BELIEF IN NATURALISM:BELIEF IN NATURALISM:

An Epistemologist’s An Epistemologist’s Philosophy of MindPhilosophy of Mind

SUSAN HAACK

<shaack@law.miami.edu>

Marília, Brazil, 2013

“Partisanship is treason in philosophy” – George

Santayana

… … so this lecture is not aboutso this lecture is not about

faith in faith in naturalism, butnaturalism, but

about the nature of belief, andabout the nature of belief, and

the place of the concept of belief in a the place of the concept of belief in a modestly naturalistic epistemologymodestly naturalistic epistemology

1. Varieties of Naturalism1. Varieties of Naturalism

literary, artistic, etc.literary, artistic, etc.

philosophical, including:philosophical, including:– in metaphysicsin metaphysics

– in ethicsin ethics

– in philosophy of sciencein philosophy of science

– in epistemologyin epistemology

philosophical naturalisms differ in philosophical naturalisms differ in strength strength

most modest: simply eschew supernatural most modest: simply eschew supernatural or purely or purely a prioria priori approaches approaches

more ambitious: hope to turn philosophical more ambitious: hope to turn philosophical questions over to the sciences to resolvequestions over to the sciences to resolve

most ambitious: repudiate phil. questions most ambitious: repudiate phil. questions

Sidney Hook (1902-1989) explored the

interrelations between naturalism in metaphysics, in

epistemology, and in philosophy of

science

&&

connections of the kind Hook’s argument connections of the kind Hook’s argument suggestssuggests

can be found running through my workcan be found running through my work

e.g., in metaphysicse.g., in metaphysics

my approach is modestly naturalistic, my approach is modestly naturalistic, contrasting contrasting

bothboth with Lewis’s or Kripke’s with Lewis’s or Kripke’s a prioria priori approachesapproaches

andand with Quine’s readiness to let with Quine’s readiness to let metaphysics tag along after sciencemetaphysics tag along after science

as I see it, metaphysicsas I see it, metaphysics

is not about our language or our concepts, is not about our language or our concepts, but but about the worldabout the world, & hence empirical, & hence empirical

but requires, not fancy equipment, but requires, not fancy equipment, experiments, etc., butexperiments, etc., but

close attention to familiar, everyday close attention to familiar, everyday experienceexperience

in philosophy of sciencein philosophy of science

my view is again modestly naturalistic, my view is again modestly naturalistic, contrastingcontrasting

bothboth with the formal-logical models of with the formal-logical models of Popper, Hempel, etc. Popper, Hempel, etc.

&& with purely descriptive SSK, STS with purely descriptive SSK, STS modelsmodels

& I conceive of the sciences& I conceive of the sciences

as using the same underlying procedures as using the same underlying procedures as everyday empirical inquiryas everyday empirical inquiry

but enormously enriched, refined, and but enormously enriched, refined, and amplified by the scientific “helps” to inquiry amplified by the scientific “helps” to inquiry developed over generationsdeveloped over generations

& in both metaphysics and philosophy & in both metaphysics and philosophy of scienceof science

I eschew both supernatural entities andI eschew both supernatural entities and

supernatural “explanations”supernatural “explanations”

(which by my lights are not really (which by my lights are not really explanatory at all)explanatory at all)

but from here onbut from here on

I will set other forms of naturalism asideI will set other forms of naturalism aside

and focus on and focus on epistemologicalepistemological naturalism(s) specificallynaturalism(s) specifically

2. Epistemological Naturalism2. Epistemological Naturalism

reformist aposteriorist naturalismreformist aposteriorist naturalism

reformist scientistic naturalismreformist scientistic naturalism

revolutionary scientistic naturalismrevolutionary scientistic naturalism

reformist aposteriorist naturalismreformist aposteriorist naturalism

conceives of epistemology, not as wholly conceives of epistemology, not as wholly a a prioripriori, but as continuous with the sciences , but as continuous with the sciences of cognitionof cognition

acknowledges the contributory relevance acknowledges the contributory relevance of scientific results to epistemologyof scientific results to epistemology

… … this view is defended in my bookthis view is defended in my book Evidence and InquiryEvidence and Inquiry

… now out in its 2nd, expanded edition!

reformist scientistic naturalismreformist scientistic naturalism

looks to the sciences of cognition to looks to the sciences of cognition to answer epistemological questionsanswer epistemological questions

this seems to be Goldman’s official view this seems to be Goldman’s official view – though his practice in – though his practice in Epistemology Epistemology and Cognitionand Cognition doesn’t conform to it! doesn’t conform to it!

revolutionary scientistic naturalismrevolutionary scientistic naturalism

denies the legitimacy of traditional denies the legitimacy of traditional epistemological projectsepistemological projects

urges that they be abandoned in favor of urges that they be abandoned in favor of natural-scientific projectsnatural-scientific projects

defended by Stich (1983) & Churchlands defended by Stich (1983) & Churchlands

all three positions can be found in

Quine – sometimes in the same sentence, or paragraph!

Quine’s equivocations are lubricated by Quine’s equivocations are lubricated by an ambiguityan ambiguity

he uses “science” to mean sometimeshe uses “science” to mean sometimes

– (broad sense) “our presumed empirical (broad sense) “our presumed empirical knowledge”---SCIENCEknowledge”---SCIENCE

– (narrow sense) “the sciences”---(narrow sense) “the sciences”---sciencescience

… … so that he shifts fromso that he shifts from

epistemology is part of SCIENCE (= epistemology is part of SCIENCE (= reformist aposteriorist naturalism), toreformist aposteriorist naturalism), to

epistemology is part of epistemology is part of sciencescience (= (= reformist scientistic naturalism)reformist scientistic naturalism)

… … and from there to and from there to

epistemological questions are epistemological questions are misconceived (= revolutionary scientistic misconceived (= revolutionary scientistic naturalism)naturalism)

presumably because it is SO implausible presumably because it is SO implausible e.g., that physics, say, could tell us what e.g., that physics, say, could tell us what makes evidence better or worse makes evidence better or worse

focus here: the place of belief in focus here: the place of belief in naturalistic epistemologynaturalistic epistemology

Quine, Stich, and Churchland all suggest, Quine, Stich, and Churchland all suggest, as (one) reason for their revolutionary as (one) reason for their revolutionary naturalism, skepticism about the concept naturalism, skepticism about the concept of beliefof belief

but they rely on but they rely on differentdifferent “atheist” positions “atheist” positions

QuineQuine: : extensionalistextensionalist atheism atheism

StichStich: : functionalistfunctionalist atheism atheism

ChurchlandChurchland: : smooth-reductionistsmooth-reductionist atheismatheism

Karl PopperKarl Popper

was also an atheist---an was also an atheist---an objectivistobjectivist atheist atheist

who proposed an “epistemology without a who proposed an “epistemology without a knowing subject”knowing subject”

but he had confused the but he had confused the personalpersonal with the with the subjectivesubjective

unlike Popper, I don’t believe that unlike Popper, I don’t believe that “epistemology without a knowing “epistemology without a knowing subject”---and hence without belief---is subject”---and hence without belief---is viableviable

& so, unlike Popper, I need an account of & so, unlike Popper, I need an account of what it is to believe somethingwhat it is to believe something

3. What is Belief?3. What is Belief?

my account has three interconnected my account has three interconnected elementselements

i.i. dispositional (behavioral)dispositional (behavioral)

ii.ii. neuro-physiologicalneuro-physiological

iii.iii. socio-historicalsocio-historical

(i) the behavioral (dispositional) (i) the behavioral (dispositional) elementelement

Alexander Bain (1816-1903) connected belief and action: the sign of sincerity of assertion is

willingness to act on what you say

… inspiring C. S. Peirce’s conception of belief as a habit of action

H. H. Price (1899-1984) added the insight that belief involves multi-form dispositions

someone who believes that snakes someone who believes that snakes are dangerousare dangerous

will (normally) be disposed, e.g.,will (normally) be disposed, e.g.,

to shriek at the sight of, & run away from, to shriek at the sight of, & run away from, snakessnakes

to assert/assent to sentences in his to assert/assent to sentences in his language saying that snakes are language saying that snakes are dangerousdangerous

to be surprised if he sees someone to be surprised if he sees someone stroking a pet snakestroking a pet snake

““normally,” because this needs normally,” because this needs amplificationamplification

to accommodate interrelations among to accommodate interrelations among beliefsbeliefs

to allow for abnormal desires, e.g. to to allow for abnormal desires, e.g. to show faith by handling snakes without show faith by handling snakes without showing fear showing fear

… which is religious ritual in some U.S.

protestant sects

there is no difficulty about spies or there is no difficulty about spies or confidence trickstersconfidence tricksters

though they lie for a living, they don’t act though they lie for a living, they don’t act contrary to all, or even most, of their contrary to all, or even most, of their beliefsbeliefs

& even in their professional lives, they still & even in their professional lives, they still have the have the dispositiondisposition to speak and act in to speak and act in accordance with what they believe, though accordance with what they believe, though it is overridden it is overridden

& I can explain the difference between& I can explain the difference between

degreedegree of belief: which depends on how of belief: which depends on how strong the dispositions are, how much you strong the dispositions are, how much you would bet that would bet that pp, how surprised you’d be if , how surprised you’d be if not-not-pp

& firmness & firmness of belief: which depends on of belief: which depends on how entrenched the disposition is, how how entrenched the disposition is, how easily changedeasily changed

usually the two go togetherusually the two go together

but you can believe something with a high but you can believe something with a high degree of confidence but a low degree of degree of confidence but a low degree of firmness, andfirmness, and

you can believe something with a high you can believe something with a high degree of firmness but a low degree of degree of firmness but a low degree of confidenceconfidence

the internal connection belief/truth the internal connection belief/truth

comes about because to assert, or to comes about because to assert, or to assent to, “p” commits you to its truthassent to, “p” commits you to its truth

so that (as James says) “the true is the so that (as James says) “the true is the good in the way of belief” is good in the way of belief” is true in virtue true in virtue of what belief involvesof what belief involves

(ii) these dispositions are physically (ii) these dispositions are physically realizedrealized

not “smoothly reducible” to physical statesnot “smoothly reducible” to physical states

but realized via meshes of but realized via meshes of interconnections interconnections

– between receptors (whatever registers between receptors (whatever registers input from the world)input from the world)

– and activators (whatever activates and activators (whatever activates verbal or other behavior)verbal or other behavior)

my picture is of …my picture is of …

neuro-physiologically generic parts of the neuro-physiologically generic parts of the brain that get associated, in this person, to brain that get associated, in this person, to this object, property, word, thing this object, property, word, thing

not a specific part of the brain that lights not a specific part of the brain that lights up, or turns pink, or whatever, in every up, or turns pink, or whatever, in every person who believes that person who believes that p p

this, as it turns out …this, as it turns out …

is apparently confirmed by some recent is apparently confirmed by some recent work in brain sciencework in brain science

showing that a single neuron in a patient’s showing that a single neuron in a patient’s brain would fire whenever he heard the brain would fire whenever he heard the name of, or saw a picture of a person, name of, or saw a picture of a person, object, etc.object, etc.

for example …for example …

in each subject there was some (generic)

neuron that fired when he saw a picture of Homer Simpson, or

heard the name

(iii) so the content of beliefs is (iii) so the content of beliefs is determineddetermined

notnot by physical features of their neuro- by physical features of their neuro-physiological realizationsphysiological realizations

but by but by theirtheir connections to (i) the world connections to (i) the world and (ii) the use of words in the subject’s and (ii) the use of words in the subject’s linguistic community linguistic community

… … think of an alarm clockthink of an alarm clock

the clock is physical, &

works according to physical laws

but to say it is set for 7:05 a.m. is to

refer to social conventions

… here, my inspiration is George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), the founder of

social psychology

in in Mind, Self, and SocietyMind, Self, and Society Mead asks: Mead asks:

in what ways are humans like other in what ways are humans like other animals, and in what ways unlike them?animals, and in what ways unlike them?

how could the human capacity for how could the human capacity for language have arisen out of our animal language have arisen out of our animal ancestry (e.g., the “conversation of ancestry (e.g., the “conversation of gestures” in a dogfight)?gestures” in a dogfight)?

I take from Mead the insight that I take from Mead the insight that “mindedness” depends on social, “mindedness” depends on social, specifically on linguistic, interactions specifically on linguistic, interactions

& my conception of the content of beliefs & my conception of the content of beliefs as depending on socio-historico-linguistic as depending on socio-historico-linguistic factors is in this spiritfactors is in this spirit

Genie, the “wild child”Genie, the “wild child”

… … there may be different realizations of there may be different realizations of the belief that the belief that pp

in a (monolingual) English speakerin a (monolingual) English speaker– which will involve dispositions to which will involve dispositions to

use/respond to English sentencesuse/respond to English sentences

& in a (monolingual) Russian speaker& in a (monolingual) Russian speaker– which will involve dispositions to which will involve dispositions to

use/respond to Russian sentences use/respond to Russian sentences

what makes both of their beliefs the what makes both of their beliefs the belief that belief that pp??

the parallels in their dispositions to the parallels in their dispositions to non-verbal behaviornon-verbal behavior

the similarity of meaning of the the similarity of meaning of the relevant Russian and English relevant Russian and English sentencessentences

as I conceive it, a language is a as I conceive it, a language is a congeries of a vast number of close-congeries of a vast number of close-enough idiolectsenough idiolects

& similarity of meaning (across & similarity of meaning (across languages or within a single language) is languages or within a single language) is a matter of degreea matter of degree

BUT

& how much similarity we need to & how much similarity we need to attribute sameness of beliefattribute sameness of belief

is context-dependentis context-dependent

mostly: similar-enough is good enoughmostly: similar-enough is good enough

in logical contexts, finer-grained in logical contexts, finer-grained distinctions are neededdistinctions are needed

4. Applying the Theory4. Applying the Theory

do animals and pre-linguistic babies have do animals and pre-linguistic babies have beliefs?beliefs?

no, not in the fullest sense: they have no, not in the fullest sense: they have dispositions to non-verbal, but not to dispositions to non-verbal, but not to verbal, behaviorverbal, behavior

… … which is not to deny thatwhich is not to deny that

maybemaybe some other animals have limited some other animals have limited linguistic abilitylinguistic ability

certainlycertainly small children gradually get small children gradually get closer to having full beliefs as they closer to having full beliefs as they gradually acquire languagegradually acquire language

I think of little Tanya, in the

McMartin Preschool case …

… … what about Stich’s “Mrs. T.”?what about Stich’s “Mrs. T.”?

apparently she had Alzheimer’sapparently she had Alzheimer’s

& her capacity for full belief was & her capacity for full belief was diminishing, as connections in her brain diminishing, as connections in her brain failedfailed

but it is CRAZY to conclude, as Stich but it is CRAZY to conclude, as Stich does, that does, that no oneno one believes anything! believes anything!

both Stich and Churchlandboth Stich and Churchland

make much of the fallibility of introspectionmake much of the fallibility of introspection

yes, it’s fallible (think of the joke about two yes, it’s fallible (think of the joke about two behaviorists meeting on the street)behaviorists meeting on the street)

but the no-belief thesis clearly doesn’t but the no-belief thesis clearly doesn’t followfollow

our beliefs aren’t always transparent to our beliefs aren’t always transparent to usus

because we are so good at self-deception, because we are so good at self-deception, fooling ourselves about what we believefooling ourselves about what we believe

fortunately, my account suggests how we fortunately, my account suggests how we manage to do thismanage to do this

Blaise Pascal had the key ideaBlaise Pascal had the key idea

to make yourself believe that p,

behave as if you do believe it---

and if you keep it up, you will believe it!

of course, questions remain …of course, questions remain …

what exactly is inference?what exactly is inference?

what exactly is occurrent belief?what exactly is occurrent belief?

how exactly does what you perceive how exactly does what you perceive change what you believe?change what you believe?

thank you! … obrigada!