ATSS-BAR 24 October 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Faculty Advisor CWOl Kerkhofs), Group Room RIO, Fort Bliss, TX 79918-8002

SUBJECT: The Battle of Dunkirk - 1940

1. Thesis Statement. Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk was a big victory and proved to be a great military morale booster for the British people.

2. Discussion. The German Army was an awesome force during World War II. There were many retreats during past wars but none as stunning and heartwarming as the seaborne evacuation of the military from Dunkirk. The British Navy first thought they had only rescued around 30,000 - 50,000 men on their first evacuation. Admiral Ramsey engineered Operation Dynamo which rescued over 340,000 men. The French and British soldiers were able to go back and fight another day, which was a great morale booster for the citizens of their lands.

3. Conclusion. The speed of the German Army victory, combined with the miraculous seaborne evacuation of the Allied Northern pocket, meant Western populations did not experience great bloodshed, which was a great morale booster for the British and French people.

4. Counterpoint. The battle of Dunkirk was one of the greatest triumphs in British history but a military major defeat. The evacuation of a third of a million men was a unique achievement, but a military disaster.

5. Haines Award. We do request that the Haines Award Selection Board consider this paper for the General Haines Award for Excellence in research. Writing Research Papers, 10th Edition by James D. Lester, is the guide used in the preparation of this research paper.

Q~g~~, SGM, USA Chairperson

MSG Henry T. Williams III MSG Miroslav Jelcha MSG Angela Brody MSG Maurice Thorpe

THE BATTLE OF DUNKIRK

by

SGM Daniel J. Kessinger Jr.

MSG Henry T. Williams III

MSG Miroslav Jelcha

MSG Angelia Brody

SGM Maurice Thorpe

SGM (WOl) Kerkhofs

Resource Management R 1 0

24 February 2006

Kessinger 11

Thesis: Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk was a big victory and proved to be a great military morale booster for the British people

I. Background.

A. German military decisions.

B. Germans Attack Dunkirk.

II. French North Army.

A. British Expeditionary Forces.

B. Leadership.

C. Structure.

D. Strategy.

E. Consequences.

III. German Armament.

A. Allied Armament.

B. Terrain.

C. Weather Conditions.

IV. Pre-Evacuation Conditions.

A. Dunkirk Evacuation.

B. Post Evacuation of Dunkirk.

V. Dunkirk Military Operations.

A. Communication.

B. Battlefield Casualties.

C. Historian Opinions.

VI. Summary and Conclusion.

Dunkirk

The Battle of Dunkirk

Although, some people see the battle of Dunkirk as a type of victory, more men would

have been saved with proper planning and communication. The operation was one of the biggest

surprises of World War II and for Hitler it proved to be one of his few mistakes. The battle of

Dunkirk explores the background of Germany's military decisions, the Germans attack on

Dunkirk, The French North Army, The British Expeditionary Forces, Leadership, Structure,

Strategy, Consequences, German Armament, Allied Armament, Terrain, Weather Conditions,

Pre-evacuation Conditions, Dunkirk Evacuation, Post Evacuation of Dunkirk, Dunkirk Military

Operations, Communication, Battlefield Casualties, Historian Opinions, and the Summary I

Conclusion. The points brought up will prove that the operation was a success and a victory for

the British people. Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk was a big emotional victory and proved to be

a great military morale booster for the British people

One of the most controversial questions in the history of World War II surrounds the

infamous "stop" order issued in the last days of May 1940, which allowed the British

Expeditionary Force (over 338,226 men including 26,176 French) to escape from Dunkirk.

"The blood of every single Englishman is too valuable to shed," Hitler said. "Our two people

belong together racially and traditionally. That is and always has been my aim, even if our

generals can't grasp it (Bullock, 537)." The controversy is based upon two separate questions.

First, was Hitler solely responsible for the decision to stop his advancing Army at the gates of

Dunkirk, or did General Gerd von Rundstedt make the decision and Hitler merely agree with him

based on Rundstedt's military expertise? The second question, and perhaps the most debated

among military historians and military leaders alike, is why was the stop order issued at all

(Bullock, 18)?

2 Dunkirk

In response to the first question, little doubt exists that Hitler did, in fact, insist that the stop

order be issued on his own behalf. Hitler was already nervous over the ease at which his Armies

had successfully advanced into France and was quite concerned by the lack of overwhelming

resistance his Armies continued to encounter. All of this seemed too good to be true and only

served to heighten his concern since he was not sure what the French and British might be

planning from the south. Hitler's uneasiness was reinforced when he visited Rundstedt's Army

Group A Headquarters on May 24th, 1940.

Rundstedt informed Hitler that he was concerned about the way the tank strength had been

reduced during the long and expeditious advance across France and, more importantly, the

possibility of further engagements with the enemy from the north and the south. Hitler agreed

with Rundstedt's reservations and wanted to save his panzer force for future operations. He

could not risk losing them fighting in the Flanders marshes. Although undoubtedly inspired by

Rundstedt's shared concern over the condition and strength of the panzer forces, the decision to

halt the attack of the armored force at the Canal Line and not allow any further advances beyond

that point was made by Hitler alone. Later that day, after meeting with Rundstedt, Hitler called

for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and after a heated discussion, insisted that the tanks be

halted and the infamous stop order was issued.

One further argument supports the fact that it was Hitler's decision to issue the stop order and

not Rundstedt's overwhelming influence over him, as some may assume. After the British

escaped from Dunkirk, Hitler never tried to lay the blame of his mistake on the advice of his

generals as he had so often done in the past. As Liddell Hart states, "Such negative evidence is

as significant as any" (Hart, 81).

3 Dunkirk

The final question of why Hitler issued the stop order offers several possibilities. Hitler was

convinced from his own personal experience during the First World War that the muddy

Flanders terrain was not suited for heavy armor. The marshes were crisscrossed with canals and

drainage ditches which made tank maneuvers hazardous and vulnerable to heavy losses if they

fell prey to British or French attack. Hitler wanted to save as many tanks as he possibly could

for his battle against the French and his march into Paris, which was the next phase of Hitler's

plan-the defeat of the French Army. Therefore, Hitler saw no sense in squandering his tank

force in the swampy lowlands of the Flanders marshes, or for that matter, risking destruction in

the streets of Dunkirk when they could be put to better use in the future.

The most compelling argument behind Hitler's issuance of the stop order was Field Marshal

Hermann Goering's assurance to Hitler that the Luftwaffe was more than capable of single

handedly stopping the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk (Taylor,

263). Hitler saw this as an opportunity to save his precious panzer force from the hazards of the

Flanders region and give Goering a chance to score a decisive victory for his Luftwaffe.

Goering's insistence that the Luftwaffe could finish the job without the aid of the Army may

have influenced Hitler's decision as well since a victory by Goering would surely deny the Army

generals from reaping the glory of the triumph. Therefore, with assurances from Goering and

Hitler's concern over the possible heavy loss of tanks to the Flanders region, Hitler issued the

stop order with the understanding that Dunkirk would be left to the Luftwaffe (Home, 533).

The opportunity for the Luftwaffe to inflict serious casualties on the enemy by bombing them

from the air during their escape attempt certainly had merit. Hitler's Army generals, on the other

hand, were completely appalled when they received the order that Dunkirk was to be left to the

Luftwaffe. Manstein later wrote that, "Dunkirk was one of Hitler's most decisive mistakes

4 Dunkirk

(Manstein, 124)." He goes on further to express his discontent by stating, "Hitler had a certain

instinct for operational problems, but lacked the thorough training of a military commander

which enables the latter to accept considerable risks in the course of an operation because he

knows he can master them. Therefore, Hitler preferred the safe solution of defensive action to

the bolder method suggested by Army Group A (Braunbeck, 135)."

Guderian (117) was also perplexed when he received notification of the stop order and stated,

"On this day (the 24th), the Supreme Command intervened in the operations in progress with

results which were to have a most disastrous influence on the whole future course of the war.

Hitler ordered the left wing to stop on the AA. It was forbidden to cross that stream. We were

not informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: 'Dunkirk is to be left to the

Luftwaffe'. We were utterly speechless."

The true reasons for Hitler's historic decision to issue the stop order will never be known. Just

as this account is nothing more than speculation, the fact remains that over 336,000 men

survived to fight another day. Telford Taylor (264) best summarizes the events as they occurred

at Dunkirk: "And so, while the British were preparing and commencing the greatest naval rescue

operation in recorded history, Hitler and the generals wrangled about the stop-order and busied

themselves with plans for the approaching offensive on the Somme-Aisne front. The stop-order

would not have been issued but for the failure to grasp the urgency of cutting the Allies off from

the coast before the resourceful might of British sea power could be brought to bear in a huge

salvage operation. The reprieve of the stop-order was the prelude to "the deliverance of

Dunkirk." The German forces did not know what was in store for them when it came to the

allied forces.

5 Dunkirk

During WWII, France lacked military intellect at the strategic level. Truthfully, the shortage

of brilliance was common among all military ranks with one excellent exception, Colonel

Charles de Gaulle. The real problem was not in the quality of the men but more in the poor

system of command and communications which rendered them strategically useless. The plan

was for communication by telephone; however, the lines were repeatedly cut by the advancing

tanks. This meant that messages to the front were by dispatch rider, making information out of

date by the time it reached its destination. Adding to this was the fact that the French Army of

the North consisted of a very small, mature population. The Getman troops were much younger

and better trained. "The officers were considered the best in the world on a tactical and

operational level " (answers.comltopic/battle-of-france).

In May 1940, the allied command was still committed to a plan that predicted victory on the

Escaut where English troops of the British Expedition Forces (BEF) and French Army of the

North (FAN) were in support of the Belgian army. They did not even suspect that the entire

central front of the French line of defense had abruptly surrendered, allowing the Germans to

create a wedge that with the passing of time proceeded more and more quickly toward the sea

breaking every resistance ( answers.com/topic/battle-of-france).

Amplifying the insufferable conduct of its commanders, French troops' belief in the

invulnerability of the "Ligne Maginot" (Maginot Line) led them to become extremely

discouraged when they learned that the enemy was already racing forward on French ground.

The push from the Germans split the front in half. The southern part included all the divisions of

the still unemployed forces of the Maginot Line unusable because they lacked the transportation

to relocate in time to reinforce the other heavily engaged forces. The only hope was the FAN,

who together with the BEF, had fought less and had suffered fewer losses. Though General

6 Dunkirk

Gamelin had briefed the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, of the lack

of adequate forces, equipment, and training, he was dismissed on 20 May for failing to contain

the German offensive (answers.comltopiclbattle-of-france).

Gamelin's replacement, Maxime Weygand, a 73-year-old hero of the First World War and

Marshal of France, was certainly worthy of the assignment entrusted to him. Marchal Maxime

Weygand's ability as a tactician and strategist was undeniable, but he had no better resources

than those available to Gamelin. Only two days prior, he was in Beirut, Lebanon. Urgently

recalled, he was transported by plane across the Mediterranean with great risk of being

intercepted by German squadrons. After a delay in Tunis, he was again in flight toward France,

arriving the morning of20 May. The new leader for the French military, responsible of the

destiny of France, did not even know his staff but would still have to stop the Nazi advance. On

that same day as Weygand assumed control, the Germans conquered Abbeville, reaching the

Channel separating the British and Belgian forces in Flanders from the main French armies. By

then, the battle was already lost (Spartacus.schoolnet.co.uklFRweygand.htm).

Weygand's best quality was indisputably pragmatism. He refused any offensive planning on

paper but preferred a direct contact with the front to understand the genuine conditions of his

soldiers. To do this, he planned an inspection at Dunkirk. He immediately started to realize the

disastrous breakdown in the communications of the French army. He originally planned to travel

by train, under the mistaken certainty that there was still a direct link with the Army of the North.

To get out of the emergent trap, Weygand conceived what he believed to be the most logical plan.

He put every thought of an offensive towards the east in the direction of Belgium aside and

planned what became known as the "Weygand plan." This plan was a maneuver of approach in

north-south direction between the two separated allied armies. Already unsound in theory, in

7 Dunkirk

practice the plan presented immediate difficulties. Most important was the division among the

allied commanders. The senior leaders of Great Britain, France and Belgium threatened to fail

the initiative from the beginning. With the purpose of arranging a plan of common action,

Weygand once again assumed the risk of flying up to the encircled battle zone for a meeting with

the combined senior military leadership. The mission soon transformed into an adventure of

legendary status. Under unremitting attack from German bombers, Weygand was forced to land

and to take off three times due to the absolute lack of information about the precise location

where all the commands had gathered. Finally reaching Calais, he was informed he must retrace

his steps because the meeting had been organized in Ypres! Upon arrival in the town building of

the city, none of the desired participants were present. After an exhaustive wait, only Billottes,

the French general in command of the First Army Corps and King Leopold of Belgium (chief

commander of the armed forces of Bruxelles) arrived. Weygand summarily presented his ideas

to reunify the two allied sections but discovered, to his surprise, that the operation was already

partially in progress under the initiative of Gort. Gort had, on May 20, entrusted the assignment

to the 5th and 50th British Divisions to reduce the hostile breach in the direction of the Escaut.

An English-French disengagement of troops from the "oriental scenery" of the east was arranged

to allow an offensive toward the south. Belgian forces had to sustain the withdrawal by

increasing engagement with the units of the Wehrmacht (Spartacus.schoolnet.co.ukl

FRweygand.htm).

The definite program on the agenda Ypres possessed two enormous enigmas: the real ability

and wish of resistance of the Belgians and the obedience of the British general Gort. Lord John

Gort taught at the Staff College, and in 1925, was promoted to colonel. In 1930, he was

appointed as Commander of the Guards Brigade, and in 1936 he was appointed to the post as

8 Dunkirk

commander of the Staff College - a post he held up to 1939. In 1937, Gort became a full general

(Spartacus.schoolnet.co.ukl2WWgort.htm).

It seemed likely that no other British senior army leader of the time would have done any

better than Gort. Gort arrived in Ypres after the sunset and had knowledge of the plan of the

French general from Billotte. He was fully committed to the French directives without opposing

anything, recognizing in the maneuver the only possibility of unblocking of the zone near Calais

and Dunkirk. On May 23, the Expedition Corp perfected the withdrawal from the Belgian

territory, leaving only units of rear-guard of the 5th and 50th Divisions, already harshly stricken

in the attacks of the three previous days (answers.com/topiclbattle-of-france).

For the whole day on May 25, Gort was concerned by this second order, knowing that the

staving in of the Belgian lines was by now a matter of days or hours. He had also thought some

days before about affecting a general retreat for the re-embarkation in direction of Dunkirk, but

Churchill's government had refused with vigor citing reasons of "opportunity." How could they

abandon the French ally to its destiny and bring home the English troops practically intact

without risk of being accused of cowardliness? Gort, however, after days of waiting without any

novelty, assumed responsibility to communicate the order that led off the retreat toward the sea:

General Franklin had to bring back the 5th and 50th divisions toward Ypres to Dunkirk. The

Weygand plan was definitely abandoned (answers.com/topiclbattle-of-france).

On Monday, May 27, 1940, the Belgian army capitulated. Putting aside the political problem,

the collapse of Belgium involved what Gort had estimated: the whole left front of the Allies was

crumbled in the turn of a few hours. His preventive maneuver to move the 5th and 50th

Divisions to coverage of the region was scarcely enough to save him from the disaster. The

gravity of the crisis was immediately clear in London from where on May 27, at 1300 hours, it

9 Dunkirk

was telegraphically communicated to general Gort to evacuate the greatest number of men

possible.

Intelligently, the English Command omitted to point out if in the evacuation they had to also

include the French forces of the 16th Corp of the Army of the North that defended the line

between Gravelines and Bergues and the rest of the 1st Army. The French did not know what

orders to follow because their command had fallen in the chaos at the moment of the Belgian

capitulation with the subsequent collapse of the border defenses. The destruction of the French

Army of the North and the British Expedition Corp were imminent. The strengths disposition on

the field was the following: the 16th French Corp defended the right line of the new perimeter of

defense planned around Dunkirk and, in practice, they were the only force near enough to the

port to reasonably be saved. The remaining forces, the French and British were disseminated

between the sea city and Armentiere, a small town at little distance from Lille, forming a corridor

with too long sides to be effectively defended by the men at disposition, particularly the 44th and

48th British Divisions that kept the sides of the wedge. In the meantime, on the evening of May

28, Operation Dynamo, the repatriation of the British Expedition Corp, had started

( answers.com/topic/battle-of-france).

Battlefield conditions played a key role in the success of Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk.

There has always been a potent and omnipresent synergy between the environment, or physical

geography, and battle (Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne, 1). Nearly 340,000 British and French

troops were evacuated from the port of Dunkirk. The key elements were the German and Allied

Armament, firepower, terrain in Europe and mountains, Dunkirk ports, sea conditions, and

weather conditions that affected the war and operation Dynamo.

Dunkirk 10

The Battle of Dunkirk was a major battle during World War II which lasted from around May

26 to June 4, 1940. A large force of British and French were cut off in northeast France by a

German Armored advance to the Channel coast at Calais. Over 330,000 Allied troops were

evacuated by sea (Wikipedia, 1).

The German and Allied Armament were very similar and the firepower for each actually

favored the Allies. Clearly, the German military was very powerful during the start of World

War II. In overall strength, the allied forces had no reason to be intimidated. The French Army

by itself was as large as the German Army; with the addition of the British Expeditionary Force

(BEF) and the Belgian and Dutch, the allies were superior. The Allied also had 3,500 tanks to

the Germans 2,800 (Tanner, 144).

The French Char B was the best tank on either side, and the French Somua and British

Matilda were comparable to the most powerful German tank, the Mark IV. These tanks on both

sides mounted only machine guns. The German Luftwaffe held a slight advantage over the

combined Allied air forces in number of planes. The real advantage held by the Germans as the

Battle of France approached was that they were the aggressors. The German General Staff

would decide where the crucial action would take place, and they could mass their forces

accordingly (Tanner, 144). The German and Allied Armament and firepower played a factor but

terrain played a factor in the decision making of leaders and the chain of command.

In simplest terms, Europe can be described as a large peninsula with many small peninsulas

that extend westward from Asia. Because of its shape and the adjacent water bodies it has the

most maritime friendly climate of all continents (Winters, Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne, 15).

The terrain of Flanders proved to be a consideration for Adolf Hitler to halt his troops and

equipment. Flanders terrain is flat, swampy, and laced with a complex network of canals and

Dunkirk 11

ditches; it is poor country for tanks. The German Army was restricted to moving its tanks on

rural roads with limited cover; clearly, Guderian knew any further advance by his tanks would be

difficult. Although European terrains are a consideration in the planning process, the seaports at

Dunkirk and water played a significant factor in Operation Dynamo (Winters, Galloway,

Reynolds, and Rhyne, 20).

The Dunkirk seaports or harbors were bombed by the Germans making the inner harbors or

seaports useless for embarkation, but the Germans could not destroy two long channel

penetrating jetties, or moles. These moles or barriers were constructed well into the sea to aid

docking navigation and to protect the harbor from storm waves. The shorter west mole was

made of stone, as was the shoreward section of the longer east mole, but farther out the east mole

consisted of openwork concrete pilings through which the sea flowed (Winters, Galloway,

Reynolds, and Rhyne, 21).

The east mole extending 1600 M (4250 ft) from shore was especially important in the

evacuation of the troops from Dunkirk. At the same time, smaller craft evacuated other soldiers

from the sandy beaches. This second task would have been impossible except for the small

vessels pool of wooden-hulled boats, fortunately and coincidentally organized only a few weeks

earlier to assist in the search for the new German magnetic mines in the English Channel

(Winters, Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne, 21). The sea conditions and weather is always a

factor in war and this war was no different.

War and the environment are intertwined in a complex, diverse, and often capricious fashion,

the result being an ever-varying military cacophony incorporating repetition, counterpoint,

juxtaposition, inversion, and reversal, all within the evolving framework of space and time

(Winters, Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne, 1).

Dunkirk 12

Dunkirk and the nearby Normandy coast are about 50 degrees north of the equator, making

them central to evolving mid-latitude weather patterns of Western Europe. Location and strong

maritime influences favor the year-round passage of east-moving wave cyclones that bring

clouds, wind, high humidity, rapid weather changes, and pronounced seasonal differences

(Winters, Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne, 16).

The slow deterioration ofNorthwest European weather from April through June results partly

from the decreasing pressure of the Siberian high winds, which, in tum, permits a greater number

of cyclones to track through the area, bringing storms and very rough seas. It can be said that the

best weather season is in April. After April the weather patterns change significantly. Military

leaders have to take this into consideration during their planning phase. Adolph Hitler would

learn this lesson during World War II and the Battle of Dunkirk (Winters, Galloway, Reynolds,

and Rhyne, 16).

During the Battle of Dunkirk the evacuation was hampered by heavy rain that may have

discouraged a final attack by the German Panzers. In addition, a large cyclone was over the mid

Atlantic and appeared to be heading for the English Channel. Such a storm, with high winds,

and waves would certainly have slowed the evacuation process further (Winters, Galloway,

Reynolds, and Rhyne, 21).

The Battle of Dunkirk was hampered by weather which limited the fighting capability of the

German Air and Land Campaign. The twist of fate made possible by the weather conditions

during this time enabled the allies to evacuate Dunkirk and rescue thousands of military

personnel. It also allowed a number of British personnel to regroup in England and prepare to

meet the Germans again the next year in North Africa (Winters, Galloway, Reynolds, and Rhyne,

23).

Dunkirk 13

Battlefield conditions played a key role in the success of Operation Dynamo in Dunkirk . .

Military leaders must know their enemies forces, firepower, and equipment, but the most

important elements are terrain and weather conditions. These factors can either win or lose a war

for a country. The weather and terrain were a major factor in the success of Operation Dynamo

in Dunkirk, but Operation Dynamo itself would not be stopped due to any battlefield conditions.

The British soldier' indomitable spirit was a key to the successful evacuation, but this spirit

would not have been enough if Hitler had not delayed his panzer division's advance. Even

though only one British battalion covered the Aa (80 km long river in northern France) between

Gravelines and St. Orner, Hitler believed that the Division needed time to close up and regroup

before progressing any further. He also believed that it would serve him better to not completely

destroy the British forces. He stated that "all he wanted from Britain was that she acknowledge

Germany's position on the Continent... His aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that

she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept" (Hibbert, 149). Goering took

advantage of this anxiety. Goering hoped to gain the accolades of success with his air force in

this region. He believed that if the Luftwaffe could win the victory, the prestige of the Fuerher

would remain intact. This delay, for whatever reason, was exactly what the British needed to

allow the time to plan, resource, and execute one of the most daring and successful evacuations

in military history.

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was tenuously holding 87 miles of front with only

seven divisions with enemy forces in contact along the entire front. The Germans had already

penetrated the Belgian line and poor decisions by the French rendered them ineffective in

helping to suppress the German advance. Additionally, "all administrative and training unit and

other non-combatant troops" (Hibbert,156) needed to evacuate before any combat troops could

Dunkirk 14

withdraw. This made the borrowed time from the Panzer halt invaluable to the evacuation of

thousands of troops.

"On May 20, a meeting had been called at Dover in the deep galleries of the east cliff below

the castle. Here, in a large room which had held an electrical plant during the First World War

and was consequently known as the 'Dynamo Room', Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay had

opened a discussion of the' emergency evacuation across the Channel of very large forces' .

Ramsay, an enterprising, clear-headed, somewhat aloof and decidedly didactic officer of 57,

whose career had been impeded by an inability to accommodate himself to the idiosyncrasies of

his superiors, knew the Straits of Dover well. He had served there in the First World War, and in

1938, had been called from the Retired List to examine the harbour and port and the state of their

defenses. On the outbreak of war, he had taken over command as Flag Officer in Charge. His

first main problem, of course, was to find enough ships to evacuate so large a number of men in

the short time which would be allowed him" (Hibbert, 150).

Fortunately, the British people rallied together to provide every available vessel to support the

operation. Owners of ferry steamers, specifically designed to operate in the channel, self.,.

propelled barges, paddle steamers, and pleasure crafts offered their services. Also available were

"40 Dutch coasters (schuits) which had steamed over after the fall of Holland and which were

now manned by crews of the Royal Navy" (Hibbert, 156).

Originally, the plan was to use three ports for the evacuation. But, by 23 May, the Germans

were once again on the attack. Boulogne and Calais were no longer available. Only "30 odd

miles between Gravelines and Nieuport, either side of Dunkirk" (Hibbert, 156) remained under

Allied control. The corridor into the port at Dunkirk had to be kept open if the men were to

reach the evacuation point. Lord John Gort, Commander-in-chief of the BEF, knew that he

Dunkirk 15

would have to fight his way all the way back to the beach. Sir Ronald Adam, on orders from

Gort, and French General Fagalde organized a tighter perimeter around Dunkirk. "The British

sector was divided into three - one segment for each corps - and each segment had its own strip

of beach for the evacuation, and its own ammunition and food dumps inside the perimeter with a

collecting area outside it. To solve the problem of traffic congestion, all vehicles, with very few

exceptions, were to be abandoned beyond the canals.

"Brigadier Lawson was given the task of organizing the troops already in the perimeter and of

strengthening the defenses along the canals as the remainder came in (Hibbert, 157)." The

remainder would not get through until much later. By the 28 th , the Belgian army surrendered

exposing a large segment of the perimeter. The BEF 2nd COrpS, under General Brooke, fought

hard to repel the Germans over an ever widening front. The 50th Division and eventually, the 4th

and 3rd Divisions expanded to reinforce the eastern wall of the corridor into Dunkirk. However,

the German 256th Division threatened to exploit the line with an impromptu assault before the

gap was fully defended. The armored cars of the 1 i h Lancers thwarted that effort and brought a

halt to the attack. Lawson fortified the Lancers with a "scratch force of gunners and engineers

fighting as infantry" before a heavier attack from the persistent Germans. Units from the French

60 th Division joined in the battle and the 4th Division from Dixmude redirected its efforts towards

the defense by order from General Brooke. The Germans would break through a small area,

pushing back the Allies. To their credit, these forces held a tenacious line between the Germans

and the evacuation corridor. "Six divisions of the French 1 st Army were surrounded southwest of

Lille, where for four days they bravely continued a hopeless struggle under the leadership of

General Molinie, pinning down seven German divisions well away from the Dunkirk perimeter"

Dunkirk 16

(Hibbert, 157). Such was the fighting all along the perimeter for securing the terrain that would

allow forces to withdraw to the evacuation port.

"By midnight on the 29th , the greater part of the BEF and nearly half of the French 1 st Army"

(Hibbert, 157) finally reached the canals that would lead them to ' safety' . There they found that

most of the casualties from the base hospitals and a large number of other non-combatants had

embarked on 25 May, with more wounded and base personnel following later. On 26 May, the

Admiralty signaled Dover that 'Operation Dynamo' would commence. Admiral Ramsay' s

challenges were just beginning. Dover was not naturally ab.le to adapt to the congestion that

would result during the evacuation. Dover had eight cross-Channel steamer berths and only

about 50 mooring buoys. Soon 20 ships "were moored in tiers three deep" (Hibbert, 159). ' These

buoys also supported the refueling and restocking of supplies for all ships. On the opposite shore,

things were even worse. Several days of continuous aerial bombing had destroyed the

waterworks and mains and the docks were useless. All that was left was a guiding jetty and two

moles - the West (oil storage area) and the East (most important for its three-quarter mile plank

way to the roadstead. Not created for the berthing of ships, docking on the East mole was

difficult without enemy interference. Still, to contend with, was the problem of how to protect

the ship movement within the Channel. The route had to be swept for mines and a plan for

countering the German battery shelling and aerial bombings was needed. Enemy ships added

even more to this already dangerous mix of complex elements.

For the men, fighting their way to the port of Dunkirk was more than just perilous.

Sometimes the flames of burning oil, tanks and warehouses, sheds, and quayside offices

prevented any passage and the bombing was brutal. The chosen plan called for the smaller

vessels to transport the men from the beaches on either side of the main port area and then

Dunkirk 17

shuttled out to the larger vessels. The smaller vessels could get into and out of the evacuation

points where larger ships could not.

However, a shortage still existed in the number of small boats needed to get such a large

number of men out within the forecasted two-day window of opportunity. Intelligence

information predicted that that was the extent of time available before the oppressive German

forces would cease the operation. Soon, many more small vessels were on their way. From all

over the south and east coasts and from the banks of the Thames, owners of yachts and private

boats came to offer their support.

By midnight on Sunday, 30,000 men had reached Dover safely. Nevertheless, on Monday,

the intensity of the enemy increased, several more ships were damaged, and some turned back.

It was clear that they would have to abandon the mine-swept short route to Dunkirk because of

the heavy shelling from Calais. They would have to take the route that ran north of the Goodwin

sands to K winte Buoy to the northwest of Ostend, 48 miles longer. This significantly increased

the exposure to the Germany Luftwaffe. Sixteen Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter aircraft

dispatched to patrol the route.

Captain Tennant (the Senior Naval Officer) came ashore at Dunkirk and realized that they

would need every available craft at the eastern beaches of Dunkirk. It was obvious to him that

time was running out. A chief officer from the cross-Channel steamer, 'Queen a/the Channel'

wrote of his experience during one part of the evacuation, "Our guns with others were in action.

We landed a man on the pier to hang on to our ropes. About 8 pm, Lieutenant-Commander

William's, Royal Navy, came on board and told the captain to proceed out of the harbour, lower

his boats and get the men on board from the beach. We arrived at the anchorage .... When I was

about to lower the fourth boat we received the information that there were a number of troops

Dunkirk 18

arriving at the pier. With the remainder of the crew we still had on board we proceeded

alongside the pier. We got about 600 men on board. They were arriving in batches.

About 11 pm, we were told there were no more men in the vicinity, so we cut our mooring

ropes. On hearing more men running along the pier, we got the ship alongside the pier again and

got about 80 more men on board. During our stay alongside there we had four air raids. While

we were leaving the pier the enemy dropped illuminated parachutes which lit up the whole sea

front. Our Captain backed the vessel up the harbour under the smoke screen made available to

us from the burning town of Dunkirk. We then proceeded to try and pick up our boats and

crew ... " (Hibbert, 159).

This recount gives a clear example of the tedious task in evacuating the men. Keep in mind

that the men were fighting all the way back to the beaches. The situation had become so tenuous

that only 2,500 men were evacuated that night. The arrival of more small craft would be the only

hope of salvaging the operation. Captain Tennant knew that he must attempt to use the very

treacherous East Mole. Its below pier tidal activity made it extremely dangerous. The attempt

was a success and they got many more men on board. The following day, full use was made of

East Mole. Soon, in spite of all of the obstacles, as many as 900 men were being evacuated in

each trip. The ships used every available space to allow for the maximum number of men to

board. David Divine wrote that the ships could not fire their guns because they were so top

heavy. Instead "they heeled over to wild and impossible angles" "to avoid action against falling

bombs" (Hibbert, 159).

Sadly, these bombs could not be avoided. The wrecks of ships, floating bodies and other

debris made navigation nearly impossible. Once berthed, ships were often shelled in place

because they could not move since other ships had docked along side and to the front and rear of

Dunkirk 19

her trying to get as many men on board as possible. If a ship managed to get out of the docks,

she might very well be shelled while traversing the Channel. Dive bombings, magnetic mines,

and hitting the hidden wrecks of other destroyed ships once in the Channel caused the loss of

thousands of men so recently removed from the shores of Dunkirk. By the 29t \ the situation at

the Dunkirk Channel crossing was deplorable.

Torpedoes, aerial bombing, and lumps of propelled concrete, and more mines and debris sank

ships at an alarming rate. A change in the wind caused the before screening smoke from burning

Dunkirk to shift away from Allied advantage. By 1900 hours, the harbor at Dunkirk was

inaccessible because of the blockage of damaged ships, and all evacuation was back at the

beaches. So many modem destroyers were lost that the remainder had to withdraw or see the

destruction of the future of British sea lifelines. Only 15 of the older and smaller destroyers were

to remain available for the operation.

Things looked bleak. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was sent over to Dunkirk to strengthen the

naval organization off Dunkirk. He made Admiral Ramsay 'acutely' aware of the situation and

by 1530, "six of the modem destroyers were ordered to return immediately to the operation"

(Hibbert, 160). Finally, they got a break. Quieter seas, low cloud cover, and the return of the

'Dunkirk burning' smoke screen made for easier progress. At the East Mole engineers had also

constructed jetties out of the abandoned vehicles that could be driven from the beaches. Allan

Barrell of the Shamrock (a pleasure craft) wrote: "We stared and stared at what looked like

thousands of sticks on the beach and were amazed to see them tum into moving masses of

humanity .... We could seat sixty men and with those standing we had about eighty weary and

starving British troops, some without boots, some only in their pants, but enough life left in them

to clamber on board the destroyers.

Dunkirk 20

Repeatedly we brought our cargo to this ship until she was full .... Later I took in two or three

large Carley floats one behind the other. These were filled to capacity, about fifty men in each

standing up to their waists in water in the net inside. My craft was loaded, too. We were just

making for our destroyer when I was brought to a standstill ; my engine stopped, the propeller

had fouled, I believe, a human obstruction. There were many of these in the shallow water.

Naval men came down and tried to free the obstruction but without success. I was too weak to

dive under the thick black oil which surrounded us, so rather than be left sitting on our useless

raft I asked to be taken on HM ship.

This was the last straw, having to leave my vessel which constituted my life savings ... I took

one more glance at the beach and sat down beneath a gun with my hands over my face and

prayed" (Hibbert, 160). There was also chaos on the beach. Men were running into the water,

fearing being left behind. Many drowned in the surf. Yet the day saw 53.823 men evacuated,

6,500 more than the previous day. The next day was not so successful. The natural forces that

had helped the day before were absent and the Germans attacked with renewed vigor. The RAF

lost more than 28 aircraft that day and on Saturday, the Luftwaffe's heaviest attack of the

operation took another 31. In light of the current situation, Admiral Ramsay concluded that

daytime operations were too costly and ordered that they cease. This would also give the

exhausted rescue crews time for much needed rest.

During this brief respite, fighting to hold the ever shrinking perimeter around Dunkirk

continued and the Germans prepared for an all out assault. Up to this point, the Germans had

failed to grasp the impact of the operations at Dunkirk. They envisioned that they were on a sure

path to destroying both the French and British forces confined within their restraint. This was

after Hitler decided to go forward with the attack because the British would not accept his offer

Dunkirk 21

to alliance themselves with him. When finally they recognized the import of the event, they

were even more determined to see that vision come to fruition.

The beginning of the last full night of the evacuation was proving the most difficult. The

beachheads, the docks, and the Channel were terribly blocked by debris. The remaining men

who had been the last line of defense around Dunkirk now were a giant mass waiting to be

evacuated. The men were "hungry, thirsty, and desperately tired, their minds tortured by the

screeching of the dive-bombers' whistles, the ships' sirens, the exploding bombs, the rattle of

machine-guns, the shouts and screams of men", (Hibbert, 161) some broke down completely.

Soon though, thankfully, most men noticed that the bombs were having little effect. The shells

would sink into the sand with tall columns of sand muting and diminishing their blast. Other

than taking a direct hit, getting behind a bank, an old mattress, or getting into a foxhole was all

the protection needed. Finally, the last of the non-combat troops were evacuated and the mass of

men still waiting were those accustomed to battle. Before long, "dive-bombers were met not

only by the guns of the ships at sea, but the rifle fire of the men on the beaches" (Hibbert, 161).

Some of the humor, legendary to British soldiers, had returned. Yorkshire Army Gunners

began "singing as they waited for their tum, 'Oh, I do like to be beside the seaside!'" (Hibbert,

164). One ship was pulling men out of the water after the ship they were on capsized. One

fellow, having come up under the overturned boat tapped and asked "What shall I do". (Hibbert,

164) His rescuers told him to duck down and come out without playing any 'hide and seek'. As

he was pulled into the boat the "little Cockney ... gasped like a landed fish: 'Gawd, what a bloody

nightmare" (Hibbert, 164)!

Though most of the days of the operation were a nightmare for all involved, the last day was

far less muddled. The combat hardened sergeants had all of the waiting men staged in such an

Dunkirk 22

orderly fashion that they appeared to be ready to march in a parade. By midnight on 1 June,

64,429 men had left Dunkirk during that day's evacuation. "The next night Operation Dynamo

was completed" (Hibbert, 164).

Left behind was the French rearguard. They fought bravely but the heavy fighting pushed

them all the way back to within two miles of the East Mole. British and French Admiralties had

agreed to evacuate 30,000 French troops but there were far more than that in Dunkirk. As word

spread that the last ship was departing, French soldiers swarmed the beach. They came out of the

cellars and holes rushing to try to grasp the last chance to leave Dunkirk to safety. As the final

ship, the Shikari, sailed out of Dunkirk, 40,000 French remained, captured by the Germans.

However, 338,226 men evacuated from Dunkirk.

The British public believed that the Evacuation of Dunkirk was a great victory; and for the

men now safely back on home soil, they could not think of it any other way. Even with the loss

of 68, III killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, the BEF could still credit this to its future survival.

However, the loss of vast quantities of equipment "(2,472 guns, 63,879 vehicles, 20,548

motorcycles, and well over 500,000 tons of stores and ammunition)" (Hibbert, 164) indicated that

the army they saved had nothing, or little, to defend the country with. The Royal Navy learned

how vulnerable it was to aerial bombing and out of the 1,000 ships used in the evacuation, 243

(including six destroyers) sank at Dunkirk with another 19 other destroyers severely damaged.

Prime Minister Churchill remarked, "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance

the attributes ofa victory. Wars are not won by evacuations" (Hibbert, 164). "But if Dunkirk,

even in the limited sense which Churchill mentioned, could not be considered an emotional

victory, it did achieve something of inestimable value: for the first time, perhaps, since the war

began, the British people were wholeheartedly determined to fight and to win. They had seen for

Dunkirk 23

themselves what modem warfare meant" (Hibbert, 164). "But they had seen, too, a brilliant

display of improvisation, an inspiring example of fortitude and self-sacrifice" (Hibbert, 164).

Churchill's 4 June speech to the House of Commons said, "The British should fight on the

beaches and on the landing grounds, in the fields, and in the streets and in the hills, and that they

should never surrender". "He was not forming public opinion - he was reflecting it. The

Dunkirk spirit was born" (Hibbert, 164).

Based on the facts and assumptions presented some would stake the claim that a miracle took

place at the battle of Dunkirk. Nearly 340,000 British and French troops were evacuated from the

besieged port of Dunkirk. At the time the British government and the press as kind of a victory

portrayed the event. The "Spirit of Dunkirk" became a powerful instrument to help sustain

morale at home and rally support abroad. However, some historians maintain the belief that the

battle of Dunkirk was no miracle at all. In fact, there is evidence that would support that the

Battle of Dunkirk was a military catastrophe. Records indicate that the initial retreat of men was

poorly planned and executed which led to the onslaught of thousands of soldiers. The soldiers

killed needlessly as a result of the failed retreat could have very well been used later in the many

other battles of World War II (Lutton.html). Additionally, positive communication between the

allies did not exist. The communication was so bad in some instances that it lead to betrayal

within the coalition. The many stages of the retreat took place in many facets and phases on the

battlefield; but none of it was properly communicated to the allies. Was this intentional? In some

cases the bad communication was an after effect of poor equipment and faulty systems.

Nevertheless, these systems do not account for the failure in the coalition chain of command.

These failures prevented the allies from being properly informed. Proper communication could

Dunkirk 24

have very well been the turning point in the United States relationship with the allies and the

success of the war.

The French sacrificed many lives during World War II, in some cases during different battles

they lost more men than the United States Armed Forces. When the French learned of the retreat

by the British Expeditionary Forces, it was too late for them to make proper preparations for

their own departure. Instead, they attempted to board the same vessels that the British had

arranged for during the retreat. However, this was met with much resistance.

Men were killed and simply executed as the French tried to board the British vessels. The

thought process for such cowardly actions was to allow for as much needed passenger space for

the American and British Expeditionary forces. The intent of the British Expeditionary Force

was never communicated to the French. Ironically, even though the French were not kept

abreast of the coalitions retreat, word did travel back to Hitler. As a result, he slowed his

advance on positions within that region. Hitler's intent was carried out by General Von

Rundstedt. The German Forces were commanded to stop! This gave them the much needed rest

that they deserved and allowed for them to perform local repairs on the armored vehicles. The

slow of the German Forces advance could have been considered an act of humanity or a gesture

to gain support for his initiatives in the War. Nevertheless, Hitler was still met with much force

and all the military might that could be mustered in every other region where battles continued to

take place.

Hitler never regained his strength in Dunkirk; as a matter of a fact, he began to lose his foot

hold. When the offensive resumed, the German priorities had shifted and the focus of the attack

was Paris and the Heartland of the country, where a large bodi of French troops remained.

Dunkirk then became a sideshow for the German Forces! Some historians cite that had Hitler

Dunkirk 25

continued to pursue his intentions in that region, the German impression would have traveled a

lot further west. Today, we could very well all be speaking German. The United States Armed

forces led by Vice Admiral Ramsay took note of Adolph Hitler's lack of aggression. The plan

was then crafted to return to the shores to remove and pull back the rest of our forces from the

beaches of Dunkirk. On 24 May 1940, Hitler's actions led to the now celebrated Military

Operation Dynamo. The evacuation took place on 26 May 1940. Originally, it was only

intended to remove 45,000 men. However, the actual total came to 338,000 men. Although the

German Forces at this time were more focused on Paris and the Heartland of Germany, Hitler did

order the shores of Dunkirk to be bombarded. The weather hampered the offensive of the

Germans. Moreover, the steel arms of the British navy literally reached in to the Shores of

Dunkirk and removed our men; only this time the coalition was completely informed of our

intentions and it became a unified effort of both military and civilian vessels accomplishing this

so called victory (BBC News).

In conclusion, Operation Dynamo saw many failures. These failures could very well have

been perceived as the lack of a miracle at Dunkirk. Although a large number of military ships

and civilian vessels were used during this rescue, the operation itself was not cited for its success.

Hitler's failed strategy could have led to a major part of the operation's success, and the weather

could have contributed as well. Nonetheless, the men were rescued. Hopefully as military

analysts and strategists continue to review this operation, they will note that it was the spirit of

the men that led to the victory. A better planned operation would have helped drastically.

Eventually, synchronization would have saved many lives!

Dunkirk 26

Works Cited

Alan Bullock. Hitler: a study in tyranny. London: Odhams Press Limited, 1952.

"Battle of France." Answers.com.

"Battle of Dunkirk." Wikipedia Encyclopedia. 10 October 2005 . . "Battle

of Dunkirk" Lutton.html. 26 December 2005 < http: www.ihr.org/jhr/vo2/vo2p 375_>

Braunbeck Jr. , Paul A. , MAl. "The Military Leadership Analysis of Adolph Hitler" .

March 1997. .

"Dunkersky, zazrak. http://web.fazole.cz/plateklart.asp?id=6235>

"Kveten 1940, Dunkirque."

"General Maxime W eygand." Spartacus Educational.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. History of the Second World War. New York: Putnam's, 1970.

Hibbert, Christopher "Operation Dynamo." History of the Second World War, Part 6,

1973: 146-165.

Heinz Guderian. Panzer leader, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York:

Dutton & Co, 1952.

Home, Alister. To lose a battle: France 1940. Boston: Little, Brown and Company,

1969

"John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort."

"General John Gort." Spartacus Educational.

La Battaille De France, DVD, directed by Jean Aurel (1964, Zodiac).

Dunkirk 27

Parkinson, Roger. Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat. New York: David McKay Company

Inc., 1973.

"Svetova valka." Dunkirque.

Tanner, Stephen. Epic Retreats from 1776 to the Evacuation of Saigon. Sarpedon, 2000.

"The Miracle of Dunkirk" BBC News. 26 December 2005.

Taylor, Telford. The march of conquest. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.

Winters, Galloway, wr dl. Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War.

John Hopkins University Press, 1998.

"World War II European western front, World War II operations and battles of France." Battle of

France.