Berti - The Israeli Citizenship Model

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The Fletcher School al Nakhlah Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

The Fletcher School Online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2009

TheIsraeliCitizenshipModel:TheRoleofPluralismandParticularisminDrawingtheBoundariesoftheIsraeliPolityBenedettaBerti

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the Israeli citizenship

discourse, emphasizing the influence of Israels

historical experience, societal composition and

constitutivevalues.The firstsectionprovides the

theoreticalfoundationoftheessay,describingthe

Israeli citizenship model, stressing its complex

nature, and explaining how three alternative

models of citizenshipliberal, republican, and

ethnonationalistcoexist and interact in the

Israelipolity.

The existence of multiple, and at times

divergent, notions of citizenship reflects theinternal tensionsbetween competing corevalues

of thestate,suchaspluralismanddemocracyon

the one hand and ethnonationalism and

particularism on the other. The second section

analyzes the current normative framework

concerning Israeli nationality law, highlighting

the dynamics described in the introductory

section. Finally, the article applies these

theoretical and normative frameworks to a

specific case study in which the notions of

citizenship

described

above

clash.

This

particular

case study looks at the current family

reunification policy visvis spouses of citizens

coming from the West Bank and Gazaemphasizing how positive political steps are

neededtoaccommodatethedisparatevaluesand

imperativesinIsraelicitizenshipdiscourse.

WHICH CITIZENSHIP MODEL FOR ISRAEL?

Thecitizenshipdiscourseinanygivensociety

is influencedby apluralityof factors, suchas:a

countrys history, itsjuridical traditions, nation

building objectives, and societal composition.1

Furthermore,thecitizenshipmodelanddiscourse

adopted in a particular country are alsointrinsically related to internal conceptions of

collective identification. Theyembodya specific

culturalselfrepresentation,asenseofnationhood

andcommunity,andaparticularisticethnos.2

AsGershonShafir3pointsout,becauseofthis

inherent complexity and given the multiple

factors that shape a countrys citizenship

discourse, the final narrative is hardly ever

monolithic.Itoftenconsistsofalternativenotions

that coexist andat timesclash. This is

particularly

true

in

the

Israeli

case,

where

the

tensions among alternative citizenship

conceptionsaremodeledaftertheinternalclashes

between conflicting constitutive values, such as

ethnicidentityandparticularismversuspluralism

and democracy. As Shafir further explains, the

tension between the exclusionary impetus of

frontier society and the inclusionary impetus of

civil society (...) has expressed itself in a

Benedetta Berti, FletcherMALD 2007, is theEarhart Doctoral Fellow at the Fletcher School

and the Neubauer Fellow at the Institute for

NationalSecurityStudies (TelAvivUniversity).

She specializes in international security studies

andMiddleEaststudies.


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The Fletcher School al Nakhlah Tufts University

2

hierarchical and fragmented citizenship

structure.4 Inotherwords,different corevalues

connected with Israels historical experience

shape the states view of citizenshipenabling

three models to coexist: liberal, republican, and

ethnonationalist.

The republican ideal of citizenship, focused

onthenotionofpublicgoodandcommonwill,onactiveanddirectparticipationinthepublicsphere

as thekeydutyofcitizens,on thepraiseofcivic

virtues, and on citizen mobilization,5 was the

predominantmodel in theYishuv6periodand in

theearlyyearsoftheStateofIsrael.Accordingly,

the republican idea of citizenship served two

mainfunctions.First,duringIsraelsemergenceas

a frontier society, when a zone of

contact/conflict arose between different societal

groups,7 the concept of citizenship was used to

draw

community

boundaries

and

create

an

internal and cohesive community visvis the

others. Secondly, the republican ethnos was

usedinternally, inthenationbuildingprocess,to

mobilize citizens around the ideal of common

goodand themoralpurposeofZionism. Italso

served to promote direct participation in the

polity trough the national myth of the early

Chalutzim (pioneers)a narrative that

emphasized values such as collective solidarity,

patriotism, and labor as a means of

individual/collective

emancipation.

Evenifithaslostprominence,dueinpartto

the evolution of Israel from a frontier, state

dominatedsocietyinitsformativeliminalyearsto

a more established, civilsociety oriented

democracy,therepublicanidealofcitizenshipand

itsrhetoricisstillpresent incontemporaryIsraeli

society.8Themajorcontributionoftherepublican

citizenship model in contemporary Israel is the

continuation of the ideal of citizenship as active

participationandnotjustabundleofrights.This

is best embodied, for instance, in the ethnos

surroundingthemilitaryservice:

[T]heemphasisonmilitaryserviceforthe

nation as the proof of inclusion in the

body politic echoes a republican

conception of citizenship, in which a

connection is made between the

commitment to make sacrifices for the

nation and the right to fair share in

governing()9

However, the republican ethnos of the early

period has been challenged by the growing

impact of the liberal idea of citizenship. This

second model of citizenship hasbeen associated

with the ongoing debate on the nature andcharacter of the country as a Jewish and

DemocraticState.10

Since its formativeyearsof theYishuv, Israel

conceived of and described itself asboth a state

fortheJewishpeopleandasademocracy. Thisis

clearlyemphasizedbothintherhetoricofIsraels

earlyleadersanditsconstitutivedocuments,such

as the Declaration of Independence,11 which

establishedsidebysidea state for theJewish

people and the principle of nondiscrimination

applicableto

all

citizens

irrespective of

religion,race,or

sex.12

Thereforeat

least at a

theoretical

levelthere is

little doubt that

Israels state

building

process

was indeed

aimedatcreating

a Jewish,

democratic state and that the liberal notion of

citizenshipflourishedinthiscontext.

Theliberalidealstressesuniversalcitizenship,

grounded on the principles of generality, civic

unity and cohesion, and equal treatment of all

citizensunderthelaw.13 Inthiscontext,thebasic

conception of liberal citizenship as abundle of

rights, focusedon individualsandon theprivate

sphere, has been gaining increasing support in

Israeli societysuperimposing itself on the

republican model. This has created internal

tension between the universal character of

citizenship rights under the liberal model

adopted in most liberal democraciesand the

exclusivity and particularism of the republican

Thereforeat least at atheoretical levelthere

is little doubt thatIsraels state-buildingprocess was indeedaimed at creating aJewish, democraticstate and that theliberal notion of

citizenship flourishedin this context.


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model,rootedintheearlyformativeperiodofthe

state.

Finally, in addition to these two citizenship

models, the Israeli polity also encompasses an

ethnonationalistdiscourseandcitizenshipmodel.

In fact, Israel isoftenmentionedasanexception

to the contemporary tendency of modern

democracies to distance themselves frommaintaining a strong ethnonationalist affiliation

in the

elaboration of

their

citizenship

discourse.

Israel stands

out in its

continued

insistence on

a

firm

and

explicit bond

between

ethnicallybased nationality and statehood. In

declaring that Israel is the state of the Jewish

people,what is in effectbeing claimed isoneof

the basic tenets held by classical theorists of

nationalism: that a state ought to represent a

nation.14

Numerousscholars,therefore,haveidentified

Israel as an ethnic democracy, where the

dominant

ethnic

group

enjoys

special

collective

rights,whilethenonJewishcitizensarelimitedto

individualrights.15Similarly,thecountryhasbeen

identified as an ethnocracy, where a specific

group attempts to assert and maintain

disproportionatepower, rights,and control,16 for

the sakeof cultural and religioushomogeneity.17

At the extreme of this spectrum, scholars have

indicatedthatthisstrongaffiliationwithanethnic

groupconstitutesa structural impediment to the

fulfillment of the premises of liberal democracy,

callingthestateanimagineddemocracy.18

Thecitizenshipdiscourseassociatedwiththis

characteristic of Israeli democracy is ethno

nationalist, where a common religiousethnic

historicalculturebecomes thedefining featureof

membership in the political community.19 An

exampleofhow thisethnonationalistconception

of the polity has shaped Israeli political and

societal life is manifest in certain aspects of its

immigrationpolicy. Infact,thecoreprovisionof

the Israeli immigration law, the Law of Return,

reflectsaperceptionofmembership in the state

which is not territoriallybound or defined,but

ratherisbasedonapreexistingaffiliationwiththe

Jewishpeople,initsperceptionofthatpeopleasa

nation.20 This premise leads to an unorthodox

approach to immigration. The traditionalhierarchical order that privileges native citizens

overimmigrantsisnullifiedandanewimmigrant

is entitled to the very same status as a native

citizen, in thenameof culturalunityand shared

nationhood.As a result, Israelbecamea country

ofimmigrants21withanationalitylawfocusedon

emigrationandonpreservingstrongtieswiththe

largerethniccommunityofreference.22

Together with an ethnonationalist model of

citizenship, Israel has also adopted a broader

concept

of

groupdifferentiated

citizenship,

definedbyKymlicka as the adoptionofgroup

specific polyethnic, representation, or self

governing rights.23 The idea of differentiated

group rights and duties is in fact another

important aspect of the Israeli conception of

citizenship. In Israel, the concept of citizenship,

whichisassociatedwithguaranteesofbasicrights

andfreedominaccordancewithliberalprinciples,

is also qualifiedby the concept of nationality as

ethnic identification (Jewish, Arab, Bedouin,

Druze;

or

Jewish,

Christian,

Muslim).24

In

other

words,allcitizensenjoyadegreeofequalrights,

but these generic protections are also associated

withspecificrightsanddutiesthatarederivedby

the combination of their citizenship and ethnic

nationality. This creates myriad different

conceptions and narratives of citizenship and

membership status, as well as a groupbased

conceptionofrightsandduties.

For instance, the membership in an ethnic

religiouscommunitydefinestherulesofpersonal

status and family law that are applicable to that

citizen.25Thisisbecausethereligiouscourtsofthe

three main religious communities (Jewish,

Muslim, Christian) are empowered by the

Ministry of Religion to deal with family and

personal status matters26 and have personal

jurisdiction over all members of their

communitya legacy of the Ottoman millet

system. An additional example of group

Similarly, the countryhas been identified as an

ethnocracy, where aspecific group attemptsto assert and maintain

disproportionate power,rights, and control, for

the sake of cultural andreligious homogeneity.


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differentiatedduties is the obligation to serve in

the army, which although mandatory for all

Israelicitizens,isaccordingtoanadministrative

practice normally not enforced on Palestinian

Arab Israelis (while Druze and Bedouin men

regularlyserveinthearmy)27.

In sum, defining a single citizenship model

for the State of Israel is extremely complex, asradically different notions of this concept are all

accommodated in the citizenship discourse.

Therefore republican, liberal,ethnonational,and

even multicultural/groupbased models of

membership andbelonging coexist in the Israeli

national political discourse. This coexistence

reflects the internal struggle between the

universalistandpluralistnatureoftheIsraelistate

and its particularistic and exclusive tendencies.

As the article will further articulate, this

multiplicityof

models

both

echoes

and

explains

the internal tension between Jewish and

Democratic.

NATIONALITY LAW IN ISRAEL: AN OVERVIEW

Israels citizenship policy is based on two

main legislative acts: the Law of Return5710

(1950),28andtheNationalityLaw5712(1952).29

The Law of ReturnTheLawofReturnisacorelegislativeactthat

enshrines the right of all Jews to immigrate to

Israel. It represents a constitutive principle

recognized since the establishment of the State

and embodied in the 1948 Declaration of

Independence: The State of Israel willbe open

forJewishimmigrationandfortheIngatheringof

the Exiles.30 Accordingly, the Law of Return

reflectsanunderstandingoftheStateofIsraelasa

trusteeinchargeofadministeringarightthatin

fact predates the birth of the state itself.31 As

eloquently putby former Israeli Prime Minister

DavidBenGurion inhis introductionoftheLaw

ofReturn:

ThislawdoesnotprovidefortheState

tobestowtherighttosettleinIsraelupon

theJewlivingabroad;itaffirmsthatthis

rightisinherentinhimfromtheveryfact

ofbeingaJewThisrightprecededthe

State;thisrightbuilttheState32

The conceptofapreexisting rightofallJews to

immigrate to Israel is also entrenched in the

semanticsoftheJewishimmigrationdiscourse.In

fact,theactofimmigratingtoIsraelisnotdefined

as immigration. The term used is aliyah or

ascent;which,inconnectionwiththeideaofself

fulfillment,confersontotheactofimmigrationanadditional

layer of

symbolic

validation.

This specific

understanding

of the State as

a trustee,

together with

the powerful

evocative

value of the

concept of

aliyah, lay at

the core of the

Law of Return, which codified ethnic ius

sanguinis33asthepreferredmechanismtoacquire

citizenship.

Adopted in1950, theLawofReturnhasan

important place among Israels legislative acts.

The State of Israel lacks a formal written

Constitution,

and

in

its

place,

it

has

a

series

of

Basic Laws,34 which provide a constitutional

basisforthestate.AlthoughtheLawofReturnper

se is not abasic law, it is commonly deemed to

possess constitutional implications,35 both

becausethelegislativebranchhasshownextreme

reluctance in considering amendments to this

Law, and also because it reflects the founding

ideologyofIsrael. Thus, it islikelytobegivena

prominentroleinthefutureconstitution.36

Themainprovisionofthe1950LawofReturn

states: EveryJew has the right to come to this

country as an oleh,37 and the only legitimate

reason to deny this right is if the applicant is

engagedinanactivitydirectedagainsttheJewish

people; or is likely to endanger public health or

the security of the State. According to the

provisions of the Law of Return, all olim

immigrating to Israel will be granted an equal

statustothosewhowereborninthecountry.

In fact, the act ofimmigrating to Israel is

not defined as immigration . The termused is aliyahor ascent;

which, in connectionwith the idea of self-

fulfillment, confers onto

the act of immigrationan additional layer ofsymbolic validation.


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This legislative act creates obvious problems

under a liberal citizenship model and the Israeli

legislative branch did not ignore this contrast.

Haim Cohn, who was attorney general in 1950,

explained to the Constitution, Law and Justice

Committee in the Knesset: we do not wish to

introducediscriminationbetweenJewsandnon

Jews inanyotherlaw.This istheonlylawtolaydownspecialrightsforaJewbecauseheisaJew

().38 Since the very outset, there were clear

internal

tensions

between the

Law of

Return and

its ethno

national

implications,

and

the

equal rights

principle

that had

shaped the

Israeli

democracy since the Declaration of

Independence.39 This tension, although not fully

resolved, was lessened however by the more

comprehensive Nationality Law, passed in 1952,

providing alternative means to acquire Israeli

citizenship

outside

the

venues

provided

by

the

LawofReturn.

Additionally,theLawofReturnwasnotonly

problematic visvis the regulation and

recognitionofnonJewish immigrationbut italso

left a wide degree of uncertainty around a

number of problematic issues, such as: who is a

Jew according to the Law of Return? And what

would be the status of nonJewish spouses of

eligibleJews under the same law? The issue of

establishingwho is aJew for thepurposeof the

LawofReturnreachedtheIsraeliSupremeCourt

in the ShalitCase

(Benjamin Shalit v. Population

Registry).40 In1967BenjaminShalit,married toa

nonJewishwoman,attemptedtoregisterhistwo

children (Israelicitizensbyvirtueofhavingborn

in Israel and having a Jewish father) in the

Population Registry asJewish nationals with no

religion (nationality and religion being two

different categories in the population registrys

records). The registry refused to recognize the

children asJewish nationals on the ground that

the childrens mother was not Jewish.41 The

petitioner disputed this notion of Jewish

nationalityconnectedtoareligiousinterpretation

of Judaism, he argued in favor of a secular

definition of membership based on self

identification, and he grounded the complaintunder his right to freedom of conscience as

guaranteed by Israels Declaration of

Independence.

InahistoricverdictfortheStateofIsrael,the

court ruled thatfor the purpose of the

population registry and the Law of Returnthe

government did not have the authority to

determine a persons national affiliation.

Additionally, the court ruled that a bona fide

statement of affiliation shouldbe considered as

proofof

nationality.

The

case

created

enormous

distress within Israeli society, emphasizing the

conflictsbetweensecularandreligiouscitizens.It

led the Knesset to amend the Law of Return,

which tried tobalance the secular and religious

viewsonnationality.

As a response to the religious communitys

plea to set the communityboundaries according

to religious Jewish law, the 1970 amendment

provided more firm criteria, besides self

identification,toestablishwhoqualifiedasJewish

under

the

Law

of

Return.

But

it

also

included

new

categoriesofpeopleeligibletobegrantedtheoleh

status, in linewithamoresecularunderstanding

of citizenship law.42 The amendment, in fact,

extendstheLawofReturnto:

()achildandagrandchildofaJew,

thespouseofaJew,thespouseofachild

ofaJewandthespouseofagrandchild

ofaJew,exceptforapersonwhohas

beenaJewandhasvoluntarilychanged

hisreligion.43

Furthermore, the law specifies that For the

purposesof thisLaw, Jewmeansapersonwho

was born of a Jewish mother or has become

convertedtoJudaismandwhoisnotamemberof

anotherreligion.44

However,evenifthisamendmentputanend

to many controversies arising previously under

In a historic verdict forthe State of Israel, the

court ruled thatfor thepurpose of the

population registry andthe Law of Returnthe

government did not havethe authorit y to

determine a personsnational affiliation.


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the Law of Return, it still left room for debate

regardingwhatconstitutesavalidconversionfor

thepurposeoftheLawofReturn.Thisquestion,a

corollary of the wider dilemma of defining who

qualifies asaJew,was also theobjectofjudicial

review in the Shas Movement v. Director of

PopulationRegistry (1989), and Pesarro (Goldstein)

v.Minister

of

Interior

(1995)decisions.45Inthe1989

case,thecourtdeterminedthatforthepurposeof

the Law of Return, and also for immigration

purposes, any certified conversion performed

outside of Israel wouldbe considered valid and

wouldautomaticallyentitlethatindividualtooleh

rights.

Inthe1995case,thecourtdidnotruleonthe

merits and declined to order the population

registry to register as aJew a woman who had

gonethroughanonorthodoxconversionwhilein

Israel.But

it

did

indicate

that

the

Law

of

Return

seemed to allow her to do so. This spurred a

controversy ledbytheOrthodoxChiefRabbinate

in Israel, which eventually ended with the

recognition of the Rabbinates monopoly on

conversions in the country.46 More recently, in

March2005,thecourtaddressedagaintheissueof

nonorthodoxconversionsinIsrael,andruledthat

individuals residing in the country and who

undergo thenonorthodox conversionprocess in

Israel, but who are able to perform the actual

conversion

ceremony

abroad,

will

be

recognized

asJewsforimmigrationpurposes.47

The Nationality Law

Adopted in 1952, the Nationality Law

regulates acquisition and loss of Israeli

nationality. Israeli nationality is conferred

through theLawofReturn,analyzedabove,and

through birth, residence, and naturalization.

These rules apply equally to Jewish and non

Jewish immigrants.48 Nationality by birth is

grantedaccordingtotheiussanguinisprinciplein

three instances:first,toallchildrenborn inIsraelto at least an Israeli parent; second, to children

bornoutsideofIsraelprovidedthatat leastone

parentisacitizenbybirth,naturalization,return,

or residence and third, to peopleborn in Israel

withoutanynationality.

Nationality in the third instance,however, is

grantedonlyiftheapplicationissubmittedwhen

the candidate isbetween18and25yearsofage,

andifhe/shehasresidedinthecountryfiveyears

prior to submitting the application.49 This

provisionistheresultofa1980amendmenttothe

1952 law. It solves one of the anomalies of the

preceding regime, underwhich childrenborn in

Israel by one Israeli parent were granted

citizenshipthroughthelawofreturn,ratherthanaccording amore general ius sanguinis principle.

The 1980 amendment achieved the important

outcomeofstandardizingthecitizenshipbybirth

acquisitionprocess, eliminating religiouslybased

differences.50

Regarding

citizenship by

residence, in

1952 the

nationality by

residence

provision was

used to

determine and

regularize the

statusofArabIsraelis.Inparticular,thelawgave

Israeli citizenship to all Palestinians who were

registered in the population registry, who had

been residing in Israelsince theestablishmentof

the state, and who were still an inhabitant of

Israelatthetimethelawwaspassedaswellasto

all

children

born

in

Israel

after

the

establishment

of the stateby parents who complied with the

abovementionedrequirements.51Theformulation

of citizenshipby residence, in these terms, was

highly problematic. It left a number of Arab

inhabitants of Israel defacto stateless, since they

could not meet the requirements for citizenship,

and their Palestinian citizenship had been

terminatedwiththeendof theBritishMandate.52

The 1980 amendment to the Nationality Law

solved this situation firstbygrantingnationality

via residence to this category of people and

extending it to their children and second by

standardizing the acquisition of nationality

throughtheiussanguinisprinciple.53

With respect tonationalitybynaturalization,

thisformofcitizenshipisgrantedatthediscretion

oftheMinistryoftheInterioruponthefulfillment

of certain requirements. The requirements

include: three out of five years of continuous

The 1980 amendmentachieved the important

outcome ofstandardizing the

citizenship-by-birth

acquisition process,eliminating religious-

based differences.


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residency prior to submitting the naturalization

application;permanentresidencystatus;intention

to settle in Israel; and renunciation of previous

nationalities (asopposed to thosewhonaturalize

under the Law of Return, and who are not

required todenouncepreviousaffiliations).54The

Minister,athisdiscretion,canexemptcandidates

from complying with some of these criteria;55andas a matter of policy56this was generally

donetonaturalizespousesofIsraelicitizenswho

could not use the Law of Return provision to

acquire Israeli

citizenship (i.e.

spouses of non

Jewish citizens)

and who did

notmeetall the

requirements to

obtain

citizenship by

naturalization.

However, since

1996, the

Minister of

Interior has

adopted an

equalizer provision. This makes it harder, in

practice, to obtain citizenship for all spouses. It

requires them to leave the country for sixweeks

after

the

marriage,

re

enter

on

a

temporary

visa,

and only then apply for permanent residency

within Israel, thereby substantially delaying the

initiationofthenaturalizationprocess.57

The second part of the Nationality Law

discusses the conditions under which a citizen

could lose Israeli nationality. In general,

nationality is lost through a double procedure

requiring both the formal renunciation of the

individual and the acceptance of such

renunciationby the Ministry of the Interior. In

thissense,therightofexpatriationisnotabsolute.

Rather, it isahybridbetween the formulationof

expatriation as an unconditional right of each

individual and the older British doctrine of

perpetualallegiance,whichquestionedthenotion

of voluntary expatriation/relinquishment of

citizenshipandstatedthattheallegiancebetween

the citizen and state could not be severed

unilaterally by the individual.58 Naturalized

citizens, however, can lose their citizenship for

numerous reasons, ranging from acts of

disloyalty, to having acquired it through false

claims. Finally, all citizens could have their

citizenship revoked for committing certaingrave

actsofdisloyaltyagainstthestate.59

MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE NATIONALITYLAW: A CASE STUDY

This section discusses the nexus and

interrelation between nationality law and

minorityrightsthroughthelensoftheNationality

andEntryintoIsraelLaw,asthisseemstobeone

of the main areas where the tensions between

particularism and universalism, as well as the

conflicts between different understandings of

citizenship,manifestthemselves.Accommodation

of minority rights within Israel is also an

important criterion by which to evaluate theJewishanddemocraticnatureof thestateand to

analyze the de facto enforcement of the de jure

equalityprovisionintheIsraelipolity.

Israel does grant equal civil and political

rights toall itscitizens,at leastata formal level.

However, thekey challenge seems tobehow to

ensure that the dejure equality provision in the

IsraeliBasicLawstranslatesintodefactoequality.

Given the stratified nature of Israeli society,

which seems to guarantee differential access to

different

ethnic

groups

within

the

Israeli

polity

and affirm ethnonational conceptions of

citizenship,thisquestionisallthemorecomplex.

The problem is compounded by the de facto

exclusion of Arab minorities from both power

sharing arrangements and distribution of

resources and wealth. In this sense,JewishArab

relationsaretheacidtestinIsraelidemocracy.

Since the creationof theStateof Israel itself,

citizenship status of the Arab minority in Israel

hasbeenaprominentissue.Attheendofthe1948

War, the new government immediately granted

citizenship to the Arab inhabitants who found

themselves inIsraelafterthewar (about160,000)

and later established a mechanism to regularize

otherresidentsthroughthe1952NationalityLaw

provision, as explained in theprevious section.60

Pelednotesthattheoptionofdenyingcitizenship

status on thebasis of a strict ethnonationalistic

principle (whichwouldhavemade Israel similar

Following the decisionto grant citizenship

status to Arabresidents , the State

was immediately

confronted with thechallenge of extendingthe same rights to the

Arab minor ity thatwere available to all

other c itizens.


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toSouthAfricasHerrenvolk)wasneverperceived

asalegitimateoptionandcontradictorytoIsraels

early commitment to democracy and equality.61

Ontheotherhand,astrictlyliberalunderstanding

of citizenship, which would have prevented the

development of a preferential immigration right

fortheJewishpeople,wasalsotobeperceivedat

oddswithbothZionistideologyandthehistoricalexperience that led to the establishment of the

StateofIsrael.Therefore, theadoptedmodelwas

acompromisebetweenthesetwo

views, an attempt to reconcile

universalismandparticularism.

Following the decision to

grant citizenship status to Arab

residents, the State was

immediatelyconfrontedwiththe

challengeofextending the same

rightsto

the

Arab

minority

that

were available to all other

citizens. In this sense, Ben

Gurion first stressed theneed toextendpolitical

rights to the new citizens in the first 1949

elections, declaring: We must not begin with

nationaldiscrimination.62

However, until 1966, a major obstacle

persisted for Arab citizens seeking to exercise

their rights and freedoms as well as achieve de

facto equality. Following the 1945 Defense

Emergency

Regulations63

a

measure

imposed

by

the security situation in the country and

incompatible with a liberal understanding of

citizenshipArab citizens were subject to a

separate military administration. In 1966, in a

major equalizing step, the military government

wasdismantledandbothJewishandnonJewish

citizens became subject to the same

administrativecivilian law. The following year,

withthe1967warandthesubsequentinclusionof

East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights under

Israelicivilian law,Arab residentsof thoseareas

became eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship

throughnaturalization. Inpractice thiswasoften

difficult to do, as it was perceivedby the same

Arab community as an act of treason and a

repudiationofthePalestiniancause.64

At the same time,Arab Israelisbegan in the

late 1960s to bring the first constitutional

challengestotheethnonationalunderstandingof

citizenship that hadbecome so predominant in

the country. In1965, thepetitioners inYeredorv.

Chairman of the Central Elections Committee65,

members of the Arab socialist group alArd,

protested against the Central Election

Committees refusal to register them as

candidates in the parliamentary elections. The

Committee did so on the grounds that theMinistryofDefensehaddeclaredalArdanillegal

group due to its nonacceptance of Israels

territorial integrity and its

right to exist as a state.66 On

that occasion, the court held

that the Committee had the

authority todisqualifyparties

advocating for thedissolution

of the state and that the

disqualificationofthe listwas

validfor

the

reason

that

this

candidates list is an illegal

associationsinceitspromoters

negatetheintegrityandveryexistenceoftheState

of Israel.67Thisprinciplewasupheld in1985 in

Moshe Neiman et al. v. Chairman of the Central

ElectionsCommittee,althoughinthatcasethecourt

did not uphold the disqualification of aJewish

(Kach) and an Arab political group (Progressive

ListforPeace),arguingthatsuchdisqualifications

are only valid when the existence of the list

threatens

the

survival

of

the

state

or

its

democraticcharacter.68

Currently, the laws on political participation

areregulated in theBasicLaw,by theregulation

of the Knesset passed in 1950. Specifically, the

1985 7A Amendment to the law69 forbids

participation to those opposing the Jewish

character of state, its democratic nature, or to

thosewhoopenlyinciteracism.Thisappearstobe

a compromise to uphold both the liberal

democratic model of the state and its ethno

nationalist character. But the law has been

criticized by Arab Israelis for reducing their

political rights, including their right to challenge

theJewish character of the state. This debate is

particularlyrelevantinthecontextoftheongoing

debateon the future IsraeliConstitution.Several

Arab Israeli groups have proposed alternative

notionsoftheJewishandDemocraticmodel,de

Several Arab Israeli groupshave proposed alternativenotions of the Jewish and

Democratic model, defactoarticulating an

alternative

conceptualization of t henotion of cit izenship.


9/17

Spring 2009


9

facto articulating an alternative conceptualization

ofthenotionofcitizenship.

For instance, the main center for the

protectionof therightsofArabcitizens in Israel,

theAdalahCentertheLegalCenterforRightsof

the Arab minority in Israelhas put forward a

draft democratic constitution asking to redefine

Israel as a democratic bilingual and multicultural State, and to renounce theJewish and

Democratic paradigm.70 Similarly, the National

Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local

Authorities in Israelhasargued for theabolition

of policies that grant privileges to the majority

ethnic group and to recognize the Palestinian

citizens as an indigenous minority with self

government rights.71 Other sectors of the Arab

IsraelipopulationhavenotchallengedtheJewish

Democraticexistingmodelperse.Forinstance,an

April2007

poll

by

the

Israel

Democracy

Institute

revealed that 75 percent of the Arab minority

would not oppose the Jewish and democratic

model in theupcomingconstitution,as longas it

came together with an equal rights provision to

protectminorities.72

Thisperspective isparticularly significant. It

recognizes that the proliferation of multiple

notions of citizen and theJewish character of

the state are not per se obstacles towards

achievingdefactoequality.Yet itdemonstratesa

desire

that

the

State

provide

a

political

answer

to

theproblembytakingpositivestepstoreducethe

equalitygapthatexistsamongitscitizens.

In describing the citizenship status of

minoritygroupswithinIsrael,withallthedefacto

limitationsand thedejureproceduraldifferences

discussedabove, it isalsoworthmentioning that

Arab citizens of Israel have a set of rights and

duties derived from their minority status. They

are enshrined in accommodation (polyethnic)

and selfgovernment rights.73 Within the

accommodation system for minority groups,

rights include but are not limited to: linguistic

rights,therighttopreservetheminoritylanguage

andculturethroughthemaintenanceofaseparate

educational system, and the rights to religious

freedomand tomaintainaseparatecourtsystem

for personal status matters.74 Selfgovernment

rightswith the exception of the exercise of

jurisdictionby religious courtsare not as well

developed in the collective form and minorities

have often criticized this as an obstacle to the

achievementof a truly liberal and multicultural

system.

However, this particular problem is not

exclusive to the Israeli polity. Devising a

framework under which minority and group

rights arereconciled with

the need to

promote and

preserve

political unity

and societal

cohesion

represents an

immensely

complicated

challenge

for

any multi

ethnic state. In

this sense, the assumption that only an identity

neutral state can provide effective minority and

selfgovernmentrightsandensureadequate legal

protection for its minorities is not thoroughly

proven.

On the contrary, effective minority rights

protectionoften stems from rejecting colorblind

approaches and by acknowledging, promoting,

and

protecting

the

different

cultural,

ethnic,

and

religious identities within a given society.

Applying this framework to the State of Israel

would suggest that, instead of weakening the

Jewish nature of the State, it would be more

effective to strengthen the special rights and

statusof existingminoritygroups (whichwould

notalterthepredominantlyJewishidentityofthe

overwhelmingmajorityof its citizens)aswellas

improve thedefactoequalityofallof itscitizens.

Similarly,intheIsraelicase,itcouldverywellbe

that other factorssuch as the existence of an

armed conflict and the persistence of substantial

security threats to the Statehave impaired the

concrete achievementofautonomy andminority

rights far more than the Jewish identity of the

state. That said, there are cases in which the

democraticimperativesofthestateandtheliberal

understandingofcitizenshipcomeunder intense

distress.One such example is the current family

In this sense, theassumption that onlyan identity neutral

state can provideeffective minori ty andself-government rightsand ensure adequatelegal protection for it s

minorities is notthoroughly proven.


10/17

al Nakhlah


10

reunification policy of Arab Israelis. This policy

touches on that same intersection between

minorityrightsandcitizenshipdiscourse, further

testing the Israeli systems ability to uphold its

liberalpremises.

Between 1967 and 2002, the

common practice regarding

family reunifications of ArabIsraelis with spouses residing in

the areas of Gaza and the West

Bank was to allow the Israeli

spouse to file (and inmost cases

obtain)apermittobringthenon

Israeli spouse to live in Israel.75

However, following the March

31, 2002 suicide attack in Haifa

carried out by Hamas member

Shadi Tubasimwho had

succeeded

in

entering

Israel

through the family reunification

program for Arab Israelis and

residentsthe Interior Ministry temporarily

stoppedallpendingreunificationrequests.76

The temporary freeze was then followedby

the approval of the Nationality and Entry into

Israel (Temporary Order) Law, (5763 2003),77

whichprohibited inhabitantsof theseareas from

obtainingaresidencepermittostayinIsrael,thus

preventing family reunification between Israeli

citizens

and

their

spouses.

Although

the

law

was

dictated by legitimate security concerns and

written in colorblind terms, thepracticaleffect

ofthisprovisionwasto impingeuponthefamily

rights of one particular group of citizens and

contradict the classic liberal understanding of

citizenship rights. The law did, however, allow

exceptions. For instance, it allowed exceptional

temporary residency permits for work or health

reasons or to prevent the separation of a child

under the age of twelve from his/her parents

(providedthattheparentswerelegallyinIsrael).

This legislative initiative was designed as a

temporary measure to be valid for a oneyear

period. The government could renew these

measures for security purposes provided it had

reviewed the lawand itseffects.TheNationality

and Entry into Israel Law was renewed inJuly

200478 and again inJuly 2005 when the Knesset

reconfirmed the extension of the law for an

additional period. The Knesset did, however,

makeaseriesofamendments. Itallowedspecial

permits for spouses of Israeli citizens (female

spouses over 25 years of age and male spouses

over35yearsofage),79and for

childrenunder14yearsofage,80

andreiterated thepossibilityof

obtaining special temporarypermits for work and health

reasons. Currently, the law

amendedtoextendthefreezeto

citizens of enemy stateshas

been reapproved and extended

untilJuly2009.81

The Nationality and Entry

into IsraelLawhasbeenat the

center of an intense debate

within Israeli society. It has

been

perceived

as

a

discriminatory law that

disproportionately affects Arab

Israelisbylimitingtheircitizenshiprightsaswell

as their basic civil liberties. This has been the

argument of the Adalah Center. The Center has

challengedtheconstitutionalityof theLaw,filing

a complaint in August 2003 in which it argued

that: the law violatedbasic international human

rights standards as well as the constitutionally

protected right to family and equality; it was

discriminatory

in

its

nature;

and

it

was

a

disproportionatemeasureadoptedinthenameof

security.82

The Supreme Court delivered its opinion in

May2006anddismissedthepetition(byavoteof

65).Itdidsoonthegroundsthatthelawdoesnot

violate a constitutional right (since citizens have

no constitutional right for their spouses to

immigrate to Israel), especially considering the

stateofwarbetween theareaand Israeland the

security needs of the state (VicePresident

Cheshin andJustices Grunis and Naor).83Justice

Adiel andJustice Rivlin concurred in upholding

thelaw,butaddedthattheprovisiondoesviolate

therightto family,althoughtheviolationofthe

constitutional right is proportionate, given the

securitycircumstances.84JusticeLevyalsoupheld

thelaw,butadded:Ifchangesarenotmade,the

lawwillbeunlikely tosatisfyjudicialscrutiny in

the future.85Theminorityopinion,deliveredby

Al though the law wasdictated by legitimatesecurity concerns andwritten in "color blind"

terms, the practical effectof this provision was toimpinge upon the familyrights of one particulargroup of citizens andcontradict the classic

liberal understanding of

citizenship rights.


11/17

Spring 2009


11

Justice Barak, on the other hand, found that the

law violated Article 2 and 4 of the Basic Law:

Human Dignity and Liberty (right to family life

and right to equality) and that although

appropriate in its scopebased upon legitimate

security concernsthe law failed tomeet all the

proportionalityrequirements.86

The debate over the Nationality and Entryinto Israel Law did not however end with this

judgment. Adalah filed another petition to the

Supreme Court in June 2007, demanding the

cancellation of the Citizenship and Entry into

Israel Law, in its amended version.87 Following

thepetition, theSupremeCourtinMay 2008

issued an order nisi giving the State 60 days to

explainwhythelawshouldnotbestruckdownas

unconstitutional.88Thegovernmentsubmittedthe

reply inAugust 2008,89but the controversy over

thefreeze

on

family

reunification

has

not

yet

been

settled.

The internaldisagreementsover thescopeof

the Nationality andEntry into IsraelLaw reveal

thedifficulties that Israel facesvisvisadhering

to its constitutive equality provision and liberal

citizenship principles in the face of ongoing

political/security threats and the governments

supreme responsibility to protect its citizens. In

this sense, the Supreme Courtsjudicial scrutiny

could offer a venue by which the Court could

push

the

State

to

modify

the

controversial

law

and restrike a balance in favor of all Israels

citizens.

CONCLUSION

The Israeli citizenship discourse is a

fragmented one. It is composed of diverging

notions of citizenship that maximize different

values and imply radically different

Weltanschauungs. On the one hand, the liberal

citizenship modelwith its universal, general,

and egalitarian underpinningshas been

integrated into the Israeli citizenship discourse

and the countrys normative framework via the

equality clause of the Basic Law: Dignity and

Freedom and by the states commitment todemocracy and equal rights. On the other hand,

theliberaldiscoursealthoughcrucialisnotthe

onlyapplicablecitizenshipmodel. Therepublican

model of active participation and mobilization,

rather than as a simple bundle of individual

rights, is still an important component of the

Israeli discourse on citizenship and political

membership. Furthermore, the predominant

ethnonationalist ethos, as symbolized by laws

suchastheLawofReturn,continuestoshapethe

ideological

and

normative

understanding

of

Israelicitizenship.

The analysis of the evolution of the

Nationality Law in Israel and the case study on

thestatusandrightsofArabIsraelisdemonstrate

how the abovementioned citizenship models

continue toshapeand influence thecurrent legal

framework, which continuously attempts to

accommodate these diverging conceptions and

needs. Often, this framework places pragmatic

needsandflexibilityaboveinternalcoherenceand

consistency.

The views and opinions expressed in articles are

strictly the authors own, and do not necessarily

represent those of al Nakhlah, its Advisory and

EditorialBoards, or theProgramfor SouthwestAsia

and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher

School.


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al Nakhlah


12

WORKS CITED

1PatrickWeil,AccesstoCitizenship:AComparisonofTwentyfiveNationalityLaws,inT.Alexander

Aleinikoff,DouglasKlusmeyer,CitizenshipToday:GlobalPerspectivesandPractices(Carnegie

EndowmentforDemocracy,2001),18.2

Daniel

Levy,

Changing

Configurations

of

German

and

Israeli

Immigration

Regimesa

Comparative

Perspective,inDanielLevy,YfaatWeissChallengingEthnicCitizenship:GermanandIsraeli

PerspectivesonImmigration(NewYork,Oxford:BerghahnBooks,2002),1.3GershonShafir,YoavPeled,TheDynamicsofCitizenshipinIsraelandtheIsraeliPalestinianPeace

Process,GershonShafir,ed.,TheCitizenshipDebates(Minneapolis,London:Universityof

MinnesotaPress,1998),251.4Ibid,56.

5CassR.Sunstein,BeyondtheRepublicanRevival,YaleLawJournal,98(1988).

6Yishuv(Hebrewwordmeaningsettlement)isthetermusedtodefinetheJewishcommunitiesin

PalestinebeforethebirthofIsraelasaState.7YoavPeled,GershonShafir,TheRootsofPeacemaking:TheDynamicsofCitizenshipinIsrael,1948

93,International

Journal

of

Middle

East

Studies,

28

(3)

(1996),

39

399.

8Ibid.

9AyeletShachar,WhoseRepublic?:CitizenshipAndMembershipInTheIsraeliPolityGeorgetown

ImmigrationLawJournal(1999),260.10

ThesearetwoofthecorepillarsoftheStateofIsrael,andtheyhavebeenintegratedintothenational

ethnossincetheDeclarationofIndependenceof1948andlaterinthe1992BasicLaw:Human

DignityandLiberty(accessed

April29,2007).11

Intheformer,onereads:TheStateofIsraelwillbeopenforJewishimmigrationandforthe

Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its

inhabitants;itwillbebasedonfreedom,justiceandpeaceasenvisagedbytheprophetsofIsrael;it

will

ensure

complete

equality

of

social

and

political

rights

to

all

its

inhabitants

irrespective

of

religion,

raceorsex;itwillguarantee freedomofreligion,conscience, language,educationandculture; it

will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it willbe faithful to the principles of the

CharteroftheUnitedNations.12Ibid.13

See:IrisMarionYoung,PolityandGroupDifference:ACritiqueoftheIdealofUniversalCitizenship,

inGershonShafir,ed.,TheCitizenshipDebate(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,

1998);WillKymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,inGershonShafir,ed.,TheCitizenshipDebate

(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1998).14

BernardSusser,EliezerDonYehiya,IsraelandtheDeclineoftheNationStateintheWest,Modern

Judaism,Vol.14,No.2,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),191.15

Baruch

Kimmerling,

The

Invention

and

Decline

of

Israeliness,

State,

Society,

and

the

Military

(Berkeley,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2001),180.Seealso:YoavPeled,EthnicDemocracyand

theLegalConstructionofCitizenship:ArabCitizensoftheJewishStateTheAmericanPolitical

ScienceReview,86(2)(1992),43233.16Kimmerling,180.17

Weil,19.18

OrenYiftachel,TheShrinkingSpaceofCitizenship:EthnocraticPoliticsinIsrael,MiddleEastReport,

223(2002),39.


13/17

Spring 2009


13

19JulesColemanandSarahK.Harding,Citizenship,theDemandsofJustice,andtheMoralRelevanceof

PoliticalBorders,inWarrenFSchwartz,ed.,JusticeinImmigration(Cambridge,UK:Cambridge

UniversityPress,1995),44.20Shachar,235.21

Estimatesrelate

that

between

1948

and

1995,

approximately

2.4

million

people

immigrated

to

Israel,

withthetwomajorimmigrationpeaksintheearlyyearsoftheState(1948troughthelate1950s),

andbetween199095,whenabout700,000peoplearrivedfromtheSovietUnion.SeeGabriel

Lipshitz,CountryontheMove:MigrationtoandwithinIsrael,19481995(Dordrech,ND:Kluwer

AcademicPublisher,1998),23.TounderstandtowhatanextentIsraelcanbedefinedasa

countryofimmigrants,onecouldlookatthefactthatin1996around38percentofthepopulation

ofIsraelwasforeignborn.Thismeansthatoneineverythreecitizenswasanimmigrant.This

dataisevenmoresignificantifwethinkthattheUnitedStatesCensusBureauindicatedthatin

1997onlyoneeverytenUScitizenswasforeignborn.SeeShachar.22Weil,33.23

WillKymlicka,MulticulturalCitizenship,inGershonShafir,ed.,TheCitizenshipDebate

(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1998),167.24

MarkJ.Altschul,IsraelsLawOfReturnAndTheDebateOfAltering,Repealing,OrMaintainingIts

PresentLanguage,UniversityofIllinoisLawReview,(2002).25

OritIchilov,PoliticalLearningandCitizenshipEducationunderConflict:thePoliticalsocializationof

IsraeliandPalestinianYoungsters(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2004),96.26

Familylawmattersbecomeespeciallycomplexwhenmembersofdifferentreligiouscommunitiesare

involved.See:MosheChigier,HusbandandWifeinIsraeliLaw(Jerusalem:ArielUnitedIsrael

Institutes,1985).27

IsraeliDefenseForces,DruzeandCircassianPeople,

;IsraeliDefenseForces

BeduinsandArabs,

(accessedFebruary20,2009).28

TheLawofReturn5710(1950)(accessed

April30,2007).29

NationalityLaw,57121952,

(accessed

April30,2007).30DeclarationofIsraelsIndependence1948(TelAviv,May14,1948)

(accessedApril30,2007).31

Shachar,241.32DavidBenGurion,quotedinJulesColemanandSarahK.Harding,Citizenship,theDemandsof

Justice,andtheMoralRelevanceofPoliticalBorders,inWarrenFSchwartz,Justicein

Immigration(Cambridge,UK,CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),21.33IusSanguinispolicydeterminesthatcitizenshipstatusisgrantednotinvirtueofonesplaceofbirth(ius

solis)butonthebasisofthecitizenshipstatusofonesparents.34Thereisanongoingdebateonthestatusofthesebasiclawsvisvisotherlegislativeacts;thelaws,

however,seemtolackatrueconstitutionalstatusastheydontautomaticallytrumplaterin

timelegislation,andtheycanberepealedand/oramendedbytheKnesset.35

MarkJ.Altschul,IsraelsLawOfReturnAndTheDebateOfAltering,Repealing,OrMaintainingIts

PresentLanguage,UniversityofIllinoisLawReview,1345(2002).


14/17

al Nakhlah


14

36Ibid.

37OlehisaJewishImmigrantwhohasmadealiyahtoIsrael.

38InYfaatWeiss,TheGolemanditsCreator,orHowtheJewishNationStateBecameMultiethnic,in

DanielLevy,YfaatWeissChallengingEthnicCitizenship:GermanandIsraeliPerspectiveson

Immigration

(NewYork,

Oxford,

Berghahn

Books,

2002),

83.

39Intheformer,onereads:TheStateofIsraelwillbeopenforJewishimmigrationandforthe\

IngatheringoftheExiles;itwillfosterthedevelopmentofthecountryforthebenefitofallits

inhabitants;itwillbebasedonfreedom,justiceandpeaceasenvisagedbytheprophetsofIsrael;

itwillensurecompleteequalityofsocialandpoliticalrightstoallitsinhabitantsirrespectiveof

religion,raceorsex;itwillguaranteefreedomofreligion,conscience,language,educationand

culture;itwillsafeguardtheHolyPlacesofallreligions;anditwillbefaithfultotheprinciplesof

theCharteroftheUnitedNations.40

PninaLahav,JudgmentinJerusalem,ChiefJusticeSimonAgranatandtheZionistCentury,

(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1997),197220

(accessedMay2,2007).41

Judaism

is

matrilineal

in

its

transmission

of

membership;

hence

the

child

of

a

Jewish

father

and

a

non

Jewishmother,accordingtotheOrthodoxinterpretationofJudaism,isnotconsideredJewish

accordingtotheJewishlaws(halakha).42

LawofReturn(AmendmentNo.2)57301970,


Ibid.44

Ibid.45

Shachar,24649.46TheauthorityofthethreemainbranchesofJudaismreformed,conservative,andorthodoxto

performconversionsisrecognizedoutsideofIsrael.Onthecontrary,withinthecountry,the

Orthodoxmovementhasthedefactosupremacyonregulatingallpersonalstatusmatters,and,

therefore,any

conversion

performed

outside

the

mainstream

orthodox

system

will

not

be

recognizedasvalid.47

IsraeliHighCourtApprovesConversionsDoneAbroad,JerusalemPost,March31,2005,

(accessedMay

2,2007).48MinistryofForeignAffairs,AcquisitionofIsraeliNationality,August4,1998,

(accessedMay2,2007).49Ibid.50

Shachar,251.51

NationalityLaw,57121952,3(a)3(b).52

Shachar,250.

53Ibid.54

NationalityLaw,5(a):(a)Apersonoffullage,notbeinganIsraelnational,mayobtainIsraelnationality

bynaturalisationif:(1)heisinIsrael;and(2)hehasbeeninIsraelforthreeyearsoutoffiveyears

precedingthedayofthesubmissionofhisapplication;and(3)heisentitledtoresideinIsrael

permanently;and(4)hehassettled,orintendstosettle,inIsrael,and(5)hehassomeknowledge

oftheHebrewlanguage,and(6)hehasrenouncedhispriornationalityorhasprovedthathewill

ceasetobeaforeignnationaluponbecominganIsraelnational.


15/17

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15

55MinistryofForeignAffairs,AcquisitionofIsraeliNationality.

56Thisishowevergrantedbyarticle6(d)oftheNationalityLaw:

d)TheMinisteroftheInteriormayexemptanapplicantfromalloranyoftherequirementsof

section5(a)(1),(2),(5)and(6)ifthereexistsinhisopinionaspecialreasonjustifyingsuch

exemption.

57Shachar,255256.

58OfficeofLegalCounsel,SurveyoftheLawofExpatriation,June12,2002,748.

59Article11oftheNationalityLaw1952:

(a)AnIsraelicitizenwhounlawfullyexitedIsrael tooneofthecountries listed inArticle2Aof

thePreventionofInfiltrationLaw,1954,(Lebanon,Syria,Egypt,TransJordan,SaudiArabia,Iraq,

Yemenoranypartof EretzYisrael outsideofIsrael)orwhoacquiredcitizenshipofanyofthese

states,willbeperceivedashavingrelinquishedtheirIsraelicitizenshipanditwillberevokedas

of thedayof theirexit;Therevocationof theIsraelicitizenshipofaperson inaccordancewith

thisarticle,revokes theIsraelicitizenshipof theirminorchildwho isnotaresidentofIsraelas

well.

(b)TheMinisterof Interior isauthorized to revoke the Israelicitizenshipofapersonwhohas

committedanact,whichconstitutesofbreachoftrustoftheStateofIsrael.

(c)TheMinisterofInteriorisauthorizedtorevoketheIsraelicitizenshipofapersonifithasbeen

proved tohis satisfaction that thecitizenshipwasgrantedbasedon false facts; theMinisterof

Interiorisauthorizedtodeterminethattherevocationofcitizenshipwillapplytotheminorchild

ofthatperson.

(d)RevokingIsraelicitizenship inaccordancewithsubsection(b)and(c)willbeexecutedbya

priornoticefromtheMinisterofInteriorasofthedatedeterminedbytheMinisterofInteriorin

thecitizenshiprevocationnotification.60

YoavPeled,EthnicDemocracyandtheLegalConstructionofCitizenship:ArabCitizensoftheJewish

State,TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,86(2)(1992),435.61

Ibid.62

Ibid,436.63

UriDavis,CitizenshipandtheState:aComparativeStudyofCitizenshipLegislationinIsrael,Jordan,

Palestine,Syria,andLebanon,(Reading,Berkshire,UK,IthacaPress,1997),4950.64

Ibid,5051.65

E.A.1/65,Yeredorv.ChairmanoftheCentralElectionsCommitteefortheSixthKnesset19P.D.(3)365.

(QuotedinMosheNeimanEtAl.v.ChairmanOfTheCentralElectionsCommitteeorTheEleventh

Knesset,IsraeliSupremeCourtSittingasaCourtofElectionAppeals,May15,1985).66Peled,436.67Yeredorv.ChairmanoftheCentralElectionsCommitteefortheSixthKnesset.68

MosheNeimanetAl.V.ChairmanOfTheCentralElectionsCommittee.69

Basic

Law:

the

Knesset

1950,

Amendment

of

Section

7A,

1985,

7A.)Acandidates listshallnotparticipateinelectionstotheKnessetifitsobjectsoractions,

expresslyorbyimplication,includeoneofthefollowing:

(1)negationoftheexistenceoftheStateofIsraelasthestateoftheJewishpeople;

(2)negationofthedemocraticcharacteroftheState;

(3)incitementtoracism.(accessed

April29,2007).70

DemocraticConstitutionofAdalah,TheReutInstitute,


16/17

al Nakhlah


16

institute.org/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1626>(accessedMay2,2007).71TheFutureVisionofthePalestinianArabsinIsrael,TheNationalCommitteefortheHeadsoftheArab

LocalAuthoritiesinIsrael,ed.GhaidaRinawieZoabi,2006.72YoavStern,Poll:75%ofIsraeliArabssupportJewish,democraticconstitution,HaAretz,April29,

2007,

(accessed

May

2,

2007).

73IlanSaban,Conference:TheLegalAndSocioEconomicStatusOfArabCitizensInIsrael:

Contribution:MinorityRightsInDeeplyDividedSocieties:AFrameworkForAnalysisAndThe

CaseOfTheArabPalestinianMinorityInIsrael,NewYorkUniversityJournalofInternationalLaw

andPolitics,Summer2004.74

Ibid.75

FamilyunificationandchildregistrationinEastJerusalem,BTselem

(accessedMay2,2007)76

BethanyM.Nikfar,FamiliesDivided:AnAnalysisofIsraelsCitizenshipandEntryintoIsraelLaw,

NorthwesternUniversityJournalofInternationalHumanRights,Spring2005.77

ProposedNationalityandEntryintoIsrael(TemporaryOrder)Law,57632003,June4,2003.78

Family

unification

and

child

registration

in

East

Jerusalem,

BTselem.

79TheNationalityandEntryIntoIsraelLaw(TemporaryOrder)(Amendment)2005,passedbythe

Knesseton27July2005.3.PermitforSpousesNotwithstandingtheprovisionsofArticle2,the

Interior Minister may, at his discretion, approve an application of a resident of the region to

receiveapermittostayinIsraelfromtheregionalcommander (1)regardinga[male]residentof

theregionwhoisoverthirtyfiveyearsoldinordertopreventhisseparationfromhis[female]

spousewho is lawfullystaying in Israel; (2) regardinga [female]residentof theregionwho is

overtwentyfiveyearsold inorder topreventherseparation fromher [male]spousewho is

lawfullystayinginIsrael;803A.PermitforChildrenNotwithstandingtheprovisionsofArticle2,theInteriorMinistermay,athis

discretion(1)grantaresidentoftheregionwhoisunderfourteenyearsoldapermittoresidein

Israel

in

order

to

prevent

his

separation

from

a

parent

who

has

custody

of

him

and

who

is

lawfullystayinginIsrael;(2)approveanapplicationforapermittostayinIsraeltobegrantedby

the regional commander toa residentof the regionwho isaminor andwho isover fourteen

yearsold, inordertopreventhisseparationfromaparentwhohascustodyofhimandwho is

lawfullystayinginIsraelandprovidedthatsuchapermitshallnotberenewediftheminordoes

notliveinIsraelonaregularbasis.81ExtensiontoCitizenshipLawsValidityisLatestinaSeriesofIsraeliPoliciesofRacialSeparation

BasedonNationalBelonging,AdalahCenter,July7,2008

(accessedNovember19,2008).82

SpecialReport:BanonFamilyReunification,AdalahCenter,

(accessedMay2,2007);SeealsoBriefingArticleChallengingtheConstitutionalityofthe

DiscriminatoryNationalityandEntryintoIsraelLaw,AdalahCenter,March2005.83CourtRulingonNationalityLawHCJ7052/03,


Ibid.85Ibid.86SummaryofCourtRulingonNationalityLawHCJ7052/03,SummarybyAdalahCenter87

AdalahCenter,PressRelease,June6,2007,AdalahPetitionsSupremeCourttoOverturnNew


17/17

Spring 2009


17

CitizenshipLawBanningFamilyUnification:LawPreventsPalestinianCitizensofIsraelfrom

BeingConnectedtothePalestinianPeopleandMembersoftheArabNation

(accessedJuly2,2007).88

IsraeliSupremeCourt,Ordernisi,5030/07,May5,2008

(accessedNovember13,2008).89

July14,2008(accessedNovember

13,2008).

Berti - The Israeli Citizenship Model

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