetic a priori claims are identity claims, or whether he just thinks that mathematical claims, as one particular class of synthetic a priori claims, are essentially nothing but identity claims.

165 LHP, 430. 166 FK, 72. 167 LHP, 435-436. 168 It is not clear whether Hegel is simply generalizing here by saying that all so-called synthetic a priori judgements

are analytic, or just that these particular synthetic a priori judgements are analytic. Either way, Hegel's argument is just that the distinction itself is at best not very clear, and at worst incoherent entirely, and it should therefore be rejected on just those grounds.

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to the fact that the synthetic a priori classification is at best dubious, if not wholly confused, and

this explains Hegel's hesitancy to regard any a priori truth, proposition, or judgement as being

anything other than analytic. Moreover, even though Hegel does not dispute Kant's insistence that

these propositions are universal and necessary, he argues that Kant goes wrong in attributing our

awareness of them to our sensuous perception rather than to the understanding, or what Hegel terms

“the Notion.” Hegel says that Kant's basic problem is that he didn't grasp the two together, meaning,

the understanding or “Notion” and the senses. Ultimately, what he seems to be saying here is that

Kant's failure in this regard can be attributed to his exhaustive dualisms between, for example,

intuition and concept, our senses and our understanding, or (as evidenced in the previous

paragraph) subject and predicate.

To conclude our discussion of the epistemological aspect of Hegel's critique of Kant, it is

clear that there are two main issues with the Kantian philosophy, the first of which can be

summarized as the subjectivism charge, and the second are the issues related to Kant's formulation

of the highly controversial synthetic a priori type of judgement. We discussed the multiple layers

of motivation for the subjectivism charge, which include, but are not limited to, Kant's notion that

our cognitive faculties are one and all subjective, that the starting-point of the Critical system is a

subjective one, the Ego or the self, and finally, the famous “Restricktionslehre,” or more

specifically the inscrutability thesis, viz., the claim that the field of our knowledge is limited

strictly to the realm of appearances and not to that of things in themselves. In relation to the second

criticism noted above, concerning the synthetic a priori, Hegel's argument is just that there are

wholly legitimate grounds for rejecting the existence of such claims. Seeing that we have already

discussed both the methodological and the epistemological issues with Kant's philosophy, from

Hegel's point-of-view, we must now turn to the metaphysical issues, which are the last set of

objections we will discuss as part of our broad overview of Hegel's critique of the Kantian

theoretical philosophy.

Part 3: Metaphysics

Hegel's criticisms of Kant's metaphysics stem from a variety of sources, including, among

others, Kant's account of the nature of the forms of our intuition, space and time, Kant's purported

resolution of the “Antinomies of Pure Reason,” and finally, Kant's notoriously controversial

conception of the thing in itself. Apart from the final criticism having to do with the notion of things

in themselves – which will be the central concern of the next chapter – as is usual, I shall consider

each of these criticisms in turn, beginning, of course, with Hegel's thoughts on Kant's understanding

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of space and time.169

In the LHP, Hegel's attack on the Kantian notions of the a priori forms of space and time

occurs amidst a more general assessment of Kant's first faculty of knowledge, sensuousness or

sensibility. We should note that in the early stages of the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” in what he

calls his “metaphysical expositions of the concepts of space and time,” Kant famously outlined his

notions of space and time in a series of four and five (respectively) central points. And, to be sure, it

is these points which Hegel focuses on in his criticism of Kant's account of space and time. Instead

of relying upon Hegel's own understanding of these points in the LHP – which could prove

problematic from an interpretative standpoint – I will examine these points by returning to their

original Kantian context within which they occur in order to assure myself that I am getting an

accurate treatment of them.

Regardless of the exact context, it is customary when dealing with Kant's arguments in the

“Aesthetic” to confine oneself solely to an examination of Kant's thoughts on space. The first point

Kant makes in reference to the form of space is:

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation.170

Now, in relation to Hegel's critique of Kant's arguments made in the above passage, as I understand

Hegel's criticisms on this score, he sees two issues with the notion that space is not an empirical

concept. In the first place, Hegel makes it clear that there was never any question that space is never

anything empiric since he says explicitly that, “the Notion is never really anything empiric.”171

Second, according to Hegel, when Kant says that “in order that I may relate my sensations to

something outside of me, I must presuppose space [and similarly with respect to time],” 172 he

thereby begs the question with regards to the non-empirical character of space [and time] since, as

this statement illustrates, for Kant, space cannot be derived empirically precisely because we cannot

represent spatial things without the form of space being in some sense “in us,” i.e., in our

169 For a helpful discussion of Hegel's critique of Kant's thoughts on the nature of space and time see Michael Inwood, “Kant and Hegel on Space and Time,” in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 49-65.

170 CPR, A23/B37. 171 LHP, 434. 172 LHP, 434.

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consciousness.173

After Kant has established the non-empirical character of space, he tries to establish that it is

a necessary a priori condition for the possibility of our empirical experience, and as such space

cannot be derived from such an experience. He says:

Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation, which necessarily underlies outer appearances.174

One of Hegel's issues with the proposition that space is a necessary a priori representation, and thus

can be seen to underlie all outer intuitions, is just that space [and time], even though they are some

of the most basic concepts of our experience, Hegel insists that they are still external, not internal,

simply in the sense that they exist “out-there” and not merely “in us.” Thus, it seems to me that

Hegel is questioning Kant's premise that the forms of space and time can only be found in us rather

than “out-there” in the world itself. Also, Hegel regards the idea that space and time are a priori in

that space and time must (necessarily) be brought to bear on things as analogous to the idea that our

teeth are a necessary condition for eating precisely because teeth must be brought to bear on food in

the act of eating.175 Again, it seems to me that, what Hegel is saying here is just that the a priority of

space [and time] cannot be established merely from the fact that these forms must necessarily be

presupposed in the act of representing things, because, as he says rather facetiously, we must

presuppose the use of our teeth in the acting of eating things; and surely, we do not regard the

knowledge that we need our teeth to eat as anything but a posteriori, or similarly, we do not regard

this as providing us with any a priori insight into the nature of food. One might again take this to be

a version of Trendelenburg's “neglected alternative,” for Hegel says:

there are things-in-themselves outside, but devoid of time and space; consciousness now comes, and it has time and space beforehand present in it as the possibility of experience, just as in order to eat it has mouth and teeth, &c, as conditions necessary for eating. The things which are eaten have not the mouth and teeth, and as eating is brought to bear on things, so space and time are also brought to bear on them; just as things are placed in the mouth and between the teeth, so it is with space and time.176

Considered against the background of the “neglected alternative,” Hegel is making the argument

that our minds may not, after all, come ready-made with the forms of space and time inherent in

them, literally “imposing” them – in accordance with the crude doctrine of the “mind-making-

173 LHP, 434. 174 CPR, A24/B38-39. 175 LHP, 434-435. 176 LHP, 434-435.

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nature” – on an otherwise formless manifold. It is perfectly plausible, in Hegel's eyes, that the

manifold of sensation (or more crudely, the external world) may just be inherently spatio-temporal

after all. I would argue that this is just another way of questioning the a priori status of the forms of

empirical intuition.

The third point Kant makes in respect of spatial form is meant, I think, to establish that

space is an intuition rather than a concept, since, so the argument goes, in apprehending space, we

thereby apprehend it in terms of its particularity, not in terms of its generality. Kant's point is just

that, in virtue of this particularity, space is an intuition and not a concept. That is:

Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on [the introduction of] limitations. Hence it follows that an a priori, and not an empirical, intuition underlies all concepts of space. For kindred reasons, geometrical propositions, that, for instance, in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third, can never be derived from the general concepts of line and triangle, but only from intuition, and this indeed a priori, with apodeictic certainty.177

Hegel's remarks to the above passage are somewhat obscure, but he seems to question the

entailment that Kant argues for above, from the particularity (or one-ness) of our intuitions and

representations to their intuitional (rather than purely conceptual) status by drawing on the example

of a tree. He says:

The abstract conception tree, for example, is in its actuality a number of individual and separate trees, but spaces are not such particulars, nor are they parts; for one immediate continuity remains, and hence a simple unity. Ordinary perception has always something individual before it; space or time are always however one only, and therefore a priori. It might however be replied to Kant: the nature of space and time undoubtedly involves there being an abstract universal; but there is in like manner only one blue.178

Despite the relative obscurity of the above remarks, following Inwood,179 there seem to be two

equally plausible readings of where the locus of the problem lies for Hegel: first, Hegel might be

questioning the ultimate validity of Kant's argument by calling attention to the fact that the one-ness

(what Inwood refers to as the “unique-ness”) of the forms, especially that of space, does not, strictly

speaking, necessarily entail their a priority by virtue of the fact that blue, as Hegel points out, is

likewise an intuition but clearly not also a priori. It is thus clearly an a posteriori concept derived 177 CPR, A24-25/B39. 178 LHP, 435. 179 See Inwood, “Kant and Hegel on Space and Time,” in Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant, 49-65.

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from our experience of things. Another reading is that “since blue is nevertheless a concept or an

abstract universal, the uniqueness of space and time does not entail that they are not concepts or

abstract universals.”180 By drawing attention to the fact that our notion of “blue-ness,” a particular

which is nevertheless a concept, an abstract universal to be specific, Hegel is attempting to undercut

the passage above, showing that it cannot be established from the character of our representation of

space as a bare particular that it is an intuition and not a concept.

Kant's fourth and final point is intended, as I understand it, to reaffirm the a priori,

intuitional (rather than the a posteriori, conceptual) character of our spatial representations. It reads:

Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now every concept must be thought as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite number of representations within itself. It is in this latter way, however, that space is thought; for all the parts of space coexist ad infinitum. Consequently, the original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.181

Kant's argument relies on the fact that space contains an infinite number of representations or parts,

and so the claim is that it surely cannot then be classified as a concept, as a concept contains only a

finite, not an infinite, number of representations or, what some might call “marks.” Moreover, since

space is not a concept, Kant reasons, it must be an a priori intuition, nothing else. All that Hegel

says in respect to Kant's argument here is that: “Space and time, then, are certainly not thought-

determinations, if no thoughts are there present, but a Notion, so soon as we have a Notion of

them.”182 Once again, it is extremely unclear as to what Hegel means by this; so it might prove

helpful to see what Inwood has to say here.183 For one thing, Hegel is clearly questioning Kant's

conclusion that space is purely intuitional rather than conceptual. As Inwood explains, Kant would

not deny that we have a concept of space; but that does not imply that space is itself a concept, or

that our mode of access to space and spatial things is conceptual rather than intuitive. So long as we

treat Hegel's remarks in these terms, it is difficult to see how they pose a substantial objection to

Kant. Basically, there is an important distinction to be made between what Inwood calls “the

concrete, filled space and time of our everyday experience”184 on one hand, and the empty space and

time we make use of in Euclidean geometry on the other. The latter, much more so than the former,

can be accurately classified as being conceptual, since we arrive at them primarily by means of

conceptual abstraction: that is, we never encounter in our ordinary experience empty space and

180 Ibid., 54. 181 CPR, A25/B39-40. 182 LHP, 435. 183 See Inwood, “Kant and Hegel on Space and Time,” in Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant, 49-65. 184 Ibid., 54.

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time, for instance, like we do of concrete, filled space [and time]. So it is possible, then, at least on

the interpretation Inwood sketches here whereby we distinguish two possible conceptions of space

and time: a filled space and an empty space, one which we ordinarily experience, and one which we

do not, to call into question Kant's central arguments that the nature of space is intuitional. Thus we

see that Hegel might have a point.

Yet, by far Hegel's most detailed treatment of the status and character of space and time

occurs in EN, where, in the process of explicating the logical progression of the determinations of

space (as well as time) – that is, how the determination of the former logically leads to that of the

latter – Hegel raises some key criticisms against Kant's conception of spatio-temporal form. In what

follows, my principal aim is simply to identify and explain what I take to be the most important of

those criticisms.

The first criticism Hegel raises against the Kantian notions of space (as well as time)

concerns their status as mere forms of our sensuous intuitions. Interestingly, Hegel shares Kant's

view that space (like time) is a mere form of our sensuous intuition in the sense that it is an

abstraction – in the case of space an abstraction of what he calls “immediate externality.” According

to Inwood,185 however, the space which Hegel has in mind here is the empty space (space II), not

the concrete space we ordinarily encounter in our everyday lives (space I). Nevertheless, space

represents, for Hegel, the possibility, not the actual positedness, of “being-outside-of-one-another.”

Although the meaning of this passage is rather obscure, it seems to me that Hegel is asserting that

space is the ontological condition of the possibility of things which exist external to us, and to each

other; and as such, space is what makes it possible for things to exist in the first place.

After he establishes that space (and time) are just forms of our intuitions, Hegel moves on to

a consideration of that crucial metaphysical question: is it (referring to space) something real on its

own account, or is it simply a property that supervenes on prior entities? He replies:

To ask whether space by itself is real, or whether it is only a property of things, is to ask one of the most well-worn of all metaphysical questions. If one says that it is something inherently substantial, then it must resemble a box, which, even if there is nothing in it, is still something subsisting within itself. Space is absolutely yielding and utterly devoid of opposition however; and if something is real, it is necessary that it should be incompatible with something else. One cannot point to a part of space which is space for itself, for space is always filled, and no part of it is separated from that which fills it. It is therefore a non-sensuous sensibility and a sensuous insensibility.186

What this passage implies is that, while space is not real (and thus ideal) from a certain stand-point,

it is also equally real from another stand-point. Let's take the former first. On the one hand, Hegel 185 See Inwood, “Kant and Hegel on Space and Time,” in Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant, 49-65. 186 EN, §254Z, 225.

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rejects the reality of space from the stand-point which says that it is an object-like container or, to

use his own words, “a box, which, even if there is nothing in it, is still something subsisting within

itself.”187 But, on the other hand, he nevertheless affirms the complete reality of space from the

stand-point which says that, at least insofar as it is filled, concrete space, it is completely

impervious, and so cannot be occupied by other things. At the same time, though, the implication

here is that, insofar as space is not the filled, concrete space of our everyday, empirical experiences,

but rather an empty abstraction of our intellects, space is completely penetrable, and in this way can

in fact be occupied by other things, and so from this stand-point, it is not real. I take it that this is

what Hegel is driving at when he claims above that “space is a non-sensuous sensibility and a

sensuous insensibility.”188 He is simply referring to the two different types of space: space

understood as an empty abstraction of our intellects on the one hand, and space understood as the

concrete, filled space of our shared, empirical reality on the other.

The only remaining noteworthy criticism Hegel explicitly levels against the Kantian

transcendental philosophy in EN occurs in the midst of his discussion of the logical progression of

space, more exactly, how space, through its own inherent logical structure, generates the point, how

the point generates the line, and how the line generates the plane. I refer here to the criticism,

already touched upon in passing, that Kant was downright wrong-headed to presume that the

proposition: “the shortest distance between two points is a straight line;” is synthetic a priori. As we

saw earlier, for Hegel, this proposition – and presumably all other supposed synthetic a priori

propositions for that matter – are, however, analytic. Hegel reasons as follows: “Kant's definition is

clearly analytic, since the straight line reduces itself to simplicity of direction, which, when taken in

relation to quantity, yields the determination of the smallest quantity, and consequently of the

shortest distance.”189 Hegel makes it plain here that the concept of a straight line logically entails the

concept of the shortest distance between two points, and as a result, we cannot possibly posit the

former without also positing the latter, which is exactly what it means for a proposition to be

analytic.

As far as his criticisms of Kant's account of the nature and status of space and time are

concerned, we can now see that Hegel mainly takes issue with the fact that, on the Kantian view of

space and time, they are merely a priori, subjective forms of our empirical intuition; they are not, as

he takes them to be, a posteriori, objective concepts or universals which somehow exist “out-there”

in the empirical manifold. These criticisms can primarily be found in LHP, and EN, and they are

based on Kant's remarks in the “Aesthetic,” where he outlines his views on the nature of space and 187 EN, §254Z, 225. 188 EN, §254Z, 225. 189 EN, §256Z, 227.

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time, the forms of our empirical intuition, as well as on Hegel's treatment of the logical unfolding of

the concept of space (and time) in EN, where, as we have seen, Hegel explains how the logical

structure of space generates the point, the line, and the plane, respectively. It is within this latter

treatment that Hegel reiterates his fundamental objections to Kant's formulation of the synthetic a

priori.

So, having summarized Hegel's (metaphysical) criticisms of Kant's conception of space and

time in LHP and EN, we must now turn to consider the second major aspect of Hegel's critique of

Kant's metaphysics, his views on the Kantian Antinomies. For, another metaphysical concern Hegel

has with the Critical philosophy centers around Kant's formulation of, as well as his attempted

resolutions for, the so-called “Antinomies of Pure Reason,”190 those logical contradictions inherent

in our faculty of reason as such. But before I attempt to locate Hegel's criticisms with respect to

these Antinomies, I have to explain what they are, and how they putatively arise within the Kantian

framework of a discursive form of cognition; but, in order to do this, I begin by turning to a

consideration of Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion and its relation to the specific

cosmological conflicts of pure reason.

Due to the fact that the Antinomies cannot be properly understood independently of a

discussion of Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion, let me pause for a moment to offer a brief

explanation of the details of that doctrine. Very briefly, the key to understanding Kant's doctrine of

transcendental illusion is to understand the relation between the two rational principles P1, “find for

the conditioned knowledge obtained through the understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity

is brought to completion,”191 and P2, “if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions,

subordinated to one another – a series which is therefore itself unconditioned – is likewise given,

that is, is contained in its object and its connection.”192 Simply put, transcendental illusion is a direct

result of the conflation of these two principles, of P1 with P2. For one thing, the problematic

character of this move stems from the fact that we are herein conflating the merely formal or logical

necessity to think in terms of the unconditioned, viz., to search for the unconditioned for every

given series of conditioneds, with the metaphysical necessity that there actually is an unconditioned

for every given series of conditioneds given to us in some manner. Just because our faculty of

reason is inevitably constrained to think in terms of the unconditioned, viz., to seek an

190 For a helpful discussion of the “Antinomies of Pure Reason” and their relation to Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion see Michelle Grier, Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Moreover, for a helpful discussion of Hegel's criticisms of Kant's “Antinomies of Pure Reason” see John Llewellyn, “Kantian Antinomy and Hegelian Dialectic,” in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 87-103.

191 CPR, A307/B364. 192 CPR, A307-308/B364.

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unconditioned for every particular series of conditions, that does not mean that there actually is an

unconditioned corresponding to that particular series of conditions “out-there,” as it were. So, in

moving from the wholly rational principle P1, the need to search for the unconditioned for any and

every series of conditioneds, to the rational principle P2, the (erroneous) assumption that the

unconditioned, in whatever form, is something which is actually given to us, we are attempting to

deduce knowledge of spatio-temporal appearances by means of pure concepts of reason alone, and

in the process confusing synthetic (material) claims with merely formal (logical) claims. Even

though this account has been very brief, I would argue that it nevertheless captures the essentials of

Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion.

The general problematic associated with the Antinomy of Pure Reason can be understood in

the following terms. In the first place, the Antinomies are nothing more than that particular form of

transcendental illusion associated with the transcendental idea of the sensible world, or the cosmos;

more specifically, it is that fallacious form of dialectical inference which follows from an erroneous

and wholly illegitimate “hypostatization,” or rather “reification,” of the idea of the “unconditioned”

in the form of the cosmos. Kant outlines the fallacious form of dialectical inferences in terms of the

following dialectical syllogism:

1. If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions is likewise given;

2. Objects of the senses are given as conditioned.

3.Therefore, the entire series of all the conditions of objects of the senses are

likewise given.193

Generally, the issue with the above dialectical inference, the reason why it is formally fallacious, is

that it involves a transcendent, and thus wholly erroneous, misemployment of the categories of

thought beyond their proper immanent employment. As Bird explains, “the concepts of the

understanding are converted into Ideas such as that of the “unconditioned” and “absolute whole”

which cannot be found in experience, and mark the division between legitimate immanence and

illegitimate transcendence.”194 In this way, mere appearances are mistaken for transcendent things in

themselves, whereby the rational cosmologist is inextricably led to believe that we can acquire

knowledge of spatio-temporal reality by means of pure concepts of reason alone; that is to say, we

are illegitimately attempting to derive knowledge of the unconditioned in the form of the cosmos, or

the transcendental idea of the cosmos (which can be understood as a transcendent thing in itself)

simply from the knowledge of sensible objects considered as the particular conditioneds, (e.g. mere

appearances). As I understand it, then, the fundamental reason why the above dialectical inference

193 CPR, A497/B525. Brackets mine. 194 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 674.

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is formally fallacious, according to Kant, is that it conflates mere appearances with things in

themselves by virtue of the fact that it illegitimately moves from synthetic (material) claims made

about immanent appearances (in premises 1 and 2), objects of the senses considered as the

conditioneds, to synthetic material claims made about transcendent things in themselves (in the

conclusion 3), the entire series of objects of the senses considered as the “unconditioned,” and in the

process is led to posit that thing in itself as the unconditioned in the form of the cosmos, as

something that is actually given to us. And, as we will come to see in more detail further on, once

this unconditioned (transcendental idea) in the form of the cosmos is posited as something actually

given, and in this way is “out-there,” so to speak, the specific cosmological conflicts will arise; but,

of this, more later.

The fallacious form of dialectical inference outlined above is what I understand as the

general problematic associated with the Antinomies, viz., that basic, wholly fallacious, form of

dialectical inference which (somehow) generates the specific Antinomies themselves – what I

understand as the specific Antinomial problematic. It is important for two main reasons: first, it is

important for understanding how the specific (mathematical) Antinomies are generated, and second,

how these Antinomies function as an indirect proof of transcendental idealism.

For the moment, let us concentrate on the former. Even though there is considerable

ambiguity in Kant's account of the connection between the Antinomy of Pure Reason itself (the

fallacious dialectical form of reasoning outlined above) and the specific (mathematical) Antinomies,

in short, how the former can be said to give rise to the latter, the explanation, I think, lies in the way

in which the unconditioned in the form of the sensible world is understood. According to Kant,

there are four different ways of understanding the transcendental idea of the sensible world, the

synthesis of the manifold, each of which corresponds to one of the four cosmological, i.e., cosmical,

concepts. Laying aside the details of Kant's derivation of these cosmical concepts, the crucial point

is that, once they are derived, and thereby incorporated into, the fallacious Antinomy of Pure

Reason outlined above, what we are presented with are the four specific Antinomies themselves,

once again assuming the form of a fallacious dialectical inference. Since our account is concerned

with the first two (mathematical) Antinomies, I have focused specifically on those, to the exclusion

of the latter two. The first (mathematical) Antinomy, which has as its focus the cosmical concept of

the composition of the sensible world, or more specifically, “the absolute completeness of the

composition of the given whole of all appearances,”195 is essentially nothing more than the sensible

world subsumed under the category of quantity, and so can be understood to take the following

form:

195 CPR, A415/B443.

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1. If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions [and so the

absolutely unconditioned] with respect to the composition of the sensible world is

likewise given.

2. Objects of the senses are given as conditioned.

3. Therefore the entire series of all the conditions of objects of the senses are likewise

given.

However, in the second (mathematical) Antinomy, the cosmical concept is no longer the

composition of the sensible world, but rather the idea of “the absolute completeness in the division

of a given whole in the [field of] appearance.”196 In this case, the idea of the sensible world, viz., the

transcendental idea of the cosmos, is subsumed under the category of reality, generating the

particular cosmical concept under consideration here. And, so when this particular cosmical

concept, this particular conception of the sensible world, is incorporated into the basic Antinomy of

Pure Reason, we derive the following dialectical syllogism:

1. If the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its conditions [and so the

absolutely unconditioned] with respect to the division of the real in the sensible

world is likewise given.

2. Objects of the senses are given as conditioned.

3. Therefore the entire series of all the conditions of objects of the senses are

likewise given.

Now that I have provided a very brief account of the problematic associated with Kant's Antinomies

of Pure Reason, both in terms of how the actual Antinomy of Pure Reason itself arises, as well as

how it generates the specific cosmological conflicts themselves, one final issue concerns us before

we can move on to a discussion of those specific cosmological conflicts, which is how we can make

sense of Kant's theory that transcendental idealism provides the key to the resolution of the

Antinomies.

I mentioned above that the basic form of dialectical inference associated with the Antinomy

of Pure Reason outlined earlier – and which I have termed the basic Antinomial problematic – is

important for our understanding of how these Antinomies function as an indirect proof of Kantian

transcendental idealism. It is now time to explain how this might be the case. To start, the way that

the Antinomies function as an indirect proof of transcendental idealism is that they tacitly reveal

what is so inherently problematic with its opposite, transcendental realism. The suggestion is that

the only way of fully understanding the way in which the Antinomies “indirectly prove” idealism is

by understanding how transcendental realism inevitably generates the various Antinomies, both in

196 CPR, A415/B443.

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terms of the basic Antinomy of Pure Reason itself (which we have outlined above), as well as the

specific cosmological conflicts (which we will discuss shortly). But, because we have already

discussed the connection between the two, between the basic Antinomial problematic, and the

specific Antinomial problematic, once we explain how transcendental realism leads to the former,

it's not too difficult to see how it might lead to the latter.

As I said above, transcendental realism inevitably generates the Antinomy of Pure Reason;

at the same time, though, I haven't said much more about this. To that end, then, the way that

transcendental realism generates the basic Antinomy of Pure Reason is that the transcendental

realist fundamentally misunderstands Kant's TD by prima facie conflating appearances with things

in themselves. In an important sense, this misunderstanding is bound up with the very enterprise of

transcendental realism itself, and as such it is essentially something the realist cannot avoid. More

specifically, as we saw earlier, the transcendental realist – in the case of the Antinomies in the

specific guise of the rational cosmologist – cannot avoid deducing knowledge of spatio-temporal

reality (or appearances) by means of pure concepts of reason alone (things in themselves), with the

result that the unconditioned in the form of the sensible world, the transcendental idea of the

cosmos, is thereby posited as something that is actually given to us. In this way, the transcendental

realist mistakes what is merely a subjective necessity to think, or search for the unconditioned for

every series of conditioneds, with an objective necessity that there actually is an unconditioned.

Once the idea of the cosmos is posited as something actual, it seems that we are inevitably lead to

think of the cosmos in different ways, each of which leads to one of the specific dialectical

inferences (i.e., cosmological conflicts) noted earlier.

But, this needs more explanation: for how does conflating mere appearances with things in

themselves lead to the erroneous “reification” of the idea of the cosmos, and by implication, both

the basic Antinomial problematic as well as the specific Antinomial problematic? Once again, even

though there seem to be some obscurities in Kant's explanation of this,197 the thought seems to be

that, if spatio-temporal objects of sense were things in themselves, and by implication if the a priori

conditions of the possibility of the former were also the a priori conditions of the possibility of the

latter, then upon the former being given, viz., spatio-temporal objects of sense as the conditioned,

then things in themselves as the unconditioned would likewise be given. This is because spatio-

temporal objects of sense, or appearances, just are things in themselves, and so if spatio-temporal

appearances are given, as Kant says, then we must admit that things in themselves thought of in

terms of the unconditioned are likewise given – since they are the very same things! So that is why

mistaking appearances for things in themselves is so problematic; it leads to the erroneous and

197 See CPR, A498-499/B526-527.

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wholly illegitimate “reification” of the idea of the sensible world, which thereby generates the

specific cosmological conflicts themselves.

One final note before we move on to those cosmological conflicts: we have seen that, very

generally, transcendental idealism provides the key to the resolution of the Antinomies, in the

respect that they can be understood in terms of the basic metaphysical fallacies, which take the form

of fallacious dialectical inferences, associated with transcendental idealism's rival position,

transcendental realism. Very crudely put, by illustrating the way in which realism inevitably

generates the Antinomy of Pure Reason itself, specifically why the underlying transcendentally

realistic assumption that appearances are things in themselves entails the fallacious dialectical

inference outlined above, the Antinomies essentially explain to us what is so troubling about the

transcendentally realistic world-view. In addition, it is important to note that this assumption is

manifested in the specific Antinomies themselves, as we will shortly see; the implication being that

it is what accounts for both the fundamentally irresolvable character of those Antinomial conflicts

as well as the mutually-opposed, or “conflicting,” conclusions drawn therefrom. That is to say, it is

because appearances are taken for things in themselves in each of the four cosmological conflicts

that their conclusions are not just irresolvable – since that very conflation is what generates them, as

we saw – but also mutually-incompatible. To be sure, though, the only way to see how this

conflation accounts for the inherently irresolvable character of the various Antinomial conflicts is

by examining them themselves.

The First Antinomy

What the thesis of the first Antinomy attempts to show is that the cosmos is spatio-

temporally finite, for if we assume that it is not finite, that it is infinite as regards to both time and

space, we are thereby presented with an absurdity. In other words, claiming that the cosmos is

temporally infinite, i.e., that it has no determinate beginning in time, involves one in a blatant

contradiction. This is because, by claiming that an infinite time series (that is, an infinite sequence

of temporal events) has elapsed up to the present moment, we are thereby imputing to this infinite

time series a terminus (in the form of the present moment), which is a specific point at which the

series itself comes to an end, violating the infinite character of the universe as such. But the idea of

an infinite time series that terminates is a contradiction since it violates the very definition of what it

means for a time series to be infinite – that is, a condition for a time series being classified as

“infinite” is that it is a time series that has no determinate end. Since this shows that the world

cannot be temporally infinite, it tacitly proves that the world is limited insofar as space and time are

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concerned, and so can be regarded as finite.

In contrast to the proof of the thesis, what the antithesis purports to show is nothing more

than that the world is infinite as regards space and time after all, for if we assume that the world is

spatio-temporally finite, that it has a beginning in time and a limit in space, what we are presented

with is a downright contradiction. Let me pause to offer a brief explanation. To begin with, by

claiming that there was a determinate time at which the world began, we are thereby tacitly

claiming that there was a time at which the world did not exist – viz., to state the obvious, the time

before it came into existence! The thought here is simply that it is impossible to account for the

existence of the world occurring at any one particular time, because such an event would have been

preceded by, and in a sense occurred within, the context of an absolutely empty time – the time

before the existence of the world. Moreover, since empty time cannot contain what Kant refers to as

“a distinguishing condition of existence rather than of non-existence,”198 the world cannot possibly

have come into existence during an empty time. Since this putatively shows that the world could not

have had a determinate beginning in time, it thereby upholds the veracity of the position of the

antithesis according to which the world is indeed infinite in respect to time (and space).

The Second Antinomy

Roughly speaking, the thesis of the second Antinomy attempts to show that the nature of

composite substance is such that it can only be made up of simple parts, and a consequence of this

is that whatever exists in the world is necessarily composed of the simple, or of what in turn is

composed of the simple. Like the first Antinomy, the argument of the second Antinomy takes the

form of a “reductio” by essentially assuming the opposite of what it intends to prove, viz., that

substances are not reducible to the simple, which is then followed by a demonstration of the

incoherency of such a position. For, on the assumption that composite substances are not reducible

to the simple, abstracting from the character of the substantial all semblance of composition entails

the very abstracting of the actual substantial itself. Another way of putting this is to say that, since

there is nothing more fundamental to the nature of the composite than the composite itself – as there

is no simple! – if we were to think away the composite of composite substance, the important

implication would be that we would thereby be thinking away the whole of substance. And, since

this is evidently unacceptable, we are confronted with two possibilities: either we can admit that

there is something “we-know-not-what” about the character of the composite that prohibits us from

thinking away all composite in thought, in which case what we are left with is the incoherent

198 CPR, A427/B455.

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thought of an irreducible composite, or we can admit that, after we think away all composite, there

is nevertheless something which still persists, namely, the simple, in which case the argument of the

thesis is upheld. According to Grier,199 the reason the former case is incoherent is that it is always

possible to remove in thought the composite parts of a composite substance precisely because

composition, as applied to substances, is only an accidental relation in independence of which they

must still persist as self-subsistent beings. It is for that reason, then, that we can indeed think away

all composition from that of a composite substance, but that there must nevertheless be something

non-composite which remains, and that is the simple. Thus, the substantial is composed of the

simple.

By contrast, the antithesis portion of the second Antinomy argues effectively that the

character of composite substance is such that it cannot be composed of simple parts, or what is

ultimately reducible to the simple. This is because, by means of a “reductio,” if we assume that

composite substance is composed of simple parts or the simple, we are basically confronted with a

straightforward contradiction. Allow me to pause for a brief explanation. Essentially, insofar as

composite substance exists of the simple, or what is ultimately reducible to the simple, it must

nonetheless exist in space, for what it means for a composite substance to be composite is for it to

occupy a determinate space. As such, the number of parts that constitute a particular space has to be

equal with the number of parts constituting the composite being which occupies that particular

space. And since every part of the composite occupies a space, the simple (qua first part of that

composite) must also occupy a space. The problem with this is just that the simple would therefore

be (infinitely) reducible to the composite since (1) everything real must occupy a space, (2) every

space is infinitely reducible to further spaces (i.e. the composite), and (3) the simple is something

real. However, to claim that the simple is ultimately reducible to the composite is tantamount to a

contradiction, for what it means to be a composite is to be made up of many parts, whereas what it

means to be simple is not to be made up of any further parts. As I understand the antithesis, that is

exactly why the nature of composite substance is such that it cannot be composed of simple parts,

nor what is ultimately reducible to the simple.200

Earlier I noted that a crucial interpretative issue with respect to (the basic as well as specific)

Antinomial problematic is how to make sense of Kant's claim that both sides of the dispute are

wrong for they mistake appearances for things in themselves. Moreover, we saw how this conflation

of mere appearances with things in themselves factors into the basic Antinomy of Pure Reason 199 See Grier, Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, 196.200 For a helpful discussion of the various problems associated with each individual Antinomy, see Allison, Kant's

Transcendental Idealism, 357-396; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, 385-417; Grier, Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, 172-230; and Ameriks, “Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy.” This list is by no means exhaustive.

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itself, which I had outlined earlier in the form of that fallacious dialectical inference. So, with this

background, it is now time to explore the way in which the rational cosmologist's conflation of

appearances with things in themselves factors into the specific (mathematical) cosmological

conflicts under consideration here, in the respect that this conflation accounts for the fundamentally

irresolvable character of those cosmological conflicts themselves.

In the first place, one of the many conclusions to be drawn from our previous discussion of

exactly how the conflation of appearances with things in themselves, evidenced in the fallacious

dialectical inference of pure reason noted earlier, is that this very conflation is what ultimately leads

to the erroneous “reification” (or “hypostatization”) of the transcendental idea of the cosmos, which

(as we also saw) is arguably the center of gravity of the whole Antinomy of Pure Reason itself. The

result of this is that the cosmos, or simply the physical universe, is now something that actually

exists. The connection between this very general feature of the basic Antinomy of Pure Reason

itself with the specific cosmological conflicts is quite simple: once it is admitted that the cosmos

actually exists, one then has to account for the various ways in which it exists, as we saw previously

in my explication of the Antinomy of Pure Reason in the form of a fallacious dialectical inference,

in short, it has to be determinate. And, the various mathematical Antinomies are nothing more than

the mutually-conflicting conclusions about the specific character of the physical universe, such as,

for example, whether it is finite or infinite in magnitude, or whether it is composed of infinitely

divisible composites or not. Laying aside the specifics of how the rational cosmologist mistakes

appearances with things in themselves in each individual (mathematical) Antinomy, Bird argues201

that the rational cosmologist's conflation of appearances with things in themselves leads to the

erroneous “hypostatization” of the universe as something which is actually given to us, and in this

way he or she is thereby led to make claims about the character of the universe which we can

neither strictly affirm nor deny. Indeed, it is also in this way that one seemingly cannot disentangle

oneself from the conflicting arguments expressed in the first two (mathematical) Antinomies. The

basic point is that the rational cosmologist, in each individual mathematical Antinomy, attempts to

derive knowledge of spatio-temporality by means of pure concepts of reason alone (i.e., things in

themselves), and in the process conflates mere appearances with things in themselves – which

explains why the cosmos, a mere transcendental idea of reason, is posited as something that is

actually given to us, leading to the various Antinomies of Pure Reason themselves. Although I

cannot go into much detail here as to exactly how idealism prima facie avoids this Antinomial

problematic, Kant's thought is that the only way this metaphysical impasse can be avoided is by

adopting his preferred position known as transcendental idealism, and this leads very naturally to

201 See Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 674.

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Hegel's chief criticisms of the Kantian Antinomies.

With this background of the Kantian Antinomies, we must now consider them within the

broader theoretical context of the Hegelian critique. The reason I have explained how

transcendental idealism, for Kant, functions as the key to resolving the Antinomies is that it is this

claim, more so than anything else, that Hegel attacks within the context of Kant's formulation and

treatment of the Antinomies. Basically, Hegel can be seen as questioning Kant's underlying claim

that transcendental idealism, and only transcendental idealism, provides the key to the resolution of

the cosmological conflicts of pure reason, insisting instead that, rather than averting or alleviating

those natural contradictions inherent in our faculty of pure reason as such, transcendental idealism

actually does nothing more than re-locate them from the sphere of being to the sphere of

consciousness, viz., from the nature of reality itself to the nature of us. As he puts it in the following

passages:

Or, in other words, this transcendental idealism lets the contradiction remain, only it is not Being in itself that is thus contradictory, for the contradiction has its source in our thought alone. Thus the same antinomy remains in our mind; and as it was formerly God who had to take upon Himself all contradictions, so now it is self-consciousness. But the Kantian philosophy does not go on to grapple with the fact that it is not things that are contradictory, but self-consciousness itself. Experience teaches that the ego does not melt away by reason of these contradictions, but continues to exist; we need not therefore trouble ourselves about its contradictions, for it can bear them. Nevertheless Kant shows here too much tenderness for things: it would be a pity, he thinks, if they contradicted themselves. But that mind, which is far higher, should be a contradiction – that is not a pity at all. The contradiction is therefore by no means solved by Kant; and since mind takes it upon itself, and contradiction is self-destructive, mind is in itself all derangement and disorder. The true solution would be found in the statement that the categories have no truth in themselves, and the Unconditioned of Reason just as little, but that it lies in the unity of both as concrete, and in that alone.202

Yet he did not succeed in dissolving the conflict. He did not succeed, in the first place, because he did not suspend finitude itself. On the contrary, by turning the conflict into something subjective again, he allowed it to subsist. In the second place, he did not succeed because he can only use transcendental idealism as a negative key for the resolution of the antinomy inasmuch as he denies that either side of it is anything in itself. In this way what is positive in these antinomies, their middle, remains unrecognized. Reason appears pure only in its negative aspect, as suspension of reflection. It does not emerge in its own proper shape.203

Hegel argues that Kant's transcendental idealism does not in fact resolve those metaphysical and

logical contradictions, inherent in our faculty of reason itself, on the basis of the notion that, as he

202 LHP, 451. 203 FK, 84.

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says, “by turning the conflict into something subjective again,”204 the contradictions thereby

effectively become transferred to the realm of consciousness, and as such are no longer to be found

in the realm of being itself. Kant's resolution of the Antinomies, based on the doctrine of

transcendental idealism as such, is not in fact a resolution at all, according to Hegel.

However, what exactly is involved in Hegel's claim that Kant's failure to resolve the

Antinomies stems from the nature of transcendental idealism itself, and how does such a doctrine

implicitly re-locate these cosmological contradictions from the realm of nature to the realm of

consciousness? The key, I think, lies in Kant's views on the character of spatio-temporal form,

particularly his claim that space and time, as the empirical modes by which we represent to

ourselves things external to us, nevertheless remain mere “subjective” forms of our intuition; that is,

it is the status of the forms of our sensibility as merely subjective modes of empirical intuition that

provides the key to a proper understanding of Hegel's criticisms of the Antinomies. If one takes the

view that there is something inherently problematic about the character of space and time, whether

they are empirical modes of our intuition or not, and that this manifests itself in Kant's doctrine of

the Antinomies, then it isn't difficult to see how, in claiming that space and time are mere

“subjective” modes of our empirical intuition and not “objective” determinations of things, that

Kant thought he had resolved the various Antinomies. However, in the passages quoted above,

Hegel's claim is just that Kant didn't seem to realize that he is now effectively and inadvertently

attributing those spatio-temporal contradictions to the state of our consciousness precisely because,

on the ideality thesis, space and time are ultimately products of our mind and not products of the

thing as such. Otherwise put, since space and time are our fundamental a priori modes of empirical

intuition (even if only in a very weak sense) they have no independent existence outside our

thoughts, and so whatever contradictions arise from their natures are now transferred from the

sphere of being to that of consciousness. This seems to be the underlying message of Hegel's

statement that:

all these determinations of a beginning in time, and so on, do not really belong to things, to the implicitude of the phenomenal world, which has independent existence outside of our subjective thought. If such determinations belonged to the world, to God, to free agents, there would be an objective contradiction; but this contradiction is not found as absolute, it pertains only to us.205

Furthermore, Hegel contends that it was a failure of Kant's not to take those prima facie

contradictions having to do with the state of our consciousness with the same amount of weight as

those pertaining to the state of the thing; if he had, he may not have been so keen to use the ideality

204 FK, 84. 205 LHP, 450-451.

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thesis as the only possible solution to the Antinomies, given the extent to which Hegel's criticisms

cast doubt on the ultimate success of such a strategy.

Further, in the EL Hegel expands upon his criticism of Kant's purported resolution of the

Antinomies by calling attention to the fact that Kant, failing to perceive those so-called

cosmological conflicts within “all objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts, and ideas,”206

erroneously thought that such contradictions were only to be found within the transcendental ideas

of God, or the soul, for example. Kant based his identification of the Antinomies solely on the table

of judgements taken from ordinary logic, and then mistakenly identified only four Antinomies or

contradictions of pure reason, where, in fact, there are an infinite number of such Antinomies,

manifesting themselves in every possible object of our experience. Hegel says:

But, at the same time, it must be noted that here again Kant stopped at the merely negative result (that how things are in-themselves is unknowable), and did not penetrate to the cognition of the true and positive significance of the antinomies. This true and positive significance (expressed generally) is that everything actual contains opposed determinations within it, and in consequence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension of an ob-ject amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations.207

Essentially, what Hegel is saying here is that, in apprehending an empirical object as a determinate

“this,” and not a determinate “that,” we are not only apprehending what it is, but we are also

apprehending what it is not. Accordingly, even though Hegel strictly opposes the Kantian procedure

of resolving the Antinomies (for reasons noted earlier), it is clear that he agrees with Kant in that,

contra the traditional metaphysicians for whom the Antinomies are just occasional contradictions of

syllogistic reasoning and inference, they are those wholly necessary metaphysical-logical errors

which are inherent in our very faculty of reason itself. According to Hegel, then, Kant's problem in

the context of the Antinomies was simply that he had not gone far enough in his endeavour of

uncovering those unavoidable contradictions inherent in all the objects of our experience by virtue

of the fact that he had stopped short at the cosmological ideas, only identifying such cosmical

concepts as God, and the soul, to name a few. One way of summarizing this is to remark that, for

Hegel, Kant failed to realize that these contradictions are inherent not just in our faculty of reason as

we attempt to cognize the infinite (i.e., the unconditioned), but that they are inherent in our faculty

of reason as we attempt to cognize the finite as well.

But what exactly does Hegel mean by this, by the idea that everything of a possible

experience in some sense admits of a contradiction? Let me explain: for Hegel, everything is a

manifestation of the “Notion,” or the “Concept” (Begriff), and as such, those mutually exclusive,

206 EL, §48, 92. 207 EL, §48Z, 93.

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albeit wholly valid, Antinomial arguments which are found in Kant's “Dialectic” can both be upheld

from the Hegelian holistic point of view, since, given the nature of the dialectical method as such,

these seemingly contradictory conclusions regarding such things as the nature and status of space

and time, for example, can only be properly understood inasmuch as they are incorporated into a

larger, more unified conception of reality, “of what there is in truth,” as Hegel would put it.

Otherwise put, once the dialectical progression of the “Idea” has been brought to a close in SL, it

becomes apparent that, whereas Kant would take these Antinomial conclusions to be exactly that,

mutually exclusive, wholly opposed determinations of objects, and nothing more, Hegel maintains

that they are actually nothing but opposed aspects or “moments” of the “Whole.”

But how can this be the case; how can Hegel legitimately impute wholly contradictory,

mutually exclusive sets of properties to one and the same thing? Even though to adequately answer

this question would probably take us far beyond the scope of the present chapter, I would like to

offer a bit more detail with the use of an example. In EL, while Hegel draws out the implications of

his notion according to which any metaphysical theory which admits of a sharp distinction between

possibility and impossibility is empty and superfluous, he makes it quite clear that the rationale

behind this view is that, speaking crudely, everything is as much impossible as it is possible, given

the fact that things manifest not only diverse but opposite determinations. He goes on to proclaim:

And, furthermore, just as everything can be considered possible, so we can say with equal right that everything can be considered impossible, since any content (which, as such, is always something-concrete) contains not only diverse but opposite determinations. Thus, for example, nothing is more impossible than the fact that I exist, for “I” is at once simple self-relation as well as, unconditionally, relation to another. The same situation holds for every other content in the natural and spiritual world. We can say that matter is impossible, because it is the unity of repulsion and attraction. The same holds for life, for law, for freedom, and, above all, for God himself as the true, i.e., triune God; … Whether this or that is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the totality of the moments of actuality, an actuality which, in the unfolding of its moments, proves to be Necessity.208

So, even though the context here is a discussion of the putative value of distinguishing in ordinary

consciousness between what is “strictly impossible” in comparison with what is “merely possible,”

it nevertheless provides an illustrative enough example of Hegel's arguments in relation to the

Antinomies, to be more precise, of how Hegel's holistic view of reality is able to incorporate both

sides of each individual Antinomy.

In outlining Hegel's metaphysical criticisms of the Kantian philosophy, I first discussed

Hegel's criticisms with respect to Kant's views on the nature and status of space and time, and then I

took the reader through the Kantian Antinomies by first explaining Kant's doctrine of transcendental

208 EL, §143Z, 217.

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illusion, and more importantly, how transcendental illusion generates the various Antinomies of

Pure Reason themselves. As we saw, many of Hegel's criticisms with respect to the former stem

from Kant's conclusions in the “Aesthetic” that space and time are mere forms of our subjective

intuition, and not independent things in themselves or objective determinations that attach to things

in themselves, whereas his criticisms with respect to the latter stem from Kant's claim that

transcendental idealism, and only transcendental idealism, provides the key to the resolution of

those cosmological conflicts of our pure reason that we necessarily stumble into as we search for

the unconditioned for every series of finite conditioneds. In the next chapter, I will resume this

discussion of the multifarious metaphysical issues with the Kantian philosophy by focusing on

things in themselves, and why Hegel thought they were an entirely dispensable component of

Kant's transcendentalism.

Conclusion

My aim in canvassing the aforementioned methodological, epistemological, and

metaphysical criticisms from Hegel's treatment of the Kantian philosophy over a variety of sources

has been to offer a very broad account of Hegel's critique of the Kantian transcendental philosophy,

serving as an entrée into my discussion, as well as analysis of, Hegel's views on the Kantian

conception of things in themselves. Because my ultimate concern at this stage of my thesis is with

Kant's doctrine of things in themselves, and the reasons Hegel gave for rejecting that doctrine rather

than with Hegel's critique of the Kantian philosophy writ large, I have not assessed any of these

arguments. I am not concerned with whether they are good arguments or not, only with whether the

“real” historical Kant, – viz., the methodological Kant for whom things in themselves represent an

intelligible, and thus non-sensible, way of considering things – can legitimately be said to be prima

facie open to them, in the respect that they apply to a methodological reading of Kant's TD. To that

end, in the next chapter I begin by outlining what I take to be Hegel's chief criticisms of things in

themselves.

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Chapter 4: Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy: Things in Themselves

Introduction

In the previous chapter, my aim was to introduce Hegel's critique of the Kantian theoretical

philosophy, and I did this by canvassing the major themes – methodological, epistemological, as

well as metaphysical – of just that critique, all the while laying aside Hegel's criticisms of Kantian

things in themselves, which for our purposes is surely the most important element of Hegel's

critique. It is not surprising, then, that I have chosen to do justice to that element of the Hegelian

critique here in this chapter, focusing on just what it was about the Kantian conception of things as

they are in themselves that Hegel found so objectionable. My aim in this chapter is thus to outline

Hegel's fundamental criticisms with regards to Kant's conception of things in themselves, and only

things in themselves, and similar to the approach adopted in the last chapter, where my concern was

with outlining, rather than assessing, all of the major Hegelian criticisms of the Kantian philosophy

(apart from those concerning things in themselves of course) once again I will avoid assessing any

of those arguments and claims as such, focusing instead on such issues as: how such criticisms can

be seen to arise within the context of Hegel's dialectical method, what they ultimately consist in,

and how they can best be understood.

This chapter is divided into three parts, each of which concerns itself with a particular

Hegelian criticism of the Kantian notion of things in themselves, which I have here understood as

the indeterminacy criticism, the essence criticism, and the limit criticism. I treat these in that

respective order.

Part 1: The Indeterminacy Criticism

In this part of the chapter, I outline Hegel's indeterminacy criticism with respect to things in

themselves, before examining some of the arguments by which the metaphysical principle at the

heart of this criticism – namely, the principle that: to be is to be determinate – is derived.

To begin with, one of the underlying themes of Hegel's critique of Kantian things in

themselves can be summed up in terms of the idea that the conception of things in themselves is

unintelligible to us, in the sense that it is a concept which, insofar as it is attended to in thought,

furnishes us with nothing whatsoever. More specifically, it seems to me that Hegel's basic claim is

that, in forming the concept of a thing in itself, we do so by means of a process of abstraction that is

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taken so far that there is nothing left over after such a process has been completed, and the problem

is that there is no content under which the concept of things in themselves could then be subsumed.

Take the following passage in EL, for instance, where Hegel says:

The thing-in-itself (and here thing embraces God, or the spirit, as well) expresses the ob-ject, inasmuch as abstraction is made of all that is for consciousness, of all determinations of feeling, as well as of all determinate thoughts about it. It is easy to see what is left, what is completely abstract, or totally empty, and determined only as what is “beyond;” the negative of representation, of feeling, of determinate thinking, etc. But it is just as simple to reflect that this caput mortuum is itself only the product of thinking, and precisely of the thinking that has gone to the extreme of pure abstraction, the product of the empty “I” that makes its own self-identity into its ob-ject. The negative determination that contains this abstract identity as [its] ob-ject is likewise entered among the Kantian categories, and, like that empty identity, it is something quite familiar. – We must be quite surprised, therefore, to read so often that one does not know what the thing-in-itself is; for nothing is easier to know than this.209

As the concept of an intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial thing of some sort, the thing in

itself is thus a thing considered in abstraction from our sense-experience, from everything that is

“for consciousness,” as Hegel says, and so it is a concept which is “completely abstract,” or “totally

empty,” the “caput mortuum”210 that “is itself only the product of thinking.”211 It is in this way that

things in themselves are “empty abstractions void of truth.”212 That is to say, Hegel's claim is that

things in themselves are unintelligible as concepts for they are complete abstractions of our sense-

experience, and are in this way entirely empty. In the light of this claim, Hegel effectively argues

that things in themselves qua things are not in fact real things at all, and cannot be said to exist as

things, and so the task before us now is to explore in more detail exactly why it is that Hegel

maintains that things in themselves cannot exist in the first place.

Very briefly, the problem with such an abstract concept, in Hegel's eyes, and thus the

problem with things in themselves – a thing in itself being an utterly abstract concept of a type of

thing or object for which neither the forms of our intuition nor the categories of our understanding

can be applied – is just that it is a concept of a thing or object which is utterly indeterminate or

property-less. Simply put, the problem with an indeterminate object, and thus the problem with

things in themselves, is that they are necessarily indeterminate, and, as Hegel's metaphysics will

eventually show, an indeterminate object cannot exist. Or, otherwise put, things in themselves

cannot exist by virtue of the very indeterminacy which constitutes a central component of what they

209 EL, §44, 87. 210 Term used by alchemists to refer to the “dead” precipitate that remained after the organism's “living spirit” had been

given off. 211 EL, §44, 87. 212 SL, 21.109.

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themselves are. So, in the end, the indeterminacy criticism can thus be summarized in terms of the

claim that things in themselves cannot exist precisely because they are so abstract (and therefore

unintelligible) that they have reached the point of being utterly indeterminate – determinacy being a

necessary ontological condition of things.

If we dig a little deeper, however, we soon discover that the indeterminacy criticism – viz.,

the criticism according to which things in themselves cannot be said to exist by virtue of their

indeterminacy or lack of properties – stems from the common-sense principle, central to Hegelian

metaphysics as such, that, in order for something to exist, it must, at the very least, be a determinate

thing, a thing with properties. In other words, “to be is to be determinate” is the basic metaphysical

principle underlying the indeterminacy argument, and this is evidenced in the following passage

from SL:

It may be observed that here we have the meaning of the thing-in-itself. It is a very simple abstraction, though it was for a while a very important determination, something sophisticated, as it were, just as the proposition that we know nothing of what things are in themselves was a much valued piece of wisdom. – Things are called “in-themselves” in so far as abstraction is made from all being-for-other, which really means, in so far as they are thought without all determination, as nothing. In this sense, of course, it is impossible to know what the thing-in-itself is. For the question “what?” calls for determinations to be produced; but since the things of which the determinations are called for are at the same time presumed to be things-in-themselves, which means precisely without determination, the impossibility of an answer is thoughtlessly implanted in the question, or else a senseless answer is given. – The thing-in-itself is the same as that absolute of which nothing is known except that in it all is one. What there is in these things-in-themselves is therefore very well known; they are as such empty abstractions void of truth.213

Especially in light of the sentence: “Things are called 'in-themselves' … in so far as they are thought

without all determination, as nothing,”214 it is not at all difficult to see why I have placed the

indeterminacy criticism, particularly the claim that determination is an ontological condition of

things, front and center in my account of Hegel's criticisms of things in themselves. There is no

doubt that things in themselves are indeterminate, and there is no doubt that that is why they cannot

be said to exist, why they are akin to the thought of A and ~A. As Justus Hartnack says:

Whatever is, is something. This is not just a claim within Hegelian Logic; it is a rather commonsensical claim. Anything which exists, anything which can be thought of as existing, anything which can be named or pointed to must in principle be classifiable as a something or other. It must be a stone, a spider, a certain kind of flower, etc., etc., A something which is nothing is not just a logically self-contradictory notion but is also an ontological impossibility. On this point Hegel just expresses our commonsense view.215

213 SL, 21.108-21.109. 214 SL, 21.109. 215 Justus Hartnack, “Categories and Things-in-Themselves,” in Stephen Priest, ed., Hegel's Critique of Kant (Oxford:

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In short, what Hartnack is expressing here is the view, strongly endorsed by Hegel, that

determination is a necessary condition of existence, viz., of what, ontologically speaking, “being”

is. To be or to exist is necessarily to be or to exist as something, and the reason we can say that

stones, spiders, and flowers exist, using Hartnack's examples, is that they all have certain

identifiable characteristics which make them what they are, viz., stones, spiders, and flowers. His

suggestion is that, for Hegel, things are the way they are in virtue of the properties they have, and

alternatively, things have the properties they have because they are the kinds of things they are. This

passage can be viewed as a summary of the indeterminacy criticism, of why things in themselves

cannot exist and of why the conception of such things is an utterly empty and meaningless one, and

the reason, to repeat, is simply that such things are indeterminate, and thus amount to what

Hartnack refers to above as an “ontological impossibility.”

By now it should be apparent what Hegel's indeterminacy criticism consists in; it consists in

the notion that, since determinacy is a necessary condition of existence, of things to be anything at

all, and since things in themselves, as lacking all the properties which belong to things in our

experience, are utterly indeterminate things of some sort, then things in themselves cannot exist. I

would now like to examine some of Hegel's arguments on this score, on how we know determinacy

is a necessary ontological condition of things, and the most logical place to begin is SL, where

Hegel outlines the logical unfolding of the pure a priori categories of thought as well as the pure

determinations of being as such, in short, the “Concept,” beginning with the simplest form or

logical determination of being, that of pure immediate being.

At the very beginning of his study of the logical derivation of the categories of thought, SL,

Hegel poses the all-important question: “how must science begin?;” and the answer will in large

part define the course of that logical derivation itself. The answer to this question is pure simple

immediacy as such, or more appropriately, pure, immediate, indeterminate being itself; for our

purposes, however, the crucial point is not how Hegel answers the question, that pure simple

indeterminate being constitutes the starting-point of his study of the logical derivation of the

categories of thought, but why he answers as he does, viz., why pure immediate being is the

starting-point of SL. That is, why does he answer that SL must begin with the category (as well as

logical determination) of pure, utterly abstract, indeterminate being as such rather than with

something else, say, the category of concrete being itself, or maybe even that of time? As far as I

know, the key lies in the fact that it is very important, for Hegel, for philosophy, above all else, to be

three things: first, utterly presuppositionless; second, thoroughly self-critical; and third and finally,

Oxford University Press, 1987), 77-87, 81.

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absolutely simple (that is: “simple” in relation to presuppositionless philosophy's starting-point).

Very early on in SL Hegel makes this abundantly clear, claiming that:

Being is what makes the beginning here; it is presented indeed as originating through mediation, but a mediation which at the same time sublates itself, and the presupposition is of a pure knowledge which is the result of finite knowledge, of consciousness. But if no presupposition is to be made, if the beginning is itself to be taken immediately, then the only determination of this beginning is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. There is only present the resolve, which can also be viewed as arbitrary, of considering thinking as such. The beginning must then be absolute or, what means the same here, must be an abstract beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose, must not be mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the entire science. It must therefore be simply an immediacy, or rather only immediacy itself. Just as it cannot have any determination with respect to an other, so too it cannot have any within; it cannot have any content, for any content would entail distinction and the reference of distinct moments to each other, and hence a mediation. The beginning is therefore pure being.216

And in EL, the claim is much the same:

When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but thought in its pure lack of determination, for determination requires both one and another; but at the beginning, we have as yet no other. That which lacks determination, as we have it here, is the immediate, not a mediated lack of determination, not the sublation of all determinacy, but the lack of determination in all its immediacy, what lacks determination prior to all determinacy, what lacks determinacy because it stands at the very beginning. But this is what we call “being.” Being cannot be felt, it cannot be directly perceived nor can it be represented; instead, it is pure thought, and as such it constitutes the starting point. Essence lacks determinacy too, but, because it has already passed through mediation, it already contains determination as sublated within itself.217

One should readily see that these passages are noteworthy not simply because they establish that

the beginning of science is, from Hegel's perspective, pure, simple immediacy as such, or rather

pure, simple being, but that they also explain in considerable detail why the beginning is as it is. As

I intimated earlier, the starting-point is as it is – the thought of pure, indeterminate immediacy as

such – by virtue of our genuine, heart-felt desire to be thoroughly self-critical philosophers who

take nothing for granted about the nature of thought (and reality) as such. In our desire to suspend

all of our determinate thoughts about what thought is – such as an activity of judgement as it was

for Kant – what we ultimately end up with is nothing over and above the utterly abstract thought

that thought is. Similarly, Houlgate writes that “thought that sets aside all its assumptions about

what it is, is left with nothing to think but the simple thought that it is.”218 Armed with nothing more

216 SL, 21.56. 217 EL, §86Z, 137. 218 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic: From Being to Infinity (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press,

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than the category of simple, pure being as his starting-point, the pure immediacy of which thought

is minimally aware, Hegel will derive, by means of an utterly self-critical, presuppositionless

process which takes nothing for granted about how science is to begin, the remaining pure

categories of thought.

As far as I know, in order to understand how one category of thought logically mutates into

another in Hegel's SL, all we need focus on is the inherent logical structure of the original category

itself (or what is the same, the original determination of being), which, in the present case is the

category of pure being, and then see what this category entails. Concerning pure, simple being,

Hegel immediately remarks:

Being, pure being – without further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another; it is has no difference within it, nor any outwardly. If any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or if it were posited by this determination or content as distinct from an other, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness.219

Hegel is outlining here exactly what we are presented with when we posit pure being. Such being

is, as I have stated before, nothing over and above the pure, indeterminate immediacy of which

thought is minimally aware. Simply put, it is being, pure and simple, and as such, it contains

absolutely no determination or content, either inwardly or outwardly, whatsoever. According to

Houlgate:

… it is sheer immediacy itself. It is the least we can understand thought to be and the least we can understand there to be at all. Such being is that with which we are intimately familiar but which we rarely, if ever, reflect upon: the sheer isness of things, here considered by itself in abstraction from all relation to things or anything else as sheer, indeterminate being.220

But therein lies the problem, for once we attend to pure being's sheer and utter immediacy itself,

such being proves to be “pure indeterminateness and emptiness.” It is for that reason that “pure

being, the indeterminate immediate is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.”221

Said otherwise, by virtue of its complete and utter purity (and immediacy), pure being thus logically

proves to be nothing at all. Moreover, since it is indeterminate in that it lacks all determination –

both implicitly and explicitly – it cannot be distinguished from nothing and thereby collapses into

the very idea of nothing itself, or nothingness as such, for, in being so utterly indeterminate, the

category of pure being cannot even be the very minimal being that pure being has to be.

2006), 31. 219 SL, 21.68-21.69. 220 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 264. 221 SL, 21.69.

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At this point in SL we know that the starting-point of any genuinely self-critical, and thus

presuppositionless, derivation of the most basic categories of thought (and determinations of being)

begins with pure immediacy as such, or what Hegel terms “pure being.” We have also seen that

there is clearly a close affinity between pure being, insofar as its sheer immediacy is concerned, and

nothing. If we pursue this line of thought a bit further, then, we find Hegel saying the following in

relation to nothingness.

Nothing, pure nothingness; it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, complete absence of determination and content; lack of all distinction within. – In so far as mention can be made here of intuiting and thinking, it makes a difference whether something or nothing is being intuited or thought. To intuit or to think nothing has therefore a meaning; the two are distinguished and so nothing is (concretely exists) in our thinking or thinking; or rather it is the empty intuiting and thinking itself, like pure being. – Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as what pure being is.222

It is remarkable how similar Hegel's account of the category of nothing (as presented here) is to his

previous account of the category of being. Even though it seems like a tautology to say that

“nothing is nothing,” on the face of it, that is exactly what Hegel is saying here when he refers to

nothingness as the complete and total absence of all determination. His point is that “nothingness

is,” as Houlgate informs us, essentially “the sheer immediacy of nothingness itself.”223 Since it is

sheer immediacy as such, the category of nothingness is thus indistinguishable from that of pure

being. The key, I think, lies in the fact that both share each other's pure, indeterminate immediacy.

Just as pure being is utterly indeterminate in its pure immediacy, nothingness is likewise utterly

indeterminate in its pure immediacy as well. As such, pure being can thus be seen to mutate

logically into nothingness; and conversely, nothingness can now be seen to mutate logically into the

previous category of pure being. “This means, of course, that pure being and pure nothing not only

vanish but also prove to be ineliminable since each one disappears into, and so immediately revives,

the other.”224

To recapitulate: as the mutual vanishing of the category of pure being into that of nothing,

and conversely, nothingness into that of pure being, the category of becoming constitutes the

implicit truth of both being and nothingness. Additionally, however, Hegel claims:

Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same. The truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – “has passed over,” not passes over. But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not the same, that they are absolutely

222 SL, 21.69. 223 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 264. 224 Ibid.

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distinct yet equally unseparated and inseparable, and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately dissolved itself.225

The important point here is that the categories of pure being and pure nothing are in one respect the

same, but in another respect also distinct. Let me explain: insofar as being and nothing are

considered in terms of their pure and utter immediacy, being and nothing constitute one and the

same thing: absolute indeterminate immediacy. Contrariwise, though, insofar as “being is being,

and nothing is nothing”226 – as Houlgate aptly puts it – such concepts constitute wholly distinct

categories since they contain within themselves a determinate difference; however, the only

problem is that as an indeterminate difference, it cannot as yet be determined. Houlgate confirms

this when he says that “[being and nothing] form two radically different indeterminacies whose

difference is, however, indeterminable.”227 But, this is where it gets interesting: in spite of their

explicit distinctness, each category still implicitly proves to logically vanish into its other, for, as we

saw Hegel claiming above: “each immediately vanishes in its opposite.”228 As each one endlessly

(and immediately) vanishes into its other, however, each one loses the sense in which it constitutes

a distinct category, and ultimately each category becomes reducible to the process of vanishing

itself, i.e., becoming as such. This is what Hegel meant above when he said that the truth of being

and nothing “is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other:

becoming.”229

However, is this process of the mutual vanishing of the opposites of being and non-being (or

nothing) really to go on forever? If so, then it would seem that we would be confronted with an

endless process of vanishing, that is, the vanishing of being into nothing, and contrariwise, that of

nothingness back into being, ad infinitum. But if not, what puts a stop to the moments of ceasing-

to-be – the immediate vanishing of being into nothing – and coming-to-be – the immediate

vanishing of nothingness back into being – that are constitutive of the process of becoming as such?

As paradoxical as it may sound, one implication of the process of becoming as such is that it

proves, immanently through its own endless sublating (or negating) of its twin moments of being

and nothing, to bring to a close, once and for all, the putatively endless process of coming-to-be and

ceasing-to-be itself. Simply put, it is the cause of its own demise. To explain: a presupposition of

this process is, as we saw earlier, the mutual distinguishedness of the categories of being and

225 SL, 21.69-21.70. 226 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 265. 227 Ibid. 228 SL, 21.69. 229 SL, 21.69-21.70.

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nothing: each category cannot logically collapse into its opposite unless they comprise two distinct

categories of thought. At the same time, though, the logical outcome of this endless process of

sublating (or negating) of being and nothingness is the loss of what makes them distinguishable

from one another (viz., the difference); in other words, by means of its own endless sublating, the

process of becoming negates the very condition for becoming as such. And, since it is this mutual

difference of the categories which fuels the process of becoming as such, with the loss of this

difference, the process stabilizes itself and thereafter is brought to an abrupt close.

So, the crucial point of our previous analysis is that the category of becoming is not simply

the process whereby being and nothing logically vanish (or collapse) into one another, but the end

result of the vanishing itself, that is, the stable unity of being and nothing that the very process of

becoming proves to be. For, Hegel claims in SL that “becoming is the unseparatedness of being and

nothing, not the unity that abstracts from being and nothing; as the unity of being and nothing it is

rather this determinate unity, or one in which being and nothing equally are.”230 Note that Hegel

refers to the unity of being and nothing (or becoming) as a determinate unity; so what this suggests

is that the end result of the process of becoming as such cannot be fully understood in terms of the

category of becoming alone. Rather, it has to be understood in terms of the category of determinate

being itself.

We have thus finally come to the category of determinate being, or what Hegel sometimes

calls existence as such. Previously, we saw how the category of becoming, by means of its own

inherent logical structure, undermines itself through the sublation of the condition for the process of

becoming as such, i.e., the distinguishableness of being and nothing. We also saw that the end result

of this putatively endless process of vanishing (becoming) proved to be nothing other than the unity

of being and nothing in the form of determinate being. After all, as Hegel writes:

Existence proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, the becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself, and existence therefore appears as a first from which the forward move is made. It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first.231

What this passage does is reinforce exactly how the process whereby becoming entails determinacy

(or determinate being) comes about. And, as I said, determinate being is the very point at which this

process is brought to a final rest; in fact, such being is:

inward unrest – a unity which in its self-relation is not simply motionless, but which, in virtue of the diversity of being and nothing which it contains, is inwardly turned

230 SL, 21.92. 231 SL, 21.97.

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against itself. Being-there, on the contrary, is this unity or becoming in this form of unity; that is why it is one-sided and finite. It is, as if the antithesis has disappeared; it is contained in the unity, but only in-itself, not as posited in the unity.232

Indeed, that, as I take it, is exactly what the category of determinate being amounts to: it is the unity

of being and nothing which has stabilized itself once the process of becoming has been brought to a

rest. As such, it is the vanishing of the antithesis of being and nothing in the form of a concrete,

determinate unity. This unity – as we will come to see in the course of SL – will also prove, by

means of its own inherent logical structure, to be something, to be finite, to be spatio-temporal, as

well as a host of other things. But, all of this will have to await explanation for another time.

In conclusion, then, what this investigation of the opening stages of SL, starting from the

categories of pure being and nothing and ending with the categories of becoming and determinate

being, demonstrates, is that the concept of pure, simple, immediate being (as well as pure, simple

immediate being itself) is logically unstable, and as such, undermines itself by mutating logically

into further, more determinate categories, like that of nothingness or becoming, for instance. More

specifically, by highlighting the centrality of the principle that, to be is to be determinate, for

Hegelian metaphysics, Hegel's ground-breaking arguments in SL explain why something (not in the

specifically Hegelian sense but in general) has to be determinate in order for it to exist at all, that is,

for it to be anything. Another way of understanding this is to claim that, according to Hegel, if

something exists, although it may very well prove to be other things, the very least it has to be is a

determinate something, a something with properties.

The basic purpose of the preceding investigation into the opening stages of SL was nothing

more than to underline the centrality for Hegel's metaphysics of the idea that the very least that an

(existent) something can be is a determinate something, that is, a thing that is characterizable,

definable, or specifiable in terms of something or other, a “this” rather than a “that;” to put it

otherwise, a something with properties, features, or characteristics of some kind – the way that it is.

Apart from Hegel's account of the dialectical development of the categories of being, nothing,

becoming, and determinate being in the early stages of SL, however, there are other no less

illuminating discussions that manifest the all-pervasive metaphysical principle that, to be is to be

determinate. The discussion to which I refer is Hegel's account of the “Also” and the “One” of

perception in PS.233

Turning our attention now to PS, particularly to Hegel's dialectical examination of the shape

232 EL, §88, 143. 233 For a good discussion of the chapter on “Perception” in PS, and more specifically on the “One” and the “Also” of

“perception,” see Robert Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Routledge, 2002), 51-59; Terry Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28-34; and Robert C. Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 337-347.

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of consciousness known as “perception,” we come across the Hegelian ideas of the “Also” and the

“One,” which, when we consider them in their specific dialectical progression, prima facie illustrate

just how important the notion of determination is for Hegelian metaphysics in general. Much like

our discussion of the opening stages of SL considered before it, this particular section of PS clearly

lends credence to the idea that determination is a necessary ontological condition, for Hegel – that

is, a condition for the actual existence of things rather than a condition merely for our apprehension

or cognition of those things.

It is not surprising to learn that Hegel's account of the “Also” and the “One” of perception in

PS is surrounded in much controversy. But, at the same time, it seems to me that the prevailing

interpretation among Hegelian commentators is that, when Hegel is speaking about the conception

of the “Also,” for instance, all he is doing is introducing, in typical Hegelese, the metaphysical

theory known as the bundle theory of an object, that is, the theory whereby a thing is said to be

nothing over and above the sum of its features, attributes, or more exactly, properties. According to

this view, then, the thing simply is all of these properties; it is not, as we will come to see, the thing

underlying such properties, viz., that of which these properties are properties of. As Hegel says:

This abstract universal medium, which can be called simply 'thinghood' or 'pure essence,' is nothing else than what Here and Now have proved themselves to be, viz., a simple togetherness of a plurality; but the many are, in their determinateness, simple universals themselves. This salt is a simple Here, and at the same time manifold; it is white and also tart, also cubical in shape, of a specific gravity, etc. All these many properties are in a single simple 'Here,' in which, therefore, they interpenetrate; none has a different Here from the others, but each is everywhere, in the same Here in which the others are. And, at the same time, without being separated by different Heres, they do not affect each other in this interpenetration. The whiteness does not affect the cubical shape, and neither affects the tart taste, etc.; on the contrary, since each is itself a simple relating of self to self it leaves the others alone, and is connected with them by the indifferent Also. This Also is thus the pure universal itself, or the medium, the 'thinghood,' which holds them together in this way.234

Remembering what was said above, then, as Hegel makes it clear here, salt, for instance, based

solely on the bundle view, is nothing but the sum of its properties, that is, its white color, its tart

taste, its cubical shape, etc … occupying a definite region in space. Likewise, Stern says,

“perception thus treats each individual as a co-instantiation of some collection of property-instances

in a single spatial region.”235

But, following his consideration of the bundle view in PS, the “Also” of perception, he

thereafter goes on to consider the substratum/attribute view, signified in the “One” of perception.

234 PS, 68-69. 235 Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, 52.

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The reason for this is that the truth of the former moment of consciousness is rendered fully explicit

only when it is incorporated into, and necessitated by, the latter moment. Hegel explains how such a

process occurs:

In the relationship which has thus emerged it is only the character of positive universality that is at first observed and developed; but a further side presents itself, which must also be taken into consideration. To wit, if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent to one another, if they were simply and solely self-related, they would not be determinate; for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their opposites. Yet; as thus opposed to one another they cannot be together in the simple unity of their medium, which is just as essential to them as negation; the differentiation of the properties, in so far as it is not an indifferent differentiation but is exclusive, each property negating the others, thus falls outside of this simple medium; and the medium, therefore, is not merely an Also, an indifferent unity, but a One as well, a unity which excludes an other. The One is the moment of negation; it is itself quite simply a relation of self to self and it excludes an other; and it is that by which 'thinghood' is determined as a Thing.236

To be sure, there are conflicting interpretations of exactly what Hegel is doing here; for, although

the prevailing interpretation of this passage is that Hegel is transitioning from the conception of a

thing according to which things are nothing more than mere collections of co-instantiated

properties, to the conception of a thing whereby it is said to be something, albeit “we-know-not-

what,” underlying the sum of its properties, it is not quite clear precisely how Hegel makes this

transition. So, for that reason, I will now attempt to lay out as plainly and concisely as possible what

I take the overwhelming import of the previously cited passages to be.

Clearly, one can see that these passages accomplish two essential things: first, Hegel is

diagnosing the inherent tension(s) within the conception of a thing considered as an “Also,” and

second, he is also illustrating how the “Also” of perception thus mutates logically into the “One.”

Relatively early on in the second passage, Hegel makes it clear, I think, that the issue with the

bundle theory is its prima facie indeterminacy. For, one of the implications of this view – since it

conceives of things exclusively in terms of what Hegel refers to as “positive universality,” meaning,

in terms of a collection of indifferent universal properties existing in a mutual self-relationship with

themselves – is that it loses the sense in which its properties can be differentiated from other

properties. And, one of the conditions for metaphysical determinacy is that the things which are said

to be determinate exist in a mutual relationship with an other, namely, its opposite. As Hegel says

himself, “for they [the universals] are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves

from one another, and relate themselves to others as to their opposites.”237 Let me explain: every

236 PS, 69. 237 PS, 69.

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property, insofar as it is determinate, presupposes its opposite from which it can be differentiated,

for without this moment of negation, as Hegel calls it, we would have absolutely no good grounds

for supposing that a thing is the sort of thing it is. Something is white only in relation to something

black, cubical only in relation to something circular, sweet only in relation to something bitter, and

so on ad infinitum. Yet, as Hegel explains it, we come to realize that this process of differentiation

(i.e., the moment of negation) cannot be sustained from within “the simple unity of their (i.e., the

properties') medium,”238 and so it “falls outside of this simple medium (the “Also”)”239 into another,

namely, into a “One.” To clarify this a bit: implicit within the metaphysical principle, which Hegel

no doubt espouses, that only inasmuch as a thing's properties can be differentiated from another

thing's properties can we make sense of that original thing as being the collection of properties

which it is, is the notion of a unified underlying thing of which those properties can be predicated.

The implicit truth of the bundle view has now a priori been proven to be the substratum view.

As I understand Hegel on this count, in order for the original collection of universals to be

unified, rather than being a mere hodge podge of “we-know-not-what,” in which case the universals

would not be anything at all, there has to be an underlying thing in which those universal properties

inhere. This brings us to the metaphysical idea of the substrate. We have now moved from saying

that the thing really is the collection of universals to saying that the thing is that which has those

universals, viz., from the “is” of identity to the “is” of predication. Hegel summarizes the situation

thus:

The object which I apprehend presents itself purely as a One; but I also perceive in it a property which is universal, and which thereby transcends the singularity [of the object]. The first being of the objective essence as a One was therefore not its true being. But since the object is what is true, the untruth falls in me; my apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property, I must rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a community. I now further perceive the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding it. Thus I did not in fact apprehend the objective essence correctly when I defined it as a community with others, or as a continuity; on account of the determinateness of the property, I must break up the continuity and posit the objective essence as a One that excludes.240

One plausible interpretation of this passage is that Hegel is here arguing (at least in part) that the

central issue with the substratum theory is that it is as equally indeterminate as the bundle theory

was shown to be. To recap: earlier we saw that an implication of the bundle theory was that the

properties themselves were indeterminate, which explained the dialectical move from the

conception of the “Also” to that of the “One.” Contrariwise, now it is the underlying thing, not the

238 PS, 69. 239 PS, 69. 240 PS, 70-71.

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properties predicated of that thing, that is prima facie indeterminate or character-less. Allow me to

pursue this further: for my part, the reason for the substrate's putative indeterminate nature is simply

that we can never differentiate it or “pick-it-out,” as it were, from its properties, since, any putative

act of identifying this substrate apart from its properties is undermined by the fact that it seems

impossible to reach the underlying thing, the substrate, for in the process of doing so we would

thereby only be identifying one of the thing's properties, never the actual thing itself.

In the end, then, it seems that our conceptual predicament has not improved in the least for

the simple fact that accepting the substratum/attribute view lands us in the very same metaphysical

predicament as we were earlier when we affirmed the bundle view, which can be summed up in

terms of the idea of positing what is indeterminate. Thus, we have a dilemma: on the one hand,

either we can affirm a bundle view of things according to which the thing is identified with the

properties, in which case we cannot do justice to the determinacy of the thing which has the

properties; or, on the other hand, we can affirm a substratum view according to which the thing can

now be identified with that which has the properties rather than with the properties themselves, in

which case we cannot do justice to the determinacy of the properties. Stern, I think, sums up

consciousness's predicament very nicely when he says:

Hegel argues that consciousness oscillates between the one conception and the other, sometimes treating the object as a bundle of properties which then undermines its sense that the object is really a unified individual distinct from other individuals, and sometimes treating the object as a unity over and above its plurality of properties, which then leads to the idea of a character-less substratum and back to the 'This' of sense-certainty. Perception cannot decide which conception is the correct characterization of how things are, and which conception merely results from the delusive influence on us of how things appear to us to be.241

In each of these cases, the problem concerns determinacy, and how the individual theory under

consideration attempts to resolve the way in which either (a) the underlying thing is indeterminate

or (b) its properties are indeterminate, with the result that perception, as a form of consciousness,

sublates itself and can no longer be considered adequate.

To be sure, our analysis thus far has served to reinforce, albeit in a way somewhat different

from Hegel's presentation of being, nothing, becoming, and determinate being in SL, exactly why

existent things have to be determinate not just in order for us (qua conscious observers) to identify

them as such, but for them to exist as things in the first place. For, to repeat the all-important

metaphysical principle, for Hegel, to be is to be determinate. Indeed, I would go so far as to argue

that the best way to understand this section of PS is in the light of that very principle, since Hegel's

account of the “Also” and the “One” illuminates the issues ordinary consciousness encounters as it

241 Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, 57.

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attempts to account for the determinacy of things with properties as well as the determinacy of those

very properties themselves. All that I am saying here is that the metaphysical principle which says

that determinacy is a necessary ontological condition of things lies at the very center of Hegel's

dialectical account of the “Also” and the “One” of perception, and it is for that reason, then, that

neither of those accounts in PS can be adequately understood independent of that principle and its

significance. By the same token, though, and what is probably more important for our purposes, is

that that particular aspect of Hegel's metaphysics which says that things must have properties (and

thus be determinate) if they are to exist at all, cannot be understood apart from his account of the

conceptions of the “One” and the “Also” in PS, for it is here, perhaps more so than anywhere else in

the Hegelian corpus, where it becomes clear just why things must be this way, namely, why things

must be determinate if they are to exist. As long as we keep the centrality of this metaphysical thesis

in mind, it becomes much easier to understand Hegel's criticisms of the Kantian notion of things in

themselves.

Part 2: The Essence Criticism

In addition to the charge of unintelligibility, which we have already seen constitutes Hegel's

foremost criticism regarding (the concept of) things in themselves, Hegel takes issue with the

Kantian dualism of appearances and things in themselves by effectively arguing that there is

something inherently problematic about the idea that appearances can “appear” independently of,

apart from, or without any putative reference to, their corresponding essences. This is what I have

termed the essence criticism, and it is nothing more than the idea that the essence of an object

(provided of course one is an essentialist for whom there actually are such things) cannot exist in a

realm of being ontologically separate from the actual object, or what is the same, its appearance. In

other words, there is a clear sense in which essences – which we will come to see represents the

“in-itself” character of objects – have to appear with their corresponding appearances, and so the

important thought, even if it is not made explicit, is that things in themselves cannot in any way

exist “above,” “beyond,” or even “behind” the realm of appearances as they are sometimes said to

do on the more robust metaphysical views of the TD. I first explain what this criticism consists in

by drawing on the various sections of the Hegelian corpus which are relevant in this context,

starting, of course, with SL, after which I will then consider a particular dialectical progression in

PS which is meant to illustrate the various problems any metaphysics faces insofar as it does not

abide by the principle that essences must appear.

In the first place, inasmuch as we take the term “essences” as a synonym for an empirical

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object's inherent or “in itself” nature, we thereby arrive at the idea, fundamental to Hegel's critique

of the thing in itself, that we cannot posit an appearance of something without in turn positing that

thing as it is “in-itself,” viz., the thing in itself. For, if an essence is nothing over and above the “in-

itself” aspect of things, how things are intrinsically or “in-themselves,” and if things cannot appear

without their essences, then it follows that things cannot appear without the properties comprising

their “in-itself” character, which is to say independently of the way in which they really or

intrinsically are. To claim that essences must appear, in other words, is essentially to claim that the

“in-itself” aspect of things must appear, that things in themselves and appearances cannot exist in

separate ontological realms of being, but that they must exist in the same ontological realm of

being. In Section II of Book 2 of the “Doctrine of Essence” in SL, Hegel says:

Essence must appear. Being is the absolute abstraction; this negativity is not something external to it, but being is rather being, and nothing but being, only as this absolute negativity. Because of this negativity, being is only as self-sublating being and is essence. But, conversely, essence as simple self-equality is likewise being. The doctrine of being contains the first proposition, “being is essence.” The second proposition, “essence is being,” constitutes the content of the first section of the doctrine of essence. But this being into which essence makes itself is essential being, concrete existence, a being which has come forth out of negativity and inwardness. Thus essence appears.242

And its corresponding passage in EL:

Essence must appear. Its inward shining is the sublating of itself into immediacy, which as inward reflection is subsistence (matter) as well as form, reflection-into-another, subsistence sublating itself. Shining is the determination, in virtue of which essence is not being, but essence, and the developed shining is [shining-forth or] appearance. Essence therefore is not behind or beyond appearance, but since it is the essence that exists, existence is appearance.243

Although the underlying meaning and import of this passage is that appearances cannot “appear”

independently of their corresponding essences, Hegel leaves it unexplained just how he arrived at

this conclusion. Nevertheless, this passage is still important since it provides us with the most

fundamental aspects of Hegel's argument on this front. In the first place, the nature of (empirical)

things is such that they contain within themselves two mutually essential moments or aspects: first,

the moment of “being;” and second, the moment of “essence.” Taking the former, insofar as things

can be said to exist, those things contain within themselves “being” not in the empty, abstract sense

or form of “pure being” with which he opens his derivation of the categories in SL, but rather in the

concrete, more determinate form of that which appears, or simply “is.” And taking the latter, once

again, insofar as things exist, those things contain within themselves “essence” for the simple

242 SL, 11.323. 243 EL, §131, 199.

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reason that it is in the essential nature of a thing to appear, to be determinate, and thus to exist. The

logical result of this argument, then, is that a thing's essential, “in itself” nature and its concretely

appearing nature go hand-in-hand, and the consequent thought is that the essence of things and the

appearance of things cannot be so neatly separated into contrasting moments of one and the same

entity, each of which exists in its own ontologically separate realm of being as it were.

Yet, one could still ask why this is the case; why are essences necessarily made manifest in

the very appearances they are essences of? That is to say, why do essences have to be made

manifest in the phenomenal-empirical realm of appearances, and not exist in some super-sensible

realm over and above the empirical? In order to answer this, we must return to SL, particularly to

Hegel's explication of the process whereby the category (as well as the form of being) of essence

logically unfolds into the notion of seeming. This is important because, as we will soon discover,

the essences of things are ultimately nothing other than how those things “seem” (i.e., appear) to be.

And, it is to the SL that we must now turn.

The starting-point of the logical transition from the category of essence to that of appearance

(or “seeming”) can only be essence itself. As Houlgate reminds us,244 the first noteworthy aspect of

the category of essence in SL is that it is not to be understood in the traditional sense as the intrinsic

nature of a thing which somehow exists behind or beyond that thing, or even as a substrate

underlying that thing as its metaphysical “(Grund);” instead, it is nothing but the sphere of non-

immediacy as such. The simple explanation for this is that essences are not things which are

immediately given to us in the way in which the things themselves are. Essences can only be

grasped by means of thought: for it is only by means of a process whereby we attend to the thing

itself and abstract from that thing its putatively unessential properties from its essential ones that we

can arrive at that thing's essential nature or essence. This suggests that essences are not immediately

given to us like the actual things are; they have to be deduced by means of a process of thought, and

are thus mediated by (or there by virtue of) thought itself. As I take it, that is why the sphere of

essence, for Hegel, is the sphere of non-immediacy: the essence of a thing is something radically

different from, and thus thoroughly opposed to, the manner in which that thing immediately

presents itself to be.

More to the important point, however, since essence is the truth of being,245 and since the

truth of essence is, as we have seen, non-immediacy, the immediacy which being exhibits can only

be an apparent or “seeming” immediacy mainly because being cannot really be immediate being

after all. Or, as Houlgate puts it, “once we understand the essence of something to be what it truly 244 See Stephen Houlgate, “Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel's Science of Logic,” in Stephen Houlgate and

Michael Baur, eds., A Companion to Hegel (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), 139-159, 141. 245 See, for example, SL, 11.241.

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is, we have to consider the immediate characteristics of the thing, that are at variance with that

essence, to be what the thing merely seems to be.”246 Thus, we have two mutually-opposed aspects

of being: first, the non-immediate (or simply mediated) realm of essences, and second, the realm of

illusory immediacy, or “Schein”. Yet, there is a certain sense in which this distinction is misleading,

for it paints an ultimately dualistic picture of essences and illusory immediacy (or seeming)

whereby the former is utterly divorced from the latter, and vice versa, as its opposite, as its other.

The point is simply that, as Houlgate says, essences are “understood to be this, rather than that – to

be the essence, rather than what is merely illusory: but that means that the essence proves to be

immediately what it is, rather than what it is not.”247 But this is to regard the realm of essence as the

realm of immediacy, for what we are ultimately saying is that essences are “immediately” distinct

from their illusory immediacy, which thereby confers on the realm of utter non-immediacy,

immediacy as such. What this suggests, in other words, is that there really aren't two aspects of

being after all, viz., that the essence of being is utterly distinct from being's illusory immediacy,

“for in the sphere of essence (as it arises from the doctrine of being) there is no simple

immediacy.”248 As such, being's illusory immediacy should not be taken as something different from

the essence of being, standing over against it as its other. Rather being's illusory immediacy or mere

seeming is essentially nothing but an emanation of the very essence of being itself249 – it is how

essence projects itself to be; the immediate characteristics of a thing which we take to be at

variance with that thing's essential characteristics, its essence, can only be properly understood

when we take it to be nothing but the way in which that thing's essence appears to us to be. As

Hegel himself says, “shine is essence itself in the determinateness of being.”250

But, what are the full implications of this view, of the logical transition whereby being's

essence has shown itself to be nothing other than shine (or “appearance”) itself? As I see it, the

fundamental implication here is that the category of essence is thus no longer to be understood as

something different from, or opposed to, the category of shine (viz., being's illusory immediacy)

itself; essence is shine itself, or more precisely the very process of seeming as such, as Houlgate

points out.

Essence as it is in truth, therefore, is not simply distinct from seeming, nor is it that

246 Stephen Houlgate, “Hegel's Critique of Foundationalism in the 'Doctrine of Essence,' in Anthony O'Hear, ed., German Philosophy Since Kant, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 44 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35.

247 Houlgate, “Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel's Science of Logic,” in Houlgate and Baur, eds., A Companion to Hegel, 141.

248 Ibid. 249 For an interesting, and certainly helpful, illustration of how being's illusory immediacy comes to be nothing but an

emanation of the essence of being itself, see Houlgate's account of the ferocious man in Houlgate, “Hegel's Critique of Foundationalism in the 'Doctrine of Essence,' in O'Hear, ed., German Philosophy Since Kant, 35-36.

250 SL, 11.248. “Shine” or “Schein” can also be rendered as appearance.

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which seems: it is the very process of seeming – the process of seeming to be immediate being and of seeming to be distinct from such seeming immediacy. That is to say, essence is the movement from one seeming to another, from seeming to seeming, or “the seeming of itself within itself (das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst).”251

What this passage conveys is exactly what we have been looking for up to this point, a very precise

explanation as to exactly how (and why) a thing's essential properties reveal themselves to be

nothing but the movement whereby those properties show themselves to be something other than

they are in reality. Essence thus must now be understood as the movement of seeming itself; and

this is exactly why, in encountering things as they merely appear to us, as they merely seem to us,

we thereby inevitably encounter those things as they really (in essence) are.

As brief as our discussion has been up to this point, it gives us a sense of why essences

cannot fail to be made manifest in the very objects they purport to be essences of. To recapitulate:

the sphere of essence logically mutates into, by means of its own accord, the sphere of illusory

immediacy, or shine itself; the implication being that the way in which we immediately take things

to be, the way in which things merely seem to be for us, can be nothing other than the way in which

those things actually (essentially) are. This is not to say that everything is as it appears to us; but it

is to say that the essences of things cannot be entirely hidden from us, and can be got at by means of

a process which stays firmly within the realm of the empirical. For, as we saw above, the sphere of

illusory immediacy, which is oftentimes taken to stand over and against the realm of essence, is

nothing but a projection of the realm of essence itself; being's illusory immediacy and character

thus prove to be nothing but an emanation of being's inherent or “in-itself” nature, and so the result

of this is that the traditional dualism between seeming and essence is thereby dissolved. But, before

I bring our discussion of the essence criticism to a close, I want to turn to a particular dialectical

progression in PS which illustrates both the epistemological as well as metaphysical problems

arising from a metaphysics according to which essences do not appear. To put it very simply, we

will now examine one example of a metaphysical view which takes the essences of things to be

utterly different from the appearances of things, and so in this way necessarily posits the realm of

essences over and above the realm of appearances, or empirical reality as such. The discussion to

which I refer is the chapter on “Force and the Understanding” in PS.252

As I said, I think it is prudent at this time to flesh out exactly what happens when we fail to

take the idea of essences, as Hegel would say, as it has proven in truth to be; specifically I will 251 Houlgate, “Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel's Science of Logic,” in Houlgate and Baur, eds., A

Companion to Hegel, p. 141. 252 For a good discussion of the chapter on “Force and the Understanding” in PS, see Stern, Hegel and the

Phenomenology of Spirit, 59-66; Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology, 34-46; and Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel, 353-376.

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explain why Hegel thought that Kant's ontological dualism between essence and appearance was

fundamentally incorrect. As we will see, the short answer is simply that the dualism, as Kant

understands it, ultimately fails, for Hegel, to capture the implicit immanent thrust of the distinction

between essences and appearances – or what, for our purposes, can also be understood as

“Schein.”As I understand him, Hegel is simply saying, as we have already touched upon, that we

cannot attempt to properly understand a thing simply by identifying or grasping its essential nature

in abstraction from its concretely appearing nature. Alternatively, the thought is that we cannot

detach a thing's putative essence, its intrinsic nature (as Kant presumably had done in formulating

his doctrine of things in themselves) from its outward appearance, or rather the way in which it

presents itself to be. And, from what we have seen thus far, the inherent nature of the thing (viz., its

truth) is to appear, to be determinate, and ultimately, to exist – as the appropriate stages of SL have

demonstrated. So the important point is that, contra Kant's view that there is a distinct, super-

sensible realm of things, that is, understood in terms of essences, existing somehow “behind” or

“beyond” the ordinary, phenomenal realm of appearances, and which supposedly acts as these

things' intrinsic natures, Hegel's view is such that things' intrinsic natures have to be manifested

empirically in the ordinary, phenomenal realm of things. The implication here is that, by virtue of

the doctrine that “essences must appear,” things realize their intrinsic natures only by means of a

process whereby they mutate logically into empirical appearances, and thereby exist as those very

empirical appearances. In fact, we will see that, for Hegel, the very idea of an essence or intrinsic

nature considered in abstraction from the way in which it appears to be (its existence) is an entirely

empty thought. Since we have already considered Hegel's argument in its basic form, we must now

turn our attention to its finer details if we are to get a better understanding of it.

More to the basic point, however: how can we understand the notion of a pure essence, or an

essence considered in abstraction from its corresponding appearance? The fundamental point of our

analysis thus far is that the category of a pure essence mutates logically into the category of

appearances; simply put, the former entails the latter. But, due to the cryptic nature of Hegel's

arguments in SL, which leaves much unexplained, I will now turn to a particular discussion in PS so

as to flesh out in a far more comprehensive fashion some of the finer details of Hegel's argument to

the effect that essences must appear. What I am saying is that, in order to understand why essences

must appear, why the notion of an essence detached from that of appearances is so conceptually and

metaphysically problematic, we have to consider Hegel's discussion in PS dealing with the nature

of “force,” for if we understand exactly how and why ordinary consciousness in the shape of “force

and the understanding” gets mired in the difficulties it does in its respective chapter, it is much

easier for us to make sense of the inherent issues associated with the idea of an essence considered

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entirely apart from its appearance. Another way of putting this is simply to say that, by

understanding the logical transition in PS under the heading “force and the understanding,” we

thereby understand why essences must appear, simply because the problems confronting “force and

the understanding” arise when ordinary consciousness does not, in fact, heed the results of SL and

elsewhere that essences must appear.

But before we get into the finer details of Hegel's discussion of “force and the

understanding,” it is important to provide some context for this discussion by returning to the form

of consciousness preceding “force and the understanding,” that is, “perception.” We have already

seen that, in perception, ordinary consciousness is stuck within a common-sense view of things, or

what Stern, adopting the famous Sellarsian terminology, refers to as the “manifest-image,”253 as

well as the conceptual difficulties such a view encounters in its attempt to make sense of the world

and our relation to it. The pivotal move of ordinary consciousness, in the form of “perception,” is

clearly a move away from a common-sense world-view to a more scientific world-view, returning

to the terminology above, away from the “manifest-image” and thus towards the “scientific-image.”

But the problem with this move, with the move from “perception” to “force and the understanding”

is that, by moving towards a more scientific world-view encapsulated in the latter, ordinary

consciousness is not in any way capable of averting, or even alleviating, some of the major

problems it previously faced when it was in the form of “perception,” although, of course, the

problematic is not entirely the same. Just what this problematic is, and how the issues arise for

ordinary consciousness in the form of “force and the understanding” will be fleshed out shortly.

So, in moving from the “manifest-image” to the “scientific-image,” ordinary consciousness

is no longer confronted with the problematic associated with “perception” and its moments of the

“Also” and the “One.” Whereas in the moment of the “Also” (as we saw) ordinary consciousness is

led by its own immanent logic to posit an underlying unity – in order to account for the thing's unity

– of the thing's manifold properties in the form of a “One,” in the moment of the “One”

consciousness posits those manifold properties to account for that very plurality or an “Also.” This,

I take it, is what Hegel means when he says: “on one side, a universal medium of many subsistent

'matters,' and on the other side, a One reflected into itself, in which their independence is

extinguished … and what is posited is only their transition into one another.”254 But, the important

point isn't made until further on, when he says:

In other words, the 'matters' posited as independent directly pass over into their unity, and their unity directly unfolds its diversity, and this once again reduces itself to unity. But this movement is what is called Force. One of its moments, the dispersal

253 See Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, 60. 254 PS, 81.

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of the independent 'matters' in their [immediate] being, is the expression of Force; but Force, taken as that in which they have disappeared, is Force proper, Force which has been driven back into itself from its expression. First, however, the Force which is driven back into itself must express itself; and, secondly, it is still Force maintaining within itself in the expression, just as much as it is expression in this self-containedness.255

In this passage here, Hegel, first of all, identifies the movement of the independent matters from a

unity to a diversity, and contrariwise, ad infinitum, with the notion of a “force.” But, Hegel also

identifies each of these moments of force with a separate force itself: whilst the former movement

from a unity to a diversity is, I take it, force's expression, the latter movement from a diversity to a

unity is, on the other hand, force proper. Even though force manifests itself in these different,

mutually-opposed ways – what Hegel will come to call the “force soliciting,” and the “force

solicited” – Hegel's conclusion, in the end, is that force as such is the movement itself, not the mere

moments of such a movement: “Force is rather itself this universal medium in which the moments

subsist as 'matters;' … It exists, therefore, now as the medium of the unfolded 'matters.'”256

Although Hegel does not make it very clear how the interplay between these two mutually-

opposed forces leads to consciousness positing a single, underlying force as the ground of the realm

of appearances, that is exactly what consciousness does, for:

This true essence of Things has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks through this mediating play of Forces into the true background of Things … there now opens up above the sensuous world, which is the world of appearance, a supersensible world which henceforth is the true world, above the vanishing present world there opens up a permanent beyond; an in-itself which is the first, and therefore imperfect, appearance of Reason, or only the pure element in which the truth has its essence.257

Consciousness is therefore led, by virtue of the logical structure of the notion of force as such, to

posit a single, unifying force of the world of phenomenal appearances in the form of a super-

sensible (or transcendent) realm directly contrasted with the former as its essence. On this line of

interpretation, then, there are two ontological realms: a sensible realm, and a super-sensible realm,

the latter being the essence of the former. But, the problem, I take it, with this modern, scientific

world-view is that it putatively cannot explain the regularities inherent in the empirical,

phenomenal realm simply by appealing to universal laws alone: “Thus the realization of Force is at

the same time the loss of reality … It is empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and

255 PS, 81. 256 PS, 83. 257 PS, 86-88.

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positively the simple or unitary universal.”258 Another way of putting the point is to say that these

laws fail to explain empirical reality not simply because the realm of such laws is an empty

“beyond,” for Hegel, but, more importantly, because of the character of these laws themselves. For,

as “universal” laws of reason, their character is such that they seemingly cannot account for the

sheer particularity inherent in the world of sense.

But, what are we to do at this point; how can we escape the problematic associated with

modern science's attempt at explaining the particular by means of the universal alone? As we will

see in the course of PS, an exit-strategy opens up for proponents of the scientific world-view as

force mutates logically from the sheer emptiness of force as such to determinate force in the form of

specific natural laws like the laws of gravity, magnetism, planetary motion, etc … As a result, then,

there is no longer one, single, all-encompassing law functioning as the sole explanation of all of the

law-like regularities manifested in the natural world, but rather an indefinite number of determinate

laws playing very specific roles in the overall maintenance of the natural world. For example, the

law of gravity explains why bodies necessarily fall downwards rather than upwards, the law of

magnetism explains why like poles repel one another whereas opposite poles attract one another,

and the laws of planetary motion define and describe the movement of the heavenly planets around

the sun. The suggestion is that those sympathetic to the scientific world-view ultimately have no

need to fear that their preferred explanations are far too general, abstract, or simply empty to count

as cogent explanations of the law-like regularities among particular natural phenomena simply

because such accounts have now incorporated specific, determinate laws in order to explain what

most needs explaining: the empirical-causal relations which manifest themselves in the natural

world.

At the same time, however, although scientific theorists can rest assured that their account

can in fact explain how determinate, physical laws bind together the sheer wealth of natural

phenomena in a single, all-inclusive, all-embracing, empirical-causal system, such a world-view

still faces various issues, as Hegel notes when he says:

But this plurality is itself rather a defect; for it contradicts the principle of the Understanding for which, as consciousness of the simple inner world, the True is the implicitly universal unity. It must therefore let the many laws collapse into one law, just as, e.g., the law by which a stone falls, and the law by which the heavenly bodies move, have been grasped as one law. But when the laws thus coincide, they lose their specific character. The law becomes more and more superficial, and as a result what is found is, in fact, not the unity of these specific laws, but a law which leaves out their specific character; just as the one law which combines in itself the laws of falling terrestrial bodies and of the motions of the heavenly bodies, in fact expresses

258 PS, 86-88.

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neither law.259

Hegel goes on to suggest that, by incorporating ever-more determinate laws into its explanation of

the inner workings of the natural world and all of its various phenomena, the modern, scientific

program creates as many problems as it solves: for, in becoming more and more determinate, these

universal laws of reason thereby lose the sense in which they are “universal” laws as such. As a

matter of fact, this is exactly what prompts science's attempt to unify its laws into a single unified

theory, but, in doing so, such a program suffers yet again from its fare share of pitfalls. And, as I see

it, it is these conceptual pitfalls, arguably more so than the ones which we have considered thus far,

that constitute the foremost challenges to any putative attempt at a systematic unification of all of

the known laws of nature into a single, unified theory.

Furthermore, there is no shortage of problems with the modern, scientific paradigm of

subsuming all of the particular, determinate laws of nature under a single, all-encompassing law of

extreme generality. To start, a law of this sort is incredibly superficial, if not empty entirely, for

Hegel: “But when the laws thus coincide, they lose their specific character. The law becomes more

and more superficial, and as a result what is found is, in fact, not the unity of these specific laws,

but a law which leaves out their specific character.”260 Second, there is no longer any necessity in

these laws: that is, we cannot answer why certain laws obtain rather than others? As Hegel writes,

“But that definition does not contain the necessity of its existence; it exists, either because we find

it; i.e., its existence is not necessary at all, or else it exists through, or by means of, other Forces, i.e.

its necessity is an external necessity.”261 And, finally, it loses much of its explanatory force, since “it

is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so plain that, while it pretends to say

something different from what has already been said, really says nothing at all but only repeats the

same thing.”262 In this respect, then, I wholeheartedly agree with Stern's appropriation of the

inherent issues, from the perspective of the logical development of force as such, with any so-called

unified theory.263 As we come to see in the next few pages of PS, Hegel comes to refer to the issues

associated with the aforementioned modern scientific paradigm as the paradigm of the “inverted

world.”

As far as I understand it, the “inverted world” is the picture of reality that stems from

science's attempt to explain the law-like regularities inherent in the known, sensible world by

appealing to a super-sensible world of natural laws existing over and above the ordinary, empirical

259 PS, 91. 260 PS, 91. 261 PS, 93. 262 PS, 95. 263 See Stern, Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit, 63.

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world with which we are all intimately familiar. More importantly, though, by positing a second,

ontological world of mercurial laws and forces as the metaphysical ground (“Grund”) of the spatio-

temporal, empirical-causal world, consciousness is thereby forced to appeal to natural laws and

forces utterly opposed to the way in which they manifest themselves, and is, for just that reason,

problematic. As Hegel says himself:

what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. What in the law of the first is the north pole of the magnet is, in its other, supersensible in-itself [viz. in the earth], the south pole; but what is there south pole is here north pole. Similarly, what in the first law is the oxygen pole of electricity becomes in its other, supersensible essence, hydrogen pole; and conversely, what is there the hydrogen pole becomes here the oxygen pole. In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, according to the immediate law, the supreme satisfaction of the injured individuality.264

This, I think, captures the nature of the “inverted world” well enough. To sum up, natural

laws/forces have two mutually-opposed aspects or moments: first, how such laws manifest

themselves (i.e., their manifest-image) and second, how such laws are “in themselves” (in this case

their scientific-image). Despite the fact that he doesn't explicitly say it here, the underlying message

of the aforementioned passage is that, as I hinted at above, to appeal to the latter for the purposes of

explaining the former is highly problematic in light of the fact that such things have two radically-

opposed natures. Consider, for a moment, the phenomenon of falling bodies – Does it really make

sense to explain why all bodies necessarily fall downwards (rather than upwards) merely by

appealing to the law of gravitational force which states that “any two bodies attract each other with

a force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the

square of the distance between them?” With the introduction of the “inverted world” paradigm at

this point in PS, all Hegel is doing is expressing the rather commonsensical view, albeit in

extremely complicated prose, that it doesn't.

Remember that the fundamental point of the previous discussion of the “inverted world”

paradigm as Hegel presents it (or rather as it is elicited by the logical development of force as such)

in PS was simply to explicate the putative issues surrounding the notion of pure essences, viz.,

essences devoid of appearances. With that said, as long as we understand that notion in the light of

this particular section of PS, it becomes all the more intelligible. That is, Hegel's dialectic of the

nature of “force and the understanding,” specifically the “inverted world” paradox, illustrate just

what is wrong with the idea of an essence abstracted from the object of which it is supposed to be

an essence, and it is for that reason that I have considered it here. The underlying implication of our

analysis is that one could legitimately apply the very same charges against the notion of a pure

264 PS, 97.

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essence as one could apply against the notion of super-sensible forces existing in some sense over

and above the empirical-causal world of appearances (as encapsulated in the “inverted world”

paradigm). Just as super-sensible force as such, considered as the metaphysical ground (“Grund”)

of the natural world, is empty as an explanation of the law-like regularities which obtain in the

natural world, the notion of a pure essence is likewise empty as well, although it is empty for

somewhat different reasons.

Part 3: The Limit Criticism

The third and final criticism Hegel levelled against Kant's conception of things in

themselves, which manifests itself throughout Hegel's critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy,

is known as the “limit criticism,” and thus concerns the nature of metaphysical and/or

epistemological “limits.” More specifically, Hegel's fundamental claim is that, on the basis of the

nature of a limit of a thing, be it a metaphysical or an epistemological limit, the very idea of

postulating a limit to something – being a point beyond which we absolutely cannot proceed – is

unintelligible for the simple fact that we seemingly cannot put a limit in place without in the

process transcending it. In chapter 3, where we laid out the basic criticisms Hegel had with the

Critical philosophy, excluding those concerning things in themselves, we saw what role this

criticism plays in terms of the Critical methodology and epistemology. In particular, we saw that

Hegel's main claim was that it is inherently incoherent to postulate a limit to our knowledge – a

limit being a point beyond which our cognition cannot proceed – precisely because putting that

limit in place means transcending that limit. As I said above, we cannot put a limit in place without

in the process transcending that limit. And the situation is no different here within the context of

Hegel's critique of things in themselves. To repeat: Hegel's argument consists in the idea that there

is something inherently problematic (if not incoherent) in positing a limit to our knowledge – in this

case, the limit is understood to be things in themselves – if we are unable to transcend that limit, as

the very idea of a limit as such implies transcendence.

So, in my attempt to explore the limit criticism in the final stages of this chapter, my concern

is exclusively with how it relates to Hegel's critique of the Kantian concept of things in themselves,

not with how it relates to the Critical methodology or epistemology in general, and in order to

accomplish this, I will draw on Hegel's thoughts on the nature of limits as such, and in particular

why a limit implies transcendence.

The important question is: what is it about a “limit” that prohibits us from putting it in place

without thereby transcending it? What is it about the idea of the thing in itself acting as this putative

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“limit” to our cognition that is ultimately so problematic, for Hegel? In EL, among other places,

Hegel gives us a glimpse into his thinking when he says:

Hence, it is the supreme inconsistency to admit, on the one hand, that the understanding is cognizant only of appearances, and to assert, on the other, that this cognition is something absolute – by saying: cognition cannot go any further, this is the natural, absolute restriction of human knowing … Something is only known, or even felt, to be a restriction, or a defect, if one is at the same time beyond it.265

Considered in isolation, this passage alone corroborates much of what we have been saying, which

is that Kant never could have established the notion of things in themselves as the determinate limit

of our cognition without thereby going beyond it if he was ever to know that they in fact represent

the absolute epistemic limit of our cognitive faculties, that is, the point at which our cognition

cannot any longer be said to penetrate into the inner recesses of reality, identifying and making

sense of what ultimately exists. After he makes the aforementioned remarks, Hegel essentially goes

on to reiterate the very same point by claiming:

It is only lack of consciousness, therefore, if we do not see that it is precisely the designation of something as finite or restricted that contains the proof of the actual presence of the Infinite, or Unrestricted, and that there can be no knowledge of limit unless the Unlimited is on this side within consciousness.266

Granted that he does not make explicit reference here to things in themselves as the determinate

limit of our cognition, but rather to the “Infinite,” the “Absolute Idea,” still, the underlying message

has not changed. In order to know that we cannot gain access to the “Infinite,” the “Absolute Idea,”

we would have to reach the exact point at which the “Absolute” begins and our knowledge of

empirical reality ends, at which point we would then be observing the scope of human knowledge

as a whole, where it begins, and where it ends. In this case, the problem is that we would thereby be

violating the sense in which that limit (i.e., things in themselves) really is the absolute limit of our

cognition, the point beyond which our cognition absolutely cannot proceed. This argument stems

from the rather commonsensical notion that, if a limit really is a limit of something, then we

shouldn't be able to go beyond it in any sense at all; if we could proceed beyond it, however, then

one might naturally say that that limit, whatever it may be, really isn't a limit to anything after all.

So, the important implication here is that, if things in themselves really are the determinate limit of

our cognition, as Kant thought they were, it follows that we wouldn't be able to go beyond them in

any sense at all. Consequently, if, as Hegel contends, we couldn't set a limit without going beyond

that limit, then the very idea of a limit of something, and thus the very idea of things in themselves

as that limit, is somehow internally incoherent. According to this line of argument, then, the entire

265 EL, §60, p. 105. 266 EL, §60, p. 106.

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Critical program of attempting to set limits to our cognition in the form of things in themselves

prior to any investigation into the nature of reality as such thus founders from the outset, in Hegel's

eyes, since the very idea of an investigation in terms of establishing limits to our cognition is

fundamentally contradictory.

Yet, I think a bit of fleshing out is in order here, for I have not yet explained exactly why the

Critical program, especially in connection with Hegel's thoughts on the nature of limits, is

inherently contradictory. In other words, we have already seen that Hegel thinks it is impossible for

us to establish a limit to something without in the process going beyond it, and why this is

problematic, but we have not yet explored any of Hegel's arguments to this effect, to the effect that

the nature of a limit logically entails transcendence. In light of this, we must now devote ourselves

to precisely that task.

For one thing, one can understand a limit, Hegel suggests, as a restriction: if something is

limited, it is also restricted as the former logically entails the latter, that is, a limit necessarily

entails a restriction. Further, as Hegel makes clear in the following passage, a restriction can only

be determined as a restriction from without, so to speak, or in comparison with something that is

not so restricted. He says:

For a determinateness, a limit, is determined as restriction only in opposition to its other in general, that is, in opposition to that which is without its restriction; the other of a restriction is precisely the beyond with respect to it. Stone, metal, do not transcend their restriction, for the simple reason that the restriction is not a restriction for them.267

One can readily see that this passage doesn't offer us much in the way of a new, original answer to

the question posed above; it merely restates a Hegelian theme that had manifested itself earlier, i.e.,

that we cannot set a limit or determine something as restricted without presupposing that which is

without restriction, in this case the infinite, or what is the same, the unrestricted. But the clue to

understanding the finer points of these arguments in this context lies in the final sentence of the

passage above, where Hegel first draws upon the example of the stone in order to flesh out, I think,

exactly what he is driving at.

As I have said, the key to understanding the passage quoted above, especially of how we

can make sense of the thought that a restriction can only be determined as such in relation to what

is not restricted, is by focusing on Hegel's example of the stone noted there. Despite the

uninformative nature of the final sentence of the passage noted above, where Hegel rather

obscurely notes that a stone or a metal does not transcend their restriction – which he fails to

identify – for it is not a restriction per se for them, he returns to the case of the stone further on in

267 SL, 21.121.

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his analysis with the remark that, “a stone does not think, does not even feel, its determinateness is

not a restriction for it, that is, it is not in it a negation for the sensation, the representation, the

thought, and so on, which it does not have.”268 Hegel's message here is that the fact that a stone

cannot think, cannot feel, cannot represent, etc … is by no means a restriction from the perspective

of the stone itself simply because stones do not have any of these potentialities; only the failure to

actualize one's potentialities can be construed as a deficiency, a lack, and thus a restriction, for

Hegel, and since none of the aforementioned abilities can be included under a stone's potentialities,

its failure to actualize them makes no difference. Contrariwise, however, if something that has these

potentialities, for example, sentient creatures who think, feel, represent, etc … suddenly, and for

whatever reason, lost them, such a thing would now prove deficient in the respect that it cannot

actualize one of a number of its potentialities, potentialities it formerly had. Hegel reaffirms this

point when he further remarks that “being held fixed to one place is a restriction for a human being,

but not for a plant,”269 for unlike human beings, plants are of course essentially stationary

organisms; so the fact that the plant cannot be anything other than a stationary organism proves

inconsequential whereas, on the contrary, the human being, which is clearly a non-stationary

organism, would consider being held fixed to one place a restriction, a clear-cut limitation of one's

powers, since it has the potential to do otherwise. That, as I take it, explains why Hegel thinks that,

to claim that something is limited or restricted in some respect entails presupposing what is

unlimited or unrestricted in that very respect. Now we know why Hegel thought that the nature of

the Critical program of specifying, defining, or locating the limits of our cognition in the form of

things in themselves was inherently so problematic.

Up to this point, we have examined Hegel's arguments on the problematic nature of limits,

on how the nature of a limit as such implies transcendence in some form or another, and what this

means for Kant's claim that our cognition is necessarily limited. With respect to why the nature of a

limit implies transcendence, we saw that one of Hegel's basic claims is that a limit is a restriction,

and a restriction can only be a restriction for something only insofar as that thing is capable of not

being restricted; being held fixed to one place, for example, is only a restriction for a human being,

not for a plant, because the human being, under ordinary circumstances and conditions, can move

about, and is not usually restricted in this way. It is only a restriction for the human being, as we

saw, because, by virtue of its being held fixed to one place, the human being is unable to actualize a

potentiality it would otherwise normally have, whereas in the case of the plant, however, no such

potentiality is failing to be actualized in this instance, and so it cannot be said to be restricted in the

268 SL, 21.121. 269 SL, 21.122-21.123.

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way that a human being would be under similar conditions. As we will shortly see, this is not the

only reason the nature of a limit implies transcendence, for Hegel; it is not just that the nature of a

limit as such necessarily entails transcendence, it is that the nature of the finite necessarily entails

transcendence as well. The only way of adequately making sense of Hegel's claim that a limit

presupposes that which is not limited is to understand his claim to the effect that the finite, or

finitude as such, necessarily points beyond itself, and in this way necessarily participates in the

infinite, and in order to do this, we must return to SL, where Hegel explicitly outlines the process

by which the category (or determination of being) of finitude necessarily mutates into its opposite,

the category of infinitude.

The logical mutation of the category (as well as determination of being) of finitude into that

of infinitude is arguably one of the most pivotal – certainly one of the most well-known –

mutations in all of SL. In order to understand how this mutation occurs, we have to understand what

the category of finitude is and what it entails. In the very beginning of his account of the logical

transformation of the category of finitude in SL, Hegel responds to the question of what is the

nature of finitude as such by replying:

The finite has thus determined itself as connecting determination and limit; in this connection, the determination is the ought and the limit is the restriction. Thus the two are both moments of the finite, and therefore both themselves finite, the ought as well as the restriction … The restriction of the finite is not anything external, but the finite's own determination is rather also its restriction; and this restriction is both itself and the ought; it is that which is common to both, or rather that in which the two are identical.270

As I understand Hegel on this score, there are two essential, interrelated aspects or moments of the

category of finitude as such. These moments are: first, the ought, and second, the restriction.

Considering the former, finite things are what they are and nothing more than that. A tree is a tree

and, as a result, nothing more than a tree. Hegel even goes so far as to claim that it is in the intrinsic

nature of trees to manifest their inherent “tree-ness.” The implication here is that trees should (or

“ought”) to manifest their inherent “tree-ness.” One can then say that the moment of the “ought” of

every finite thing (or, more appropriately, for every something) is for it to manifest its inherent

nature. Now, considering the latter, recall that finite things not only are what they are but such

things can only be what they are. As the finite thing that it is, a tree is a tree; however, at the same

time, the tree is also not a rock or a stone, for instance. It is in this sense, then, that finite things are

limited. A finite thing can only be what it is, and as such, a finite thing cannot be what it is not;

finite things are thus restricted by virtue of their limits, viz., by virtue of what finite things are not.

270 SL, 21.119-21.120.

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This comprises the moment of every finite thing's “restriction.” Pursuing the example of the tree a

bit further, the moment of restriction within every tree is simply that a tree is only a tree, and not

something else like a rock or a stone.

But, what is the overall significance and import of these “moments” of the category of

finitude for its eventual mutation into the category of infinitude? In order to explain this, we shall

have to explicate further the category of finitude itself. For my part, the most basic characteristic or

feature of finitude is that finite things contain within themselves non-being or negation; in this way,

a finite thing's nature consists of negation. What this implies is the following:

the truth of this being [finite being] is (as in Latin) their finis, their end. The finite does not just alter, as the something in general does, but perishes, and its perishing is not just a mere possibility, as it might be without perishing. Rather, the being as such of finite things is to have the germ of this transgression in their in-itselfness: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death.271

So, by virtue of the fact that finite things come to negate themselves, and thus “propel themselves

beyond themselves,”272 it is in the intrinsic nature of finite things to perish, to come to an end, to die

out, etc. After all, as Hegel says, “the living die, and they do so simply because, insofar as they live,

they bear the germ of death within themselves.”273

Yet, the pertinent question here is what exactly happens when finite things perish, when

they cease-to-be, that is? The important thing to remember here, as Houlgate reminds us,274 is that,

in ceasing-to-be, the finite thing cannot cease-to-be altogether; it cannot pass over into sheer and

utter nothingness precisely because sheer and utter nothingness has already been proven to be

intrinsically unstable. As a result, then, what arises from the process whereby finite things cease-to-

be the finite things they currently are is merely another finite thing, albeit one that is altogether

different from that which ceased-to-be. Hegel explicitly confirms this when he remarks that: “So, in

going away and ceasing to be, the finite has not ceased; it has only become momentarily an other

finite which equally is, however, a going-away as a going-over into another finite, and so forth to

infinity.”275 As one can see, this passage is important for two reasons: first, it demonstrates that,

when a finite thing ceases to be, what it leaves within its wake is not sheer and utter nothing-ness,

as one might have supposed, but rather something finite in turn; second, as a result of its finite

character, the finite something which the first finite something left in its wake (by means of its own

perishing) perishes as well, thereby leaving another finite something within its wake in the same

manner as the first finite something did. One can see that, at least on the face of it, there is no 271 SL, 21.116-21.117. 272 SL, 21.116. 273 EL, §92Z, 149. 274 See Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 395. 275 SL, 21.123.

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putting a stop to this process, and for that reason, it is characterizable as an endless (i.e., infinite)

series of finite things leading to additional finite things through the never-ending cycle of the

perishing of finitude as such.

Moreover, Hegel argues in no uncertain terms that this determination of the infinite is not

exactly what infinitude in truth ultimately proves to be; in other words, since it is clearly an

underdetermination of the infinite, one may say (rightly), then, that this sense of the infinite is not

itself genuine infinity. According to Hegel's derivation of the category of infinity in SL, there is a

second way of understanding the nature of infinitude as such that turns out to be far more genuine

than the first. We have seen that, whenever a finite thing ceases-to-be, there is always something,

specifically a something in the form of an other, that is left behind in its wake. Furthermore, since

the process whereby finite things cease-to-be is of course an endless cycle in itself, the something

(or other) which is left behind as a result of such a process is in turn characterizable as endless (or

infinite) as well, for the simple fact that it, for all intents and purposes, never actually ceases-to-be

itself. In the words of Houlgate, this second sense of infinity is:

simply the being that in the demise of any finite thing turns out not to come to an end after all … It is being that, in contrast to finite being, does not end but always is. Or to be more precise, it is being that constantly constitutes itself as unending in and through the demise of finite things.276

So, what this tells us, however implicitly, is that that which is left over from the original finite

something's ceasing-to-be is not an entirely new, self-subsistent thing in its own right; rather, it is a

mere aspect or moment of that original, finite thing's intrinsic being – its “other-ness.” This

explains why the original finite thing never completely ceases-to-be, since a part of it (i.e., its other)

does not cease-to-be at all. A piece of the finite remains when all else perishes, and so the finite is

in a very important sense never-ending or infinite itself. Thus, we see can how the category of the

finite leads of its own accord to that of the infinite.

Additionally, it is important to note that the conception of the infinite with which we have

been dealing so far did not arise as a result of the finite sublating itself into the infinite, but rather

from the very nature of finitude as such, to be more precise, it arose from what finitude logically

proved to be. At the same time, however, we cannot forget that the infinite is itself the negation of

the finite, its sheer “other,” and that is why, as Houlgate says, “in order to be explicitly in-finite,

infinity must set itself apart from finite being as something other than the latter.”277 All that

Houlgate is saying here is that the only way the infinite can truly function as the negation or “non-

being” of the finite is for it to stand over and above, and thus opposed to, the finite as its beyond or

276 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 398. 277 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 404.

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limit. Hegel himself says as much when he stipulates that:

The infinite is in this way burdened with the opposition to the finite, and this finite, as an other, remains a real existence even though in its being-in-itself, in the infinite, it is at the same time posited as sublated; this infinite is that which is not finite – a being in the determinateness of negation. Contrasted with the finite, with the series of existent determinacies, of realities, the infinite is indeterminate emptiness, the beyond of the finite, whose being-in-itself is not in its existence (which is something determinate).278

In this way, then, the infinite comes to the fore since it is the sublation of the finite after all. In other

words, since the finite necessarily points beyond itself to the infinite, that is, to its “in-itself” or its

“ought,” the finite cannot but sublate itself, thereby transforming itself into the infinite in the

process.

This leads to Hegel's famous conception of the “bad infinite.” Insofar as the infinite is

understood as the “non-being” or negation of the finite, the infinite stands over against the finite as

its “other,” and is thereby limited by that “other” as its opposite. Moreover, insofar as the infinite is

limited by the finite, the infinite loses the sense in which it is “in-finite” per se,considering that the

nature of infinite being is such that it cannot be limited or bounded by anything else, including, of

course, the finite. After all, we have already seen that infinitude as such consists of nothing other

than endless, unlimited being; and this explains why Hegel refers to this type of infinity as “bad.”

As I intimated earlier, it is “bad” (or “spurious”) since it fails to encompass the finite within itself,

and so is not completely limit-less or endless as infinity in truth has revealed itself to be. As such,

this conception of infinity can at best be described as that of a “finite-infinity,” and ultimately, it

isn't exactly “in-finite” at all.

Our situation at this point is such that, while the category of the finite passes over into that

of infinity, the category of infinity in turn passes over into that of the finite as well. Considering the

former, we saw that the finite undergoes a process in which it ceases-to-be by becoming an “other,”

in particular, another finite thing. Since this is essentially an infinite process in that every single

finite thing undergoes it – whether in the form of the original finite something or its “other” which

it generates – there is always something left behind in the process (in the form of an “other”). Just

as the process is infinite (since, after all, it has no end), that which is left behind in the process is

itself infinite as well, as there is always something there in the indeterminate form of an “other.”

Considering the latter, the infinite, insofar as it is truly “in-finite,” necessarily stands opposed to the

finite as its “other,” limiting the finite in such a way that the infinite can neither encompass it nor

encroach upon it in any way. As such, it is not real infinity at all, only a finite form of infinity. So,

278 SL, 21.126-21.127.

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with that said, we have now come full-circle with respect to the category finitude as such.

So, what this examination ultimately demonstrates is that we are once again caught in a

vicious cycle: inasmuch as the finite is finite, the finite is in truth infinite; by contrast, inasmuch as

the infinite is infinite, the infinite is in truth finite. It is this alternation of the categories of the finite

and the infinite that Hegel (among other things) explicitly refers to as the “tedious” or

“monotonous” infinity since it is a putatively inescapable process – or, as we will see, a progress –

that does not end. Yet, there is an exit-strategy lurking in the background here, and it is simply a

matter of locating it within the process itself. In fact, we have already stumbled upon a putative

exit-strategy when we mentioned that implicit within the finite is the infinite, and vice versa. That

is, when properly understood, there is a prima facie unity of the finite and the infinite. Hegel writes:

In each, therefore, there is the determinateness of the other … neither can be posited and grasped without the other, the infinite without the finite, the finite without the infinite. In saying what the infinite is, namely the negation of the finite, the finite itself is said also; it cannot be avoided in the determination of the infinite. One need only know what is being said in order to find the determination of the finite in the infinite. Regarding the infinite, it is readily conceded that it is the null; this very nothingness is however the infinite from which it is inseparable. – Understood in this way, they may seem to be taken according to the way each refers to its other.279

Additionally, further on in SL Hegel summarizes his view as follows:

finitude is only as a transcending of itself; it is therefore within it that the infinite, the other of itself, is contained. Similarly, the infinite is only as the transcending of the finite; it therefore contains its other essentially, and it is thus within it that it is the other of itself. The finite is not sublated by the infinite as by a power present outside it; its infinity consists rather in sublating itself.280

In reference to these passages, the point is that the implicit logical truth of the finite (as well as the

infinite) is its opposite, its “other,” and so the two are in a very important sense inseparable from

one another. And that is, as I take it, what in the main constitutes the unity of the finite and the

infinite. In a very similar way, Houlgate reinforces the point that the fundamental import of the

unity of the finite and the infinite is just their inseparability from one another when he asserts that

“to the extent that each forms an intrinsic part of and so is united with its other, it can no longer be

conceived as other than its other at all.”281

More needs to be said about such unity, particularly about how it arises from two things so

putatively different as the finite and the infinite. As we saw, although the finite is implicit within the

infinite, and the infinite within the finite, I think it safe to say we still need to say a little more here.

279 SL, 21.131. 280 SL, 21.133. 281 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 417.

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To this end, the unity of the finite and the infinite refers to the idea that, through an endless process

of mutual sublation, the determinations of the finite and the infinite “flip-over,” or rather “turn-

into,” their opposites: the finite negates itself and flips-over into the infinite, and reverse-wise, the

infinite negates itself and flips-over into the finite. Now, if the reader isn't entirely clear on this

point, on how such a process actually occurs, the following passage should prove immensely

helpful in that respect.

The finite comes first; then there is the transcending of it, and this negative, or this beyond of the finite, is the infinite; third, this negation is transcended in turn, a new limit comes up, a finite again. – This is the complete, self-enclosing movement that has arrived at that which made the beginning; what emerges is the same as that from which the departure was made, that is, the finite is restored; the latter has therefore rejoined itself, in its beyond has only found itself again.282

Apparently, ordinary consciousness (or what Hegel calls the understanding) errs not just in the

sense that it fails to perceive within the first moment of infinity (that is, the “bad infinite”) an

implicit finitude, but also that the determinations of the finite and the infinite themselves are but

moments of a putatively endless process – what Hegel calls “the progress to infinity.” To quote

Hegel: “the two occur in this progression only as moments of a whole.”283 What this means is that

each of these logical transitions, from the finite to the infinite, and vice versa, are merely

independent logical stages in a larger, more complex progress to true infinity.

But, the important question is: how does this “progress to infinity,” as Hegel calls it,

constitute what is truly infinite, that is, what infinity in truth logically consists in? As I see it, the

reason this “progress to infinity” really is the implicit logical truth of the finite (as well as the

infinite for that matter) is that it is the process whereby the finite and the infinite lose their

independent identities by becoming moments of an infinite process of which such determinations

are merely a part. Additionally, it is important to remember that this progress isn't comparable to the

conception of the “spurious infinite” for, as Houlgate says, it is “the movement in which being

always unites with itself and because it is not bounded in any way by the finite or the finite infinite

but includes them as its own moments. The true infinite is simply the process of always-relating-to-

self to which finitude itself gives rise.”284 In essence, then, the “progress to infinity” is nothing over

and above the process whereby being (in the mutually-opposed moments of the finite and infinite)

relates to, and ultimately unites with, one another, assuming an entirely new logical shape or

identity in the process.

To conclude, the issue at the center of the previous discussion has been why, from a purely

282 SL, 21.134. 283 SL, 21.135. 284 Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel's Logic, 424.

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Hegelian point-of-view that is, it is methodologically impossible to set a limit to something –

regardless of its content – without in the process transcending that very limit. And, what the

antecedently explicated (immanent) logical progression of the category of finitude suggests is that

the very idea of a finite thing cannot be understood independent of, apart from, or without reference

to, what stands opposed to it as its logical opposite or “other,” i.e., the infinite. So, for Hegel, it is

not only a matter that it is methodologically and epistemologically problematic to set a limit

without presupposing some form of cognition of what lies beyond that limit, such as the infinite or

unlimited, for example, but the nature of finitude is such that every individual finite thing

necessarily points to, or rather participates in, the infinite or unlimited itself. As we saw, the

implication here is that the very concept (or rather category) of finitude logically entails the infinite;

that is to say, what finitude in truth turns out to be is not something that stands over against, or

opposed to, the infinite as its “other.” It is, rather, that which unites with its “other,” the infinite, in

the endless process whereby being “comes-to,” or “unites-with,” itself, so to speak.

Conclusion

In this chapter, our aim was to explore the three main criticisms, most of which were largely

metaphysical, Hegel had with respect to Kant's conception of things in themselves. These were, the

indeterminacy criticism, the essence criticism, and the limit criticism. In each of these cases,

moreover, my strategy consisted of beginning with a brief outline of each of these criticisms, what

they are as well as what they involve, after which I would then offer a more detailed account of

some of the arguments by which these criticisms, or in some cases claims, theses, or even

principles inherent to these criticisms, are derived. This was done in the hopes of offering a more

comprehensive account of the criticisms under consideration. With this general background of

Hegel's critique of things in themselves, we will now turn to the final chapter, where we will

examine each of these three criticisms in the light of the four main interpretations of Kantianism:

the ontological, the aspect, the intrinsic nature, and the methodological readings, beginning, as is

usual, with the ontological reading.

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Chapter 5: An Assessment of Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy:

Things in Themselves

Introduction

In the previous chapter, my aim was to set up Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical

philosophy, with particular emphasis on his criticisms of Kantian things in themselves, in a way that

would serve as an entrée to my ultimate assessment of these criticisms, which takes place here. To

recapitulate, there we saw that the three major criticisms Hegel levelled against the Kantian

conception of things in themselves include what I have termed as the indeterminacy criticism, the

essence criticism, and the limit criticism, respectively. Thus far, I have outlined these criticisms by

explaining what they are and how they might be understood within the context of Hegel's dialectical

philosophy, but I have not offered any detailed assessment of them at this point. Needless to say, it

is now time to turn to just that assessment. So, with this background of Hegel's criticisms of things

in themselves, I will now assess the three major criticisms Hegel had with the Kantian conception

of things as they are in themselves in the light of (what I have identified as) the four main

interpretations of Kantian idealism: the ontological reading, the two-aspect reading, the intrinsic

nature reading, and the methodological reading. But let me be clear: I am not concerned with

whether or not Hegel's arguments on any of these matters are sound; I am assuming, for the sake of

argument, that they are. My fundamental concern is just with whether his arguments against the

notion of things in themselves can be said to apply to Kant's “actual” views on the matter, to be

more precise, to the various ways in which the conception of things in themselves can be

understood, in which case Hegel's critique of things in themselves would constitute a major

stumbling-block for those (like Kant) who are committed to such things, be it metaphysical or

simply methodological.

This chapter, much like the last, is divided into three parts, each of which will consider a

different criticism and then examine this criticism on the basis of the four main readings of Kantian

idealism which I have already listed above, beginning with the indeterminacy criticism. Very

simply, I will see whether or not the particular criticism under consideration can legitimately be said

to have any force on each of the four interpretations of Kantian transcendental idealism, and it is to

that task that we must now turn. In each case, I start by very briefly re-examining the particular

criticism under consideration, before I assess its force in the light of the four transcendental

readings of Kantian idealism.

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Part 1: An Assessment of the Indeterminacy Criticism

As I noted above, before I assess the indeterminacy criticism from the various transcendental

perspectives, I very briefly re-examine the criticism under consideration, beginning with the

indeterminacy criticism. Very concisely, Hegel contends, as we saw in considerable detail in the previous chapter,

that Kant's notion of things in themselves is unintelligible as a concept for it is a concept of a thing

that is so abstract, and so far removed from anything of an ordinary experience, that it is altogether

empty; “they are as such nothing but empty abstractions void of truth,”285 as Hegel occasionally puts

it. The problem with this, and the reason why the concept of things in themselves effectively refers

to a non-entity, in Hegel's eyes, is that, since the thing in itself is such an abstract concept, a concept

of an intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial thing which bears absolutely no relation to

anything from our ordinary experience, Kant's concept of such things refers to an entity that cannot

in any wise exist. More specifically, it is because the thing in itself violates one of the fundamental

principles of Hegel's metaphysics, according to which being requires determinacy, that things in

themselves cannot exist; or, put differently, it is because the thing in itself denotes an indeterminate

object, viz., an object without any properties, that it cannot exist. Within the context of Hegel's

criticisms of things in themselves, this is how I have understood the indeterminacy criticism, and in

what follows, we will see what this criticism means when it is understood within the context of each

of the four readings of Kant's idealism, starting with the standard ontological reading.

Let's begin by briefly sketching some of the crucial details of the ontological reading. For

one thing, remember that, on a traditional ontological reading in the Jacobi-Van Cleve tradition,

Kant's TD is fundamentally metaphysical in import and significance in that it denotes a distinction

either between two discrete classes of object, or two ontologically-separate realms of being entirely

(thus the two-object and two-world significations). These classes of object or ontological realms of

being obviously represent appearances and things in themselves, the former being the spatio-

temporal objects of a possible experience that we can make sense of in terms of the a priori

categories of our understanding, the latter being those intrinsically non-spatio-temporal objects

which somehow exist independent of our empirical experience, and which, moreover, can neither be

made intelligible in terms of the forms of our sensibility nor in terms of the categories of our

understanding in the way that appearances, or phenomena, clearly can. On these traditional,

285 SL, 21.109.

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metaphysical views of Kant's TD, Kant remains committed (even if only in a weak sense) to the

existence of things in themselves, and licenses statements about such things, such as, for example,

the statement that the realm of things in themselves acts as the metaphysical “Grund” of our

experience in such a way that they can legitimately be said to contribute something to our

experience that neither the forms of our empirical intuition nor the categories of our understanding

can provide. In this way, our spatio-temporal representations “of” objects are in some important

sense representations “of” intrinsically non-spatio-temporal things in themselves; likewise,

appearances or phenomena are appearances or phenomena “of” noumena (things in themselves).

Even though I am sure to have neglected certain aspects of the ontological view of Kant's TD, our

aim has been to sketch the fundamentals of this view, its major themes, principles, and

characteristics, in order to set the stage for the remainder of our discussion of the indeterminacy

criticism in relation to this particular reading of Kant's idealism.

Seeing that we have sketched the fundamental themes of the ontological view of Kant's TD,

how it can best be understood and what it amounts to within the broader theoretical context of

Kant's transcendental idealism, we can now consider what Hegel's indeterminacy criticism might

mean on the basis of this view of Kant. To begin with, recall that the fundamental presupposition of

the indeterminacy criticism is that things in themselves are necessarily indeterminate. For, if things

in themselves are determinate after all, then they cannot be said to violate the Hegelian stricture that

being requires determinacy, with the result that, in postulating the conception of things in

themselves, Kant would not thereby be postulating anything that Hegel would find objectionable; he

would be postulating nothing more than an object which conforms to the fundamentals of Hegel's

metaphysics, in particular the notion that things must have properties if they are to exist. Obviously,

the easiest exit-strategy for proponents of the ontological view of the TD to take at this juncture is

thus to argue that their preferred conception of Kantian things in themselves does not in any way

violate the metaphysical principle that being requires determinacy. And I think they would have a

point, given that, on an ontological reading, things in themselves represent a discrete class of super-

sensible object with intrinsic, non-spatio-temporal characteristics, the important point being that

they are still determinate, they are still things with properties, however mysterious these non-spatio-

temporal, acategorial properties may be. Put differently, although, on an ontological view, things in

themselves are certainly devoid of the sorts of properties we ordinarily encounter in the objects of

our normal, everyday experience, things in themselves are nevertheless determinate for they are

said to be endowed with a distinct class of substantive non-spatio-temporal, non-categorial

characteristics, and the resulting upshot for the ontological theorist is simply that their model of

things in themselves can thereby be claimed to be immune from the indeterminacy charge. Contrary

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to Hegel's assumption, then, things in themselves are anything but indeterminate!

However, against this line of defense, it might be responded that the ontological enterprise

whereby things in themselves are understood to be determinate in some wholly mysterious, non-

spatio-temporal, acategorial, and non-substantive terms is entirely illegitimate, considering the fact

that things in themselves would thereby be made determinate in a way that is so far removed from

anything we might ordinarily experience that it's virtually unintelligible to us. How could we

possibly make sense of a form of determinacy that is inherently non-spatio-temporal, non-causal

and the like, when all we ever experience are intrinsically spatio-temporal objects of a possible

experience we comprehend in categorial terms? What would such a mercurial form of determinacy

as this look like, one might ask. These are all legitimate questions to pose, and this gives us reason

to question whether the ontological theorist's strategy of attempting to escape the indeterminacy

charge by appealing to a super-sensible, and thus highly mysterious, non-spatio-temporal, non-

causal and non-substantive form of determinacy is a viable one, given the paucity of evidence to

suggest that it is even possible, let alone that it's intelligible. In the end, I think we can all agree that

it seems to fall squarely on the shoulders of the ontological theorist to explain what his hypothetical

non-formal, non-categorial form of determinacy might entail, and since there is very little to suggest

that such an explanation is forthcoming, it is only reasonable to conclude with the Hegelian that the

Kantian's attempt at escaping the indeterminacy charge within the context of an ontological reading

of the TD has ultimately been proven fruitless.

Yet, what about the other metaphysical readings of Kantianism, namely, the two-aspect

reading and the intrinsic nature reading; does the indeterminacy criticism fare any better insofar as

it is assessed in the light of either a two-aspect or an intrinsic nature reading of Kant? Let's take the

aspect reading first. Again, in order to see whether the Kantian (in the form of the aspect theorist)

can putatively escape the indeterminacy criticism, I begin by sketching some of the general themes

and characteristics of this view, before I examine it on the basis of the indeterminacy charge.

In the very first chapter of this thesis, when I was initially formulating the major readings of

Kant's TD, one of the things we saw during my discussion of the aspect reading was that the aspect

reading emphasizes the underlying metaphysical character of Kantianism, and of Kant's TD in

particular – not surprising, when we consider that this is another metaphysical reading! It does this

not by claiming, in line with the traditional ontological reading, that the TD is meant to denote two

entirely different classes of thing or object, existing in some mysterious super-sensible reality of

we-know-not-what, but rather by claiming that the TD is a contrast between two different “aspects”

or sets of properties of one and the same entity. The aspect reading emphasizes the hidden

metaphysical dimension of Kant's TD by claiming that there is a sense, clearly intended by Kant, in

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which things in themselves are supposed to represent mind-independent reality, or the “Absolute”

for some. Evidently, there is a sense in which Kant intended the conception of things in themselves,

or more specifically, “things as they are in themselves,” to act as a philosophical correlate for

“things as they are intrinsically” (or “in-themselves”), and thus beyond all possible experience. In

fact, given that things in themselves are obviously things which are intrinsically non-spatio-

temporal for Kant, in saying that things in themselves correspond to mind-independent reality, the

aspect theorist is essentially saying that mind-independent reality is intrinsically non-spatio-

temporal, and non-categorial, among other things. Remember what Allais said:

Kant is committed to the claim that the things we cognise have, in addition to the way they appear to us, a nature that is independent of us, which we cannot cognise … He claims that things as they are in our experience are mind-dependent, and not metaphysically ultimate, and that they must be grounded in an aspect of reality that is entirely independent of our minds, but is unknowable.286

Within the context of our discussion of the indeterminacy charge in relation to the aspect reading of

Kant, the important point to take from this passage is that, despite any contemporary interpretations

to the contrary, Kant remains committed to the existence of something which lies beyond all

possible experience, and which is intrinsically non-formal, and non-categorial, and this “something”

takes the form of things as they are in themselves.

More to the important point, however, as a metaphysical view of Kant's idealism, the two-

aspect view posits things as they are in themselves for the purposes of explaining, in however an

obscure fashion, the nature of our experience. Hence, the crucial claim is that there is said to be a

way things are in themselves that accounts for the way things are as we experience them under the

forms of our empirical intuition and under the categories of our understanding; in this way, things in

themselves are taken as the “Grund” of our empirical experience on an aspect reading just as they

were taken as the “Grund” of our experience on an ordinary ontological reading, and this has the

very same advantages – for the Kantian of course – when it comes to the indeterminacy criticism.

For, as we saw earlier, the key to the ontological Kantian's success in averting the indeterminacy

charge was that its conception of things in themselves was able to retain a form, albeit a highly

mysterious form, of determinacy. If we take Kantian things in themselves to mean mind-

independent reality, reality as it intrinsically is outside of any cognitive imposition, both formal and

categorial, there is still a way things “are” from this perspective – the perspective of mind-

independent reality. Since this reading is without doubt metaphysical – as it in no wise denies the

existence of things as they are in themselves – Kant's doctrine of things in themselves is once again

286 Allais, “Transcendental Idealism and Metaphysics: Kant's Commitment to Things as They are In Themselves,” 2-3.

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said to be a conception which refers to a wholly determinate item, a determinate non-spatio-

temporal item, to be precise. The upshot for the aspect reading, then, is that its conception of things

in themselves does not violate the principle, which Hegel clearly adheres to, that being requires

determinacy. Kant's conception of things in themselves refers to something determinate, on this

reading, and the Hegelian's indeterminacy criticism can now be seen to be standing on very shaky

ground indeed.

However, be that as it may, just as there was cause for concern at this point for the

ontological theorist for whom things in themselves are entirely determinate, albeit in a non-spatio-

temporal sense, there is likewise cause for concern for the aspect theorist for whom things in

themselves are also determinate in this very same sense: for one could easily respond – just as one

did in the context of the ontological view in relation to this criticism – by claiming that, in

attempting to account for the determinacy of things in themselves without drawing on either the

forms of our intuition or on the categories of our understanding, the aspect theorist fails to provide a

cogent position with respect to the kind of determinacy such things seemingly have. He thus fails to

provide sufficient answers to the questions of how this form of determinacy – a determinacy which

is inherently non-spatio-temporal, and non-substantive – can be understood, as well as what it might

look like, and the consequent drawback for the aspect view and its supporters is that the form of

determinacy which their view seems to require is arguably unintelligible. The indeterminacy

criticism once again withstands the Kantian's counter-attack.

Having assessed the indeterminacy charge on the basis of the aspect view of Kant, we must

now turn to an assessment of the intrinsic nature view on this very same basis, the final

metaphysical reading of the TD. In the first place, in a way that is very similar to both the

ontological and the aspect readings' conceptions of things in themselves, the intrinsic nature

reading's conception of things in themselves refers to an existent item of some sort, even if we

cannot know exactly what sort that is, and more importantly, even if we cannot obtain any

knowledge of it; in this way, this reading aligns itself with both the ontological reading and the

aspect reading as metaphysical readings of the TD. In her book Kantian Humility, Rae Langton (the

leading intrinsic nature theorist) makes the claim that objects of sense (appearances or phenomena)

have certain substantive non-relational properties, features, or characteristics which constitutes their

intrinsic nature, and it is just these non-relational properties which we cannot know when it is

claimed that we cannot know things as they are in themselves. So, in other words, the inscrutability

thesis, that is, Kant's claim that we cannot know things as they are in themselves becomes, on an

intrinsic nature reading of the TD, the idea that we cannot know the intrinsic non-relational

properties of the objects which constitute our immanent experience. Ultimately, the intrinsic nature

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reading paints a relatively complex picture of the meaning of Kant's TD when we remember that

phenomenal appearances are the relational, causal properties of objects of sense, the very same

objects of sense, in fact, which have intrinsic natures which we cannot know. Furthermore, the

category of “substance/attribute” is incorporated into the intrinsic nature theorist's understanding of

things in themselves since substances are said to be things in themselves with intrinsic non-

relational properties, and this will have important ramifications when it comes to the indeterminacy

criticism, as we will now see.

Although we saw that the metaphysical readings of Kant's TD have been able to escape the

indeterminacy charge – the charge according to which things in themselves cannot exist in light of

their indeterminacy – since they posit wholly determinate things in themselves, we also saw that

these views nevertheless suffer in the end due to their patent inability to explain just what exactly

the form of determinacy things in themselves are said to have, a form of determinacy that does not

draw on either the a priori forms of our intuition or on the a priori categories of thought, ultimately

amounts to; they cannot explain how things as they are in themselves can be neither spatial, nor

temporal, nor even substantive, and yet somehow remain fully determinate. This explains our

conclusion, in each of the last two discussions, that this strategy is ultimately unsuccessful in

combating the thrust of the Hegelian's indeterminacy charge.

Yet, this is where it becomes clear that the intrinsic nature reading does not succumb to the

indeterminacy criticism in the way that the other metaphysical readings do. For, as I just said, unlike

both the ontological and the aspect reading, the intrinsic nature reading does draw on at least one of

the categories in its explanation of what exactly Kant's notion of things as they are in themselves

involves, and these are the categories of “substance/attribute” and the “relational/non-relational.”

Within the context of a discussion of the force of the indeterminacy criticism in the light of an

intrinsic nature reading of Kant, the upshot for the intrinsic nature theorist is that, by claiming that

things in themselves are substances with intrinsic non-relational properties, he or she is thereby

making sense of things in themselves, even if only implicitly, in a way that we can understand, viz.,

in terms of the category of substance. To put it simply, in equating things in themselves with

substances (and thus in terms of the category of “substance/attribute”), although the intrinsic nature

theorist violates the non-categorial nature of things in themselves (which we discussed in chapter

2), this has the advantage here of allowing the intrinsic nature reading to escape the way in which

the form of determinacy it requires in order to escape the indeterminacy charge is unintelligible.

The reason the other metaphysical readings couldn't explain how things in themselves could be non-

spatio-temporal and non-categorial, and yet somehow remain determinate, (and thus couldn't

ultimately avert the force of the indeterminacy charge) was that they did not draw on any of the

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categories; however, the intrinsic nature reading does just this, and the result is that this reading is

unique among metaphysical readings in that it is able to avert the indeterminacy charge. Hence,

Hegel's criticism does not stand up on this interpretation.

Since we have already discussed the extent to which the indeterminacy charge holds up on

any of the three major metaphysical readings of Kantianism, all there is left for us to do now is to

discuss the only remaining reading of Kant's idealism in this very same connection as well, the

methodological reading (which also just so happens to be the only formal reading) of Kant's TD. I

outline the methodological reading, and then consider whether the indeterminacy criticism can

withstand the critical scrutiny of a methodological theorist, for example.

We have already seen (in numerous connections) that, if we take a methodological view with

respect to Kantian things in themselves – which, as a merely formal reading of Kantian idealism,

does not posit a second super-sensible class of objects existing independent from our experience –

then there is no question that Kant's commitment to such things is a merely conceptual commitment

to a second way of considering the objects of our experience. For, on this line of interpretation,

there is only one class of objects, the spatio-temporal objects of our experience, and two ways these

objects can be considered: either “in-themselves” through reason, in which case they are taken as

transcendent objects lying beyond the field of a possible experience and which are inherently non-

spatio-temporal, and non-categorial, or as appearances, that is, as the phenomenal objects of sense

which they clearly are. Although we also saw that the former way of considering things can be

classified as illusory – since the objects of our experience really are spatial and temporal for Kant –

it is nevertheless valuable when it comes to evaluating the errors of past philosophers, especially the

errors of those traditional metaphysicians who assumed, without much reason, that we gain

knowledge of material reality simply by analyzing our pure a priori concepts alone (and thus by

means of our faculty of a pure reason alone). According to the methodological interpretation, then,

there are no things in themselves existing in some mysterious sense “behind” or “beyond” our

experience; there is just our experience, and the objects which constitute that experience: tables,

chairs, supernovas, and cell-phones, all of which conform to the forms of our intuition as well as to

the categories of thought. However brief my discussion of the methodological reading has been in

this connection, I nevertheless think it is sufficient for the task before us.

For, from what I have said above, it is clear that there is a very simple exit-strategy for the

methodological Kantian to pursue at this point against the Hegelian's indeterminacy charge.

Remember that, insofar as the indeterminacy charge was concerned, the central problem with things

in themselves was that they were said to exist without any outward characteristics, they were so

abstract and so far removed from our experience that they were empty concepts of our imagination.

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They violated the principle that, for something to exist it must be a determinate something, a

something with properties, a “this” rather than a “that” – a glass of water rather than a cup of coffee,

a house rather than a sky-scraper, an electron rather than a proton, and the like. Each of these things

have discernible properties which not only makes them what they are, but which makes them

things, period. And a property-less thing is a non-thing for Hegel, and this explains his misgivings

about postulating things with no (discernible) properties like things in themselves. But clearly the

methodological Kantian has the upper-hand at this point in the argument because, on a

methodological reading, there are no such things. There are no things (things in themselves) with

inherently non-spatio-temporal characteristics, and which are, for all intents and purposes,

indeterminate or property-less; there are only the objects of our experience, with their normal “run-

of-the-mill” spato-temporal, categorial properties, given to us in sensibility and accessible through

our understanding, and which are entirely determinate. Ultimately, the question becomes: how can

the methodological Kantian be said to violate the principle that being requires determinacy when he

or she never posits any outwardly indeterminate items? If there are no things in themselves, then

there is no problem of their potentially being indeterminate as there is nothing to be indeterminate.

Thus, the indeterminacy criticism fails.

Nonetheless, there may still seem to be a problem for the methodological theorist. For,

however objectionable Kant may have found the idea of positing a transcendent non-spatio-

temporal class of object on a methodological view, there is still on this account the hypothetical

possibility that such things could in fact exist. Remember that, on this view, they (i.e., things in

themselves) are problematic concepts, not incoherent concepts; they are concepts which are not

internally contradictory but which nevertheless cannot be verified in or through our experience. So,

in this way, the methodological Kantian leaves open the merely hypothetical possibility that things

in themselves exist, things which can be accessed by means of a pure intelligence, and in so doing,

the methodological Kantian thereby commits himself to a view of things in themselves which the

Hegelian would certainly not allow. In the SL, for example, Hegel is not just involved in category-

theory, he is involved in metaphysics as well. The SL is not just designed to show the logical

progression of the categories, – how one category, by means of its own inherent logic, transitions

into that of another – it is designed to show how the determinations of being as such, this time by

means of their own metaphysical structure, transition or mutate into other more complex

determinations of being, and how these complex determinations of being mutate into still more

complex determinations of being. With this in mind, what becomes clear from these progressions is

that there is no meaningful distinction between metaphysical possibility and logical possibility, for

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Hegel287 – the SL being an exercise in metaphysics just as much as it is an exercise in logic. Thus, if

the metaphysical-logical structure of an object, or of things generally, as outlined in SL, stipulates

that being requires determinacy, then this is not just a condition of the existence of the objects of

our experience, but rather a condition of the existence of objects in general. According to Hegelian

(but not to Kantian) metaphysics, then, determinacy is a necessary ontological condition of things in

general, and the important implication this has for the methodological theorist insofar as the

indeterminacy criticism is concerned is that his or her preferred position with respect to things in

themselves prima facie violates the principle that being requires determinacy since there

nevertheless remains, on this view, the merely hypothetical possibility that indeterminate things (in

themselves) may exist after all. Assuming that Hegel's arguments in SL are sound, the Hegelian

wins the day on this front to the extent that, in committing himself to the merely hypothetical

possibility that things in themselves, which would be manifestly indeterminate, could exist, the

methodological Kantian thereby commits himself to a view of things (in themselves) that violates

the principle that, to be is to be determinate, and in the process succumbs to the indeterminacy

charge.

As for whether the indeterminacy criticism holds up on the basis of the four major readings

of Kant's TD, the answer is yes, except, of course, on an intrinsic nature reading of it. In the case of

the ontological and the aspect readings, we saw that the fundamental problem was that these

readings couldn't explain the nature of an intrinsically non-spatio-temporal, acategorial type of

determinacy, the type of determinacy such views require if they are to escape the sense in which

they posit wholly indeterminate things (in themselves); they couldn't explain how things in

themselves could be both determinate and non-spatio-temporal, non-substantive, and so forth. For

this very reason, it was concluded that both these views do in fact succumb to the indeterminacy

charge to the extent that their preferred conception of things in themselves violates the principle that

287 See, also, EL, §143Z, 215-217, where Hegel rejects the thesis that possibility consists simply in thinkability when he states that: “Now, since any content can be brought into this form, providing only that it is separated from the relations in which it stands, even the most absurd and nonsensical suppositions can be considered possible. It is possible that the moon will fall on the earth this evening, for the moon is a body separate from the earth and therefore can fall downward just as easily as a stone that has been flung into the air; it is possible that the Sultan may become Pope, for he is a human being, and as such he can become a convert to Christianity, and then a priest, and so on. Now in all this talk of possibilities it is especially the principle of “grounding” that is applied in the way discussed earlier: according to this principle, anything for which a ground (or reason) can be specified is possible. The more uneducated a person is, the less he knows about the determinate relations in which the ob-jects that he is considering stand and the more inclined he tends to be to indulge in all manner of empty possibilities …” See, also, Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 282-283, where Taylor summarizes Hegel's argument from this passage by claiming that, for Hegel, “something can only be judged as really possible against some background of presumed reality; this is what makes a given outcome possible or impossible.” So, the important point to remember here is that, contra Kant, Hegel would not admit that either of the aforementioned scenarios, against the specific background of realities on they rest, is even “logically” possible. This, I believe, highlights exceptionally well the sense in which any putative distinction between metaphysical possibility on one hand, and logical possibility on the other, is, in Hegel's eyes, utterly empty.

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being requires determinacy. However, the reason that intrinsic nature views do not share the same

fate as their other metaphysical brethren is because they explain the nature of things in themselves

with the use of the category of “substance/attribute,” allowing them to avoid the way in which the

other two metaphysical views cannot make sense of the kind of determinacy metaphysical views

require in order to avoid the Hegelian's indeterminacy charge – the charge that things in themselves

are indeterminate and thus cannot exist. Moreover, in the case of the methodological reading, it was

shown that, in rejecting the existence of things in themselves, although the methodological theorist

does not outwardly posit the existence of a putatively indeterminate object in the way that, for

instance, both the ontological and the aspect theorists do, he or she still commits oneself to a view

of things that is manifestly un-Hegelian, in the sense that it runs counter to the Hegelian notion that

things must be determinate if they are to exist. It is now clear that Hegel's indeterminacy charge is

particularly well-equipped to deal with the Kantian's counter-attacks; but it remains to be seen

whether any of the other two Hegelian criticisms fare this well.

Part 2: An Assessment of the Essence Criticism

The second major issue Hegel sees with the Kantian idea of things in themselves can be

summarized in terms of the charge that essences must appear. I will of course be implementing the

very same tactic here to assess the extent to which the essence charge can be upheld on each of the

four major readings of Kantianism as I used earlier in connection with the indeterminacy charge in

this very same context. What this means is that I will be assessing the essence criticism in the light

of the various transcendental interpretations of Kantianism, starting, as always, with the three

primary metaphysical readings of the TD (the traditional ontological reading, the “two-aspect”

reading, and the intrinsic nature reading), and ending with the methodological reading. However, it

must be noted that I will not be spending as much time outlining each of these readings here

because doing so for a second (and even a third) time wouldn't be very prudent; I will only be

mentioning the important details of each of these views for the purposes of our discussions. I first

offer a brief outline of the essence criticism and then assess it on the basis of each of the various

readings of Kant's TD.

As I noted above, the crucial claim of the essence criticism is just that, if the essences of

things (whatever those may be) are to exist, they cannot be completely hidden from us; they must

manifest themselves in some way in our immanent experience. This is not to say that essences are

immediately given to us – atoms, for instance, are not immediately given in our experience of

objects, they must be got at empirically by means of those scientific practices and procedures most

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conducive to this type of investigation, which will include a considerable amount of theorizing; but

it is to say that essences cannot be entirely hidden from us in a separate ontological sphere of being.

The suggestion, then, is that the realm of essences cannot be anything other than the phenomenal

realm of appearances.

To start with, insofar as we take a straightforward ontological view of the TD, in which case

the TD is meant to contrast the spatio-temporal objects of our experience with a super-sensible class

of non-spatio-temporal object, it becomes clear that the essence charge has considerable force to it.

For, in outlining the details of the ontological view in chapter 1, we saw that the ontological view's

conception of things in themselves is such that the way things are for us is in some sense a product

of the way things are in themselves, and the consequent implication is that things in themselves

function as the metaphysical “Grund” of our immanent experience on these views. Our spatio-

temporal representations “of” objects, for instance, are in some mysterious sense ultimately spatio-

temporal representations “of” intrinsically non-spatio-temporal things in themselves; in this way,

things as they are in themselves give something to our experience that neither the forms of our

intuition nor the categories can. Now, exactly what this “something” is, and how the causal process

works by which things in themselves “contribute” something to our experience remains a mystery,

but there is no question that there is a causal connection between the two, that is, between our

representations of objects on one hand, and how these very same objects are “in themselves” on the

other. In fact, evidence of just this connection can be found in Jacobi's famous dilemma, for this is

exactly why Jacobi couldn't enter into the Kantian system without positing some form of noumenal

causation by means of things in themselves (or in his case, the transcendental object). In other

words, as an ontological theorist, Jacobi, as we saw earlier, was resigned to the fact that the thing in

itself acts as the “Grund” of our experience, and it is just this feature of the doctrine of things in

themselves as such which provoked much of his frustration when it came to the Kantian philosophy

in general.

But what is the problem with positing Kant's conception of things in themselves as the

“Grund” of our experience in this context? The problem, in short, is that, in so doing, the

ontological reading inevitably commits itself to the view that Kant's TD must be understood in

terms of a contrast between how things merely seem to be to us on one hand, and how things really

are in themselves on the other. If appearances are appearances “of” things in themselves, as they are

inevitably taken to be on an ontological reading of the TD, then it is only natural for one to take

things as they appear to us in the most pejorative sense to denote things as they merely seem to be

to us and things as they are in themselves to denote things as they really are. Since the ontological

view inevitably posits a second super-sensible class of object independent from those of our

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experience for the sole purpose of accounting for the determinate nature of that experience, albeit in

a highly mysterious and no doubt indirect sense, it underscores the greater ontological reality of the

realm of things in themselves in comparison with appearances in a way that has troubling results for

the ontological theorist when it comes to the essence charge.

Let me illustrate my point with the use of an example. Assuming that I am ontological

theorist for whom things in themselves represent a second class of object, if I wanted to derive the

essence of, say, the chair on which I now sit, it certainly wouldn't make much sense to appeal to

how the chair appears to me given that appearances are largely illusory. The chair as it appears to

me is not how the chair really is; for all we know, the former could be entirely different from the

latter, and as long as we keep this in mind, it becomes obvious that I would thus have to appeal to

how the chair is “in-itself” in order to derive its essence for this is where the real, rather than the

merely apparent, properties of the chair are located. My contention is that I could never acquire the

essence of the chair if I am never acquainted with the true nature of the chair as such, and the only

way of becoming acquainted with the true nature of the chair is to venture into the transcendent

realm of things in themselves. In this way, the essences of objects, on an ontological view of the

TD, are effectively thereby divorced from the appearances of those objects, and this presents us

with a view of essences which is downright incompatible with the Hegelian dictum that essences

must appear. By underscoring the greater ontological reality of things in themselves in comparison

with appearances, the ontological theorist is effectively constrained to endorse a view of essences

whereby essences are seen not to appear, violating the crux of the essence criticism as such.

Since we saw that the essence criticism has considerable force to it on a straightforwardly

ontological view of Kant, the pertinent question now becomes whether it also has the same amount

of force on an aspect view of Kant's TD. Additionally, we saw that, to take an aspect view of Kant's

TD, whereby Kant is said to remain committed to there being a way things are in themselves,

independent from our experience, which we cannot cognize, is inevitably to read Kant's TD in a

traditional metaphysical fashion, specifically it is to read the TD in terms of a correlate for the age-

old appearance/reality distinction, viz., between how things merely seem to be to us on one hand,

and how they really are “in themselves” on the other. This suggests that the TD is just as much the

“Grund” of our experience on an aspect view as it was on an ontological view, and that is the heart

of the problem: once we take the realm of things in themselves to hold the “real” properties of the

objects of our experience, in our attempt to derive the essences of the objects of our experience, we

become compelled to transcend the realm of immanent experience into the super-sensible beyond in

a way that contradicts the notion that essences must appear. This was evidenced in my example of

the chair I mentioned above, and so I need not restate it in too much detail here; but, let it be known

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that the basic point was that I cannot derive the essence of the chair if I can never become directly

acquainted with the actual character of the chair as such, but in order to do this, I have to leave the

firm footing of the empirical and venture into the mysterious super-sensible. My claim is that, in

identifying the thing in itself with the putative “Grund” of our immanent experience, the aspect

theorist commits himself to a view of essences according to which they are taken to be entirely

hidden from us in an altogether separate ontological sphere of being, yet again violating the letter of

Hegel's essence criticism.

It would certainly be natural for the reader to assume at this point that, as the third and final

metaphysical reading of Kantianism, the intrinsic nature view suffers the same fate as each of the

metaphysical readings we considered thus far. In other words, in virtue of its status as a

metaphysical reading of Kant's TD, it is entirely natural to think that the intrinsic nature view

suffers in the very same way that each of the other two metaphysical views suffers, which is that it

is a view of the TD such that it takes the realm of essences to be ontologically distinct from the

realm of appearances, thereby violating the principle that essences must appear. My contention is

that this natural inclination is the correct one. To explain: in chapter 1 of this thesis, we saw that

there are three basic claims intrinsic nature readings make with respect to Kant's doctrine of the TD.

First, Kant's conception of things in themselves must be understood in terms of substances with

intrinsic, non-relational properties; phenomena are the relational properties of substances. Second,

in virtue of our sensibility being a receptive faculty of knowledge, in the respect that we can only

obtain knowledge of an object insofar as it affects us in some manner, the relational properties of

objects, which do not supervene on the intrinsic properties, are the only kinds of properties of

objects we can apprehend in our experience of them. Third, Kant's claim that we cannot know

things as they are in themselves (i.e., the inscrutability thesis) becomes equivalent to the claim that

we cannot know the intrinsic properties of substances. As with both the ontological view and the

aspect view, there is no doubt a sense in which, on an intrinsic nature reading, the thing in itself

once again functions as the metaphysical “Grund” of our experience – the way things are in

themselves governs the way things are as they appear to us. This is because, as we just saw, things

in themselves are substances acting as the substrate of our immanent experience, and this has the

same unfortunate consequences on an intrinsic nature reading as it did within the context of each of

the other two metaphysical readings we considered thus far. It can now be seen that all of the

metaphysical views of the TD succumb to Hegel's essence criticism for they universally ascribe the

“real” properties of objects to objects as they are in themselves rather than to the object as it appears

to us and in this way effectively posits the essences of objects in a realm of reality which is entirely

beyond our reach.

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Now that we have assessed the extent to which each of the metaphysical views of Kant's TD

can prima facie be seen to escape the charge that they posit the essences of objects in a way that

violates the principle that essences must appear, we must now consider the sole formal reading of

Kant's TD (the methodological reading) in this connection as well.

First of all, the most important feature of the methodological view within the present context

is just that, as a merely formal and thus wholly non-metaphysical interpretation of Kantianism, the

methodological view does not in any way presume that Kant was committed to the actual existence

of things in themselves; he is only committed, according to this view, to there being a way things

can be considered “in themselves,” which is entailed by the discursive nature of our cognition, not

to a way things really are “in themselves.” The “in itself” does not, in other words, denote a mode

of existence, only a mode of consideration. In the present context, this means that there is no

metaphysical “Grund” of our experience as there was on all of the metaphysical views, which

somehow exists beyond our (immanent) experience, and which is intended to provide justifying

grounds for our belief in the existence of external objects, thereby securing that experience from a

traditional skepticism with regards to those objects. If there is a “Grund” of our experience at all on

this view, it must be taken purely in the formal sense to denote those fundamental (and thus for

Kant a priori) “Grund” concepts which govern our experience, without which our experience

would no longer be the sort of experience it is. These fundamental “Grund” concepts are by no

means intended as justifying grounds for our belief in an outside world; to quote Bird, they are

merely intended to “outline the governing features of experience and point to its structure of a

mutual dependence between understanding and the senses, between its general and particular

elements.”288

The upshot for the methodological theorist at this point is that, by rejecting the actual

existence of things in themselves as the putative “Grund” of our experience, there is no longer any

good reason to think that an object's real properties exist in any other realm than the immanent

realm of our sensory experience. Thus, there is no longer any good reason to think of the TD in

terms of a contrast between how things appear to us and how they really are, which undercuts the

rationale for transferring the realm of essences to the realm of things in themselves. Let me return to

the case of the chair. If, on a methodological view of the TD, there is no way in which the chair is

“in itself,” independent from our experience, but only the way in which the chair is given to us in

the realm of appearances, viz., as a spatio-temporal object of our representations, then there is no

reason to believe that the essence of the chair manifests itself in any other realm than the empirical.

Essences would have to manifest themselves in the empirical for the empirical is all there really is,

288 Bird, The Revolutionary Kant, 752.

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and this is a clear indication that essences do appear on this particular transcendental model after

all.

What I just proposed was simple: the methodological view of the TD averts the essence

criticism because it is a purely formal reading of Kant's TD, and as such, it does not posit things in

themselves as the “Grund” of our experience in a way that lends support to the notion that the TD is

some sort of sophisticated Kantian metaphor for the distinction between appearance and reality, and

consequently, there are no longer any grounds for understanding the essences of objects to manifest

themselves in the transcendent realm of the super-sensible. But, a complication arises once we

realize that methodological views nevertheless leave open the hypothetical possibility that things in

themselves might exist. So, the important question is what happens if they do exist. Does this mean

that the realm of things in themselves would then somehow manifest the essences of the objects of

our experience, in which case the methodological view would subsequently face the very same

difficulties in the present context as the metaphysical views did. My view is that it would not, and

let me explain my reasons for saying this. If things in themselves (or noumena), meaning objects

which can be accessed by means of a pure intelligence alone, without any contribution from the

senses, actually existed, they would be so radically different from the objects of our sensory

experience that it wouldn't make any sense to say, as we did in the previous cases, that things in

themselves somehow constitute the essences of the objects of our experience. In the event that

things in themselves exist, they would be a type of object (a pure “intelligibilia”) that would

immediately be given to us as soon as it is thought; they would be objects with intrinsic non-spatio-

temporal, non-categorial characteristics which would be given to us by a single intellectual act of

intuition, and the important point is that it is only reasonable to think that such things would have

their own unique essences. On a methodological view, there are phenomena with their essences, and

if things in themselves exist, noumena with theirs. So, what I am suggesting is that, even if things in

themselves exist, on a methodological reading of Kant, Kant would still be expressing a

fundamentally Hegelian metaphysics whereby the essences of phenomenal appearances are in no

way divorced from those appearances themselves and relegated to the noumenal realm of things in

themselves.

Our conclusions regarding the extent to which each transcendental reading violates the

Hegelian's essence criticism, according to which essences must appear, have been rather

straightforward. On the one hand, if we take any one of the three possible metaphysical positions

with respect to the TD, the criticism succeeds. This is because each of those readings understands

the notion of things in themselves in terms of the “Grund” of our experience, whereby the realm of

the “real” becomes relegated to the transcendent realm of things in themselves, and this with

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devastating results. This means that any act whereby we attempt to deduce the essence of an object

has to be undertaken in the realm of things in themselves for this is where the real properties of the

object are located. But, on the other hand, we also saw that, if we take a methodological view in

respect to the TD, the criticism fails, and this because such views do not understand the thing in

itself in the way that the other views do, as the putative “Grund” of our immanent experience,

causally connected with that experience in a way that underscores the sense in which the TD was

intended to denote a contrast between appearance and reality. The end result is that there is no

longer any need for us to “go transcendent” in our search for the essences of things, and we could

thus remain firmly within the realm of the empirical in doing so. Moreover, in the highly unlikely

event that things in themselves do exist, their nature would be such that they would require their

own unique essences, which essentially means that there would then exist two classes of object,

with two sets of essences: phenomena with phenomenal essences, and noumena with noumenal

essences. To the extent that the essences of phenomena would manifest themselves in the realm of

those very phenomena, essences would in fact appear.

Part 3: An Assessment of the Limit Criticism

We have one criticism left to tackle in our assessment of Hegel's critique of Kantian things

in themselves, and this is the limit criticism. As with both the indeterminacy criticism and the

essence criticism, in assessing the extent to which Kant's view of things in themselves, on each of

the transcendental readings I have here formulated, violates the limit criticism, I start by very

briefly repeating what the central theme(s) of the limit criticism consist in, and then I consider what

this means against the backdrop of each transcendental reading of Kant's TD.

Very basically, in the last chapter, we saw that the nature of a limit is such, in Hegel's view,

that one seemingly cannot be put in place without transcending it. Take, for example, a physical

limit, say, the outer limit of the known universe. Hegel's claim is not that one has to physically go

beyond the exact point at which the universe comes to an end in order to know that there is a limit

to the universe. Rather it is the less-controversial claim that a limit is only a limit to something if

that something can, in a different context and under different conditions, go beyond that limit –

being held fixed to one place is a limit to a man, not to a plant precisely because the man, and not

the plant, is in itself not a stationary being, and as such, can move about in such a way that being

held fixed to one particular place would ordinarily be considered a restriction. Hegel's claim, then,

can be summarized in terms of the idea that that which is limited in a certain context presupposes or

points to that which is un-limited or un-restricted in that very same context. So, insofar as the

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Kantian doctrine of things in themselves is concerned, the limit criticism consists in the notion that

such things could not be identified as the determinate limit of our cognition, the determinate point at

which our cognition of reality stops, unless we could proceed beyond things in themselves, and

obtain knowledge of what Hegel famously terms the “Absolute,” that which stands opposed to

things in themselves by which things in themselves can be determined as the limit of our cognition.

Otherwise put, if our cognition was limited in the respect that we cannot obtain knowledge of things

in themselves as Kant believes, then it must also be the case that our cognition is un-limited in this

way as well to the extent that we can, under different conditions, obtain knowledge of such things.

Let's assume, as we have always done, that Hegel's arguments on this score are sound, that

there is something inherently problematic about establishing a limit to something given the fact that

that which is limited presupposes that which is un-limited. If this were the case, then it is obvious

that Kant cannot posit things in themselves as the determinate limit of our cognition without

committing a blatant contradiction. So, with this very general background of the issues confronting

any putative act of establishing a limit to something, one can now clearly see that the limit criticism

turns precisely on whether things in themselves are posited by Kant as the determinate limit of our

cognition in each of the relevant cases before us: simply put, if they are, then that particular reading

of Kant violates the principle, central to the limit criticism, that a limit cannot be established

without that limit being simultaneously transcended, but if they are not, and Kant does not posit

things in themselves in this way, then he certainly does not violate the aforementioned principle and

thus he cannot be said, on this particular reading, to be open to the limit criticism as such.

If this is all that is required in order for the Hegelian's limit criticism to stick, then we need

not go into too much detail here, as we have done in the past, for it is obvious that all of the

metaphysical views succumb to the limit criticism while the methodological view does not. This is

because, unlike the merely formal methodological view which remains committed to the merely

formal thesis that the notion of things in themselves amounts to a secondary way of considering the

objects of our experience, which is entailed by the discursive nature of our cognition, all the

metaphysical views remain committed in some fashion to the wholly metaphysical thesis that things

in themselves exist (which is what makes them metaphysical) in a way that suggests that they

function as the limit of our cognition, the determinate point at which our cognition of things can go

no further. In other words, on a methodological view of things in themselves, the underlying

significance of the Kantian conception of such things lies in the fact that it points to a way of

considering the objects of our empirical experience which allows us to diagnose, as well as provide

a therapy for, what Kant takes to be some of the major metaphysical-logical errors in traditional

metaphysics, and so there is no longer any transcendent reality, on this view, as there is on each of

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the metaphysical views, existing above and beyond our immanent experience, which we cannot

cognize, and which thus functions as the determinate limit of our cognition.

Nevertheless, perhaps I'm being a bit hasty here: for we must never forget that, based on a

methodological reading of Kant's TD, even though the primary import of the conception of things in

themselves is merely formal or conceptual in that it represents a non-discursive way of considering

things (sensible objects), which is entailed by the wholly discursive nature of our cognition as a

faculty of knowledge requiring both sensible particulars as well as general concepts, there is still the

hypothetical possibility that such a conception might refer to an existent thing after all. When it

comes to Kantian exegesis, however anti-metaphysical methodological views of the TD purport to

be, they nevertheless leave enough space in their metaphysics for the potential that things as they

are in themselves may actually exist. Moreover, if they were to exist, since they would clearly be

unknowable to us, things in themselves would still function as the determinate limit of our cognition

on methodological views, and the important implication this has for the methodological theorist

within the context of the limit criticism is that their preferred view of things in themselves can

potentially succumb to the limits charge. Simply put, in light of the fact that they problematically

postulate the actual existence of things in themselves, methodological views of the TD

problematically succumb to the limits charge as such. As a result, the Hegelian can maintain at this

point that the limit criticism has some force even on a methodological view of the TD.

One final remark before we conclude our investigation into the overall force of the limit

criticism, considered against the backdrop of the various transcendental readings of the TD: in line

with our general approach of taking Hegel's arguments to be logically sound, thus far we have been

assuming that Hegel was correct about the nature of a limit, that is, that there is something

inherently problematic about the nature of a limit such that one cannot be put into place without it

thereby being transcended or passed over. But one might respond that, in doing so, I have failed to

do justice to the full complexities of the Kantian position on this score, among which is the fact that

the existence of such things as the Antinomies of Pure Reason, metaphysical-logical puzzles which

we cannot solve and which are inextricably linked to our particular (discursive) mode of

understanding, suggest that it is entirely possible, despite what Hegel may have thought, that we can

indeed know there is a limit to something, in this case, our cognition, from a purely internal

perspective which does not presuppose any such transcendence of the actual limit. Put another way,

in light of the existence of the Antinomies, we can certainly know that our cognition is limited

without knowing what it is that limits it, standing opposed to our cognition by which our cognition

is shown to be limited, in the respect that it is incapable of grasping the “Absolute,” or all there is.

Most importantly, this means that the conceptual grounds on which the limit criticism as such rests

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are a bit shaky indeed, to say the least. Thus, one might think of Kant's Antinomies as marking a

“limit,” but from the inside, as it were: we are faced by such Antinomies because we have worked

up to the extent of our cognitive capacities, while at the same time finding that we cannot transcend

that limit.

Although this may initially seem to be a decisive objection against the limit criticism as

such, particularly against those arguments Hegel uses to derive the conclusion that the Kantian

postulation of things in themselves as the limit of our cognition is somehow contradictory, this is

not necessarily the case, as we will now see. This is because the only way we can determine

whether this objection is decisive or not is to examine the Kantian Antinomies so as to come to

some conclusion as regards to whether they show what Kant thinks they show, namely, that there

are legitimately irresolvable problems confronting our cognitive faculties, problems which do not

just appear to be irresolvable but actually are irresolvable, and which are inextricably bound up in

the very nature of our cognition itself. That is, we would have to see whether the formal Antinomial

arguments are good or not, and since doing this would obviously take us far beyond the purview of

the present chapter, such an investigation cannot be undertaken at this time, which means that we

have to essentially leave the debate as it stands, without coming to any determinate view as regards

to the strength of this particular argument.

To conclude our analysis of the extent to which Hegel's limit criticism applies to Kant's

“actual” views on things in themselves, specifically on the various interpretations of such things, a

few remarks are in order. First, insofar as the metaphysical interpretations of the TD are concerned,

our conclusion was that each of these readings ultimately succumbs to the limit charge – the charge

that there is something problematic about any project of setting a limit to something given the fact

that the nature of a limit is such that a limit cannot be put in place without in the process

transcending that limit – precisely because they set up Kant's conception of things in themselves in

such a way that it putatively acts as the limit of our cognition, or the point at which our cognition of

reality stops. This is suggested in the very metaphysical nature of these interpretations of the TD as

ones which stress the sense, which they regard as particularly well-entrenched in the Kantian

theoretical philosophy, in which Kant was committed to the actual existence of things in

themselves, that is, things which are intrinsically non-spatio-temporal which we cannot cognize.

Second, insofar as the methodological view of the TD is concerned, our conclusion was much more

favorable in that we saw that the methodological view doesn't assume that Kant was committed to

the actual existence of things in themselves, and in this way averts the limit criticism by never

actually positing a limit to our knowledge as such. The most we could say about this view in the

present context is that it merely “problematically” succumbs to it for it merely “problematically”

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posits the existence of intelligible objects (noumena) beyond the realm of our empirical experience

which we cannot cognize.

Conclusion

We come now to the final stage of this chapter, where I will very briefly summarize our

conclusions with respect to the overall force of Hegel's critique of Kant's concept of things in

themselves, and more specifically, with respect to the extent to which the three main criticisms

Hegel had with the concept of things in themselves as such hold insofar as the “real” Critical Kant

is concerned. That is, since we have seen that there are four major views of just how the “real”

Critical Kant is to be understood, in summarizing the overall force of the Hegelian critique of things

as they are in themselves, what we are essentially doing is summarizing the extent to which the

three major criticisms of such things (viz., the indeterminacy criticism, the essence criticism, and

finally, the limit criticism) hold against the backdrop of the four major competing interpretations of

Kant's TD, which we have seen are the traditional ontological view, the aspect view, the intrinsic

nature view, and the methodological view – the methodological view being the one which I have

here defended as the only textually and systematically plausible interpretation of Kantianism as

such. The important question is therefore whether any of the aforementioned criticisms can be seen

to have considerable argumentative force when they are considered against the backdrop of the

various interpretations of Kant's TD as such, in which case they would thereby constitute major

hurdles for any philosopher broadly ascribing to some form of Kantian idealism. Perhaps we could

put this another way: do any of Hegel's three main criticisms against the thing in itself hold if we

take Kant, first, as a traditional metaphysician for whom things in themselves represent a discrete

class of object; second, as an outwardly Critical philosopher who nevertheless remains committed

to their being a way things are in themselves, independent from the way we experience them, which

we cannot cognize; third, as a closet Leibnizian monadologist for whom the thing in itself is

understood in terms of a substantia noumenon, the underlying substance of the world which has two

distinct sets of properties (the extrinsic and relational, and the intrinsic and non-relational), where

phenomena are the extrinsic causal powers of substances; and fourth, as a direct realist for whom

there necessarily exists only one type of object, the spatio-temporal objects of our sensory

experience, which we are made directly aware of in that experience, but where there are two ways

of considering these objects: either as appearances or as things in themselves, in which case they are

taken as objects of sense, which conform to both the a priori forms as well as the a priori

categories, or as objects of reason (intelligibilia) which conform to neither the a priori forms of our

196

intuition nor to the a priori categories of the understanding, where Kant accepts the first way and

rejects the second. Essentially, our conclusion can be put rather straightforwardly in the following

terms: for reasons we have already discussed, all of these interpretations succumb to the

indeterminacy criticism except the intrinsic nature reading; all of them succumb to the essence

criticism except the methodological reading; and finally, all of them succumb to the limit criticism

except (to some extent) the methodological reading.

However, with this basic understanding that Hegel's criticisms of things in themselves have

much less force when this notion is interpreted methodologically, in terms of our overall assessment

of this highly controversial, yet at the same time central, concept of Kant's Critical philosophy, what

does this all mean? What does it mean that Hegel's three criticisms of things in themselves (the

indeterminacy criticism, the essence criticism, and the limit criticism) succeed more often than they

fail, in the respect that they actually apply to Kant's conception of things in themselves, given the

various ways in which such things can be construed? It means, first of all, that not only is the

methodological reading of things in themselves the most plausible (both textually as well as

philosophically) reading of such things within the narrow framework of Kantian transcendental

idealism, its major themes and principles, against which the plausibility of each of the various

interpretations of things in themselves can be measured (which was our conclusion from the first

part of this thesis), but that it is also the best reading insofar as Hegel's critique of things in

themselves is concerned; that is to say, it is the reading against which the fewest number of

Hegelian criticisms ultimately hold water, further reinforcing the methodological view of Kant's TD

as the only appropriate view to take with respect to what Kantian transcendental idealism ultimately

consists in.

Moreover, it suggests that Hegel's rejection of the Kantian conception of things in

themselves was a bit misplaced, given the fact that it was based on an overly metaphysical (and thus

ultimately misguided) misreading of the thing in itself as a concept which refers to a necessarily

existent item, existing somehow beyond the realm of a possible experience, which we cannot

cognize. (If it wasn't, then Hegel's criticisms of the Kantian conception of things in themselves

would have done more justice to the merely formal methodological nature of the concept as one

which does not refer to a necessarily instantiated or existent item, but rather to a merely

problematically instantiated or existent item, an item which we cannot be sure whether it exists or

not). As it stands, though, Hegel's criticisms of things in themselves (except, of course, the

indeterminacy criticism which holds equally well on an epistemological or methodological view of

the TD) retain much more argumentative force on the metaphysical readings of the TD than they do

on the merely formal, methodological reading of the TD, showing that Hegel's view of things in

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themselves was based in large part on a fundamental misunderstanding of what Kant's TD

ultimately consists in. So, despite the thoroughness with which Hegel's critique of the Kantian

theoretical philosophy, especially with regards to things in themselves, was undertaken, this seems

to me to suggest that Hegel's critique proves not to be as serious a challenge to the concept of things

in themselves as many have assumed.

198

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