Bediuzzaman and the Concept of 'Adl

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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI: 10.1163/156853110X517782

Asian Journal of Social Science 38 (2010) 554582 brill.nl/ajss

Bediuzzaman and the Concept of Adl:owards a Nursian Ontology of Divine Justice

Colin urnerUniversity of Durham

AbstractBediuzzaman Said Nursi (18761960), one of the foremost Muslim thinkers in the modernera, is one of few scholars in the Sunni Islamic tradition to make the notion of justice (adl) acornerstone of his theological discourse. Tis article is an attempt to prise open the shell ofNursian thought on Divine justice by examining the concept as it applies to three different butoverlapping spheres: the sphere of the relationship between God and the cosmos in general; thesphere of the relationship between God and man in particular; and the sphere of the relation-ships that man enjoys with his fellow men. Te objective is to throw light on one of the mostcontroversial, yet under-researched, aspects of Muslim theology as seen through the intellectualprism of one of the Muslim worlds most overlooked scholars of Quranic exegesis.

KeywordsNursi, God, justice, good, evil, Quran

Introduction

Ontologists ask questions such as: What does it mean to say that somethingexists.Te ontology of justice, therefore, is the study of what it means to saythat justice existsor that something or someone is just. In short, what isjus-

tice? While ontology is usually defined as the study of being a definitionthat would, for some, preclude by default our applying the term to anabstract concept such as justice our concern here is with Divine justice,which is arguably itself a mode of being; being, that is, as imbued with thecolours and characteristics of a particular attribute predicated of God that isreferred to in the Quran as adl. Tis is a term that is usually translated asjustice, but which, like all words in the Islamic revelation, are more oftenthan not lost in translation. For the intents and purposes of this paper, how-ever and to obviate too much semantic nit-picking , we will not be

abandoning the word justice completely, but we will be questioning itssuitability as an English rendering of a Quranic term which is full of rich


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theological and philosophical nuances, and which arguably encompassesrather more than is connoted by the English rendering in question.

Tat secularity and moral relativism have served as the default setting forsocial scientific discourse in the post-Enlightenment period is more or lessaxiomatic. While this is bound to render any meta-ethical question such aswhat is justice? problematic, the issue becomes even thornier when the ques-tion is asked with regard to the justice of God. Tose for whom God is notpart of the equation deal with the problem by dismissing it, and understand-ably so: If there is no God, then the subject of Divine justice is incoherentand not worth discussing. Tat is not to say, of course, that those who do notbelieve in God do not enter into debates concerning the attributes of the

Creator whose existence they deny. Much of the fame of notable self-professedatheists, such as the biologist Richard Dawkins, for example, inheres in theireagerness to engage believers in vigorous debate concerning the merits anddemerits of belief in an omniscient, omnipotent and, more importantly, justGod. Tat such debates are so often launched from positions that are theo-logically flawed comes not only from their own misconceptions of what Godactuallymeansbut also, in many cases, from the ontological and epistemo-logical poverty of their religious adversaries. We shall revisit this issue brieflylater in the article when we discuss the notion of the perceived absence of

God from natural disasters.Te problem is, of course, is that God remains largely unknown, most cer-tainly to unbelievers, but often to many believers also. Nursi (1995:233)himself alludes to this in the introductory section of his treatise on natureand causality, where he says that there are certain phrases which people usewhich imply unbelief, and that believers use them also but without realisingtheir implications. Te point Nursi is making here concerns the causal nexusand the fact that the materialist view which holds that causes actually createtheir own effects, or that beings come into existence through the random cre-

ational power of nature, is parroted by believers without their realising thatsuch assertions run counter to the notion of Divine Unity. A similar problem exists in the context of Divine justice, obviously for

unbelievers but also, it seems for some believers. For unbelievers, the problemis how to square the notion of an omnipotent, all-compassionate God withthe existence in the world of events and phenomena which are deemed eviland acts which are deemed unjust. One may argue that these criticisms arebased on the presumption that the disputants are singing from the same defi-nitional hymn sheet and are in agreement on what evil and injustice actually

are. God is put on trial, then, by those who have already decided on thedefinitive meanings of evil and injustice and who would judge God in


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whom they do not believe in accordance with their own frame of defini-tional reference.

For Muslim believers, the problem is not one of denial of God, but of gen-eral opacity of thought when it comes to the issue of Divine justice. For lay-men, the problem of reconciling Gods compassion with the existence of eviland injustice is not an insignificant one. For Muslim scholars, the problemis more an epistemic than an ontological one. Tere is a famous dispute inearly medieval Muslim history between the Mutazilite and the Ashariteschools of theology which focused on whether good and evil were discernibleintellectually or whether they can be known only through revelation; orwhether good and evil inhere in things essentially or whether they are good

or evil only because God has commanded that they be so.1

Te Ashariteargument was, in short, that whatever God decrees is just because He decreesit as absolute Sovereign of the cosmos and not because it conforms with anyexternal standards of justice discerned or formulated by human ratiocina-tion. Te Asharite belief which, in the Sunni world at least, found favourand became the mainstream theological position was that whatever isgood is good only because God has decreed it so. Te position of theMutazilites the so-called rationalists of early Muslim theology wasthat man is able to distinguish good from evil through his own powers of

ratiocination and that if God commands the good, it is because that whichHe commands is good inherently and essentially. In short, the Mutaziliteposition begins with an a priorinotion of what good is and, in one sense,suggests that Gods decrees are based on what is good and not the other wayround. While this appraisal is not wholly immune from accusations of over-simplification, one cannot escape the fact that however the Mutazilitesregarded good and evil, they posited a Creator whose decrees were deter-mined by, and dependent on, external factors. A full discussion of this issueis, of course, beyond the scope of this article, and it should be mentioned

that compromise positions have been suggested by various theologians whichare able to reconcile the Divine Command Teory with the human sense ofgood and evil. What is important here is the problems that arise when God isjudged on the basis of notions which are products of human thought alone,unaided by revelation.

It is worth noting at this juncture that Nursi is what we may call a neo-Asharite in this respect. As such, he writes very much as a theologian ratherthan a philosopher of ethics and therefore the dynamics of his discourse

1

For background on the Asharites, see Makdisi (1962:3780). For an insight into Asharitetheodicy, see Legenhausen (1988:257266). For an insight into Mutazilite thought, see Hou-rani (1976:5987).


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teleological schemes and concepts, but stripped of any proper context in themodern world. Te secular children of the Enlightenment still debate issues

such as freedom, truth and justice, but they impose upon them their ownontological and epistemic framework one which lacks any rational way ofmaking sense of morality: Te old framework is gone, and without thatframework, the concepts under discussion truth, freedom, goodness, jus-tice become mere tools of emotivism rather than subjects for a moraldebate that makes sense (MacIntyre, 2007:89).

Emotivism, MacIntyre argues, is what happens when the proper moralcontext is lost.2 Moral debates still take place, and people can even argue backto a set of basic premises; however, there is nothing to do when they reach

them. All they are left with, ultimately, is the assertion of personal preference.For example, the invasion of Iraq by the USA and Great Britain was hotlydebated, particularly with reference to its status as a just war. Nevertheless,for the most part, these debates boiled down simply to the assertion of indi-vidual preferences. One believes war is justified in some instances because oneprefersthe basic premises which lead to this conclusion. Conversely, pacifismstems from preferring an opposing set of premises. What, then, is left ofmorality? In truth, not very much. Morality is reduced to the assertion ofindividual whims, and this really is no morality at all. Moral language is still

used, but to express preferences rather than real moral claims. Moreover,emotivism is buttressed by the prevalence in contemporary academe of socialconstructivism and the fact that moral relativism is very much the defaultsetting in postmodern intellectual discourse.

One consequence of this is that the words we use to express our pseudo-moral values also become debased. Te definitional problem of the wordjustice is one that cannot be underestimated. Postmodern man is facedconstantly with the issue of what the linguist Uwe Poerksen (1995) calls thetyranny of modular language. Although Poerksen is not an anthropologist

of religion, what he is actually describing are the names given to what Nursiwould most probably have described as the gods of modernity. While Poerk-sen does not describe them as gods, he does describe them as tyrants, withcertain instantly recognisable characteristics. One is that they defy definition,yet carry with them an aura of respectability and goodness (Poerksen,1995:2526). In linguistic terms, they have many connotations but no deno-tation: While theyconnotecertain things, theydenote nothing in particular.Tere is, as he says, no such thing as care or welfare or standard of living,yet these words suggest good and beneficial things to most people, even

2 For a penetrating deconstruction of emotivism, see MacIntyre (2007:635).


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though their real meanings are never questioned.3 Justice, while absent fromPoerksens list, is, I contend, one such word. So much that is written on jus-

tice today is based on the premise that we are all agreed on what justice actu-ally is what it actually denotes rather than connotes when, in fact, inthe absence of absolute values, definitions of justice become, by default, sub-jective and conventional.

For this reason, this paper endeavours for the most part to talk not aboutthe justice of God, but rather about Divine adl the Arabic word that isusually translated as justice but which, for reasons already given, may in facthave only a tenuous link with the notion of justice as understood in theRawlsian sense of the term or, indeed, in the sense understood in most secu-

lar discourse today. Furthermore, the discussion is based on what may be seenas a sort of inductive approach to the definitional framework within whichour exposition takes place. In other words, rather than attempting to observeGod, man and creation through the prism of our preconceived notion ofwhat justice is, we begin instead with the premise that God is, as the Qurandescribes, possessed ofadland from there we explore, through Nursian eyes,the consequences that this has for the cosmos in general and man in particu-lar. Tis will, I hope, serve to throw light on what is arguably one of the mostpoorly understood of the Divine attributes, and in so doing clear up miscon-

ceptions which may exist with regard to Gods creational acts which occurwhen we view them through the opaque glass of our preconceived notions ofwhat it means to be just.

o this end, we are going to look at what adldenotes according to one ofthe Qurans most formidable interpreters, Said Nursi. Firstly, however, weneed to take a brief look at the Quranic use of the term. Te root a -d -lappears in its various forms no more than 28 times in the Quran. Verbs ofthe first form adala derived from this root have a wide range of mean-ings, including: to act and deal justly, equitably, with fairness and proportion;

to establish justice; to straighten; to dispose aright; to hold as equal; to adjustproperly as to relative magnitude; and to pay as an equivalent (Omar,2005:454). Interestingly, adala can also have the meaning of to swerve fromthe right path, and is used in the Quran on at least three occasions inthis sense (Quran, 4:135, 5:9, 27:60).4 However, adala is used mostly toconnote the notion of acting with equity, fairness and, most importantly,proportion. Te only verbal noun derived from this root which appears inthe Quran is adl. Tis too admits of a number of meanings, including

3 For his list of plastic words, see Poerksen (1995:2526).4 Te translation of the Quran used throughout this article is that of Yusuf Ali (n.d.).


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justice, equity, accuracy and equivalent (Omar, 2005:454). Te noun adlcanalso mean ransom, recompense and compensation, and is used in this sense

at least three times in the Quran, for example, in verses 2:48, 2:123 and6:70. For the most part, however, adlis used to connote equity, fairness andproportion.

It is the notion of acting with proportion and with balance the lattersignified directly by several other verbal forms derived from the same root which sets adlapart from a similar term, qist, that is also used in the Quranto mean fairness and just dealing. Te term qist, however, is not as sensitiveto subtle nuances of meaning as adl, particularly in terms of the notions ofbalance, equilibrium and equanimity, and would seem to suggest justice and

fairness on a societal level rather than on a creational one as well.5

It is alsothe word adl rather than qist which forms the basis of Nursis ontologyof Divine justice, although Nursi tends to use the term adla, which isderived from the same root as adland carries more or less the same weight ofmeaning.

Key to our dissection of the Quranic-Nursian perspective on adl is theverse below:

O man! What has seduced thee from thy Lord Most Beneficent? Him Who cre-

ated thee, fashioned thee in due proportion, and gave thee a just bias; In whateverForm He wills, does He put thee together. (82:6-8)

Te above verse concerns the actual creation of man the fashioning of hisphysical body and the provision of supra-material faculties in, according toYusuf Ali, due proportion and with a just bias. Yusuf Alis translation of theverb adala as the giving of a just bias is open to question. Te verb is actu-ally used transitively in this verse, suggesting that setting aright or fashion-ing harmoniously would offer a more suitable rendering. Tis is supported

by Muhammad Asad (2003:10671068), who translates adala in this verseas to make proportionate. His translation of the full verse is below:

O Man! What is it that lures thee away from thy bountiful Sustainer, who has createdthee, and formed thee in accordance with what thou art meant to be, and shaped thynature in just proportions, having put thee together in whatever form He willed (theeto have)?

5 For the definition ofqist, and instances of its usage in the Quran, see Omar (2005:454).


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Assuming that what adlactually denotes in the creational sense of the term asused by the Quran is the giving of proportion and balance and the putting

of things in their rightful place, we shall now look at the concept of Divineadlfrom the Nursian perspective as it functions in the context of three dif-ferent but interconnected spheres. Te first sphere is that of the relationshipbetween God and the cosmos in general; the second sphere is the sphere ofthe relationship between God and man in particular; and the third sphere isthat of the relationships that man enjoys with his fellow men.

Te First Sphere

For Nursi, the ontological reality ofadlin the creational sense is such that itserves two inter-related aims. Firstly, through the production of apparentpolarities and complementary opposites, it facilitates the coming into exis-tence of difference and individuation. Light and dark, good and evil, day andnight, birth and death, construction and destruction, heaven and hell, beautyand ugliness all of these mutually dependent pairs and complementaryopposites, some of which have external reality but not external existence are there for an express purpose. In the words of Nursi (1995:401):

Everything from the cells of an animate body, the red and white corpuscles in theblood, the transformations of minute particles, and the mutual proportion and rela-tion of the bodys organs, to the incomings and outgoings of the seas, the income andexpenditure of springs under the earth, the birth and death of animals and plants, thedestruction of Autumn and the reconstruction of Spring, the duties and motion ofthe elements and the stars, and the alternations, struggles and clashes of death andlife, light and darkness, and heat and cold, are ordered and weighed with so sensitivea balance, so fine a measure, that the human mind can nowhere see any waste orfutility, just as human science and philosophy see everywhere and point out the mostperfect order and beautiful symmetry. Indeed, human science and philosophy are a

manifestation and interpreter of that order and symmetry.

Nursi then adduces the balance and equilibrium of the heavenly bodies in thesolar system as particular evidence of Divine adl. Drawing for inspiration onthe anthropic cosmological principle, Nursi (1995:401) turns to the finely-tuned balance evident in the movement of the earth:

[Te earth] travels an orbit of twenty-four thousand years in one year, not scatteringor shaking the things stored up and stacked on its face, despite its extraordinary

speed, nor throwing them off into space. If its speed had been increased or reduced just a little, it would have thrown its inhabitants off into the atmosphere, and


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scattered them through space. And if its balance was to be destroyed for a minute, oreven a second, it would destroy the world.

Tis balance, he claims, points as clearly as the sun to the existence of a Cre-ator who is not only powerful and compassionate but also, more importantly,All-Just (dil) (Nursi, 1995:401). Indeed, in all of the workings of the cos-mos, including the apparent binarities mentioned above, such as life anddeath, light and darkness, and the apparent struggle for existence betweendenizens of the natural world, Nursi sees balance and equilibrium where oth-ers, he claims, see nothing but conflict and contradiction. Addressing thenaturalists and materialists, he writes (1995:162163):

You say: Every living being from the greatest angel to the tiniest fish owns itself andworks for itself and struggles for its own pleasure. It has the right to life. Its aim andpurpose and all its endeavour is to live and continue its life. And supposing to beconflict the compassionate, munificent manifestations of the universal law of the All-Generous Creator which is manifest through plants hastening to the assistance ofanimals and animals hastening to the assistance of man through a principle of mutualassistance, which is conformed to in perfect obedience by all the principal beings ofthe universe, you declare idiotically: Life is conflict.

In Nursis view, all of these apparent opposites and seemingly hostile polari-ties are mediated with such precision that one cannot help but conclude thatit is harmony and cooperation that underpin the creation rather than hostil-ity and chaos (1995:162):

How can particles of food hastening with total eagerness to nourish the cells of thebody a manifestation of that principle of mutual assistance be conflict? Howcan it be a clash and struggle? Rather, that hastening and assistance is mutual help atthe command of a Munificent Sustainer.

We now arrive at the second and more important aim of adl. Harmony andequilibrium, which are the by-products of adl, can exist only among thingswhich are different, be this difference real or apparent. And diversity and plu-rality exist for one purpose and one purpose alone, and that is to allow us torecognise the reality of existence itself. For if existence did not occur indegrees, gradations and individuations in other words, in the form of dif-ferent things, held together in harmony and equilibrium through the mediumof Divine adl, then man would be unable to perceive it. Te diversity of cre-

ated beings, the production of complementary opposites and the plurality which exists within unity are there in order to make existence known.


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For without knowledge of existence, knowledge of the Necessarily ExistentOne i.e., God would be impossible.

o know that there is existence, and that there is One in whom existenceinheres and from Whom existence emanates, we need diversity, plurality,complementary opposites and apparent instances of lack and absence. Manneeds darkness in order to understand light; he needs death in order tounderstand life; he needs evil in order to understand good; and so on. Dark-ness, death and evil are the apparent lacks and absences, the gradations inexistence, which make existence known.6 All of this is mediated by adlandwith one supreme aim in mind: to facilitate the self-disclosure of God andthe revelation, to man, of all of the divine attributes, the manifestation of

which is possible only through the mediation ofadl, which, together withDivine determining (qadar) and wisdom (h ikma), is responsible for theordered and orderly manifestation of the Divine names and, with it, themeans whereby man is able to make sense of the created world.

According to a Prophetic radition, God said: I was a hidden treasure kuntu kanzan makhfan and I created the world in order to be known, wor-shipped and loved.7 Tis hidden treasure is disclosed through the mediationof adl an attribute so important that Nursi (1990:12) accords its equalstatus with the three main fundamentals of belief tawh d(Divine Unity),

nubuwwa (Prophethood) and hashr(the Resurrection) as being one of thefour aims (hadaf ) of the Quran. Tere is to the knowledge of this writer noother modern scholar who puts so much importance on adlin the creationalsense, and when one considers the hidden treasure radition, it is not diffi-cult to see why this is so.

In the creational sense, then, adl is that function of the Creator whichensures harmony and equilibrium between different things. Te existence ofdifferent things is to make known the existence of existence itself, while the

6 Te lacks and absences in the cosmos by which created beings are known and recognisedare described by Nursi in terms of degrees (martib and darajt). Degrees of the existence of athing, he says, are through the intervention of its opposites. Tus the degrees of heat arethrough the intervention of cold; degrees of light are through the intervention of darkness, andso on. For a more detailed explanation, see Nursi (1992:546). Tere are interesting parallelsbetween Nursis theological exposition of degrees of intervention of non-existence and theseventeenth century Iranian theosopher Mull Sadrs philosophical principle of the gradationof being (tashkk al-wujd), the theory he invokes to account for the differentiation betweencreated beings. For more on Sadrs theory, see Jambet (2006:97102).

7 Tere is no consensus among hadth experts as to whether the Hidden reasure raditionis actually a radition at all, although it enjoys currency among a number of Sufi thinkers, poets

and mystics, including Jalal al-Din Rumi and Ibn al-Arabi. For an interesting dissection of theHidden reasure radition from a mystical perspective, see Murata (1992:6165).


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purpose of existence is to facilitate mans awareness of the One who makesexistence possible.

Te Second Sphere

We now turn to the second sphere in which adlfunctions, namely the sphereof the Creator-creature relationship, and in particular the relationshipbetween man and God. Tis relationship is multi-faceted and highly com-plex; however, the scope of this article is such that we can deal with twoaspects of this relationship only, and even then with considerable brevity.Tey are, however, aspects which are key to Nursis understanding of adlinsofar as it impacts on mans existential position and his relationship withthe Creator, which is discussed at length in the Risale-i Nur, and particularlyin the 30th Word, the First Aim of which is also known as Ene Risalesi, orreatise on the Human I (Nursi, 1992:557569).

Te First Aspect

Te first aspect is that of mans position as khalfa as representative of

God on earth, tasked as he is with the heavy responsibility of the Divine trustor amna.8 As recipient of the trust, which consists, among other things, ofknowledge of all the Divine names, his responsibility is, as Nursi tells us onnumerous occasions, to relinquish his imaginary ownership of these namesand reflect them as the Creator intends them to be reflected.9 Te fulcrumupon which rests his ability to either reflect the names or appropriate themfor himself and cover up their link to the Divine is the component of thehuman soul (nafs) which in urkish is called ene from the Arabic anand which in English we call I.10

8 Te rust appears in verse 33:72 of the Quran and signifies for Nursi the acceptance byman of the role of vicegerent of God on earth, a position from which even the Heavens andthe Earth and the Mountains shrank, so heavy was its burden. See also Nursi (1992:268).

9 Nursis insistence that mans most pressing responsibility as bearer of the rust is to giveup his imaginary ownership of the Divine names that are reflected in him finds expression inmuch of his work. Te notion of the human appropriation of the Divine attributes is a themewhich runs throughout Ene Risalesi, as well as other parts of the Risale-i Nur. For example, seeNursi (1992:332, 480; 1995:162163, 458459; 1997:267, 434, 497; 1998:90).

10

Te word eneis, like the word nafs, is sometimes translated as ego, a word that is avoidedin this article in order to obviate any misconstrual of the term as one which has Freudianconnotations.


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rightful place so that equilibrium and harmony may exist, then adldenotesthe attribute which man must nurture in himself if he is to truly act as

khalfatullh f al-ard, or Gods representative on earth. It means, in short,mans surrendering the names of God to their rightful Owner and admittingthat in and of himself, he is nothing but a mirror in which God contemplatesHis own attributes. Te term adl, then, connotes, inter alia, acting in Godsname, and for His sake alone. It means living in accordance with the old Sufiadage, akhallaq bi akhlq Allh (Nursi, 1992:564),12 of displaying Godsattributes while giving up all rights of ownership over them. Tis, accordingto Nursis understanding of the Quran, appears to be precisely what man wascreated for. And just as taslimiyya submission brings about islam, then

adl, which means putting things in their rightful place or, in other words,acting in accordance with the Divine order Fa istaqim kam umirta (Be stead-fast and do as you were commanded!) (Quran, 11:112) is supposed to bringabout peace, harmony and equilibrium in mans personal life, thus fulfillingthe requirements of Divine justice and shaping the kind of relationship hehas with God. Indeed, Nursi (1992:780) adduces the verse as evidence of theimportance of moderation, the middle way and, by extension, the consciousmanifestation ofadlin all aspects of human life.

In Nursis view, when man acts without adl in other words, when he

refuses to submit his imaginary ownership of the Divine names he bringsabout chaos, imbalance, disequilibrium, disharmony and, in a very real senseof the modern term, injustice, both in his own personal life and in the livesof those he touches. o refuse to surrender that ownership, or in other wordsto choose to cover up (Arab. kafara) his existential link with the Divine, isnothing less than to choose unbelief (kufr),13 and to choose unbelief is, as faras Nursi is concerned, to make a mockery not only of oneself but of thewhole creation, the very purpose of which is the recognition and glorificationof God. And, as Nursi tells us in no uncertain terms, to denigrate the cosmos

in this way is indeed the greatest of all injustices (1995:119):

So too, since they (i.e., the people of unbelief ) deny the manifestations of the DivineNames which are apparent in the mirrors of beings, exalting their value, they insultthose sacred Names, and in addition, by degrading the value of all beings, greatly

12 Skran Vahide translates this phrase as Be moulded by God-given ethics, which does notquite connote the idea of mans manifesting consciously the attributes of God while abjuringany ownership over them.

13 Te term kufr, usually translated as unbelief is a verbal noun from the Arabic root kafara,

meaning to cover. Unbelief in the strictly Quranic and, by extension, Nursian senseconcerns the misappropriation of the Divine Names, refusal to surrender them to their rightfulOwner, and thus the conscious covering up of mans existential link to the ranscendent.


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detract them. And while all beings are dominical officials charged with elevatedduties, through unbelief, the people of misguidance cast them down, and showingthem to be lifeless, transitory, meaningless creatures, they in a way violate the rightsof all of them.

Common perception has it that the antithesis of adlisjawr, particularly inthe modern interpretation of these words, with adltranslated as justice andjawras injustice (Wehr, 1976:596, 147). While adlandjawrare indeed polaropposites even in the classical sense of the terms, arguably a more appropriateterm to describe what actually happens when adl is deficient in humanbehaviour is the word ilhd. According to the Quranic verse (7:180), themost beautiful names (asm al-husn) belong to God and man should callon Him by means of them. It then says that man should beware of those whoyulh idna f asmihi those who pervert, twist or corrupt the names ofGod.14 Bearing in mind the Nursian notion of man as a mirror whose func-tion it is to manifest the Divine attributes, it may be argued that pervertingthe names of God means either not reflecting them consciously at all, orreflecting them imperfectly.

An example may be of use here. God is compassionate and enjoins com-passion on all men. Mothers, as Nursi reminds us on numerous occasions,are especially gifted with the capacity to reflect Divine compassion, wittingly

or unwittingly.15 However, there is true compassion and there is compassionthat is well-meant but misdirected.16 A mother may be unable to bear thetears of her child and, as a result, may capitulate to his demands for chocolateevery time he cries for it. She is acting out of what she believes to be compas-sion, and indeed, it is a hard heart indeed that can watch a child cry and notbe moved. Indeed, the mother may consider that to withhold chocolate fromher child is wrong, and that justice demands that her child not suffer. How-ever, as Nursi points out time and time again, Divine adlis always temperedby Divine h ikma or wisdom:17 God puts things in their rightful place as He

pleases, but in accordance with an inherent wisdom and purpose which,while sometimes fathomable by man instantly and sometimes in theoretical

14 While there is no explicit mention by Nursi ofilhdin this particular context, the notionis easily construed from his discussion on the corruption which man wreaks on his own soulwhen he is out of balance and far from the middle way, the epitome of which was the Prophet.For this, see Nursi (1995:9293).

15 For some examples, see: Nursi (1992:21, 43, 75, 368; 1995:136, 181, 260).16 Te possibility of misdirecting compassion is mentioned in Nursi (1995:261).17

It should be reiterated here that when Nursi discusses adl, qualities such as Divine wis-dom, mercy and compassion are often mentioned as companion attributes. For example, seeNursi (1992:67).


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desires. Ten it can deceive the conscience and put the spirit to sleep so they feel nopain. Otherwise that grievous suffering scorches the conscience; the pain is unendur-able, the despair cannot be borne. Tis means, however far one deviates from theStraight Path, to that extent one is affected in that way, causing the conscience to cryout. Within every pleasure is a pain, a taint. Tat means glittering civilization, whichis a mixture of fancy, lust, amusement, and licentiousness, is a deceptive panacea forthe ghastly distress arising from misguidance, a poisonous narcotic.

Examples of social and civilisational ills in Nursis writings are too numerousto mention, and are all interpretable in his schema as a result of the inability,or unwillingness, of man to give up the names, to acknowledge their right-ful owner, and to make adlcentral to his endeavours as a human being.

With regard to adlin the sphere of mans relationship with God, the sec-ond aspect that Nursi stresses is the non-arbitrary nature of Divine justice. Infact, whenever he talks about adl, he almost always mentions words such ash ikma (wisdom), rahma (compassion) and qadar(Divine determining) in thesame breath.18

Tis is important particularly in the context of events and situations whichmost people are likely to deem unjust. For example, after the devastating tsu-nami of 2004, when some 230,000 souls perished within the space of a fewhours, one of the most common responses among believers as well as unbe-

lievers was to question the goodness of a God who seemingly failed to inter-vene in order to obviate such terrible human suffering. Te aforementionedRichard Dawkins was among the more vocal of Gods critics, while apolo-getic rejoinders in the form of tracts such as David Bentley Harts Te Doorsof the Sea: Where Was God in the sunami?failed to engage convincingly withthe notion of a God whose compassion is eminently reconcilable with theexistence of what for both the Quran and Nursi would be an evil in appear-anceonly.19

Tat the occurrence of so-called natural disasters should provoke such a

response is not surprising when one considers the poverty of modern Muslimtheology and the intellectual and emotional complexities which inhere in thegeneral theodicean problem. One brutally frank response to those who doubtGods justice when such events occur would be the classical Asharite ques-tion: Is the creation not His to do with as He pleases? In the words of thePersian poet, Harcheh n Khusraw konad, shrn bovad Whatever that

18 For example, see Nursi (1992:7778, 9599; 1995:31, 105, 329; 1997:59, 273, 300;1998:86, 207209).

19 A clip of Richard Dawkins discussing the tsunami on the 2009 Channel Four documen-

tary, sunami: Where Was God? can be accessed at http://www.atheistmedia.com/2009/12/tsunami-where-was-god-richard-dawkins.html. See also Hart (2005).


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King does, it is good. Several hundred thousand people across the world dieevery day, our Asharite disputant would argue, but no-one raises the kind of

objection that was raised when the same number lost their lives in the spaceof a few hours and as the result of a disaster that was seen as both naturaland an act of God.

Ultimately, of course, it is a question of relativity. When, in July 1994,over twenty fragments of a passing comet smashed into the southern hemi-sphere of the planet Jupiter, providing astronomers on earth with their firstdirect observation of a collision between two heavenly bodies, the excitementamong the scientific community was palpable. Had those fragments hit thesouthern hemisphere of our earth, however, the response would have been

very different. As far as the creational act of God is concerned, what isdeemed unjust depends on every individuals own perspective, and the extentto which it affects him or her personally. Te Quran itself attests to this quiteclearly in the verse below (2:216):

Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike athing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Godknoweth, and ye know not.

Although this verse was revealed in the particular context ofjihad, and theaversion of some Muslims in the nascent community-state of Medina to gointo battle, one may quite easily apply the reasoning in the verse to any situa-tion, as the wording of the verse itself . . . it is possible that ye dislike athing which is god for you . . . indicates. However, the extent to which oneconsiders something abhorrent or unjust depends on how much consider-ation is given to the important factors of h ikma and qadar those indis-pensable facets of Gods creational command which, according to Nursi,always go hand in hand with his adl. As we have seen, in the Quranic-

Nursian sense of the term, one of the key meanings of adlis to put some-thing in its right place, but what its right place actually is depends on Divinewisdom rather than the judgement arrived at through the workings of humanratiocination, particularly when the latter is decoupled from the moderatinginfluence of revelation. And Divine wisdom is married to Divine compas-sion, and Divine compassion to Divine mercy, and so on. God does what Hewills with His creatures, but what He wills is never ad hoc or arbitrary: Tereis, the Quran claims, always an underlying wisdom, even if man is unable tograsp it at first.

Tis is borne out by, inter alia, the famous story of Moses and the figuredescribed by the Quran as one of Our bondsmen, who accompanies Moses


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on his search for truth and, in so doing, inducts him into the secrets of theDivine wisdom that lies beneath acts which are unfathomable on account of their

apparent injustice.20 Te bondsman in question is not named by the Quran,although many have identified him as the legendary saint-cum-prophet-guideKhidr.21 When Moses asks the bondsman of God to accompany him on hisjourney, the latter is reluctant to agree: Moses, the bondsman says, may claimto be in the pursuit of wisdom, but will not have the fortitude to bear whathe encounters on the way. Eventually, the bondsman agrees to accompanyMoses on the condition that the latter exercise patience and refrain fromjudging events on the basis of their outward appearances. As their journeyprogresses, Moses is tested severely as the bondsman proceeds to scupper a

boat, kill an innocent boy and restore a crumbling wall for the inhospitablepeople of a town. Each apparently inexplicable and iniquitous occurrencedrives Moses to question the bondsmans wisdom, and finally, when Moses isseen clearly to have failed the test of trust and patience, the bondsmanannounces that their companionship is over. Before they part, however, thebondsman reveals the hidden wisdom behind his seemingly unfathomableactions, indicating that each one was in the best interests of all concerned,and that he had been directed to act as he had by God.

Te story of Moses and the bondsman is designed apparently to demon-

strate the limits of human reason and the infinitude of Divine knowledge. Italso shows that there are paradoxes in human life that are often beyondhuman comprehension: apparent loss, for example, may be real gain; appar-ent cruelty may actually be mercy; and returning good for evil may in actualfact be justice rather than generosity. Arguably the most important lessonafforded by the story is that Gods wisdom is infinite, transcending all humancalculation. Consequently, whatever befalls man in the creational sense can-not help but be a result of adl, or else Divine Wisdom would not havedecreed it for him.22

An excursus into Nursian theodicy would be of value here, but again alengthy exposition of his stance on the goodness of God in the face of theexistence of evil is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. Suffice tosay that the Nursian position mirrors to some extent the Augustinian notionof the asymmetry of good and evil. In short, for Nursi, evil is simply what is

20 For the whole story of the truth-seeking quest of Moses and his encounter with the wisebondsman of God, see Quran, 18:6082.

21 Khidr is one of the four messengers of God deemed to have superhuman longevity,although they live on a different existential plane and are not normally visible to mortals. Te

other three are Ilys (Elias), Idrs (Enoch) and s (Jesus).22 For a fascinating Jungian insight into the Khidr legend, see Battye (1993:166191).


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known theologically as privatio boni, or the privation or lack of good.23St. Augustines (1961:1112) exposition ofprivatio boniis summed up in this

excerpt from his Enchiridion:

And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in itsown place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value thegood more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as eventhe heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himselfsupremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works,if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. Forwhat is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, dis-ease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected,

that does not mean that the evils which were present namely, the diseases andwounds go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist;for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance, the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils that is, privations of the good which we call health are accidents. Just in the sameway, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. Andwhen they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: When they cease to exist inthe healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Snatches of Nursis discourse on good and evil can be found throughout his

writings, but particular focus on the issue can be found in his treatise onDivine Decree and Determination, which forms the wenty-Sixth Word(Nursi, 1992:477490). Tere, Nursi exonerates God of any blame for theexistence of evils in the world by attributing them to the capacity of man toexercise his free-will injudiciously. Evil, which Nursi (1998:582) dismisses asthe non-existence of good aprivatio boni is decreed by God in responseto mans desire for it and the exercise of his will in pursuing it (1992:478):

As for evils, it is mans soul that wants them, either through capacity or through

choice, like in the white and beautiful light of the sun some substances becomeblack and putrefy, and the blackness is related to their capacity however, it isAlmighty God Who creates the evils through a Divine law which comprises numer-ous benefits. Tat is to say, the cause and the request are from the soul, so that it isthe soul which is responsible, while it is Almighty God Who creates the evils andbrings them into existence, and since they have other results and fruits which aregood, they are good.

It is for this reason, Nursi argues, that mans acquisition (kasb) of evil,through his desire for it, is itself evil, while Gods creation of that evil in

23 Te theory ofprivatio boniis usually attributed to St. Augustine of Hippo (354430). Forhis exposition of evil as the lack of good, see Augustine (1961:1118).


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unjust acts and situations as one of the mysteries of Divine Determining(1992:478479):

Divine Determining is both exempt from evil and ugliness with regard to results andfruits, and free from tyranny and ugliness with respect to reason and cause. BecauseDivine Determining looks to the true causes and acts justly. Men construct theirjudgements on causes which they see superficially and fall into error within the pure justice of Divine Determining. For example, a judge finds you guilty of theft andsends you to prison. You are not a thief, but you have committed a murder which noone knows about. Tus, Divine Determining also sentenced you to imprisonment,but it sentenced you for the secret murder and acted justly. Since the judge sentencedyou for a theft of which you were innocent, he acted unjustly. Tus, in a single thing

the justice of Divine Determining and Divine creation and mans wrongful choice oracquisition were apparent in two respects; you can make analogies with this for otherthings.

Nursi concludes by saying that with regard to origin and end and to causeand results, Gods Determining and creation are thus completely exemptfrom evil and injustice (Nursi, 1992:479). In short, injustice may have anapparent existence, but even then it is in the eye of the beholder: whatappears to be injustice will, if seen through the prism of belief, appear assomething both just and eminently wise.

Divine adl, then, is not arbitrary, and must be understood as working intandem with wisdom (h ikma) and Divine determining (qadar). As Nursi(1992:78) says:

Do you wish for a proof that all things are done with justice and balance? Te factthat all things are endowed with being, given shape and put in their appropriate placein accordance with precise equilibrium and in appropriate measure, shows that allmatters are done in accordance with infinite justice and balance.

All things are done, he asserts, with justice and balance. And this includesthose events which occur in life which man believes at first glance are bad forhim, but which, if he reflects on them, he realises were for his own good. Addto the fact that evil is relative the reality of Gods sworn intention to test manwith all manner of tribulations, and the wisdom behind Gods acts ofadlbecome even clearer.25 Tis world is, after all, a sphere of Divine trial, andDivine trial is imposed on man in order to allow him to evolve spiritually and

25

Be sure We shall test you with something of fear and hunger, some loss in goods or livesor the fruits (of your toil), but give glad tidings to those who patiently persevere . . . (Qur an,2:155).


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achieve a state of equanimity in this world and, ultimately, salvation in theworld to come.

Te Second Aspect

Te second aspect of the Creator-creature relationship focuses on a more prac-tical issue, namely the methods adumbrated by the Nursi and, indirectly,by the Quran itself by which man is able to effect this relinquishment ofthe Divine names in his everyday life and attain to that state of balance andequanimity that is synonymous with both adland islm. One is his advocacyof a quasi-Sufi method of attaining self-knowledge and Divine gnosis,embodied in his famed four steps of impotence (ajz), poverty (faqr), com-passion (shafaqa) and reflection (tafakkur) steps which, he asserts, have theability to lead man more safely and surely to the mercy of God than the vari-ous programmes of self-awareness employed by of some of the Sufi brother-hoods (Nursi, 1992:491).26 Nursis brief exposition of these four steps in theaddendum of the wenty-Sixth Word (Kader Risalesi) is important not onlybecause it sheds light on the general spiritual psychology of man whichunderpins most of the Risale, but also because it posits a path to self-under-standing and God-knowledge which, like the authors work itself, is accessibleto all, and which eschews the need for spiritual guides, elaborate devotionalexercises or formal affiliation to any particular Sufi or mystical brotherhood.

Te four steps advocated by Nursi constitute only one aspect of his teach-ings on the methods open to man if he is to attain a constant awareness ofGods presence (Nursi, 1992:494), itself a crucial component of the existen-tial equilibrium and harmony that man must attain in order to manifest adland fulfil his potential as Divine vicegerent on earth. Another aspect andarguably one which is more germane to the issue of justice in the Quranic-Nursian sense of the word is his discourse on the three main powers

which inhere in the human soul, and the fact that spiritual well-being, socialharmony and, ultimately, mans eternal salvation are dependent on these threepowers being in a state of equilibrium. In his discussion of these three pow-ers and their centrality to mans psycho-spiritual development one can findthe key to Nursis whole thesis on justice, namely his invitation to thestraight path of moderation.

Nursis exposition of mans or, rather, the souls powers appears in anumber of places in the Risale, but the most comprehensive treatment can be

26 For his complete exposition of the four steps, their aims, objectives and methods, seeNursi (1992:491494).


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found in his exegesis of the opening chapter of the Quran, al-Ftiha, in hisIshrt al-ijz (Signs of Miraculousness; Nursi, n.d.). Tere he says that the

human soul possesses three powers (quwwa): the power of animal appetites(al-quwwa al-shahwiyya al-bahmiyya), the function of which is to attract ben-efits; the power of animal passion or repulsion (al-quwwa al-ghadabiyya), thefunction of which is to ward off harm; and the power of intellect (al-quwwaal-aqliyya), the function of which is to distinguish between that which is ben-eficial and that which is harmful (Nursi, n.d.:23). It is how these powers areused by man that determines his behavioural states and affects his spiritualprogression. Each power may be either overused, which leads to excess (ifrt)or it may have a deficiency (nuqsn), in which case it leads to negligence

(tafrt). Nursi warns against both extremes excess and negligence andcautions man to aim for the middle way, which is justice (Nursi, n.d.:23).

For example, deficiency in the power of intellect results in foolishness(ghabwa) and idiocy (balda), while excess leads to deception and trickery(jarbaza), preoccupation with trivia and inordinate attention to minutiae(tadqq f safsif al-umr). When the power of intellect is used properly andattains the middle way, the result, Nursi says, is wisdom (h ikma) (Nursi,n.d.:23). A deficiency in the power of animal appetites results in lassitude(khumd) and lack of enthusiasm (adam al-ishtiyq) while at the other end

of the spectrum, excess results in depravity and dissolution (fajr). When themiddle way is attained, however, man is led to a state of mind in which he isencouraged to do what God has commanded and eschew what he has forbid-den (Nursi, n.d.:23). As far as the power of passion/repulsion is concerned,underuse leads to fear and cowardice (jabna) while an excess results in rash-ness (tahawwur), a precursor of tyranny (zulm) and despotism (istibdd). Temiddle way as far as this power is concerned is courage (shaja), whichenables man to uphold the message of Divine Unity and protect the sanctityof Islam (Nursi, n.d.:2324).

rue justice, Nursi avers, obtains when the middle way is achieved. Byway of illustration, he uses a medieval theological controversy to demonstrate what happens when men are unable to avoid excess or deficiency in theirexercise of these powers. With regard to the issue of the creation of mansactions (khalq al-a ml), he says, the Sunni position is the just one since itrepresents a mean between excess and deficiency, with excess typified by theMutazilites, whose inordinate reliance on reason led them to champion thenotion of absolute free-will, and deficiency typified by the Jabriyya, who sup-ported the idea of absolute determinism (Nursi, n.d.:23).27 Te Sunni path

27 For background on the Jabriyya, see Montgomery Watt (2010).


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Te Tird Sphere

Te third sphere in which adlis designed to function is the sphere of inter-human relations. Te idea of social justice and its attendant concepts ofhuman rights and equality, together with the notion of the achievability of asocially more just world, is probably what comes to mind most readily whenthe English word justice or the Arabic words adl or adla are invoked.Moreover, one of the prevalent themes in the writings of contemporary Mus-lim thinkers and ideologues is issue of social justice. Indeed, it is no exaggera-tion to say that the so-called Islamic revival of the past 150 years has as oneof its central tenets the need to restore justice to a Muslim world beleagueredby a myriad ills, some of its own making, some engendered by its encounterwith certain forms of non-Muslim hegemony: imperialism, political and cul-tural colonialism, globalisation, and so on.

Nursi is no exception, for social justice features largely in many of his trea-tises, not least in those parts of the Risale-i Nurwhere he rails against theinjustices heaped upon him in the form of numerous arrests and trials allon trumped-up charges and all ending with his acquittal together withperiods of imprisonment and years spent in exile or under surveillance.28 Tatadl is crucial to the harmonious functioning of this third sphere thesphere of human society and interpersonal relations was therefore not loston Nursi, who had experienced the results of its absence or deficiency at closequarters.

However, Nursi does not offer any neat prescriptions for the establishmentof a just society, at least not in political terms. Unlike the vast majority ofMuslim ideologues and thinkers of the past century and a half, for whom themost pressing problem has arguably been the issue of governance and power,Nursi offers no political solutions for the ills of the Muslim world. He makesno call for the restoration of the Caliphate, for the re-institution of the shariaor for the creation of an Islamic state. He formulates no grandiose plans for

the creation of an ideal society and, unlike most of his Islamist coevals, doesnot advocate the use of force or the fomenting of rebellion to usher in a newIslamic golden age.

For Nursi, social justice is something which in theory should evolve frommans awareness of the dynamics of Divine justice on the creational level andhis conscious manifestation of that justice in the societal sphere. For Nursi,social justice is obtained through the adherence of individuals to the sharia the set of codified laws derived from the Quran and the Prophetic custom(sunna) which regulate personal and interpersonal relationships on a whole

28 For example, see Nursi (1995:326328; 1997:9698; 1998:224).


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host of different levels. And this sharia is, from the Nursian perspective,nothing more than a microcosm of what he calls the Greater Sharia, which

is nothing less than the Divine custom (sunna ilhyya), or the creational lawswhich are evident in the workings of the cosmos.29 Te interrelationship andinterdependence of these two codes are taken as given by Nursi (1992:763):

Tere are two Divine Sharias: Proceeding from two attributes, man is addressed byboth, and bound to comply with both. Te Sharia of Creation, which proceeds fromthe attribute of Will, orders the circumstances and motions of the world, the macro-cosm, which are not voluntary. It is dominical will, and is also wrongly termedNature. Te Sharia proceeding from the attribute of Speech is the code of lawswhich orders the actions of man, the microcosm, which are voluntary.

Tat Nursi acknowledges the voluntary nature of the code of laws whichorders the actions of man shows not only that he sees adherence to the codi-fied sharia as something which, ideally, grows organically out of mans aware-ness of the creational sharia, but also that he stands apart from those Muslimthinkers who believe that the codified sharia is something that is to beimposed from above.

In this sense, Nursi is a gradualist in his approach to social change. Hisemphasis throughout the Risale-i Nuris on the perfection of belief, not the

imposition of a social code: Each individual is to work at purifying his ownsoul rather than attempting to purify the souls of others, and if a healthysocial system emerges, it emerges because of the collective efforts of individu-als rather than the top-down imposition of a code of laws which address thesocio-economic and political problems of society but which take as given thebelief of its members and thus ignore or gloss over it. Ever the pragmatist,Nursi eschews the kind of utopian vision that lies at the heart of much of themodern Islamist endeavour to re-create the mythical golden age of Medina atthe time of Muhammad. While he asserts unequivocally that on a purely cre-

ational level, Divine justice underpins all things, he admits readily that onthe societal level, absolute justice does not and can never manifest itselfin this earthly realm.30 In his treatise on the necessity of the Resurrection, he

29 According to Nursi, the Greater Sharia, which he also calls the Sharia of Creation com-prises the order of the universe and the Divine laws of creation. See Nursi (1992:549).

30 Nursis exposition of the concepts of absolute justice and relative justice are key to hisdiscussion of the conflict known as the Battle of the Camel, which took place between sup-porters of the Prophets cousin, Ali, and supporters of the Prophets wife, Aisha. Nursi contends

that the battle was basically a clash over conflicting legal concepts, with Alis belief in the possi-bility of applying absolute justice ranged against his opponents view that the time for absolutejustice had passed, and that the community had now to rely on the notion of the lesser of two


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adduces the absence of absolute justice in this realm as one of the proofs ofthe Supreme ribunal in the world to come, asserting that not only are

reward and punishment virtually non-existent here, but that not even athousandth part of the requirements of justice is fulfilled (Nursi, 1992:61).While it may have been possible in the earliest years of Islam for the Prophetto manifest absolute justice in his capacity as legislator, with the passing oftime and the corruption of Muslim society, the attainment of absolute justiceon the societal level became increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible:the only alternative was what Nursi terms relative (idf) justice, which wasthe best that rulers, judges and jurists could hope for.

In short, Nursis approach to the amelioration of society and the pursuit of

social justice mirrors to an extent the approach of Muhammad himself. Tefirst 13 years of Muhammads mission were dedicated largely to matters offaith, metaphysics and the fostering of self-knowledge and God-awareness; when he eventually migrated to Medina, he did not do so with any pre-planned programme of reform or radical social change. Indeed, he enteredMedina as a political refugee rather than as a utopian visionary bent uponcreating an ideal society. Te Muslim community-state which evolved inMedina evolved out of a pooling of the efforts of individuals rather than theimposition by one man of a credo and an accompanying code of canon law.

Nursis emphasis on the need to perfect belief, his eschewal of politics, hisrejection ofjihad as a military endeavour31 and his gradualist approach tosocietal amelioration and the establishment of social justice all suggest that,unlike the vast majority of Muslim thinkers whose dreams of Medina propeltheir ideological and political discourse, based on the mythical golden age ofthe Prophet during the final decade of his life, Nursis focus is very muchMeccan in orientation, and aimed at the betterment of the human soul as aprerequisite to the betterment of human society.

Conclusion

aking our cue from the Islamic revelation itself, at the outset of this article,three different but overlapping conceptual spheres were posited in which theDivine attribute adl translated, albeit with certain caveats, as justice inEnglish functions were posited: the creational sphere, where justice is syn-

evils enshrined in the concept known as relative justice. Nursi concludes that since both sideswere sincere in their interpretations of the law, both those who killed and those who died were

in the right. See Nursi (1997:7475).31 For insight into Nursis views on politics andjihad, see urner (2007:94111).


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onymous with balance; the sphere of the Creator-creature relationship, andin particular the relationship between man and God, where justice is some-

thing that man is created to manifest by attaining a state of spiritual balanceand equanimity; and the sphere of interhuman relations, in which the attain-ment of social justice is contingent on mans ability to base his social life onthe spiritual balance and equanimity that he has attained in his spiritual life.

More importantly, we have seen how Said Nursis discourse on Divine jus-tice follows the contours of the Quran, both structurally and conceptually. While Nursi does not posit overtly the existence of the three interlinkedspheres mentioned above, we have seen that his arguments are eminentlyamenable to such a tripartite division. Although Nursi is bound theologically

to the notion that adlis what God decrees it to be, we have seen how, on thecreational level, he has opened up the Quranic concept of Divine justice andelaborated upon it by adducing examples of balance and equilibrium in thecosmic realm. In so doing, he has contextualised adl within the nexus ofDivine names and attributes such as wisdom, compassion and determiningin an attempt to prove its non-arbitrary nature.

We have also seen how, on the level of the Creator-creature relationship,and in particular with regard to mans position before God, Nursi enjoins justice on believers in their personal-spiritual lives, outlining means and

methods of personal growth which are designed to ensure progress towardsthe straight path of moderation, which he sees as the epitome of justice.And finally, on the level of interhuman relations, this article has attempted

to show that while Nursi is as aware as any of his coevals of the need forsocial justice in a world which appears to be bereft of that value, he does notoffer any specific political solutions in order to secure it. Rather, his conten-tion is that in order to manifest justice in as full a sense of the word as hisown existential limitations allow, man needs to focus not on the creation ofan Islamic state, but of an Islamic state of mind.

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Bediuzzaman and the Concept of 'Adl

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