Baker, William W. - An Apologetic for Xenophon's Memorabilia (1917)
Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
description
Transcript of Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 1/13
Xenophon's Memorabilia of SocratesAuthor(s): Bernard BosanquetSource: International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Jul., 1905), pp. 432-443Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2378132 .
Accessed: 16/05/2014 03:39
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Journal of Ethics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 2/13
432
International
Journal
of
Ethics.
XENOPHON'S
MEMORABILIA
OF
SOCRATES.
This
article s an
attempt
o put
togetherthe
thoughts
which
t
appears
to me that
Xenophon ntended
o
attribute
to
Socrates
on
the central heme
of
Wisdom
or
Science in
relation
o
Life and
Goodness.
There is
at
least a
certain
interestn
trying
o
trace n
some
detailthe
mpression hich
Socrates
had
made
on
the
mind of
a
disciple
who,
although
no
philosopher,
was
not
destitute
f
sagacity,
nd
I
do
not
conceal mybeliefthat the
slightness
of the
consideration
usuallyaccorded to the
Memorabilia'
arises from
a
deep-
seated
prejudice
against
the truth
which
appears to me
to
be
the main
thesis f that
work.
I
should ike to
combat
his
prejudice by
a
simple
statement
fwhat
it
appears to me
that
Wisdom or
Knowledgemeantfor
ocrates,or for
Xeno-
phon,
or for
the
Athenian
mind
before
Plato-whichever
it
maybe heldthatwe shallreallyhavebeendiscussing.
For I
am
not
going
to be
highly
critical.
It does
not
seem
to
me
indeed
a
dangerous
assumptionthat
on
the
whole the
best
ideas
in
the
Memorabilia
belong substan-
tially o
Socrates,
ust as
it
is
easyto see
thatthe
details
nd
arguments
hroughout
elong
in
great
measure to
Xeno-
phon. Let
the
views
and
ideas, of
which
am to
speak,
be
credited,fanyone hinks tmorecritical, o Xenophonhim-
self. The
important
oint
s
that,
s I
understand,
t is
not
suggested
that
Xenophon
could
have
borrowed
from
Plato.
For
the interest
s to see
how near
we get to
Plato,
not
by
reading
philosophy nto
Xenophon,
but
by
rectifying
he
current
onceptionof
Socrates'
simplepoint of
departure.
Perhaps
it is
not
merely
Socrates,
but the
Greek
mind
commonto Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, that we are
really rying
o
reEstimate.
I
will set
out the
theory f
so-calledWisdom and
Knowl-
edge
as I
find t
in
Xenophon withas little
commentary
s
possible.
Wisdom
or
Science involves
rom
he earliestGreek
times
1
I have Gomperzparticularlyn mind.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 3/13
Xenophon's
Memorabilia
of
Socrates.
433
what we
should
call the two
sides of theory
nd practice
n
the closest fusionwith one another. When Xenophon's
Socratesbeginsto define
ts nature,
we are inclined
o
sepa-
rate
these
aspects,
and to
say that
some
of his tests
apply
to theory
r science,
nd others
o
practice r
conduct.
But
this s just
what urge
that
we
mustnot do.
His
testsfor
thinking, amely,
iscrimination,
ight
preference,
nd true
classification,
pply
no less to conduct,
nd
the conditions
for mastery
f conductapply
equally to thinking.
Unlder-
standing
his to
be
so, and
thatwe are
distinguishing
he
two
sides of
an
indivisible
nergy,
by which
mind
deals
with
the
World,
we
may
say
that
Xenophon's
Socrates
or
the
Socratic
Xenophon
has distinct
ests
or
definitions
oth
applicable
to
the same
energy
called Wisdom
or
Science,
some
from
he
theoretical
nd some
from
hepractical
point
of
view.
As a mastery f the theory fanything, nowledgemust
fulfil he
condition
f ability
o
expound
or
define;
or
as
I
suggest
we ought
more strictly
o say,
as
the mastery
f
anything,
nowledge
r wisdom
must
fulfil
n
the one
side
the theoretical
onditionof ability
to
expound
or
define.
This gives
us definitionnd the
recognized
ocratic
concept,
and runs us into
Dialectic with
all
its implications,
which,
however, elong npartto the practical ide. But again,as
the
mastery
f
anything,
nowledge
if
it is
to
be
called
so)
must
fulfil he
condition hat
one
must
have power
to
do,
one
mustnot make
mistakes n
action;
a condition
which
s
explained
o demand
continued
raining
r
ascesis,
of which
the
elements
re "learning"
and
"practice"
or "rehearsal,"
elements
equally
applicable
to
violin
playing
and
to
geo-
metrical easoning. It is thereforeo be observedthatour
narrow
erms
Knowleldge
r Wisdom,
though
they
re
cur-
rent
renderings
f the Greek
noun
in
question,
re
really
unfitted o be
the subjectof
the predicates
hus
developed,
which
apply
equally
and alike to what
we
call
knowledge
and
to creative
action or
conduct.
The
craftsman's
r
artist's nfalliblemind, eye,
and
hand are,
I
imagine,
the
originalconditions of the conceptionwith whichwe are
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 4/13
434
International
Journal
of
Ethics.
dealing,
nd
even
"skill,"
r,as
I prefer,
mastery"-the
mind
of
themaster-would
really
give
us a far truer
point
of
de-
parture handoes ourowndepreciated erminology-depre-
ciated
not
by
so-called
"intellectual"
dealism,
but
by the
views
of
cognition
which
have accompanied
empiricism.
This
training
r ascesis,
which
gives
the
power
to do,
and
involves
nfallibility
n
act,
thepreference
hatnever
misses
the right,
nd is tested
by
"right"or "fine"
dealing
whether
with
situations
r
with
arguments,
mplies
furtherhe
care
ofone'sself, henot ettingne'sselfrundown, ike n athlete
getting
ut of
training,
he
not
being
ignorant
f one's
self,
but continuously
ttending
o
one's powers
and their
appli-
cation.
Thus, too,
wisdom
or
mastery
s one
withtemper-
ance and
continence,
nd
is
incompatible
with
want
of
self-
control,
though
this
perhaps
is compatible
with
a certain
transient
perception
of
the good,
unconfirmed
we
are to
supposeby study nd bytraining.
And
thus
completed
Knowledge
or
Mastery
s possession
of
the art
or
craft
f
"living."
This
we
are emphatically
old
-we are
pointed
to the
science,
the trained
kill
or
profes-
sional
infallibility,hose
object
matter, n one
side (i),
is
"living."
And this
o begin
with,
s
the
reaction
f
the ndi-
vidual
mastery
r
capacity
o
a test at once
theoretical
nd
practical,consists in the power and habit of "dialectic."
Dialectic involves,
s throughout
Greek philosophy,
he
in-
tercommunion
f friends,
nd the discrimination
fgood
and
bad
things.
Intercommunion
f
friends,
we
may
observe,
is itself
form
f ascesis
or
practical
raining,
howing
how
inseparable
re
the
sides
of
the
conception
we
are
analyzing.
And,
on the
otherhand,
erious
study
f
the most
mportant
things n life s whatSocrates'man of mastery ossesses,by
contrastwith
the
man of no
mastery,
he
incontinent.
The
latter
does
not
and the former
oes study
or
pay
attention
to
"the
most
important
hings."
I confess
hat before
this
simple
nd
fundamental
xpression
f whatwisdom
or
mas-
tery
connoted
n
the Socratic circle,
the controversies
f
intellectualism
nd
pragmatism
eem
to me extremely
rivial
and shadowy. With this discriminationf good and bad
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 5/13
Xenophon'sMemorabilia
f Socrates.
435
things
we
may
compare Herodotus' brief
ummary
f the
speech
of
Themistocles efore
alamis.
"Now
his
argument
was a
reviewand
a
contrast
f
the
better nd
the
worse in
all
that
is
possiblefor
man's
nature
and
situation;
and of
these
having
exhorted them
in
every
case
to
choose
the
better, e
toldthem
o
go on
board
their
hips."
The
nature
of the
object
matter f this
mastery
nd
discrimination,bove
designatedby the
simple
verb "to
live,"
is
often
et out
at
greater
length.
For
example,
"All
learningwhereby
one
may cause to live well a household or a city-statend may
deal
rightlywith
human
affairs";
nd in
everything
t con-
fers the
power-not
as
I
understand,
he chance
or
liberty
or
potentiality ut the
positive
ability-of
the
disciplined
mind o
choosethe
right nd abstainfrom he
wrong.
Thus,
in
general,
wisdom,
knowledge, r
mastery
s
the
attribute
by which
all
splendid
and
profitable
hings
are
done,
and
moralitys included mongthese.
I
interpolate hat
the
distinction, ometimes
nsisted
on
in later
thought,
etween
he craftsman's
bility
s
a
capacity
of
alternatives,
nd
moral
disposition
s
habituated
n a
single
direction,was not
strongly
resent o
Xenophon's
Socrates.
"'So muchthe
worse
for
his
theory,"
t
may
be
replied.
"It
is
just this
neglect
by
which
he
omits,from he
comparison
ofwisdom and virtue, he essentialfeature f the one-sided
moral
choice."
But
it
mustbe
remembered hat
we are cer-
tainly
alsifying
he
facts
f
we makethis
distinction
bsolute,
as, also,
perhaps,
f
we maintain
complete
dentificationn
principle. It
seems clear
to me
that
the
craftsman's
bility
is
notreally
bare
capacity f
alternatives,
ndthe
instances
whichwe are
apt
to
allege confuse he
issue. If the
doctor
can poisonas skilfully s he can cure, even thiswouldnot
mean
thathe can
wholly
ay his
habitual rt
aside-the con-
trast
to prove
thisshould
be
between
kill
andwant of
skill,
not
between
different
pplications f his
usual
skill,
which
presuppose ts
retention.
There
is here no
capacityof op-
posites
so far
as the
employmentf
the
art is
concerned.
If,
however, uch an
argument
were
takento
mean
that to
help and to injurewere to thephysician,s such, ndifferent
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 6/13
436
International
ournal
f Ethics.
ends, and
if
we
at the same time
were to
definehis art
as
the art of
healing, henno
doubt t
would
be shown, n con-
ditionour illustrationtood,
that
the craftsman's
bility
an
dissociate
tselffrom
his habit n
a way which would
be
a
bad model to
take
for the theory
of morals.
But surely,
if
we
thus appeal
to the whole scope of the art of
healing,
we
lie
open to
the
answer
that the
facts re otherwise,
nd
the physician,
hus
understood
n his
full
connotation,
has
notthe alleged
moral
versatility.
The art,
s we
learn from
Plato,is a whole,and involves s its end a conception fthe
good
of its object.
The instinct f
the
healer
is as
normal
to thephysicians
his
skill,
nd
I
believe
t
to be
absolutely
beyond
question
that
n
every
rt and craft
he
possessor
s
in
some degreemoralized
by
its possession.
Its difference
fromwhat
we call
morality
smerelyhatof
part
fromwhole.
It
mayin certain ases
be
foundcapable
of being
subordi-
natedto bad aims,because there ie outside t unmoralized
regions
of
the
man's naturewhich
play
theirpart
n a total
decisionof
the will. But
so far
s
it
goes
it
is
of
the nature
of
a
moralhabit,
nd
the
dealization
f
t
by
the
Xenophon-
tic
Socrates
s at
least
as
true
to
human
nature
s
the later
attempt o
relegate
t
to a
lower
evel.
I
repeat,
hen-wisdom
or
mastery
s
the
qualityby which
all splendid nd profitablehings re done, and moralitys
counted
among
these. Wisdom
is a
masterly
ealing
with
life nd the mportant
hings.
Its
main
pplications,
bjects,
and effects
re
first uch
as
happiness,
welfare,
r
well-being,
distinguished
rom
good
fortune
y
the essentialcondition
of
wisdom,
iz., tudy
nd
practice;
next
the
"royal"
or
"sov-
ereign" art,
the art
of
producing
happiness
for
communities,
whichsubsequently igures ol splendidlyn Plato.and Aris-
totle
as the architectonic
rt of
life-further,
Dialectic
as
the
discrimination
f
good
and
evil;
finally
he
"good"
par
excellence-the dvantageous
as such-the
organization
or
totality hich
raisesrelative dvantageousness
o
the nclusive
or
positive
advantageousness
which is one
with
the
end.
For
this
s
really, think,
he
relation f the partial,
xternal,
ambiguous, r relative ood to thesingle elf-sufficinghole
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 7/13
Xenophon's
Memorabilia
of
Socrates.
437
or balance of ife,which s true satisfaction
nd
involvesthe
end of iving.
This contrast etweenrelative nd positive-
not to say absolute-good
is hardly, think, dmitted s a
rule to be present n the Memorabilia,
nd the reiterated
argument rom he
relativityf particular
r externalgoods
is set down as a mere negative criticism,mplying
hat
for
Socrates therewas no good beyond "the
conducive" as
a
means to partial ends, which a change
of circumstances
might of
course turn to evil.
It
seems to
me that
this is
a failure f dentification.The argumentn question,which
infers hat ll
particular
nds and means are
capable of being
not-good qually s of being good, is surely
ust the familiar
doctrine f Plato
(or
Aristotle)
hat
all
particular
oods
are
relative,
iableto turn o evil,
nd not
stable
nor
self-sufficing,
while the true
good
alone
can contain ts
own context,
hat
is, be positive r self-sufficing;hat s to say,
can possess
the
character fa self-subsistenthole. Socrates' contentions
just
the familiar ntroduction o this argument.
All
par-
ticular goods are
"ambiguous."
Even
happiness,
f
you
misconstrue
t
as an
aggregateof "ambiguous"
goods, "health,
wealth, trength, lory,"
nd the like,
s
itself n
ambiguous
good.
It
is
plain
that
misconstructions
f
this
nature
are
meantto be opposed
throughout ocrates'
discussion
o
the
unity nd mastery nvolved n wisdom or the professional
science of life. The
broken
conversationswhich
nsist
on
the
mere relativityf good, as, the conducive
or expedient
for
the
individual,
re
plainly, o myreading, rguments
f
which
the conclusion is omitted;
their conclusion
being
obvious from he
whole
spirit nd tone of
the conversations,
as importinghat, n
wisdom nd mastery,bsoluterelativity
or the unambiguous nd self-sufficingood or happiness s
presented s theonly
omplete nd adequate
end. The depth
of
Socrates' nsightntothe antithesis hus
nvolvedbetween
the
point
of
view of
character nd the pointof view of
cir-
cumstance-the
main
principle f the unambiguous
nd am-
biguous goods respectively-is llustrated
y the fact that
he
actually ointsoutthe distinctionnd connection
f which
modern statisticians how but a feeble grasp, between
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 8/13
438
International
Journal
of
Ethics.
primary nd
secondary
poverty.
The
jesting
proposal,
n
determiningor social
purposes
the
meaning
of the
term
poor,
to rank
extravagant
monarchs
elow the
poverty
ine
and good
managers
of
small
ncomes
above
it, shows
an
ap-
preciation f
the
unimportance f
income as
compared
with
character
which
would
throw
uite a
newlighton
our
most
notorious
recent
statistics
f
poverty.
Plato,
of
course, s
sensitive
nough
to
the
wretchedness
f
the deal
tyrant; ut
the
particular
eduction
which
Socrates so
shrewdly
makes
in applying heprinciple f therelativityfpoverty o the
problem
of
social
classification,
hardly
know if
we
find
again
either n
Plato or
in
Aristotle.
That
no
sharp line
can be
drawn
between
rich
or
poor
is
really
social fact
of
the
very
first ruth
and
importance.
There
can
be
little
doubt,
think, hatthe
conceptionof
the
effective, nam-
biguous,
and
self-sufficing
ood was
present,
s
involving
the power of character ver circumstance,o the mindof
whoever
wrote or talked in
this strain.
Finally
and
defi-
nitely, n
contrastwith
ignorance, the
object
matter
of
wisdom
ppears
to
consist
n
the
beautiful,
he
good,
and the
just.
Its
mastery f
"the
important
hings"of
life, hat is
to
say,gives
t a
contentwhich
s
mainly
thical,
ut
perhaps
rather
more
truly
defined han
the
content f
Ethics in
the
modern ense.
So far
we
have been
dealing
with one side
of
the
object
matter
of the
mastery,
kill,
or
knowledge
which
we
may
call
the
science
of
life,
understanding
hat
science is
for
Socrates
required
o
answer
at
every
moment
o
practical s
well as to
theoretical ests.
It
is,
we have
said,
the archi-
tectonic
cience,
he
science
bywhichwe
know
and
practice
"to live,"to deal successfully ithall situations,nd to set
before us
self-sufficingnds
adequate to
this
organization
of ife.
But
our
ethical
aspirations,
rained
upon
Kantianism, re
hardly
satisfied
with
so
"objective"
an
account,
much as
it
really
involves
of the
good
will,
of
character s
op-
posed
to
circumstance,
nd of
the
adequate
conception
f
the self.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 9/13
Xenophon's
Memorabilia
of Socrates.
439
Let
us
turn to
what
Xenophon
has
to tell
us of
the
relationof Wisdom or mastery o the Perfection f the
Self.
It is
indeed
2)
a
commonplace
hatthe
selfwas the
object
of
Socratic
science.
Our
only
question
s
in
what form he
problem
was
raised and
considered.
To know ne's
self,
hen,
s
primarily
o
attend
o
one's
elf-
both
n
body
and in
mind;
to
care for
one's self
or
keep
in
training,
ot to
let
one's self run down-the
phrase
s
applied
to menwho,like
Alcibiades,
deterioratedn character
fter
parting
ompany
with
Socrates.
More
particularly
ne is
to
know-to
consider-what
good
there
s
in
one for human
service; nd the
whole
onception
f
training
r
discipline,
ith
its
components
f
learning
nd
rehearsal r
practice,pplies
o
the
mastery
f the self s to
mastery
f
life.
This
metaphor
f
the athlete nd his
training
s one
of
the
greatspiritualmetaphors f thewesternworld. We know
it
in
Plato's
champions-the
Knights
of the
Spirit
in
the
Commonwealth-who
are
athletes,
ompetitors, rize
win-
nersin
the
greatestof all
contests;whose
carnal
weapon is
but
a
type
of
their
piritual
watch
and
ward.
We know
it
again
in
the
New Testament:
"Now
theydo
it to
obtain
a
corruptible
rown,but we an
incorruptible."
"We wrestle
notwithflesh nd blood, butwithprincipalities-withpir-
itual
wickedness
n
high
places."
And
last and
best
of all,
for
those
who
delight
o
recognize
the
meeting
f
extremes
in
the
spiritual
world, he
same
deahas
been
impressed
pon
us all
from
boyhood
n
the
figure f
Mr.
Greatheart f
the
Pilgrim's
Progress. This,
then,was
Socrates'
primary
iew
of
Wisdom
and
Mastery
n
relation to
the
Self.
If
men
would take care of themselves-attend to themselves-
Socrates
seemsto
have
insisted, n
the
simple,direct
Greek
phrases
which o
my
mind re
so
extraordinarily
mpressive,
there
was
hope
that
they
mightturn
out
good.
"Those
have
lived
best
who have
best
given
attention o
becoming
perfect."
And
distinct
s
is the
note of
discipline
nd
self-
culture
nd
attention
o
the aim
of
goodness, we
have yet
no individualism,f ndividualism eansseparation rom he
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 10/13
440
InternationalJournal
of
Ethics.
common ife. The warning, Do not be
uncritical f
your-
self,"goes hand in hand, n a remarkable
arallelism,with
the exhortation,Do not neglectthe serviceofyour com-
monwealth."
And so we
have
here the
distinct
basis
of
perhaps
the
greatest
thought
n Greek
Philosophy,
he
thoughtwhich
connects
he intercourse
f souls
in
friendship
t
once with
the
attainment
f
truth
n
discussion
nd
with
he
realization
of
the
highest
ife.
It
is
reported
o us in
simple
nd
prosaic
words;the"becoming etter" s constantlyiewed s a social
activity;we have seen that
ascesis
itselfhas
intercoursewith
the
good
for
one of
its
forms.
And
we
naturally
onnect
with
this
the
well-known
ccount, already
referred
o,
of
the
meaning
which
n
Socrates' circle attached
tself
o
the
term
dialectic."
On the
one
hand t
was
spiritual
discern-
ment"-the discriminationf
"the
most
mportant hings
n
life," teady ttention o which s the mark nd condition f
the attainment f
self-mastery.On
the other hand it
was
"conversation,"
he
meeting togetherto take
counsel, an
activity
haracteristic f the
bettermind, nd all-important
for he
promotion
f
the
ettermind.
In
appreciating locrates' dea of the self,we must bear
in
mindthat his
attention ad been caught
by the natureof
the nvisible. He is aware of the generalfacts f symbolism,
and
notes that
mind,
tself
nvisible,
s
somethingwhich
be-
comes real for
us
in
the look and action of the
body. As
a
first
ontribution
like to the
theory f
expression
n
art,
and to
the
analysis
of
what Hegel would
call "the actual
soul,"
his ideas
on
this
point
are
significant. And further,
he is
aware of
soul
or mind
not only as itself
nvisible,
ut
as a linkwith the invisibleworld, and a testimony o its
value. "Do not despise the invisible,"
Xenophon makes
him
say, with
naive earnestness. The
mind, nvisible s it
is,
is
our
bosom's lord, our monarch.
I
do not know f we
have
an
earlier
expression
n
Greek
thoughtfor the con-
ception
f the
royalor sovereign eason,whichwas to be so
fateful
n
Platonic
and
later
philosophy; gain surelyone of
thegreat metaphors f the world. And it is to be remem-
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 11/13
Xenophon's
Memorabilia
of
Socrates.
44I
bered that
this link with
the
invisible,
his
sovereignty
f
mind,does not stop at itself. Here, as withPlato, the kin-
ship of the whole invisible
world
has attracted he thinker's
attention; nd we
are
pointed
from he soul to
the
worship
of the
gods,
and
brought
ack
again
fromthe
gods
to
the
law of
our
State,
which
is
the
sanctioned
nd
wholesome
linkbetween
the
deity
and;
ourselves. We
seem in
this
to
catchthevoice
of Plato when
he
tells
us that
matters fre-
ligion are best settledby
the Delphic oracle,
to whose
sanc-
tion twas thatSocratesappealed,or whenagainhe warned
theworld thatthe establishmentf a
religious ervice
s
no
trivialmatter,
nd should
not
be left
open to
the
personal
capriceof women
nd
invalids. There is something trange,
of
course,
n
reading
the
reiteration f
Xenophon's strong
impression hatthe City's
use and wontwas the guide which
Socrates recommended
n
religiousmatters. We recall the
non-natural arning, heprivaterelation o God, whichwas
part
at
least of theinnovation hat drew hostility pon Soc-
rates. I could fancy hat
detect, hroughoutXenophon's
jottings,
he
note so
commonwithgreat reformers,I come
not to destroy ut to
fulfil,"with ts undertone, you have
not the right o claim
the new privilege;for you have not
exhausted he old
formula." The
non-natural
ign, Socrates
is always desirous o impress pon us, is not a thing hat s
likely o happen to
anyone else.
The
sayingthat the
body
is
to be trained s a servant o
the
mind, he root of
Plato's applicationof gymnastics,
s
given to Prodicus,but to
Prodicus as repeatedby Socrates.
It
is
indeed a thoughtwhichfollows
n
a completerform
fromthe whole of
Socrates' conception f training;for in
the apologue of Prodicus it is mainly directionfor the
attainment f success
in
bodily tasks, though,especially n
this
connection, very
shrewd
piece
of
advice.
With
this ide of
wisdom
r
mastery,
he
care of one's
self,
the
aspiration
o better
ife,
he
sovereignty f mind,we may
connectthe
striking pplication
f the
notionof "slave" to
the
man who
finds
himself evoid of the
principle f
"mas-
tery." Especially "slavery" s the term for the conviction
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 12/13
442
International
Journal of
Ethics.
of
sin-we can
call t no
less-produced
in
a man not
without
promise
nd good
meaning,
nd
havinggreat
possessions
n
theway of books and study,by the dialecticof Socrates.
"He went
away grieved,
and
despisinghimself,
nd con-
vinced
hat n good truth
he was a slave."
"He
went away
grieved,
for
he had
great
possessions."
In both cases, the
possessions
were
inadequate
to the
spiritual
need.
Is
it
possible
not to recognizehere,
s so often
n the shrewd
nd
simple
home-truths
f
Greek
thought,
the
logical
frame-
workand substantive nticipation f the more intenseand
passionate
utterance
fthe New Testament?
Just
o, surely,
we
have
the
logical
framework
f the
story
of the
Tempta-
tion
n
the
legend
of how
Crcesusthe rich claimed
admira-
tion
from
Solon
the wise
for
the
contentsof his treasure
houses,
and how
the admiration
was refused.
We have
had
already
the
metaphor
of
the athlete
and
asceticof the spiritualife,and the metaphor f the royalty
ofreason;
have
we
not here the
third
f
the
great
metaphors
which
n
all
subsequent
ages
have appealed
to the
higher
self-consciousness
f
man? Man is born
for
freedom,
ays
Rousseau;
to
renounce
one's freedom s
to renounce
the
quality
of
humanity,
o repudiate ven
its duties.
Freedom
is to think, ays
Hegel;
he who rejectsthinking
nd
speaks
offreedomknows not what he says. To think, suppose,
is
to
break
down
barriers,
o exhibitthis
and the other
as
a unity
n
spiteof their
difference,
o let themind
feel tself
in
the world,
and remodel
the world as
an unobstructed
expression
of the
mind. This
is
why thinking
s freedom,
and
why he
nstinct f
ages has followed
ocrates n
holding
that
essentially
nd in principle
o be reasonable
is to be
free, ndbe irrationals to be a slave.
By what right,
t may
be asked
in
conclusion,
oes
Xeno-
phonor his master,
whichever
tmay have
been, couple
the
science
and method of
life withthe science
and
method of
ethical
perfection?
The answer
lies close
at hand
in the
very
meaningfor a Greek
of such
wordsas life and
good-
ness;
and we
hardlyneed Plato to
draw t
out forus,
and to
exhibitthemind as thecentre nd focusof all things, uch
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.148 on Fri, 16 May 2014 03:39:36 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7/17/2019 Bernard Bosanquet -- Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bernard-bosanquet-xenophons-memorabilia-of-socrates 13/13
Xenophon's Memorabilia
of
Socrates.
443
that
contradictions
n our environment
re also of
necessity
contradictions ithin urselves.
I suppose
t might erynaturally
e said
that
have
merely
taken
commonplaces
ut of Platonic
or
later
thought,
nd
read them
into
Xenophon by help of the
common Greek
phrases and notions
through which
Greek
Philosophy
s
intimatelyooted n the
every-day
mind and life
of Greece.
And I
submit,
f
that
were all, the
process
s
stillnot alto-
gether
without ts interest.
If
we were
reading Plutarch,
indeed, it
would be of
less importance,
ecause
then
we
should
be
dealing
with
the debris f
the
great
systems, nd
the
only
questionwould
be how much
the
Greek
anguage,
and the
popular
philosopher vailing
himself
f
it,
had
suc-
ceeded
in
preserving. But
here,
as I
understand,
we
are
before
the
great
written
ystems,
nd
things
which
became
commonplaces fterthemare of
considerable
nterest nd
valuewhenhintedbefore hemwithany degree of definite-
ness,whether wing to
Socrates
himself r to
Xenophon's
shrewdness
nd the highlevel of
Athenianculture
n
gen-
eral; or not
improbably,
n part to Socrates, and
in
part
to
that
extraordinarynspiration y which
even
average
dis-
ciples seem
to push
forward rom
he positionbequeathed
them
by their
master.
Great deas almost pply
themselves,
andvery ikelymuchofXenophon'ssuggestivenesswas due
to
a
communication f
the Socraticferment f
whichXeno-
phon himself
ould not
have told
the origin. At any rate,
I
have made
myprotest,
nd tried o
show that he Memora-
bilia
deserves
better
treatment han
of late it has received,
and
that the
connection
of virtuewith
knowledge, o far
from eing an obsolete
platitude,
means
something o which
our age is blind because thought nd knowledgehave lost
for
us
the
depth and
sting of meaningwhich
they had for
Xenophon's
Socrates.
BERNARD
BOSANQUET.
THE
UNIVERSITY OF
ST. ANDREWS,
SCOTLAND.