BEYOND COLD WAR POLITICS:THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PRIME

MINISTER NEHRU

Kaydee MuellerHistory 412

Eisenhower and His TimesDecember 8, 2008

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On December 9, 1959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower landed in New Delhi,

India as part of twenty day tour of eleven nations throughout the Middle East, Europe and

Africa. After his arrival, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and

Indian President Rajendra Prasad attempted to drive from the airport Presidents house,

but the immeasurable crowds of Indian spectators made this nearly impossible, even

bringing the motorcade to a near standstill more than once. This crowd, like others

Eisenhower would draw during his short trip to India, were upwards of one hundred

thousand people, and were some of the largest crowds ever drawn by a foreign dignitary.

An on-site National Geographic reporter described the near hysteric crowd—“Friendly

crowds, shouting hysterically, surrounded the leaders. Greeters shoved forward to touch

Mr. Eisenhower or just his automobile. They crushed fenders, stove in the trunk, and

snapped off the radio antenna.”1 Eisenhower was no stranger to attracting large crowds

especially after he earned the status of an international hero following his World War

Two service, but few crowds can compare to those formed by the thousands of Indian

citizens who gathered to enthusiastically greet the President of the United States. It is

interesting to note that so many of the people of India, a newly independent country with

strong anti-imperialist sentiments were so enthusiastic in their greetings of the President

—a man who maintained a close, personal relationship with the once imperial rulers of

India, the British.2 This trip marked an impressive end to a two-term presidency that has

left behind many unanswered questions pertaining to his leadership style, his

effectiveness as a president, and more specifically, the strange relationship with Prime

1 Gilbert M. Grosvenor, “When the President Goes Abroad: A dramatic pictorial record of Mr. Eisenhower’s 11-nation tour of Asia, Africa and Europe,” National Geographic 117, no. 5 (May 1960): 614. 2 For more information on Eisenhower’s trip abroad in 1959 see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961; The White House Years, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1965) 486-513.

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Minister Nehru, a strict non-alignment proponent whose political views flew in the face

of the goals of the United States during the Cold War.

The eight years during which Dwight D. Eisenhower served as the United States

President were a time of co-existence—democracy and communism, free-trade and

controlled economics, Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev. Both men, like the countries

they presided over, lived in a world seemingly divided into two camps, the communist

camp and the democratic camp, or to be more specific, the Soviet camp of the U.S.S.R

and the Western camp controlled by the Americans. But what many forget to recognize

was that a third option very much existed during the Cold War and it was most often the

choice of developing countries recently freed from the constraints of colonial rule. This

camp played host to those third world countries which chose to focus on national

development and thus refused to align with either side of the Cold War. In 1955, non-

aligned leaders gained international recognition when, with the help of Gamal Abdel

Nasser of Egypt and Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister Nehru presented the

policy of non-alignment to a coalition of third world countries at the Bandung

Conference of Asian and African Nations in Indonesia.3 Unlike any of his predecessors in

the Oval Office, Eisenhower’s presidency was one of constant and consistent interaction

with the third world, and as the third world consisted of a large proportion of the world

population, swaying these non-aligned countries to the American point of view became

an essential goal of the Eisenhower administration.

Prime Minister Nehru was one of the most important leaders in the third world,

and therefore gained a lot of attention from President Eisenhower, his cabinet and

3 Chester J. Pack Jr., “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” in The Eisenhower Administration, The Third World, and The Globalization of the Cold War, eds. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), xii-xiii.

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advisors. 4 Communications with and discussions of the Prime Minister take up a large

percentage of the papers detailing the United States foreign relations, and a significant

portion of foreign aid was earmarked for his developing nation. The Eisenhower

Administration has a special interest in India because it was a budding democracy which

shared thousands of miles of border with the recently declared People’s Republic of

China, a domino fallen into Communist hands. Prime Minister Nehru, on the other hand,

recognized that both the Americans and the Soviets would be willing to lend millions, if

not billions of dollars of aid with the hopes of wooing India into their respective camps.

While his policy did encourage both sides of the Cold War to grant aid and encourage

investment in India, this was not an ulterior motive. Though it is easy to see that the

Americans and the Soviets both recognized India’s strategic importance and hoped to use

aid and investment to convince Nehru to join their bloc, Nehru was not claiming non-

alignment to encourage more funding. In fact he often opted to go to the United Nations

or to request a loan, in place of direct economic aid or assistance. Nehru, therefore, could

not be wooed with the financial prowess of the United States, and it would take much

more for President Eisenhower to convince the Prime Minister to lean to the West during

the Cold War. The United States and India, as well as their respective leaders did share

more than they would often admit though, and democracy, a dislike for Soviet

4 In the academic world, the relationship between Eisenhower and Nehru often receives some attention, but in respect to Eisenhower, Nehru is simply one of many foreign leaders with who he dealt, and Eisenhower is often mentioned, but only in passing with regards to Nehru’s time in office. In Benjamin Zachariah’s biography of Nehru, President Eisenhower is almost completely forgotten, yet the Prime Minister visited the united States twice, and India received significantly more financial aid than other third world countries. Burton I. Kaufman acknowledges the aid given to India during the Eisenhower Administration, but does not seem to analyze the importance of the aid to improving relations with India, in Trade and Aid. There have been many attempts to understand Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards the Third World since he left office, and many scholars have attempted to analyze the relationship with Nehru as one aspect of a whole. Here I aim to take this one step farther by developing the relationship past correspondences and the importance of aid, to understanding the personal relationship that allowed Ike and Nehru to accept one another despite drastically differing on views of international affairs.

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aggression, and an overall genuine hope for World Peace allowed the two countries, and

the two men to come together and form a working relationship as Eisenhower’s years in

office dwindled.

To understand the relationship between Eisenhower and Nehru, it is important to

explore the development of their political views, the world in which they served and their

personal relationship and this paper attempts to develop each topic as aspects of the final

conclusion.

Nehru

By the time Eisenhower entered the Oval Office in January of 1953, India had

been an independent Republic for just three years. After spending many years as a colony

of the British Empire, India was attempting to create a government while simultaneously

eliminating the barriers to development such as religious conflict between Muslims and

Hindus, territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, as well as the limiting social

interaction controlled by the strict caste system. In 1946, the Provisional Indian

government was sworn in with Nehru as Provisional Prime Minister to control the

transfer of power to Indian hands. Once India declared official independence, Nehru was

elected to the position of Indian Prime Minister and would serve at this post until his

death in 1964. The accomplishments of the Prime Minister are great, he created the

world’s largest democracy, developed plans for economic and industrial development

that would make India a leading example for decolonized countries throughout the third

world, and he maintained a position of strict non-alignment in the polarized world of the

Cold War.5 As the focus of this paper is the policy of non-alignment and the relationship

5 For this section of the paper, I have drawn from the recent bibliography of Nehru by Benjamin Zachariah, whose scholarship seems the most current and lacking in bias. Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004), xxi, 118-140.

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between Prime Minister Nehru and the leader of those with whom he would not align,

President Eisenhower, it is important to define non-alignment, what it meant to the Prime

Minister and how he developed and applied this policy.

The Development of Non-Alignment

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Jawaharlal Nehru was building an international

reputation as an accomplished statesman and negotiator. He was an early and outspoken

anti-colonialist, and became an inspirational leader throughout the third world countries

struggling to break free of colonial powers.6 After spending seven years in England,

earning a degree from Cambridge and passing the Bar exam, Nehru returned to India just

before the outbreak of World War I. Though the country experienced a few small

movements for independence from the Crown, none were nation-wide. The need for

independence did not sweep the nation until Gandhi began to lead public, peaceful

protests against the imperial government. An agrarian movement against the British

government had begun, but no one in the cities or the Congress was actually aware of it.

It was only with Gandhi’s non-cooperation Movement “peasants were able to link up

with and claim the authority of Gandhi” that the movement became nationally united.7

The influence of Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement on both the Indian people, the

quest for independence and Nehru can not be underestimated. It was also during his time

as a young Gandhian that Nehru, like many of India’s educated youth, was “forced to

discover and confront the nakedness of exploitation and poverty in India.”8 The

realization that India was an impressively poor country with a larger number of the

population illiterate and close to starvation forced the future Prime Minister to realize the

6 Ibid., xxi. 7 Ibid., 49. 8 Ibid., 56.

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countries desperate need for economic and industrial development. a realization that

would mold his future political and social policies.

The Great Depression and World War II marked a period of transition for both

India and Nehru. National independence was still the end-goal, but with the distraction of

economic crisis and world war, the Britons shelved any possibility of granting Indian

independence because the colony provided an ideal market for finished goods, a surplus

of raw materials, and an allied front during the War. Finally, in the Post War world, Great

Britain was unable to maintain an imperial government and simultaneously rebuild from

the damage of World War II, so it was on August 15, 1947 that the viceroy of British

India officially left, and the provisional government, with Nehru at it’s head, stepped in.

As the Prime Minister of India, Nehru recognized the special role the India would

play in the international community. During his tenure in office Nehru experienced the

formation of Israel and Pakistan, the decolonization of much of the Middle East, Asia and

Africa, the Korean War, the reconstruction of Western Europe, the formation of military

alliances such as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, the establishment of the

People’s Republic of China, the Kashmir conflict, and the overarching fluctuation of

tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western World. By the time Nehru was

chosen as India’s first Prime Minister, his reputation, prestige, and importance as a leader

in the third world made India an important strategic goal for both Cold War camps.

Though many countries were choosing to align with one side in the Cold War, a select

collection of leaders in the third world choose to follow Nehru’s example and remain

uncommitted to either side, choosing instead to focus on national development. When

Nehru recognized the desperate poverty, exploitation, and underdeveloped state of his

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country so many years before, he had inadvertently developed the policy that would

influence India’s foreign relations throughout his term.

Defining Non-Alignment

Once an independent nation, India had quite a tumultuous road ahead of nation-

building, economic development and industrial expansion. If Nehru was to get the people

of India out of abject poverty he would need the financial support of the international

community. Throughout his time as Prime Minister, Nehru consistently preferred the help

of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to direct aid

from the United States or the Soviet Union, but this did not mean he was willing to refuse

offers of trade, aid, and agricultural or military tools from independent nations. He would

also need to avoid military conflicts because the Indian Army was in the early stages of

redevelopment, and the country lacked the military technology possessed by the Super

Powers of the time.9 The Prime Minister was determined to achieve political and

economic independence as well as social equality for all Indian people. He recognized

that the key problems preventing India’s successful development was the economic

distribution of wealth and was therefore willing to combing government planning with

private investments and capitalistic endeavors. He recognized the importance of

economics in maintaining the democratic government and understood that if his plans for

India’s development failed, there presence of a strong Communist Party of India could

make significant political gains, and the “Unprecedented experiment in democracy”

could fail.10

9 Ibid., 157. 10 Robert Trumbull, “Unprecedented Experiment in Democracy,” New York Times, January 20, 1952. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=93557228&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientld=5472&RQT=309&VName=HNP (accessed November 29, 2008).

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It was from a past of colonial exploitation, the need for development and

international support, the desire to avoid of military conflict, and an overall hope for

peace that Nehru created non-alignment. In 1965 Krishna Menon described the policy as

based on—

“(a)non-alignment, (b)support of the freedom of the colonial peoples and (c) opposition to racism,” but they do not fully explain the conduct of contribution of India in world affairs. World peace and co-existance as goals or motivating factors more fully explain a great part of it. Ours in a world in which strife, war and conflict are inherent in the relations between nations. The foreign policy of India does not exclude the use of force or the threats of it, or the preparedness against these….Nationalism plays both a key and conclusive role in our motivations and conduct. Nonalignment is…the policy of independence. It reserves and stoutly maintains that India will make its own decisions in her national interest and in conformity with her ideas of what is good in world interests. It is also a policy based on self-reliance and national dignity.11

He then outlines the Five Principles on which Nehru ideologically based non-alignment:

the Five Principles are ‘self-interest’ formulations. They are mutual respect, mutual interests, not interference in others’ internal affairs and reciprocity. The very idea or ‘mutuality’ is based on self-respect and self-interest. Not only does respect which is not ‘mutual’ become subservience, but it fails to insure the respect for oneself in which mutuality rest.12

Menon, like many in the Indian government, was an ardent supporter of the Nehruvian

model and was even often viewed as an overly enthusiastic enforcer of non-alignment by

foreign governments. By 1955, with his government and international reputation more

firmly secured than ever, the Prime Minister met with other third world leaders in

Bandung, Indonesia to discuss the development and effective use of non-alignment. India

became an example for countries struggling to shake free of colonial powers, or to

develop politically, socially and economically independent of previous imperialist

powers.13 It is also important to understand that though the Indian government refused to 11 V.K. Krishna Menon, “Progressive Neutralism,” in India’s Nonalignment Policy: Strengths and Weaknesses, ed. Paul F. Power (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), 78-79.12 Ibid. 13 Statler and Johns, The Eisenhower Administration, xii-xiii; Zacharian, Nehru, 217-220.

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align with one superpower or another, it was by no mean neutral. As Nehru explained “I

dislike the world neutrality, because there is a certain passivity about it and out policy is

not passive….It [is] a policy which flowed from out past history, from our recent past and

from our National Movement and from various ideas that we have proclaimed.”14 Nehru

instead remained non-aligned with a particular foreign power so he could interpret each

situation as it occurred and respond as best as possible. The Prime Minister believed that

by being aligned with a certain power, he would also be limited in his ability to negotiate

with others, and that his ultimate goal of world peace would be in jeopardy.15 By 1955,

the Indian government was a secure democracy. Nehru had effectively stabilized the

state, rationally calmed sectarian forces into a coexistence, assumed control over the

party, achieved legitimacy for his democratic government and successfully made India

the model colony for independent, but struggling, nations within the third world who

hoped to develop non-alignment as their foreign policy.16

Eisenhower’s Third World Policy

Before Eisenhower actually took office, the fear of Communism was rapidly spreading

throughout the Western world, especially the United States. The Truman Doctrine

guaranteed American support, especially militarily, to any country attempting to fight

against Communist insurrection. By the time Eisenhower took his position as

Commander in Chief, the United States was firmly entrenched in the Cold War, and was

currently fighting both Korean and Chinese Communist in the Korean War.17 In keeping

14 T.M.P Mahadevan, “Indian Philosophy and the Quest for Peace,” in India’s Nonalignment Policy: Strengths and Weaknesses, ed. Paul F. Power (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), 1. 15 Ibid., 2. 16 Zachariah, Nehru, 212-213. 17 It is an interesting, but little known fact, that while peace talks between the Chinese and Americans were at a stand still, it was actually Prime Minister Nehru who, not so discreetly, spread rumors that the Americans were considering nuclear attacks on the Chinese if they did not return to the negotiations. Needless to say, the atomic weaponless Chinese were quickly convinced to resume the talks.

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with his campaign promise to Go To Korea, Eisenhower did negotiate an armistice

ending the conflict in 1953. Peace was not only a term Eisenhower used to win the 1952

election, but it was a goal that was woven throughout his eight years in office. Though he

was no stranger to using militaristic means to influence other governments as Zachary

Karabell effectively demonstrates in his Architects of Intervention, he does not examine

how Eisenhower was also convinced that psychological warfare, financial aid, and

American investment in foreign nations could convince both their leaders and the general

public that the United States had their best interest at heart, unlike the evil soviets.18

Aid

Foreign aid and economic support played a tremendous role during the

Eisenhower years, and a significant portion of the money went directly to the third world.

Though many in the Congress were against foreign aid because it did not necessarily

guarantee allies. As Chester J. Pach emphasizes, “The President urged Congress to

approve increased spending on economic aid for Third World countries but he

encountered considerable resistance. Eisenhower considered foreign assistance ‘the

cheapest insurance in the world’ against the spread of Soviet influence….He challenged

the common criticism that foreign aid was notion more than a ‘giveaway program’.19 The

Eisenhower Administration recognized that each country required a specially designed

policy which incorporated political, social and economic variants. In Iran, when the Shah

enjoyed United States support, the popularly elected Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq was

removed from power in a seeming contradiction to the Democratic policies of the United

States.20 18 Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention; The United States, the Third World and the Cold War: 1946-1962 (Baton Rouge: LA., Louisiana State University Press, 1999). 19 Pack, “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,”xiii. 20 For more details on the CIA’s coup of Mosaddeq see Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 50-91.

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While Eisenhower was certainly willing to use the military power of the United

States to intervene in foreign affairs, he also recognized when a more peaceful method of

intervention was just as effective. Neutral countries like India and Yugoslavia certainly

fell into this category, and the administration often encountered significant resistance

from other government branches when requesting aid for non-aligned countries. Though

“India’s neutral and nonaligned foreign policy and its program of national economic

planning and centralized control alienated many congressmen” Eisenhower “justified

economic assistance to India as a means of strengthening the forces of democracy in

Asia…and regarded India as the principal test of the theories behind development aid.”21

In terms of Yugoslavia, Eisenhower met resistance when proposing aid, but again stoutly

defended his proposal by emphasizing “the military and psychological benefits it derived

for Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviet Union.”22 To the Eisenhower administration,

winning the third world country could be done in various ways, and he often incorporated

all resources of financial and military aid, psychological warfare, and even direct military

support to gain supportive governments and populations. While the long term effects of

these decisions has left many countries worse off, Eisenhower’s decision to intervene or

provide American aid most often achieved his set goals.

Tito

After World War II Josip Broz Tito declared the Federated People’s Republic of

Yugoslavia under the Yugoslav Communist Party and attempted to unite the people of his

nation under the flag of national pride. President Truman and his advisors were

immediately suspicious of the Communist leader, but after his fallout with Stalin and the

21 Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid, Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 69-70.22 Ibid.

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Soviet Union, Tito became an essential part of the anti-Communist policy in Europe. “By

1947, [an] ‘anticipation of fragmentation within the international communist movement’

let the Truman administration to begin to develop a strategy ‘aimed at driving a wedge’

between the Soviets and their allies.”23 But, before the relationship with the Soviet Union

soured, Yugoslavia was considered “fully within the pro-Russian bloc of States” and

“increased the opportunity for the Soviets to spread Communism to Italy and Greece.” 24

After over two years of distrust and friction between the United States and Yugoslavia,

the relationship suddenly improved when, in 1948, Stalin and Tito split over Tito’s

refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands to give up aspects of his nations sovereignty and

independence. After the split, the administration recognized that “the split was genuine

and that it marked the first substantial challenge to Soviet leadership within the

international communist movement [and] led to U.S. assistance for the Tito regime.

Tito’s bid for autonomy also represented a destabilizing influence within the bloc…By

assisting Yugoslavia, the United States could demonstrate that autonomous communist

regimes would receive a cordial welcome in the West.”25 Truman and Eisenhower were

willing to recognize and support Tito’s independent Yugoslavia because he stood against

the Soviet Union, and was therefore a friend to the West. In the way that any friend of the

Soviets was an enemy of the United States, for instance the Communist government in

China, any enemy of the Soviet Union could be a friend, or at least an associate, of the

United States. Tito was often more interested in national issues than in aligning strictly

with the West, and because of his stance as a Communist the American government

remained suspicious of him, but he was invaluable in the fight against the imperialistic 23 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, (University Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 8. 24 Ibid., 9. 25 Idib., 43-44.

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desires of the Communist.26 Once in office, the Eisenhower governments opted to

continue Truman’s policy of using Yugoslavia to drive a wedge in between the Soviets

and the surrounding satellite states, as well as to prevent the continued spread of

Communism throughout Europe. To do this Eisenhower supplied Tito with tremendous

financial and military aid, but unlike his relationship with Nehru, Eisenhower never

formed a personal connection with the Yugoslav leader. The two men coexisted and used

each other for personal and national gains, but remained separated by their chosen mode

of government, never fully able to accept one another.

Yet, in India, the United States Executive Branch recognized that Nehru enjoyed

tremendous, almost demigod like, popularity and could not simply be pushed out of

power. The administration realized that psychological warfare and propaganda alone

would not be enough to win the support of the Indian government. Supporters of Nehru,

and therefore non-alignment, would not be easily convinced to join the Western fight

against Communism, and it would take recognition and respect of the governments

foreign policy to make any progress towards cooperation between the United States and

the Indian government. In a study of India prepared by the Indian Embassy for the

Department of State, the importance of recognizing and respecting India’s government is

emphasized.

Make a special effort to treat India as a grown-up in the family of nations. This will involve: (a) Informing the GOD of out readings of facts on important issues by messages to Nehru by the President of the Secretary of State in the most important cases…(b) Informing and as often as possible consulting the GOD in advance on important major moves of general importance…(c) Consulting the GOI in advance on our thinking and proposed action on issues directly affecting India…(d) Show friendliness by accommodating India on small matters of importance to her.27

26 Ibid., 235-236,

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The Eisenhower Administration also recognized that the Indian government had

developed a reputation as an important member of the international community and to

gain favor with the Indian government, the United States must first offer respect. But

still, something was different between the President and Prime Minister was different,

they maintained a special relationship of respect that went beyond politics and was based

on a mutual desire for peace.

Eisenhower and Nehru: A Lasting Relationship

When the relationship between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister

Jawaharlal Nehru is studied, it is often as part of a larger picture of their time in office,

regarding Eisenhower’s approach to the third world, or Nehru’s policy of non-alignment.

Yet, the two men shared a close relationship, evident in the fact that the Prime Minister

holds the special honor of being the only head of state to spend the night at Eisenhower’s

personal farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Though the early years of Eisenhower’s

presidency proved rocky for the two men, contemporary world events forced the men to

recognize that they had more in common than the differences which stood to divide them.

The two men were united in their views against Soviet aggression, in their hopes for a

successful democracy in India, and most importantly (and idealistically) a hope for

eventual and lasting peace.

The Early Years

Once Eisenhower won the 1952 election and began his eight year tenure as the

President of the United States, Prime Minister Nehru had developed a position of almost

27 “India, 1957-1962, A Study,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. 8, ed. John Glennon, (United States State Department, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian), 399.

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total power within India and a reputation as a successful mediator and accomplished

diplomat within the international community.28

It is difficult to overstate Nehru’s importance and prestige on the Indian and international scenes...he had unchallenged sway over both the government and the ruling Congress party. As minister of external affairs, he was the principle architect of India’s foreign policy and was intimately involved in managing its diplomacy….Nehru was recognized as the most outstanding figure in the Third World, a major statesman who had become a force to be reckoned with in international affairs.29

With this reputation, it was impossible for the Eisenhower administration to ignore the

leader of India, and on a larger scare, the Third World. Unlike his predecessors,

Eisenhower was dealing directly with the leaders of newly independent countries

throughout the world, and the administration quickly set to gather intelligence and

develop programs for this new arena hoping to create another sphere of influence against

the Soviets. In 1953, an intelligence report on Nehru’s attitude towards Communism

suggested that his enthusiasm for Communism had begun to wane, and this could prove

valuable to creating anti-soviet sympathies in the region. “In a confidential conversation

with Ambassador Bowles…Nehru reiterated the view that the USSR is presently an

aggressor…and even went so far as to state that he fully understood the American

position of balancing Soviet forces in Europe.”30 Already, the US government recognized

the importance of gaining favor with the Prime Minister because of his status within the

Third World, as well as the strategic importance of friendly relations with India due to

28 “Probable Developments in South Asia,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. XI, part 2: Africa and South Asia, John Glennon, ed. (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1983), 1074. 29 Howard B. Schaffer, Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 56-57. 30 Research for near East, South Asia and Africa, “Nehru’s Attitudes Toward Communism, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, No. 6269, Date: July 24, 1953”, in eds. Praveen K. Chaudhry and Martha Vanduzer-Snow The United States and India: A History Through Archives, The Formative Years, (Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications, 2008), 295.

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it’s geographic location. “The most serious effects of the loss of South Asia to

Communist control would be psychological and political. It would add to the Soviet Bloc

fiver countries…and would extend Communist control to include nearly half of the

world’s population. Loss of South Asia…would greatly reduce confidence in the capacity

of the free world to halt the expansion of Communism.”31 India, as the largest democratic

nation within South Asia, was clearly crucial in the US plans to prevent the spread of

Communism throughout Asia. Despite problems of poverty, low standards of living,

religious conflict, dissatisfaction with the declaration of an independent Pakistan and an

increasingly ineffective Congress, American policy makers had high hopes that India

would succeed in the quest for democracy.32 More importantly, they recognized that “the

continuation of US economic aid would contribute to Indian economic stability and might

encourage a more favorable attitude toward the West…despite its independent and

neutral policies, India’s general disposition will probably remain favorable to the West In

the East-West struggle.”33 Despite consistent declarations of neutrality by Indian

government officials, and Nehru himself, American officials remained hopeful that by

combining the democratic tendencies of India with economic aid and an increasingly

personal relationship between Nehru and Eisenhower, India would continue to lean more

towards the West in the politics of the Cold War.34

In attempts to further US-Indian relations upon the recognition of India’s political,

economic and strategic importance, both Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of

31 “Consequences of Communist Control Over South Asia,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, vol. XI, part 2: Africa and South Asia, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publications Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1983), 1063. 32 “Probable Developments in South Asia,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1074-1087. 33 Ibid., 1089.34 John Foster Dulles, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President: November 30, 1954,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, vol. XI Africa and South Asia, part 2, et. al. eds. John P. Glennon (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publications, 1983), 1786.

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State John Foster Dulles included India on their separate tours of South Asia and Africa,

early in Eisenhower’s term. These visits were the first signs that the current administraion

recognized and respected India’s importance in the international community. Later aims

to further the relationship between India and the United States developed as advisors

began to suggest that the President invite Nehru to visit the United States in late 1954. As

relations between India and the United States continued to deteriorate as a result of

disagreements over relations with the Communist government in China, military aid for

Pakistan, and military alliances within Southeast Asia, the Assistant Secretary of State for

Near East, South Asian and African Affairs drafted the following memorandum—

Because of widespread Indian resentment toward these policies of substantial economic aid programs for India and our information and cultural efforts to improve the United States-Indian relations have in a sense become holding operations rather than means of extending out influence. It is entirely possible that the Congress may be tempted in the future to cut India off from special economic assistance…since no significant change to which India objects in likely we should find some means of making those policies more acceptable to India. In my opinion the only way in which that might be done would be through a personal approach of Prime Minister Nehru by President Eisenhower himself… Madame Pandit believes that if Nehru were to spend two days with the President himself in informal surroundings…it might effect a profound change in the Prime Minister’s attitudes toward the United States.35

Though the visit would not come to fruition for just over two years, the fact that policy

makers were emphasizing the importance of a possible visit by Nehru suggests that they

believed the only way to gain Indian support would be to convince the Prime Minister

that he and the American President, and by extension, the two nations they represented

had much in common.

The years between the first recommendation that Nehru visit and the actual trip in 35 “Harold G. Josif and Henry T. Smith, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Easter, South Asian and African Affairs (Byroade) o the Secretary of State, November 4, 1954”, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, vol. XI Africa and South Asia, part 2, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publications Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1983), 1772-1773.

Mueller 18

December of 1956 were tumultuous times for both the United States and India. While the

United States was dealing with an irritant from Wisconsin, creating the Baghdad and

South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), organizing the overthrow of the new

President of Guatemala, managing the repercussions from the Supreme Court decisions to

uphold Brown v. Board of Education and developing an interstate highway act, India was

equally as busy. The relatively new republic was hoping that a Five Year Plan (1951-

1955) would jump start agricultural and industrial development, announcing optimism for

the spread of non-alignment throughout the recently independent countries of the Third

World, attempting to mediate between two superpowers and encouraging the limitation of

an arms race, hoping to avoid territorial conflict with Communist China through friendly

diplomacy and, finally, attempting to mend the rift between itself and the recently

declared Pakistan over the region of Kashmir.36 In the summer of 1955, plans to invite the

Prime Minister began to take root, but the situation devolved when it was revealed that

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be visiting India just weeks before the dates

intended for Nehru’s trip to the US. American policy makers “did not want to appear to

be climbing on the bandwagon of building up Nehru to much.”37 After the Soviet

Premiers visit though, popular opinion practically demanded a similar visit to improve

US-Indian relationships—“The Khrushchev-Bulganin tour, in which they also upheld

India’s claim to Kashmir against Pakistan while attempting to tar the United States with

the colonialist brush, has reinforced the conviction of responsible Washington officials

36 “NSC 5701: Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal,” in John Glennon et. al. eds., FRUS 1955-1957 volume VIII: South Asia (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 29-41.37 “Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State,” in et. al. eds. John P. Glennon, FRUS 1955-1957 volume VIII: South Asia, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 290.

Mueller 19

that the free but neutralist nations of Asia must be handled with special care.”38 That

special care called for by The New York Times came in the fore of an official invitation

for Nehru to visit the United States in the summer of 1956. While on tour of South Asia,

Secretary of States John Foster Dulles stopped in India to extend the Presidents invitation

to the Prime Minister. This invitation was seen as an illustration of “the new attention

being given to the problem of the ‘uncommitted world’” and would provide the two

world leaders with a chance to discuss the issues of non-commitment, India’s

nationalistic ambitions, colonial aspirations of the worlds superpowers, and the

recognition of Communist China.39 When Nehru accepted the invitation to visit, US-

Indian relations were somewhat strained, as the two nations foreign policies continued to

clash over the settlement of Kashmir, the return of Goa from the Portuguese government,

American involvement in military pacts and India’s growing relations with the Soviet

Union. Though the meeting was originally set for the seventh of July, the two men were

forced to reschedule, preferring “to hold their private talks at a time when it was certain

no strain would be imposed on the President” during his recuperation.40 As international

conflicts arose over the Suez Canal and anti-Soviet uprisings in Hungary the prime

Ministers visit continued to increase in importance as the two countries would need to

work together to bring peace to the international community.

The Visit to Gettysburg

Though one meeting between world leaders is rarely enough to create stable and

lasting bonds that stand the test of domestic and international strife, the meeting between

38 Elie Abel, “Dulles Sets Visit to India in March,” New York Times, January 14, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com (accessed on December 2, 2008). 39 “Nehru is Invited to White House: Acceptance Seen,” New York Times, March 15, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com (accessed December 2, 2008). 40 Edwin L. Dale Jr., “Eisenhower, Nehru Postpone Parley,” New York Times, June 26, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com (accessed December 2, 2008).

Mueller 20

President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru could not have come at a better time to

improve relations and help develop a sense of respect and understanding between the two

men. On Saturday, December 16, 1956, the Prime Minister arrived for a four day visit to

the United States. According to a Presidential Brief developed to prepared Eisenhower

for the visit, the United States have five objectives for the visit—

(1) To increase Mr. Nehru’s respect and appreciation of the general objectives of American foreign policy, (2) to bring out such broad and significant areas of agreement between the United states and India as the development of broader international cooperation, the need for armament control and inspection safeguards, economic expansion liberties and representative institutions; (3) to ‘agree to disagree’ on those specific foreign policy issues which clearly involve differing Indian and American concepts of national security and national interest, (4) to give a sympathetic hearing to the Prime Minister’s views and make him feel he has been consulted on the problems discussed, and (5) to establish a closer personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister.41

The Prime Ministers visit, though short was of significant strategic importance to the

Eisenhower administration, and if it proceeded smoothly, could tremendously improve

United States-Indian relations.

41 “Briefing Paper-Nehru Visit, December 16-20, 1956,” Presidential Papers, Eisenhower Library, Accessed at Eisenhower National Historic Site.

Mueller 21

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