Beyond Eurafrica?

MA-thesis for the Master of Arts in European Studies

Beyond Eurafrica?

Sovereignty, Hegemony and Human Rights in the political economy of the trade rela-

tions between the Area of European Integration and the former AASM.

An interdisciplinary approach.

Philippe Lionnet

06-108-914

Bernstrasse 147

3400 Burgdorf BE

+41 79 202 88 89

[email protected]

Center for International and European Studies, University of Basel

MA European Studies

Prof. Dr. Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Prof. Dr. Laurent Goetschel

Fall-semester 2011

Handed in: 05.01.2012

mailto:[email protected]

University of Basel Beyond Eurafrica? Center for International and European Studies MA-Thesis MA European Studies Philippe Lionnet Prof. Dr. K. Nadakavukaren / Prof. Dr. L. Goetschel 05.01.2012

2

DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I hereby declare that I have written this document without support by third persons

and with legitimate means, only with the sources and the literature indicated.

Burgdorf, January 3, 2012

Philippe Lionnet


3

Thesis acknowledgments

This paper was for the most part written during a stay at the European Union Center

of Excellence at University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, using the European Union

Commission Archival Collection and the Archive of European Integration located

there. The realisation of this project would not have been possible without the assis-

tance of a number of persons. First, I would like to thank the Kálmán and Maria

Lauer-Stein Foundation in Basel and Prof. Dr. Stephan Breitenmoser of the Uni-

versity of Basel Faculty of Law for the very generous support of my undertaking. In

terms of conception of my work, my advisors Prof. Dr. Laurent Goetschel and Prof.

Dr. Krista Nadakavukaren-Schefer were primary influences through their seminars I

had the opportunity to visit and contribute to during my studies in Basel and their

comments on my project in various discussions. Another rather unexpected input on

the question of changing sovereignty crucial for this thesis came from Dr. Christian

Arnsperger, who encouraged me to look beyond the existing definitions of this con-

cept of international law and gave me valuable input on its apparently changing na-

ture from the perspective of an economist.

Also, the very friendly and straightforward assistance by Dr. Phil Wilkin, curator of

the archival collection was decisive in order to find the documents necessary for my

project among the huge quantities available in his excellent archive. His detailed

knowledge of the available sources and the history of the European integration pro-

cess saved me hours and hours of searching. I would also like to express my grati-

tude towards the staff of the EUCE, namely Dr. Timothy Thompson for the warm

welcome and the possibility to contribute a talk to the institute’s event-schedule and

Prof. Dr. Christian Gerlach of the University of Bern, for bringing the resources in

Pittsburgh to my attention in the first place and his support in various issues since my

BA-studies in Bern. Finally, without all the discussions with my friends and family and

their backup, my studies would generally not have been possible in the way they did.

Thank you.


4

1. Introduction 7

2. Theoretical background 10

2.1. Legal principles 10

2.2. Theoretical framework 23

2.3 Approach and research-questions 34

2.4 Sources and Literature 40

2.5 Method 42

3. The trade systems 44

3.1. The colonial pattern 44

3.1.1. The System of Berlin 49

3.2. The Treaty of Rome 52

3.3. The “Regime of Association” with the AASM (1957-1963)56

3.3.1 The “Regime of association” and sovereignty 64

3.4. The System of Yaoundé (1963-1975) 72

3.4.1 Sovereignty and the System of Yaoundé 81

3.5. The System of Lomé (1975-1990) 85

3.5.1 Sovereignty and the System of Lomé 94

3.6. Beyond “the spirit of Lomé” (1990-2000) 96

3.6.1 Sovereignty beyond the spirit of Lomé? 102

3.7. Cotonou: The contemporary pattern (2000-) 107

3.7.1 Cotonou and sovereignty 113

4. Analysis – A general shift of paradigms? 116

5. Conclusion 123

6. Literature and Resources 126


5

List of abbreviations

AASM ASSOCIATED AFRICAN STATES AND MADAGASCAR

ACP AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC (STATES)

AEI AREA OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

CAP COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

CFA UNTIL 1958 COLONIES FRANÇAISES D’AFRIQUE, SINCE 1958 COOPÉ-

RATION/COMMUNAUTÉ FINANCIÈRE EN AFRIQUE

CID CENTRE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

CU CUSTOMS UNION

DG DIRECTORATE GENERAL (OF THE COMMISSION)

DS DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY

EC EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

ECSC EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY

EDF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

EEC EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

EU EUROPEAN UNION

EURATOM EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY

FTA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

GATT GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

IEL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

ILO INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

ILS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY

IS INTERDEPENDENCE SOVEREIGNTY

ITO INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANISATION


6

LDC LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

MFI MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION

NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

NIEO NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

ROO RULES OF ORIGIN

STABEX STABILISATION OF EXPORT EARNINGS (FUND)

SYSMIN SYSTEM OF STABILISATION OF EXPORT EARNINGS FROM MINING

(PRODUCTS)

UNCTAD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

UNO UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

WS WESTPHALIAN SOVEREIGNTY

WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION


7

1. Introduction

When the governments of six states on the European continent initiated a process of

continuous economic and political cooperation by abandoning parts of their sover-

eignty in trade matters, they in fact included a pre-existing system of interrelated so-

cieties into their attempts to establish a trade system: especially the late 19th century

had seen a policy of acquisition, occupation and administration of colonies by the

naval powers of the European continent, leading to an immense expansion of the

territory under their control and thereby of raw-material supplies, markets for manu-

factured products, spaces for capital accumulation and of countering domestic social

pressures1, “integrating” them in a system which became known as imperial – a ref-

erence to the empires of the European antique. Of course, this “integration” had been

different from the process beginning between the six. But both processes became

connected, as the trade-relations remained and were partly organised under the aus-

pices of the European Economic Community (EEC).

The agreements between the political institutions of this Area of European Integration

(further on referred to as AEI) and the African States which were part of the French,

Belgian, Italian or temporarily German colonial system have accompanied both par-

ties since the Treaties of Rome. The AASM-states, as they were called by the Com-

mission of the European Community in 1957, were not only part of the external rela-

tions of the AEI from its beginnings – as opposed to the British Commonwealth of

Nations - but also accurately reflected a territorial division imposed earlier by ambi-

tious European Powers, namely through the General Act of the Berlin Conference in

18842. As many African states celebrated 50 years of independence in 2010, it signi-

fied basically the same anniversary of “post-colonial association” with the very same

states of which independence had been gained. The association, reflecting other

1 See e.g. Fieldhouse, David K., The West and the Third World, Oxford 1999; Osterhammel,

Jürgen, Kolonialismus, 5. Edition, Munich 2006 and Münkler, Herfried, Imperien, 2. Edition,

Berlin 2008 for historical overviews. 2 Available at The Latin Library:

http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/berlinconference.html (Last access:

10.11.2011).

http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/berlinconference.html


8

structural changes in the system of international relations as the end of the Cold War

and the debt crisis caused namely by the excessive lending of cheap petro-dollars in

the 1980s underwent series of quantitative changes during the decades of its exist-

ence, with apparently new and innovative paradigms and approaches to reach ap-

parently changing goals. What remained a basic principle throughout the series of

agreements and also of the expansion of multilateral trade liberalisation through the

GATT and later on the WTO was the assumption, that all these agreements and eco-

nomic systems were the result of equal negotiations between sovereign states distin-

guished through territorial borders, state population and exclusive political control as

it was traditionally the case between the states of Europe and their historic affiliates

in North America. Being the basic principle of international relations and the system

of states originating in the political arrangements of the Peace of Westphalia – there-

fore a European concept – state sovereignty is of central importance for the focus of

the thesis. The end of the colonial regime and the beginning of contractual relations

with the European Community interrelate with an extensive expansion of nominal

sovereignty, as 40 new states emerged between 1945 and 1960. Their relations to

the existing states on the European continent which had granted sovereignty alt-

hough remained in different ways, one of them being the institutionalised connection

to the AEI-African trade relations have been a part of it from the very beginning until

today as a specific branch and an integration-process in itself.

This thesis intends to shed light on the nature and history of this relationship and

seeks to analyse what role state sovereignty had in the trade system for the involved

parties and how it was applied therein – concentrating on its relationship to economic

integration – to encapsulate whether the numerous quantitative changes give

grounds for a rather qualitative, structural change beyond the mere variety of rhetoric,

an actual restructuring of the aid and trade relations. To do so, it follows an interdis-

ciplinary historical approach based on a critical perspective in the neogramscian tra-

dition, combined with a legal analysis based on the relevant fundamental principles of

international economic law and argues, that processes of restructuring may be theo-

rized by analysing the relation and separation of the economic and the political

sphere from the perspective of states and that sovereignty as a concept can be use-


9

ful to highlight changes in the international political economy. As it is the area cov-

ered by the AEI since the transition to sovereignty in the early 1960s, the geograph-

ical focus lies on the former French colonies in West Africa and the island of Mada-

gascar, named Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) since the Treaty

of Rome. After having set the analytical framework, it provides an historical overview

of the relations European states have established with the AASM-states in Sub-

Saharan Africa through treaties beginning in the late 1950s, following a comparative

analysis of the basic concepts within those treaties based on the concept of sover-

eignty. It thereby covers a fairly long period of time, where the amount of institutional,

political and social changes obviously seems to be vast, which emphasizes the need

to concentrate on the very baseline of the development. The main interest concerns

the relationship between international economic integration and domestic policy and

their interaction, resulting in concrete legal regimes affecting domestic margins of the

possible and also serving the dissemination of concrete economic concepts and ide-

as aiming at changes in modes of production.

The introduction of political conditionalities and therein relationship between Human

Rights and trade policy, which appear to go hand in hand since the Council agreed

upon their introduction as interrelated aspects of trade policy3, will be especially high-

lighted. Two main contributions are intended to be made: First, the application of a

neogramscian approach on the specific policy area by giving a historically embedded

view on the current state of affairs intends to test the validity of the approach and to

encapsulate its value for an understanding of European politics towards the African

ACP-states. Second, the evaluation of sovereignty as a legal principle to connect the

legal and political aspects of the thesis by integrating it in the theoretical framework is

intended to add a perspective on the apparently “changing” nature of the concept

though processes of globalisation.

3 See Directorate General for External Relations, Resolution of the council and the member

states meeting in the council on human rights, democracy and development, 28. November

1991.


10

2. Theoretical background

The following chapter intends to line out the theoretical foundation of the thesis. It

begins with an introduction into basic principles of International Economic Law (fur-

ther referred to as IEL) emphasizing on aspects relevant for aid and trade agree-

ments. In a second section, the origins and basic principles of neogramsican theory

will be treated, concentrating on its contributions to the analysis of international politi-

cal economy. Subsequently, the two sections are lead together in a third section,

where the research questions and the approach derived from both fields are ex-

plained and illustrated.

2.1. Legal principles

The rise of IEL to one of the most important fields of law is a relatively novel devel-

opment. Its volume, scope and efficacy have increased significantly since the 1980s.

This development although, as often argued when referring to an assumed process

of globalisation, relates not primarily to the amount of bi- and multilateral trade

agreements which existed also in a comparable quantity in the late 19th and the early

20th century, but in a shift of competencies from the domestic to the international

sphere of regulation and the respective institutionalisation4. The increasing im-

portance and coverage of IEL is therefore the expression of the dominance of a trade

system based on multilaterally agreed and partly regulated free trade.

As the relations between the European Community and later on the European Union

and the AASM/ACP-states are enshrined in international treaties (further referred to

as “the Conventions”) and relate to other trade regimes with which they share the

vocabulary, certain fundamental principles and institutions of international economic

4 The law of international treaties is significantly older. See: Faundez, Julio, international Eco-

nomic Law and development: before and after neo-liberalism, in: Faundez, Julio, Tan, Celine

(ed.), International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries, Cheltenham 2010,

pp. 10-33.


11

law are necessary for an analysis of their development. The following section gives

an overview on the terms used in the thesis and their significance for the subject. Se-

cond, the relevant regimes existing outside the Conventions and their basic mecha-

nisms are lined out. Because of the nature of the relations discussed in this thesis,

aspects of general International Law are to be taken into account as well as some of

particular (Treaty) Law. The term “International Law” already implies that nation-

states, usually represented by their executive branch of government are central for

this field. As the European Union and earlier the European Communities are in many

respects an extraordinary actor in the international sphere and certainly no nation-

state, a basic question arises: what does the entity represent in the particular field of

trade relations?

Regarding trade relations with the outside, the AEI first and foremost is to be seen as

a customs union (CU), planned since the treaties of Rome and completed in 1968,

which means an association between states who agree to have most or all trade bar-

riers based on tariffs removed between them while setting up common external tariffs

(CET) and quotas for goods entering from outside the CU5. Therefore, the regulation

of trade flows from the outside into the territory of the CU as it lays in the focus of this

thesis lies to some extent in the nature of the entity. The European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC), although, already went a step further before the CU: the states

transferred certain parts of their economic sovereignty in trade matters to a supra-

national body, which later on acted based on European Community Law forming an

independent body of law - according to the court set up to ensure its application6.

5 See Baldwin, Richard, Wyplosz, Charles, The Economics of European integration, 3. Edition,

New York 2009, pp. 172 ff. 6 As the European Court of Justice held in: EuGH, Costa/E.N.E.L., 1251, 1964, No. 6: “Zum Un-

terschied von gewöhnlichen internationalen Verträgen hat der E[W]G-Vertrag eine eigene

Rechtsordnung geschaffen, die bei seinem Inkrafttreten in die Rechtsordnungen der Mitglied-

staaten aufgenommen worden und von ihren Gerichten anzuwenden ist. Durch die Gründung

einer Gemeinschaft für unbegrenzte Zeit, die mit eigenen Organen, mit der Rechts- und Ge-

schäftsfähigkeit, mit internationaler Handlungsfähigkeit und insbesondere mit echten, aus der

Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten der Mitgliedstaaten auf die Gemeinschaft herrührenden Ho-

heitsrechten ausgestattet ist, haben die Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveränitätsrechte beschränkt

und so einen Rechtskörper geschaffen, der für Ihre Angehörigen und sie selbst verbindlich

ist.“


12

Sovereignty, as defined by the French scholar Jean Bodin in 1576 and enshrined for

Western Europe during the peace of Westphalia in 1648 is the fundamental principle7

of the international system of states, forming a normative and – to a certain extent -

legal basis for the effective supremacy of territorial entities8. According to STEPHEN

KRASNER, it consists of four main elements based on authority and control. Au-

thority refers to the aspect of a government of whatever nature being the primary

entity entitled to exercise domestic political power on its territory, defined by borders

and externally through representation. Control on the other hand refers to the actual

capabilities of a government to do so through its institutions. Both aspects are interre-

lated, but may also exist independently – occupation, as an example, may remove

the control of a domestic government and replace it by a foreign whereas authority is

not affected by this act. The occupied territory is possessed, but the occupying force

is not entitled to this possession. This differentiation – as an example - is of high im-

portance for contemporary International Humanitarian Law, as far as it concerns the

responsibilities of occupying powers. The moment when a state actually becomes a

person of international law is controversial, the main division being between a consti-

tutive approach and a declarative approach9.

The four sub-sets of sovereignty KRASNER has established are:10

1. Domestic sovereignty (DS): the power of the nation-state within its territorial bor-

ders to exercise political authority through structures and policy. It appeals to both

authority and control and has also been denoted by the permanent Court of arbitra-

tion in the case Island of Palmas in 1928 as “independence, signified by sovereign-

ty”11.

7 Or, as Krasner puts it, the “single most important question for political analysis”. See: Krasner,

Stephen, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton 1999, p.12. 8 Sander, Simon, The meaning of economic sovereignty.

9 Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, 5. Edition, Cambridge 2003, pp. 367 ff.

10 Krasner 2003.

11 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Netherlands v. USA, Island of Palmas case, April 4, 1928:

“Sovereignty, in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard

to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the

function of a state.”


13

2. Interdependence sovereignty (IS): the control of transborder flows between

states, e.g. goods, persons, pollutants, diseases and intellectual property. This cate-

gory obviously bears certain importance for issues related to international trade and

globalisation. An erosion of IS would thus be given, if a state lost control over its

borders while nominally having authority within them.

3. Westphalian sovereignty (WS): A product of the peace negotiations following a

decade-long war in Europe leading to the erosion or dissolution of political stability, it

is founded on the principles of territorial integrity, inviolability of its borders and

the supremacy of the state as a governing body within its territory over external fac-

tors and structures (e.g. invaders or religious institutions). As KRASNER puts it: “The

fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that states exist in specific territo-

ries, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate be-

haviour”12. Therefore, domestic authority and the inviolability of borders are the

main features of WS.

4. International legal sovereignty (ILS): It concerns the establishment of a political

entity according to DS, IS and WS in the international sphere, meaning the recogni-

tion of its authority by other sovereign entities and its exercise to establish legal rela-

tions through contracts or membership in international organisations.

Negatively spoken, the categories DS, IS, WS and ILS describe mutually recog-

nised, legally independent territorial entities, having control over their inviola-

ble borders, able to exercise effective authority and control without the inter-

ference of external structures, but also include different variations of this assumed

situation by differentiating its aspects. The governments of the states are transmitters

of sovereignty and also eventual international obligations through their domestic ju-

risdiction13, meaning the power to exercise law. Although the sub-sets are cumula-

tive, they are not exclusive. A state is not inexistent, when it is no longer able to exer-

12

Krasner, p. 20. 13

Enshrined in Art. 27 of the UN-charter.


14

cise some or even all of the aspects of sovereignty – sovereignty and jurisdiction may

be derogated or divided. Examples are cases of administrative cession, where

territories have their own jurisdiction without sovereignty for functional reasons14, the

aforementioned occupation where jurisdiction shifts to another power but sovereign-

ty remains in place, the co-empirium of an “internationalised” area15 and finally the

condominium, where sovereignty and jurisdiction are both divided16. Considering

colonial rule, the categories of title as a legally protected right of recognition and

possession as the actual control over a territory or a resource are important17. As

will be shown later, the European colonial rule in most cases formally left title and

authority with “domestic rulers”, but exercised control by taking possession18.

According to CHARLES TILLY19 and KRASNER20, these concepts emerged under

circumstances dominated by processes of violent coercion and accumulation as dis-

tinctive features of the international order. As inter-state relations have moved from

the strategic-military system of the Treaty of Westphalia and also the Conference of

Vienna in 1815 to rather trade-centered relations, an adaptation of the concept ap-

pears necessary:

14

An example is the "Badischer Bahnhof" in Basel. 15

Like Beijing in the late 19th century or the allied occupation of Berlin in 1945.

16 E.g. the island of Andorra.

17 See: Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic Law, Dordrecht 1999, pp. 134 ff. and also

the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883 available at

the World Intellectual Property Organization:

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html (Last access: 23.11.2011). 18

As comparable to contemporary transnational corporations, which partly exercise control over

certain natural resources and territories without formally having any authority. See the Confer-

ence Report on the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Natural Resources and Conflict

in Africa, June 19 2006, available at:

http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Afr

ica_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov%2017.pdf (Last access

16.12.2011). See especially chapter VI, pp. 17 ff. 19

Tilly, Charles, States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992, in: Theory and Society, Vol. 23,

No. 1, February 1994, pp. 131-146. Available at JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org/pss/657814 (Last

access 20.10.2011). 20

Krasner, Stephen D., Compromising Westphalia, in: International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, Win-

ter 1995-1996, pp. 115-151. Available at JSTOR: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539141 (Last

access 24.10.2011).

http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html

http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Natural%20Resources%20and%20Conflict%20in%20Africa_%20Cairo%20Conference%20ReportwAnnexes%20Nov%2017.pdf


http://www.jstor.org/pss/657814

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539141


15

Economic sovereignty is – although frequently used21 to describe and analyse e.g.

processes of “globalisation” – not comprehensively defined. Concerning economic

and trade policies, It seems plausible that some attributes may although be derived

from KRASNERs approach: IS gives ground to include control of economic flows

over the borders, e.g. in analogy to the EEC: labour, goods, services, capital. DS im-

plicitly includes monetary and macroeconomic policies as well as the creation and

distribution of certain public goods and the use of natural resources. ILS obviously

refers to the possibility of a state to enter international trade negotiations and act as a

legal person of international law, whereas WS through its authority-aspect indicates

the supremacy of the domestic state within its borders. In reality however, most

states do not fully control those aspects - which would be the approach of a Stalinist

system of planned, domestic economy - or have given up control in different cases

for different reasons. THOMAS FRIEDMAN has famously coined the term Golden

Straitjacket22 to describe states giving up aspects of their traditional sovereignty for

the sake of economic gains – a point of view that has much earlier been taken by the

Permanent Court of Justice as well in the case SS Wimbledon concerning sovereign-

ty23. Concerning processes of economic and political integration, it seems therefore

necessary to add the possibility of a state voluntarily abandoning parts of its sover-

eignty through a principally sovereign act – for example through the membership in a

supranational organisation. As contradictory as this seems, the possibility of entering

international treaties in the sense of ILS does in my opinion not cover the step from

mere contractual trade obligations to the longer-term transfer of competencies to a

supranational body.

21

E.g. the Declaration of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, November

30, 2009 as a contemporary example, available at: http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/oedp.pdf (Last

access: 15.12.2011) or contributions by various scholars. See: Sander, Simon, The meaning

of Economic Sovereignty, University of Uppsala, September 2011. 22

Friedman, Thomas, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization, Chicago

2000, pp.101-112. 23

“The Court declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a state undertakes to per-

form or refrain from performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt

any convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the

sovereign rights of the state, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain

way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State sovereign-

ty”. PCIJ, Case of the SS Wimbledon, Judgment No. 1 of August 17 1923, p.25.

http://www.umatilla.nsn.us/oedp.pdf


16

Concerning international treaties, the principle usually referred to by the brocard pac-

ta sunt servanda24 is most important. It basically means that for the sake of good

faith and legal certainty, treaties are to be kept – even if they may contradict domestic

law of a state25. The same holds for general principles of international customary law,

which following the principle of supremacy of international law over politics, excluding

certain options for domestic governments and legislators. This principle, appearing

only logical from our present-day perspective, is not as comprehensive as it seems.

The main contender-state towards the transatlantic western international system in

the Cold-War era26, the Soviet Union, has not accepted the supremacy and principles

of this international law for its foreign policy until the end of the 1980s27 - what signi-

fied the end of an alternative international system nominally based on socialist inter-

nationalism, principles of equality, self-determination and peaceful co-existence and

an inherent right to intervention based on class-struggle as an underlying concept28.

As international treaties are in most cases established between sovereign states, the

principle of sovereign equality is crucial. Enshrined in Art. 2, Sec.1 of the UN-

charter of 194429, it was defined in more detail in the Declaration of Principles of In-

24

See Shaw 2003: “Arguably the oldest principle of international law”. 25

Herdegen, Matthias, Völkerrecht, 8. Edition, Munich 2009, pp. 33-35. For a different view

based on contemporary developments, see: Nollkaemper, Andre, Rethinking the Supremacy

of International Law, Amsterdam Center for International Law working paper, February 3,

2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336946 (Last access: 20.12.2011). 26

See Van der Pijl, Kees, Transnational classes and international relations, London and New

York 2005, pp.79 ff. 27

See: Altrichter, Helmut, Kleine Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917-1991, 3. Edition, Munich

2007, pp. 172 ff. and Shaw 2003, p. 33: „The Soviet Union would act in pursuance of Leninist-

Stalinist foreign policy ideals and would not be bound by the rules to which it had not given

express consent“. 28

One of the main theorists of Socialist international relations, Evgeny Pashukanis, saw interna-

tional law as a transitional interclass law within two opposed systems until the collapse of the

capitalist system and the victory of the proletarian revolution. During the Stalinist renunciation

of revolutionary internationalism he although influenced the academic discourse within the

USSR in the opposite direction, interpreting international law as a direct means of class war-

fare rather than a temporary compromise. See Grzybowski, Kazimierz, Soviet international law

and the world economic order, London 1987 and Shaw 2003, p. 32. 29

“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members”. The

Charter of the United Nations. Available at the United Nations:

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (Last access 23.12.2011).

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1336946

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml


17

ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Ac-

cordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 197030:

1. States are juridically equal

2. Each state enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty

3. States have the duty to respect the personality of other States

4. The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable

5. Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic

and cultural systems

6. Each state is obliged to fully and faithfully comply with its international obligations

and to live in peace with other nations

Those points reflect a long-established positivist perspective31 on international law as

based on the principle of consent between the states, meaning that states are not

only the main subjects of international law, but also its main creators and modifiers –

in contrast to domestic law based on centralised legislation. The legal fiction estab-

lished through these points appears to contain rights as territorial integrity as well as

obligations as non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state – although the

bundle of rights inherent in full sovereignty is not comprehensively defined and there-

fore hardly justiciable.

If sovereign states decide by consent through their governments to partly or totally

abolish barriers of trade between their borders without agreeing on a common exter-

nal tariff, they enter a free trade agreement (FTA), usually through the mutual ratifi-

cation of a treaty governing the terms and conditions of the exchange-relationship32.

If one of the parties within the agreements grants advantages to the other by e.g.

30

UN General Assembly, Declaration of Principles of international Law Concerning Friendly Re-

lations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

October 24, 1970. Available at the UNHCR:

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,459d17822,459d17a82,3dda1f104,0.html (Last access:

01.01.2012). 31

See: Totaro, Martin V., Legal Positivism, Constructivism and International Human Rights Law,

in: Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2008, pp. 720-765. 32

Baldwin/Wyplosz 2009, pp. 177-180.

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,459d17822,459d17a82,3dda1f104,0.html


18

lowering its tariffs for certain goods the other party exports without claiming the same

treatment for his comparable goods, the agreement contains preferential treatment

or discriminatory liberalisation33. These preferences may include whole sectors

like commodities, agricultural goods etc. or single states within a system of trade.

Where no preferences are agreed upon and rights and duties are held in equilibrium

between the parties, the agreement is reciprocal34. To avoid transhipment, mean-

ing the entering of a product into an area of preferential trade to benefit from those

preferences without having been produced in the area in the first place, Rules of

origin (ROO)35 are applied to assess the origin of a product. In existing multilateral

trade agreements, preferences and reciprocity are to be granted to all parties to the

same extent to comply with the principle of non-discrimination36. To ensure the

maximum of trade liberalisation within a multilateral agreement, most-favoured-

nation-clauses can oblige the signatories to grant all advantages their most fa-

voured nation receives to all other parties37. As those principles in combination with

the obligation “to serve the treaty” may conflict with domestic legislation, dispute set-

tlement or arbitration plays a crucial role in trade agreements – and as ASIF

QURESHI has convincingly argued concerning trade relations and sovereignty38 as it

allows the protection of economic interests beyond the constraints of the agreement.

To avoid the cancellation of the agreement because of conflicts, an institutional struc-

33

Ibid., pp. 163 ff. 34

It is important to note that reciprocity as a general principle of universal international law differs

from reciprocity in trade agreements, as it therein refers rather to the reciprocal respect of du-

ties agreed upon as an element of legal obligation as a guideline e.g. concerning ius in bello,

not only to the theoretically “equal” exchange of goods. 35

Used to determine whether a good is eligible for preferential treatment or not. They may be

based on the added value influencing the tariff heading, the used materials (“domestic con-

tent”), a “substantial transformation” or specified processes. See Duttagupta, Rupa, Panagari-

ya, Arvind, Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin: Economics and Politics, IMF working paper,

November 2003. Available at the International Monetary Fund:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03229.pdf (Last access: 02.12.2011). 36

Senti, Richard, WTO, Zürich 2011, pp. 36-46. 37

An essential element of multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO. See Senti 2011,

p.36. 38

Qureshi, Asif, Sovereignty issues in the WTO Dispute Settlement – A development sovereign-

ty perspective, in: Shan, Wenhua, Simons, Penelope, Singh, Dalvinder, Redefining sovereign-

ty in International Economic Law, Studies in International Trade Law, Vol.7, Portland 2008, pp.

159-170.

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03229.pdf


19

ture of some sort serves as an appellation body in such cases, intending to solve dis-

putes within the existing framework and the boundaries of its interpretation to stabi-

lise the trade system in the long term.

As I attempt to combine the use of those legal principles mentioned above for an ap-

proach from a neogramscian perspective lined out in the next section, the relevant

tensions and conflicts are to be defined. Concentrating on the dichotomy between

political decisions of governments and domestic legislative bodies and the assumed

locked-in economic policy constraints, the main conflict arises between the obligation

pacta sunt servanda and the sovereignty; probably more concrete the economic

sovereignty of a state. I will further draw on this conflict during my analysis of the

treaty making process within the European-African trade relations. Another legal field

appeared in the 50-years period as a guiding principle of certain trade- and aid-

agreements: The significance of Human Rights in international law and especially its

connections to international economic law is primarily a contemporary development.

Its roots although lie within the Lockean Heartland referred to later on, its first mani-

festations being the Habeas Corpus Act and the Bill of Rights formulated by the Brit-

ish parliament in 167939 and 168940 respectively and the US-declaration of inde-

pendence in 177641. The concern to address human rights in a sphere beyond the

protection of citizens from their government although originally arose from political

movements to abolish slavery – and thus from a trade-issue42. They entered the

sphere of international law after The Second World War through the UN General

Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, after the trials of Nuremberg had seen the ap-

plication of crimes against humanity among others as grounds of justification for the

39

Securing the need of legality as a basic principle of protection of citizens from the government

as a pre-condition for the emergence of liberalism. Available at:

http://www.constitution.org/eng/habcorpa.htm (Last access: 29.12.2011). 40

Securing the rights of the parliament towards the monarchy. Available at the Avalon project of

the Yale Law School: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp (Last access:

14.12.2011). 41

See: Kley, Andreas, Kissling, Christian, Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Bern 2008 for the

interrelations and the mutual influence of the British, the French, the US-American and even

the Swiss constitutional systems. 42

Cottier, Thomas, Trade and Human Rights: A relationship to discover, in: Journal of Interna-

tional Economic Law, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2002, p. 112.

http://www.constitution.org/eng/habcorpa.htm

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp


20

indictment of individuals through the victorious states. During the Cold War, the UN-

pacts I and II added further – although facultative – legal instruments binding gov-

ernments by their consent. Right after the erosion of the socialist regimes in the east,

the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights set the base for an extension of the interna-

tional system of human rights protection in legal application. Globally, the picture re-

mained fragmented until the present day – with comparably high standards of protec-

tion provided within the European Union and also among the signatories of the Euro-

pean Convention of Human Rights43. Based on the extensive ratification of UN-

treaties and covenants, an increasingly strong current44 in legal discourse argues,

that Human Rights within “modern” international law are continuously obtaining a

constitutional character, with an effect erga omnes and ius cogens-character for the

core values on a global scale45. The obvious conflict between the notion of “univer-

sally” binding values and the principles of sovereignty is much older. The notion of

humanitarian intervention, meaning the wilful violation of the sovereign rights of a

state through another for the protection of certain values was developed by Hugo

Grotius in the 17th century and applied centuries before e.g. the intervention of NATO

in Serbia in 199946. It is although a distinctive development in the 1990s, that the pro-

tection of human rights as grounds of justification or even grounds of obligation for

interventions are explicitly applied by western states.47

International economic law and human rights law interrelate in different aspects. First

and most obvious, they have gained significance through the use of conditionalities

based on Human Rights standards. Generally spoken, a system of conditionalities

43

Which includes also states like Russia or Turkey, which are not traditionally seen as “Europe-

an”. 44

An institutional manifestation is the International Criminal Court (ICC), which seeks to anchor

the universal character of Human Rights through a binding international treaty. 45

See Tams, Christian J., Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, Cambridge

Studies in International and Comparative Law No. 44, Cambridge 2005 for an overview with

emphasis on International Criminal Law and its connections to Human Rights. 46

The intervention of a French expeditionary force in Syria in 1860 as an example was legiti-

mised through the forced consent of the Osman Empire through the European imperial powers

to protect Lebanese Christians from massacres by Muslim groups. See Buergenthal, Thomas,

Thürer, Daniel, Menschenrechte, Zürich/St. Gallen 2010, pp. 11 ff. 47

See Buergenthal/Thürer 2010 and Chomsky, Noam, The New Military Humanism, Monroe

1999.


21

sets up certain standards a government have to meet to qualify for certain benefits48

or the benefits are earmarked in the first place49. As the mechanism of conditionali-

ties is based on incentive – the incentive for a government to meet standards aiming

to receive something in return – conditionalities are a typical feature of international

treaties with a certain asymmetry between the parties, namely a clear division be-

tween the donor and the receiver. A typical example is a regime of conditionalities

implemented through a Multinational Financial Institution (MFI), establishing the in-

centive through credit-based funding to influence the behaviour of a government in

certain way to influence the domestic policies50. The MFI which is institutionally near-

est to the UN, the World Bank, has realised certain constraints for its investment pro-

jects through so-called safeguard mechanisms originating in the early 1980s51 – alt-

hough they may not be directly compared to human-rights based conditionalities,

which the institution refuses to implement52. Even if the World Banks legal base as a

UN-institution lies in Art. 55 lit.c of the UN-charter obliging it to support the respect

and realisation of human rights, a direct responsibility for conditionalities is not given

in this case. Thereby, the distinction between trade-provisions and aid-provisions is

crucial, especially because they have often been combined in agreements with de-

veloping countries. The benefits from trade may be preferential access to markets as

mentioned before or mechanisms like STABEX which I will refer to later on, which

compensates for losses from world-price-volatility in the trade-framework. Aid on the

other hand consists of direct, budgetary aid which is traditionally transferred to re-

ceiver-governments to support them to provide the public goods and services for their

citizens and finance the public household and humanitarian aid, which is provided in

48

The „don’ts“, also referred to as „negative conditionalities“. 49

The “dos”, also referred to as “positive conditionalities”. 50

E.g. for the IMF: “to restructure a developing country's economy as the best basis for sus-

tained economic growth.” 51

See: The World Bank, Law Justice and Development,

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:22

226433~menuPK:6256357~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:445634,00.html (Last

access: 28.12.2011). 52

The World Bank Institute, Article on the World Bank Development Outreach, October 2006:

“The World Bank’s role is a facilitative one, in helping our members realize their human rights

obligations.”

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:22226433~menuPK:6256357~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:445634,00.html



22

crisis-situations through various actors, public and private53. In terms of development

aid, the first category is the most important and also the most controversial.

A distinct feature of the post-war structure in international trade is the increasing im-

portance of multilateral frameworks and institutions. For much of the period, a large

part of international trade relations took place in the wider context of the 1947 Gen-

eral Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which were intended to liberalize trade

by removing existing trade barriers and preventing domestic governments from im-

plementing new ones. Probably the most central institution of the contemporary re-

gime in world trade is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) established 1995 in the

aftermath of the Uruguay-round of negotiations as the institutional manifestation of

the GATT and the failed International Trade Organisation (ITO) 54. While the latter

concentrated on the trade in goods and was merely a loose arrangement with weak

instruments of enforcement, the WTO provides a much more effective framework and

addresses a wider definition of trade55, which would go far beyond the focus of this

thesis.

53

See Moyo, Dambisa, Dead Aid, London 2010, p.7. 54

...as it did not find a majority in the US-congress. The Havana-charter, being intended as the

founding document of the institution, became the backbone of the GATT anyway – which was

established by the US-government as a transitory replacement, as it was within the exclusive

competences of the executive as a treaty rather than an international organisation. It appears

ironic, that the establishment of the multilateral trade order is originally founded on a circum-

vention of democratic institutions. See Senti 2011, pp. 10-13. 55

Senti 2011.


23

2.2. Theoretical framework

The main assumption of the theoretical framework I am using for my thesis lies in the

notion of change, specifically concerning the systems of international political econ-

omy. It thereby primarily challenges traditional approaches in the discipline of interna-

tional relations as Realism56, Neorealism57, Institutionalism58 and World-System-

Theories59, which due to their rather static, abstract nature don’t appear to be able to

provide satisfying explanatory power for empirical developments since the early

1970s60. In the following section, I will give an overview on the theoretical base of the

approach and introduce the main concepts I use for my research.

The theoretical roots are to be found in the works of ANTONIO GRAMSCI61, primarily

in his famous prison notebooks written during his imprisonment as a leader of the

Italian Communist Party by the fascist Mussolini-Regime between 1926 and 1937. In

an exhaustive though due to the difficult circumstances fragmented critique on the

dogmatic Marxism of the Second International62, GRAMSCI drew on developing an

answer to the question, why – in contrary to the determinism of historical materialism

developed by Marx and Engels – the socialist revolution had failed outside Russia

and why the bourgeois state and the capitalist mode of production proved to be much

more pertinent in Western Europe than assumed by the Socialist movements, in spite

of the higher level of economic development and organisation of the working class,

56

E.g. Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations, 5. Edition, New York 1978. 57

E.g. Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International politics, Reading 1979. 58

Selznick, Philip, Institutionalism “Old” and “New”, in: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 41,

No. 2, June, 1996. 59

For an overview, see Nölke, Andreas, Weltsystemtheorie, in: Schieder, Siegfried, Spindler,

Manuela (ed.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, 2. Edition, Opladen & Farmington

Hills 2006, pp. 325-352. 60

DOROTHEE BOHLE provides a selection of approaches treating specifically the Area of Eu-

ropean Integration (AEI). Bohle, Dorothee, Neogramscianismus, in: Bieling, Hans-Jürgen,

Lerch, Marika (ed.), Theorien der europäischen Integration, 2. Edition, Wiesbaden 2006. 61

See the homepage of the International Gramsci Society for a short biography:

http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/about_gramsci/biograpy.html (Last access:

31.12.2011). 62

Neubert, Harald, Antonio Gramsci: Hegemonie – Zivilgesellschaft – Partei, Hamburg 2011, pp.

24 ff.

http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/about_gramsci/biograpy.html


24

which traditional Marxism saw as the main precondition for the success of the Social-

ist Revolution63. Based on a macchiavellian understanding of power64 within a state,

his approach included a number of key-concepts, which have been adopted in the

so-called neogramscian branch of International Relations.

GRAMSCIs argumentation is built around an interpretation of the relationship be-

tween state and civil society. As the civil society in Western Europe was obviously

highly developed and diverse in contrast to Russia - manifesting itself in a variety of

organisations, associations and parties - he located the main and primary difference

therein65. Consisting itself merely of voluntary membership, he differentiated civil so-

ciety as the sphere of consent in opposition to the sphere of coercion represented by

the state and its institutions. Therefore, the modern state in his view is to be under-

stood as an extended state66, a state-society complex always including state and civil

society and eventually pervading territorial borders to contain “related” states. As he

stuck to the basic notion of historical materialism, history being a continuum of class

struggle, the role of classes is crucial in his concept. But whereas traditional Marxism

concentrated on the role of coercion through the state and its capabilities as means

to ensure and maintain the supremacy of the ruling class by imposing fear and re-

spect on the ruled, his argument emphasized the importance of consent and civil so-

ciety in the “more developed” countries of the West by introducing his concept of he-

gemony. A dominant class may become hegemonic through the sphere of ideologi-

63

Van der Pijl, Kees, A survey of global political economy, Sussex 2009, p.233. 64

Gramsci adopted the conceptualization of power as a centaur, combining beast and man and

thereby standing for coercion and consent. In the words of Macchiavelli: “That prince is highly

esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily

conspired against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his

people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to have two

fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of exter-

nal powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies, and if

he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when

they are quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and

even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations and has lived

as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will resist every attack...”. Translation by

W.K. Marriott, available at: http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm (Last access:

13.11.2011). 65

Van der Pijl 2009. 66

Gramsci, Antonio, Amerika und Europa, Hamburg 2007, pp. 64 ff.

http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm


25

cal consent provided and maintained through institutions and intellectuals67 in civil

society, which is subsequently translated into state power and thereby secure its rule

much more deeply and effectively than through mere coercion. For the establishment

of hegemonial rule in GRAMSCI’s argument, the role of intellectuals is important: By

building an historic bloc of forces including them and through them the propagation of

certain comprehensive intellectual concepts68, the economic supremacy of the ruling

class may be anchored in a civil society and thereafter be carried through consent,

making it less vulnerable for turmoil and less dependent on force. He referred to the-

se functional intellectuals as organic in the sense that their work through publications,

comments and educations supported and perpetuated the established rule by shap-

ing the way the social world was perceived and by universalising the interests and

values of the ruling class in a society to make them accepted and supported by wide

parts of a population even if their own interests and positions were contradicted

thereby. This takes place through a network of institutions within the civil society,

which enjoy some autonomy from the state. GRAMSCI called this process of shaping

top-down through elites passive revolution – empirically applying it on e.g. the pro-

cesses during the Italian Risorgimento, where he found the interaction between eco-

nomic relationship and political ideas to be decisive to form a state-society complex

leading to the Italian nation-state including wide parts of the population69. In an out-

look from his time and situation, he analysed the potential impact of the fordist model

of production and of Americanism on European countries in the future, as he saw it

as the most efficient mode of capitalist production by the time, utilising his concepts

and providing an extensive analysis of the hegemonial character of the US-capitalist

classes. As an activist in the socialist movement, GRAMSCI was clearly most inter-

ested in the revolutionary potential of his thought, developing possible strategies for

the establishment of a socialist historic bloc and finally counter-hegemony to over-

come the bourgeois-capitalist state of affairs.

67

Hobden, Stephen, Jones, Richard W., Neogramscianism, in: Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, Ow-

ens, Patricia, The Globalisation of World Politics, New York 2008, pp. 149-153. 68

Cox, Robert W., The political economy of a plural world, London 2003, p. 33. 69

Van der Pijl, 2009.


26

Neogramscianism as a strand of thought intending to adopt those concepts and ide-

as for an understanding of contemporary international relations was established

through the works of ILO research director ROBERT COX in the early 1980s, who

drew on GRAMSCIs writings to get an understanding of the power of the capitalist

west in the world. In his initial article, he primarily challenged the notions of Realism,

which concentrated on the military and economic supremacy of the USA70 to explain

its dominant role by explaining it as a transnational consent backed up by military

force – and thereby adopting the dualisms of civil society and state respective con-

sent and coercion as being most significant for a deeper understanding of the post-

war order. Fundamental for COX’ analysis is the Term of hegemony, which signifi-

cantly differs from the way it is used e.g. in neorealist discourses, where it merely

describes the dominance or supremacy of a state towards others.

COX argued that US-hegemony was not to be understood as an attribute of the US-

state and its capabilities for coercion, but as a form of consent shaped by an eco-

nomically dominant class backed by the state. He further emphasized his critique on

the orthodoxy of IR theory by distinguishing problem-solving and critical theory. Prob-

lem-solving theory - referring to in his’ original and famous notion, that “theory is al-

ways for someone and for some purpose”71 – serves the hegemonic consent by set-

ting theoretical limits and definitions of “common sense”, taking the order of things as

given and moving therein to analyse issues. This view is logically derived from the

broader Marxist notion that if ideas and values in the end are a reflection of a particu-

lar set of social relations and are themselves transformed as those relations change,

it follows that all knowledge of the social world must reflect a certain context, a cer-

tain time and space72. Epistemologically, knowledge therefore cannot be objective

and timeless in any case – as claimed by traditional theory, which finally serves those

who prosper under the existing order, namely ruling elites. Whether it happens on

purpose or not, the status quo is reinforced and legitimated by making it appear natu-

70

Cox, Robert W., Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations The-

ory, in: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1982, pp. 126-155. 71

Cox 1981, p.128. 72

Hobden/Jones, p.151.


27

ral, infinite and immutable through “value-free” theory73. Critical theory on the other

side – and here COX located his own approach – tries to identify the underlying

structures of power and hegemony in a post-positivist manner and concentrate on

attempts to make them visible by reconstructing the origins of an existing system, its

current state and possibilities for change. In his attempt to give a comprehensive ex-

planation of the process of qualitative change beginning in the 1970s – the thing

COX found conventional theory to be unable to do – he proposes a dialectical

scheme built on GRAMSCIs work:

Still having a basically historical-materialist perspective, class struggle continued to

play a central role in his work. The struggle for cultural hegemony although, based on

the dialectical relationships between material capacities (relations of production), ide-

as and institutions embedding hegemonial rule legally and politically according to

COX was not only to be found on the national level, but also in the international

sphere and the existing world order – and as important here as at the domestic level,

as it is primarily the “outward expression of the internal (national) hegemony estab-

lished by a social class”74. Social modes of production (like subsistence, fordist

mass-production, mercantilism etc.) in his view shape not only the form of the state

where it takes place but finally also the international economic (world) order – et vice

versa75. The sphere of ideas, their manifestation in social modes of production and

finally their dialectical relationship and influence on the other categories is therefore a

focal point of the neogramscian analysis of Robert Cox. In an international perspec-

73

For a more extensive neogramsican critique on established theoretical strands of thought, see

Bieler, Andreas, Morton, Adam David, Neo-Gramscianische Perspektiven in:

Schieder/Spindler 2006, pp.353-379. 74

Cox, Robert W., Approaches to World Order, New York 1996, p.137. 75

Bieler/Morton 2006, p.358.


28

tive, a constellation as the one shown above contains a number of different forms of

state, as they change along with the social foundations from which they arise76. This

introduces a strong dynamic element into the international system, which as a con-

sequence is not primarily state-centric but divided into state/society-complexes shar-

ing values, social modes of production and state-form77.

Cox’ identified the change as being a continuous shift from the established post-war

US-lead hegemony known as Pax Americana78 shaped by the Cold-war class com-

promise and the reconstruction of war-torn Western Europe, which had distinct fea-

tures like the Keynesian, interventionist welfare-state, the fordist model of production

with relatively high wages in industrialised countries and the institutional framework of

Bretton Woods to a new order. The erosion of these structural features is widely

been agreed upon – the neogramscian interpretation is distinguished primarily in the

reasons it assumes for this development, interpreting it as the ability of a transnation-

al class to influence the hegemonic consent in a specific way:

76

As VAN DER PIJL argues: „The hegemonic state of the Pax Britannica was the liberal state,

the dominant form of state of the era of rivalry the welfare-nationalist state and the state form

of the Pax Americana (…) the corporate liberal state“. 77

In the words of Gramsci: “...the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities

with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win

the active consent of those over whom it rules.” Bieler/Morton 2006, p. 362. 78

For an exemplary case-study, see Hobden/Jones 2008, p. 152.


29

The “embedded liberalism” of the post-war order KARL POLANYI and JOHN

RUGGIE refer to in their analyses of the system79, had - according to Cox - estab-

lished a historic bloc of business representatives, politicians and intellectuals support-

ing neoliberal economics, who intentionally and as a comprehensive political project80

forced this transformation to suit their interest – and did so not only through coercion-

al capabilities, but also through the creation of broad consent for the ideological sys-

tem of marginalism81, advocating a perspective on social and political issues as a

series of economic axioms through publications, think-tanks and associations. The

transformation was accelerated significantly, after the political turmoil in the socialist

states grouped around the Soviet Union and the partial dissolution of the east-west-

division, weakening the class compromises of the former decades and giving

grounds for the assumption that the “western” liberal-democratic model had success-

fully passed the test of time and prevailed82 – an actual “end of history”83. A central

role in this transformation was played by US-American and British actors since the

late 1970s, whose hegemonic idea is based on free trade. Which, according not only

to neogramscian criticism, lies very much in their interest as their states are the most

efficient producers competitive in all markets they have access to84. The most obvi-

ous manifestation of the neoliberal project is probably the Washington Consensus85,

79

Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation, New York 1944 and Ruggie, John G., International

Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar economic order, in:

International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, 1982, pp. 379-415. RUGGIE’s article is

available at the WTO:

http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/ruggie_embedded_liberalism.pdf (Last

access 23.12.2011). 80

A view especially shared by STEPHEN GILL, see Gill, Stephen, Constitutionalizing Inequality

and the Clash of Globalizations, in: International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, International

Relations and the New Inequality, Summer, 2002, pp. 47-65. 81

VAN DER PIJL subsumes theoretical approaches which are highly influential for mainstream

economic theory under the expression, being namely Marginal Utility, Game Theory and Ra-

tional Choice. See van der Pijl 2009, pp. 30-224. 82

Bieler/Morton 2006, p. 369. 83

A formula often referred to as a criticism of FRANCIS FUKUYAMAs famous essay and the lat-

er monography. See: Fukuyama, Francis, The end of history and the last man, New York

1992. 84

Hobden / Jones 2008. 85

Coined by the US-economist JOHN WILLIAMSON in an analysis of US-policies in 1989. Wil-

liamson, John, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in: Williamson, John (ed.), Latin

American Readjustment: How much has happened, Washington 1989. The chapter is availa-

http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/ruggie_embedded_liberalism.pdf


30

which primarily includes the following guidelines as a description of US-restructuring

policies in Latin America:

1. Reduction of state spending

2. Devaluation of currencies

3. Privatisations

4. Promotion of free markets

A series of research projects have contributed by applying the notion of this neoliber-

al transnational historic bloc e.g. by analysing the influence of the Trilateral Commis-

sion on the policy guidelines of the Washington Consensus86, the role of the Europe-

an Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) in the process of economic integration in (East-

ern) Europe87 and the role of economic elites in the Atlantic Partnership88. More re-

cently, authors like his former student STEPHEN GILL and the Amsterdam School

around KEES VAN DER PIJL, HENK OVERBEEK and OTTO HOLMAN among oth-

ers have further developed the basic ideas behind COX’ approach to form a coherent

analytical scheme. Namely VAN DER PIJL provided a historical analysis89 of eco-

nomic and philosophical framework emerging during the transformation by emphasiz-

ing the leading role of the British political development after the Glorious Revolution

in 1688 as a starting point for the creation of a transnational sphere, where the free

movement of capital was continuously implemented and set as a guiding principle for

international politics. The development of an ideological framework propagating free

trade and constraints to political action for the sake of private entrepreneurship and

property by elites in the Anglo-Saxon association between the United States of Amer-

ica and Great Britain mentioned by COX – what VAN DER PIJL refers to as the

ble through the Peterson Institute for International Economics:

http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486 (Last access: 14.11.2011). 86

Gill, Stephen, Globalisation, market civilization and disciplinary neoliberalism, in: Millenium:

Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2003, pp. 399-423. 87

Van Appeldoorn, Transnationale Klassen und Europäisches Regieren, in: Bieling, Hans-

Jürgen, Steinhilber, Jochen (ed.), Die Konfiguration Europas, Münster 2000, pp. 198-221. 88

Van der Pijl, Kees, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, London 1984. 89

Van der Pijl, Kees, Transnational classes and international relations, London 2005.

http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486


31

Lockean Heartland90 – and its continuous struggle with hobbesian contender-states

positions the historical-materialist approach of neogramscian theory as opposed to

ahistoric, state-centered problem-solving theory. And whereas COX still focused on

the role of the US as a hegemonic state91, later contributors have identified the in-

creasing importance of the transnational capitalist class instead of a particular state

for the hegemonic project of neoliberalism. Gill has identified two basic features of

the current transformation process, which I will draw on further for my research.

Disciplinary Neoliberalism: Gill analyses Neoliberalism not only as an economic

agenda or an ideology, but as a form of rule. As the transformation of state-forms and

institutional frameworks continues, the pressure on social groups92 and governments

rises due to the increase of structural power capital gains compared to politics. Capi-

tal accumulation and withdrawal becomes, thanks to its high mobility compared to

other factors of production in the extended transnational sphere of free capital-flows,

an increasingly important factor in the disciplining of political entities, shaping the be-

haviour of states, classes and individuals around the competition to attract transna-

tional capital93. Also, the influence of international organisations, rating-agencies and

elites increases the ability of neoliberal imperatives to gain acceptance within political

organisations. Finally, with reference to FOUCAULT94, GILL and VAN DER PIJL

identify a global panopticum of measures95 aimed to establish social patterns of be-

haviour for the inclusion of individuals into the new order, also combining disciplin-

ing neoliberalism with GRAMSCIs concept of passive revolution to explain the

processes of transformation which took place in Easter Europe after the End of the

Socialist regimes by analysing the significance of intellectual and political elites carry-

ing out neoliberal reforms utilising severe conditionalities to establish a new system

90

Ibid., p. 65 ff. 91

An interesting contribution for the European Integration has been made by BOHLE: Bohle,

Dorothee, Neoliberale Restrukturierung und transnationales Kapital in der Vertiefung und Er-

weiterung der Europäischen Union, in: PROKLA, Vol. 128, No. 128, 2002, pp. 353-376. 92

Especially employed wage-earners. See Gill, Stephen, Law, David, The Power of capital: Di-

rect and structural, in: Gill, Stephen (ed.), Power and Resistance in the New world order,

Houndmills 2003, pp. 93-115. 93

Bohle 2006, P.201. 94

Namely: Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish, New York 1995. 95

Ibid.


32

of rule96. Top-down passive revolution was necessary to bring forth a middle class,

which could be integrated in the historic bloc.

New Constitutionalism: In contrast to classic constitutionalism, the new constitu-

tionalism is defined as the concrete political project to make transnational liberalism,

and if possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future development97.

The new constitutionalism emphasizes market efficiency, discipline and confidence,

economic policy credibility and consistency and limitation on democratic decision

making processes.

As GILL states, Proposals “imply or mandate the insulation of key aspects of the

economy from the influence of politicians or the mass of citizens by imposing internal-

ly and externally binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal, monetary, trade and

investment policies. Ideology and market power is not enough to ensure the adequa-

cy of neoliberal restructuring.”98 Put differently: in the neogramscian perspective, the

new constitutionalism describes the intentional and identifiable project to establish

a transnational constitution for the preserving of the interest of the transnational capi-

talist class from democratically legitimised and responsible political actions in nation

states and beyond – a process GILL refers to as “locking-in” of neoliberal social

modes of production in a new structure of global governance to set the limits of the

politically possible99 for future governments.

The creation of a protected domain100 of individual rights and freedoms including a

set of private property rights secured by the rule of law and the coercive capability of

the state are classic liberal ideas, which taken alone would not justify the claim of a

qualitative change – GILL argues, that neoliberal ideas go much further by advocat-

96

An older contribution for Southern Europe which used the approach and apparently set forth

an analytical example: Holman, Otto, Integrating Southern Europe, EC expansion and the

transnationalisation of Spain, London 1996. 97

Gill 2003, pp. 138 ff. 98

Ibid., p. 139. 99

Ibid. p. 161 ff. 100

As originally set out by JOHN LOCKE in his Treatises on government. See Kley 2008.


33

ing constitutional constraints as positive factors of efficient production in a capitalist

system. Democratic rule thereby is not seen as a primary concept101, but rather as a

possible threat to the inherent concept of injustice102. At the same time, the “econom-

ic problems” to be handled by the new constitutionalism are not merely scarcity, ex-

ternalities and choice, but the identification of sets of binding rules and procedures to

be established facilitating market exchange and preventing or abolishing other rules

which could possibly interfere with markets – the famous “red tape” to be “cut”. The

main feature of neoliberalism and therein the new constitutionalism therefore lies in

a separation between the spheres of politics and economics103.

101

As an example, FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK wrote: “Though democracy is probably

the best form of limited government, it becomes an absurdity if it turns into unlimited govern-

ment (...) [It] is not “antidemocratic” to try to persuade the majority that there are limits beyond

which its action ceases to be beneficial and that it should observe principles which are not of

its own deliberate making.” Hayek, Friedrich A., The Constitution of liberty: The Definitive Edi-

tion, Chicago 2011, p. 183. 102

Another argument comes from ROBERT NOZICK, answering claims of “injustice” with an “en-

titlement”-approach. Democratic decisions would not by any means be legitimate to interfere

with existing property rights. As he stated: “..whatever arises from a just situation by just steps

is in itself just”, expanding the “protected domain” of property beyond longer-term views on the

original acquisition of said property – and policies intending to influence the distribution of

wealth. See: Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford 1974. 103

Concerning the European Union, Bieling/Deppe argue that the new constitutionalism has re-

placed the “old” European constitutionalism established by the Treaties of Rome. While it was

based on a complementary relationship between integration, trade liberalisation and develop-

ment of the welfare-state, we now face a project aiming for an integrated economic area which

was continuously established since the late 1970s.


34

2.3 Approach and research-questions

This thesis does not intend to give a comprehensive statement on the questions

whether the implementation of free trade policies is a “good” or a “bad” thing. The

neogramscian concepts and the basic assumptions on the development in global po-

litical economy developed especially by Stephen Gill seem although fruitful for a poli-

cy field as related to economic world order as the trade-relations between the Area of

European Integration (AEI) and the Associated African States and Madagascar

(AASM) and their relation to sovereignty. I will therefore utilise the framework lined

out in this chapter to analyse the developments therein using the legal concepts of

international economic law in order to test, whether the qualitative transformation

which is assumed by this school of thought is plausible in this field and whether it is

visible in the legal framework and its application. Now, how can the two disciplines be

connected?

As my field of research mainly concerns areas of economic integration and relation-

ships between states which have been based for a long time on a certain dependen-

cy, I regard the concept of sovereignty in its aspect of control as crucial. This in two

ways:

1. As showed before, the political decision of a sovereign state to enter a form of

economic integration may allegedly lead to a loss in sovereignty, meaning an ac-

tual loss of ability to politically control flows of goods, capital, services and/or la-

bour and eventually of freely shaping the economic system, whereas internal and

external authority formally remain.

2. The main claim of the branch of neogramscian theory I build upon lies in the sepa-

ration of the political from the economic sphere through a comprehensive and in-

tentional project, the definition of the politically possible through the locking-in of

economic concepts like e.g. free trade mainly conducted by privately owned busi-

nesses founded through private investment domestic and foreign as opposed to a


35

state-centered economic model with a high degree of intervention and political

control.

As the process of European Integration shows and as mentioned before, sovereign

governments may and do in fact abandon parts of their control voluntarily for the

sake of assumed and actual benefits from integration104. This also happened in the

process of multilateral trade liberalisation through the GATT or later on the WTO,

where the reduction of government control over distinct areas to the highest extent

possible is stated as an explicit goal105. In any case, it can be held that there is a con-

flicting relation between sovereignty in its control aspect and (economic) integration.

As the institutionalisation and formalisation of the relations between the integrating

European States and their former colonies are a form of integration according to the

provided definition as well, the ambiguity between this very process and the sover-

eignty of its members also applies therein. Assumed that integration is based on sov-

ereign decision-making, the motivation to abandon parts of sovereign control for the

sake of an integration project is in my opinion crucial. At that point, the neogramscian

approach offers explanatory power beyond the mere supremacy106 of a system by

addressing the social forces behind the decision and pointing out another, rather

104

Economic integration is hereby understood as the creation of territorially distinguishable areas,

where existing political measures controlling trade flows through defined and agreed borders

are abolished and new measures are implemented on an intergovernmental or supranational

basis, which may or may not contradict domestic policies. 105

Senti 2011, p.8. 106


36

structural conflict between the sphere of the economic, meaning market-mechanisms

and political regulation to pursue certain goals – e.g. a certain distribution of wealth,

promotion of accumulation through investment, progressive taxation, anti-cyclical

public spending despite the process of integration and so on.

In terms of multi-level-governance107, the economic sphere in practice operates on a

higher level, as social policy as an example is to a large extent left to domestic regu-

lation. The claimed process of neoliberal restructuring of the embedded post-war or-

der in the industrialized Western States towards a separation of the economic sphere

from the political with the aim of minimising the political influence governments may

have on free markets and the influencing of the political decision making through the

disciplining power of capital relations in a disembedded economy. Of course, the

separation was never absolute – and also not in any case wanted by “classical liber-

als”108. The state is always needed, even in its minimal, “night watch”-version, to en-

sure a regulatory framework, coercional capabilities through the monopoly on vio-

lence and – as emphasized by COX, GILL and VAN DER PIJL – as a transmitter of

social modes of production. Neoliberalism, in short, is not an “internationalist” system

seeking to dissolve the sovereign state as a concept, but relying on its existence and

functioning while marginalising it through increasing constraints.

107

Covered by Regime-theory. 108

ADAM SMITH as an example argued strictly for policies which inhibited monopolies or even

too large companies, as he saw smaller businesses as the optimum for the functioning of mar-

ket forces. See Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Na-

tions, Vol. 1, Indianapolis 1976, pp. 78 ff.


37

To get a comprehensive analytical framework, the dimensions may be combined:

The scheme refers to the perspective of the sovereign state. Sphere (1) would be the

assumed fictional situation, that economic sovereignty in its different aspects is ab-

solute, meaning absolute authority and control concerning ILS, WS, DS and IS. As

states exercise control through political actions, the sphere of the political would be

dominant and domestically control the production, exchange and distributions of

goods. In such a scenario, international economic exchanges would be strictly state-

controlled and only take place through political consent e.g. through bilateral treaties.

Sphere (2) as an opposite would represent a situation where states have abandoned

the maximum amount of control for the sake of a process of economic integration

on an all-embracing, global scale. As we speak of economic integration and trade

flows, the economic sphere would be fully separated from the political in the sense of

an all-encompassing laissez-faire market economy without any domestic regulation –

as the neogramsican approach supposes that the political integration due to the heg-


38

emonic character of neoliberalism would not take place at all or be slower109. Reality

of course, takes place between the two extremes: The European Integration process,

as an example, has brought new layers of political regulation, which have become

much more effective through the integration itself110. I mainly argue that the tension

between the two spheres is a viable conceptual basis to explain “change” as set out

in the theoretical framework shown before and allows a combination of the neogram-

scian perspective with the concept of sovereignty. Put differently: the locking-in of the

politics-economy-separation through economic integration depends crucially on sov-

ereignty: How sovereign are the African states to politically control economic aspects

of the societies within their territorial borders and how and to what extent are they

constrained through processes of economic integration? To what extent is the inte-

gration with its constraints the result of sovereign decisions? The fact that the sover-

eignty of the African states I focus on was originally established in the period this in-

tegration began to take shape111 renders the concepts even more significant and in-

teresting for this specific analysis. If the assumption of a hegemonic economic world

order based on the lock-in of neoliberal policies through agreements is taken as a

starting point, the emerging sovereignty of numerous states appears as the main

precondition for such a system to arise – through the governments as transmitters of

decisions and orthodoxies taken and established on the “international” or “multilat-

eral” level. It will therefore be taken as a vantage-point for the research-questions to

see, which role the AEI had in the process of establishing and stabilising sovereignty

in the AASM-states:

First, how do the establishment of sovereignty and the trade relations between the

area of European Integration interrelate?

109

As an example, the lack of legitimation based on the democratic deficit of the European Union

has become an often-repeated phrase. 110

The competition rules of the European Union as an example allow a high degree of interven-

tion through cooperation. 111

This thesis sees the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community as a starting

point in 1952, although there may be plausible argumentations leading to an earlier or later

time.


39

Second, do the treaties distinguishably contribute to the “locking-in” of an economic

model in African states separating the political and the economic sphere aiming to

constrain the limits of the possible for future governments?

Third; what role do conditionalities as an apparently new concept play?


40

2.4 Sources and Literature

In the field of international law and in addition to the most widely received approach

on sovereignty by KRASNER, I refer to further works on the topic by NEIL BREN-

NER112, BOB JESSOP113, ERIK SWYNGEDOUW114 and articles released most re-

cently concerning especially developing countries. Especially mentionable are contri-

butions by JULIO FAUNDEZ, FIONA MACMILLAN and CELINE TAN115, who have

delivered comprehensive and detailed lineouts of the interrelation of IEL and devel-

opment policies. Also, the personal contribution of CHRISTIAN ARNSPERGER to my

understanding of sovereignty and its changing character was highly valuable and ap-

preciated. In terms of political approaches, the work of MICHAEL POLANYI and

ROBERT COX is of central importance for my work, as it provides an analytical un-

derstanding of shifts in the international sphere since the Second World War, of

course completed by STEPHEN GILL and authors of the “Amsterdam School”. The

original work of ANTONIO GRAMSCI proved to be an enriching lecture, as it provides

an approach which is quite unique in its focus on the importance of ideas and

change. WILLIAM BROWN has provided a detailed historic overview on the Lomé-

Conventions and their circumstances, which I could refer to frequently.

Thanks to the friendly support by the EUROPEAN UNION CENTER OF EXCEL-

LENCE116 in Pittsburgh, USA, I had the opportunity to access the complete collection

of Commission documents and other publications and non-publications available

there which provided me a wide and very useful source-base for my work on the dif-

ferent trade-systems and the case-studies. As the transitional period between 1957

and 1963 is the lest covered by the respective literature, original sources have mainly

flown into this part of the thesis: The sources used consist primarily of official SEC

112

Brenner, Neil, New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, Oxford

2004. 113

Jessop, Robert, State Power: a strategic-rational approach, Cambridge 2008. 114

Swyngedouw, Erik, Neither global nor local, globalization and the politics of scale, in: Cox,

Kevin R., Spaces of Globalization, New York 1997, pp. 137-166. 115

Contributions in Faundez, Julio, Tan, Celine (ed.), International Economic Law, Globalization

and Developing Countries, Cheltenham 2010. 116

www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/ (Last access: 23.12.2011).

http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/euce/


41

and COM-documents, complemented with various extracts of the joint publication of

the negotiation-partners, The Courier and various memos and press releases. To

assess certain developments in the actual trade figures, statistical material from EU-

ROSTAT and UNSTATS mostly available online117 proved to be indispensable.

Concerning the application and introduction of conditionalities, EMILIE HAFNER-

BURTON has provided a clarifying overview on the regime-structure African states

face, which was very helpful in order to encapsulate the significance of the “Europe-

an” approach together with the analyses provided by SIEGMAR SCHMIDT, IAN

TAYLOR, MOSES TEKERE and a very recent contribution by ANDRIS ZIMELIS.

117

EUROSTAT: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ (Last access:

13.12.2011) and UNSTAT: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm (Last access: 13.12.2011).

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm


42

2.5 Method

A chronological, comparative approach on the trade system between the AEI and the

AASM-states is applied, which is based first and foremost on the treaty documents

and respective literature. Thereby, the principles and concepts of IEL shown before

are used as abstractions to alleviate a comparison. To illustrate the different systems

implemented and the institutions, the following scheme is used as a “blueprint”:

It primarily represents the geographical areas involved in this specific integration pro-

cess, the European and the African continents. The Lockean Heartland defined as

the traditional sphere of liberal free-trade between the US-American-British state-

society complexes with the institutions emerging from is included to show the expan-

sion of its influence and the subsequent establishment of different layers of economic


43

integration in addition to the European-African system. The main institutions, facilities

and treaties of the layers are represented by respective symbols.

As the thesis concentrates on the significance of sovereignty, its relevance for the

first series of conventions marking the transitory period from an openly colonial to a

post-colonial system of relations is a first key aspect. To encapsulate its significance,

sources allowing a reconstruction of discourses within the organs and institutions of

the trade systems and the AEI are used to see, what understanding of the concept of

sovereignty appeared and also, how it was applied and influenced the trade relations

in terms of structure. The treaties as a basis of the respective systems serve as the

central source and a starting point for its analysis. The effect of the discourses are

subsequently verified by referring to statistical material and contributions in articles

and the literature, giving a second focus on the change in real economic terms,

meaning eventual changes in trade- and aid-flows between the systems, which are

interpreted by referring to the negotiation-documents and analyses primarily drawn

from the EUROPEAN UNION REPOSITORY COLLECTION in Pittsburgh and the

official archives available online. I will finally assess the plausibility of the qualitative

shift assumed by the theoretical approach I apply and its relation to state sovereignty

and draw a conclusion that summarises the findings and the further assumptions de-

rived from the analysis.


44

3. The trade systems

3.1. The colonial pattern

Although colonial rule of European States has existed earlier, the formalisation and

extent of regulation through the General Act of the Berlin Conference makes this

document a viable starting point to assess the order preceding the trade regimes of

the Area of European Integration with African “countries and territories”. The charting

of the Congo River by Henry Morton Stanley which was finished in 1877 removed

terra incognita118 from maps and globes printed on the European continent119. While

Asia had been violently opened for what JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL calls “free trade

imperialism”120 in the decades before, the not yet colonised continent offered huge

spaces for further expansion – popularly staged by “explorers” like David Livingstone,

the Frenchman Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza and said Stanley. He later began to

work for King Leopold II of Belgium, who sent him to the Congo to establish a free

state and thereby lay the foundation for a colonial regime121 aimed at the extraction

of commodities covered by the International African Society - an association of aris-

tocrats, merchants and industrialists with the formal goal of “researching and civiliz-

ing”122 the continent. As other European countries gained foothold on the African

continent in the same period, areas of conflicting interests seemed inevitable. King

Leopold strongly advocated the mutual benefit of common trade to avoid conflicts

with the French and German expansion and was thereby openly supported by the

US-government and private associations in the US123. As disputes concerning the

118

A term referring to empty spaces on maps marked with the term to be found until the late 19th

century. 119

Although especially the Portuguese had expanded their area of influence to the African conti-

nent in the 16th century already, they had concentrated on the establishment of harbours on

the coasts – especially for slave trade. See Osterhammel 2006. 120

Ibid., p. 39. 121

See Hochschild, Adam, King Leopold’s Ghost, New York 1998. 122

Ansprenger, Franz, Geschichte Afrikas, 3. Edition, Munich 2007, pp. 75 ff. and Kinet, Ruth,

Der weisse Mann und sein Erbe, Das Unternehmen Kongo, in: Die Zeit, Afrika, 2.edition,

Frankfurt 2007, pp. 15-18. 123

Mollin, Gerhard, Die USA und der Kolonialismus: Amerika als Partner und Nachfolger der bel-

gischen Macht in Afrika, Berlin 1996, pp. 34 ff.


45

access to the Congo river between European powers arose and began to influence

the structure of alliances on the European continent, the German Chancellor Otto von

Bismarck finally initiated a Conference in Berlin to diplomatically settle the scramble

for Africa to serve the main goal of his foreign policy – maintaining po-litical stability

on the European continent – and further demonstrate the role of a mediator he had

established for the German Reich after the 1871 French-German War.124 The confer-

ence resulted in the General Act125 as an international treaty signed by the repre-

sentatives of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Spain, the United States of America, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Swe-

den-Norway and the Ottoman Empire. The goals of the Act as set out in the preamble

were explicit:

“...in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions most favourable to

the development of trade and civilization in certain regions of Africa, and to assure to

all nations the advantages of free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing

into the Atlantic Ocean; Being desirous, on the other hand, to obviate the misunder-

standing and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation (prises

de possession) on the coast of Africa; and concerned, at the same time, as to the

means of furthering the moral and material well-being of the native populations...”

The concentration on “trade” and trade-related issues as the navigation on the wa-

terways crucial for the transport of commodities to the shore to ship them back to the

colonial homeland was programmatic126. It is therefore obvious and amply docu-

mented, that trade hereby signified not a relation of exchange, but extraction to sup-

124

Canis, Konrad, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik nach 1871, in: Schmidt, Rainer F. (ed.), Deutschland

und Europa, Wiesbaden 2004. 125

Available at the Latin Library:

http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/imperialism/readings/berlinconference.html (Last access:

12.12.2011). 126

As visible in the main points of the agreement:

(1) Freedom Of Trade In The Basin Of The Congo;

(2) The Slave Trade;

(3) Neutrality Of The Territories In The Basin Of The Congo;

(4) Navigation Of The Congo;

(5) Navigation Of The Niger;

(6) Rules For Future Occupation On The Coast Of The African Continent



46

port economic growth of the European industries while avoiding conflicts endanger-

ing these commodity-flows. Also, and probably more important, having colonies was

a matter of prestige and domestic political support against the socialist movement on

the one hand, and of internal politics on the other hand, as colonies allowed domestic

capital to find new possibilities for investment and empowered people a “national”

alternative to emigration to the US.127 Further, as not all territories by the time had

been included into the system, future occupations were governed by uniform rules –

and of course considered perfectly legal, as long as they were based on treaties with

“local chieftains”. The river-basin of the Congo was set under a regime of neutrality,

where “the trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom”.

Article 1 of the act held, that “...in extending the principle of free trade to [the Congo

basin] the conference Powers only undertake engagements for themselves, and that

in the territories belonging to an independent sovereign state this principle shall only

be applicable in so far as it is approved by such state”. The independent, sovereign

states in this context were not the native structures of society128, but the colonial

powers, exercising domestic sovereignty over the territories through occupation or

acquisition129. As the acquisition was realised through treaties with whoever was ac-

cepted as being a local authority, said authority nominally remained “domestic”. Arti-

cle 2 granted free access for all nationalities to the coastline of the territories and the

river ways, Articles 3 and 4 opened the region for duty-free / quota-free imports

based on non-discrimination between the colonial powers with the aim of establish-

ing a free-trade-system. Article 5 even provided a certain protection of basic fun-

damental rights for Europeans – explicitly excluding native people - through “pro-

tection of their persons and property” for “foreigners without distinction” together with

the “right of acquiring and transferring movable and immovable possessions and na-

tional rights and treatment in the exercise of their professions”. The “native tribes”

which the signatories “exercising sovereign rights” were bound to preserve and to

127

The concept of „social-imperialism“. See Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Sozialimperialismus, 4. Edition,

Königstein 1979. 128

Which indeed existed, namely in the form of kingdoms. See Ansprenger, pp. 64 ff. 129

To legitimise the claim for the Congo free-state, the Belgian government as an example pre-

sented signed contracts of acquisition.


47

whose “moral and material well-being” they had to contribute by “instructing [...] and

bringing home to them the blessings of civilisation” were primarily granted “freedom

of conscience and religious toleration” in Article 6, which at the same time also guar-

anteed “especial protection” for “Christian missionaries, scientists and explorers”.

Chapter II held the prohibition of slave trade, an issue which was delicate and im-

portant to gain public support for the treaty, as the abolishment-movement had

gained momentum especially after the US-civil war130; Chapter III the neutrality of the

free-trade-area in terms of excluding it from hostilities in case of war between signa-

tories. Article 12 therein established a system of arbitration based on mediation

through “one or more of the friendly powers” to be had recourse to “before appealing

to arms”. Chapters IV and V guarantee the non-discriminatory access to the Congo

and Niger rivers for merchant ships of “all nations”. Chapter VI – rightly assuming that

the signatories were about to expand their spheres of influence on the continent -

obliged the signatories to notify the other Powers in case of further acquisitions to

avoid new grounds of conflict and “to enable them, if need be, to make good any

claims of their own”. Article 35 set the obligation for the powers to “insure the estab-

lishment of authority in the regions occupied by them [...] sufficient to protect existing

rights and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions

agreed upon” making an effective presence and actual possession of territories nec-

essary according to the principle of Uti possidetis131 to obtain legitimate claims.

Contrary to a widespread interpretation, the main act did not “divide” the continent

between European powers in a comparable way as the Treaty of Tordesillas did in

1494 – legal title and authority explicitly remained with the “native tribes” and any

claim had therefore to be secured by treaty and a visible presence132 – but served as

a legal instrument for the setup of the free trade area in the Congo-Niger region, the

130

McNeese, Timothy, The Abolitionist Movement, New York 2008 and Brown, Robert, The story

of Africa and its explorers, Vol. 4, Nabu press (online), 2011, pp. 159 ff. 131

See Shaw, Malcolm, The Heritage of States, The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris today, in:

British Yearbook of international Law, Vol. 67, 1996, pp. 75-154. 132

An inchoate title, meaning a status of virtual possession without any act of actually taking pos-

session was thereby excluded. See also Oppenheim, Ronald, International Law: A Treatise,

Vol. 1, 3. Edition, 2008, p. 386.


48

definition of rough spheres of influence133 on the continent to avoid conflicts leading

to military clashes in Europe and – for the same reason - for future dispute settle-

ment. The Belgian Congo as a recognised protectorate of the Congo-society was

although in fact considered as private property of the Belgian Crown, namely Leopold

the second134.

133

The Finally Act in fact is the first known legal document which defines spheres of influence. 134

Oppenheim 2008, pp. 373 ff.


49

3.1.1. The System of Berlin

As shown above, the Act created a free trade area (1) between the European signa-

tory-states (3) and the designated area on the African Continent, namely the Congo-

basin (2). The borders, quotas and tariffs between the European states remained

unaffected. The Lockean Heartland was part of the regime, Great Britain (4) as a full

member and a strong colonial power, the USA (5) – having no interest in African terri-

tories due to the Monroe-Doctrine135 - were represented during the negotiations in

Berlin and influenced the outcome through several suggestions and support for the

Belgian position and generally the opening of the continent for free commercial ac-

cess, but did not ratify the treaty. As the regime affected primarily exchanges of

goods by means of naval transportation, the Congo (6) and the Niger (7) were of pri-

mary importance for the extraction of heavy goods on waterways to the coast and

generally the access to the area. The territory defined as the French area of influence

135

The principle of non-involvement in the non-American hemisphere introduced in the early

19thcentury through President James Monroe.


50

North and Northwest of the Congo Free-state was the foundation for the states later

known as Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Niger,

Chad, Cameroon, The Central African Republic and Gabon – the Congo itself the

Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), Rwanda and

Burundi - 16 of the 18 AASM-states136. Subsequently, a number of French posses-

sions followed the Berlin Conference, significantly enlarging the territory under

French Control and setting the territorial structure of the later African states.

Basically, the colonial pattern was based on exclusive relationship137, giving the re-

spective powers control over trade flows within their sphere of influence defined by

the Act. Representing major sources of supply of raw materials for the domestic

manufacturing industries in Europe, they also increasingly served as markets for

manufactured goods with surplus value added through processing138. Political, eco-

136

Except Madagascar and the Italian possessions in Somalia. 137

Frieden, Jeffry A., International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation, in:

Frieden, Jeffry A., Lake, David A., International political economy: Perspectives on global

power and wealth, London 2000, p. 110. 138

An economical purpose of colonies which was supported through the implementation of infra-

structural projects as well. See Osterhammel 2006, p. 80.


51

nomical and cultural ties were actively developed139 especially by France to desig-

nate the territories as specially related to the metropolitan homeland and securing

this relationship in the future against claims of other powers. These policies, known

as Francophonie etc. constructed what is later on referred to as special relations and

emphasized during the later period of development-colonialism based on mandates

given by the League of Nations after 1918 for the former German colonies, nominally

aiming at leading the states to independence as soon as their stage of development

was sufficient.

139

Also through the establishment of a monetary union, the Franc Zone which has endured until

today for many of the AASM-states. See Manning, Patrick, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa

1880-1995, 2. Edition, Cambridge 1998, pp. 78 ff. See table in Annex XII.


52

3.2. The Treaty of Rome

As mentioned before, the establishment of a framework for trade between the EC-6

and states outside the area was also a necessary consequence of the initiation of a

CU through the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Second, France insisted140 on the status of

economic associates to be introduced for the colonies as a fundamental principle, as

it would otherwise be impossible141 to sign the Treaty. The existing system of colonial

trade was thereby linked to the emerging project of economic integration. In the fol-

lowing section, the legal basis for the first trade system between the AEI and the

states related to them through colonial rule is lined out.

Part IV RT structures the Association of the overseas countries and territories, setting

the main purpose in Article 131 as the promotion of “the economic and social devel-

opment of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations be-

tween them and the Community as a whole”. Further defining the objectives more

clearly in Art. 132, Sec. 1-5:

“1. Member States shall apply to their trade with the countries and territories the

same treatment as they accord each other pursuant this Treaty.

2. Each country or territory shall apply to its trade with Member States and with the

other countries and territories the same treatment as that which it applies to the Eu-

ropean State with which it has special relations.

3. The Member States shall contribute to the investments required for the progressive

development of these countries and territories.

140

Van Reisen, Mirjam, The enlarged European Union and the developing world: what future?, in:

Mold, Andrew (ed.), EU development policy in a changing world: challenges for the 21st centu-

ry, Amsterdam 2007, pp. 30 ff. and Milward, Alan S., Politics and economics in the history of

the European Union, New York 2005, p. 82. 141

As stated during the Conference of Venice. See: Association pour la documentation de l’outre-

mer, l’association des pays et territories d’outre-mer à la Communauté Economique Euro-

péenne, No. LIII, March, 1960, p.2.


53

4. For investments financed by the Community, participation in tenders and supplies

shall be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons who are nationals of a

Member State or of one of the countries and territories.

5. In relations between Member States and the countries and territories the right of

establishment of nationals and companies or firms shall be regulated in accordance

with the provisions and procedures laid down in the Chapter relating to the right of

establishment and on a non-discriminatory basis, subject to any special provisions

laid down pursuant to Article 136.”

Basically, what emerged in Sec. 1. and 2. as an unilaterally set framework for the

trade regime with the former and existing colonies was to be based on non-

discrimination between the EC-6 and vice versa the countries or territories. Sec. 3

laid the foundation for an allocation of funds aimed at development aid, whereas Sec.

4. and 5. adopted non-discrimination also for private parties concerning public pro-

curement and the right of establishment. The emphasis on this principle shows, that

the countries and territories were basically to be treated as an extension of the Euro-

pean Economic Community, where the former colonial powers would although theo-

retically not enjoy a privileged position towards the other members – or put different-

ly, most-favourite-nation-status was to be granted as a minimum. Within the

French, Dutch, Belgian and Italian system of colonial trade, Tariffs were usually inex-

istent or low between the colonial power and the colonies142 – but not necessarily

between the colonies and other states within the EEC. As a consequence of the prin-

ciple of non-discrimination, this question was addressed in Article 133:

1. Customs duties on imports into the Member States of goods originating in the

countries and territories shall be completely abolished in conformity with the progres-

sive abolition of customs duties between Member States in accordance with the pro-

visions of this Treaty.

142

The French SURPRIX-system although added a system which lifted prices generally – and of

course the colonial powers had a more direct control of trade flows than tariffs and quotas

would have allowed. Towards the rest of the world although, protection of the colonial trade

flows especially through quotas before the Treaty of Rome was high. See: Lynch, Frances,

France and the international economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome, New York 1997, pp.

39 ff. and Table 7.7, p. 157.


54

2. Customs duties on imports into each country or territory from Member States or

from the other countries or territories shall be progressively abolished in accordance

with the provisions of Articles 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17.

3. The countries and territories may, however levy customs duties which meet the

needs of their development and industrialisation or produce revenue for their budg-

ets. The duties referred to in the preceding sub-paragraph shall nevertheless be pro-

gressively reduced to the level of those imposed on imports of products from the

member State with which each country or territory has special relations. [...]

Sec. 1. and 2. set another cornerstone by introducing reciprocity as a guiding prin-

ciple of the system. Sec. 3 granted the governments of the countries and territories

the possibility to circumvent full reciprocal tariffs to protect their domestic budget or

emerging economy from overly competitive imports from the booming Western Euro-

pean members by setting the colonial tariff as a limit to be reached “progressively”143

– again in the sense of most-favourite-nation. This according to a timetable set by

the EC-6 during the negotiations in Rome, setting up 12- to 15-years periods for this

phasing-out of tariffs. This also meant, that the system of exclusive relationship was

devolved to a certain extent in trade matters – at least theoretically.

In terms of the legal concepts introduced earlier, the main objective of the trade sys-

tem based in the Treaty of Rome was the creation of a FTA. The protectionist nature

of the system of trade in contrary to a “world-market” approach is set out in Article

134, where the level of tariffs applied to third countries may be subject to “measures”

if it proves to be low enough to cause “deflections of trade to the detriment of any

Member State”. Article 135 set a legal base for further agreements concerning trade-

related policy-areas, Article 136 for an Implementing Convention determining the

143

Anyway, the French economy benefited from the agreement in different ways: First, the costs

the French government had through infrastructural adjustment and social “development” were

shifted to the community – leaving Germany without any overseas territories with a compara-

ble amount of the EDF to carry. Second, an assumed increase in external trade by the colo-

nies would have brought additional exchange revenue into the CFA-zone and thereby benefit-

ted France. Third, the French industry which was well-established in the AASM profited direct-

ly from projects financed through the EDF.


55

first Trade agreement between the European Customs Union and its overseas Coun-

tries and Territories.


56

3.3. The “Regime of Association” with the AASM (1957-1963)

The Implementing Convention, referred to by the Commission as an “arrangement”

came into force in 1958. It was implemented under the auspices of the Directorate

General VIII of the Commission responsible for exchanges and over-seas develop-

ment and followed the Scheme introduced by the Treaty of Rome. As the Commis-

sion put it, the regime was to be understood as an integral part of the European Inte-

gration project, although being much “more subtle and bearing more rights than obli-

gations”144 and serving as a “transitional instrument between the colonial regime and

the global competitiveness”145. Following the proposed scheme, it may be illustrated

as follows:

144

Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Commentaire sur les directives fixant

les modalités d’application progressive du droit d’établissement dans les pays et territoires

d’outre mer, September, 1960, p.5: „Les pays et territoires d’outre-mer entretenant des rela-

tions particulières avec certains Etats membres ont été associés à la Communauté écono-

mique européenne. Pour ces pays et territories, le traité établit un régime plus souple et plus

léger que celui imposé aux états membres et comportant plus de droits que d’obligations”. 145

„Un instrument de transition entre le Régime Colonial et la Compétitivité Mondiale“, in: Les

Communautés au travail, Opéra Mundi, No.181, January 3rd

, 1963.


57

The European Economic Community (EEC) – the CU between the EC-6 as one of

the main pillars of the beginning process of European Integration together with EUR-

ATOM and the ECSC opened the borders between the states for goods, capital, ser-

vices and people (1). As set out in the treaty, the problem of (post-) colonial associa-

tion especially of France was dealt with by setting up a FTA (2) with the countries and

territories – of which the economically most important were African (3) – based on

non-discrimination and reciprocity146. The emphasis France laid on the associa-

tion is obvious when looking at the relations. 15 out of 18 territories were French pro-

tectorates (red), two Italian (green) and one (Togo) formally independent (black)147.

146

La Commission de la Communauté Économique Européenne: La nouvelle convention eurafri-

caine, une expérience pratique de lute contre le sous-développement, Décembre 27th, 1962.

147 After World War One, Togo became protectorate under the League of Nations and was divid-

ed into a British and a French section. As the British section came to Ghana by cession, the


58

This being said, most of the states were not sovereign (having neither full DS, ILS,

WS nor IS)148 and therefore did not enter the regime through signature and ratifica-

tion of a treaty. The French territories by 1957 were associated under the Community

of free peoples under the Constitution of 1946149, where France had included the

right to self-determination guaranteed by the basic principles of the UN into its colo-

nial system by setting up a successful referendum taking place on September 28,

1958150 after having declared French citizenship for all inhabitants of its territories.

Granting the right of self determination in its Art. 91, sec. 2, the constitution left the

territory assemblies151 the choice within six months to keep the status of “overseas

territory”, to change to an “overseas department” more closely integrated with France

or choose sovereignty as autonomous states. This step was a consequence of the

Algerian war, which followed the violent protests of the Algerian independence

movement and lead to a political crisis in France ending the Fourth Republic in 1958.

Twelve territories152 chose sovereignty, five153 remained overseas territories. Another

six months were subsequently granted by the French government for the establish-

ment of federations between the colonies. After the transitional year, the Community

of Free peoples basically had established the new structure of sovereign states in

sub-Saharan Africa except for the Commonwealth. The institutional structure subse-

quently set up contained the following pillars:

French part was granted autonomy in 1955. See: US Department of State, Background note

on Togo, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5430.htm (Last access 22.12.2011). 148

See The New York Times, A Gazetteer of Emerging Africa and Its Peoples Swift March to In-

dependence, Monday, January 4th, 1960, p.6C.

149 After a rejected first draft considered as too liberal – according to the leader of the radical party

leading to France becoming “a colony of its colonies”. 150

The only state to prefer immediate independence following the outcome of this popular vote

was Guinea, which formally parted through secession. All other “overseas territories” accepted

the Constitution of the Fifth Republic by a total of 93.5% of the votes cast and 65% of the reg-

istered voters. 151

Parliamentary assemblies authorized through the 1956 “loi-cadre”, through which the French

Parliament granted legislative power on “internal affairs” to the territories. 152

Madagascar, Sudan, Senegal, Mauritania, Chad, Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Daho-

mey, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger. See: Ambassade de France, Service de presse et

d’information, Progress report on the new French Community: Self-determination – permanent

and without limitation. French Affairs No. 79, January 1959, p.2. 153

French Somaliland, Comoro Islands, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, French Polynesia, New Cale-

donia.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5430.htm


59

1. The Presidency of the Community: The French President representing and presid-

ing over the Community, which also takes part in his election.

2. The Executive Council of the Community: Charged with “the cooperation of mem-

bers of the Community at Government and administrative levels” after Art. 82 of

the Constitution, consisting of the Premier of the French Republic and the heads of

Government of the other member States. Based in Paris, although it “may meet in

the capital city of another state”. It is called upon to discuss “the general policy of

the Community, including foreign policy, defence, and currency, common econom-

ic and financial policy as well as policy on strategic raw materials etc.”

3. The Senate of the Community: Composed of delegates chosen by the Parliament

of the Republic and by the legislative assemblies of the other member states,

“studies the acts and treaties or international agreements when called upon to do

so by the President of the Community”. Meeting in Paris in the Luxembourg palace

twice a year for no longer than a month. Binding decisions are possible, when re-

spective domains are delegated by the other states legislative assemblies.

4. The Court of Arbitration of the Community: Composed of seven judges appointed

by the President for six-year terms.

The Constitution of 1958 also offered the possibility of enlargement in its Title XIII154

for “states that wish to associate themselves with the Community in order to develop

their own civilisations” as stated in Art. 88. The French embassy in New York proudly

announced the Constitution to be “an original type of organization, planned to meet a

series of problems that are themselves unusual”155, announced and defined through

historic statements of General de Gaulle in Brazzaville 1944 and 1958, marking “the

two greatest steps in the evolution of the overseas peoples under French control”.

The representatives of the territories having insisted on an implementation of the

“right to independence” into the relationship with metropolitan France at the same

154

Available at the Assemblée Nationale: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#XIV

(Last access: 10.11.2011). 155

„It is more than a Commonwealth, for it has „common affairs“ over which the institutions of the

Community alone have jurisdiction. It is less than a Federation, for each State has great free-

dom to manage its internal affairs”. French Affairs, No. 79.

http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp#XIV


60

time affirmed the close cooperation “in order to meet the economic and technical

problems of the modern world”. The opting for independence of Mali in 1960 although

set a strong precedent – further states demanded the same, and by the end of the

year, all 13 states of the community were formally independent, marking the failure of

the bilateral association strategy by France.

The regime was unilaterally set up by the newly founded European Council156 for

practical reasons: The metropolitan scheme of trade-flows was technically not com-

patible any more with the CU the colonial powers had entered157. Accordingly, the

FTA did not replace the bilateral relations158, but served primarily the avoiding of

transhipment by applying the Common external Tariff on the goods coming from the

“countries and territories”. On the other hand, a community preference159 for exports

originating from the EC should abolish discrimination through colonial relations. A

certain protection was although granted on “tropical products” following the official

argumentation that it was “impossible” to “brutally pass the states from the closed

colonial regime to a regime where the global game plays”160. Obviously, the list of

preferentially treated goods although corresponded with the kinds of goods the

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was not able to produce161 and the goods the co-

lonial regime had mainly imported before to Europe162 – as WILLIAM BROWN

shows, the preferential treatment maintained the access to those raw materials but

did not alter the geographical pattern of trade163. The issue of price stabilisation was

156

The intergovernmental Council of ministers, in this case the foreign ministers. 157

The entering of goods under preferential, colonial terms would have signified transhipment and

trade discrimination. 158

As an example: concerning aid, France remained (and remains) the principal source of aid to

the AASM-area. For the aftermath of the Rome Treaty, see: The Year book of world affairs,

The London institute of world affairs, Vol. 25, 1971, p. 133. 159

The European Economic Community and Africa, 10.556/X/63-E, p.4. 160

“…parce que il était impossible de passer brutalement du régime fermé de l’époque colonial à

un régime jouant sans précaution le jeu mondial”. 161

Bananas, Ananas, Raw coffee, Vanilla, Girofle, Muscat, Cocoa-beans, cocoa-mass, cocoa-

butter, cocoa-oil, huiles essentielles, tropical wood, pre-cut tropical wood. See: Liste des pro-

duits tropicaux originaires des PTOMA pour lesquels la Commission recommande une accélé-

ration spécial, Annexe I, VIII/COM(60)120 Rev. 162

Ibid. 163

Brown, William, The European Union and Africa, The Restructuring of North-South Relations,

New York 2002, p. 40 f.


61

addressed already by the Commission as early as in 1960, as it was foreseeable that

the realisation of a Common Market by the EC-6 would not allow the colonial trade-

preferences and stabilisation-schemes to continue.

“De telles mesures sont autant plus necessaries que les avantages très substanciels

don’t la plupart des Pays associés beneficient encore dans certains Etats members

pour l’écoulement de leurs productions risquent de ne pouvoir être indéfiniment

maintenus, du fait meme de la réalisation du marché commun. De solutions de rem-

placement à l’échelle de la Communauté Européenne sont donc indispensables

[...].”164

As the associated states by the time did not have any significant industrial production

fit for exportation165, the provisions agreed upon by the EC-6 on liberalisation of trade

with manufactured goods166 were applied on the associated states as well – of

course with no effect on trade flows. Additionally, the European Development Fund

(EDF) began to work in 1958 as an additional, “dynamic measure”, providing a

means of “permanent economic action” aimed to the formation of cadres and a “re-

thinking” of economic structures to support the “access of the African economy to

global competitiveness”. The stabilisation-mechanism proposed by the Commission

was based on EDF-funds through a system of “drawing-rights” to a limited extent, as

it was regarded as an “experiment” financially involving also member states of the

EC-6 which were not colonial powers – respectively had no “over-seas responsibil-

ity”.167 Accordingly, the need of the stabilisation facility to be only of complementary

nature to avoid suppression of the French solution168 which existed since 1954169 and

164

Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Propositions de la Commission en vue

de la mise en œuvre de la déclaration d’intention des états membres en date du 12 mai 1960

relative aux pays associées, VIII/COM(60)120 rev., September 21 1960, p.2. 165

Brown 2002, p. 39. 166

As within the Customs Union. 167

„Le caractère provisoire de cette initiative soulignerait l’aspect expérimental qu’elle revêt pour

les Etats membres n’ayant pas eu de responsabilité outre-mer. See: Communauté Econo-

mique Européenne, Commission, Propositions concrètes présentées comme suite à la déci-

sion du conseil en date du 19 décembre relatives à la régularisation des recettes d’exportation

des pays et territoires d’outre-mer associés, VIII/COM(61)29 rev., April 19, 1961, p.8 f. 168

By 1961, Senegal (Arachides), Sudan (Arachides, Cotton), Niger (Arachides), Cameroon (Ara-

chides, Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton), Togo (Arachides, Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton), the AEF (Arachi-


62

concentrated on Arachide, Cocoa, Coffee, Coprah and Cotton was emphasized by

expert advisors. To limit the financial consequences170 on the EC-6, the stabilisation

was to be decided unilaterally by the Council of ministers for each product for a peri-

od of five years – according to the needs and priorities of the EC market171 - and

thereafter to be signed by the Commissioner and the representatives of the African

countries and territories. The Conference of the association also declared that a

comprehensive mechanism of stabilisation on the Community level had to be estab-

lished, as long as it would respect the “natural laws of the markets” within the “range

of the possible”172. It would thereby be an international precedent and a contribution

to the efforts on a “global scale”173. Further, the non-discriminatory freedom of estab-

lishment for natural and legal persons originating from the non-colonial EC-6 mem-

bers was established by Art. 8 and 16 of the implementing convention and realized

through directives for the gradual abolishment of discrimination – which allowed Eu-

ropean companies to enter the markets in the AASM without discrimination compared

to such originating in France by selling services on-site.

The territories were excluded from the attempts to create a larger-scale trade struc-

ture primarily by the US through the GATT by the time; the negotiations could only

address the French government. The GATT expanded the trade principles agreed on

by the US-government under F.D. Roosevelt as a reaction to the economic crisis be-

ginning in 1929 in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act known as Hull-program in

reference to Cordell Hull the responsible Secretary of State. The Hull-program lined

out the main pillars of the World Trade Order it aimed to establish, which remained

des, Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton), Ivory Coast (Cocoa, Coffee, Cotton), Ruanda-Urundi (Coffee),

the Belgian Congo (Cotton) and High Volta (Cotton) were included in the French price-

stabilisation scheme. See: Produits bénéficiant actuellement d’interventions anticonjonctu-

relles par le moyen d’organismes locaux de stabilisation, Annexe, VIII/COM(61) 29 rev. 169

And institutionalized 1955 through the “Fonds National de Régularisation des Cours des Pro-

duits d’Outre-mer, see: Communauté Economique Européenne, Direction Générale VIII, Note

explicative sur les caisses de stabilisation dans les pays de la zone franc, June 14, 1961. 170

„L’individualisation de chaque opération de prêt serait de nature à faciliter une saine gestion

financière”, Ibid. 171

Conférence de l’assemblée parlementaire Européenne avec les parlements d’états Africains et

de Madagascar, Décision sur les caisses de stabilisation, CEAM/67/61, p. 5. 172

„Cette régulation devrait être réalisée de façon que soient respectées, dans toute la mesure

du possible, les lois naturelles du marché“, CEAM/67/61, p.6. 173

„À l’échelon mondial“, Ibid.


63

the guidelines of multilateral trade liberalisation through the GATT and later the WTO

until the present day174. As the French Union included representatives of the colonies

in the domestic political system would probably have isolated the states for a signifi-

cantly longer time, if the independence movements legitimated through the UN-

charter would not have finished the formal base of the colonial system by the early

1960s.

174

Dismantling of trade barriers, non-discrimination (most-favoured nation) and reciprocity. See

Senti 2011, pp. 8-10.


64

3.3.1 The “Regime of association” and sovereignty

The Constitution of the French Fifth Republic and the Regime set up for the overseas

territories is remarkable in many ways. First, the questions of sovereignty and asso-

ciation were interlinked: The newly independent states were characteristically re-

ferred to as “former overseas territories that have chosen the status of member

states of the community in accordance with article 76 of the constitution”175 by the

French government. Further, as de-colonialisation had given the former colonies po-

litical independence, the EC was faced with a problem not foreseen in the Treaty of

Rome, which was formally set up for an unlimited period. The President of the Com-

mission, Walter Hallstein, reacted to the process by emphasizing the impossibility of

awaiting the expiry of the Implementing Convention to tackle the “problem of the

changed relations between the newly independent countries and the European Eco-

nomic Community”176. Their integration in a trade scheme with Europe were said to

be realised urgently in order to maintain the existing relations and thereby the flows

of goods:

“D’autre part, du point de vue politique, c’est bien maintenant qu’il faut concentrer les

efforts, étant donné que c’est dans l’avenir immediate que va être determine

l’orientation des nouveaux Etats africains à l’égard de la C.E.E. et de l’Europe en

general.”177

Such a temporary solution would “mainly depend on whether the parties concerned

showed a desire to maintain the bonds of association”. As an elegant solution, ac-

cession to independence would therefore not be regarded as a state of affairs termi-

nating all relationships of association, “but rather would this association be assumed

to continue on the factual basis of the previous position”178. This continuation on a

175

Ambassade de France, Service de presse et d’information, Progress report on the new French

Community: Self-determination – permanent and without limitation. French Affairs No. 79,

January 1959, p.6. 176

European Economic Community, Commission, Information Memorandum, The accession of

Overseas Countries and Territories to independence and their association with the European

Economic Community, July 5, 1960, P.2643, 500/60-E. 177

Ibid. 178

Ibid.


65

provisory formula was initiated during a visit of Mr. Hallstein in the Republic of Congo,

two days after its celebration of independence by a memorandum of understanding

between him and President Minister Lumumba179. Asked about the specific case of

Togo, the President of the DG VIII, M. Lemaignen, pointed out “that there would be

no need to have recourse to Article 238 of the “Treaty of Rome”. The application of

this Article would actually involve a rather long procedure and negotiations which

might appear premature, since discussion of the system to replace the Convention

which expires on 31 December 1962 will have to begin in the near future.”

Formally, the newly independent states had to be addressed under Art. 238 RT,

which allowed the EC to establish trade relations with “independent legal persons of

international law” – and not any more under Art. 136. The Commission although did

not go so far as to address those states as such. This meant nothing less than the

explicit statement of the Commission to refrain from treating the newly established

states as such under the provision foreseen for “regular” international agreements the

Community was authorized to conclude for the sake of a future system of association

– which had not even entered its negotiation phase. A first qualitative distinction be-

tween the existing sovereignty of European, North- and even South-American states

appeared.

Also, the Regime of association has to be seen in the light of its circumstances: As a

feature of the post-war structure, the Bretton-Woods institutions were established at

the time. Being US-dominated liberal multilateral institutional structures and including

funding used for reconstruction in Europe, they stood as pillars of influence on the

EC-6, having multilateral liberalism as a structural blueprint for the post-war world180.

In contrary to this project, a new contender had emerged. The Soviet Union chal-

lenged the liberal project through a different and competing form of social relations as

179

Ibid. 180

Bieling, Hans-Jürgen, Steinhilber, Jochen, Die Konfiguration Europas: Dimensionen einer

kritischen Integrationstheorie, Münster 2000 and Gill, Stephen, The Emerging World order and

European Change, in: Miliband, Ralf, Panitch, Leo (ed.), Socialist Register, London 1992, pp.

157-196.


66

well as international order181. The US-government had initiated the right to self-

determination in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 as a guiding principle of its foreign policy

and strongly advocated the granting of independence on the basis of political princi-

ple but also – being the economically dominant and most competitive force - for the

benefits to be gained for the opening of markets for US-capital and products182. Fears

of an expanding Soviet sphere of influence made the maintenance of European con-

trol preferable to the US, which supported it despite its reluctance to allow a system

of special relations in trade to be upheld by insisting on non-discrimination towards

other trade-partners183.

In short: The process of de-colonialisation, which took place mainly between 1945

and 1960184, brought a spread of the liberal concept of sovereignty to an extent yet

not experienced. Over 40 new states were created in the period, formally ending the

system of imperial colonial rule. A decisive role was thereby played by the main polit-

ical institution of the post-war order, the United Nations Organisation (UNO).The UN-

charter set a change in the sphere of international law: colonial rule was held to be

illegitimate through the right to independence, although the charter itself did explicitly

mention only “the development of self-government” in Chapter XI and “progressive

development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate” in

Chapter XII – which is a result of a compromise achieved during the negotiations by

the colonial powers185. Resolution 1514 in 1960, when most African countries were

formally independent and represented in the UN General Assembly finally held that:

181

See Table 3.2 State/society complexes and forms of state, 1800–1990 in: Van der Pijl 2005,

p.86 and the following chapter. 182

Brown, 2002, p.35 and Brett, E.A., The World Economy since the war: The politics of uneven

development, Houndmills 1985. 183

“D’après les dernières informations, le président des U.S.A. aurait déclaré, au cours de ses

conservations avec le premier britannique sur les projets d’action concertée des pays asso-

ciés à la C.E.E. et des Etats du Commonwealth en Afrique, que les U.S.A. ne pourraient ap-

prouver aucune réglementation qui entraînerait des discriminations à l’égard des Etats sud-

américains et asiatiques”, 10.556/X/63-E. 184

Especially for the AASM and the African Commonwealth, other states did not reach nominal

independence until the 1990s. 185

Fox, Gregory H., Humanitarian occupation, Cambridge 2008, p.34 and especially fn. 90.


67

1. “immediate steps” were to be taken to “transfer all powers to the peoples of non-

self-governing territories”

2. “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should

never serve as a pretext for delaying independence”

The function of sovereignty in this situation may in my opinion be connected with the

basic dialectical trias of Robert Cox:

The sovereign, independent state as a feature of the liberal, capitalist state-society-

complex dominating the West was challenged by the principles of socialist interna-

tionalism and “self-determination of the people” as the basis for the socialist “world

order” in the East. The two opposing forms of state both could potentially expand to

the territories and populations which had the potential to detach from the existing sys-

tem and use a much wider margin of political possibilities. The Regime of association

which was set up with the diplomatic backup by the US-government for these rea-

sons built on an alleged principle of positive neutralism, which meant that no ideolog-

ical or political influence was to be taken on African Governments – and thereby

seemed to offer them a third way apart from alignment with the West or East186 and

giving grounds for hopes of developing a genuinely “African” way of economic and

social development187. The Commission emphasized this characteristic of the asso-

ciation:

186

See also: Carbone, Maurizio, The European Union and international development: the politics

of foreign aid, New York 2007, p. 43. 187

Conférence de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne avec les parlements d’états Africains

et de Madagascar, Expose sur les formes politiques et institutionnelles de la coopération entre


68

“The important point is that the Association has no political strings: a country like Ma-

li, which belongs to the Casablanca group, and the countries of the OAMCE, with

their very different political leanings, are equally at home in it”188

It is interesting to note that even if the presented position of the African delegates

stated that “there is no neutrality in cooperation”189, the EEC appeared to them as the

best form of economic multilateral cooperation between developed and developing

countries as it was “open to all African states regardless their political regime”190. Ef-

fectively, the implementation was handled different. Although an association without

political neutrality would have prevented the establishment of the “new” system with

states like Cameroon191 and Mauritania192, the “openness” of the Convention for new

signatories was explicitly limited to those who did not belong to an “economic group

having incompatible objectives compared to those of the association”193. The clause

allowed the exclusion from trade access and possible benefits through transfer pay-

ments on political and ideological grounds.

Association was defined by a juridical committee of the Council of Europe in 1952 as

being a set of connections between a state and a community through particular trea-

les Etats Africains et de Madagascar ainsi que la Communauté économique Européenne,

June, 1961, CONF 61-2, pp.7 ff. 188

10.556/X/63-E 189

“Il n y a pas de neutralisme en matière de coopération”, CONF 61-2, p. 9. 190

“En étant une Communauté ouverte à laquelle tout pays Africain peut s’associer, sans consi-

dération de régime politique, la C.E.E. apparaît à l’heure actuelle […] comme la meilleure for-

mule de coopération…”, Ibid., p. 11. 191

Where a civil war against the Union des Populations du Cameroun and the initiation of a se-

cession of British Cameroon (which happened in 1960) from the Commonwealth complicated

the situation. 192

Where President Moktar Ould Daddah, originally the local ruler for the French, established an

authoritarian regime, as he considered his people “unready for democracy”. 193


de Madagascar, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission politique et institutionnelle, June 23,

1961, CEAM/66/61, p.5: “…que la nouvelle Association, dont la durée sera illimitée, devra être

ouverte à tous les Etats Africains, étant entendu qu’aucun d’entre eux ne pourra appartenir à

un autre groupement économique poursuivant des objectifs incompatibles avec ceux de

l’association.”


69

ties on limited subjects194. This limitation in the treaty of Rome was explicitly stated

for the realms of foreign policy, defence policy and internal policies – thereby includ-

ing trade policy. The focus of the Convention of implementation according to this

principle was strictly apolitical in a narrow sense. Through its including character and

the promise of autonomy, the “globalisation of the claim for statehood” as TRUTZ

VON TROTHA calls195 it could be supported while economic connections remained in

place.

What were significant features of those new states concerning the liberal project

emerged in the Lockean Heartland and the Relations to the former colonial powers?

First, liberal sovereignty was barely institutionalised196. As CHRISTOPHER ALLEN

has argued197, the absence of political parties and a civil society in the Western

sense allowed the best organised elites to gain power before popular movements

had the possibility to develop – leading to governments with a weak political base,

coalescending around clientilist and personalised relationships, often based on au-

thoritarian rule backed by the military. In the AASM, this was especially visible, as the

colonial regime was in most cases replaced by a dictatorship, a totalitarian regime, a

single-party-system or a sham democracy198. As a consequence of the replacement

of often informal, charismatic, religious relationships of allegiance through the secular

administration of the colonial state199, the lack of political culture in a European sense

in combination with the imposed concept of statehood established a model of state,

basically existing for its own sake.

Second, the economies and infrastructures of the states were focussed on the colo-

nial pattern of trade and production, with the lack of literacy and technical education

and therefore limited grounds for economic class formation giving the state an over-

194

Ibid.:“Un État associé est un Etat qui s’engage à nouer des liens étroits avec une communau-

té; ces liens se matérialisent par des traits particuliers, qui peuvent d’ailleurs porter sur des

objets limités.” 195

Von Trotha, Trutz, Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika, in: Die Zeit, Afrika, Frankfurt 2006, pp. 61-65. 196

Brown 2002, p. 21. 197

Allen, Chris, Understanding African Politics, in: Review of African Political Economy, No. 65,

1995, pp. 301-320. 198

See Table in Annex IV. 199

See also: Osterhammel, pp. 76 ff.


70

whelming economic and political role200 and deepening its dependency on the trade

flows with the former metropolitan centre to secure its revenues201. The interconnect-

edness of politics and economics through authoritative intervention together with the

obvious incentive to concentrate on certain cash-crops covered by the preferential

treatment within the trade regime set the base for rather state-centric economic sys-

tems to emerge in the countries and territories. The African represented in the con-

ference of the association states eagerly expressed their anxiety about losing the

colonial preferences and benefits:

“Les avantages accordés aux pays associés au Marché commun ne font que rem-

placer les préférences que les anciennes métropoles réservaient aux territoires na-

guère sous leur dépendance. One question très grave se pose icy: Qu’adviendrait si

les Six ne reprenaient pas à leur compte les obligations que les anciennes mét-

ropoles avaient contractées à l’égard de ces pays dans le domaine de la politique

commercial? Il en résulterait un prejudice certain, lourd de consequences pour la

stabilité économique, et partant politique, des pays africains intéressés.”202

Accordingly, the freedom of action the representatives of the new governments

claimed was pre-emptively relativized by them in a joint declaration of the AASM:

“...que l’association avec la Communauté Économique Européenne que les Etats

africains et malgache, devenus indépendants, déclarent vouloir poursuivre, laisse

entier la liberté d’action des pays associés en matière économique et commercial

200

Brown, P.21, Clapham. 201

Conférence de l’assemblée parlementaire européenne avec les parlements d’états Africains et

de Madagascar, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission économique et commerciale, June 24,

1961, CEAM/67/61, p.4.: “la structure actuelle de l’économie et du commerce extérieure des

pays associés sur l’étroite solidarité qui les unissait aux anciennes métropoles et sur

l’ébranlement que subiraient ces nations si, dans le cadre de l’association avec la communau-

té européenne, elles ne pouvaient conserver un soutien au moins équivalent à celui dont elle

bénéficiaient jusqu-ici et qui leur est indispensable pour le maintien de leur revenu national”, 202

Conférence de l’Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne avec les Parlements d’États Africains

et de Madagascar, Les critères et les objectifs de l’association, June, 1961, pp.6 f.


71

sans autre réserve que celle de ne pas porter atteinte aus (sic!) règles convention-

nelles et à l’esprit de l’association.”203

Effectively, what had happened? The Regime of association in fact did not change

much in real terms. The main difference compared to the colonial pattern of trade

was the expansion of the unilateral trade preferences by the metropoles – primarily

Paris – on the five additional member states of the AEI. This caused primarily anxiety

among the domestic governments relying on the existing trade system and the ac-

cordingly aligned economies to lose the benefits through a significant change in trade

policy – well aware of their minimal possibilities to leave their marks on its develop-

ment.

203

Conférence de l’assemblée parlementaire européenne avec les parlements d’états Africains et

de Madagascar, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission économique et commerciale, June 24,

1961, CEAM/67/61, pp. 3 f.


72

3.4. The System of Yaoundé (1963-1975)

The Convention of Association signed on July 20th 1963 entered into force on June

1st 1964 for a period of five years. It was based on a preliminary draft, which was sent

to African governments for analysis and review. The main concerns appeared to be

aid for “production and diversification” and technical matters of incoherent internal

taxation within the EEC distorting the principle of reciprocity –emphasis from both

sides was laid on a swift conclusion of the negotiations to avoid ruptures in trade-

flows204. The years of the Regime of association were marked by two main economic

developments with consequences for African states: during the fifties, commodity

prices in relation to those of manufactured goods dropped by more than 20%. This

worsening of the terms of trade meant that during the decade the volume of exports

from developing countries rose by 52% while their importing capacity increased by

only 44%, or even only 15% if population growth is considered. The real numbers for

most countries were even worse, since these include oil producing economies being

nominally better off. Also, due to this and the significant rates of growth especially in

Western Europe, per capita purchasing power between the developed and the de-

veloping world diverged more and more – by about a factor of five205. The resulting

“second stage of the association” was considered by the Commission to have the

following features206:

1. Voluntary membership of all parties in the association based on effective coopera-

tion;

2. Every new disposition entering the association may not put the associated states

in a worse situation than the existing Regime of association;

3. The main goal of the association is the improvement of the people’s lives” in the

“associated states.

204

As the foregoing debates in the assembly show. 205

Annual report of the International Monetary Fund, September 9, 1963. 206

Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Communication de la Commission au

Conseil, Considérations sur le futur régime d‘association, VIII/COM(61)110 final, July 12 1961,

p.2.


73

Simply put, the association was therefore not intended to change anything in eco-

nomic terms without compensation; the mentioned “main goal” can actually be read

as a direct reference to the Berlin Conference as seen before. The only genuinely

new element was the “voluntary membership”, formally indispensable as most of the

AASM became formally independent during the year 1960 - before the Convention

was ratified. The “not independent” states stayed under the existing, temporarily non-

limited207 regime while the newly “independent” of course would have logically

dropped out. The Commission although argued, that the association was to be legiti-

mately sustained due to the special relationships originating in the colonial era:

“L’association s’étend à das pays et territories extra-éuropéens qui à la date de la

conclusion du Traité entretenaient avec certains membres des relations particulières,

sans que lesdites relations aient été précisées. Certes elles ont en partie disparu du

fait de l’accession à l’indépendance, mais celles qui subsistent suffisent à justifier,

voire à l’imposer, une liaison économique de ces pays avec la C.E.E. sous la forme

d’association”208.

Also, the association was according to the Commission founded with the aim to en-

sure the development of the countries and the well-being of their inhabitants, which

the commission held as being valid without restrictions209. Although, political depend-

ency could not be a part of this relationship as it was incompatible with the preamble

of the Rome Treaty with its reference to the General Principles of the UN-charter210 –

the Commission therefore explicitly excluded it as an option. On the other hand, a

different kind of relation was highlighted – based on the European process of integra-

tion:

“Enfin l’association est un élément essential de l’économie interne du Traité, dont

l’équilibre serait compromise s’il disparaissait sans que rien ne vienne le remplacer.

207

Art. 240 RT. 208

VIII/COM(61)110 final, July 12 1961, p.3. 209

“L’obligation qui lie la Communauté à la réalisation de cet objectif subsiste sans restriction.",

Ibid. 210

«La reconnaissance de l’égalité souveraine des Etats, le respect de l’intégrité territorial et de

l’indépendance politique, le respect des droits humains et des libertés fondamentales, sans

distinction de race, sexe, langue ou religion.»


74

L’une des raisons déterminantes de l’association des territoires d’outre-mer a été la

nécessité de dédommager ceux-ci de la disparition des privilèges acquis sur le mar-

ché français qu’implique la réalisation progressive du marché commun. Cette neces-

sity reste encore maintenant inchangé.”211

The EC-6 as a CU ratified the treaty multilaterally, as the EC had no international le-

gal personality by the time. The single FTA was replaced through a series of FTAs,

as the EEC had to deal with diverging interests of the countries as well as with differ-

ent productive structures (2). Reciprocity between the 24 states remained as a guid-

211

Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Communication de la Commission au

Conseil, Considérations sur le futur régime d‘association, VIII/COM(61)110 final, July 12 1961.


75

ing principle based on “progressive abolition212 of customs duties and charges having

an effect equivalent to such duties” although the “educational protectionism”213 re-

mained an option. The African States and Madagascar as formally sovereign states

were parties to the treaty just as the European, the Convention contains no territorial

distinction between the two continents but speaks of the “members”. The Convention

was open for ratification to all economically comparable214 states and could be de-

nounced by any member on six month’s notice. Within the EEC, the Commission was

solely responsible for the application and implementation of the Convention and the

EDF through its Directorate General VIII by the time presided by Robert Lemaignen.

The Lockean Heartland (4, 5) and its contender, the Soviet Union were still excluded

– as the ratification of the GATT was in progress215 and Great Britain was not obtain-

ing membership in the EEC until 1973216. The EDF was although used for joint

schemes217 with the US-AID and multilateral institutions as the UN-Technical Assis-

tance Bureau, the Special Fund, the International Labour Organisation and the

UNESCO. Additionally, EDF-funding was coordinated with the World Bank. With re-

gard to the rest of the world although, the system was further isolated. Article 2 Sec.2

set out the establishment of a common external tariff (CET)218 (7) for the FTA apply-

212

Tariff discrimination – meaning the preferences towards the respective colonial power – was to

be abolished within the first six months from the entry into force of the Convention, followed by

the timetable set out. Quotas had to be abolished within four years of the Conventions entry

into force. Always with the option to derogate due to “development, budgetary or industrializa-

tion needs”. European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, Infor-

mation Memo, P-23/63, July, 1963, p.5. 213

Les Communautés au travail, La nouvelle Convention Eurafricaine, un instrument de transition

entre le régime colonial et la compétitivité mondiale, in: Opéra Mundi, No. 181, January 3rd

,

1963, p.4. “Possibilité pour les territories associés de continuer à protéger leur production

contre la concurrence des Six (“protectionnisme éducatif”) ou de percevoir sur les exportations

de ceux-ci des droits de douane à caractère fiscal, à la seule condition qu’aucune discrimina-

tion ne soit faite entre eux”. 214

„The Association is open to all states whose economic structure and production are compara-

ble with those of the associated states“, P-23/65, p.18. 215

See table in Annex VI. 216

Due to the strict resistance of France, blocking the entrance of Great Britain in 1963 and 1967

through its veto. 217

The extension of the Trans-Cameroon-railway and the eradication of cattle plague in the Lake

Chad basin. 218

“Le maintien du tarif extérieur actuellement que des perspectives peuvent se présenter ulté-

rieurement de négociations avec le GATT ou avec d’autres zones de solidarité telles que le


76

ing to all tropical products originating from “third states” – meaning obviously other

especially South American states in the southern hemisphere - and consisting of the

by 40% reduced rate of customs duties of the EEC219. This concession to third coun-

tries should prevent trade diversion and apparently successfully: from 1957 to 1962,

EEC imports from the associated countries grew by 7.5%, while those from third

countries increased by 15%220. Besides the trade aspect, the system of Yaoundé was

intended to be a “coherent whole”, “all-embracing” in pursuance of the great principle

of “trade and aid”221 - covering not only every “essential aspect222 of the struggle

against under-development” but also providing remarkably more aid: The EDF was

continued as a supply of aid and technical assistance to contribute to the expansion

and protection of industrial production-structures – publicly defended by the Commis-

sion as a part of the “ultimate purpose” of the EEC:

“...the ultimate purpose of the European Economic Community is to create a large

economic area within which persons, services, products and capital can circulate

freely in accordance with common rules. In these conditions, it may be wondered

whether association, by bringing the overseas countries into competition with Euro-

pean Industries which are fully equipped and have long been amortized, would not

constitute a brake on their legitimate and rational industrialisation”223

In the same memo, the Commission while insisting on aid and technical assistance of

being intended to “stimulate the flow of the private capital which must be obtained”

also defined certain fields to be “not the concern of private enterprises [...] by their

nature”224. Also, it stated a right to revision explaining the five-years limit of the con-

tract, reasoning that “the wishes of the young states which were to accede to full in-

Commonwealth, l’Association Européenne de libre échange ou la zone de libre échange Lati-

no-Américaine“, CEAM/67/61, p.6. 219

See table in Annex. 220

The European Economic Community and Africa, 10.556/X/63-E, p.8. 221

Ibid., p.5. 222

“Promotion of trade, diversification of structures, industrialization, free movement of persons,

capital and services, moderation of short-term fluctuations of prices, technical co-operation,

productive investment and investment in economic and social infrastructure”, Ibid. 223

European Economic Community, Official Spokesman of the Commission, Information Memo,

P-23/63, July, 1963. 224

“Communications, Health, Welfare, Cultural affairs, Irrigation and the like”, see: Ibid., p.2.


77

ternational sovereignty should be respected and that the future should not be mort-

gaged without obtaining the consent of both parties”.225 Least developed countries

named “those associated States [...] which on account of previous international

commitments, were obliged to continue an “open door” policy vis-à-vis the world at

large”226 were addressed by industrialisation-programs aiming to the “diversification”

of their economies. On the other hand, 200 million dollars of the 780-million EDF

were intended to “aid to production”227 concentrated on additional goods to the tropi-

cal mentioned before: coffee, cotton, tobacco, sugar and oil. The other main principle,

“negotiating as equals” was addressed with a far-reaching further institutionalisation

of the association:

1. The Association Council (AC) composed of members of the Council of the EC and

the Commission and one representative of each associated government, deciding

unanimously.

2. The Parliamentary Conference of the Association (CON), composed of members

of the European Parliament and parliament members of the associated states

based on parity, passing resolutions on “all matters of concern to the association”

and defining the duties of the AC.

3. The Court of Arbitration of the Association (CA), serving as a means of arbitration

through majority vote if the AC fails to find a solution as a first instance of dispute

settlement. Composed of a president appointed by the AC and four judges, two

appointed by the Council of the EC, two by the associated states.

The influence of the Commission on the outcome is shown in the criticism the re-

sponsible commission of the European Parliament expressed in a comparative study:

mainly for neglecting suggestions by the assemblies of both parties and for confront-

ing them repeatedly with faits accomplis – by even informing the press before the

225

P-23/63. 226

Congo-Leopoldville, Togo, Somalia. 227

The actual term was dropped in the final agreement, for the sake of a longer passage mention-

ing “the gradual adaptation of the production of the associated countries with a view to en-

couraging commercialisation at world prices under satisfactory conditions.” See: Europe, Daily

Bulletin No. 1240, The EEC-AAS Conference ends on an optimistic note: some real progress

has been made, April 11, 1962, p.4.


78

EP228. Besides, it showed that the preliminary version set up by the Commission had

been changed only in minor issues like the amount of funds available to the EDF and

technical details concerning goods being of specific interest for certain states229.

As the EDF delivered funding for projects proposed by the governments in the bene-

ficiary countries, an intrinsic contradiction to the declared goals of industrialisation

and diversification appeared and was already visible by the end of the 1960s: As the

colonial trade pattern had established structures of production concentrated on com-

modities and agricultural products, these generated the largest share of income. It is

therefore not surprising, that most part of the development projects funded through

the EDF was directed towards the agricultural and the mining sector, enforcing the

existing trade-structure230. The infrastructure projects which accounted for most part

of the EDF-investment were mostly realised through contracts for French and Italian

firms, generating not only a backflow to their domestic economies but also to com-

plaints by the German government, where companies did not profit to the same ex-

tent from the flows of development money to the south231. The commitment to a pro-

tection of the exportation-goods of the AASM-agricultural sector from multilateral

trade liberalisation which was continuously realised through the GATT was explicitly

held as a main point during the preparations for the second Yaoundé-Convention and

the subsequent Lomé-system, setting out the importance of stabilising the world-price

through interventions232 - as the French Surprix-system had done before. The in-

volvement of the European Central Bank as a financing institution, although realised

228

Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Etude compare des recommandations de la confé-

rence de l’assemblée parlementaire Européenne avec les parlements d’États Africains et Mal-

gache et des Considérations sur le future régime d’association établies par la Commission de

la C.E.E., Octobre 2, 1961, APE-6264. 229

Ibid. 230

Journal official des communautés européennes, Communications et informations, no. C 13,

February 5 1969, Title III. 231

The share of German firms concerning EDF-contracts between 1958 and 1963 was only 6.8%,

growing to 9.1% until 1966 and 15% until the first Yaoundé-agreement expired - showing the

difficulties to penetrate a market founded on “special relations”. 232

Communauté Économique Européenne, Le Comite Economique et Social, Application de la

Convention d’Association entre la Communauté Economique Européenne et les Etats afri-

cains et malgache associés, CP 21/65 (139), Supplément No.3.


79

much later, was also considered and sketched by working-groups in 1965 already233.

Altogether, the new states’ governments had a significant role as receivers of aid.

The project-bound EDF-funding could only be directed to projects approved by the

domestic government; generally all forms of community aid were restricted to234:

1. The states concerned;

2. Corporate bodies in the state concerned, whose activities are not primarily profit-

making but rather likely to benefit the community as a whole and which come un-

der state control;

3. Cooperatives and similar bodies recognised by the states concerned;

4. Regional and interstate bodies to which the Associate countries belong.

According to these principles, the disbursement of aid was strictly state-centered and

– as the second point shows – even excluding profit-oriented private actors as recipi-

ents. Besides the increase of funds for the EDF, the assembly and council debates

show the main importance the marketing and sale of these agricultural products had

for the AASM-representatives235, while industrialisation and diversification was almost

exclusively advocated for by the EEC.

“At all events, the trade arrangements should be based on a stable, contractual basis

providing proof against intervention by third parties, particularly with the regard to

GATT, and substantial substantial quantities of products which are particularly im-

portant for the economy of certain associated and associable states should have

permanent access to the Community market at remunerative prices”236.

233

Communauté Économique Européenne, Réponse à la question écrite no. 160 de M.Pedini à la

Commission, Participation de la Banque Européenne au financement de crédits en faveur des

pays en voie de développement, May 4, 1965. 234

European Communities, Commission, The Second Yaoundé Convention, Great possibilities

for private Investment in Africa, CEE VIII/27, p.9. 235

See e.g. Memorandum from the AAMS to the EEC on Annex VIII to the final act of the Yaoun-

dé-Convention and Association EEC-AAMS, The Council, Press release, CEE/EAMA 94/65,

April 7, 1965. 236

European Parliament, Ten years of the parliamentary conference of the Association, CPA/171,

January, 1975, p. 17.


80

The actual effect of the Free Trade arrangements was ambiguous. Whereas AASM-

exports to the EEC increased by approx. 6.2% a year in average and imports by ap-

prox. 5.5%, the numbers were far from stable.237

237

See Table in Annex VIII.


81

3.4.1 Sovereignty and the System of Yaoundé

“A condition d’être démystifiée, la notion d’Eurafrique est une réalité économique”.238

The primary feature of the trade-system of Yaoundé compared to the Regime of as-

sociation lies obviously in the new-gained status of sovereignty by most colonies by

1962. The leadership of France in this matter has been amply documented, showing

the interest of the government to maintain its spheres of influence through an eco-

nomic regime it could not establish unilaterally due economic ties within the EEC and

the expressed political will of its colonies to gain independence. From the point of

view of sovereignty, there is although another aspect: As the economic patterns

within the colonies remained, the interest to maintain the trade with the former colo-

nial powers was eminent for the new-formed governments239. The French colonial

structures which had formed conceptions of law, domestic institutions and the official

language of fifteen out of the eighteen240 associates served also as a framework for

the newly sovereign states, anticipating its institutional structure as its basic princi-

ples. Also, the ratification of a trade treaty as an act of international legal sovereignty

had a legitimising and affirmative241 effect on their status – internationally and domes-

tically. The negotiations in Yaoundé were respectively institutionalised, adopting Eu-

ropean diplomatic usances in a “true multilateral negotiation, with the traditional ma-

chinery at all levels: ministerial conferences; a steering committee at ambassadorial

level, specialised working parties of experts. The often conflicting interests of the

238

Adress of Mr. van der Goeas van Naters, in: Conférence de l’assemblée parlementaire Euro-

péenne avec les parlements d’états Africains et de Madagascar, Les formes politiques et insti-

tutionnelles de la coopération, June, 1961, p.2. 239

As BROWN puts it: “The new states faced major problems of underdevelopment, narrow ex-

port bases, colonially established patterns of trade and infrastructure and their social conse-

quences of low levels of literacy and education, health and welfare. It was towards the latter of

these that the imperial powers had directed their limited modernization and improvement

budgets”. Brown 2002, p. 21. 240

„…que quinze sur seize des États associés sont francophones et possèdent des institutions,

des conceptions du droit, de l’enseignement et de la civilisation, qui les rapprochent entre eux

en les rapprochant en même temps de leur source, qui est également, pour plusieurs de leurs

partenaires européens, la source de nombre de leurs institutions, de leur droit et de leur civili-

sation: la France…”, Adressa of Mr. van der Goes van Naters. 241

See also Herdegen 2009, pp. 35 ff.


82

twenty-four sovereign states were freely discussed”242. Under the title “Efforts by the

Associated states themselves”, political guidelines for the associated states were

proposed concerning the “rational programming of economic development”, an eco-

nomic policy “likely to encourage and to increase, within the framework of such pro-

gramming, any initiatives – private initiatives in particular – in the activities contrib-

uting to the development of the economy as a whole” and a financial policy “ which

will enable the State concerned to increase its own financial participation in its devel-

opment”. Concrete schemes to be supervised by a “second supervisor” in each state

were also contained, as budgetary discipline243 concerning “public and external reve-

nue”244 – following the principles of political neutrality and voluntary cooperation, the-

se proposals were neither legally binding nor were they implemented.

The participation of the associated states in the new institutions was rather modest.

As of 1970, only 13 out of the 18 sent delegations to the association assembly at all,

4 having no domestic parliament refraining from sending even observers and Soma-

lia – although having a parliament – abstained declaring financial reasons. The disaf-

fection for the parliamentary component of the agreement from the African side due

to its rather representative function remained throughout the Yaoundé-system245. Be-

sides the non-alignment the cooperation with the EEC seemed to offer, the apparent

economic success of the European integration-project with its reciprocal development

set an example for the possibilities close connections to this area could have in fu-

ture. An association linking African states to this flourishing area by – to some extent

242

The Commission of the European Economic Community, The European Economic Community

and Africa, 10.556/X/63-E, Part 1, P.4. 243

“Increase public revenue and avoid a disproportionate increase of public expenditure (taking

increases in population and economic expansion into account)”, Ibid. 244

The Association Council, Resolution concerning the general pattern for financial and technical

cooperation, Annex to CEE-EAMA/116 e/66 (IP5), May 18, 1966, Art. 12. 245

Parlement Européen, Documents de Séance, Rapport sur les résultats de la cinquième réu-

nion de la conférence parlementaire de l’association C.E.E-E.A.M.A qui s’est tenue à Tanana-

rive du 10 au 15 janvier, Document 228, March 7, 1969, Sec. 6 and 7.


83

– becoming a part of the integration-project while remaining politically independent

was favourably regarded by African government representatives246.

The margin of adaptation which was granted by Art. 61 of the Convention showed a

differentiation among the 18 AASM-countries: By the end of the first Yaoundé-

agreement, 5 governments247 had decided to keep up certain trade-limitations

through non-preferential tariffs, whereas 13 conformed to the principle of reciprocity.

In a practical sense, the principle was although not upheld by the European states as

well: as mentioned, the tropical products were treated more preferentially than others.

Therein, the Benelux and Germany248 had negotiated special protocols, guaranteeing

fixed conditions for such products originating in third countries. Also, much more im-

portant, all agricultural products comparable249 with such covered by the CAP were

excluded by the EC-6, claiming250 that the interests of the associated states were to

be accounted for in the internal CAP-negotiations.251

Concerning integration, the Convention explicitly stated “opportunity to pursue re-

gional re-groupings and African unity” not only as granted within the limits of the as-

246


de Madagascar, Expose sur la coopération entre la Côte d’Ivoire et la Communauté écono-

mique Européenne, June, 1961, CONF 61-1, p.4. 247

Rwanda, Congo-Kinshasa, Somalia, Togo, Burundi. 248

Germany obtained almost all bananas from Latin America based on bilateral agreements. At-

tempts to launch African Bananas on the German market failed completely, leading to the sit-

uation that imports declined from 6299 tons of AASM-bananas in 1963 to 44 in 1964. As ba-

nana-exporting AASM-states with the exception of Ivory Coast did not have the means to pro-

duce cardboard boxes to meet the shipment requirements, they were technically excluded and

not able to profit from the market expansion through the Convention. As commented in Eu-

rope: “[the banana-negotiations have] shown to African authorities the real problems which

they will have to resolve before they can share in the benefits of the Association with the EEC

at trade level”. Europe, Common Market, Increasing AASM exports to EEC countries,

No.2323, January 24, 1966. 249

This included rice, manioc, canned fruit, non-tropical fruit and oleaginous products. 250

Usually answering requests regarding this problem by “recognizing the importance of these

problems for the economy of the countries concerned”. 251

La Correspondance Européenne, Bilan provisoire de l’application de la Convention de Yaoun-

dé dans le domaine des echanges commerciaux, June 24, 1968, pp.3 f.


84

sociation, but also a constraint for the association.” – as a favourable model for eco-

nomic development.252

252

“…the Association shall not hamper any steps taken to establish fresh regional groupings or

African unity”. P-23/63, p.6.


85

3.5. The System of Lomé (1975-1990)

“In the history books [Lomé I] will go down as a symbol of a revolution which gave the

Third World access to... [shared responsibility] and to increased prosperity”253

As the second Yaoundé-Convention expired in 1974, the membership of Britain,

Denmark and Ireland in 1973 had increased the number of countries with special re-

lations to be associated by the former Commonwealth to 46 and the EC-6 to the EC-

9. Second, the former Belgian, Dutch, British and French colonies agreed to enter the

negotiations as a group of states called the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) –

under the auspices of the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) and the UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Africa. The ACP-group was initiated by the former Common-

wealth countries, which could have accessed the existing system of association

through Protocol 22254 of the Association-agreement of the United Kingdom with the

EEC – they chose to ignore the deadline and began talks with the AASM and Arusha

groups leading to the ACP255. Third, the Commission of the EEC expressed dissatis-

faction with the outcome of the Yaoundé-system and urged the need for a “new form

of association”256 to properly handle the dependency between the parties:

“We are dependent on the Third World here and now as well as in future. It, in turn,

depends on us to a considerable degree. Our interests are linked. We should there-

fore try to express this dependence clearly and irrevocably. Let us go beyond yearly

or short-term arbitrary arrangements and forge contractual links between us. [...] they

253

Address by G. Spenale, President of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, June 1, 1976. 254

Which offered basically three possibilities for accession: A joint agreement with the Yaoundé-

convention, an association agreement under Art. 238 of the Rome Treaty or a reciprocal trade

agreement under Art. 113 of the Rome Treaty. See also: Brown, p.45. 255

Sissoko, Macki, Osuji, Louis, Cheng, William, Impacts of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions

on EC-ACP Trade, in: The African Economic & Business Review, Vol.1, No. 1, Spring 1998,

p.8. 256

Also: Address by G. Spenale.


86

will be agreements binding on all which will set out the guiding principles of our poli-

cies and the rules which we will abide.”257

The Convention covered aid to the ACP states, preferential trade access to EC-

markets, the stabilisation of export earnings and development. Being set up for five

years, it also provided a mechanism of dialogue258 for a joint monitoring of the im-

plementation by the parties. As the ACP managed it to maintain a unified bargaining

position, their influence on the resulting system appears significant259 compared to

the Yaoundé-Convention set up by the EEC states. As JAN ORBIE argues, it may

not only be seen as a manifestation of contemporary demands by third world coun-

tries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), but also as an attempt to glob-

alise the system of embedded liberalism to a certain extent, based on a relatively

high predictability and flexibility for receiver-states260. By the time, it had become

clear that the decades of economic growth in the industrialised countries did not as

positively affect the African continent: where average incomes in the “advanced

countries” grew per 3.9 % annually between 1960 and 1970, the growth rates were

significantly lower on a much lower level261. One of the consequences of this devel-

opment was the formation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-

ment (UNCTAD), where the principle of reciprocity in trade especially through the

GATT was decided to be waived for developing countries for the sake of preferential

257

Preface by EC-Commissioner Claude Cheysson in: Commission of the European Communi-

ties, Europe – Third World, Interdependence Facts and Figures, Development Series No. 2,

1978, p.7. 258

An achievement, partly regarded as the main achievement of the Lomé-system. The decisive

power although remained with the EC-9, as BROWN and SISSOKO et al. Argue – a position

that appears more convincing, regarding the one-sided economic dependency of the ACP-

governments and the fact, that no disputes were decided in favour of the ACP. 259

During the negotiations, some space for state-led according to the NIEO-demands was won by

the ACP-representatives – also, the STABEX was an important step for their economic inter-

ests. The non-preferential treatment had although already been established as a principle

through UNCTAD and the GATT in the beginning of the 1970s, to speak of a pioneering role of

the AEI appears therefore questionable. 260

See: Orbie, Jan, The European Union & the Commodity Debate: From Trade to Aid, in: Re-

view of African Political Economy, No.112, 2007, pp.297-311. 261

Brown 2002, p. 47.


87

treatment in 1968262. Also, the interest of the non-aligned-movement where all the 18

AASM-states were members not to be pushed towards one of the dominant Cold-

War-superpowers respectively their social modes of production was strongly advo-

cated for during the negotiations for Lomé I and constituted one of the basic princi-

ples of the ACP-group. The four fundamentals of Lomé policy which reflect these cir-

cumstances were agreed upon as263:

1. Dependable cooperation relations based on a system of entitlement laid down in a

freely negotiated contract between equal partners

2. One contract binding two regional groups, excluding any manipulation or discrimi-

nation inspired by unilateral assessments of the partners’ sovereign choice of eco-

nomic systems, political regimes and development models. This means non-

alignment and respect for national and cultural individuality.

3. A global approach defining and combining a whole series of instruments of coop-

eration, which provides a well-balanced response, in the light of the priorities the

ACP countries themselves define, to needs that vary with economic structure and

level of development.

4. Cooperation based on a permanent dialogue (ensured by the institutional structure

taken over from Lomé I and which, now consultations have been stepped up, will

be much wider in scope.

The association’s emphasis on keeping the colonial trade- and preferences-situation

on a stable level and the principle of reciprocity and non-discriminatory treatment

which had influenced the Yaoundé-system seemed to have changed at least in a de-

claratory sense: Dependable cooperation, based on entitlement – instead of rights

and obligations. The idea of entitlement of the ACP-states is also visible in the central

role of their needs in the negotiation-documents and the final convention. Also, the

free choice of the form of state and the social mode of production seemed to mark a

262

UNCTAD, Resolution 21 II, New Delhi 1968. See also: UNCTAD, Official Web page,

http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1 (Last access 21.11.2011). 263

The main provisions of the new ACP-EEC Convention, in: The Courier, no.58, November 1979

pp.27

http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1


88

decisive breach not only towards the colonial past, but also towards the other west-

ern donor of development assistance, the USA. Other than the intentionally loosely

formulated and strictly trade-centered Yaoundé-association which in its wording tried

to avoid any appearance as a “camouflaged colonialism”, the all-embracing approach

of the Lomé-system demanded, appears also as remarkable. Obviously, the system

of Lomé was an expansion of the association, in terms of members as concerning the

institutional structure:

The EC-9 (1), now including Great Britain as the other important colonial Power still

ratified the agreement for the further formalising of the now nominally post-colonial

trade relations as sovereign states on a multilateral level. The resulting system of

trade (2) although, was different in a number of respects: First of all, reciprocity was

no longer the long-term goal of the economic integration process. As the now to a

certain degree unified ACP-states (3) were able to negotiate through an international


89

organisation with the permanent secretariat (ACP-SEC) as a focal point for coordina-

tion and communication – and thanks to the changes within UNCTAD and GATT re-

flecting the Cold-War situation - they reached certain gains. The GATT were by the

time ratified by all states involved and reinforced the position of the ACP as they ex-

plicitly did not require developing countries to grant reciprocal preferences to devel-

oped countries264. Concerning the international legal sovereignty of the new states,

the non-reciprocity is of particular interest, because it was not reached by consent

among the states, but as a result of a long-enduring debate and bargaining among

the governments in the group265. The integration of the new states in an international

organisation through the Georgetown-agreement lead to a much better negotiating-

position and subsequently to a modification of the trade doctrine of the colonial and

the Yaoundé-system. This has also to be seen in a broader development of south-

south-relations emerging since the late 1950s as the non-aligned-movement and the

Group of 77, culminating in the demand for a New International Economic Order

(NIEO) in the period the first Lomé-Convention was negotiated on. As the process of

decolonialisation had nominally expanded the Western system of sovereign nation-

states to an unpreceeded extent and thereby formally overcome the imperial system

in place before through an universal, multilateral norm – the right to independence –

the nature of north-south relations seemed to be thoroughly different and hence

guided by development to bridge the gap between the formal sovereignty and the

structural weaknesses.

The main goal of the Convention, as set out in its Article 1, was described as the “ac-

celeration of the rate of growth of trade and the improvement of the conditions of ac-

cess of their products to the market of the EEC”. The principle of most-favoured-

nation remained between the EC-states, meaning that the colonial preferences could

264

See protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to introduce a Part IV on

Trade and Development, February 8, 1965. 265

Reflecting structural economic differences among the ACP, as agrarian states as most AASM

saw non-reciprocity as a main key to economic prosperity, while economically strengthened

Oil-producing countries thanks to the roaring prices of crude oil like Nigeria were sceptical to-

wards protectionism and association in general. See also Brown 2002, p. 55.


90

not be upheld266. This was underlined by Article 3, confirming non-discrimination267

. On the other hand, 99.2% of all ACP-exports were granted duty-free and quota-free

access to the European Market – except all commodities covered by the CAP and

goods affected through non-tariff trade barriers as health and quality regulations,

which were controlled on the level of individual member-states. As MACKI SISSOKO

ET AL. show, African exports lost significance for the AEI due to a number of rea-

sons: First, most AASM-countries increased food production for domestic consump-

tion while trying to shift to manufacturing for exportation. Second, the GATT had lead

to a factual elimination of the Common External Tariff (CET) of the AEI towards prod-

ucts coming especially from Latin America and the USA, leading to import substitu-

tion and lowering prices within the EEC268. The development lead also to a growing

inequality within the ACP in terms of export numbers, as AASM-export figures due to

their agricultural basis declined whereas exports of the former commonwealth and

Asian countries steadily increased269. The structure of trade had not altered remarka-

bly, as it continued to consist of agricultural products and crude oil, the AEI account-

ing for over 50% of exports of the ACP-group, whereas the USA did only for 15% in

1975270. Crude oil and coffee alone represented almost 40% of ACP exports to the

AEI, followed by the traditional tropical products cocoa, sugar cane, bananas and

increasingly gold and diamonds271. Oil clearly became the main product as its share

of total exports reached almost 34% in 1991272. As many of the ACP-states were

266

This would not have been of much economic interest neither, as Exports from the AASM as for

Africa in general had lost significance: Whereas EC-imports from Asia and the mid-east had

increased significantly until 1975, AAS exports and imports had declined steadily, reaching

5.8% of all LDC-exports by 1975 compared to 14.2% in 1957. In absolute terms although, the

change was not that severe. See: EUROSTAT (1992) and Sissoko et al. 1998, pp. 14-15. 267

The ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on February 28 1975, Art. 3, Sec. 1: “The Commu-

nity shall not apply to imports of products originating in the ACP States any quantitative re-

strictions or measures having equivalent effect other than those which the Member States ap-

ply among themselves.” Available at the ACP-secretariat:

http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/lome1.htm (Last access: 13.12.2011). 268

Sissoko et al. 1998, p. 14. 269

Ibid., EUROSTAT (1992). 270

The numbers being remarkably higher for the AASM, see: The Courier, no. 44, July-August

1977, pp.20 ff. 271

Sissoko et al. 1998, p. 17, Table 5. 272

EUROSTAT (1993). This development made Nigeria, Angola and Gabon the main trade part-

ners of the AEI on the continent.

http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/lome1.htm


91

heavily dependent on (agricultural) commodities and their volatile prices on the inter-

national market due to the colonial pattern of production they had inherited, the Stabi-

lisation of Export Earnings-Facility (STABEX) was installed273. STABEX, based on

Articles 16 and 17 of the Convention served as a security measure in case of contin-

uously deteriorating terms of trade by providing funds intended to replace a loss274 in

export earnings for the “tropical products” and commodities – notably through direct

budget transfers which had not to be repaid. Being named “the most important inno-

vation” by the EC, the colonial origins of the system are not to be overseen. In addi-

tion, “industrial development” was defined as the second primary goal of the Conven-

tion, represented by the Centre for Industrial Development (CID). The institutional

structure of Yaoundé remained, although the Court of Arbitration was abolished and

replaced by “procedures of good offices” and the word “association” was removed

from the Convention in general – e.g. the Parliamentary Conference of the Associa-

tion became the Consultative Assembly. The term replacing “association” as a slogan

used in the official publications was “partnership” or as the Courier stated in its spe-

cial issue concerning the initiation of Lomé I “a relationship very much based on

equal terms between the two partners”. The institutional structure and the changing

paradigm to a long-term partnership appear not only as a difference towards the Ya-

oundé-system, but also the late French colonial regime which claimed to aim for the

development of its colonies to subsequently release them into independence as soon

as they were “ready”275. Compared to its “transitional” predecessors, the structure of

the Lomé-system due to the predictability and reliability set as main principles was

obviously built to endure.

Set for a period of five years, the Lomé-Convention was followed by three subse-

quent agreements: Lomé II in 1979 contained 58 ACP-countries and kept the main

features of the system established by the first Convention. The funding-system for

the stabilisation of volatile prices was extended by SYSMIN, which adopted the

273

Brown 2002 and Sissoko et al. 1998. 274

The negative fluctuation necessary to trigger the additional funding was set out in Article 17,

Sec. 2 was set to 7.5% in general, 5% for sisal and 2.5% for “the least developed, landlocked

or island ACP-states” listed in Article 24. 275

Shillington, Kevin (ed.), Encyclopaedia of African History, Vol. 1, pp. 443 ff. Which may be

doubted for good reasons. See Ansprenger 2007, Osterhammel 2006 and Brown 2002.


92

mechanism of STABEX for mining products and thereby reinforced the economical

incentive offered to governments of commodity-dependent states to join the agree-

ments. This emphasis on mineral exports was also addressed by new provisions

aimed to investment protection, with the aim to replace missing and declining EEC

investments in the sector by private. Although the need of the ACP states being de-

pendent from exports and world market prices was emphasized during the negotia-

tions, the Commission did not miss to mention the “heavy dependence” of the Com-

munity “on external sources of supply for mining products”276. The Joint Declaration

annexed to the treaty expanded the principle of non-discrimination to private inves-

tors from the EEC. Also, the introduction of a Human Rights-clause was first men-

tioned during the negotiations, brought forward by the Dutch Foreign minister277, alt-

hough it could not be introduced as it was heavily opposed by the ACP-group278. In

analogy to the CID, a Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation was set up to

“disseminate throughout the ACP countries scientific and technical information in the

agricultural sector”. Lomé III (1984-1989) showed two main conflicts between the

ACP and the EC: while the ACP mainly complained about the insufficient funding

provided to the stabilisation facilities279 and the declining ACP-exports to the EC, the

Commission saw the five-years-renegotiations as a main source of instability280 in the

EC-ACP-negotiations. Also, the establishment of the Single European Market intro-

duced additional obstacles for ACP-goods by requiring additional investments to

comply with the now unified product-standard measures which could not be funded

without more debt281. Additionally, the GATT Uruguay-round extended measures for

trade liberalisation for commodities which threatened the system of preferences the

ACP anxiously tried to uphold. The resulting agreement differed from its predeces-

sors by adding more detailed provisions for investment protection and promotion in

276

The Courier, no.58, November 1979, p.31. 277

Kappel, Robert, Demokratie und Menschenrechte in der Entwicklungspolitik der EU, in: Ha-

nisch, Rudolf (ed.), Demokratieexport in die Länder des Südens?, Hamburg 1996, pp. 276 ff. 278

Ibid. 279

Primarily caused by rising prices for crude oil worsening the balance of payments, the men-

tioned substitution of imports in the AEI for most states’ products and – linked to these factors

- increasing debt. 280

Brown 2002, p. 53. 281

Ibid., p. 69.


93

Articles 240-247282 and shifting the focus of the development aspect from industriali-

sation to “self-reliance” and “food-security”. The preamble now explicitly included the

“faith in fundamental human rights”, although it was not taken up by any concrete

provision.

282

Which although were non-self-executing and therefore merely called for “further action”


94

3.5.1 Sovereignty and the System of Lomé

Applied to the scheme proposed in this thesis, the fifteen years of the three Lomé-

agreements had a number of remarkable features. The institutional structure and the

linkage between the regime and a certain predictability of World-market prices which

were very important for the revenue of the ACP governments clearly tightened the

relations and increased the economic dependency of the former colonies. As for the

AASM, which as exporters of agricultural products depended on cash-crops to gain

foreign currencies to finance imports, the STABEX-system very much replaced the

former French SURPRIX-system. These aspects were interpreted by dependence-

theorists as JOHAN GALTUNG283 among others as nothing less than a functional

system perpetuating African commodity-dependence in exports while keeping up the

protection of the European agricultural market, based on structural power through

exploitation, fragmentation and penetration by the embedding of government elites.

On the other hand, during the negotiations many of the seemingly advantageous fea-

tures of the system appeared to be the result of successful sovereign bargaining be-

tween and by the ACP-members and the emphasis on non-interference in internal

affairs seemed to grant the states an amount of sovereignty beyond the possibilities

strictly strategically motivated cooperation with the USSR or the USA offered, giving

the Lomé-system the appearance of an adaptation of NIEO. Also, the development

aid through the EDF gave ACP-governments the possibility of project suggestion

which was certainly a unique feature of aid disbursement – even if, as CECIL RA-

JANA has held, the project determination remained in the hands of the Commissions

DG, as the ACP was not given effective representation in the responsible commit-

tee284.

Concerning sovereignty, the aspect of stabilisation appears as crucial. Whereas the

Regime of association had kept the colonial system by expanding it unilaterally to the

AEI consisting of six states and the Yaoundé-agreement had legitimised the govern-

283

See Galtung, Johan, The Lomé Convention and neo-capitalism, University of Oslo chair in

conflict and peace research papers, Vol. 20, 1975. 284

Rajana, Cecil, The Lomé Convention: an evaluation of EEC economic assistance to the ACP-

states, in: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Issue 20, Vol.2, 1982, pp.179-220.


95

ments of the new states through an international legal agreement and ensured the

continuation of the economic pattern their revenue relied on, the Lomé-system

served the institutionalised stabilisation of the sovereign states. This comes clear es-

pecially when looking at the aid system, which allowed no withdrawal of financial

means after allocation and was based on a cooperative approach, in which the ACP-

governments basically provided the administrative framework for EEC-financed aid.

The insistence on political neutrality allowed the Lomé-system not only to be a viable

alternative for the non-aligned states, but also the inclusion of states like Angola and

Ethiopia, where the political system in place made bilateral relations diplomatically

difficult to establish285.

For the AASM, the trade situation worsened due to reasons lined out before, whereas

their economical structure remained in the colonial pattern, needing foreign exchange

to buy manufactured and investment goods on ever worsening terms. Therefore, their

economies benefited286 from the increase in stabilisation mechanisms and aid, espe-

cially as the French SURPRIX-system was abandoned as a further consequence of

the ongoing GATT-negotiations. The NIEO-aspects which were adopted especially in

the first Lomé-convention, allowed the rather state-centric systems not only to be

stabilised, but also to legitimately remain in place – but on the other hand, they were

more closely integrated into the trade system between the two partner-organisations

through its institutional and apparently beneficial character. Considering my scheme

of analysis, the Lomé-Convention shows a tension between relative political autono-

my in the sense of economic sovereignty, but also the setup of a structure of integra-

tion which lead to a restriction of said sovereignty through Lomés II and III287.

285

Frisch, Dieter, Zur Zukunft des Lomé-Abkommens, in: Africa Spektrum, No. 1, 1996, p. 62. 286

As Sissoko et al. put it: "Without the preferences granted to them by the EC, the associates

would probably have fared even worse." Sissoko et al. 1998, p. 14. 287

„Indeed, the evolution of the Convention also demonstrated the problematic nature of such

formalized relations between groups of states in a rapidly changing international environment.

The process of renegotiation is a recognition of the periodic need to restructure institutional-

ized relationships (...) in this context; Lomé III signalled a move to change the principles of

ACP-EU cooperation and reflected a wider process of change in North-South relations”. Brown

2002, pp. 71-72.


96

3.6. Beyond “the spirit of Lomé” (1990-2000)

I separate the Lomé IV-Convention from the Lomé-System logically, as it is distin-

guishable in different aspects. First, the period of validity was extended from five to

ten years with a mid-term revision, as a consequence of the high emphasis the

Commission put on this issue during the negotiations288. The Convention therefore

consists of an original (1990-1995) and a revised version (1995-2000). The system of

Lomé, which came into existence under the circumstances of the Cold War, was now

confronted with significant changes in the international system. The fourth convention

was negotiated during the turmoil taking place in the Eastern European states, which

lead delegates of African states to express their fears of a shifting focus of aid and

trade cooperation to the new states about to be opened after decades of relative iso-

lation289. The trade-system had expanded in terms of territory and volume - com-

pared to the 46 states signing the first Lomé-Convention, there were 68 in 1989. But

in relative terms, the trade between the two organisations had developed unequally:

Whereas the exports from ACP-states had accounted for 4.44% of total imports by

the EEC, the number had declined to reach 1.78% in 1990290. The diversification of

trade had also barely taken place, as manufactured or processed products did not

reach relevant numbers in trade statistics – they were in fact higher in 1962 than by

the end of the 1980s291. The main products exported by the ACP to the EEC in 1991

were primarily Crude oil, followed by the traditional “tropical products” and valuable

minerals and metals292. Being the alternative source for these products, imports from

Latin American countries had risen having a substituting effect in the EEC-market.

The colonial patterns of trade had not dissolved, although they showed a significant

difference between the both former metropolitan powers: UKs share of ACP-imports

288

Brown 2002, pp. 88 ff. 289

“not to abandon their friends of the South for the benefit of their brothers of the East” 290

The trade numbers had undergone one sharp decline between 1970 and 1975 mostly due to

the oil- and economic crisis. Between 1975 and 1980, the share of the ACP of EEC-imports

had been steady, but had crumbled by the end of the 1980s. Source: EUROSTAT, 1992. See

Table in Annex. 291

EEC imports of manufactured products from the ACP had declined from 6.2% in 1962 to 1.5%

in 1987. Source: EUROSTAT, 1993. See also Sissoko et al. 1998. 292

Crude oil accounted for 33.7% in total followed by Coffee and Cocoa beans with 4.6% and

4.5% respectively. Source, EUROSTAT (1993).


97

had declined by half between 1970 and 1981 accompanied by a small rise of other

EEC-countries’ share. The French trade pattern with African countries although had

not only remained stable, but had even relatively increased293. On the other hand, the

EEC remained the most important market for ACP-products.

The institutional structure of the trade system remained the same. The significant

change of the contract was the abandoning of the consequently emphasized principle

of “political neutrality” as shown before for the sake of “political dialogue”, a develop-

ment which is closely linked to the end of the Socialist system of states (6). Article 5

of the Convention corresponded with Article 10 of its predecessor – but had under-

gone slight reformulation:

293

From 18.32% to 21.23%, Source: EUROSTAT, 1985.


98

Art. 10 Lomé III

“Cooperation shall be aimed at supporting development in the ACP-states, a process

centred on man himself and rooted in each people’s culture. It shall back up the poli-

cies and measures adopted by those states to enhance their human resources, in-

crease their own creative capacities and promote their cultural identities...”

Art. 5 Lomé IV

“Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main pro-

tagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion

of all human rights. Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived in accordance

with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is recognised as a basic

factor of real development and where cooperation is conceived as a contribution to

the promotion of these rights.”

The economy- and primarily state-based approach of the existing Lomé-Convention

emphasized the diversity of the cultures and according to their neutral approach re-

ferred to the states inhabitants through the economic term of human resources. Lomé

IV introduced the dimension of Human Rights as a precondition for “real” develop-

ment and in general, in its wording concentrates much more on the role of individuals

and private actors within the states the cooperation aims at. The definition of the Hu-

man Rights which the Convention intends to cover given in Article 5, Sec. 2 is wide:

“all human rights (...): non discriminatory treatment; fundamental human rights; civil

and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights”. Further, the Convention

states the right of “every individual” to “production by the law”. In terms of implemen-

tation and enforcement, the Convention although contained only the possibility in Art.

5 Sec. 3 to allocate financial resources at the request of the ACP-states to promote

human rights through “specific schemes” – a model coherent with the financing-

mechanism of the EDF, where the funds were intended to flow from.


99

The Council Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development issued in

November 1991294 set guidelines for a “consistent” approach concerning the signifi-

cance and realisation of Human Rights in “development cooperation” – and also

combined it with further concepts: “good governance”, democracy, social justice and

the rule of law were declared parts of a larger set of requirements to achieve “bal-

anced and sustainable development”. Also, the declaration set out positive and nega-

tive “initiatives”. While the guarantee of sovereignty in Article 3 remained as a basic

principle, Articles 5 and 6 stated a declaratory breach, as they did not provide a legal

basis for actually responding to Human Rights violations. Comparable clauses were

entered into agreements with Latin American and Asian countries in the early 1990s

and finally in the Maastricht Treaty295 as a guiding principles for the policy area of

development-cooperation under Title XVII.

The Resolution on Human Rights of 1991 gives a quite clear outline of the under-

standing of sovereignty which was now declared guiding:

“While sovereign States have the right to institute their own administrative structures

and establish their own constitutional arrangements, equitable development can only

effectively and sustainably be achieved if a number of general principles of govern-

ment are adhered to: sensible economic and social policies, democratic decision-

making, adequate governmental transparency and financial accountability, creation

of a market-friendly environment for development, measures to combat corruption, as

well as respect for the rule of law, human rights and freedom of the press and ex-

pression (...) these principles will be central in their existing or new development co-

operation relationships”.

Also, the declaration contains references to the suspension of “official”, intergovern-

mental aid in the case of “grave violations” of these principles296 and the negative

294

Available at Dialogue for Democratic Development:

http://archive.idea.int/lome/bgr_docs/resolution.html (Last access: 14.11.2011). 295

Article 130u, Sec. 2, The Maastricht Treaty: “Community policy in this area shall contribute to

the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to

that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedom”. 296

Which, according to CHRISTOF HARTMANN, had happened through intentional delays in the

case of Liberia and Uganda before a legal basis existed. This point of view is although disput-

http://archive.idea.int/lome/bgr_docs/resolution.html


100

effects of military spending combined with the will to adopt “concrete measures in

their cooperation in order to encourage developing countries to reduce their legiti-

mate security needs”. As a matter of fact, the declaration stated that “human rights

clauses will be inserted in future cooperation agreements”, a principle which was af-

firmed and reinforced in 1995297 through the additional establishment of a suspension

mechanism for all agreements with third countries. The revised version of Lomé IV,

which came into force in November 1995 accordingly – despite the firm opposition of

most ACP-states298 – introduced both the essentiality299 of Human Rights and De-

mocracy and a suspension-mechanism as a possible negative measure. The sus-

pension-mechanism was linked to the element of dialogue introduced by the first Lo-

mé-convention and therefore subject to consultations.

The idea of political conditionality was neither new nor ACP-specific: The Community

had applied political conditionalities as an instrument to support the restructuring of

the Central and East European Countries (CEECs) from 1988 on through trade and

aid agreements. Countries estimated to be “leading” in reform processes were grant-

ed higher amounts of direct budgetary aid than those seen as less advanced – the

applied criteria in fact being the “respect for Human Rights, leading to the withholding

of agreed support for Romania and Bulgaria”.300 Association agreements with CEECs

from 1990 on were conditionalised in themselves: States could only join, if the Com-

ed, as it is not entirely clear whether such delays were caused by rather technical difficulties or

intentionally. He uses the term “political discretion” to describe this assumed approach. See:

Hartmann, Christof, Demokratisierungsprozesse in Afrika und die europäische Entwicklungs-

politik, in: Nord-Süd aktuell, No. 3, 1995, p. 425. 297

Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and

human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries. COM (95) 216 final,

23 May 1995. Available at the Archive of European Integration: http://aei.pitt.edu/4097/ (Last

access: 30.12.2011). 298

Hartmann 1995, Kappel 1996 and Brown 2002. 299

Meaning that the provisions as an “essential element”. The “essential element”-clause intro-

duced in Lomé IV bis stipulated that certain elements could lead to the suspension of coopera-

tion in case of violation through a “suspension clause” also introduced with Art. 366a Lomé IV. 300

PHARE, the Aid program for the CEEC did not contain an explicit provision as a legal base for

conditionality – these were applied in a rather ad hoc –fashion. See: Regulation 3906/89, Offi-

cial Journal of the European Union, L 375, December 23, 1989. Until 1996, the same held true

for the program to assist reforms in the former Soviet Union after 1992, until explicit condition-

ality-provisions were included in Regulation 1279/96, Official Journal of the European Union, L

165, July 4, 1996.

http://aei.pitt.edu/4097/


101

munity found them to meet the conditions necessary for defined reforms301. After the

Soviet Union had ceased to exist in 1992, the Council decided that all agreements

concluded with members of the European development-organisation CSCE should

contain a suspension-clause if “human rights and democratic principles” were disre-

spected302. The first generation of these agreements did not contain any provision for

consultations in such a case.

301

„The rule of law, respect for Human Rights, a multi-party-system, free and transparent elec-

tions and a market economy.” See: Zielinska-Glebocka, Anna, The Evolution of East-West

Trade relations and European Integration, European Community Studies Association paper,

May 14, 1995. 302

Which corresponds with the principles of the CSCE.


102

3.6.1 Sovereignty beyond the spirit of Lomé

A certain new quality appearing between the negotiations of Lomé IV and Lomé IV

bis directly concerns state sovereignty. The unilateral declaration of guiding principles

by the EEC-states concerning not only the nature of the trade relations but directly

the nature of the states to be achieved in the ACP-states is a strong contrast to the

declared neutrality of the former Lomé-treaties. As a consequence mainly of the end

of the Cold War and the optimism towards the possibilities for western values and

normative systems to disseminate on a global scale, the introduction of Human

Rights standards and the recognition of equity as hierarchically higher than the prin-

ciple of Domestic sovereignty and jurisdiction for the ACP-states appeared as decla-

rations, yet without any legally binding effect.

The connection to the conditionalities used towards states in Eastern Europe is also

linked to sovereignty. As the socialist regimes collapsed, a number of states entered

the system of sovereign states in the Western sense, which opened spaces for ex-

ports in capital and goods as well as for the expansion of the multilateral trade sys-

tem. In an attempt to stop the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the USSR under Mi-

khail Gorbatchew directly addressed the pressures of change by reforming the entity

to a “Union of sovereign Soviet republics” in 1991303. Concerning the AASM, the dec-

laration of a future integration of conditionalities based on human rights ended the

reliability and predictability for the receiving governments they had enjoyed under the

Lomé-system so far. Also, the new spaces in the east, the allocation of significant

funds by the European Community in the region and the beginnings of a neighbour-

hood-policy towards geographically nearer states together with the declining econom-

ic importance of the EEC-ACP-trade indicated a stronger insecurity for the govern-

ments, which had been affirmed, legitimised and supported in the past decades.

Also, the debt crisis beginning in the mid-1980s had influenced north-south-relations

in general. Large OPEC-surpluses due to the massive exportation of mineral oil had

flooded the private-banking system with capital, so called “petro-dollars”. The in-

303

Altrichter 2007, p. 193.


103

crease in available capital stimulated low-interest-loans, which were given to devel-

oping countries as well – leading to excessive lending and spending without sufficient

returns from investments to tackle the sharp increase in interest rates by 1979. As

lenders of last resort, the World Bank and the IMF gained not only importance for the

highly indebted states, but also leverage concerning the influence on domestic eco-

nomic policies through conditionalities. The structural adjustment programmes aimed

for an influence on the forms of state and the social modes of production by reducing

the role of the state in the economy, supporting private entrepreneurship and releas-

ing “market forces”304. The aforementioned Washington Consensus was in fact a

summary of these policies305, which had before been lined out in the Berg-Report by

the World Bank in 1981306, followed by the principles of the Structural Adjustment

facility by the IMF.

Considering the proposed scheme, the separation of political influence and economic

forces was supported by the IMF-measures insofar, as the GATT had been relatively

vague and flexible on the issue and allowed different forms of state interventions307.

Concerning the Lomé-system, it is primarily remarkable how little in fact changed.

Despite the amount of declarations and intentions, the baseline of the Lomé-system

was not modified. Certain obligations were even lowered, as the repayment of

STABEX-funds308 to support debt cancellation. Also, structural adjustment pro-

grammes were introduced similarly to the IMF/World Bank, receiving about 10% of

the funds planned for the period 1990-1995309, appearing rather as an Annex added

than a profound change in financial terms310. But in terms of approaches on sover-

eignty, the introduction on adjustment as opposed to neutral stabilisation and aid was

304

Brown 2002. 305

See: Faundez, Julio, International economic law and development: before and after neoliberal-

ism, in: International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries, Cheltenham

2010, pp.10 ff. 306

Brown 2002, p.77. 307

Faundez 2010. 308

The Courier, Issue 109, 1988. 309

The amount planned for STABEX alone was significantly higher. 310

Grants for national programmes and projects received about ten times more EDF-funds, the

amount used for structural adjustment – about 1.15 billion ECU in the Lomé IV financial proto-

col was about as high as the amount reserved as „risk capital“ and „interest rate subsidies“.


104

significant, also the adaption of adjustment policies established close programmatic

ties between the AEI and the Bretton-Woods-institutions in development policies311.

Short, by the mid-1990s the governments of the 18 AASM-states were all tied to

structural adjustment programmes through the IMF/World Bank312, while the financial

contribution of the AEI through the ACP-group to the shift in policies was rather neg-

ligible, but marked a shift of paradigm. The division of labour between the two Bret-

ton-Woods institutions and its significance for sovereignty is crucial: Whereas the IMF

as an supervising institution provides a system to control exchange rates and possi-

bilities to tackle imbalances of payments for countries to maintain monetary and eco-

nomic stability, the World Bank is a multilateral investment bank that comprises two

major organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and

the International Development Association (IDA). Moreover, associated with, but le-

gally and financially separate from the World Bank are the International Finance Cor-

poration, which mobilizes funding for private enterprises in developing countries, the

International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and the Multilateral Guar-

antee Agency. All IMF-members have a right to financial assistance to a certain ex-

tent under the condition of adjusting their economic policies, whereas the World Bank

finances concrete projects and provides technical assistance to states in order to

support economic growth. This interplay explains why programmes by both institu-

tions were implemented subsequently in the AASM – the IMF supported the huge

payment deficits after the debt crisis, the World Bank financed the economic restruc-

turing necessary through IMF-conditionalities313. Concerning sovereignty, the IMF

follows a distinctive mindset:

“Set up as a voluntary and cooperative institution, the IMF attracts to its membership

nations that are prepared, in a spirit of enlightened self-interest, to relinquish some

311

See also Brown 2002, p.109. 312

See table in Annex VI. 313

See also: Chossudovsky, Michel, The globalization of poverty and the New World Order, 2.

Edition, Quebec 2003 and Rodwan, Abouharb, Cingranelli, David L., Human Rights and struc-

tural adjustment, Cambridge 2007, pp. 30 ff.


105

measure of national sovereignty by abjuring practices injurious to the economic well-

being of their fellow member nations.”314

Concerning the AASM in the light of the economic situation, the “enlightened self-

interest” for the call on IMF and World Bank loans appears although rather a matter

of Sachzwang than such a noble perspective. The role of the governments estab-

lished, legitimised and stabilised namely through their agreements with the AEI alt-

hough is to be seen very much in the sense of the “relinquishment of national sover-

eignty”. Also, in the sense of the conventions of international law, they constituted the

political and legal entities having formally International Legal sovereignty and there-

fore the authority to agree to policies and projects of structural adjustment. A shift to

economic integration nominally narrowing the political elbowroom for AASM-

governments and to less state-controlled economic principles supporting “market-

forces” appears therefore plausible for the period. Their role as transmitters of the

passive revolution – in GRAMSCIs terms – of the social modes of production alt-

hough was thought on the basis of a developed civil society in a Western sense, in-

terlinked with the state and accepting its authority through a certain consent. Inter-

preting AASM-governments as rather “governments for their own sake” as quoted

before raises the question, whether such a government-led transformation was pos-

sible at all – the failure of structural adjustment to create long term economic growth

became apparent315 during the decade after its implementation316 and lead to a se-

ries of revised programs, namely the IMF-Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility

(ESAF) until 1999 and afterwards the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).

For the Lomé IV-agreement, besides its rather declaratory commitment to such struc-

tural adjustment, the introduction of Human Rights conditionalities appears as more

314

Driscoll, David D., The IMF and the World Bank – How do they differ?, on: The International

Monetary Fund, Official Web page, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

(Last access 02.12.2011). 315

Having also negative social outcomes. See The World Health Organization on SAPs:

http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html (Last access: 01.01.2012). 316

“The failure of structural adjustment has been so dramatic that some critics of the World Bank

and IMF argue that the policies imposed on African countries were never intended to promote

development. On the contrary, they claim that their intention was to keep these countries eco-

nomically weak and dependent”. Colgan, Ann-Louise, Hazardous to Health: The World Bank

and IMF in Africa, in: Africa Action, April 18, 2002.

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html


106

remarkable. As the Lomé-system had not known any legal mechanism for the with-

drawal of funds, their flow had not been stopped even in cases of obviously severe

violations of humanitarian standards within the ACP-group317. Article 367 of the fourth

Lomé-Convention now gave a concrete provision for a unilateral layoff of the agree-

ment in case of violations. The practical implementation showed another difference to

the entitlement-approach of the Lomé-Conventions: although Human Rights condi-

tionalities were declared as being based on “mutual obligations”, the definition of the

AEIs obligations compared to the ACP-states’ was much less specific and vague.318

317

As an example: Aid flows towards Uganda under the Regime of General Amin were not

stopped until 1977 – years after bilateral aid from the US and Great Britain had ceased. “Em-

peror” Bokassa in the CAR and Ethiopia also received EC-aid, as the Commission saw no le-

gal possibility to suspend it. See also: Schmidt, Siegmar, Die Demokratie- und Menschen-

rechtsförderung der Europäischen Union unter besonderer berücksichtigung Afrikas, in: Ar-

beitspapiere zu Problemen der internationalen Politik und der Entwicklungsländerforschung,

No.28, 1999, pp. 12 ff. 318

Comparing the ACP and EU negotiating mandates, in: The Courier, no. 173, January-February

1999, pp.72 ff.


107

3.7. Cotonou: The contemporary pattern (2000- )

“June 23 – the date on which the Partnership agreement was signed in Cotonou –

represents a major historical and political event, for at least three reasons. Firstly it is

the outcome of a long process which started with the publication of the Commission’s

Green Paper, followed by a public debate and by the ACP-EU negotiations. Second-

ly, the signing of this new Agreement is a clear demonstration that after the disap-

pointing results of Seattle, in a globalised world there is still room for a true and deep

relationship between the North and the South. Thirdly, this date constitutes the be-

ginning of a new era of a relationship based on a profound reform of the spirit, the

objectives and the practice of our cooperation”.319

Signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, the capital of Benin between the European Union

and 77 ACP-states, the currently valid Convention did not only by name differ from

the former. The fundamental principles were reformulated:

1. Equality of partners and ownership of development strategies. In principle, it is up

to ACP states, in all sovereignty, to determine how their societies and economies

should develop.

2. Participation. Apart from central government as the main partner, partnership is

open to other actors (e.g. civil society, private sector and local government.

3. Dialogue and mutual obligations. “The Cotonou Agreement is not simply a pot of

money”. The parties have assumed mutual obligations (e.g. respect for human

rights). These will be monitored through dialogue.

4. Differentiation and regionalisation. Cooperation agreements will vary according to

the partner’s level of development, its needs, its performance and its long-term

development strategy. Special treatment will be given to countries that are “least

developed” or “vulnerable” (landlocked or island states).

319

Poul Nielson, European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid, in: The Couri-

er, supplement, ACP-EU Partnership agreement signed in Cotonou, September, 2000, p.2.


108

In direct opposition to the preceding systems, politics were enshrined as being of

central importance. The principle of entitlement was replaced through a “perfor-

mance-based” system of allocation, meaning that not only the need of a state for

transfer payments was regarded as a guideline for dimensioning of funds, but also its

performance in regularly held reviews of budgetary policy and conformity with devel-

opment guidelines of the agreement320. As point 2 shows, the position of govern-

ments had now explicitly lost importance, as the shift towards non-state actors begun

in the late Lomé-system became a main pillar of the agreement.

In terms of structure, the AEI (1) had been added new features through the Maas-

tricht Treaty, which generally signified a simplification and emphasis on “effectivity” of

320

Tekere, Moses, Political dimensions of the new ACP-EU Cotonou agreement, Friedrich-Ebert

Stiftung, Trade and Development issues No.10, June 2001.


109

the political actions of the European Union. A general commitment to more democra-

cy and individual rights in all policy fields and a general reform of institutions to tackle

institutional challenges through future enlargement was one pillar of revision, the cre-

ation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the other – aiming for the

creation of a Community Area of “freedom, security and justice”. For the EU-ACP

trade system (2), the institutional change was insofar significant as the aid and trade

relations were now explicitly the sole responsibility of the DG VIII “Trade”, an institu-

tional commitment to a rational, economic understanding of the relations. Also,

STABEX and SYSMIN were abolished due to their incompatibility with WTO trade-

rules in order to receive a waiver for the agreement. In addition to the EDF, the Euro-

pean Investment Bank entered as another lender, concentrating on the mining sector

from the beginning321. Although the ACP-group (3) remained the entity representing

its member-states in the negotiations, the Cotonou-system introduced a geograph-

ically differential treatment based on Economic partnership agreements (EPAs). As

the WTO-waiver for keeping the preferential treatment would expire in 2007322, these

were intended to be negotiated until then. Their aim, according to Art. 34 of the

agreement:

“Fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP-sates into the world econ-

omy, with due regards for their political choices and development priorities”, enabling

the states “to play a full part in international trade”.

The EPAs, as defined in Art. 36 of the agreement, should be:

321

See: European Investment Bank, six years financing the plundering of Africa, Les Amis de la

Terre, November 2007,

http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/EIB_six_years_financing_the_plundering_of_Africa_-

_Executive_Summary.pdf (Last Access: 13.11.2011). 322

A WTO waiver is required for every trade preference that entails discrimination among WTO

Members so as to cover the non-discrimination imposed by the first article of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A request for such a waiver was submitted by the EU

to the WTO Goods Council in March 2000 (the previous waiver to the Lomé Convention had

expired on 29 February 2000). See: Bassilekin, Achille, Possibility of obtaining a new ACP-EC

waiver at the WTO, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 71, March 2007.

http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/EIB_six_years_financing_the_plundering_of_Africa_-_Executive_Summary.pdf



110

“...new World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible trading agreements, removing

progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in all areas

relevant to trade”.

Basically, the EPAs according to articles 45 to 54 of the agreement constitute Free

Trade Areas between regional groups of the ACP-states and the EU, covering trade

in goods, agricultural products and services plus other areas such as competition-

law, labour standards, public procurement, intellectual property, standardisation and

sanitary and phytosanitary measures.323 The aim of the agreements more specifically

being the replacement of the preferential trade regime of the Lomé-system through

agreements eliminating barriers for substantially all the trade324 according to WTO

rules and therefore make another waiver obsolete. The negotiations with African

states are held with four groups, being the West, Central, Eastern and Southern and

Southern African Development Community Group325. The AASM are partly in the

Western Group, partly in the Central. Besides the EPA-approach although, the Gen-

eralised System of Preferences (GSP) and especially the Everything but arms (EBA)

trade-scheme would offer a solution for developing countries based on low tariffs or

completely duty-free access for imports into the EU-market based on non-

reciprocity326, based on a suggestion by UNCTAD in 1968 and a GATT-waiver from

1971. The EBA intended to address Least Developed Countries (LDCs)327 grants

duty-free access for all exports to the EU, except arms and ammunitions with quotas

for certain goods – bananas, sugar and rice – for an unlimited time according to the

Council of the European Union, without being subject to periodic revision like the

323

See: Bilal, Sanoussi, implications of the Doha Development Agenda on the EPA negotiations,

ECDPM working paper, November 2002. 324

A term, where no consensus has been found on yet within the WTO. The European Union ap-

plies its own “more than 90%-rule”. 325

The distinction in the South is due to the economic dominance of South Africa in the Southern

African Customs Union (SACU). 326

The European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, The European Union’s General-

ised System of Preferences, March 2004,

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_116448.pdf (Last access:

02.12.2011). 327

The status LDC depends on a formal recognition by the UNO. At present, 49 countries are

classified as such.

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_116448.pdf


111

GSP328. For the 18 AASM-states, this distinction is important: 14 out of the 18 are

classified as LDCs and therefore subject to the EBA for an undefined period. The four

states which are subject to the GSP, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon

and Gabon share a structural feature distinguishing them from the other states: they

are exporters of crude oil329.

The AEI (4) consisting of 15 member states by the year 2000, had joined the institu-

tionalised successor of the GATT, the WTO as one of its founding members along-

side the USA (5) and 74 other GATT-signatories – by the time still as the European

Communities as it did not have international legal personality until the Treaty of Lis-

bon in 2009. As the Russian Federation (6) and the former socialist states (7) had

definitely entered the western international system of sovereign states, structural ad-

justment policies and political preparations for a closer alignment to the AEI were a

central point of the set of measures known from 2004 on as neighbourhood policy of

the EU. Applications for membership of most Eastern European states were issued

between 1994 and 1997.

The conditionalities, which were first used in this area, are the other part of the Coto-

nou-agreement distinguishing from earlier systems. SISSOKO ET Al., JAMES

GATHII, BROWN and EMILIE HAFNER-BURTON among others agree on a concep-

tual change, which basically substitutes the concept of “partnership” in its bargaining-

aspect and its margins for governments do implement domestic policies without af-

fecting their status in the trade-system through a mechanism of allocation based on

criteria the EU sets. The mechanism of conditionality is enshrined in article 96 of the

Cotonou agreement concerning Human Rights, democratic principles and the Rule of

Law, serving as an additional measure “If, despite the political dialogue conducted

regularly between the Parties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil

an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the

rule of law”. Theoretically, the provision could therefore be used by both parties. As a

first step, consultations with a duration of 60 days maximum are foreseen to provide

a solution. If the solution is not acceptable for both parties, if further consultation is

328

The Council of the European Union, Regulation on the GSP, (EC) No.2501/2001. 329

African Development Bank, Oil and Gas in Africa, New York 2009, p.56.


112

refused or in case of “special urgency”330, “appropriate measures” may be taken –

with the suspension of the agreement explicitly stated as a last resort. The reciprocal

applicability appears rather superficial, as the suspension of aid flows is only an op-

tion for the EU and especially the AASM are practically insignificant as trade partners

for the EU. Article 97 covers a similar mechanism for corruption.

Article 8 of the agreement although appears to relativise this change, as it at the

same time strengthens the mechanism of dialogue explicitly aiming at a prevention of

suspension through negotiation – which at the same time appears as a further inte-

gration-mechanism using the possibility of suspension as a means to maintain per-

manent consultations.331 Another aspect is the “rolling programming” of EDF-

resource-allocation, allowing the modification of planned disbursement based on

yearly and mid-term-reviews of the governments “performance” concerning agreed

goals and generally macroeconomic development in “focal sectors” agreed on for

every country332.

330

Meaning cases of particularly serious violations. 331

Art. 8, Sec. 2 of the Cotonou-Agreement: “The objectives of the dialogue shall also include

preventing situations arising in which one Party might deem it necessary to have recourse to

the non-execution clause.” 332

The European Commission, Guidelines for 2004 Mid-Term Reviews under the ACP-EC Part-

nership agreement, available at EC development for ACP countries: http://www.acp-

programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/guid_mtr_2004_ACP_countries_eng.pdf (Last access

15.12.2011).

http://www.acp-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/guid_mtr_2004_ACP_countries_eng.pdf

http://www.acp-programming.eu/wcm/dmdocuments/guid_mtr_2004_ACP_countries_eng.pdf


113

3.7.1 Cotonou and sovereignty

The economic picture the AASM confronted the Cotonou-agreement with was not a

positive reference for the structural adjustment policies, measured on their aim of

reducing the states’ fiscal imbalances. All the 18 states belonged to the economically

least developed countries in the world, even the Oil-producing countries Gabon,

Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Côte d’Ivoire did not show any sign of a posi-

tive effect of their expensive natural resources on the wealth of their people. At the

same time, the informal sector continued to grow: according to estimates by FRIE-

DRICH SCHNEIDER, ANDREAS BUEHN and CLAUDIO E. MONTENEGRO333, the

informal sector paralleled the “formal” economy to be boosted by the SAP and rele-

vant for external trade and was crucial for the functioning of the domestic economies.

Also, the relevance of African agricultural imports had become increasingly insignifi-

cant, as tropical products were produced more efficiently in South American states

leading to a substituting effect334 and huge markets had opened in Eastern Europe.

International trade between the AASM and the AEI therefore took place primarily in

the form of a extraction of crude oil, minerals and uranium, making Gabon, Came-

roon, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and Niger the only territories with econom-

ic relevance.

For the sovereignty of AASM-governments, these developments in trade are crucial.

As their relative significance as mostly agricultural exporters declined due to multilat-

eral trade liberalisation, the Lomé-system had offered the governments a stabilising

environment mostly through the reliability of aid-flows in the sense of the “pot of

money” referred to in the goals of the Cotonou-agreement. Their role in the system

remains important: Besides additional measures in order to strengthen private actors,

the ACP-governments are the central actors the Cotonou-agreement addresses, alt-

hough it treats them more openly as transmitters of economic and increasingly social

policies through the essential elements of the Convention in the framework of a per-

manent dialogue, having conditionalities as an unilateral means of imposing pres-

333

See Annex XII. 334

See Annex V.


114

sure. Concerning the trade relations, the “stable” relations for the AASM although are

not abolished, as the EBA-scheme offers them preferential treatment which is not

likely to be changed in the foreseeable future. Despite the adaptation of the trade-

system to the changed discourse concerning North-South relations including Human-

Rights concerns as well as the status of governments as a possible threat towards

“their” populations instead of anchoring points of development following an European

path, trade flows appear to undergo remarkably little change - as does the model of

development, which still aims at “economic growth” through “sound macroeconomic

policies” as it did before. And whereas aid as an incentive was a means of stabilising

governments to implement certain policies through them, conditionalities appear to

represent a mechanism of sanction towards the same governments.

In terms of effects, SHANTAYANAN DEVARAJAN, DAVID DOLLAR and TORGNY

HOLGREN335 were unable to establish a connection between policy change and

conditionalised aid. The same result has been provided by an earlier study by CRAIG

BURNSIDE and DAVID DOLLAR336. The EU has referred to sanctions and suspen-

sions of aid and preferential treatment in 35 cases until 1990, 14 of which were di-

rected against AASM-states and 2 against non-African developing states and transi-

tional economies337. Under the Cotonou-agreement, the main development is indeed

the increase in Human Rights as a reason for the measures, whereas until 2001, the

Rule of Law and Democracy appear as most important. All cases after 2001 although

were initiated for at least two of the reasons, which appears plausible as the concepts

interrelate. Good Governance was mentioned only once, concerning Liberia in

2001.338 The suspension of aid although, as ANDRIS ZIMELIS shows in case-

studies, has not caused profound changes in government policies but adversely af-

335

Devarajan, Shantayanan, Dollar, David, Holgren, Torgny, Aid and Reform in Africa, The World

Bank, Washington 2001. 336

Burnside, Craig, Dollar, David, Aid, Policies and Growth, policy Research working paper 1777,

the World Bank, Washington 1997. 337

Guatemala in 1993 and Belarus in 1997. 338

See Table 2 in: Zimelis, Andris, Conditionality and the EU-ACP Partnership, in: Australian

Journal of Political Science, Vol.46, No. 3, 2001, pp. 389-406.


115

fected common people in Liberia and Guinea, as funds to development projects were

halted.339

339

Ibid, p. 403.


116

4. Analysis – A general shift of paradigms?

In the previous chapter, I have structured the trade and development cooperation of

the AEI with the AASM-states chronologically and under the aspect of IEL-principles.

The historical structure appears as follows:

As period (1) was the transitional Regime of association which accompanied the es-

tablishment of formally sovereign territories through the process of decolonialisation,

period (2) was defined by the nominally apolitical trade system based on reciprocity

and non-discrimination which besides aid flows from single states set up a Communi-

ty-aid structure with the EDF paralleled by aid-schemes of individual member states

surpassing it in terms of financial means. Period (3) appears as the most favourable

towards the recipient states, as it offered them a credible way of keeping aid flows

and trade preferences as non-aligned states in the bipolar world order while obtaining

certain advantages in a NIEO-fashion leading to a stabilisation of the structure of

formally sovereign states in Africa, despite their autocratic and often violent character

demonstrating their lack of domestic political legitimation. Although, the debt crisis

and the emerging structural adjustment programmes through the Bretton-Woods in-

stitutions brought an amount of political and economic pressure on the governments

to adapt their domestic economic policies which was strongly related to the function-

ing of the international monetary system and the need of AASM-governments of for-

eign exchange to be able to pay for goods their economies were not able to produce.

The end of the Cold War and the alternative international system of socialist states


117

brought certain changes in period (4), including a rather reluctant adaptation to struc-

tural adjustment in Africa by the AEI but at the same time of an immense concentra-

tion of political and economic power in Eastern Europe in order to establish the pre-

conditions its neighbourhood policies and later enlargement.

First, in a broad-brush sense, it is undeniable that certain structural features are visi-

ble throughout the different systems despite their declaratory changes. First, all sys-

tems except the final act of the Berlin Conference claim the existence of some sort of

association, special relation or inherent connection between the African Continent

and “Europe”. Second, all systems advocate an integration of “Africa” into some sort

of international trade system, namely the World Market, be it through a policy of free

trade until Lomé I-III and after or through the notion of “development” to “prepare”

their economies for a later opening. Third, some sort of cultural or civilising mission to

be fulfilled through the dispersion of values as a foundation of the relationship is a

declaratory part of every Convention, becoming apparently more important in practice

after 1990 as political influence becomes an essential element. But again, the re-

introduction of reciprocal trade relations and world-trade-integration measures in de-

veloping countries through the Cotonou-agreement, declared by the European Union

as a new era appears not as original, if the Yaoundé-Conventions and the Regime of

association are borne in mind. Basically, the trade system established an FTA be-

tween parts of the both continents based on reciprocity and non-discrimination

with several enlargements and additions and an intermezzo of preferential treatment

between 1975 and 1990.

Now, to clarify the argument, a recapitulation of the research questions:

First, how do the establishment of sovereignty and the trade relations between the

Area of European Integration and the AASM interrelate?

Second, do the treaties distinguishably contribute to the “locking-in” of an economic

model in African states separating the political and the economic sphere aiming to

constrain the limits of the possible for future governments?

Third; what role do conditionalities play?


118

The first question appears to be decisive to encapsulate a “special significance” of

the AEI concerning development and trade policy towards the AASM and others. It

has never been and is not the largest donor of aid, nor does it appear as being

unique concerning the mechanisms it uses to disperse it – but it has been the most

important trade partner for the AASM and the entity which inherited the colonial trade

flows by connecting the process of European integration to the “special relations” of

some of its members through its significance for the external trade as a CU with re-

spective competencies of its executive organ, the Commission. The trade relations

are therefore central, but aid has to be seen in a complementary way. Periods (1)

and (2), as was shown before, are interlinked through an almost seamless continua-

tion of trade flows through an international agreement replacing an “association”. The

legal act, demonstrating the ILS of the new states in its aspect of authority empha-

sized their formal admittance to the western international system of sovereign states

and had a legitimizing effect. Due to the economic dependency on the colonial pat-

tern of trade flows, preserving them stabilised the new governments additionally by

creating the necessary revenue. Period (3) with its apparently generous treatment of

the ACP-economies adds institutional mechanisms of economic state stabilisation

through STABEX and SYSMIN as reactions to crumbling terms of trade. As the ACP-

group further on consisted of non-aligned members, the “European” Lomé-system

appears first and foremost as a framework maintaining sovereignty at relatively high

costs and with no apparent interest in the domestic policy of the governments negoti-

ating the treaties and receiving aid where trade revenues are not sufficient to finance

them. Reliability, stability and institutionalisation are the keywords for the system,

granting the AASM governments nominally sovereign control, allowing government

interventions.

The parallel integration of the states in a multilateral trade and financial system

through the GATT, the IMF and the World Bank including their growing debt-

dependence is also interlinked with these sovereignty-stabilising policies: The inter-

national system these institutions and agreements work through is inseparably linked

to state sovereignty as a legal fiction, just as the idea of structural adjustment legiti-

mised through debt accrued by state governments and aimed at a change of domes-


119

tic policy and finally modes of production from a state-centered to a “market-based”

approach340 to be realised through the same governments as responsible entities for

these adjustments and the transmission of economic ideas. The aforementioned es-

tablishment, confirmation and stabilisation of state sovereignty through the AEI – the

political entity consisting of the former colonial powers – appears to have had a cut-

ting-edge-effect for further integration into international systems in a teleological

sense. VAUGHAN LOWE argues similarly, as he sees state sovereignty and its use

in international jurisprudence as:

“...an article of faith, one of the theoretical foundations of international law; and it

serves as a rhetorical flourish in discussions of constraints upon the freedom of

states to act. But it does little else.”341

Concerning the post-colonial Eurafrican trade-system, this point of view is plausible

and also accords to the argumentation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the

Las Palmas-case in its conception of sovereignty as a signifier of independence ra-

ther than as an independent principle. Following the authority-control approach of

KRASNER it is although possible to step further: The lack of success of structural

adjustment to stimulate economic growth as of states to establish effective control on

their territory within the AASM is connected to the character of state-control prevalent

in these still very “young” states. Structural adjustment programmes, development

aid, trade agreements and also political conditionalities see governments not only as

the entity having ILS in the sense of external authority to sign the treaties necessary

for these concepts – but also as having the DS in its domestic authority and control

aspect necessary for an effective implementation of “adjustment” and “development”.

To visualise the problem following my argumentation and the neogramscian ap-

proaches, a look at the multi-level-nature of the emerged governance-structure is

helpful.

340

Or, as KRASNER puts it: “to take two legacies of the North—the organization of political units

into sovereign states and the structure of existing international organizations —and use them

to disrupt, if not replace market-oriented regimes over a wide range of issues”. Krasner 1985. 341

Lowe, Vaughan, Sovereignty and international economic law, in: Shan, Wenhua, Simons, Pe-

nelope, Singh, Dalvinder, Redefining sovereignty in International Economic Law, Studies in In-

ternational Trade Law, Vol.7, Portland 2008, pp.77-84.


120

The division on the left into international/multilateral organisations like the WTO, the

IMF and the World Bank, the government-level where sovereignty is anchored and

the civil societies within the territory of these states mirrors COX’ categories of world

orders, state forms and social modes of production on the right. As signatories of

agreements, takers of loans and aid and addressees of conditionalities, the states

face policy-constraints in the sense of my second research question and GILLs con-

cept of “locking-in” while demonstrating ILS through their external authority, enabling

them to sign agreements on behalf of the territories they formally represent. As set

out before, the AEI was decisive in creating the “government-level” as illustrated

above which through the formal structure based on sovereignty replaced the colonial

state as a transmitter for territories very much within the same borders as before.

The crucial issue now lies in this transmission: For a reconfiguration and alignment

from above adjustment policies rely on to be “successful” – what GRAMSCI referred

to as passive revolution, a process going beyond the mere arbitration of legitimate

behaviour as KRASNER calls it - governments as actors must be able to influence

the societies within their territories through institutions creating consent rather than

through its coercional capabilities. As the extent of the informal sector in the AASM

shows, the actual economies are highly detached from government control and in

many cases even dissolving state borders as the main concept of westphalian sover-


121

eignty and interdependence sovereignty. The parts of the economy related to over-

seas trade are therefore not only an important source of revenue for AASM-

governments, but also the economic sector where their control “is a matter of fact342.

A locking-in” effect is formally apparent in the post-Cold War systems of Lomé IV and

especially Cotonou through their additional mechanisms of dialogue, consultation

and “development planning” using aid as support and incentive and conditionalities

as a means of pressure, its actual effect on the economic processes within the coun-

tries although is questionable for these reasons. The growing importance of the civil

society and its actors for the latest development-concepts of MFIs and the EU makes

therefore very much sense, as a penetration of the societies by economic ideas and

their alignment into the international economy through their governments only proved

to be insufficient. Human Rights conditionalities, following this line of argumentation,

seem to be not only the result of an increased influence of the European Parlia-

ment343, but also of a changed perception of the role and status of governments in

the post-colonial states. Whereas the Yaoundé and Lomé-Convention treated all

governments as transmitters of development and modernisation, the awareness of

their detachment from a political base, the limitation of their authority and control is

turned into a political and legal aim with Lomé IV.

How can this interdisciplinary perspective contribute to the understanding of sover-

eignty? As has been shown before, sovereignty is not a defined, binding legal princi-

ple which is valid for all states to the same extent but a relatively flexible legal fiction

necessary for the functioning of the Western international system. The analysis of the

trade-relations between the AASM and the AEI shows this flexible nature clearly, as

the extent of control is continuously shaped through bargaining and resulting treaties

– sovereignty therefore is not exclusively a legal, but also a political concept. Adopt-

ing Gills concept of “locking in” therefore faces a series of problems when applied to

these agreements, as it relies in itself on the existence and sovereignty based on

control of governments to take place. Formally, the existence of political and legal

frameworks aiming at changes in the social modes of production is obvious and has

342

Which may be entirely different concerning inner-African trade. 343

Schmidt 1999 and Zimelis 2011.


122

accompanied the AASM ever since the colonial system. But assuming that a hege-

monial idea as neoliberal capitalism is able to spread to societies through such

frameworks without being able to disseminate through government policies to a civil

society of some sort misconceives the character of the post-colonial state in the

AASM as an effigy of the western sovereign state. In GRAMSCIs terms: the extended

state, the interrelation between civil society and state power through governments in

order to establish consent influencing social modes of production apparently is not

given in the post-colonial state. Assumed that the process of neoliberal restructuring

is a matter of fact – in regard to the Eurafrican trade system the development ap-

pears as taking place mainly in the “international” sphere, declaratory, within institu-

tions and through quantitative modifications of qualitatively comparable frameworks.


123

5. Conclusion

State sovereignty consisting of authority and control in different aspects is the main

feature of the contemporary international system and its normative basis. In this the-

sis, I have adopted state sovereignty as a principle in order to analyse, whereas the

trade-systems between the Area of European Integration (AEI) and the 18 former

colonies known as the AASM (Associated African States and Madagascar) in its de-

velopment confirms the main assumption of the neogramsican strand of international

relations theory, which assumes that the neoliberal restructuring of the global political

economy along a separation of market mechanisms and political intervention based

on the limitation of political possibilities for contemporary and future governments is a

distinctive and formative process for the current state of affairs in this policy-area. In

an interdisciplinary approach, I have attempted to combine this process with sover-

eignty as a legal concept in order to analyse respective qualitative changes in the

trade systems.

State sovereignty served as the formal and normative basis of a system, which in

many ways has kept up the economic structure of the AASM-trade-relations with In-

dustrialised states, while seemingly being built on different ideas during the different

systems established. The role of governments as representatives in the treaty nego-

tiations and signatories through their external authority rooted in International Legal

Sovereignty (ILS) proved to be crucial, especially as they were included into different

contractual systems aiming at different modifications of the economic structure and

the social modes of production within the borders of the states.

The role of the AEI in this respect appeared as remarkable neither through the vol-

umes of aid disbursed through its programmes, nor through its mechanisms which

reflected wider changes of paradigms in North-South relations, but first and foremost

through its significance for trade, being the most important market for the exported

goods of the AASM until today and second through its relation to the establishment of

sovereign status in the transitional period between colonialism and post-colonialism.

The trade-systems between the AEI and the AASM legitimised the sovereignty of the

newly emerged states by accrediting their International Legal Sovereignty through an


124

international agreement setting up the system of Yaoundé, while keeping up the co-

lonial patterns of trade the French Fifth Republic had unsuccessfully attempted be-

fore on a “traditional” colonial basis. In a second stage, the AEI was decisive in stabi-

lising the sovereignty of the AASM by offering a “third way” for the non-aligned states

during the Cold War, increasing its volume of budgetary aid while remaining mostly

indifferent towards the internal policies of its associated, also stabilising state-centric

economic policies within the AASM which were a consequence of the prevalent colo-

nial economic patterns and the processes of state-forming in the 1960s, also allowing

domestic economic policies with relatively high levels of state intervention in the sec-

tors governments were able to control – namely the production of export-goods. The

spread of state sovereignty and its stabilisation through the AEI and the institutional

and economic structure it created and preserved, created the precondition for the

expansion of multilateral trade liberalisation through the GATT, as it builds on the

international legal personality of its members and governments as signatories.

A shift in policies towards the AASM appeared by the End of the Cold War through

the implementation of conditionalities based on principles of governance and the im-

plementation of structural adjustment programmes, seeking to promote economic

policies based on neoliberal models. As these concepts are based on state responsi-

bility and the control-aspect of sovereignty, I have argued that the nature of the “lock-

ing-in” aiming at the passive revolution of social modes of production in order to inte-

grate the AASM into an economic world order remains rather declaratory, as the sov-

ereignty of the post-colonial state was legitimised, stabilised and supported rather as

a legal fiction based on trade-approaches rooted in the French colonial system and

did not create or build “extended” states in the sense of GRAMSCI including civil so-

ciety and having the ability to create consent in order to shape social modes of pro-

duction in the longer run. Sovereignty as a concept in this perspective appears not to

be “changing” profoundly due to processes of “globalisation” as has been suggested,

but appears – besides its nature as a legal fiction crucial for the western international

relations system – rather as subject to political interpretation without much legal sig-

nificance.


125

Although the emergence of dominant if not hegemonial ideas in the expanding area

of multilateral trade liberalisation and free capital flows as a result of policies rooted in

the Lockean Heartland appears plausible and also influences the agreements and

policies of the AEI within the trade-systems after the Cold War – namely through the

introduction of structural adjustment and conditionalities – this development seems to

take place primarily in the international sphere, due to the lack of ability of AASM-

governments to effectively serve as transmitters. Whereas a “locking-in” effect is an

inherent part of the later aid and trade agreements emphasising government respon-

sibility and establishing permanent mechanisms of influence, a passive revolution of

social modes of production is apparently not achieving its intended results. In terms

of economic sovereignty, AASM-states are not primarily loosing control in real terms,

but restructuring fails on exactly this lack of control and internal authority. The in-

creasing emphasis on civil-society, individual actors and their rights may therefore be

interpreted as attempts to overcome this gap in the longer term - fortunately with

some positive outcome for parts of the populations. In any case, the dissolution of

Westphalian sovereignty in the sense of borders through unregulated settlement and

trade and the significant importance of the informal sector in the AASM seem to be

rather a return to “normality” in Africa – about one and a half centuries after the Berlin

Conference.


126

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Annexes

Annex I: Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the E.E.C in 1960.

Source: Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Pays et Territoires

d’outre-mer associés à la C.E.E., April, 1960, 1844/60-FDINE.

“Special relations” with France Senegal (“Mali-Federation”)

Sudan (“Mali-Federation”)

Mauretania

Ivory Coast

Upper Volta

Niger

Dahomey

Chad

CAR

Gaboon

Republic of Congo

Republic of Madagascar

“Special relations” with Belgium Belgian-Congo

Ruanda-Urundi (Mandate)

“Special relations with Italy Somaliland (until July 1, 1960)

Annex II: Top 20 recipients of Community aid in the transition from the Lomé-system.

Source: Development Cooperation Review Series, Issue 12, 1996, p.56.

1983/1984 1988/1989 1993/1994

India Côte d’Ivoire Ex-Yugoslawia

Ethiopia India Morocco

Bangladesh Ethiopia Ethiopia

Zaire Cameroon Egypt


153

Egypt Bangladesh Zambia

Sudan Mozambique Mozambique

Ghana Kenya Côte d’Ivoire

Tanzania Egypt Tanzania

Turkey Sudan South Africa

Morocco Zaire Nigeria

Madagascar China Zimbabwe

Mali Tanzania Palestiniana Adm. Area

Uganda Senegal Burkina Faso

Somalia Chad Bangladesh

Chad Malawi Cameroon

Togo Tunisia Senegal

Senegal Madagascar Mali

Zimbabwe Uganda Tunisia

Mozambique Rwanda Ghana

Papua New Guinea Mali Angola

Annex III: The different models in numbers344

Year Convention Number of

“associated”

Number of

European

Amount of

EDF (in mil-

lion EUR,

344

Source: EUROSTAT.


154

states states incl. OCTs).

1957 Convention of

Association

(18) 6 569.4

1963 Yaoundé I 18 6 730.4

1969 Yaoundé II 18 6 887.3

1975 Lomé I 46 9 3053.3

1980 Lomé II 58 9 4207

1985 Lomé III 65 10 7882.6

1990 Lomé IV 68 12 11583.0

1995 Lomé IV bis 70 15 13151.1

2000 Cotonou 77 15 14300

2010 Cotonou rev.

Annex IV: Forms of state in the transition to post-colonialism.

State Year of inde-

pendence

Precolonial struc-

ture of state

Form of government

after independ-

ence345

Burundi 1962 D/TR/SP/SD346

Rwanda 1962 D/TR/SP/SD

Benin 1960 Democratisation.

Madagascar 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Mali 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

ZAR 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

345

Source: Le monde diplomatique, Atlas der Globalisierung, Berlin 2009, pp.164 f. 346

Dictatorship, totalitarian regime, single-party-system or sham democracy.


155

Niger 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Senegal 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Burkina Faso 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Kongo-Brazzaville 1960 Democratisation.

Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Mauretania 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Togo 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Chad 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Côte d’Ivoire 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Cameroon 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Gaboon 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Somalia 1960 D/TR/SP/SD

Annex V: Share of ACP less Carribean of EU-Trade in 2011.

Industrial imports

(% of total)

Industrial exports

(% of total)

Agricultural im-

ports (% of total)

Agricultural ex-

ports (% of total)

2.3 3.2 10.5 (Approx. 85%

of African exports

in the sector)

6.6

Compared to

MERCOSUR (Ar-

gentina, Brazil,

Paraguay, Uru-

guay)

1.5 2.5 20.9 1.5


156

Annex VI: Dates of signature of the GATT by AASM-states.347

State Date of GATT membership

Burundi 13 March 1965

Rwanda 1 January 1966

Benin 12 September 1963

Madagascar 30 September 1963

Mali 11 January 1993

ZAR 3 May 1963

Niger 31 December 1963

Senegal 27 September 1963

Burkina Faso 3 May 1963

Kongo-Brazzaville 3 May 1963

Congo, Dem. Rep. -

Mauritania 30 September 1963

Togo 20 March 1964

Chad 12 July 1963

Côte d’Ivoire 31 December 1963

Cameroon 3 May 1963

Gaboon 3 May 1963

347

The World Trade Organisation: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (Last ac-

cess: 24.12.2011).

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm


157

Somalia -

Annex VII: Modifications from the CET for non-associated states exporting

tropical products not covered through the CAP.

Product “New rate” “Old rate”

Coffee 9.6% 16%

Cocoa 5.4% 9%

Pineapple 9% 12%

Cloves 15% 20%

Desiccated Coconut 4% 5%

Nutmeg 15% 20%

Pepper 17% 20%

Vanilla 11.5% 15%

Tea348 10.8% 18%

Annex VIII: Developments in AASM-AEI-trade under the system of Yaoundé.

1965 Drop in exports

1966 Increase of overall trade


1968 Increase in overall trade

348

Trade with Tea was coordinated with the UK and the Commonwealth-states, leading to a total

suspension of duties in January 1964.


158

1969 Growth in exports

1970 (Smaller) increase in overall trade


1972 Increase, mainly through significantly

increased commodity-prices.

Annex IX: Structural adjustment projects (SAP) by the IMF / the World Bank in the

AASM-countries by year of first disbursement.349

State First SAP by the IMF First SAP by the

World Bank

Burundi 1986 2000

Rwanda 1991 (First repayments

in 1996 and new loans in

1998 due to the civil war)

1991

Benin 1989 1989

Madagascar 1988 1985

Mali 1988 1990

ZAR 1987 1986

Niger 1986 1987

Senegal 1986 1980

Burkina Faso 1991 1991

349

The World Bank: http://web.worldbank.org (Last access 12.12.2011) and the International

Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org (Last access 13.12.2011).

http://web.worldbank.org/

http://www.imf.org/


159

Congo-Brazzaville (ROC) 1986 -

Congo, Dem. Rep. 1987 1987

Mauritania 1986 1987

Togo 1988 1983

Chad 1987 1996

Côte d’Ivoire 1988 1986

Cameroon 1987 1989

Gabon - 1988

Somalia - -

Annex X: Contemporary development situation in the AASM according to the

Human Development index and respective trade-scheme applied by the EU.

State Human Development

Index ranking (2011)

Trade scheme

Burundi 185 EBA

Rwanda 166 EBA

Benin 167 EBA

Madagascar 151 EBA

Mali 175 EBA

CAR 179 EBA

Niger 186 EBA


160

Senegal 155 EBA

Burkina Faso 181 EBA

Congo-Brazzaville (ROC) 137 GSP

Congo, Dem. Rep. 187 EBA

Mauritania 159 EBA

Togo 162 EBA

Chad 183 EBA

Côte d’Ivoire 170 GSP

Cameroon 150 GSP

Gabon 106 GSP

Somalia - EBA

Annex XI: Informal economies in the AASM

State Size of informal econo-

my in % of total GNP in

1999 (SCHNEIDER et.

al.)350

Burundi 39.1

Rwanda 40.5

Benin 51.4

350

Schneider, Friedrich, Enste, Dominik, Shadow Economies around the world, CESifo Working

paper series, No. 196, September 1999.


161

Madagascar 39.6

Mali 42.5

CAR No values, 44.7 in 2001

Niger 41.7

Senegal 45.9

Burkina Faso 41

Congo-Brazzaville (ROC) 50

Congo, Dem. Rep. 48

Mauritania 35.5

Togo 34.4

Chad 46.3

Côte d’Ivoire 42.2

Cameroon 32.9

Gabon 47.3

Somalia -

Annex XII: Extension of the CFA-zone concerning the AASM.

State Member of the CFA-Franc by 2011?

Burundi No

Rwanda No

Benin Yes


162

Madagascar No

Mali Yes

CAR Yes

Niger Yes

Senegal Yes

Burkina Faso Yes

Congo-Brazzaville (ROC) Yes

Congo, Dem. Rep. No

Mauritania No

Togo Yes

Chad Yes

Côte d’Ivoire Yes

Cameroon Yes

Gabon Yes

Somalia No

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