BEYOND MISSILE DEFENSE - Western States Legal … · INESAP, Technical University Darmstadt,...

BEYOND MISSILE DEFENSE

2


October 2002

Andrew Lichterman ([email protected])Western States Legal Foundation, Oakland, USA

Zia Mian ([email protected])Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, USA

M. V. Ramana ([email protected])Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, USA

Jürgen Scheffran ([email protected])INESAP, Technical University Darmstadt, Germany

Acknowledgements:

The authors thank John Burroughs, Jackie Cabasso,

Hal Feiveson, Randy Rydell and Frank von Hippel for useful comments

This is an updated version of Briefing Paper #10 submitted by the International Network of

Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) to the 2002 Non-Proliferation Treaty

Preparatory Meeting

Edited and Designed byGRACE

The Global Resource Action Center for the Environmentfor the Abolition 2000 Missile Ban Working Group

www.abolition2000.org

3


CONTENTS

Preface 5

Abstract 7

Introduction 9

The State of International Missile Control 13

Moving Towards a Global Missile Ban 15

Conclusion 18

Endnotes 20

References 21

Appendix 1: Table 23


4

PREFACE

On 15 April 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issueda statement drawing the world’s attention to the lack ofbinding multilateral norms concerning missiles. Althoughthe Preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons (NPT) includes the goal of eliminatingdelivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, the world has beenlamentably slow in fulfilling this promise. This applies notjust to missiles per se, but also to their development, produc-tion, stockpiling, export, and proliferation — as well as tomissile defenses.

So when, on 20 November 2000, the General Assemblyadopted a resolution on Missiles, the world community tooknotice. The resolution asked the Secretary-General to preparea report with the assistance of a panel of governmental expertson the subject of missiles in all its aspects. In July 2002, theSecretary-General transmitted the report to the General Assembly, an act that itself marked a step forward inthe norm-building process, since it was somewhat extraordinary that a group of governmental experts fromdiverse countries could reach a consensus on such a sensitive subject.1

While very thin on recommendations, the report concluded that — missiles are posing “serious concerns” forinternational peace and security; these issues cannot be effectively addressed without due regard to theirregional and global dimensions; “there exists at present no universally accepted norms or instruments”dealing with missiles; many approaches to the subject are being undertaken both within and outside theUnited Nations; and that many more such international efforts will be needed.

...the study presentsstrong arguments for

moving beyond existingpolicy and research

paradigms towards analternative approach that

seeks to advance theglobal missile agenda intothe new, fertile ground of

disarmament.

5


The present study represents one such effort from civil society to respond to this challenge. Written by anAmerican lawyer and three physicists from India, Pakistan, and Germany – all of whom have combinedscholarship with public interest advocacy — the study presents strong arguments for moving beyond existingpolicy and research paradigms towards an alternative approach that seeks to advance the global missileagenda into the new, fertile ground of disarmament. Over a half century after Herman Kahn proposed“thinking about the unthinkable,” missile disarmament is now finally emerging as a subject that merits bothserious thought and energetic actions.

The report offers for discussion and debate the elements of a “Ballistic Missile Framework Agreement”intended to serve as a basis for structuring future work in this field. Readers seeking panaceas, quick fixes,miracle cures, and silver bullets are advised to go elsewhere, for this is a serious study, while remainingaccessible to a general audience. This audience is where, ultimately, the political will must be found to bringthe various elements of this proposal to fruition.

Achieving an international ban on ballistic missiles – or ultimately all delivery vehicles for weapons of massdestruction – will surely not be easy. It will require imaginative new verification techniques, improvedmonitoring capabilities, binding legal obligations and means to enforce them, increased transparency, andfinancial and political support both inside and outside of government. It will also require new laws, newpolicies, and new institutions – both national and international – to implement them.

The study contributes to these goals more by offering an architectural blueprint of the requirements of aworking missile disarmament regime, than by offering any handbook of the political tactics needed to createsuch regime. It does not answer all the possible questions on this challenging subject, but it does break newground and will succeed in stimulating what is arguably most needed in the early stages of building newglobal norms – sustained thought and informed discourse.

Jayantha DhanapalaUnder-Secretary-General for DisarmamentUnited NationsNew York, New York2 October 2002


6

ABSTRACT

An asymmetric arms race hasdeveloped with, on the onehand, the United States’ pur-suit of more accurate conven-tional weapons, a space-based military capability, na-tional and several theater mis-sile defense systems, and, onthe other, the acquisition ofballistic missiles and increasedemphasis on nuclear weap-ons by a number of otherstates. After a short descrip-tion of the complex dynamics

7


of this arms race, the articledescribes the current state ofinternational missile control, inparticular focusing on the la-cunae in the regime and theweaknesses in some of theproposals to go beyond. Fi-nally, the article argues for acomprehensive approach todeal with missiles and outlinesa “framework” agreement torestrict the development,testing and deployment of allballistic missiles and missiledefenses.


8

“...one direct way forward isto negotiate a trulycomprehensive regimestrictly controllingand eliminatingballistic missiles.”

9


The United States is developing anarray of new weapons systems for themaintenance of its global militarydominance; the tip of the iceberg isthe national ballistic missile defense(BMD) system being prepared underthe rubric of protecting the continen-tal United States from missile attackby third world states. There is also adiverse array of attendant theatre mis-sile defense (TMD) systems to pro-tect US military expeditionary forcesaround the world. The US is also de-veloping increasingly accurate,stealthy, and longer-range conven-tional armaments, including a vari-ety of missile systems, with improvedability to destroy hard targets like mis-sile silos and buried command and control facili-ties.

At the same time, seeking to emulate US andSoviet strategic thinking and practice over the past

fifty years that nuclear weapons andballistic missiles can induce deter-rence, a number of states are devel-oping such systems, most notably,India, Pakistan, and North Korea.Prior to these states is Israel, whichhas the most sophisticated nuclearweapons and missile program out-side the five nuclear weapons states,but is closely tied to the US and pro-tected from any international pres-sures in this regard. Iraq tried to de-velop both nuclear weapons and bal-listic missiles, but the Gulf War andits aftermath have largely destroyedthis capability. Other states tried andsucceeded to varying degrees (e.g.South Africa, Brazil, Argentina,

South Korea, Taiwan, and Sweden) but haveceased at least for now.

Since the development of both intercontinen-tal-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballisticmissile defenses of any kind is a complex and

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, with the Cold War longover, a new kind of arms race has started to be-come apparent. Unlike earlier efforts of the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to match and exceedeach other in the development and deploymentof nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and conven-tional weapons, the new arms race is more global,and asymmetric in both the kind of states involvedand the kinds of weapons.


10

slow task, there is still time for political initia-tives to prevent a costly arms race betweenoffensive and defensive missiles, reduce concernsabout US ambitions in the post-Cold Warworld, and limit the escalation of regional armsraces and the scope of future wars.2 We proposehere that one direct way forward is to negotiatea truly comprehensive regime strictly controllingand eliminating ballistic missiles. This wouldplace limits on all states with missile programsand not just be another ABM treaty or nonpro-liferation measure to limit the development orspread of ballistic missiles. States with ad-vanced, long-range missile programslike the USA would have to stopfurther development of ballisticmissiles and begin reducing them aspart of a treaty bound process ofeliminating the threat they pose tothe rest of the world. In exchange,all other states would agree not todevelop or acquire ballistic missilesor join in the reduction process.

Anti-missile systems that involve thedevelopment and use of ballistic mis-siles as interceptors would be forbid-den as well.3 Limits on the develop-ment of anti-missile systems are im-portant because finding a commit-ment to going down to zero ballisticmissiles while some states were build-ing up anti-missile systems would bedifficult. Missile disarmament in thecontext of the buildup of anti-missilesystems could also lead to arms raceinstability and crisis instability endan-gering the whole disarmament pro-cess.4

Unlike existing arms controltreaties, which often takes years to negotiate (ittook over forty years after it was proposed forthe CTBT to be completed, and it has not yetentered into force) we suggest a possible newapproach that could contribute to building aninternational norm against ballistic missiles.

We outline here the case for a Ballistic MissileFramework Agreement consisting of:5

• • • • • an immediate test ban on ballistic missilesand missiles intended for use in anti-ballisticmissile systems, and a commitment to thecomplete elimination of these weapons;

• • • • • a formal negotiating machinery for realizingcommitments on missile control and disar-mament through a series of phased, inter-linked, overlapping stages, each involving bal-listic missile reductions and limits on ranges;

• • • • • a pledge not to test and deployspace weapons as a first step to aninternationally agreed space weaponsban and the de-militarisation ofspace;

• • • • • the creation of an internationalmonitoring and inspection system toprevent the development, testingand deployment of ballistic missilesand space weapons;

• • • • • a regular public review, report-ing, and implementation assessmentprocedure involving all the partiesto the agreement.

The essential precondition at thisstage would be agreement on thegoals and agreement on a negotiat-ing process to move towards them.As Mian pointed out,

6 commitment

to such an initiative already exists inthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT); the preamble to the NPT em-phasizes its goal as “the eliminationfrom national arsenals of nuclear

weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant toa Treaty on general and complete disarmamentunder strict and effective international control”(emphasis added). We suggest here a few simpleinitial steps that could form part of the frame-work structure and help create the momentumfor the disarmament process.

...the NPT em-phasizes itsgoal as “theelimination fromnational arse-nals of nuclearweapons andthe means oftheir delivery...”

INTRODUCTION

11


Ballistic missiles are, of course, not the only meansof long-range military attack. Therefore, to goahead with a comprehensive disarmament programfor ballistic missiles, it is necessary to deal withother means of projectingmilitary power around theworld using platformssuch as bombers and air-craft carriers, as well asships, aircraft and subma-rines armed with longrange missiles. As the re-gime is slowly put in place,there would have to be aparallel regime controllingall force projection capa-bilities, including cruisemissiles, the extra-territo-rial deployment of long-range bombers, and patrol-ling of international watersby aircraft carriers, andcruise missile armed shipsand submarines.

While the number of suchsystems may seem quitelarge, it must be remem-bered that these hi-tech sys-tems are manufactured primarily in only a fewcountries. We realize that in these countries, anyefforts to ban the sale or deployment of these arelikely to be opposed by the military-industrial com-plex. Overcoming such resistance shall require pub-lic mobilization and a widespread social movementwilling to challenge the national security narrativethat underpins the investment of massive amountsof resources to building such weapons, and toposit a more humane vision conducive to genu-ine human security.

While recognizing the interlinked nature of ballis-tic missile disarmament and other wide-rangingdisarmament measures, for the purposes of thispaper we limit our focus to ballistic missiles.Though we harbor no illusions about the likeli-hood of even a comprehensive disarmament re-

gime for ballistic missiles at the current moment,we nevertheless feel that arms control effortsshould think and plan for the long term. Evendebating such a proposal would have some ben-

efits. Sustained discussion ofa comprehensive ballistic mis-sile control regime could pro-vide a cross-cutting look at avariety of arms control prob-lems, from ballistic missile de-fense and the nuclear offense/defense knot, to the prolifera-tion of weapons of mass de-struction, emerging regionalarms races, and the dangersposed by a potential arms racein space. Such a debate mightprovide a renewed sense of thegrowing dangers posed by in-terrelated high technologyarms races, and hence greaterurgency to find solutions be-fore we enter irrevocably intoanother round of great powerarms competition.

Sustained discussion of acomprehensive ballisticmissile control regimecould provide a cross-cutting look at a variety ofarms control problems

INTRODUCTION


12

13


THE STATE OF

INTERNATIONAL

MISSILE CONTROL

Efforts to deal with the US National Missile De-fense program have largely emphasized the need tomaintain the ABM treaty and to limit anti-missilesystems. In December 1999, the UN General As-sembly adopted a resolution on Preservation and Com-pliance with the Treaty On the Limitation of Anti-Ballis-tic Missile Systems. Although there were 68 absten-tions, only four states voted against the resolution:US, Israel, Micronesia, and Albania (UN 2000). De-spite this widespread international pressure, the BushAdministration has made it quite clear that it in-tends to continue with NMD deployment, announc-ing in December 2001 its intention to withdrawfrom the ABM Treaty.7

Responding to the larger andlonger term challenge posed by USmilitary plans involving space ca-pabilities, several states, especiallyChina and to a lesser extent Rus-sia, have sought an internationalagreement on Preventing an ArmsRace in Outer Space (PAROS),through negotiations at the Con-ference on Disarmament (CD) inGeneva.8 Though isolated in opposition to such ne-gotiations, the United States and Israel have suc-ceeded in preventing PAROS talks.9 This has, in largepart, prevented the CD from agreeing even on anegotiating agenda for the past two years.

In trying to address the acquisition of ballistic mis-siles by newer states, the mainstream arms controlcommunity has focused on a narrow, nonprolifera-tion approach aimed at buttressing the Missile Tech-nology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR wasinitiated in 1987 with seven members and has grownto 33 member states; members agree not to helpnon-members build or acquire ballistic missiles withranges greater 300 km and payloads greater than 500

kg.10 It has had little effect in creating and sustain-ing an international norm against missile exportsbecause its design fundamentally limits its effective-ness; at best it could be said to have delayed somemissile programs.11 This is because:

1. The MTCR does not address the ballisticmissile arsenals and programs of member states,i.e., the nuclear weapon states and their allies.

2. Numerous shorter-range missiles are alreadydeployed in developing countries.

3. Although they can slow-down the militarytechnology flow, supply-side controls are inca-pable of stopping the spread of missile technol-ogy in the long run.

4. The MTCR has no specific verification andenforcement mechanisms.

5. Export controls over dual-usegoods can be in conflict withinternational technology coop-eration and commercial interestsin civilian spaceflights;12 thesemay generate incentives tocircumvent the control regime.

A few states have made prelimi-nary proposals within the limits

of the MTCR. At the recent MTCR meetings theUnited States, Britain, and France offered stepsto reinforce MTCR export controls by an in-creased dialogue with non-MTCR parties, pre-launch notification for missile and spacelaunches, and international standards in themissile field. At the October 2000 MTCRPlenary Meeting in Helsinki, Finland, memberstates envisaged an outreach to non-members andagreed on a Draft International Code of ConductAgainst Ballistic Missile Proliferation, including a setof principles, commitments, confidence buildingmeasures and incentives, that could increaseopenness about development and testing, includ-ing voluntary commitments.13 Universalization ofthe draft Code through a transparent and inclu-


14

sive negotiating process open to all states on anequal basis is envisaged. France has offered to holdthe first negotiating session in 2002.14

Other states are now considering options for astronger missile nonproliferation regime specificallyas an alternative to missile defense. At the June1999 G-8 summit in Germany, the former RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin proposed a Global ControlSystem for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles andMissile Technology (GCS). In his April 25 state-ment at the NPT 2000 Conference, the RussianForeign Minister Igor Ivanov urged considerationof a Russian proposal for a global missile confi-dence-building and nonprolifera-tion regime.15

A goal of the proposed GCS is toincrease transparency and reducethe risk of miscalculation ormisunderstanding. Nationswould be required to providenotification of missile or space-launch vehicle (SLV) test-launches. To discourage prolifera-tion, the GCS would offerincentives to members of theregime that forswore the use ofmissiles to deliver weapons ofmass destruction; includingsecurity assurances against the use of missile sys-tems, assistance from the UN Security Council ifsuch weapons were used, and assistance in thepeaceful uses of space for members that gave upmissiles as weapons.

Despite the offered incentives, the GCS proposal ismerely a nonproliferation regime, comparable insome respects with the NPT but without its ArticleVI obligation to disarm. It seems unlikely thatmajor developing countries would accept anotherregime in which the five nuclear weapon states areleft as the only missile powers. If, on the otherhand, all of the states currently with missiles orplanning such a capability in the near future wereallowed to keep their missile arsenals, then thevalue of the regime would be severely limited; evennegotiations on the regime may well serve to incite

It seems unlikelythat major devel-oping countrieswould accept an-other regime inwhich the fivenuclear weaponstates are left asthe only missilepowers.

future missile developments plans in other states.

A breakthrough in transparency arrangements wasachieved on December 16, 2000 with the estab-lishment of the Joint Data Exchange Centre(JDEC) in Moscow, staffed by military personnelfrom the US and Russia.16 The US-RussianMemorandum of Understanding on Notification ofMissile Launches provides for pre- and post-launchnotification of all ballistic missile tests and spacelaunches, as well as notification of failed satellitelaunches. Other countries can join the agreement.

In Canada, experts from several countries met inMarch 2000 and February 2001 to examine

options and alternatives to re-spond to US missile defense.17 Thefirst meeting discussed multilateralapproaches to more effectiveballistic missile control, interna-tional monitoring, and earlywarning. Participants emphasizedthe need to implement risk-reduction and confidence-buildingmeasures, such as de-alerting,improved ballistic missile earlywarning and launch notification.Monitoring and surveillance ofmissile and space-related activitiesand the exchange of technical datawere identified as the keys to an

effective missile-control verification system. Thesecond meeting recommended modernizinginternational space law to deal with the dangers ofspace weapons and warfare, expanding the JDEC,and making GCS co-operation multilateral.

On November 20, 2000 the 55th session of theUN General Assembly adopted by 97 votes to 0with 65 abstentions a resolution on missiles (A/C.1/55/L.1/Rev.1) introduced by Iran. Theresolution emphasizes the “need for a comprehen-sive approach towards missiles, in a balanced andnon-discriminatory manner, as a contribution tointernational peace and security.” It requests theSecretary-General, with the assistance of a panel ofgovernmental experts, to prepare a report onmissiles in all its aspects.

THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL MISSILE CONTROL

15


MOVING TOWARDS AGLOBAL MISSILE BAN

The asymmetric multipolar arms race that isdeveloping, between US efforts at globalmilitary dominance and the efforts of otherstates to keep from being left behind is pro-foundly dangerous.18 Present efforts at manag-ing the threat of ballistic missiles, from the USand other states, are compartmentalized and donot address interconnections and feedback.Further, the gap between these efforts and newdevelopments in military tech-nology for anti-ballistic missilesystems is large and growing, andlargely misses out on what maybe required to constrain the US.The absence of multilateralnorms for missiles/missiledefense has even elicited concernfrom the Secretary General of theUnited Nations.19

There have been earlier proposalsto limit ballistic missiles thatwere far-reaching. A formerdirector of the US Arms Controland Disarmament Agencyproposed that the US-SovietIntermediate-range Nuclear ForcesTreaty (INF) to ban all missileswith ranges from 500 to 5500 kmbe globalized.20 Such a ban wasproposed again by Canada to themembers of the MTCR in 1995.21

This would of course leave thenuclear weapons states with theirlong-range missiles.

Another suggestion is a ZeroBallistic Missiles agreement (ZBM)prohibiting the testing, produc-tion, and deployment of ballisticmissiles, which picks up on a proposal made byUS President Ronald Reagan to MikhailGorbachev at the famous Reykjavik summit in

1986.22 Reagan called for a 50% reductionwithin five years and the total elimination ofUS and Soviet missile stockpiles within tenyears.23 Unfortunately, Reagan’s parallelinsistence on his ‘star wars’ space based anti-missile system prevented any further effort inthis direction.

A more detailed scheme was proposed by theFederation of American Scientists in their “ZeroBallistic Missile” regime, which aimed at thecomplete elimination of offensive ballisticmissiles, combined with unilateral declarationsas well as regional and global multilateralagreements.24 The ZBM proposal suggested a

four-stage scheme leading towardsballistic missile elimination:

Stage I: The US and Russia agreeto make substantial and acceler-ated cuts in the number ofdeployed missiles beyond STARTII; ballistic missile-free zones arenegotiated in certain regions.

Stage II: An international MissileConference would be held todiscuss critical issues and negoti-ate the implementation of re-gional ballistic missile-free zonesand reductions announced inStage I.

Stage III: The ZBM regime wouldbe designed; an InternationalAgency for Ballistic MissileDisarmament (IABMD) would becreated to supervise the ZBMprocess and to provide technicaland diplomatic assistance tostates.

Stage IV: All states would moveon varying schedules to zeroballistic missile capability withinan agreed period of years.

Such proposals did not command much officialattention, in part because they were considered

Present efforts atmanaging thethreat of ballisticmissiles, from theUS and otherstates, arecompartmentalizedand do not addressinterconnectionsand feedback.


16

too ambitious and going too far all at once. Ithas been felt unlikely that “the five declarednuclear weapon states would agree to forego alltheir ballistic missiles in a single action, elimi-nating their nuclear deterrent in its currentform”.25 At the same time, without a compre-hensive scheme aimed at eliminating missilesand similar systems, there is unlikely to beglobal agreement on containing the problem. Toget around this bind, we suggest that whatseems to be required to control and eliminateballistic missiles is a formal arrangement thatwill:

1. Recognize the problem of ballistic missilesand comparable delivery systems and expressappropriate concern,

2. Commit to eliminate theseweapons as soon as practicablypossible,

3. Identify the fundamentalpolitical and scientific issuesinvolved in meeting such a goal,and

4. Provide a mechanism to tacklethese issues in a systematic stepby step manner through ascheduled negotiating process.

These requirements are very similarto the kinds of structures found inrecent international conventionsdealing with environmental prob-lems such as the Vienna Conven-tion on protection of the Ozonelayer and the UN FrameworkConvention on Climate Change.These international agreementsdealt with chemicals that consti-tuted a grave and urgent danger tosociety, were largely produced in aminority of states, were of greatsignificance to them, but were aglobal hazard and required interna-tional agreement to deal with

them. These conventions set up a standingnegotiating process, a Conference of Parties,which was mandated to find means to meet thegoals of the agreement.

As in these conventions, a ballistic missileframework agreement would set up a formalnegotiating process for dealing with ballisticmissiles, anti-missile systems, and analogousweapons systems, with a clear goal of eliminat-ing them. The agreement would result in aseries of phased stages, each being a step to-wards the ultimate goal. As a reflection of theseriousness of the issue, agreement would beneeded at the outset on a moratorium on thefurther development, testing and deployment ofballistic missiles and anti-missile systems. Sucha “missile threat freeze” would be like earlier

nuclear test ban moratoria thatcreated time and a climate conduc-tive for negotiations.

The flight test ban and launchcontrol regime elements of amoratorium on ballistic missiledevelopment could help preventfuture arms races, and developmentof long-range conventional weaponsoperating from or through space.Although not a substitute for amore comprehensive Outer SpaceTreaty, which would unambigu-ously prohibit the emplacement ofweapons and weapons deliveryplatforms in space, a launch controlregime that included inspectionswould help reveal efforts by anynation to place weapons in space. Aban on test flights of ballisticmissiles could also have an immedi-ate positive impact on the mostvolatile areas of emerging interna-tional arms competition, especiallyin South Asia, the Middle East andNortheast Asia.26

Given current political circum-

... a “missilethreat freeze”would be likeearlier nucleartest ban mora-toria that cre-ated time and aclimate con-ductive for ne-gotiations

MOVING TOWARDS A GLOBAL MISSILE BAN

17


stances, an international monitoring andinspection system will be necessary to buildtrust in the missile control and disarmamentregime.27 Various technical and non-technicalmeans of verification exist to focus on observ-able rocket characteristics that provide indica-tions of rocket type and performance.28 Theefficiency of verification depends on the stage inthe missile life-cycle that is to be controlled. Forexample, the flight test ban should be relativelyeasy to verify.

Though somewhat harder, activities other thanflight tests undertaken as part ofthe development of ballisticmissiles may also be amenable tovarious inspection schemes, espe-cially in light of the experiencegained in monitoring the INF andSTART agreements. Much of themissile infrastructure – such asproduction facilities, test ranges,tracking and communicationfacilities, missile containers andmissile-carrying vehicles – ishighly visible. However suchtechnical means for remotesensing need to be accompa-nied by inspections; thesecould draw on the experiencesof the UN Special Commission(UNSCOM) inspections inIraq.

Because of their dual-use, it isdifficult but not impossible todifferentiate between ballisticmissiles and space-launchedvehicles. Some functionaldifferences and operationalcharacteristics could be used toimprove distinction, such asdifferences in the basing mode,the testing procedures, thepayload, flight trajectory,guidance systems and re-entry.To determine the basic payload

type – in particular, to detect re-entry vehicles atthe front of a rocket – without disclosingproprietory information, non-intrusive devicesand techniques can be applied, such as scanningand radiographic devices.

Adequate verification capability would befurther enhanced if the leading missile powersspend even a small fraction of their militarybudgets in developing verification technologiesand building the necessary infrastructure. It isworth emphasizing that the goal is to ensure

adequate – not perfect – verifica-tion. The potential risks of breakoutunder such a regime should becompared to a world with multiplearms races with much higher levelsof insecurity.

We expect claims that any limits onballistic missile development bystates with extensive missile arsenalswill make them unable to defendtheir national interests adequately.Any useful discussion of an argu-ment of this kind requires thesestates to articulate precisely what“national interests” require increas-ingly sophisticated long range,accurate ballistic missile systems. Inparticular, it would require ananswer to how a missile flight testban would impair adequate “deter-rence.”29 The power projectionroles of these weapons and theinterests they serve would thuscome to the surface in publicdebate, rather than the moretypical situation of these stateshiding behind the generalities ofdeterrence.

Adequate verificationcapability would befurther enhanced ifthe leading missilepowers spend evena small fraction oftheir military budgetsin developing verifi-cation technologiesand building the nec-essary infrastructure.

MOVING TOWARDS A GLOBAL MISSILE BAN


18

CONCLUSION

Our main interest in revisiting the idea of a treaty banning ballistic missiles is to give it widercurrency and provide a positive alternative to those who refer to the threat of ballisticmissile proliferation to support the development of BMD systems. Wesuggest that a comprehensive ballistic missile control regime would addressboth the multiple threats and technologies claimed as necessary either todeter them or to provide direct defenses. Even the initial steps towardsa truly comprehensive ballistic missile control regime, such as a missileflight test ban, would help halt or slow a range of arms races and prolif-eration dynamics either in progress or likely to commence in thenear future. By doing so, it also would help disentangle the growingproblem of multiple arms races that feed on each other.

An agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles would delegitimizemissiles as symbols of military, technical, economic, and politi-cal prestige, appropriately described as “trappings of power”.30

It would enhance global security and stability by increasingdecision-making time and removing the threat of accidentalballistic missile launch. When compared to the MTCR, it wouldbe more conducive to cooperation and pursuit of legitimatecivilian space efforts. Because it aims at the elimination of acomplete class of weapons in a non-discriminatory fashion, itwould have a certain political appeal.

The effort to achieve a global missile control regime provides a kind ofpositive mirror image of the endless quest for military supremacy throughtechnology. The militaries of powerful states attempt to do long-range planning,in part because the development cycle for complex weapons systems commonly takesa decade or more. Arms control advocates too must think long-term – the time tocut off these emerging arms races is now, before weapons systems have developed

CONCLUSION

19


unstoppable momentum and constituencies in respective military services, military re-search and development laboratories, military contractors, and parliaments, mostparticularly in the US. By beginning today to think systematically about concepts thatmay appear too distant a prospect to take seriously, we may discover previously unno-ticed opportunities.

A global missile control regime and the types of steps it should encom-pass provides a common focus both for discussion and for organizing

efforts for disparate elements of the world’s peace movements. Thesenow include the growing movement against US space weaponsdeployment, as well as the emerging peace movements in regionsthreatened by dangerous new arms races, particularly South Asia.There is also a broader movement against economically unjust and

ecologically unsustainable globalization, which is beginning tomake the link for a new generation of activists between mili-tary “power projection” and the interests it serves.

Even if achieving a ballistic missile control regime is unlikely inthe immediate future, discussion of such a regime would, by

providing a different perspective on technology development, thedynamics of arms racing, verification issues, and the reasons

claimed for constant upgrades to military forces, help breakthe current deadlock in nuclear arms reduction efforts. The

chances for progress will be improved if the attention – and pressure– of broader civil society can be brought to bear, perhaps through a campaignfor the comprehensive flight-test ban as the first step away from the abyss ofa new arms race, which would be effective, simple for a wider public tounderstand, and relatively easy to verify.

CONCLUSION


20

ENDNOTES

1. A/57/229, 23 July 2002.

2 The need for such an alternative to deterrence andmissile defense has been emphasized by JayantaDhanapala. Speech, “Eliminating Nuclear Arsenals:The NPT Pledge and What It Means” (Talk at AllParty Group on Global Security and Non-Prolifera-tion, House of Commons, London, England, 3 July2000).

3 The development of certain other types of ballisticmissile defenses—for example, those employing lasersfrom or space—would be limited indirectly by thelaunch inspection and control elements of theregime proposed here; see further discussion belowand in a separate paper under preparation.

4 On the stability issues concerning missile defense see(Scheffran, 1989) and (Scheffran, 2001a).

5 This idea is based on a suggestion for the FissileMaterial Cutoff (Mian 2000a). Some of theelements for ballistic missiles have been outlined in(Scheffran 2001b). The framework approach wasfirst developed for environmental treaties such as theClimate Change Convention.

6 Mian, 2000b.

7 Mufson & Milbank, 2001.

8 Rissanen, 2001; DD 2000

9 Despite an initial effort in 1957 to get agreement onthe exclusive use of outer space for peaceful pur-poses, the United States consistently has maintainedthat “peaceful” uses of outer space means only non-aggressive uses and that military uses of space,including placement of weapons in space, is permis-sible unless specifically forbidden by treaty. ArticleIV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits theplacing in orbit or on “celestial bodies” ‘nuclearweapons or any other kind of weapons of massdestruction.’ For an overview of the development oflaw relevant to the weaponization of space see(Menon 1989).

10 Current MTCR members are Argentina, Australia,Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the CzechRepublic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,

Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, therepublic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, NewZealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, SouthAfrica, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the UnitedStates. See for example (DD 2001).

11 See (Scheffran & Karp 1992). Nolan (1989) arguesthat the ‘controls on missile exports, howeverdesirable, represent efforts to assert great powerprerogatives in a world in which the foundations forsuch prerogative are eroding quickly.’

12 One forecast of the worldwide satellite launchmarket for 2000-2009 estimates the value ofsatellites at over $126 billion and the cost of launchservices at over $49 billion. See (Teal 1999).

13 MTCR, 2000.

14 DD, 2001.

15 Rice, 2000.

16 ACT, 2000.

17 CCFPD, 2000; LCSG!, 2001.

18 It is often assumed that the main motivation for thenuclear and missile programs of states are regionalthreats and thus they do not have anything to dowith the P-5 arsenals. But the P-5, especially theUnited States, have a global military presence andthus are a de facto ‘regional’ threat to all countries.The premise that equitable disarmament is unneces-sary for nonproliferation has been termed ‘thegrandest illusion of the nuclear age’ (Perkovich 1999,464).

19 UN, 2001.

20 Adelman, 1991.

21 IDR, 1995.

22 Frye, 1992; Frye 1996; Sherman 1987.

23 For analyses of the proposal see the special issue ofInternational Security 12, no. 1, (Summer 1987) and(Schultz 1993).

ENDNOTES

21


REFERENCES

ACT, 2000. ‘US-Russian Strategic Stability Co-operation Initiative’, Arms Control Today (Octo-ber).

Adelman, Kenneth L., 1991. ‘How to Limit Everybody’sMissiles’, New York Times (7 April).

Burr, William & Jeffrey Richelson, 2000/01. ‘Whetherto ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The UnitedStates and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64’,International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter): 54-99.

CCFPD, 2000. ‘Ballistic Missiles Foreign ExpertsRoundtable Report, March 30-31, 2000’, Cana-dian Centre for Foreign Policy Development (April7). Available on the internet at: http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/ABOLISH NUCS/BMDexpertsMarch00.html

Covault, Craig, 2000. ‘NIMA Infotech Retools U.S.Space Recon Ops’, Aviation Week and Space Technol-ogy (7 August): 62-65.

DD, 2000. ‘Chinese CD PAROS Working Paper’,Disarmament Diplomacy 43 (January/February): 45-46.

DD, 2001. ‘MTCR Plenary Meeting’, DisarmamentDiplomacy (September): 46.

DOD, 2001. ‘Navy Area Missile Defense ProgramCanceled’, U.S. Department of Defense NewsRelease 637-01 (December 14).

Dean, Jonathan, 1998. ‘Step-By-Step Control OverBallistic and Cruise Missiles’, Disarmament Diplomacy31 (October): 2-11.

Frye, Alton, 1992. ‘Zero Ballistic Missiles’, Foreign Policy88 (Fall): 12-17.

Frye, Alton, 1996. ‘Banning Ballistic Missiles’, ForeignAffairs (Nov/Dec): 99-112.

Holton, J. Jerome, Lora Lumpe & Jeremy J. Stone,1993. ‘Proposal for a Zero Ballistic Missile Regime’,1993 Science and International Security Anthology.Washington, D.C.: American Association for theAdvancement of Science (379-396).

24 Lumpe 1993; Holton, Lumpe & Stone, 1993.

25 Dean, 1998.

26 For an analysis of the applicability of such a regimeto the case of South Asia, see (Mian & Ramana,1999).

27 We explore this in greater detail in a separateforthcoming paper.

28 See further (Scheffran 1995), (Scheffran 1997) and(Scheffran 1993).

29 A loss of confidence in the reliability of a militarysystem does not translate into a gain in confidencethat the system will fail. Thus, the perceived deterringability is not lost. This issue has been extensivelydiscussed

30 Nolan, 1991.

ENDNOTES/REFERENCES


22

Nolan, Janne E., 1991. Trappings of Power: BallisticMissiles in the Third World. Washington, D.C.:Brookings.

Perkovich, George, 1999. India’s Nuclear Bomb: TheImpact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Perlez, Jane, 2000. ‘North Korea’s Missile Pledge Pavesthe Way for New Talks’, New York Times (June 22).

Ramana, M. V. & A. H. Nayyar, 2001. ‘India, Pakistanand the Bomb’, Scientific American (2001): 60-71.

Rice, M. 2000. ‘Russia Proposes Global Regime OnMissile Proliferation’, Arms Control Today (May).

Rissanen, Jenni, 2001. ‘CD Inches Forward’, Disarma-ment Diplomacy 57 (May): 26-30.

Roberts, Brad, 2000. Asymmetric Conflict 2010 Institutefor Defense Analyses (November): 27-28.

Rumsfeld, Donald H., 2001b. ‘Report to Congress onthe Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets’,Submitted by the Secretary of Defense in Conjunc-tion with the Secretary of Energy in response toSection 1044 of the Floyd D. Spence NationalDefense Authorization Act for the Year 2001, PL106-398, July 2001, p. 18. The unclassified contentof the report can be found on the Internet at: http://www.nukewatch.org/nwd/HiRes_Report_to_Congress_on_the_Defeat.pdf

Scheffran, Jürgen, 1989. ‘Strategic Defense, Disarma-ment and Stability’, PhD dissertation, Marburg.

Scheffran, Jürgen & Aaron Karp, 1992. ‘The NationalImplementation of the Missile Technology ControlRegime: The US and German Experiences’, in H.G.Brauch, H.J. v. d. Graaf, J. Grin, & W. Smit eds,Controlling the Development and Spread of MilitaryTechnology, Amsterdam: VU University Press (235-255).

Scheffran, Jürgen, 1993. ‘Dual Use of Missiles andSpace Technologies,’ in Gotz Neuneck &O.Ischebeck eds, MissileTechnologies, Proliferation andConcepts for Arms Control, Baden-Baden, Germany:Nomos (49-68).

Scheffran, Jürgen, 1995. ‘Verification of Ballistic MissileBans and Monitoring of Space Launches’, inWolfgang Liebert & Jürgen Scheffran eds, AgainstProliferation - Towards General Disarmament, Münster,Germany: Agenda (156-164).

IDR, 1995. ‘Canada Calls for Ballistic-missile Ban’,International Defense Review (1 June).

LCSGI, 2001. ‘The Missile Defence Debate: GuidingCanada’s Role’, Available at the Liu Centre for theStudy of Global Issues internet site http://www.liucentre.ubc.ca/report/Defencereport.html.

Lichterman, Andrew, 2001. Looking for New Ways to UseNuclear Weapons: U.S. Counterproliferation Programs,Weapons Effects Research, and “Mini-Nuke” Develop-ment, Western States Legal Foundation InformationBulletin, (Winter). Available on the Internet at:http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/mininuke.pdf

Lumpe, Lora, 1993. ‘Zero Ballistic Missiles and theThird World’, Arms Control Today (April): 218-223.

MTCR, 2000. ‘Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technol-ogy Control Regime, 2000’, Press Release. Availableon the Internet at: http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/mtcr00.htm

Mahnaimi, Uzi & Peter Conradi, 2000. ‘Fears of NewArms Race as Israel Tests Cruise Missiles’, The SundayTimes (June 18).

Menon, P.K., 1989. ‘Arms Limitation in Outer Spacefor Human Survival’, in H.G. Brauch, ed, MilitaryTechnology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament:ABC Weapons, Military Use of Nuclear Energy and ofOuter Space and Implications for International Law.New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp.445-470.

Mian, Zia, 2000a. ‘A Proposal for an InternationalFramework Convention on Fissile Materials’,Unpublished Manuscript, Princeton University(April).

Mian, Zia, 2000b. ‘What’s Next? Disarmament Afterthe 2000 NPT Review Conference’, Talk at NGOPanel Discussion, United Nations, New York (May).

Mian, Zia & M. V. Ramana, ‘Beyond Lahore: FromTransparency to Arms Control’, Economic andPolitical Weekly (17-24 April): 938-942.

Mufson, Steven, & Dana Milbank, 2001. ‘U.S. SetsMissile Treaty Pullout’, The Washington Post (Decem-ber 14): p.1.

Nolan, Janne E., 1989. ‘Ballistic Missiles in the ThirdWorld: The Limits of Nonproliferation’, ArmsControl Today (November): 9-14.

REFERENCES

23


APPENDIX 1COUNTRY NAME MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS RANGE (KM) PAYLOAD (KG)

India Agni ballistic missile 1500-2500 1000

India Sagarika naval ballistic/cruise missile 300 500 (?)

Pakistan Shaheen-I ballistic missile 750 1000

Pakistan Shaheen-II ballistic missile 2300(?) 1000

Pakistan Ghauri II ballistic missile 1500-2300 500

Israel Jericho I ballistic missile 500 1000

Israel Jericho II ballistic missile 1500 1000

Israel ? submarine launched missile 1500 ?

Iran Shahab III ballistic missile 1300 750

North Korea No Dong I ballistic missile 1000 1000

North Korea1 No Dong II ballistic missile 1500 1000

North Korea Taepo Dong ballistic missile 2000 1000

Taiwan Sky Horse Ballistic missile 950 500

1 North Korea has pledged that it would not flight-test the Nodong II (Perlez 2000) and (Wagner 2001).

This could imply that it has terminated the program or is planning to do so.

Scheffran, Jürgen, 1997. ‘Elimination of BallisticMissiles,’ in Joseph Rotblat & Michiji Konuma eds,Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, Singapore:World Scientific (310-326).

Scheffran, Jürgen, 2001a. ‘Missile Defense, InternationalStability and Preventive Arms Control’, Paperpresented at Workshop on National and TheaterMissile Defences after the US Elections, Berlin, 14 –16 February.

Scheffran, Jürgen, 2001b. ‘Moving Beyond MissileDefense – The Search for Alternatives to the MissileRace’, Disarmament Diplomacy 55 (March): 21-26.

Sherman, Robert, 1987. ‘Deterrence Through a BallisticMissile Flight Test Ban’, Arms Control Today (Decem-ber): 8-13.

Shultz, George P., 1993. Turn and Triumph. New York:Scribners.

Teal, 1999. ‘Teal Forecasts 1447 Satellites, 850-950Launches Through 2009’, Teal Group PressRelease, (June 18). Available on the Internet at:http://www.tealgroup.com/pressreleases/launchforecast2009.htm

UN, 2001. ‘Secretary-General Says New U.S. DefencePolicy, Including Plans for Missile Defences, Impactson Global Security and Strategic Stability’, SG/SM/7788 DC/2276 (1 May 2001). Available on theInternet at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7788.doc.htm

Wagner, Alex, 2001. ‘D.P.R.K. Extends Missile Pledge asU.S. Readies to Resume Talks’, Arms Control Today(June). Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_06/korjun01.asp.

Zakheim, Dov S., 1999. ‘Old Rivalries, New Arsenals’,IEEE Spectrum (March): 31.

REFERENCES


October 2002

BEYOND MISSILE DEFENSE - Western States Legal … · INESAP, Technical University Darmstadt,...

Documents

Transcript of BEYOND MISSILE DEFENSE - Western States Legal … · INESAP, Technical University Darmstadt,...