IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

GEORGIA DEZSO BENEDEK, Plaintiff, vs. SAM OLENS the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA, JANE GATEWOOD; JUDITH SHAW; KASEE LASTER, and NOEL FALLOWS Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 2014-CV-246185

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFFS REPLY TO DEFENDANTS RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Comes now Plaintiff Dezso Benedek in reply to Defendants

Response to the Motion for Sanctions Against the Attorney General, and

shows the Court as follows:

1. The Court always has jurisdiction to address fraud related to concealing evidence

Contrary to the spurious defenses the Attorney General raises to

the Motion, this Court does have jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs

Motion for Sanctions Against the Attorney General under OCGA 9-15-

14, and the Attorney General knows better than anyone in the State of

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Georgia the legal basis for that jurisdiction. In fact, another Judge of this

Fulton Superior Court very recently awarded sanctions against the

Attorney General for similar misconduct, for making knowing

misrepresentations in connection with concealing evidenceas alleged

in the Motion and extensively documented in Plaintiffs Exhibits.

Kalberman v. Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance

Commission, 2012-CV-216247 (a true and correct copy of opinion by

Judge Ural Glanville is attached as Exhibit 1).

The jurisdiction to consider misrepresentations for the purpose of

concealing evidence does not expire. In Kalberman, sanctions were

imposed based upon a motion filed after the trial was over and after a

judgment had already been entered in favor of the plaintiffs (in spite of

the documents improperly withheld in that case by the Attorney

General). Judge Glanville made it clear, in his order sanctioning the

Attorney General for improperly withholding clearly relevant and

responsive evidence, that the Superior Courts always have jurisdiction

over such misconduct of the parties appearing before them. OCGA 15-

1-3.

Moreover, the conduct for which Judge Glanville fined Attorney

General Sam Olens $10,000 is not nearly as egregious as the evidence

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tampering and subsequent misrepresentations by the Georgia Attorney

General that has been documented in this case. In this case, the

Attorney General concealed evidence in an action actually being

prosecuted by the Attorney Generals office. The Attorney General then

called witnesses, including Defendant Jane Gatewood, to give knowingly

false testimony under oath that was directly contradicted by the missing

evidence. The Attorney General then made misrepresentations

concerning this very misconduct, disclaiming all knowledge and

responsibility for its criminal nature, to help spirit Jane Gatewood out of

the state.

The delays thus caused by the Attorney General aided and abetted

Gatewood, a devastating witness to the Attorney Generals evidence

tampering and subornation of perjury, in evading service in this case. At

the same time, the Attorney General misrepresented Gatewoods status,

and the nature of the claims and parties in the previous case, to this

Court in order to seek a dismissal of this action. This is far, far worse

than the Attorney General misconduct in Kalberman.

2. The Attorney Generals out-of-court misrepresentations that the criminal allegations need not be addressed are also sanctionable

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This Court also has jurisdiction based on the Attorney Generals

knowing misrepresentations in out of court statements directly

concerning this action for criminal RICO predicate acts of evidence

tampering, knowingly false statements by state agencies, and perjury. At

the same time the Attorney General was turning a blind eye-- while Jane

Gatewood, a devastating witness to criminal evidence tampering in the

Attorney Generals office, evaded service and left the stateAttorney

General Sam Olens was making public statements intended to deter an

independent investigation of the allegations of criminal misconduct in

this case now before the Court.

In those public statements to the media, Olens personally and

professionally impugned Benedeks counsel, calling him an outlandish

conspiracy theorist who was wasting the Attorney Generals time by

engaging in attention-seeking gimmicks. And, though Olens was sitting

on a stack of documents supporting the allegationswhile at the same

time claiming the documentation of criminal misconduct by state

officials did not merit any investigation by his officeOlens made the

knowingly false statements that the allegations were frivolous and

nonsensical. Those knowingly false statements were contradicted by

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documents in Olens possession at the time, some of which have since

been filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions.

Those knowingly false statements--intended to mislead the courts

and the public and interfere with the fair administration of justice

were also intentionally injurious to the professional reputation of

Benedeks counsel. As such, Olens statements, in addition to violating

the Criminal Code of Georgia, OCGA 16-10-20, were per se defamatory

and fall within the Georgia Constitutions provision regarding acts by

state officials intended to cause harm. See Exhibit 2, retraction demand

letter to Attorney General Sam Olens.

It is a serious matter for the Attorney General of Georgia to make

knowingly false and defamatory extrajudicial statements to cover for

misconduct by his own office. It is even worse to make these

misrepresentations to obstruct justice by deterring an independent

criminal investigation of the allegations in the Complaint, while at the

same time abetting evasion of service by a witness to the very criminal

RICO predicate acts alleged in this action.

3. The Attorney Generals misrepresentations occurred in and directly affect his action

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In his Response, the Attorney General claims that none of the

misrepresentations alleged in support of the Motion for Sanctions were

made in this case, Benedek II, but that the Attorney Generals

misrepresentations were confined to Benedek I.

First, it is funny how the Attorney Generals position on the

relationship between the two cases changes depending on the situation.

In Benedek I, the Attorney General claimed Jane Gatewood was not a

party in order to stall service on her, allowing her to evade service and

leave the state before she could be served in this case, Benedek II

which was filed in part for the express purpose of circumventing the

efforts to thwart service on Gatewood. Then, in this case, the Attorney

General claimed that Gatewood was a party in Benedek I, in order to

solicit the dismissal of Benedek II as merely duplicative of Benedek I.

Now that it suits his purposes in opposing the Motion for Sanctions, the

Attorney General is back to saying that the cases are not related and that

statements made in Benedek I have no bearing in Benedek II.

This is not merely lawyer pettifogging, and it is not just another

example of the duplicity by which the Attorney General allowed a

material witness to criminal conduct in his own office slip past the

process server. The claimed defense is, moreover, falsebecause the

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duplicitous statement that Jane Gatewood was a party to Benedek I was

made in this case, Benedek II. That is part and parcel of the fraud, as the

Plaintiff has consistently described it, starting with his Rule 60 Motion

to set aside the dismissal order because of its fraudulent basis.1

4. The Court can exercise its discretion to consider the fraud for purposes of Plaintiffs Rule 60 motion

This Court has the same grounds for jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

Rule 60 motion, based on the Courts inherent power to consider

1 The Attorney Generals attempt to accuse the Plaintiff of misrepresentations in this regard, with his own outlandish conspiracy theory that Plaintiff deleted the dates on emails to confuse the cases can only be described, in psychiatric terms, as projection. Benedek has repeatedly included as an exhibit the Attorney Generals statements in Benedek I that Jane Gatewood was not a party to that case, and therefore the AG disclaimed any responsibility to cooperate in serving her with processnotwithstanding that she was a material witness who already testified under oath to criminal evidence tampering by the Attorney Generaland contradicting the AG claim in Benedek II that Gatewood was a party to Benedek I. Benedek has never stated otherwise, and the only reason the dates are not included on the emails used as Exhibits is that the printer for some arcane IT reason did not print them. No documents have been altered by Plaintiff for any reason and this is a totally unsupported accusation made in bad faith. Likewise, the Attorney Generals efforts to concoct some great mail conspiracy by which he does not receive service of documents is equally meritless. The fact that the Attorney General received a copy of the Motion for Sanctions with the Amended Motion for Sanctions does not mean that the Motion was not independently mailed. Nor is it clear what would be accomplished by such a scheme. In any case, because of the month-long continuance of the hearing consented to by Plaintiff, there is no conceivable prejudice to the Defendant. The Attorney General is merely avoiding the substance of the Exhibits filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions, and the criminal fraud they document, for which the Attorney General does not have an answer no matter how long he is given to respond.

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unusual circumstances and address the same fraud by the Attorney

General. Thus, notwithstanding the Courts denial of the motion,

apparently on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because a conditional

Notice of Appeal was filed to preserve Plaintiffs appeal rights while the

Rule 60 motion was pending,2 the Court does have the authority to

consider those special circumstances and enter an appropriate order

allowing consideration of the Rule 60 motion to set aside the judgment.

5. The Attorney Generals Response ignores the criminal RICO claims of Benedek II documented in the Motion for Sanctions

In his Response, the Attorney General completely avoids

addressing the criminal RICO predicate acts documented by the Exhibits

Plaintiff filed in support of the Motion for Sanctions.

These documented criminal RICO predicate acts include evidence

tampering, influencing witnesses, perjury, and subornation of perjury.3

2 Moreover, the Court had within its discretion the power to consider the expressly conditional nature of that Notice and the Rule 60 Motion filed two days before the appeal deadline expired, based on the delay in Plaintiff receiving notice of the dismissal order. The Court had the inherent authority to recognize those extenuating circumstances, acknowledge that the Notice was filed to prevent a waiver of Plaintiffs appeal rights, and consider Plaintiffs request to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal while the Court considered the Motion to set aside the dismissal order for fraud. OCGA 15-1-3. 3 The exclusively criminal nature of these claims in Benedek II, as opposed to the tort claims and constitutional violations alleged in Benedek I, also shows why there

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The Attorney Generals duplicitous statements in Benedek II,

contradicting his assertions in Benedek I, are made to conceal evidence

of that criminal conductwhich, in Benedek II, also include allegations

of mail fraud, wire fraud, computer fraud and, as documented in the

Exhibits filed in support of this Motion, even include identity fraud in

the form of impersonating UGA students, sending out phony

correspondence in the students names, and creating fake online IDs to

log onto computer databases in the names of the students in order to

manufacture false evidence.

These actions did not harm the Plaintiff only. They also harmed

the University of Georgia, University of Georgia students, and the

University System of Georgia. In effect, they harmed the entire state of

Georgia and all its citizens, and subverted its economy as contemplated

by the Legislature in OCGA 16-14-2. The Court should decline the

Attorney Generals many invitations to ignore the criminal misconduct

that harmed the State and that is documented in the Exhibits filed in

support of the Motion for Sanctions against the Attorney General. is no claim preclusion. The legal claims of criminal violations in Benedek II by definition have different elements than the claims based on civil law stated in Benedek I. Moreover, the dismissal order shows no examination of the 100-plus page complaints to determine that there are no claims and parties not shared by the two actions. Such a sifting review would show that the claims and parties in the two cases are not the same.

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Wherefore, premises considered, Plaintiff requests the Court to enter

an order imposing sanctions on the Attorney General for the costs of

this action so far, vacating for fraud the order dismissing this action on

grounds of claim preclusion, and proceeding to consideration of the

merits of this action.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 2015. STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, P.C.

/s/ Stephen F. Humphreys ___________________________

STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS Georgia Bar No. 378099 P.O. Box 192 Athens, GA 30603 1671 Meriweather Drive Bogart, GA 30622 (706) 543-7777 p (706) 543-1844 f (706) 207-6982 m

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that all Defendants have been served

this Replyvia US mail, this 20th day of March, 2015, as follows:

Samuel S. Olens Kathleen M. Pacious Loretta L. Pinkston McLaurin Sitton Office of the Attorney General 40 Capitol Square, SW Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300 STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, P.C.

/s/ Stephen F. Humphreys ___________________________

STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS Georgia Bar No. 378099 P.O. Box 192 Athens, GA 30603 1671 Meriweather Drive Bogart, GA 30622 (706) 543-7777 p (706) 543-1844 f (706) 207-6982 m