Bengson & University of San Carlos

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents.

J.P. Garcia & Associates for petitioners.

Florido & Associates for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages.

Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, and accordingly, defendants University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A. Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff, Jennifer C. Lee, the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in accounting, with cum laude honors (sic), retroactive to March 28, 1982, and to execute and deliver to plaintiff all the necessary school credentials evidencing her graduation with such honors; and said defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginning July 22, 1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs against defendants. 2

Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09368. In a decision dated May 28, 1987, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 3

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Resolution of the appellate court dated July 7, 1987. 4

Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof-

(a) A university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for such honors; and

(b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay excessive moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is not justified by the facts and circumstances of this case and disregards the many decisions of this Honorable Court setting reasonable standards and limits in the award of such damages. (P. 2, petition; p. 12, rollo)

Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123.

The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors.

So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS.

In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.

On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar 7 referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn).

On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of the class record. 9

On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors.

On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11

On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records, reported he could not produce the same. 12 Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of private respondent. 13 The request was denied as there was no positive proof of fraud. 14

It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.

In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements. Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. 16 A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors. 18 Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 19

Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound to comply therewith.

It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When her request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982 when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking her failing grades be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the MECS and the request was approved on March 22,1982.

However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from "IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was required the same could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so that it became final according to the rules.

By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 was without the written permission of her parents or guardian. Indeed, it is unusual that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in this case, should still be allowed

to withdraw from such subject. Withdrawal from subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term examination 20 much less after a failing grade in the subject has been received.

The change of grades of private respondent is thus open to question. Obviously, private respondent employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim that the change of grades of the private respondent was attended with fraud is not entirely misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she had one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door.

Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors. The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors.

Private respondent not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent court of May 28, 1987 and its resolution of July 7, 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

x x x

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He

won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this

Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of

the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.

Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.

Panganiban, concurring opinion.

Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban

Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

Footnote

1 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

2 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands;

3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and

5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

3 An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960).

4 Said provision reads:

No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

5 Rollo, p. 36.

6 Id., at 69.

7 Id., at 13.

8 Article IV, Section 1.

9 TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.

10 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

11 During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270, dated April 11,1975, as amended.

12 Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition;

(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years;

(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government and well as with the community in which he is living;

(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal languages; and

(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the learning of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

13 Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:

(a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;

(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;

(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

14 Section 1, R.A. 530.

15 Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

16 An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936).

17 1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No. 63);

2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);

3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the application) in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);

4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and perpetually al faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).

18 See note 13.

19 Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.

20 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).



23 Ibid.

24 314 SCRA 438 (1999)

25 Id., at 450.

26 Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)

27 See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.

28 The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

29 Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

30 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001


CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress. Let me just add a few points.

The Facts in Brief

It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2),1 Article IV of the Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance with Section 22 of the same Article IV.

It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1 (4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day, he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Main Issue

The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.

1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.5 He defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage ofrepatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x x."7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.

To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again."8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same

status upon repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen – would not be consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization, which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with which he has previously been endowed.

In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant x x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen.

2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born

Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. Let me explain.

There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would properly fall under the second category (naturalized).11

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast, as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who has become such at the moment of his birth."

The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:

"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship.13 Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship.14

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include "[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof," meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent – being clearly and concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.15

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born

Filipino citizen, nothing less.

3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET

Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.

The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that the power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19

"The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action."

True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of the formercitizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But an interpretationmade in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive domain.

Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship. Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law.20 Even assuming that we disagree with the conclusion of public respondent, we cannot ipso factoattribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between perceived error and grave abuse.21

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be graveabuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty

enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."22

That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or hostility" in such exercise.

4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people.24

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.27

"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."28

5. Current Trend Towards Globalization

Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization.29 Protectionist barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being considered potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital. 1âwphi1.nêt

More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who

want to reacquire their former citizenship.

It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino is private respondent who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term, he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.

I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's prerogatives.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnote

1 "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

x x x x x x x x x"

2 "Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x."

3 "Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

x x x x x x x x x"

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: x x x ."

4 Sec. 1 thereof provides:

"Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S. citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides of last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

5 1995 ed.

6 Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)

7 Webster's Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.

8 Webster's, ibid., defines reacquire as "to acquire again", and acquire as "to get as one's own."

9 Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v. Thaye, 143 US 135.

10 Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999 ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS S1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d aliens and Citizens, s1411.

11 See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

12 Supra.

13 Assailed Decision, p. 8.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 9.

16 Sec.17, Art. IV. (Emphasis ours.)

17 Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral Commission,63 Phil 139 (1936).

18 Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990; and Morrero v Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520, December 22, 1997.

19 Co. v. HRET, ibid.

20 Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.

21 Ibid.

22 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

23 "The following were the results of the election:

Teodoro C. Cruz80,119

Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448

Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941

Manuel R. Castro 622

Mariano A. Padlan 171"

(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

24 Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.

25 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.

26 Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.

27 Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.

28 Ibid

29 See Pacifico A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odysey and Legacy: The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by Atty. Antonio M. Eliciano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998 ed. See also Artenio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New Paradigms," a lecture delivered during the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001


DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of Congress.

Who are natural-born citizens?

The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters to

choose their representatives in Congress.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.

Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification Certificate.

The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.

In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor for one term.

Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second District of Pangasinan.

Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz

reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.

"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."

On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.

Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds that:

"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renuciation of such citizenship on his part.

"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess ofdespite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status."

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:

"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."

Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained in the above provisions.

Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent,

who at one time, became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits, privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but more in its legal connotation.

The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the United States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."

It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11th of April, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."

Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.3

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.

Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, G.R. No. 151912Petitioner,Present: ' Davide, Jr., C.J.,Chairman,' Quisumbing,- versus - ' Ynares-Santiago,' Carpio, andAzcuna, JJ. SPOUSES PEDRITO BERMOY Promulgated:and GLORIA BERMOY,Respondents. September 26, 2005 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 14 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner and its Resolution dated 24 January 2002 denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (petitioner'), respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (respondent spouses') were charged with estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 38 (trial court'). The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-154193, alleged:

That on or about May 11, 1994, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Philippine Savings Bank a

banking institution, duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws xxx, thru falsification of a public document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused prepared, forged and falsified or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified an owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434, which is an imitation of, and similar to the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 issued by the Regist[er] of Deeds for the City of Manila, and therefore, a public document, by then and there typing on the blank spaces thereon the title no., description of a parcel of land containing an area of 350 square meters, located in Malate, this City, the names of the accused as the registered owners thereof, and then signing, falsifying and simulating the signature of 'ALICIA D. GANZON', Register of Deeds, appearing on the lower right hand portion of the 1st page of said document; the name EDGARDO C. CASTRO', Actg. Deputy, appearing on the right hand middle portion of the 3rd page, and imprinting thereon several entries purportedly showing that the annotation thereon was a mortgage in favor A. C. Aguila and Sons, which was cancelled on February 17, 1994, thereby making it appear, as it did appear, that accused are the registered owners of the said property, under said TCT No. 207434 which purportedly is the owner's copy of said title, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew, the same is an outright forgery, as the owner's duplicate copy of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207434 is in possession of the spouses EDGAR and ELVIRA ALAMO by reason of the previous mortgage of the said property in favor of the latter since February 17, 1994 and which was later sold to them on June 19, 1995; that once the said document has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused presented the same to the Philippine Savings Bank and used the said title as collateral in obtaining, as in fact, they did obtain a loan in the sum ofP1,000,000.00 from the said bank, and once in possession of the said amount of P1,000,000.00 with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Philippine Savings Bank in the aforesaid amount of P1,000,000.00, Philippine Currency.[3]

Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded 'not guilty to the charge. The trial court set the pre-trial on 11 June 1997. After the hearing on that day, the trial court issued the following Order (11 June 1997 Order'):

When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Maria Concepcion Puruganan, who entered her appearance as private prosecutor and Atty. Albino Achas, defense counsel, appeared and upon their stipulation, they admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the identities of the accused. Upon motion of Atty. Puruganan, private prosecutor, joined by public prosecutor Antonio Israel, without objection from Atty. Achas, let the initial hearing for the reception of the evidence for the prosecution be

set on June 18, 1997 at 8:30 a.m., as previously scheduled.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

The minutes of the hearing, which respondent spouses signed, bore the following handwritten notation under the heading 'remarks' : 'Postponed. Upon joint agreement of counsels.[5] This was the only notation made under 'remarks. Nowhere in the one-page minutes of the hearing did it state that any of the accused made any stipulation or admission. During the hearings of 18 June 1997 and 3 September 1997, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Felisa Crisostomo (Crisostomo'), manager of petitioner's Libertad Manila Branch, and one Hermenigildo Caluag (Caluag'), also an employee of petitioner. Crisostomo testified that she came to know respondent spouses when they applied for a loan in February 1994. Crisostomo stated that respondent spouses presented to her Transfer Certificate Title No. 207434 (TCT No. 207434') issued in their name over a parcel of land in Malate, Manila (Malate lot') which they offered as collateral for the loan. Crisostomo further stated after the approval of respondent spouses' loan application, respondent spouses executed in her presence a real estate mortgage of the Malate lot in favor of petitioner as security for their loan. Caluag testified that he was tasked to register petitioner's certificate of sale over the Malate lot[6] with the Register of Deeds of Manila but the latter refused to do so because the Malate lot had been mortgaged and sold to the spouses Edgar and Elvira Alamo.[7] After presenting the testimonies of Crisostomo and Caluag, the prosecution rested its case. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. The prosecution, through the private prosecutor, opposed the motion claiming that Crisostomo and Calang had identified respondent spouses. The prosecution also pointed out that as borne by the 11 June 1997 Order, respondent spouses stipulated on their identity during the pre-trial.[8]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In its Order of 21 April 1998 (21 April 1998 Order'), the trial court granted respondent spouses' motion, dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-154193, and acquitted respondent spouses. The 21 April 1998 Order reads:

The basic issues to resolve here boils down on (sic) the determination of whether the accused were identified by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the act complained of during the trial of the case

and whether they admitted their identities as the accused named in the information. After carefully going over the length and breadth of the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, there is nothing in the transcript which would slightly indicate that they identified the accused as the persons who obtained a loan from the Philippine Savings Bank and executed the corresponding documents. The identification of an accused [by the witness] may be made by pointing to him directly in open court xxx or [by] stepping down from the stand and tapping his shoulder. If the accused is not present during the trial, his identification may be effected through his pictures attached to the bail bond or some other means. The identification of an accused as the perpetrator of an offense is essential in the successful prosecution of criminal cases. By the accused's entering a negative plea to the allegations in the information, he denies that he committed the offense. He cannot even be compelled to give his name during the arraignment and for which the Court may enter a plea of not guilty for him. As to the stipulation of facts regarding the admission of the jurisdiction of the court and the identities of the accused, a cursory reading of the Order of June 11, 1997 reveals that their express conformity to the stipulation of facts entered into by their counsel with the private prosecutor was never asked of them. Considering that the admission of the identities of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime here charged is a matter which adversely affects their substantial rights, such admission must have to involve their express concurrence or consent thereto. This consent is manifested in their signing the pre-trial order containing such admissions. As to the minutes of the proceedings of June 11, 1997, suffice it to state that there is nothing to it (sic) which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place. WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, let this case be, as the same is hereby, DISMISSED and accused Pedrito Bermoy and Gloria Visconde [Bermoy] are, as they are hereby, acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.[9]

The prosecution, again through the private prosecutor, sought reconsideration but the trial court denied its motion in the Order of 28 May 1998.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General joined the petition.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 14 November 2001, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, denied the petition. It held:

In support of the demurrer to evidence, the defense counsel argued that neither of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was able to identify the accused as allegedly those who committed the crime they were prosecuted for.xxx Petitioner, however, argues that the testimonies of the two witnesses they presented identified the accused spouses as the perpetrators of the crime. xxx We are not convinced. The xxx testimony proves only one thing: that a couple purporting to be the Bermoy spouses presented themselves to the Bank and obtained the loan. Whether they are the same husband and wife accused in this case for Estafa is a different story. The failure of the prosecution to point in open court to the persons of the accused as the same persons who presented themselves to the Bank is a fatal omission. They could be impostors who, armed with the fake title, presented themselves to the Bank as the persons named in the title. The prosecution goofed. Had the witnesses been asked to point to the two accused as the same couple who appeared before the Bank to obtain the loan, there would have been no doubt on their criminal liability. Petitioner further argued that the law itself does not prescribe the ways to identify the accused, xxx [.] True, there is no standard form provided by law [for] identifying the accused. Jurisprudence and trial practice show that the accused is usually identified by the witnesses, prompted by the counsel, by either pointing at him or stepping down the witness' stand and tapping him on the shoulder, or by means of photographs. The trial court correctly pointed this out. How else can identification be done, it may be asked. The petitioner also argues that 'the identities of private [respondents] were clearly established as a result of the stipulation by and between the prosecution (thru the private prosecutor) and the defense. It insists that the Order dated June 11, 1997, is sufficient admission by the accused as to their identities, and [was] allegedly signed by them and their counsel as required under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. There is no merit to this argument. If ever stipulations were made on June 11, 1997, these must be made in writing, which must be signed by the accused and counsel as their conformity to such stipulations. The records, however, show that the Order dated June 11, 1997, merely stated what transpired during that particular hearing and what the counsels signed was the minutes for the same hearing. Hence, the identities of the accused were not stipulated upon for failure to comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court correctly ruled that 'there [was] nothing xxx which would even hint that a stipulation of facts ever took place.

xxx In fine, we are more than convinced that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused. But even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. xxx In the case at bench, it is clear that this petition seeks to review the judgment of the trial court, which already had jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the persons of this case. The trial court had jurisdiction to resolve the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused, either by denying it or by dismissing the case for lack of sufficient evidence. If the demurrer is granted, resulting [in] the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused, this can no longer be reviewed unless it can be shown that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In this case, assuming the trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack [or] excess xxx of jurisdiction. The error, if any, is merely an error of judgment.[10]

Petitioner sought reconsideration claiming that the Court of Appeals contradicted itself when it held, on one hand, that the trial court's error did not amount to grave abuse of discretion and stated, on the other hand, that any error committed by the trial court can no longer be reviewed without violating respondent spouses' right against double jeopardy. Petitioner also contended, for the first time, that it is the trial court's duty to insure that the accused sign the pre-trial order or agreement embodying respondent spouses' admissions and that its failure to do so should not be taken against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in the Resolution of 24 January 2002 which reads:

The petitioner seems to have misunderstood our ruling regarding the issue on double jeopardy in connection with [the] petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that our ruling has been contradictory for saying on one hand that 'even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be reviewed either by appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy while saying on the other hand 'assuming that trial court committed an error, the petitioner has not shown that it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack excess (sic) or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner asks: 'Which is which then? ' meaning, it has not understood what a petition for certiorari is for. If the petitioner read the decision carefully, in between the above-quoted statements of the decision is the case ofPeople v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, December 8, 1994, 238 SCRA 48, where the Supreme Court

explicitly explained that review of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the propriety of the acquittal of the accused [as a result of the grant of the demurrer to evidence] lies outside the function of certiorari. True, a petition for certiorari alleges an error of the trial court but nowhere in our decision did it mention that the trial court in this case committed an error. We merely made an assumption, without saying that there was an error committed by the trial court, to make a point. We meant that if the trial court did commit an error in ruling that there was insufficient evidence resulting in the acquittal of the accused, such error can no longer be reviewed since it would be one of judgment, which is not within the ambit of a certiorari. xxx The petitioner again asks us: 'Who has the duty of requiring the accused to sign the pre-trial order, the prosecution or the trial court itself? It answers that it is the trial court because it 'has the sole and exclusive duty of seeing to it that all requirements in such proceedings be duly complied with x x x and that duty includes the act of requiring or compelling the accused to sign the pre-trial order, [hence] it is plainly fundamentally erroneous to suppose that such duty can be delegated by the trial court to the prosecution. The petitioner further argues that 'the respondent Court was right off ousted of jurisdiction when it deliberately and without legal basis refused to consider the stipulation of facts made by the parties in the eventual pre-trial order x x x despite the absence of signature of the accused in the said pre-trial order. The arguments of the petitioner are baseless. Nowhere in Rule 118 on Pre-Trial on the Revised Rules of Rules of Criminal Procedure does it require the prosecution or the accused to sign the pre-trial order. All that is required for the trial court to do is to hold a pre-trial conference and issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated upon by the parties, and evidence marked. And if there were any agreements or admissions made or entered into by the parties during the pre-trial conference, these should be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his or her counsel. Otherwise, such agreements or admissions may not be used against the accused. xxx

Hence, it is not incumbent upon the trial court to require the parties to sign the pre-trial order to make the agreements and admissions as evidence against the accused. If the parties made such admission as to the identities of the accused in this case, it is the look-out of the counsels, particularly the prosecutor, to require the accused to sign. Why should the trial court remind the counsels what to do? If the private prosecutor wanted such admission as an evidence against the accused, then she should have required the admission in writing [sic] and signed by the accused and their counsel as required by the rules. But, as the records show, all that was signed was the minutes of the pre-trial conference. As already discussed in our decision, the trial court committed no error on this point.[11]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in:

I. HOLDING THAT SUPPOSEDLY IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL

COURT TO REQUIRE THE ACCUSED TO SIGN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER;

II FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATTERS STATED IN THE 11 JUNE 1997

PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS STIPULATIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES AND SHOULD THUS BE BINDING ON THEM;

III. REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED WERE

SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED DURING THE TRIAL BY THE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION; [AND]

IV. HOLDING THAT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAD ALLEGEDLY ATTACHED IN

THE CASE.[12]In his Memorandum, the Solicitor General joins causes with petitioner. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double jeopardy does not apply in this case.[13]

The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit.

On Whether Double Jeopardy is

Applicable Here

Paragraph 1, Section 7, Rule 117 (Section 7') of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure[14] on double jeopardy provides:

Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. ' When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which

necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in the first criminal case:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient

in form and substance to sustain a conviction;(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without

his express consent.[15]

On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16] A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first exception.[17] Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an acquittal.[18] As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the persons of respondent spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they entered 'not guilty pleas. Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.

The Extent of the Right AgainstDouble Jeopardy

The right against double jeopardy can be invoked if (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, or (b) the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or (c) the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same case.[19] The last is based on Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court[20] which provides that '[a]ny party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution[21] and Section 7, the courts

are barred from entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal. Thus, we held in an earlier case:

In terms of substantive law, the Court will not pass upon the propriety of the order granting the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and the consequent acquittal of the accused, as it will place the latter in double jeopardy. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial xxx In the case before us, the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence was based on the ground of insufficiency of evidence xxx Hence, it clearly falls under one of the admitted exceptions to the rule. Double jeopardy therefore, applies to this case and this Court is constitutionally barred from reviewing the order acquitting the accused.[22] (Emphasis supplied)

The strict rule against appellate review of judgments of acquittal is not without any basis. As the Court explained in People v. Velasco[23]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into 'the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x Thus,Green [v. United States] expressed the concern that '(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty. It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is 'part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. xxx [S]ociety's awareness of the heavy personal strain which the criminal trial

represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, '(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process. Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair.

On Petitioner's Claim that the Trial Court'sDismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was Void

Petitioner, together with the Solicitor General, contends that the Court can inquire into the merits of the acquittal of respondent spouses because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was void. They contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it disregarded evidence allegedly proving respondent spouses' identity.[24]The contention has no merit. To be sure, the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal admits of an exception. Such, however, is narrowly drawn and is limited to the case where the trial court 'act[ed] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process i.e. the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case xxx or that the trial was a sham xxx.[25] None of these circumstances exists here. There is no dispute that the prosecution, through petitioner's counsel as private prosecutor, was afforded its day in court. Neither is there any question that the proceedings in the trial court were genuine. What petitioner points to as basis for the trial court's alleged grave abuse of discretion really concerns its appreciation of the evidence. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, any error committed by the trial court on this point can only be an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. What this Court held in Central Bank v. Court of Appeals[26] applies with equal force here '

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that 'the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

On the Other Errors Assigned by Petitioner

The Court will no longer rule on the other errors assigned by petitioner ' on who has the responsibility to insure that the pre-trial agreement is signed by the accused, on the effect of the 11 June 1997 Order, and on whether respondent spouses were identified during the trial. All these entail an inquiry into the merits of the 21 April 1998 Order, which, as earlier stated, cannot be done without violating respondent spouses' right against double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 24 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. ' ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice

Chairman LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice ' Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.Chief Justice

Endnotes:

[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.cralaw

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices' Elvi John S. Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring.cralaw

[3] Rollo, pp. 84-85. cralaw

[4] Ibid., p. 78.cralaw

[5] Annex 'D of Petition; Rollo, p. 79. cralaw

[6] It appears that petitioner foreclosed respondent spouses' mortgage, bought the Malate lot during the foreclosure sale, and obtained a certificate of sale in its favor.cralaw

[7] Rollo, pp. 93-99.cralaw

[8] Ibid., pp. 91-100.cralaw

[9] Ibid., pp. 75-76. (Capitalization in the original) cralaw

[10] Rollo, pp. 64-72.cralaw




[14] Reiterated in Section 7, Rule 117 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (effective 1 December 2000).cralaw

[15] II F. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 491 (10th ed., 2004).cralaw

[16] People v. Bans, G.R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48.cralaw

[17]Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, (superseded by Section 23, Rule 119 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) provides: 'Demurrer to evidence. ' After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)cralaw

[18] People v. City Court of Silay, G.R. No. L-43790, 9 December 1976, 74 SCRA 247.cralaw

[19] II F. REGALADO, supranote 15. cralaw

[20] Substantially reiterated in Section 1, Rule 122 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.cralaw

[21] Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: 'No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied)cralaw

[22] People v. Bans, supra note 16 (internal citations omitted). cralaw

[23] 'G.R. No. 127444, 13 September 2000, 340 SCRA 207 (internal citations omitted). cralaw

[24] Rollo, pp. 47-50, 225-235. cralaw

[25] People v. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 453 (2002) (internal citations omitted).cralaw

[26] G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49.

Bengson & University of San Carlos

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