Barbara Erickson:From “Rosie the Riveter” to B–17 Pilot 4 ... Fare: Stories, Poems & Essays on...

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Book ReviewsAmerican Combat Planes of the 20th Century

by Ray Wagner Reviewed by George CullySplendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the Untied States Air Force

during the First Century of Powered Flightby Aeronautical Systems Center History Office Reviewed by Christopher A. Waln

Today’s Best Military Writing: The Finest Articles on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.S. Militaryby Walter J. Boyne Reviewed by John D. Sherwood

The First Space Race: Launching the World’s First Satellitesby Matt Bille and Erika Lishock Reviewed by Rick W. Sturdevant

Air Fare: Stories, Poems & Essays on Flightby Nickole Brown and Judith Taylor, eds Reviewed by Bruce Ashcroft

Mario Calderara Aviator and Inventor: The First Italian Pilot Pupil of Wilbur Wrightby Lodovico Calderara and Attilio Marchetti. Reviewed by Roger G. Miller

Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Rocket, 1958-2002by Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles Reviewed by James A. Painter

Thatch Weave: The Life of Jimmie Thatchby Steve Ewing Reviewed by Robert W. Covey

The Ploesti Raid: Through the Lensby Roger A. Freeman Reviewed by Ramsey Gorchev

Ask the Chief: Backbone of the Navyby J.F. Leahy Reviewed by Dennis Berger

Amelia Earhart: Case Closed?by Walter Roessler and Leo Gomez, with Gail Lynne Green. Reviewed by Scott R. Marquiss

Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman’s Glory Days Fadedby George M. Skurla and William H. Gregory Reviewed by Ronald W. McCaffrey

Then There Were Six: The True Story of the 1944 Rangoon Disasterby Karnig Thomasian Reviewed by Jeffrey P. Joyce

Rockets and Missiles: The Life Story of a Technologyby A. Bowdoin Van Riper &

Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketryby Mike Gruntman Reviewed by Jacob Neufeld

Books ReceivedComing UpLetters, News, Notices, ReunionsHistory Mystery

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SUMMER 2005 - Volume 52, Number 2

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Barbara Erickson:From “Rosie the Riveter” to B–17 PilotSarah Byrn Rickman

The Dam Busters’ Raid: Success or SideshowT. M. Webster

The Dawn of Aviation in the Middle East:The First Flying Machines over IstanbulGary Leiser

TheFogofWar:Lt.Kenneth M.Taylor on December 7, 1941George R. Farfour 42

FRONT COVER: Barbara Erickson. (Photo courtesy of the author.)BACK COVER: World War II poster, commonly called “Rosie the Riveter,” although others were as well.

2 AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2005

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Trustees and members are grateful for theirsupport and contributions to preserving, perpetuating,and publishing the history and traditions of Americanaviation.

BenefactorMrs. Ruth A. (Ira C.) Eaker Estate

PatronMaj. Gen. Ramsay PottsQuesada Foundation

SponsorsMaj. Gen. William LyonMaj. Gen. John S. PattonGen. William Y. Smith

DonorsMr. John F. DonahueEmerson ElectricRockwell InternationalGen. Bernard A. Schriever

SupportersThe Aerospace CorporationAllied-Signal Aerospace CorporationArthur Metcalf FoundationLt. Gen. John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret)CSX CorporationGen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Brig. Gen. Brian S. GundersonMaj. Gen. John P. HenebryGen. & Mrs. Robert T. HerresMaj. Gen. Harold E. HumfeldMcDonnell Douglas FoundationMrs. Irene W. McPhersonMaj. Gen. Kenneth P. MilesNorthrop-Grumman CorporationMr. William O’RourkeMr. James PartonMr. George PendeltonPratt & WhitneyUnited TechnologiesCapt. William C. WardMaj. Gen. Richard A. Yudkin

Annual Contributing MembersANSERARX, Inc.ASTECH/MCI Manufacturing, Inc.Beech Aircraft CorporationBoeing Defense & Space GroupGeneral Electric CompanyInstrument Systems Corp.Litton IndustriesLockheed Martin Corp.The Mitre CorporationNorthrop CorporationVinell Corporation

Officers

PresidentLt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret)Vice-PresidentGen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Secretary-TreasurerMaj. Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Executive Director Col. George K. Williams, USAF (Ret)

Advisors

Gen. John P. Jumper, USAFLt. Gen. John R. Dallager, USAFLt. Gen. Donald A. Lamontagne, USAFBrig. Gen. Frederick F. Roggero, USAFCMSAF Gerald R. Murray, USAFMr. C. R. “Dick” Anderegg

Board of Trustees

Col. Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Mr. F. Clifton Berry, Jr.Maj.Gen. Ralph S. Clem, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. John B. Conaway, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Russell C. Davis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret)Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, USAF(Ret)Maj.Gen. John P. Henebry, USAF (Ret)Col. George A. Henry, Jr., USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. James A. Jaeger, USAF (Ret)Mr. John Kreis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Walter Kross, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Hon. Hans MarkCMSgt Norman A. Marous, USAF Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF(Ret)CMSgtAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)Col. Robert E. Vickers, Jr., USAF (Ret)Col. George Weinbrenner, USAF(Ret)

Trustees Emeriti

Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Devol Brett, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. William E. Brown, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF (Ret)Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Mr. John E. GreenwoodGen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret)Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.Maj.Gen. Jeanne M. Holm, USAF (Ret)Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Donald S. Lopez, USAF (Ret)Col. Kenneth Moll, USAF (Ret)Col. Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Hon. Verne OrrMaj.Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret)Gen. W. Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)MSgt. Charles J. Warth, USAF (Ret)Col. Sherman W. Wilkins, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of theAir Force Historical Foundation

Summer 2005 Volume 52 Number 2

Publisher

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorScott A. Willey

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingGeorge K. Williams

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsi-bility for any damage to or loss of the man-uscript. The Editor reserves the right toedit manuscripts and letters.

Address Letters to the Editor to:

Air Power HistoryP.O. Box 10328Rockville, MD 20849-0328e-mail: [email protected]

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Advertising

George K. Williams1535 Command Dr--Suite A-122Andrews AFB, MD 20762-7002(301) 981-2139; fax (301) 981-3574e-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2005 by the Air ForceHistorical Foundation. All rights reserved.Periodicals postage paid at Lexington, VA24450 and additional mailing offices.

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The Air Force Historical FoundationAir Force Historical Foundation1535 Command Drive – Suite A122Andrews AFB, MD 20762-7002(301) 981-2139(301) 981-3574 FaxE-Mail: [email protected]://afhistoricalfoundation.com

3AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2005

The lead article in this issue is Sarah Rickman’s account of how Barbara J.Erickson managed to rise from “Rosie the Riveter” to become a B–17 pilot during WorldWar II. One of only seven surviving WAFS, “B. J.” was recently inducted into the presti-gious Women in Aviation International Hall of Fame.

Second, we revisit the Royal Air Force’s famous raid on the Ruhr Valley dams.Launched on the night of May 16-17, 1943, by 617 Squadron it was first hailed as a tri-umph of British arms but subsequently denigrated in importance. Now, sixty years later,T. M. Webster places the “Dam Busters” raid in perspective, arguing that it was a sig-nificant victory after all, albeit for different reasons than originally intended.

In the third article, Gary Leiser unveils the “Dawn of Aviation in the MiddleEast” in 1909, barely six years after the Wright brothers’ historic flight in NorthCarolina. Demonstration flights by Pierre de Caters and Louis Bleriot sparked theinterest of Turkish newsmen, bent on educating their countrymen about flying.

George Farfour seeks to dispel the significant amount of misinformation associ-ated with America’s first combat action of World War II. Concentrating on the roleplayed by one fighter pilot, 2d Lt. Kenneth M. Taylor, Farfour tells what really happenedon December 7, 1941.

Fifteen books are reviewed in this issue. Some merit praise, while others aregiven “two thumbs down.” Check them out for yourself to see whether or not you agreewith the reviewers. And, write to tell us your opinions. We welcome hearing from ourreaders. Also, look over the list of new books received. If you interested in writing areview, contact Scott Willey. See page 62.

Be sure not to miss the report by Air Force Historical Foundation’s president, Lt.Gen. Michael A. Nelson, who outlines the Strategic Plan and lays out the plan’s majorobjectives. General Nelson also discusses such new initiatives as an upgraded website,a funding challenge, and an Air Force Chronology book underway. See page 63.

The departments feature “Letters to the Editor,” announcements, news items,upcoming events, reunions, and the ever-popular History Mystery. Among the items inthe news, you’ll find the winner of the year 2004 “Outstanding Article in Air PowerHistory.” This is the first prize awarded in the category. Another of our articles is a final-ist in a U.S. Army competition. [Remember, we were once the U.S. Army Air Forces.]

Again, please write to the editor. We can only progress with feedback from ourreaders.

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.

AIR POWER History / SUMMER 2005 5

SSSSaaaarrrraaaahhhh BBBByyyyrrrrnnnn RRRRiiiicccckkkkmmmmaaaannnn

Barbara Erickson:From “Rosie the

Riveter” to B–17 Pilot

The cavernous interior of the aircraft fac-tory dwarfed the metal skeleton destinedto be a B–17’s left wing. On an adjacent

platform, a team of coverall-clad men and womenlifted a section of thin aluminum from a conveyorbelt and positioned the shiny square of skin overthe wing’s exposed ribs. They moved back as awoman wearing safety glasses and a bandanna tiedover her hair moved forward and began to buckrows of rivets into place.

Twenty-one-year-old Barbara Jane Erickson,part of the swing-shift wing assembly team,watched the woman work with a deftness thatbelied her status as one of a new breed—Rosie-the-Riveter, women working in American defenseplants. Now Barbara, too, was one of them. She hadbeen up since six that morning, had attendedclasses at the University of Washington where shewas a senior, and then reported at 5 p.m. for workon the Boeing Aircraft Company assembly line inher hometown of Seattle.

Assembly line defense work was far from glam-orous. It was tedious and physically tiring, but theU.S. was now at war. The bombing of Pearl Harborhad seen to that. War plant work was patriotic, andit paid well. But every now and then, when Barbarahad a chance to catch her breath and steal amoment’s reflection while waiting for the nextsquare of aluminum, she looked at the B–17 wingtaking shape before her eyes and allowed herself todream a little.

“I’m going to fly this airplane,” she vowed.1On July 1, 1920, Barbara Jane Erickson

entered the world. Her mother, Vera Peckenpaugh,was descended from pioneer American stock. Vera’sparents had traveled west in a covered wagon andVera, the family’s youngest child, was born inBremerton, Washington. Barbara’s Swedish father,Joel Erickson, immigrated to America where hemet and married Vera. His Scandinavian workethic complemented his wife’s Puritan work ethic.As a result, their three children—Barbara, Rogerand JoAnne—benefited from their combined indus-trious heritages.

When it came to child raising, the Ericksonsalso proved to be enlightened parents. They lettheir children find their own paths, choose theirpursuits and, ultimately, decide what they would dowith their lives. And they supported them whole-heartedly in those decisions.

Barbara was a freshman at the University ofWashington in 1938 when President Frankin D.

Roosevelt unveiled a trial program of subsidizedflying instruction known as Civilian Pilot Training(CPT) destined for college campuses. CPT, thebrainchild of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (pre-cursor of the Federal Aviation Administration), wasbased on similar programs tried in Europe and wasexpected to provide pilot training for 20,000 collegestudents per year.2 A national defense program insheep’s clothing, one of the disguises was to letwomen enroll. Barbara was one of several hundredyoung women and several thousand young menwho took advantage of the opportunity beginningin 1939.3

An article about the CPT program appeared inthe local newspaper and that changed everythingfor me. Three of my girlfriends and I thought itwould be fun to try out for the class. So, we all wentdown and applied. Two of the girls were too shortand the third didn’t pass the eye test. I was the onlyone who made it. So here I was in this class learn-ing how to fly. I didn’t know which end of an air-plane was which.


Sarah Byrn Rickman is the author of The Originals: The Women’s Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron ofWorld War II, the story of the first twenty-eight WASPs, the women who flew for the U.S. Army inWorld War II. She has written the yet-to-be-published biography of Nancy Harkness Love, WAFSfounder and commander, and is now working on a sequel to The Originals. A former journalist, MsRickman holds a bachelor’s degree in English from Vanderbilt University and a master’s degree increative writing from Antioch University McGregor. Her lifelong interest in aviation was given wingsin 1990 through her professional association with the International Women’s Air and SpaceMuseum, for whom she is now an advisor. She also does oral history interviews with WASPs (WomenAirforce Service Pilots) for the WASP Archives at Texas Woman’s University and she has written anaward-winning WASP novel, Flight from Fear.

(Overleaf) B.J. Erickson(with parachute) ready toclimb into a P–51 (unidenti-fied man and EvelynSharp). (All photos cour-tesy of the author.)

CIVILIANPILOTTRAINING[WAS] ANATIONALDEFENSEPROGRAM INSHEEP’SCLOTHING,ONE OF THEDISGUISESWAS TO LETWOMENENROLL

The class consisted of thirty-six boys and fourgirls. Twenty were sent to the airport and twenty ofus were sent to the seaport on Lake Union. I’ll neverforget the first time I flew. The instructor took me upin this little seaplane, a 65-horsepower Taylorcrafton floats. I thought, “Boy, this is the way to go.”

Barbara soloed in December 1939 and earnedher private license in 1940. But unlike the othergirls in the CPT classes at the University ofWashington, Barbara didn’t stop there.

I wangled my way into all four CPT classes. Yes, Iwas pushy. I was excited and energetic, and Iwanted it. Flying came easily to me. I was good at it.I made friends easily and I had a lot of mentors.One gentleman knew how badly I wanted to go on.A few girls were being allowed to advance, so heencouraged me to apply. I did, and went on throughsecondary training and cross country and got mycommercial and instrument ratings. I still corre-spond with him to this day and he is now ninety-seven.

After acquiring her private, commercial andinstrument ratings, as well as her flight instruc-tor’s certificate, Barbara returned to Lake Union asan instructor for the University of Washingtonflight school. There, in the same program fromwhich she graduated, she taught other young stu-dents how to fly.

“I instructed during my junior and the firsthalf of my senior year, went to school one day aweek and flew the other six. The dean of women atthe University of Washington bent the rules for me.She allowed me to take all my lectures on Mondayso that I could teach flying the other six days of theweek.” Her major was Home Economics, one of thefields open to women prior to World War II. But,with news of the war coming from overseas,Barbara remembers that school seemed “kind ofincidental at that point.”

Her job on Boeing’s line began after PearlHarbor. The government shut down all civilian fly-ing within fifty miles of the U.S. coastline andBarbara was out of a flight-instructing job.Workingat Boeing through May 1942 helped her finance thelast few months of her education.

“I had been working since I was 16—first atthe Five and Dime for 37 cents an hour and later atMarshall Fields.” Her father was the West Coastrepresentative for Macmillan Publishing, so thefamily was comfortable. However, her parents hadthree children in college at one time and all threewere expected to contribute financially to theireducations.

Barbara’s leadership potential was obviousfrom the beginning. The dean of women had seen itand Buren Reeder, her supervisor at Boeing, nowrecognized it as well. He supported her dreams andambitions, and the two remained lifelong friends.

Early in 1942, Barbara received a telegramfrom famous aviatrix Jacqueline Cochran, askingher to consider going to England to ferry airplanes

for the British Air Transport Auxiliary, but sheopted to finish school instead. In May 1942, follow-ing graduation, Barbara took a job at the MartinSchool of Flying in Walla Walla, Washington, farenough inland to remain in operation. The Martinschool was, also, training men to be Army flightinstructors.

All the boys were experienced pilots and hadhundreds of hours. At first, they didn’t like the ideaof a girl instructing them. Here I was twenty-two-years-old, just out of college, attractive, dedicated.But we were all in the same boat, up at 4 in themorning in order to fly at 5. We all wanted to suc-ceed and I showed them I could do it too. I alwayshad a smile on my face. I enjoyed what I was doing.Basically, I get along with people and I gained rap-port with them. They finally were resigned to theirfate and accepted me.

On September 6, 1942, Barbara received atelegram from another veteran woman flyer, NancyLove, inviting her to come to Wilmington,Delaware, and apply for the Women’s AuxiliaryFerrying Squadron (WAFS), a group of civilianwomen pilots attached to the U.S. Army Air Forces.“I requested leave from my job. Fortunately, I wasworking for a flight school operator who would letme go. Others weren’t so lucky.”

Barbara—who acquired the nickname B.J. inWilmington because there were four Barbara’samong the original 28 WAFS—was the 14thwoman to join Nancy Love’s elite squadron ofwomen ferry pilots. Their original assignment wasto ferry trainer airplanes from the factories to thetraining fields in the South. Later, they flew bigger,faster aircraft—but always within the 48 statesand Canada.

A friend, Eleanor Dressen, who was working atthe flight school with Barbara, accompanied her toWilmington. Not long after they arrived, NancyLove’s secretary left and Eleanor got that job.

In the fall of 1942, Jacqueline Cochran—withthe Army’s backing—established a flight school inTexas to train women pilots. These women, oncethey won their wings, were destined to ferry air-planes as part of Nancy Love’s squadron.

In January 1943, Nancy divided her originalWAFS squadron into four smaller squadrons to bestationed at ferrying bases around the country. Sheplaced B.J. in command of the women’s squadronattached to the 6th Ferrying Group in Long Beach,California. B.J. was only 22 years old. Several of theWAFS were older and more experienced. Somewere jealous. But Nancy felt she was the one tohandle the job and told her, “B.J., I’m going to for-get Long Beach. You can take care of it.”

This made young Barbara Jane Erickson privyto all the Army’s Ferrying Division and AirTransport Command discussions, planning, anddecisions concerning the women pilots from thenuntil the deactivation of the group in December1944. It may have been one of the most intuitivemoves WAFS commander Nancy Love ever made.


(Left) Barbara JaneErickson, formal portrait.

BARBARA…WAS THE14TH WOMANTO JOINNANCYLOVE’S ELITESQUADRONOF WOMENFERRYPILOTS

Super-organized B.J. became her friend, her confi-dante, her able leader on the West Coast.

“Nancy even sent Eleanor Dressen out here towork with me.”

Nancy had been reassigned to Cincinnati towork directly with Ferrying Division commanderColonel William H. Tunner. Rather than takeEleanor to Cincinnati, Nancy sent her to LongBeach to lend her skills and support to her friend.

Beginning in May 1943, the number of womenpilots grew by approximately fifty each monththrough the addition of the graduates from theArmy flight training school in Texas. They weredivided among the four women’s ferrying squadronsoperating at Long Beach, Wilmington, Dallas,Texas, and Romulus, Michigan. In July, Cochranwas named Director of Women Pilots and Love wasnamed Executive for the women flying for theFerrying Division. In August 1943, the name of thewomen pilots attached to the Army Air Forces waschanged to Women Airforce Service Pilots or WASP.

By then, the women were transitioning intobigger, faster aircraft.

Nancy Love was the first woman to fly theB–17. She was the first to fly most of the airplanesincluding the P–51, P–38, C–47 and C–54. Both sheand the Wilmington women’s squadron comman-der, Betty Gillies, checked out in a B–17 in August1943. B.J. was the third woman to fly a B–17 mak-ing two orientation flights on October 8 and 9,1943. But it was April 9, 1944, before the girl whostood on the catwalk at Boeing and dreamed of fly-ing the B–17 officially checked out as a pilot on thefour-engine bomber. On April 11, she and a malefirst pilot delivered Flying Fortress #42-97932 toDenver.

B.J. delivered her first B–17 as pilot-in-com-mand on October 31, 1944. She and WASP copilot,Virginia Hill, took the aircraft from Long Beach toCheyenne, Wyoming.

B.J. was one of only five women pilots in theFerrying Division, Air Transport Command, to holdthe rare “5p” classification, which meant she was

qualified to fly as pilot-in-command on heavy four-engine aircraft like the B–17 as well as the swift,powerful single- and twin-engine pursuits.

B.J. recalls the infamous trip of October 16,1944, when she and Nancy Love were assigned topick up a war weary B–17 named “Genevieve” atPatterson Field in Dayton, Ohio, and ferry the bat-tered Flying Fortress to Amarillo, Texas. 3

A large area of grease and oil stained the con-crete under each engine. The ship was very dirtyand much patched, but—they soon discovered—shehad a proud heritage. On the instrument panel,Nancy and B.J. found a plastic plate with the fol-lowing inscription:

“Genevieve”—First Airplane RepairedBy Rome Air Depot. Please Advise of HerEscapades, Rome, N.Y., U.S.A.

Nancy and B.J. decided to take special care ofthis tired old lady of the air. But when they fired upthe four engines, they realized that would beharder than they had hoped—#1 lost 300 revolu-tions on the right magneto; #2 was OK; on #3, theoil pressure was 20 pounds low; and #4 poured oilon the already saturated concrete ramp. Theydecided to request repairs before trying to take off.

Finally, the ship was ready. They filed clear-ance for Scott Field near St. Louis with a true air-speed of 150 mph. A large red sign on the instru-ment panel warned NOT to try to retract the land-ing gear!

En route, they did their best to ignore the air-craft that flew by them signaling “in a superiormanner” that they’d forgotten to pull the landinggear up. When a squadron of P–47s whizzed by, thepilots laughing and gesturing from inside theirbubble cockpits, “we strongly suspected that theepithet ‘women drivers’ was being directed at usalong with the hand signals.

“We became very fond of Genevieve. We felt acertain spiritual kinship with her, since we share acommon and ignominious fate, we being bound forour ‘figurative’ grave on 20 December 1944, whenthe WASPs were to be deactivated.”

On November 9, 1944, Nancy wrote to the com-manding officer of the Rome Air Depot: “We hopethat this account of the final escapade of‘Genevieve’ will be of interest. Her saga in combatwas an honorable one, as discovered in her batteredform #1 A.”

“I wrote to my mother and father every week Iwas in the service. I wrote to them after Nancy andI flew to Cornelia Fort’s funeral in Nashville. I triedto tell them not to worry. Then again after EvelynSharp died, I tried again to reassure them. Evelynwas my best friend.”4

B.J. lost six of her squadron members to acci-dents—Cornelia and Evelyn who were fellow origi-nal WAFS plus four others. She had only one closecall herself—September 19, 1944. 5

One of the advantages of being in Long Beachwas we had all these factories close by and all these


Betty Gillies, Evelyn Sharp,B.J. Erickson, and HelenRichards at Camp Pickett,Blackstone, Virginia,December 2, 1942.

B.J. DELIV-ERED HERFIRST B–17AS PILOT-IN-COMMANDON OCTOBER31, 1944

planes that we could fly. One night I got a call fromOperations. “We’ve got some P–38s down here. Doany of you girls want to check out in one at night?”So down I went. I had flown the P–38 in daylight.No problem. I took one up and flew around for anhour. But when it came time to land, I couldn’t getthe gear down.

Well, I called the tower and they called Jack.

Capt. Jack London was head of flight transi-tion for the entire base at Long Beach. He and B.J.had been dating.

They told him, “We’ve got one of your girls introuble down here.”

He drove over to the tower, got on the radio, andgave me instructions out of the manual. I had topump the gear down. I had no hydraulics. So I wentout over the ocean and flew around for an hour andpumped. Then I flew by the tower for them to see ifthe gear was down.

I was cleared to land, but because I had nohydraulics, I also had no flaps and no brakes. I wasgoing to have to land without brakes. So they toldme to land on the longest runway, which is 25Right. Long Beach had five runways and there wereone hundred airplanes parked in the area in thecenter and those airplanes were guarded by armedsentries with dogs.

Jack got in his Jeep and came racing out to therunway to meet me. I landed and rolled all the wayto the end of the runway. Then I had to find a placeto park it.

The guard, with his dog, sees this airplane com-ing down the runway from one direction and a Jeepracing in from the other. He didn’t know what wasgoing on and raised his gun. I was watching all thisfrom the cockpit and I just knew he was going toshoot Jack. But Jack stopped the Jeep, hollered tothe guard, threw his ID on the ground, and got outwith his hands in the air. Fortunately, the guarddidn’t shoot him, but I know for a minute there, hethought he had nabbed a saboteur red handed.

After Jack convinced the guard that we weren’tthere to blow up airplanes, he helped me park theairplane and drove me back to Operations.

Like I said, that was my only close call in all mytime in the WAFS. Those Rosie the Riveters builtgood airplanes!

You know, if any of the women had the best jobin the Ferrying Division, it was me. I was one of theyoungest girls, and yet I was the squadron com-mander. I had the airplanes. Everything was builtin the LA Basin. The girls back east fought to get aP–47 to bring out here so they could get checked outin the other airplanes. Weather-wise, we flew everyday while they sat on the ground back east. I wasthe luckiest of all and I’m the first one to admit it.

It was a fantastic time in our lives. We werelucky to be alive then and equipped to do the job. Itall depends on where you are and when. Timing iseverything.

B.J.’s contribution to the WASPs during thetwenty-eight months of the group’s existence isincalculable. She commanded some 80 women ferrypilots stationed at Long Beach. Like Nancy, B.J.was goal-oriented, operated by the book, and led byexample with firmness and reason. That was whyboth women got along so well. “No Nonsense” mightwell be B.J.’s middle name.

But she did try her commanding officer NancyLove’s patience once. 6

She and three other original WAFS went toWashington, unofficially, in early January 1944, tosee what they could do about securing militariza-tion for the women ferry pilots who were still civil-ians. B.J. decided to apply for a commission in theArmy and a service pilot rating.

Word of what they were doing got aroundWashington. Someone notified Nancy Love inCincinnati. “Very gently, but very firmly, sheordered us back to our bases,” B.J. confirms.

Most of the original WAFS didn’t want to bemilitarized. Several were married and some hadchildren and the WACs didn’t allow that. Otherswere over the WAC’s age limit. But if we were mili-tarized, we wanted to do it as individuals. I wasyoung and single, so I applied for a commission tobecome a Service Pilot. I had the qualifications.Using my initials, B.J., they wouldn’t know if I wasmale or female. But nothing came of it.

The Air Transport Command awardedBarbara the coveted Air Medal following a remark-able series of cross-country deliveries in an inordi-nately short amount of time. The award was sup-posed to represent what ALL the WASPs attachedto the Ferrying Division were doing, but it served toembarrass B.J. who did not like being singled outfor what she felt all the women ferry pilots diddaily—their job. 7

Today, B.J. is one of seven surviving originalWAFS. She is their heart, soul and conscience. Sheknows their history better than anyone alive—because she lived it, because she led, because she


B.J. Erickson ready to ferrythe 10,000th Vultee BT-13built.

THE AIRTRANSPORTCOMMANDAWARDEDBARBARATHE COV-ETED AIRMEDALFOLLOWING

A REMARK-ABLE SERIESOF CROSS-COUNTRYDELIVERIES

stayed the course through to deactivation, andbecause she believes in what they did.

But she will tell you, “We did our jobs. We did-n’t do anything special. We delivered airplanes forthe U.S. Army. That’s what we were hired to do.”Characteristically, she casts a bit of a jaundiced eyeat being called a heroine and at some of the hooplaraised today over what she considers their patrioticduty and something they also loved doing.

B.J. and Jack London were married April 9,1945. After the war, he received a major’s commis-sion in the AF Reserve and, when the new Air Forceoffered non-flying Reserve commissions to theWASPs in 1948, B.J. was commissioned a major aswell. They served as reservists together and retired20 years later. By then Jack was a full colonel.

The Air Force tried to take away B.J.’s commis-sion when, in the early 1950s, they found out shehad two children. She told them “I had a child whenyou offered it to me, I’m not giving it up now.” Mostof the WASPs affected by this edict—includingNancy Love—gave in and resigned their commis-sions. B.J. and fellow WASP Lauretta Foy fought itand won.

Technically B.J. could not log airtime in AF air-planes, but Jack could. He would reserve an A–26or twin Beech and they would go flying. Jack fer-ried the first operational jet fighter, the P–80Shooting Star, after the war and he saw to it thathis pursuit pilot wife got to ride in it.

The Londons and Bud and Betty Gillies wentin business together after the war when they pur-chased Acme Industrial Supply, an aviation supplycompany in Long Beach. Betty and B.J. had estab-lished a lasting friendship when both were sta-tioned under Nancy’s command in Wilmington inthe fall of 1942.

In 1966, B.J. went to work for the Piper dealerin Southern California. In 1970, she and her busi-ness partner, Barney Frazier, founded BarneyFrazier Aircraft at Long Beach Airport. Jack died in1973; Barney, in 1983. B.J. continued to run the

company after Barney’s death and brought herdaughter, Kristy London Ardizzone, in to work withher. Though she has sold the company now, B.J. stillbrokers airplanes.

In 1949, Betty Gillies recruited B.J. to workwith her on the All-Woman Transcontinental AirRace (AWTAR)—nicknamed the Powder PuffDerby and sponsored by the Ninety-Nines, theinternational women pilots’ organization. The nick-name was a holdover from the first women’s airrace held in August 1929.8 The Ninety-Nines orga-nized their first race in 1947. By 1949, the eventwas growing in reputation and numbers. Bettyserved as the chairman of the race for ten years—from 1951 to 1961—and B.J. was executive secre-tary for fourteen (1951-1965). “That means the onewho types and cranks out the copies on a mimeo-graph machine.

“I ran the office. The typewriter and mimeo-graph machine sat on my dining room table thatwas cleared only for Thanksgiving and Christmas.I had young children, so we always met at myhouse. Betty drove up from San Diego and I’d cookdinner for the board members. Jack put up with it.”B.J.’s daughters were born in 1947 and 1949.

At B.J.’s dining room table, the board plannedeach annual race, determining the start and theterminus, as well as the interim stops, and seekingsupport from the aviation and business communityin each. The event was patterned after the experi-ences the WASP had encountered as ferry pilotsduring the war. Times from point to point, fueleconomy, and care of the airplane were empha-sized. Between 1950 and 1967, B.J. competed in fiveraces (1952, 1954, 1962, 1966 and 1967) andworked the remainder as an AWTAR board mem-ber.

A Life Member of the Ninety-Nines, B.J. alsoserved three terms, a total of nine years, on theorganization’s executive board. She is a chartermember of the Long Beach Chapter, in which she isstill active.

B.J. has passed the torch of flight to youngergenerations. Both of her daughters fly. TerryLondon Rinehart was the first woman pilot hiredby Western Airlines in 1976 and retired from DeltaAirlines as a Captain in 2005. Kristy, a fully ratedpilot, is an executive with JetBlue Airlines. B.J.’sgrandson, Justin Rinehart, has his instructor’s rat-ing. Her twin granddaughters, Kelly and LaurenRinehart, have their private pilot’s licenses.

Barbara is a fixture at the Long BeachInternational Airport. The Airport Area BusinessCouncil of the Long Beach Chamber of Commercehonored B.J. during the centennial of flight in 2003,noting her more than fifty years of volunteer com-munity service to the Long Beach Airport and busi-ness community. On March 24, 2005, the LongBeach City Council named the street in front of theairport terminal building Barbara London Drive.

“I was sent to Long Beach in February 1943and I never left.”

When asked, she speaks to groups—bothadults and young people—about the WAFS and


B.J. Erickson in cockpit ofa C–47.

THE AIRFORCE TRIEDTO TAKEAWAY B.J.’SCOMMISSION[BUT] SHETOLD THEM “IHAD A CHILDWHEN YOUOFFERED ITTO ME, I’MNOT GIVING ITUP NOW.”

1. Most of the information in this article is taken froma series of personal interviews with Barbara Jane (B.J.)Erickson London, conducted by the author between June1999 and September 2004. Audiotapes and a transcript ofthe March 2004 oral history interview are on file at theWASP Archives located in the library at Texas Woman’sUniversity, Denton.2. Patricia Strickland, The Putt-Putt Air Force: TheStory of the Civilian Pilot Training Program and the WarTraining Service (1939-1944), Department of Transpor-tation, Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Educa-tion Staff, GA-20-84, Foreword, p. iii. The Civilian PilotTraining Program (it became the War Training Serviceafter Pearl Harbor) originated in the mind of Robert H.Hinckley, a member of the newly created (1938) CivilAeronautics Authority. It used facilities already in exis-tence. The ground training was handed over to collegesand universities; the flight training to established flightoperators. CPTP began with 13 colleges and 330 stu-dents. By the time it ended in 1944, 1,132 educationalinstitutions had been involved and 1,460 contractors hadqualified 435,165 trainees, including several hundredwomen. Information also online at www.centennialof-flight.gov/essay/general_aviation/civilian_pilot_training/GA20.htm3. Report dated November 9, 1944, from Nancy Love tothe commanding officer of the Rome Air Depot, RomeArmy Field in Rome, New York—Nancy Harkness Loveprivate collection, in the hands of her daughter MargaretCampbell Love.4. Cornelia Fort, the third of Nancy Love’s originalWAFS, died in a mid-air collision March 21, 1943, nearMerkel, Texas. She was ferrying a BT-13 from Long

Beach to Dallas. Evelyn Sharp, number seventeen ofNancy’s originals, died on April 3, 1944, when she lost theleft engine of her P–38 on takeoff from Cumberland,Pennsylvania, enroute from Long Beach to the docks atNewark, New Jersey. Both were members of B.J.Erickson’s women’s squadron, part of the 6th FerryingGroup, Long Beach, California.5. Sarah Byrn Rickman, The Originals: The Women’sAuxiliary Ferrying Squadron of World War II, (Sarasota,Florida: Disc–Us Books. Inc., 2001), pp.302-303.6. B.J. Erickson London, phone interview with theauthor, July 7, 2004.7. Barbara Jane Erickson received her Air Medal onMarch 11, 1944, during the graduation ceremonies forWASP Class 44-2 in Sweetwater, Texas. General HenryH. “Hap” Arnold personally pinned on her medal. Herseries of flights that earned her the distinction weremade in late July or early August 1943. After the war,President Harry S Truman awarded the Air Medal toNancy Love for her service as commander of 303 womenferry pilots during World War II.8. The Ninety-Nines: Yesterday—Today—Tomorrow(Paducah, Kentucky, Turner Publishing Co., 1996) p. 26;and, Gene Nora Jessen, The Powder Puff Derby of 1929,(Naperville, Illinois, Sourcebooks Inc., 2002), p. 288. Thefirst women only air race was flown in 1929 and officiallyknown as the All-Woman’s Air Race. Humorist WillRogers nicknamed it the Powder Puff Derby, the namecaught on.9. “Flight Path Learning Center and Museum”brochure, LAX Imperial Terminal, 6661 West, ImperialHighway, Los Angeles, CA, 90009. Phone: 310-215-5291.


NOTES

WASP and about aviation in general. She flewuntil she reached her 80th birthday. At that pointshe said, “The busy airspace of the LA Basin didn’tneed another 80-year-old woman pilot up there fly-ing around.”

In October 2004, B.J. was honored by theFlight Path Learning Center, for her contributionsto Southern California’s aviation heritage. The

Center and Museum are located on the south sideof Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Abronze plaque with her name has been embeddedon Sepulveda Boulevard, the main route to LAX.B.J. joins 44 other aviation pioneers “whose body ofwork has helped ensure Southern California’sworld leadership in aviation/aerospace.” The FlightPath Learning Center of Southern California isdedicated, through public awareness, to recogniz-ing and preserving Southern California’s aeronau-tical heritage as well as for guiding individualsand young people along their education pathstoward careers in science and technology withemphasis on aviation/aerospace.” 9

Her latest, and possibly biggest, honor yet: OnMarch 12, 2005, Barbara Erickson London wasinducted into the Women in Aviation, Interna-tional (WAI) Pioneer Hall of Fame. The ceremonywas part of the WAI 16th annual conference heldin Dallas. Fellow original WAFS Florene MillerWatson was inducted at the same time.

And Barbara was invited back “home” in 2003for the Women Fly! Women in Aviation andAerospace Conference, held at Seattle’s BoeingMuseum of Flight, to speak on her life and role inaviation.

Barbara Jane Erickson, the twenty-one-year-old who worked for five months as part of the B–17wing assembly team at Boeing in 1942, was theonly WASP in World War II who both flew andbuilt the B–17. ■

B.J. Erickson ready to takeoff in a C–47.


T. M. Webster

The Dam Busters RaidSuccess or Sideshow?

At 2128 hrs on May 16, 1943, the first aircraft ofthe newly-formed 617 Squadron lifted fromRAF Scampton’s runway and set course for

Germany. So started Operation CHASTISE, anattack that had been in planning on and off sinceOctober 1937,1 and that would be recognised asBomber Command’s most spectacular operation ofWorld War II. By dawn the next day two majorGerman dams had been breached, significantareas flooded, more than 1,250 deaths caused, andthe Ruhr Valley’s industry disrupted. The Britishforce lost eight aircraft and fifty-three aircrew.

The British would use post-raid reconnaissancepictures to show their Empire, their Americanallies and, using leaflet drops, Occupied Europe thedamage caused to the dams, the countryside belowthem and, by implication, the industrial complex ofthe Ruhr Valley.

The understandable wartime use of the raid forpropaganda purposes may have led to overstate-ment of its success. The publication of Webster andFrankland’s review of the air offensive againstGermany brought a re-evaluation which, whileacknowledging the attack’s precision, held that thephysical outcome was neither “of fundamentalimportance nor even seriously damaging”.2

This article examines the context of, and buildup to, the Dams Raid, recounts the raid itself,assesses the damage directly caused and theGerman response to it, outlines the lessons thatwere or could have been learned from the raid, andfinally places the raid in perspective.

The Background to the Raid

Contrary to popular belief, the Dams Raid’s ori-gins did not lie with Barnes Wallis, the Vickers’engineer who designed the “bouncing bomb.”3 Asearly as October 1937, Air Ministry planners weredeveloping attack options for the expected warwith Germany: the thirteen Western Air (WA)Plans. Plan WA5 required Bomber Command “toattack the German War Industry including thesupply of oil with priority to that in the Ruhr,Rhineland and Saar.”4 Bomber Command refinedthis into a plan to achieve the same effect byattacking the Ruhr’s forty-five power and cokingplants: it was believed these could be destroyed ina fortnight’s bombing (about 3,000 sorties) at anexpected aircraft loss rate of about 6 percent. Thatthese estimates were wildly inaccurate was shownby the 11.5 percent loss rates of the RAF’s then-heavy bombers in the period of the Phoney War5

and the Butt Report’s conclusions on BomberCommand’s accuracy6 which, taking no account ofthe doubtful effectiveness of the bombs with which

the RAF started the war, suggested that 12,000sorties would have been required. Extrapolatingthese figures, a loss of approximately 1,400 aircraftmight have been expected.

Even on the original estimates, the loss rate forthe new plan was considered unacceptable and theAir Ministry looked for alternative means to thesame end: the result was a plan to attack theMohne and Sorpe dams. This plan argued that theRuhr’s heavy industry was dependant on the waterthe dams held for industrial processes, for powergeneration and for drinking water: if the damscould be destroyed then industry would grind to ahalt. Assuming the logic contained no flaws, thenext step was to identify a way to attack the dams.Considerable effort went into this, concentratingparticularly on the Möhne gravity dam.7 Sugges-tions included attacking the air-side of the damwith semi-armour piercing bombs, dropping high-explosives onto the dams or attacks with multipletorpedoes from the water-side. None of these wasconsidered feasible and a guided-bomb based uponan anti-aircraft target drone was considered thebest option. Unfortunately, the fall of France placedthe target out of the range of such a weapon.

Even before the fall of France Wing CommanderFinch-Noyes of the Woolwich Research Depart-ment was working on alternative means for attack-


Wing Commander Tim Webster joined the Royal Air Force in 1990 having trained in medicine atLondon University’s Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine and undertaken post-graduate studiesin Cambridge. He has served at a number of locations in the United Kingdom as well as onOperations Desert Storm, Southern Watch, and Enduring Freedom. This article was written whilehe was a student on the United Kingdom’s Advanced Command and Staff Course. Wing CommanderWebster is currently the Senior Flight Medical Officer at Royal Air Force Marham.

(Overleaf) The Möhne Dam,after being breached. (Allphotos courtesy of theauthor.)

THE DAMSRAID’S ORIGINS DIDNOT LIE WITHBARNESWALLIS, THEVICKERS’ENGINEERWHODESIGNEDTHE “BOUNCINGBOMB”

ing the Möhne dam. After reviewing the extantpapers, he proposed that a 20,000-lb.explosivecharge detonated 40 feet from the top of the damon its water-side and in contact with it (or a suc-cession of 2,000-lb charges close together) wouldhave a reasonable chance of destroying it. His pro-posed weapon would be launched from an aircraftat low level, propel itself into the dam, sink andthen be exploded by hydrostatic fuses at thedesired depth.8 No single weapon could be used, noRAF aircraft was yet capable of delivering it to thetarget, and so multiple smaller weapons wouldhave to be substituted. The Wellington bombercould carry a 2,000-lb. charge weapon under eachwing to be dropped at height and distance from thedam and, with the weapon propelling itself afterhitting the water, skip over any intervening tor-pedo nets, strike the dam, sink and explode. Finch-Noyes proposed to use a total of sixteen weapons,but Bomber Command decided that this plan wasfraught with technical imponderables and it wasquietly shelved. Before the Dams Raid took place,other means of attack were put forward: CombinedOperations suggested floating a charge down thereservoir and onto the dam, while the SpecialOperations Executive proposed an attack by para-chutists, who would place explosive chargesagainst the dam.9

Weapon Development

Work on the design of the weapon to be used onthe Dams Raid started in the autumn of 1939. Theman behind it was Barnes Wallis, an aero-struc-tures engineer with Vickers-Armstrongs’ Aviation,already well known for his work on the R100 air-ship, and the Vickers Wellesley and Wellingtonbombers. Wallis believed that modern warfaredepended on industrial production which, in turn,relied on sources of power. He argued that produc-tion could be dispersed, making it relatively invul-nerable to the bombs then available to the RAF,but sources of power like coal mines, oil fields, andhydroelectric dams could not. They were, however,equally invulnerable to the RAF’s availablebombs.10 Wallis believed that much heavier bombscould be effective and had started to work, with theblessing of the Ministry of Aircraft Production(MAP), on a massive 22,000-lb. bomb, similar inshape to his R100 airship,11 the bomb was expectedto achieve supersonic speed in its fall from altitude.This would be suitable for these targets as it burieditself deep in the earth before exploding, causingshock-waves that would shake structures apart:the same effect could be achieved by exploding thebomb in the water close to a dam.

In autumn 1940, experiments started to deter-mine how much explosive needed to be detonatedat what distance from the Möhne dam to destroy it.Initial experiments were on 1:50 scale models,working upwards to progressively larger modelsand eventually a one-off test on the disused Nant-y-Gro dam near Rhayader, which on July 24,1942,12 proved conclusively that such dams could

be destroyed by an underwater explosion in contactwith the dam. The early model tests gave Wallisthe information needed to support his “A Note on aMethod of Attacking the Axis Powers.”13 He arguedthat his massive bomb dropped from high altitudewould be effective against the Möhne dam, but noRAF bomber was capable of carrying it to therequired altitude. The project ran in parallel witha proposal for an equally large bomber to deliver it.The Air Staff rejected both.

Wallis was not to be put off. Somehow, in June1941, he gained the support of MAP’s AerialAttacks against Dams committee for further exper-iments on the effects of explosives on dams.Progress was slow: Wallis himself admitted, “con-viction that my original suggestion was impracti-cable ….. led me to seek for other methods.”14 Earlyin 1942, he hit upon the idea of ricocheting a spher-ical weapon across the surface of the reservoir thusavoiding torpedo nets and other surface defences,striking the dam, sinking, and then exploding incontact with it at a predetermined depth thanks tohydrostatic fuses. Wallis could not account for howhe got the idea but there are similarities to Finch-Noyes’ earlier plan.

By the end of April 1942, Wallis had gainedimportant support from Professor Blackett, a sci-entific adviser to the Admiralty, and from SirHenry Tizard, who had influence with the AirCouncil, MAP and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.Their support gained him access to the NationalPhysical Laboratory’s water tanks to perfect thedelivery technique that now included backwardrotation of the weapon. Wallis claimed threeadvantages for this: “it increases the distancewhich the missile will travel after release from thecarrier, before striking the water; it diminishes thetendency of the missile to plunge downwardly onimpact with the water surface; [and] it increasesthe distance which the missile will travel whilstricocheting.”15

In mid-June 1942 Wallis demonstrated his“bouncing” spheres (the weapon was at this stagespherical although Wallis was beginning to havedoubts about this) to both MAP and the Admiralty.The Royal Navy was quick to grasp the potential ofthe weapon for attacks on capital ships. By the endof June 1942, MAP had granted permission for aWellington bomber to be used for tests involvingmock-up spherical bombs commissioned by theAdmiralty. The first ground spinning test did nottake place until October 20, 1942,16 and the firstair test until December 2, 1942, but it was thenproved that it was possible to spin the weaponwithout shaking the aircraft apart. Two days laterthe first dropping trials took place in Dorset; theywere unsuccessful, the spheres were destroyed asthey hit the water. Further experimental dropscontinued until February 1943, as Wallis sought toovercome this major problem. At this stage itseemed that Admiralty interest in a medium-sizedversion of the weapon (Highball) to be used byMosquito aircraft to attack ships, the Tirpitz inparticular, was greater than Air Ministry interest


(Left) Barnes Wallis, theVickers’ engineer whodesigned the “bouncingbomb.”

WORK ONTHE DESIGNOF THEWEAPON …STARTED INTHE AUTUMNOF 1939

in the full-sized version (Upkeep) for attacksagainst the dams. There was a small-sized version(Baseball) meant for launching against ships froma mortar in the bows of a fast attack craft.

Wallis continued to lobby for his weapon and inearly February 1943, he gained support fromChurchill’s scientific adviser, Professor Linde-mann, previously not just skeptical but activelyhostile to the plan. Things also seemed to speed upat the Air Ministry and MAP although there wasconcern that, if Wallis devoted his time to develop-ing Upkeep, the development of the projectedVickers Windsor bomber would be neglected.17

On February 14, 1943, as Bomber Commandwas preparing to open the “Battle of the Ruhr,” itsSenior Air Staff Officer wrote a paper for his AirOfficer Commanding-in-Chief, “Bomber” Harris,describing both Upkeep and Highball. At this time,although the Germans were being beaten inRussia, in North Africa, and in the Atlantic. withthe Russians calling for a second front in Europe,only Bomber Command could take the war to the

continent. Its task had been set at the CombinedChiefs of Staff’s Casablanca meeting that January:“[The] primary object will be the progressivedestruction of the German military industrial andeconomic system, and the undermining of themorale of the German people to a point where theirarmed resistance is fatally weakened.”18

Harris interpreted this as a free hand to attackany large German city: this having the effect ofattacking both the local industry and population,despite uncertainty over the effect of such attackson civilian morale. Indeed, he stated that his taskwas “destroying the main cities of the Ruhr.”19

Harris was unimpressed by Upkeep: he claimedthat it would shake apart the carrying aircraft ifnot perfectly balanced when spun and that the bal-listics would not work. It has been widely notedthat Harris did not seem initially to grasp the dif-ference between Upkeep and Highball; it alsoseems he did not grasp that the concept hadalready been tested. His own account of the DamsRaid is extremely brief and does not mention hisskepticism. Indeed, he wrote of Upkeep: “It was oneof the weapons designed for the Command outsidethe official Ministry of Aircraft Production and AirMinistry organisations…it could be taken almostas a rule that such weapons were successful.”20

This contrasts with his missive to the Chief ofthe Air Staff (CAS) in which he railed against:“enthusiasts and panacea mongers …careeringround MAP suggesting the taking of about 30Lancasters off the line to rig them up with thisweapon, when the weapon itself exists so far onlyin the imagination of those who conceived it.”21

Harris’ further assertion that “we have madeattempt after attempt to pull successful low levelattacks with heavy bombers. They have been,almost without exception, costly failures,”22 wasundoubtedly a more reasonable objection. OnFebruary 21, 1943, Wallis was finally able to showfilm of the Dorset and the National PhysicalLaboratory tank tests to a still-skeptical Harris.But by now CAS had authorized conversion ofthree Lancasters for use in the development ofUpkeep and on February 26, a formal decision to goahead was taken. It was to be ready for use thatyear, the latest date to achieve maximum effectbeing just three months away. Maximum effective-ness required the dams to be full so the attack hadto be launched before the end of May 1943. Timewas extremely short.

Development of Upkeep and the specially modi-fied Lancaster that would carry it now began inearnest. Responsibility was split between Vickersand Royal Ordnance for Upkeep, and Vickers andAvro for the aircraft. Gradually Upkeep evolvedthrough the series of trial drops on the North Kentcoast, and by trial and error it became a cylinderand lost its wooden covering. The trials were notperfect, the test pilots having difficulty droppingfrom the right height and at the right speed:unsurprisingly, therefore, Upkeep did not turn outas expected and as late as May 2, 1943, furthertrial drops were authorized.23 The extra trials were


(Above) Air Marshal SirArthur “Bomber” Harris.

(Below) Upkeep weapon.

BOMBERCOMMAND[S]…SENIOR AIR STAFFOFFICERWROTE APAPER FOR…“BOMBER”HARRIS

all to be flown at 60 ft, at a groundspeed of 210-220miles per hour, with Upkeep spun at 500 revolu-tions per minute. The final trial was on May 13;Upkeep was ready but only just in time.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty and the Air Ministrywere still debating whether Upkeep or Highballshould be used first, or whether the dams and theTirpitz should be attacked simultaneously. TheChiefs of Staff had set up a committee to monitorboth Upkeep and Highball developments,24 butwith multiple and varying “expert” opinions it wasdifficult to reach a conclusion. Finally, on May 13,having been informed that Upkeep trials had beensuccessful, while Highball trials had failed, thecommittee agreed that Operation CHASTISE (theDams Raid) should proceed. The Chiefs of Staff, inWashington for discussions with their Americancounterparts, confirmed the decision the next day.

Preparation for the Raid

Responsibility for execution of the Dams Raidfell to Bomber Command. On March 15, 1943,Harris passed it to Air Vice-Marshal Cochrane,who was told to form a special squadron, 617Squadron, from within the resources of his 5 Group(Harris having already nominated the highly-deco-rated Wing Commander Guy Gibson to lead it) toattack the dams. Gibson had significant controlover the selection and training of the aircrew, wasallowed to devise the means to reach the targetand to suggest amendments to the OperationalOrder, and given control of his force in attackingthe dams: an early example of mission command inthe RAF.25

That Bomber Command was well aware of thepropaganda value of a successful raid was shownwhen Gibson was told that he would be required towrite a book about the mission.26 Indeed, Harris’account of the Dams Raid follows on immediatelyfrom comments on the difficulty of gaining publicsupport for the Royal Air Force, which included:The Air Ministry had certainly had the idea that itwould be a good thing to get the support of the Pressand to have the operations of the Air Force reportedas fully as possible. No doubt it was hoped to com-pensate in this way for the obvious inability of theAir Ministry, by comparison with the ministries ofother services, to get the attention and the favour ofthose who matter; public support was to be called into redress the balance.27

Harris intended to draw the new squadron’s air-crew from volunteers who had completed or nearlycompleted two operational tours. However, this didnot happen; many of the aircrew had actually com-pleted fewer than ten operational sorties and someof the flight engineers none at all. Nor were they allvolunteers. The intention to draw the aircrew fromamong the most experienced aircrew, while partlymeant to reduce disruption to line squadrons, sug-gested the formation of an elite unit and alsoacknowledged the difficulty of the task. Harris wason record as opposing elite units, he had opposedthe Pathfinder Force saying, “I am not prepared toaccept all the very serious disadvantages of aCorps d’Elite in order to secure possibly someimprovement of methods…at a serious loss ofmorale and efficiency to the other squadrons.”28

But 617 Squadron was to be “a Special DutySquadron” to undertake missions “that entail spe-cial training and/or the use of specialist equip-ment.”29 The difficulty of the task can be gauged bycomparison with the efforts of Bomber Command’sMain Force at around the same time: on March 6,1943, 293 aircraft attacked Essen, but only 153bombed within three miles of the target.30

Notwithstanding the new squadron’s elite sta-tus, rigorous and realistic training was needed toachieve the required standards of bombing accu-racy. Cochrane’s original instructions to Gibson,while giving no details of the proposed targets,made it clear that mastery of night-time low flyingover water was necessary. Gibson himself tried outthe required night-flying skills; the results werenot encouraging. The squadron commenced its low-level, cross-country training on March 31, 1943,and by the end of April, following intensive train-ing with over 1,000 flying hours logged, was able to“navigate from pinpoint to pinpoint at night at lowlevel…bomb accurately using a special rangefindersight… fly safely over water at 150 ft.”31

Not all the night-flying training was done atnight. Equipment, grandly called “Synthetic NightFlying Equipment,” was used to simulate night-fly-ing conditions. Blue celluloid covered the cockpittransparencies, while aircrew wore amber-coloredflying goggles of varying intensities: the combina-tion effectively cut the light levels transmitted


Wing Commander GuyGibson.

HARRISPASSED IT TOAIR VICE-MARSHALCOCHRANE

from outside the cockpit to approximately that ofgood moonlight, but cockpit instruments could beclearly seen. A goggleless safety pilot could see theoutside world clearly through the celluloid. Oneapparently unexpected side-effect of prolonged useof the celluloid-goggle combination was that whengoggles were taken off outside the aircraft, theworld appeared red.32

A further medical problem encountered was air-sickness. Few of the aircrew had much experienceof low-flying in the Lancaster, an aircraft that wasnot designed for it and in which some of the crewsat at an angle to the line of flight. The situationwas sufficiently severe for the squadron’s medicalofficer to fly on a training flight to experience theproblem for himself: thereafter airsickness suffer-ers were treated with chlorobutanol.33 Low-flyingdid not just cause medical problems: concerns wereraised about its effects on the aircraft’s structureafter a number of bolts on one airframe were foundto have sheared.34

On April 26, 1943, having mastered flying at150 ft, the squadron was required to cut the bomb-ing height to 60 ft and the release speed to 210miles per hour. Over the next week they trainedintensively, dropping nearly 300 practice bombsthat on average fell within 120 feet of the aimingpoint.

If constant practice under realistic conditionshad allowed the aircrew to master the necessaryflying skills,35 none of them had yet dropped the

new weapon and would not until May 11, 1943,there were still a number of technical problems tobe overcome. One of these was the difficulty ofachieving, at night over water, the precise 60 ft alti-tude required to drop Upkeep accurately. Severalunsatisfactory solutions were tried before theDirector of Scientific Research at MAP suggestedthe use of intersecting spotlights. This was not anew idea; Harris himself had tried it in flying boatsand, having failed to make it work, was again scep-tical. Coastal Command had also tried it unsuc-cessfully as an aid to nocturnal, shallow-waterattacks on U-boats. 617 Squadron were duly skep-tical and difficulties were encountered in makingthe system work adequately, particularly at suchlow altitude. The two spotlight beams were set tomeet on the water (which on a reservoir could beexpected to be sufficiently smooth not to interferewith the functioning of the system) just forward ofthe port wing. Here it was difficult for the pilot tomonitor and this duty fell to the navigator, whowas thus responsible for altitude36 as well as fornavigating to and from the dams.

Having devised a means to drop Upkeep fromthe correct height, it was now necessary to find ameans to drop it from the correct range. Droppedtoo close it might simply bounce over the damendangering the aircraft as the mine exploded outof the water37 or dropped too far away simply neverreach its target. A simple device overcame thisproblem: a sight using the bomb-aimer’s eye at the


Upkeep weapon on aLancaster.

THESQUADRONWASREQUIRED TOCUT THEBOMBINGHEIGHT TO 60FT AND THERELEASESPEED TO 210MILES PERHOUR

base of a triangle completed by two nails mimickedthe desired drop position of the aircraft in relationto the dam’s towers. In effect, with the sight cor-rectly held by the bomb-aimer, the aircraft was inthe right release position when the nails obscuredthe dam’s towers. Some crews used the sight, butothers used their own variations on the theme,often including a length of string and chinagraphpencil marks on the clear-view panel.

It was now possible to drop Upkeep at the rightspeed, height and range: if the weapon worked asadvertised the dams should be destroyed. ButUpkeep and the aircraft to carry it were in shortsupply and it would be possible after each attack tosee if the dam had been breached and aircraftcould be diverted elsewhere. Accordingly, Gibsonneeded to be able to control the attack, to call a haltwhen the objective was achieved and to divert air-craft to subsequent targets. In normal area bomb-ing practice such control was unnecessary andBomber Command’s aircraft were not fitted withradios that allowed for it. The standard radio wasadequate for air-to-ground use but was found to beunsuitable for air-to-air use, particularly at night.Specialist advice was sought and the fitting of theradio used in fighter aircraft was suggested. This,with a few extra tweaks, proved suitable and wasflight trialled one week before the mission. In themeantime, a series of booths had been rigged in thesquadron’s crew-rooms to enable procedural train-ing to take place before the radios had been fittedto the aircraft.

The Raid

The attack was made in three waves. Gibson ledthe first, consisting of nine aircraft, to the Möhnedam. The second wave, five aircraft, led byMcCarthy was to attack the Sorpe dam (identifiedby the Ministry of Economic Warfare as a vital tar-get if the raid was to achieve its desired endstate)even though Upkeep was not designed to be usedagainst that earth-bank type of dam. The thirdwave, led by Ottley, comprised a further five air-craft: they were briefed to attack either the Möhneor Eder dams, but with alternate targets.Instructions as to which target they should attackwould be passed by radio as the progress of theraid became apparent.

The nine aircraft of the first wave made theirway at low-level to the Möhne, losing one aircraft(Astell) to anti-aircraft fire en route. On arrival,Gibson made a trial run before actually droppinghis Upkeep: this appears to have fallen short anddid not breach the dam. Hopgood followed, butdropped his weapon too late: it bounced over thedam destroying the dam’s power station instead.Hopgood’s aircraft was shot down by gunners onthe dam. Third to attack was Martin, whoseUpkeep fell both short and wide of the target andfailed to breach it. Young came fourth: his mineexploded in contact with the dam and Maltby, nextto attack, reported that there was a breach in thedam before releasing his own Upkeep. Maltby’s

mine also exploded in contact with the dam caus-ing a definite breach.38

Once the breach had been confirmed, Gibson ledthe aircraft with unused Upkeeps (plus Young asdeputy leader) to the Eder dam. Maltby andMartin headed for home. Achieving the correctdropping position proved very difficult at the Eder,Shannon tried three times before handing over toMaudslay who had two unsuccessful attempts.Shannon then tried twice more before finally get-ting the right alignment and dropping his Upkeepsuch that it exploded in contact with the dam butwithout breaching it. Maudslay came next andfinally released his weapon on the third attemptbut the release was too late, the mine hit the dam’sparapet and exploded damaging Maudslay’s air-craft.39 Finally the last aircraft of the first wave,Knight, attacked: he took one practice run but onthe next run Upkeep was successfully dropped andthe dam breached. Gibson ordered a return toScampton but Young’s aircraft was shot down byanti-aircraft fire on the way home.

Informed by radio that both the Möhne andEder dams had been breached Harris placed a callto CAS, in Washington for a conference with his fel-low British and American Chiefs of Staff,40 toinform them of the success. CAS in turn informedChurchill.

The second wave, intended to attack the Sorpe,actually left before the first. McCarthy should haveled but his aircraft had mechanical problems andhe had to change to another: he finally left wellbehind the rest of his wave. In the end, though,McCarthy was the only one of the wave to reachthe target: it took him ten attempts to satisfacto-rily drop Upkeep but though the dam was dam-aged, it was not breached. Barlow’s aircraft, whichactually led off the raid, was shot down by flak overGermany and the Upkeep failed to explode in thecrash. As a result the Germans captured Upkeepintact, rapidly worked out how the weapon workedand produced (but never used) their own, morecomplicated, version. Next came Munro whose air-craft was severely damaged by flak over Hollandand forced to return to Scampton. He was followedby Byers, who was shot down by anti-aircraft fireover Holland, and by Rice who, flying too low overthe Afsluitdijk, had the Upkeep wrenched off byimpact with the water without the aircraft crash-ing. Rice had no option but to return to Scamptonand so only one of the five aircraft originally des-tined to attack the Sorpe reached its target.

The third wave was a reserve force, each had itsown intended target such that all six dams in theOperational Order41 might have been attacked butcould be re-tasked to attack the Möhne, Eder orSorpe dams as required. Ottley led the wave butwas shot down before he could be diverted to theSorpe, while Burpee, always destined for the Sorpe,was shot down over Holland. Brown came thirdand attacked the Sorpe: like McCarthy, he found itdifficult to place his Upkeep appropriately and,although hit, the dam was not breached. Thefourth aircraft, Townsend’s, was tasked against the


ONCE THEBREACH HADBEEN CONFIRMED,GIBSON LEDTHE AIR-CRAFT WITHUNUSEDUPKEEPS(PLUS YOUNGAS DEPUTYLEADER) TOTHE EDERDAM

Ennepe: difficulty was experienced in finding thetarget and, although Upkeep was dropped, thedam was not damaged. Uncertainty exists aboutwhich dam Townsend’s crew attacked: they weresure they attacked the Ennepe but the War Diaryof the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht records thatthe Bever dam was attacked that night and not theEnnepe.42 Last of all was Anderson’s aircraft, orig-inally tasked against the Diemel but diverted tothe Sorpe, which never found its target andreturned to Scampton, the Upkeep unused.

The Effect in Germany

Breaching the dams unleashed huge amounts ofwater: at the Möhne 116 million cubic meters ofwater escaped within the first 12 hours (approxi-mately 88 percent of the total contents of the reser-

voir) while at the Eder 154 million cubic meters ofwater were lost (approximately 76 percent of itstotal contents). Downstream of the Möhne, in addi-tion to the damage done to its two electricity gen-erating stations, significant damage was inflictedby the passage of the flood-water: bridges weredestroyed up to 50 km away and buildings up to 65km away. Official German figures give the finaldeath toll for the Möhne as 1,294 killed or missingwhile 11 factories and 92 houses were destroyed,971 houses and 32 farms damaged, 2,822 hectaresof farmland made useless with a further 1,221hectares damaged, and over 6,300 cattle and swinekilled. In addition, nearly 50 road and railwaybridges were damaged and several kilometers43 ofrailway embankment required repair. On top ofthis, a large number of power or pumping stationsand gas or water supplies were damaged.44


Breached dam.

BREACHINGTHE DAMSUNLEASHEDHUGEAMOUNTS OFWATER: ATTHE MÖHNE116 MILLIONCUBICMETERS OFWATERESCAPEDWITHIN THEFIRST 12HOURS

The results below the Eder caused less loss oflife, only 47 people were killed, but the effectsreached far from the dam. Floods requiring the useof boats for mobility were recorded up to 140 kmsaway and the damage to the river system was con-siderable: both the Rivers Fulda and Weser had tobe dredged to restore them for navigation. Over 5km of riverbank needed rebuilding and 50 hectaresof land was made unusable.

It is worthwhile to digress at this point on themorality of this attack and the legality of the tar-get. By today’s standards the collateral damagewould be unacceptable: the current RAF would notcountenance attacking such a target. But in 1943high levels of civilian casualties were part and par-cel of the strategic bombing offensive: the need toaim at city centers because bombing accuracy wasinsufficient for anything else was bound to meansignificant levels of collateral damage. The civiliancasualties caused by Operation CHASTISE wouldsoon be eclipsed by the Battle of Hamburg: on thenight of July 27-28, 1943, Bomber Command’sincendiary attack raised a firestorm which within30 minutes had covered 22 square kilometers ofthe city. The exact casualty numbers will never beknown but figures of 40,000 killed with a similarnumber of injured seem likely.45 In such a climate,the loss of around 1,300 lives was consideredentirely acceptable in the pursuit of the disruptionof German industry. Harris even defended theresults of the attack on Hamburg:

In spite of all that happened at Hamburg, bombingproved a comparatively humane method. For onething, it saved the flower of the youth of this coun-try and of our allies from being mown down by themilitary in the field, as it was in Flanders in thewar of 1914-1918.46

Albert Speer, who had responsibility for theGerman war economy as Minister of Armament andWar Production, led the German response to theraid. He flew from Berlin the following morning toinspect the damage, initially from the air. Speerrecorded that the flooding of the valley below theMöhne had caused the “seemingly insignificant butgrave consequence that the electrical installationsat the pumping stations were soaked and muddied,so that industry was brought to a standstill.”47 Herapidly mobilized manpower to repair the damage:7,000 men were diverted from constructing defenceson the Atlantic Wall to repair the dams. Sweetman48

records that a further 20,000 workers, again manyof them drawn from the Todt Organization’s work-ers on the Atlantic Wall, were diverted to help withthe clean-up. It seems likely, therefore, that a totalof over 10,000 construction workers were divertedfrom constructing defenses against the invasion ofEurope which would occur the following year for aperiod of several months: what impact might thefortifications that they would otherwise have builthave had on that invasion? In addition to construc-tion workers, both military and civilian specialistsof many types were involved in the clean-up.

In order to restore electricity and water suppliesin the Ruhr, Speer ordered the requisitioning ofelectric motors and the importation of experts fromelsewhere in Germany regardless of the conse-quences. He aimed to restore armament produc-tion in the Ruhr to half-production within oneweek and to full production within two weeks.49

While this did not represent the total and pro-longed suspension of production that Wallis andothers had hoped for, it did represent the loss ofthree-eighths of the Ruhr’s monthly production: anot insignificant achievement that takes noaccount of production losses elsewhere caused bythe concentration of efforts into the Ruhr.

Attempts to quantify the actual productionlosses caused by the Dams’ Raid are fraught withdifficulty: the German economy was, surprisingly,still transforming itself onto a war footing andoutput was rising rapidly, so production lossesare difficult to show definitively. What can beshown is that water production in the Ruhrdropped by 75 percent in the aftermath of theraid and took six weeks to return to normal lev-els, steel production of over 300,000 tons was lostin both May and June (normal production losswas less than 100,000 tons per month) and gasavailability was cut in half.50 Commentators haveargued that this did not represent a good returnon the training time invested in preparation forthe raid or on the lives of the aircrew lost. The fly-ing hours put into training for Operation CHAS-TISE were approximately equivalent to thosetaken up in a normal 500-bomber raid but CHAS-TISE caused far more damage. No normal raidhalved the Ruhr’s production for a week and, at a4.7 percent loss rate,51 a 500-aircraft raid wouldhave expected to lose 23 or 24 aircraft comparedto Operation CHASTISE’s eight: for the effectachieved the loss was acceptable, if heavy to bearfor a single squadron.

Another response to the raid was the strength-ening of defenses around German dams. The levelof commitment is illustrated by the Eder dam: atotal of 48 barrage balloons, nine searchlights, sixrocket launching vehicles, 36 anti-aircraft gunsvarying in caliber from 20-88 mm and a smoke-screen system were provided. In addition, therewas an infantry company to guard against para-chute attacks so that up to 1,500 men were tied upin protecting one dam. For all the German dams,10,000 front-line troops were involved, the equiva-lent of a full division that could not be employedelsewhere.52

The final effect, surely not one the plannersintended, was that on German air plans. Hitlerwas furious, the Reich’s Propaganda Ministry’s logrecording, “The Führer is extremely angry andimpatient at the inadequacy of our defensive mea-sures”53 and he blamed the Luftwaffe for failing toprevent the attack. This reinforced Hitler’s preju-dices about air power; he did not believe that aneffective defense against bombing could bemounted. He refused to allow the MesserschmittMe-262 to be developed as a pure fighter (a role in


WATER PRO-DUCTION INTHE RUHRDROPPED BY75 PERCENTIN THEAFTERMATHOF THE RAIDAND TOOKSIX WEEKSTO RETURNTO NORMAL

which it was pre-eminent) instead insisting that itbe developed as a fighter-bomber.

Allied Effects

With the surviving aircrew back at Scamptonand a reconnaissance Spitfire on its way toGermany to photograph the aftermath of the raid,the Air Ministry began to exploit the publicity andpropaganda benefits of the raid. The news was bro-ken by the BBC’s morning news bulletin, the AirMinistry’s communiqué coming too late for themorning newspapers. They would not report theraid until May 18, 1943, but made up for the delaywith the enthusiasm with which they greeted thenews in their headlines. In a generally morerestrained era these included, “Huns Get A FloodBlitz” (The Daily Mirror), “Floods Sweeping RuhrFrom Smashed Dams – RAF’s Major Victory” (TheDaily Sketch) and “RAF Blow Up Three Key Damsin Germany” (The Daily Telegraph). Every frontpage carried aerial reconnaissance pictures of thedestruction but inaccuracies were creeping in, asevidenced by The Daily Telegraph’s implication

that three dams had been destroyed.News of the attack was quickly spread in the

United States: CAS briefed the Combined Chiefs ofStaff on May 17. On May 18, the New York Timesreported: “The RAF has secured another triumph”and hailed the “unexampled daring, skill and inge-nuity.”54 Such headlines must have been welcometo the British contingent at the Trident conference:they were facing an American military which was,to say the least, skeptical about British militarycapability. Churchill made the most of the opportu-nity in his address to the U.S. Congress on May 19saying, to cheers from the floor of the House:

You have just read of the destruction of the greatdams which feed the canals and provide power tothe enemy’s munition works. That was a gallantoperation costing eight out of 19 Lancaster bombersemployed but it will play a very far-reaching part inGerman military output. It is our settled policy, thesettled policy of our two staffs of war-makingauthorities – to make it impossible for Germany tocarry on any form of industry on a large or concen-trated scale, either in Germany, in Italy, or in the


Zeppelin factory.

CHURCHILLMADE THEMOST OF THEOPPORTU-NITY IN HISADDRESS TOTHE U.S.CONGRESSON MAY 19SAYING, TOCHEERSFROM THEFLOOR OFTHE HOUSE

enemy-occupied countries….In the meanwhile, ourair offensive is forcing Germany to withdraw anever larger proportion of its war-making capacityfrom the fighting fronts.55

Such declarations were aimed also at theRussians who, already fighting the Germans onthe Eastern front, were calling for the opening of asecond front in Europe. The Raid dramaticallydemonstrated Bomber Command’s ability to takethe battle to Germany.

A precision raid was also useful for propagandapurposes in Occupied France: the British WarCabinet had debated the effect of inaccurateBritish bombing on support there. Leaflets weredropped, both in France and in Holland, whichused pictures of the aftermath of the raid andexplanatory text, to stress the precision of the oper-ation: factual accuracy was not complete here asthe text claimed a breach of nearly 100 meters atthe Sorpe, in addition to the Möhne and Eder suc-cesses.56

On a less positive note, it soon dawned on theBritish that if an unexploded Upkeep had falleninto German hands, as Barlow’s had, it would bepossible to reverse-engineer a version to attackBritish dams: the Heinkel He-177 was theoreti-cally capable of carrying such a weapon.57 TheMinistry of Home Security debated the problem fornine months without reaching a definitive conclu-sion although steps were taken to protect the damsabove Sheffield. As it happened the Germans didnot attack, neither did they reverse-engineerUpkeep preferring an unsuccessful attempt to pro-duce a more sophisticated version.

Benefit and Lessons

In addition to the direct results in terms of thedamage caused by the floodwater there were anumber of indirect benefits. The most obvious ofthese was the continuing existence of 617Squadron, although it took some time to recoverfrom the crew losses sustained. The presence of asquadron that had proved its ability to delivernovel weapons, using new techniques and withgreat precision enabled the RAF to look towardsfurther precision raids. The original WA5, cripplingthe industrial Ruhr by attacking its power and cok-ing plants, was a “choke point” plan seeking strate-gic effect by targeting precise locations. The RAFnow had the potential ability to apply this conceptto other “choke points” in production and othersuch attacks would be undertaken. An examplewas the June 20-21, 1943, attack on the Zeppelinfactory on Lake Constance, which was thought tobe vital to German radar production. The conceptof attacking “choke points” remains firmly part ofRAF doctrine, although more likely these days tobe applied to infrastructure, logistic chains or com-munication nodes than to production facilities, atask made easier by the development of truly pre-cision-guided weapons.

Allied to 617 Squadron’s continued existence wasa willingness by the Air Ministry and MAP to look

more favorably at Barnes Wallis’ other ideas forlarge bombs. These would evolve into Tallboy andGrand Slam, respectively 12,000-lb and 22,000-lbpenetration bombs. 617 Squadron would useTallboy with great accuracy on a number of occa-sions. In June and July 1944, they successfullyattacked the Saumur railway tunnel, preventingthe transit of a Panzer division to attack theNormandy bridgehead, the E-boat installations atLe Havre and Boulogne, V-1 launch sites in the Pasde Calais, and the first launch site for the proposedV-3 weapon.58 In addition, the combinationdestroyed the Dortmund-Ems canal, the KrebsDam (using delayed-action fuses and low-levelattack) and twice (in conjunction with IX(B)Squadron) attacked and finally sank the Germanbattleship Tirpitz. The massive Grand Slam bombwas successfully used against the Bielefeld viaductthat had resisted all previous attempts to destroy it.

Gibson had been the first to use the “MasterBomber” technique, controlling the actions of for-mation and directing them from one target toanother by radio. Three months later GroupCaptain Searby would attack as “Master Bomber”in the raid against the V-weapons research site atPeenemünde. This raid was altogether larger inscale with nearly 600 aircraft, controlled by air-to-air radio as Searby circled the site for the durationof the attack,59 and caused ReichsministerGoebbels to comment that, in relation to V-weaponattacks, “preparations were set back by four oreven six weeks.”60 The combination of this tech-nique and of radio control from Group headquar-ters would eventually lead to the development ofsophisticated airborne command and control sys-tems. The use of ground spotters, using ground-to-air radio to talk tactical aircraft onto targets,would become commonplace in Normandy follow-ing D-Day. In Afghanistan last year, we saw groundtroops calling in close air support from B-52 heavybombers via controllers aboard orbiting AWACSaircraft.

Conclusions

If the sole criterion of success is the permanentparalysis of the Ruhr’s munitions industry andGermany’s consequent inability to prolong the war,then Operation CHASTISE failed. The AirMinistry and the Ministry of Economic Warfareboth knew that the destruction of the Sorpe damwas vital if this aim was to be met, but thatUpkeep was not really a suitable weapon for thetask. It is interesting, however, to speculate onwhat might have happened if more of the secondand third wave aircraft had reached and attackedthis target. If the disruption to German transportinfrastructure, reduced agricultural production,and the diversion of labor from the construction ofAtlantic defenses are considered, a picture beginsto emerge of the Dams Raid as a triumph.

As we have seen, however, there are otherimportant factors to take into account. The raidhad very important moral and psychological


A WILLING-NESS BY THEAIR MINISTRYAND MAP TOLOOK MOREFAVORABLYAT BARNESWALLIS’OTHER IDEASFOR LARGEBOMBS…WOULDEVOLVE INTOTALLBOY ANDGRAND SLAM,RESPEC-TIVELY 12,000-LB AND22,000-LBPENETRATIONBOMBS

1. Sweetman (1990) p.1.2. Webster and Frankland (1961) p.168.3. The “bouncing bomb” is part of the mythology ofthe raid. The weapon is more accurately described a ric-ocheting depth charge: it ricocheted across the waterrather than bouncing and its explosion was triggeredby hydrostatic pistols of the kind used in Royal Navydepth charges.4. Sweetman (1990) p.1.5. Ibid. p.12.6. Quoted in Terraine (1985) pp.292-3, the ButtReport assessed the accuracy of Bomber Command’sefforts for the period 2 June 1941- 15 July 1941 bystudying the photographs taken when bombs weredropped. It reached the depressing conclusion that ofall aircraft taking off on raids only about a quarteractually got within 5 miles of the target, and of thoseactually claiming to have attacked only one in threewas within 5 miles of its target.7. Two types of dams were involved. The Sorpe wasan earth dam (a waterproof concrete core surroundedby earth banks on either side) and not susceptible todestruction by shockwaves; the rest were gravity damswhich derive their strength from their own weight butare vulnerable to shockwaves.8. Sweetman (1990) p.8.9. Ibid. p.43. Neither plan progressed, though thereis a suggestion that Combined Operations’ effort washeld in reserve in case the bombing raid should beunsuccessful. It is hard, however, to see how a chargefloated down the reservoir could have avoided theMohne’s existing defences.10. Ibid. pp.18-19.11. Ibid. p.14. The intention was to achieve supersonicspeeds in the drop from height to bury the bomb asdeep in the ground as possible before it exploded.12. Ibid. pp.32-34.13. Ibid. p.18.14. Ibid. p.28.15. Ibid. p.30. The third point is counter-intuitive:most golfers realize that a back spun golf ball stopsshort on pitching rather than leaping forward. Wallis

was a golfer; indeed he was working from offices at hisown golf club.16. Ibid. p.35. These timings appear to be correct.Although Wallis would later claim that initial droppingtrials occurred in September 1942, there is no docu-mentary evidence to support his assertion.17. Andrews & Morgan (1988) pp. 387-9. The VickersWindsor was a four-engined bomber developed to meetSpecification B3/42 but which would, in fact, neverenter series production: four prototypes were built ofwhich only three flew.18. Terraine (1985) p.514.19. Ibid. p.518.20. Harris (1947) p.157.21. Messenger (1984) p.119.22. Sweetman (1990) p.44.23. Ibid. p.56. It appears that the extra trial dropswere requested by MAP and Air Ministry officialsrather than by Wallis. At this stage the attack was only2 weeks away and 617 Squadron were well into theirtraining for the operation but the method of attack wasnot yet fully proved.24. Ibid. p.76. Initially chaired by Rear-AdmiralRenouf the appointment soon passed to AVM Bottom-ley, ACAS (Ops).25. AP3000 p.1.3.4. Mission command gives instruc-tions on what is to be achieved and why rather thanwhat to do and how to do it.26. Messenger (1984) pp.73-74. Harris was not averseto publicity. He had authorized the “Thousand Bomber”raid against Cologne in May 1942 as much for domes-tic propaganda reasons as for operational ones.27. Harris (1947) p.156. One does not have to beunduly cynical to infer that the potential propagandaand public relations benefits of a successful attack on ahigh profile target helped to smooth the way for high-level support of the Dams Raid.28. Messenger (1984) p.85.29. Sweetman (1990) p.83. The statement suggeststhat Harris, despite his avowed dislike of elites,accepted from the start that 617 Squadron was to be anelite squadron kept in-being for specialised tasks.


effects. It was one of a number of BomberCommand “set pieces”61 which raised both theBritish public’s confidence in the Command’s abil-ity to take the fight to the Germans and publicmorale in general. Allied to this, the timing of theraid was fortuitous, as it allowed the British toparade an aerial success before the CombinedChiefs of Staff Conference and Churchill to exploitthat success before the United States Congress.Furthermore, the dramatic pictures could be usedboth in persuading the Russians that Britain wasdoing its share against Germany and in showingoccupied Western Europe that Britain could nowattack precision targets. The Germans were notimmune to the psychological effects: Speer recordsthat the raid made “a deep impression on theFührer.”62 Reinforcing Hitler’s prejudices, thisassisted the misemployment of the Luftwaffe asan offensive rather than defensive force. In addi-tion, fear of repeat attacks (never apparently con-templated) caused the equivalent of an entire reg-ular division to be tied down, protecting theremaining dams: in itself this was probably worth

the loss of eight aircraft.There were other gains for the RAF: the start of

the “master bomber” technique allied to thedemonstration that bomber aircraft could be effec-tively controlled by radio; the demonstration thatBomber Command could undertake precisionattacks (albeit with specialized training andselected crews); the creation of an “elite” squadronwhich would develop new techniques and under-take other precision attacks; and the impetus theraid gave to the Command to take Wallis’ otherspecialized bombs seriously.

Undoubtedly it was, at the time, in Webster andFrankland’s words “the most precise bombingattack ever delivered,”63 even if their assertion of“a feat of arms which has never been excelled”smacks of hyperbole. Allying this precision to thedramatic post-raid reconnaissance photographs,the undoubted bravery of the crews involved and apre-determination to use the raid for propagandapurposes, it is hardly surprising that the DamsRaid remains that RAF’s most famous single oper-ation and 617 its most famous squadron.

NOTES

IT WAS, ATTHE TIME, INWEBSTERAND FRANK-LAND’SWORDS “THEMOST PRE-CISE BOMB-ING ATTACKEVER DELIVERED

30. Verrier (1968) p.220. Whilst these results clearlyshow that an average heavy bomber squadron could notbomb sufficiently accurately to destroy the dams, theyalso show that standards in Bomber Command wereimproving. By comparison with the Butt Report’s one-third of attacking aircraft bombing within 5 miles ofthe aiming point, the Main Force was now achievingone-half bombing within 3 miles.31. Sweetman (1990) p.64.32. Ibid. p.66. A similar visual anomaly (magenta eye)is experienced after prolonged use of night vision gog-gles. This is caused by suppression of the sensitivity ofretinal green cones by the green light transmitted bynight vision goggles while the sensitivity of red andblue cones is increased. The response of the eye whenre-exposed to white light is to produce over-reaction tothe red and blue frequencies and hence a magentaimage.33. Airsickness caused by low-level buffet in aircraftnot originally designed for low-level flight is stillencountered in the RAF where Nimrod MR2 rearcreware particularly prone to it for precisely the same rea-sons. 617 Squadron’s sufferers were treated withchlorobutanol, now recognized as a hypnotic and seda-tive: it is interesting to speculate on the potentialimpact on performance of using such a drug in low-level flight. It is impossible now to establish whetherany aircrew actually used chlorobutanol during theraid and whether their performance might have beendegraded by it.34. Sweetman (1990) p.68. Bomber Command wouldhave further experience of the damage done by low-level flight to aircraft not specifically intended for thatrole in 1965. The Vickers Valiant was designed as ahigh-speed, high-altitude unarmed bomber but in early1964 was switched to the low-level role as high-altitudeoperations were deemed to be too dangerous. Less thana year later the entire fleet was grounded with fatiguedamage to the wing main spar.35. In many ways this was an innovation as mostWorld War II aircrew mastered their operational flyingskills on operational sorties.36. Getting Upkeep on target was a genuine teameffort: the pilot set the line, the air engineer who con-trolled the throttles was responsible for airspeed, thenavigator monitored altitude and the bomb-aimer wasresponsible for timely release of the weapon. Given theprecise requirements in all parameters, it is a testa-ment to the crews’ skill that the weapon was deliveredwith sufficient accuracy for it to function at all.37. This happened to Hopgood, the second aircraft toattack the Möhne. It is not entirely clear that thedestruction of this aircraft was caused by the explosionof Upkeep and it was more likely to be due to defensivegunfire from the dam.38. It seems likely that the Möhne dam was breachedby the first Upkeep to explode in contact with it andthat Maltby’s mine merely widened the breach.39. The evidence on the fate of Maudslay’s aircraft isunclear. It was thought to have been destroyed by themine’s explosion but radio transmissions were heardafterwards and German records suggest that the air-craft was actually shot down by anti-aircraft fire on itsway home.40. Euler (2001) p.40. The “Trident” conference washeld to clarify future Anglo-American operations: theseincluded confirmation of POINTBLANK, the jointstrategic bombing offensive aimed at fatally weakeningGermany. The directive was issued on 10 June 1943.41. Operation Order B.976. The six, in the order ofimportance attached to them, were Möhne, Eder, Sorpe,Lister, Ennepe and Diemel.42. Euler (2001) p.108.43. Cooper (2000) p.72. US experience with flood dam-

aged railway tracks suggested they took up to 25000man-hours per mile to repair. The Ruhr-Kassel railwayline was, indeed, unusable for several months.44. Sweetman (1990) pp. 154-5.45. Terraine (1985) pp.546-7.46. Harris quoted in Terraine (1985) p.548.47. Speer (1970) p.281.48. Sweetman (1990) p. 162.49. Ibid. p. 162.50. Ibid. pp.180-2.51. Terraine (1985) p. 518. Bomber Command lost 872aircraft out of 18506 sorties despatched during the1943 “Battle of the Ruhr”, a loss rate of 4.71%.52. Sweetman (1990) pp. 184-5.53. Quoted in Rumpf (1975) p.74.54. Sweetman (1990) p.174.55. Euler (2001) p.117.56. Sweetman (1990) p.175.57. Philpott (1980) p.114.58. Sweetman (1990) p.189.59. Terraine (1985) p.541.60. Morpurgo (1972) p.282.61. The first “Thousand Bomber Raid” againstCologne could be seen in the same light. Harris neededa major raid wreaking significant damage to demon-strate that his ideas on the employment of BomberCommand could work. Nonetheless, the need for 1000aircraft was undoubtedly for propaganda purposes.62. Speer (1970) p.280.63. Webster & Frankland (1961) p. 168. It is a testa-ment to advancing technology that what in 1943 wasthought of as remarkable precision would be routinewith today’s laser and GPS guided weaponry.

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Morpurgo, J.E. Barnes Wallis. (London: Longman,1972).

Ottaway, S. Dambuster: A Life of Guy Gibson VC.(London: Leo Cooper, 1996).

Philpott, B. The Encyclopedia of German MilitaryAircraft. (London: Bison Books, 1980).

Rumpf, H. The Bombing of Germany. (London: WhiteLion Publishers, 1975).

Speer, A. Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. (London,Nicholson, 1970).

Sweetman, J. The Dambusters Raid. (London: Arms &Armour, 1990).

Terraine, J. The Right of the Line. (London: Hodder andStoughton, 1985).

Verrier, A. The Bomber Offensive. (London: Batsford,1968).

Webster, Sir Charles and Frankland, N. The StrategicAir Offensive



The Dawn of AviatiThe First Flying M


Gary Leiser

on in the Middle EastMachines over Istanbul


The Fog of War:Lt. Kenneth M. Tayloron December 7, 1941


George R. Farfour

C lausewitz explained the concept of fog andfriction of war to military professionals. Inthe study of history, many events fall vic-

tim to a similar fog and friction especially with thepassage of time. The lens of history can often dis-tort or change events.Therefore, a true study of his-tory demands a critical eye to decipher not onlywhat happened, but why. To understand why, wemust ascertain the true facts. This article attemptsto clear that fog about one such event in Americanmilitary history, clarifying details of the UnitedStates’ first air combat of World War II, by concen-trating on the actions of one of the participants.Although a great deal of information exists aboutthis event, much of it is erroneous or contradictory.Beyond the recitation of facts, circumstances, andstatistics, the most important aspect of this story isthe resourcefulness, tenacity and courage of 2d Lt.Kenneth M. Taylor and his squadron-mate, 2d Lt.George Welch, who were the first Americans air-borne to confront the Japanese attack on December7, 1941.

Kenneth M. Taylor was born on December 23,1919, in a small town called Enid, on the plains ofOklahoma, To start a better life, his parents soonmoved eighty-three miles east to the small town ofHominy, located about twenty-five miles northwestof Tulsa. Young Ken grew up there. His childhoodwas normal for the time. He was a hard workingboy who learned from a young age the responsibil-ity and sense of value to the land that come fromworking diligently day in and day out in the tediumof small town life.

Taylor graduated from high school in 1938, andthen attended the University of Oklahoma. Somefriends from Hominy were enticed by the lure andadventure offered by flying and Taylor was noexception. Taylor completed the minimum twoyears at the university for Army pilot training asan Aviation cadet and was assigned to class 41C.1He graduated on April 25, 1941, was commissioneda second lieutenant and on the same day receivedthe silver wings of an Army Air Corps pilot. He wasassigned to the 47th Pursuit Squadron (Fighter),15th Pursuit Group, Wheeler Field, Hawaii.2

Arriving in the U. S. Hawaiian territory at thebeginning of June 1941, Taylor reported to WheelerField and began flying within two weeks. The 47thPursuit Squadron was less than a year old, havingbeen activated on December 1, 1940.3 The 47thoperated a variety of aircraft, including the MartinB–12A, Boeing P–26—both considered obsolete—the Curtiss P–36, and the most modern, the CurtissP–40.4 Taylor was happy to be assigned to train inthe P–40 Warhawk, as fourteen B models and oneC model had arrived just a month earlier.5

Life in the 47th revolved around a training envi-ronment, as the new pilots learned their craft, jock-eying for opportunities to fly the squadron’s fewfighters. Pursuit tactics were drilled into the pilotsdaily. Their lives were not overly taxing, however.Their typical schedule was 0800-1600 with an hourfor lunch. Wednesday and Saturday afternoons, aswell as all day Sunday, were off-duty periods.6 Dueto the low number of aircraft, many of the pilotsstruggled to reach the 100-hour point, whichmarked one as fully combat qualified.7

About twice a year, the squadron deployed to oneof the outlying fields for aerial gunnery practiceand qualification. Usually the deployment lastedabout two weeks, with the deployed personnel liv-ing in tents (typically as close to the beach as theycould get away with) and messing from mobile fieldkitchens. Even with tents and mobile kitchens,they enjoyed the deployments mainly because ofthe compact training schedule—0500–1000. Squa-dron personnel spent the remainder of the day onthe beach swimming, playing volleyball or baseball.Every evening the squadron ran a truck across theisland to Kailua where personnel could take in thelatest movie, go dancing or participate in othersocial activities. It was during one of these deploy-ments when the squadron had its first party with amenu of “[q]uantities of beer and fried chicken.”8

Though learning pursuit tactics was their pri-mary mission, squadron members also underwentground defense training. This training was intendedto prepare them for the task of protecting their ownairfields under austere conditions. The airmen musthave had a rude awakening as they were marchedinto the jungle and lived for a week with a pup tentas their only shelter. The squadron history reportsthat the “training was a bit rougher than usuallyexperienced by Air Corps personnel” but admittedthat it paid dividends after December 7th.9

As war with Japan got closer, the squadron tran-sitioned from training pursuit tactics into full-fledged simulated combat flying. At this time sixP–40s (five B models and their only C model) weretransferred to other units. Even with the restric-tion on aircraft flying, Taylor managed to accumu-late more than 430 flight hours by December 6th.10

Contrary to popular belief, the 47th PursuitSquadron had not been dispersed to avoid theeffects of an attack on Wheeler or because the unithad performed poorly on their gunnery qualifica-tions, but was there to perform the normal rotationof gunnery practice.11 An Anti-Sabotage alert wasput into effect on November 28th requiring a 24-hour guard of the aircraft.12 For gunnery practice,the 47th had been assigned to Haleiwa EmergencyLanding Field, along the North shore of the island


Lt. Col. George R. Farfour is the Deputy Director, Commander’s Action Group at Headquarters, AirForce Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He has been selected for reassignment as the Chiefof Safety, 341st Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB, Montana. He is a space and missile operator havingserved as an ICBM Launch officer and a Satellite Command and Control Flight Commander. Lt ColFarfour served at United States Strategic Command and on the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Theresearch on this paper was primarily performed while attending Air Command and Staff College.

(Overleaf) A row of CurtissP–40 Warhawks. TheWarhawk was the last ofthe Curtiss Hawks. Behindthe Republic P–47 andNorth American P–51, theP–40 was the most exten-sively built American air-craft in World War II.British and export modelswere designated asTomahawks or Kittyhawksdepending on their modeldesignation.

2D LT.KENNETH M.TAYLOR AND… 2D LT.GEORGEWELCH, …WERE THEFIRSTAMERICANSAIRBORNE TOCONFRONTTHEJAPANESEATTACK ONDECEMBER 7,1941

some ten miles northwest of Wheeler. The quartersfor the deployed personnel consisted of tents, butinstead of being located near the beach as usual,they were adjacent to the runway, owing to theAnti-Sabotage alert.13

Saturday, December 6th dawned like any otherwith many of the squadron personnel ready toescape the confines of Haleiwa. Taylor and Welchdecided to spend Saturday night at the officers’clubs at Hickam and Wheeler Fields, dancing andplaying poker in what had slowly evolved into thenorm. Since Sunday was a duty-free day, they couldsleep late at Wheeler and return to their Haleiwacots and tent late Sunday.14 The Officers’ Clubs atHickam and Wheeler required black-tie onSaturday nights. Rumor had it that the higher-ranking officers instituted this policy to keep theyounger officers out of the club, because the latterwere not issued dress uniforms. The young officers,realizing the best time was on Saturday nights,took matters into their own hands and procuredtuxedos. Some of the pilots of the 47th , includingTaylor and Welch, who had become inseparablebuddies, decided to join the festivities.

Welch was an outstanding pilot known for hisdaring and outspoken nature, and he exuded allthe characteristics of the typical fighter pilot.Taylor, an equally capable pilot, was more affable,with a quiet confidence that complemented Welch.They worked well together on duty and off. Theyhad gotten the reputation as “goof-offs,” mainlythrough harmless fun and pranks that didn’talways square with strict military rules. The partyat the Wheeler Officers’ Club usually started about2100 hrs and continued until the first signs of sun-light. At some point during the evening, pokerwould replace dancing as the activity of choice.After a night of dancing and playing cards until theearly morning hours, Taylor and Welch decided toget some rest, turning in about 0630.15 Many pub-lished stories maintain that the two were debating

the merits of an early morning swim at Haleiwavice turning in at Wheeler, or that they were justfinishing their card game when the attack began.These tales turn out to be nothing more than inter-esting and colorful fiction.16

At about 0755, a peaceful Sunday morning cameto an abrupt end. Taylor and Welch were jarredawake by the noise and vibrations of bombs explod-ing. After the first explosion, Taylor thought a Navyaircraft was buzzing the field as they often did onSunday morning or had an accident, and he rolledover to go back to sleep. But when he heard the sec-ond explosion, he got up and pulled on the tuxedopants he had worn the night before which were theclosest pants he could find.17 Racing from his room,he met Welch who was also on the way out. As theystood outside the BOQs, a plane was strafing thehangars and flight line and bullets were hittingdangerously close to the Officers’ Club.The crimsonred “meatball” of the Empire of Japan was clearlyvisible to the pair. As the two watched, they decidedto take Taylor’s car and drive up to Haleiwa.

Popular versions of the story contend that Welchalerted the Haleiwa Duty Sergeant to get two air-craft ready for immediate take-off.18 Neither Taylornor Welch positively recalled this event when testify-ing before the Pearl Harbor Attack hearings. Welch,remembering the condition of the waiting aircraft onHaleiwa when they arrived, stated, “[t]hey had beenalerted, apparently, from Wheeler field….”19 Taylorsaid that “[w]e had called them, or somebody hadcalled them; so they were practically ready to takeup.”20 Taylor, in later accounts stated he called theairfield.21 This version was immortalized in themotion picture Tora! Tora! Tora! as Taylor phonesHaleiwa and directs Welch to find a car—at leasthalf correct. Taylor recalls that while he phonedHaleiwa, he told Welch to bring his [Taylor’s] cararound to the officers’ club.22

In their haste both Taylor and Welch had appar-ently done the same thing and grabbed the closest


Surviving pilots who man-aged to get into the air onDecember 7, 1941. Note thepistol belts worn by thoseon duty. (left to right):2d Lts. Harry W. Brown,Philip M. Rasmussen,Kenneth M. Taylor, GeorgeS. Welch, and 1st Lt. LewisSanders.

TAYLOR …PULLED ONTHE TUXEDOPANTS HEHAD WORNTHE NIGHTBEFORE.…RACINGFROM HISROOM, HEMET WELCH

pants and shirts available, which gave rise to theoften embellished story of the two flying in theirtuxedos. At least this part of the myth is true.23

Welch and Taylor ran to Taylor’s car and raced toHaleiwa at breakneck speed. With the explosionsand enemy planes flying overhead, the incentive tohurry was extraordinary, but as the Japanese planesflew even lower over the airfield, it added motivationto the trip. Driving at speeds sometimes reaching100 mph, the two quickly traveled the ten-mile roadbetween Wheeler and Haleiwa, unmolested byJapanese gunfire. Several versions have the pairbeing strafed as many as three times on the drive toHaleiwa, yet Taylor recalls he was as afraid of thelocal police as he was the Japanese. Welch hadrecently been relieved of his own car due to the strictenforcement of speed limits around the bases.24

When the pair arrived, ground crews hadstarted getting the planes ready. Taylor and Welchran to two P–40s their crew chiefs had preparedwith engines running and were in the mostadvanced stage of preparation and readied forimmediate take off. Taylor’s crew chief, StaffSergeant George Wilson, was not there, so SergeantHurley took over the crew chief duties for Taylor.AsHurley was strapping him in, he told Taylor theyonly had the .30 caliber guns ready for action asHaleiwa didn’t have any .50 caliber ammunition. Inaddition to telling Welch about the ammunition sit-uation, his crew chief Staff Sergeant Cecil Goodroetold him orders had been received for the planes tobe dispersed on the ground. Welch dismissedGoodroe’s concern and instructed him tersely to getoff his wing as he was going to fight. It should benoted that the practice of assigning a crew chiefand a pilot to a particular aircraft had not yetevolved, especially in units like the 47th with sofew aircraft. Additionally, the training nature of theunit further made this impractical. Since crewchiefs were in training status also, they wereassigned to pilots instead of specific aircraft.Ignoring preflight and takeoff checklists, Taylorand Welch pushed their throttles to full power androared off the small runway in formation.25

This is where the story gets even more confus-ing, not due to lack of research or documentation,

but primarily because of the inherent confusion ofwar. Several accounts, including Taylor and Welch’scongressional testimony, seem to indicate the pairtook off and landed at Wheeler before engagingenemy aircraft.26 Other accounts, including thesquadron history and their own decoration cita-tions suggest otherwise.27

As the two got airborne, they requested instruc-tions from the interceptor control center and weredirected to proceed at 8,000 feet to “Easy,” a codename for one of the ten initial points on the island.These were pre-designated points pilots would beassigned to patrol. Though Welch and Taylor knewthem well, they testified they doubted very manypilots knew the points from memory on December7th. In fact, many carried maps as a reminder ofthe points. Actual combat immediately trans-formed the training program. Welch testified thatafter the attacks the initial points have “been verywell impressed upon us.”28 Once at Easy, which wasBarber’s Point, the two saw no sign of Japanese air-craft and began scanning the skies for the enemy.They observed a formation of unarmed B–17s andcontinued searching for the Japanese. Taylor latercommented, “we didn’t have to look very long” asthey quickly spotted a formation of twelve enemyaircraft about ten miles away over Ewa Field,another auxiliary base used primarily by theMarine Corps. The formation was about 1,000 feetbelow Taylor and Welch.29

Though outnumbered six-to-one, neither hesi-tated, immediately diving into the enemy forma-tion of Vals with guns blazing, catching theJapanese bombers by surprise. Taylor and Welchshot down one aircraft apiece, nearly simultane-ously. Although Welch is credited with the first offi-cial shoot down, both probably downed their firstenemy aircraft at about the same time. Taylor saidneither knew who exactly was the first and theyhad agreed in the air that whoever survived couldclaim the title. Of course, both survived. SinceWelch outranked Taylor by two Aviation cadetclasses and was technically the lead aircraft in theattack, credit went to Welch.30 Taylor doesn’t haveany trouble with that to this very day. Taylor com-mented that they were both just glad to be alive atthe end of the day.

Dispersing the formation of Japanese bombersin the initial attack, both pilots broke in differentdirections to pursue fleeing enemy aircraft. On thefirst pass, Welch discovered one of his guns hadjammed. Taylor spotted another Japanese aircraftheading out to sea and pursued it. Climbingslightly above it, he then began descending on thelumbering Val, and got so close that when hesqueezed the trigger he could see that he had killedthe rear gunner.31 As the Val went into some clouds,Taylor was unsure if he had knocked out the plane,so he continued the pursuit. As he cleared thecloudbank, Taylor saw the Val, trailing smokebehind it, like a long kite tail, lose altitude sud-denly and crash into the sea. Rolling back towardEwa, he again gained altitude to better observe thearea. Welch, apparently out of ammunition, turned


Brig Gen (Ret.) KennethTaylor standing in front ofa restored Japanese AichiType 99 Carrier "Val"Bomber, 2004. (Photo cour-tesy of Mr John Meek, © 2004.)

THOUGH OUT-NUMBEREDSIX-TO-ONE,NEITHER HESITATED,IMMEDIATELYDIVING INTOTHE ENEMYFORMATIONOF VALSWITH GUNSBLAZING,CATCHINGTHEJAPANESEBOMBERS BYSURPRISE

back toward Wheeler. Taylor observed another Valheading toward the open sea and maneuveredbehind it. He carefully allowed the aircraft to fillhis crosshairs and fired, causing smoke and dam-age. As he went to complete the kill, he too ran outof ammunition. Rather than pursuing the Val andpossibly getting caught alone and unarmed, Taylorimmediately turned back toward Wheeler. This wasTaylor’s first probable kill of the day.32

When Taylor approached Wheeler, the sky wasstill full of anti-aircraft fire. Few of the gunners hadreceived extensive aircraft recognition training andon that day, anyone with a weapon became an“expert” in shooting at aerial targets. Taylor tookhis aircraft in and landed without any damagefrom friendly fire. When he taxied in, he observedwhat could only be described as complete and totalchaos. Smoke was rising to the sky from variouspoints as far as the eye could see. Men were run-ning everywhere—looking busy while at the sametime seeming to be doing nothing. Planes were

being pushed and pulled all over the field.A groundcrew went to meet Taylor’s plane. He told them heneeded ammo and the crew looked toward Welch’saircraft nearby. Welch had landed minutes earlierand was told to get out of his plane so it could be“dispersed” for safety reasons. Welch convinced theground crew to rearm his aircraft as he intended togo back up and fight.33

Another popular story of the day holds that therequired ammunition was in a hangar that was onfire.A heroic crewman ran into the blazing buildingand emerged loaded down with ammunition.Taylor indicated he and Welch actually taxied tothe edge of the field, away from the row of hangarswhere they knew there would be .50-caliber ammu-nition.34 The crewmen around Taylor’s plane, see-ing the resolution of the argument with Welch,began servicing and reloading Taylor’s P–40 aswell. Taylor was relieved to see the .50 caliberammunition belts being loaded into his aircraft.Many accounts have the pair receiving fuel on theirfirst landing, yet Taylor recalls they didn’t needfuel, just ammo.35 Both pilots got an earful fromhigher-ranking officers, each taking a turn on theirwing dispensing guidance and advice. As the twopilots gulped water without leaving their cockpits,a growing roar of incoming aircraft could beheard.36 Welch yelled for everyone to clear his air-craft. Trying in vain to repair his jammed gun, asergeant shouted to Welch he had been unsuccess-ful. Welch nodded, pushed in the throttle androared with full power onto the runway, almostimmediately leaving the ground.37

Taylor was still getting ammunition when thesecond wave of Japanese came into sight. All atonce the ground crew and the “advisors” ran forcover in such haste they left their partially filledammo boxes on Taylor’s wing. Taylor was by him-self and an armament dolly stood in his way. “…[S]oI gave it the throttle and my P–40 jumped over thearmament dolly with no damage at all. ” The ammoboxes fell off the wings and spilled onto the apronas he departed.38 Taylor was only a few minutesbehind Welch and as he taxied out made a quickdecision. Seeing the Japanese descending and clos-ing in on the field, he recognized if he took off awayfrom them, he would be a target for them on histake-off run and when he became airborne. Taylorrealized he could maintain fire on them butbecause they were so low, they could not fire uponhim without risking crashing. He gunned theengine, swinging the plane around and faced intothe incoming enemy aircraft. Pushing in the throt-


(Top) Kate – Allied nick-name given to theNakajima Type 97 carrier,B5N1/2 two or three-manJapanese dive-bomber.

(Middle) Zero or Zeke –Allied nickname given tothe A6M2 one-manJapanese fighter.

(Bottom) Val – Allied nick-name given to the AichiType 99 Carrier Bombermodel 22 D3A2 two-manJapanese torpedo-bomber.

(These nicknames were notin use during the attack onPearl Harbor. They cameinto practice later in thewar. For consistency, theyare used in the article.)

HEOBSERVEDWHAT COULDONLY BEDESCRIBEDAS COM-PLETE ANDTOTALCHAOS.SMOKE WASRISING TOTHE SKYFROM VARI-OUS POINTSAS FAR ASTHE EYECOULD SEE

tle for his take-off, he held the tail down as long aspossible while firing his guns into the very low fly-ing enemy formation. Taylor finally raised the tailand pulled back, maintaining his fire as he roseinto the air. When he heard the landing gear lockinto place, he pulled back and to the left, executinga chandelle which must have looked better thanany contrived story of the day.39

Taylor estimated the location of the enemy for-mation he had flown into at takeoff. As hedescended onto the line of Kates and Zeros, he gota Kate in his sights and let fly with all of his guns.Unfortunately, the clouds and the smoke hadobscured the fact that Taylor was not behind theenemy formation as he had thought, but in the mid-dle of it. Just as he was beginning to think that dog-fighting was pretty easy, his plane rocked violentlyin the midst of a hail of Japanese bullets. Onepierced the canopy right behind his head and wentthrough his arm, striking the trim tab and sendingshrapnel flying into his leg. Taylor ignored thewounds as he realized his predicament.40 Taylorrevealed in a recent telephone conversation thathis crew chief had sent him two additional slugsthat he never knew about which were pried frombehind his seat.

Meanwhile, Welch had seen the situation evolveand knew Taylor was in trouble. He descended onthe plane threatening Taylor and pulled the trigger.His guns, now with the lethal . 50 calibers, hit theirmark and the Zero exploded and crashed on theisland.41 Taylor and Welch later visited the crashsite to view the wreckage which had come to a fieryrest at 711 Neal Street, Wahiawa, just off the run-way and near Schofield Barracks.42 Taylor, injured,continued his attack. Taylor rolled out of the for-mation thankful to his friend.As soon as he was outof immediate danger, he rolled back in from abovethe enemy formation, taking care to locate theactual tail of the formation. As Taylor attacked aKate, he watched it begin smoking and lose altitudebut then had a terrible realization. He noted a large

formation of Zeros coming toward Wheeler. Rea-lizing Welch was busy engaging the enemy also, hequickly extracted himself from the area to get andgive some help before confirming the kill, making ithis second probable. The P–40 was no match for theZero, especially alone. The Zeros seemed to deliber-ately turn away from Taylor and Welch’s position.43

The sequence of the second attack dogfightsoccurred just north of Wheeler and is importantbecause it dispels another myth of Pearl Harbor.

Though some accounts indicate Haleiwa wasnot attacked during the Japanese raid, thesquadron history indicates a lone Japanese air-craft strafed the field and indeed several mapsindicate Japanese routes over Haleiwa.44 Theattack apparently had no effect on the operationsof Haleiwa. Conventional wisdom held that theprimary reason Haleiwa was not attacked wasbecause the Japanese simply did not know it wasthere. Historian Gordon Prange indicates that asmall force of Zeros was directed to attack any air-craft at Haleiwa before going to their rendezvouspoint.45 Prange interviewed several key Japaneseflight leaders of the attack and indicates Sub-Lieutenant Iyozo Fujita, a Japanese pilot, hadorders to attack Haleiwa with his formation anddestroy any enemy planes found there. This sec-ondary objective would not, however, be accom-plished at the expense of the primary objective.Commander Minoru Genda, the master targetplanner for the attack, had included Haleiwa inhis calculations, so the Japanese certainly knewthe field existed well before that fateful Sundaymorning. Apparently, Fujita saw a vicious dogfightnear Haleiwa and after viewing several of hiscountrymen going down in flames decided not toattack the field and proceed to his primary objec-tive—protecting the bombers attacking Wheeler.Fujita most likely saw Taylor and Welch engaginghis lead formation. By their engagement justnorth of Wheeler, Taylor and Welch almost cer-tainly prevented an assault on Haleiwa, savingthe airfield, its aircraft and its personnel from fur-ther attack and destruction—another accolade toplace at the feet of these two remarkable air-men.46

After Taylor had scored his second probable, hecontinued to engage the enemy until he ran out ofammunition, attempting to disrupt their attack for-mations as they flew out to sea. He again flewthrough the thick anti-aircraft and small arms fireand for the second time managed to get throughwithout being shot down by friendly fire, a fate hissquadron-mate, 2d Lt. John Dains, was to suffer.47

The Japanese had gone, finishing their treacherousplan and speeding back to their carriers.

Taylor returned to Haleiwa and rejoined Welch.Both were happy to see each other. Taylor andWelch, after a hard day of fighting, decided thatthey would try to find aircraft they had destroyed.As they were searching for remains of their kills,they ran into their squadron commander, MajorGordon H. Austin, who had returned from hisduck-hunting trip on the nearby island of Molokai


P–40 wreckage at WheelerField along Hangar Row.The devastation of theJapanese attack is clear. Itwas along this row ofhangars that Taylor andWelch were re-armed withammunition.

AFTERTAYLOR HADSCORED HISSECONDPROBABLE,HE CONTINUEDTO ENGAGETHE ENEMYUNTIL HE RANOUT OFAMMUNITION

and was in an understandable state of excitementand depression. Taylor recalls they were immedi-ately tongue lashed by Austin as he expected Welchand Taylor had missed everything probably due totheir unorthodox flying attire and since they wereconsidered “goof-offs.” When they explained whatthey had done, the commander became theirinstant friend and remains so to this very day. 48

They apparently found at least one of the crashsites—the one mentioned earlier on Neal Street.49

When that terrible day was complete,Taylor hadtwo confirmed kills and two probables.Welch endedthe day with the most kills at four. One other mem-ber of the 47th, 2d Lt. Harry Brown, scored a singlekill and a probable.50 Of the eleven air-to-air killsrecognized on December 7th, seven were the resultof pilots from the 47th. The 47th was also responsi-ble for all four probables credited.51

The 47th Pursuit Squadron did quite well, allthings considered. In a process which must havebroken decoration submission and approval re-cords, their medal citations were approved in timefor the December 17, 1941 headlines—“Heroes ofthe Air Battle of Wheeler” and “Army Fliers GetDSC for Heroism in Raid”—a mere ten days.52 In aceremony on Wheeler, January 8, 1942, Taylor andWelch were awarded the Distinguished ServiceCross, the Nation’s second highest decoration forvalor in action against an armed enemy.53 Taylorwas also awarded the Purple Heart on July 1, 1942for the wounds he received during his second sortieof the day.54

As a final tribute to the personnel of the 47th, allof her personnel on leave status on the islandsreported back for duty before the sun set on thathorrible day. All the units were on continual alertafter the attack. Many recognition and award pho-tos, including publicity shots, conspicuously showthe sidearms and helmets worn by the on-alert per-sonnel. Officers and enlisted men were evendirected to wear sidearms when on pass for a timeafter December 7th.55

The 47th continued as a unit committed primar-ily to training pilots and alert and patrol dutiesaround the islands. On March 6, 1942, the unit wasredesignated as the 47 Pursuit Squadron (Inter-ceptor) from (Fighter) as it had been since beingactivated.56 The unit underwent another adminis-trative change when on May 22, 1942, its designa-tion was changed from “Army Air Corps” to “ArmyAir Forces” and became the 47th Fighter Squa-dron.57

Taylor was later assigned to the 44th FighterSquadron and continued flying P–40s where mostcontend he scored two more aerial victories. Oddlyenough, the date of his last kill was December 7,1943, though this fact cannot be verified. After thewar, Imperial Japanese war records revealed thetrue number of their losses on the attack on PearlHarbor. After reviewing the records, the InspectorGeneral upgraded Taylor’s two December 7th prob-ables to victories bringing his total kills to 6 andmaking him an “Ace.”58 The Air Force HistoricalResearch Agency’s (AFHRA) records on aerial vic-tories disagree with this data, however. Accordingto the official Air Force World War II credits, Taylorearned two victories on December 7, 1941, and onevictory on January 27, 1943.59 Dr. Daniel Haulman,a historian with the AFHRA and the keeper of theAir Force’s aerial victory records, indicates that atleast two studies have investigated Taylor’s aerialvictories, one in 1978 and another in 1991. The1991 study verified and assigned him credit for theJanuary 27, 1943 kill. Haulman found no officialevidence of Taylor ever being awarded additionalaerial credits or any documentation to suggest thereported two probables were later redesignated asvictories after the war. Taylor recalls a colonel fromthe Inspector General’s office giving him credit forthe two probables but cannot locate the documen-tation. Taylor positively recalls splashing at leastfour enemy aircraft that day.60

Taylor’s wartime highlights also included flyingthe P–40 from the aircraft carrier USS Nassau toGuadalcanal. He then returned to the UnitedStates to train pilots for combat in Europe as thecommander of a Republic P–47 Thunderbolt Re-placement Training Unit and later the 12th Pur-suit Squadron. He returned to the Pacific too late togo back into combat. Immediately after the war, hecommanded a squadron of the first USAF combatjets, the Lockheed P–80 Shooting Star, in thePhilippines.61 Subsequent assignments includedcommand of the 4961st Special Weapons TestGroup, tactical evaluator duty at United States AirForces in Europe Inspector General’s office and atour as a planner on the Air Staff in Washington,DC. He was later assigned as the Deputy Chief ofStaff, Plans for the Alaskan Air Command andfinally as a long range planner on the Joint Staff.

In 1967, he retired from active duty andassumed duties as the Assistant Adjutant Generalfor the Alaskan Air National Guard where he waspromoted to brigadier general. He retired from theNational Guard in 1971. General Taylor begananother career as an aviation insurance broker rep-


Wheeler Field after theattack. This is likely whatTaylor and Welch sawwhen they lined up to landat Wheeler after their firstsortie.

[TAYLOR]THENRETURNEDTO THEUNITEDSTATES TOTRAIN PILOTSFOR COMBATIN EUROPE

1. Brig. Gen.l Kenneth M. Taylor, Sr. , USAF (Ret.),interviewed by the author, Apr 8, 2003; William Wolf,“Aerial Action…Pearl Harbor Attack,” American AviationHistorical Society Journal 34, no. 1 (Spring, 1989): 60;Although a large volume of material has been written onthe Pearl Harbor attack, the information on the exploitsof Second Lieutenants Taylor and Welch conflict inalmost every version. As time has passed and the smallerdetails lost to history, it appears many have inserted theirown versions of events, which in turn grow, with muchliveliness. Often, the accounts are fragmented and havenumerous inaccuracies and disagreements. Though allaccounts were used as research and some will be used inthe article, the Congressional testimony of LieutenantsTaylor and Welch, the unit’s history, and interviews anddiscussions with Brigadier General Taylor will beregarded as the definitive or final arbiter of events andfacts, unless otherwise indicated.2. US Congress, Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Beforethe Joint Committee on the Investigation of the PearlHarbor Attack Part 22, 79th Cong. , 1st sess. , 1946. S.Con. Res 27, 252; The Congressional Record misspelledWelch’s name as “Welsh”.3. History of the 47th Fighter Squadron, Part I, i-27,SQ-FI-47-HI 1 Dec 41 – 1 Apr 44, IRIS No. 00056535, inUSAF Collection, AFHRA, iv.4. History, Part I, 4; US Congress, 250, 252.5. History, Part I, 2.6. Ibid. , 3.7. Ibid. , 19.8. Ibid. , 3.9. Ibid.10. US Congress, 252.11. “Amazing George Welch, The: Part One, The Tiger ofPearl Harbor,” Planes and Pilots of WWII On-line, 2000,1-9, on-line, Internet, 13 January 2003, available fromhttp://home.att.net/~historyzone/Welch1.html; History,Part I, 4; Wolf, 60 .12. History, Part I, 4.13. History, Part I, 4; U.S. Congress, 253.14. Amazing, 3.15. Amazing, 3; Rod Hafemeister, “In a Tomahawk anda Tux, Army Air Corps Pilot Shot Down the Enemy,”Army Times 62, Issue 20 (10 December 2001): 36; USCongress, 250, 253-4; Hafemeister refers to the P–40 as aTomahawk vice a Warhawk.16. Raymond J. Castagnaro and Lyle F. Padilla, “GeorgeWelch—Pearl Harbor Hero,” date unknown, 1-2, on-line,Internet, 13 January 2003. Available from http://www.acepilots. com/usaaf_welch. html; Harry A. Gailey, War InThe Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, (Novato,Calif.:Presidio Press, 1995), 78; Walter Lord, Day OfInfamy, (New York, N. Y. : Henry Holt and Company,1957), 60; Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: TheUntold Story of Pearl Harbor, (New York, N. Y. : PenguinBooks, 1981), 524; Dan van der Vat, Pearl Harbor: TheDay Of Infamy—An Illustrated History, (New York, N. Y.: Basic Books/Madison Press, 2001), 125; TaylorInterview; Later sections of Castagnaro and Padilla’swork appears to be the same as the aviation. com narra-tive. It repeats the same errors with the exception thatWelch’s name is spelled correctly.Also, in an Amazon. com

advertisement apparently written by Castagnaro andPadilla as recommended reading include at least twoinaccuracies. The first is that Taylor and Welch accountedfor seven victories on 7 December 1941—see note 50. Thesecond is that Prange interviewed Taylor and Welch forhis book, At Dawn We Slept. Prange’s work, in a 40 pageexhaustive list of source material does not list interviews,diaries, taped reminiscences or statements with eitherTaylor or Welch. He does record them in a “List Of MajorPersonnel.” ; Van Elsberg refers to the P–40 as aTomahawk vice a Warhawk.17. Len Deighton, Blood, Tears And Folly: An ObjectiveLook at World War II, (New York, N. Y. : Harper CollinsPublishers, 1993), 564; Hafemeister, 36; Taylor Interview;U.S. Congress, 250; TSgt Robert Van Elsberg, “First toFight,” Airman 32, no. 12 (December, 1988): 37.18. “Pearl Harbor: George Welsh [sic], Ken Taylor, FritzHebel,” The Aviation History On-Line Museum, 2002, 1-2, on-line, Internet, 13 January 2003, available fromhttp://www. aviation-history. com/airmen/pearl. htm;Prange, Dawn, 524; Lord, 81; Amazing, 3; AviationHistory website also misspelled Welch’s name as “Welsh”,and inaccurately claimed P–35s (vice P–36s) managed toget airborne and included numerous other errors of fact.19. U.S. Congress, 254.20. U.S. Congress, 249.21. Taylor Interview; Van Elsberg, 37; Wolf, 60.22. Richard Fleischer, director, Tora! Tora! Tora!,Screenplay by Hideo Oguni and Ryuzo Kikushima, 20thCentury Fox Home Entertainment, 145 min. , 1970, DVD;Taylor Interview; The flying portions of the motion pic-ture Pearl Harbor are very loosely based on the exploitsof Taylor and Welch. It is so historically inaccurate it isnot relevant to use in the subject of this article.23. Deighton, 524; Hafemeister, 36; Van Elsberg, 37;Stanley Weintraub’s work, Long Day’s Journey Into War:December 7, 1941 was not useful for research due to thepeculiar method of source citations. For that reason, itwas not cited except to expand on endnotes. Weintraubalso indicates on page 251 that Taylor had been in “…for-mal uniform…”. Taylor verified they were in civiliantuxedos and not uniforms, formal or otherwise.24. Amazing, 3; Castagnaro, 1; Robert F. Dorr, “ValiantAir Defense at Pearl Harbor,” World War II History Vol. 2,No. 6 (November 2003): 78; Taylor Interview; Prange,Dawn, 524; Wolf, 60; Dorr’s article had no source cita-tions. Dorr also referred to the P–40 as a Tomahawk vicea Warhawk.25. Amazing, 3; History, Part I, 22; Taylor Interview;U.S. Congress, 250; Van Elsberg indicates there were 18P–40Bs on Haleiwa on the morning of 7 December 1941.The squadron history indicates the squadron only hadeight P–40s assigned that morning. To further confusethe issue, the Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before theJoint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl HarborAttack, Part 1 indicates the exact number of aircraft atHaleiwa on 7 December 1941 is unknown, but that theorganization strength of the unit was 13 P–40s. Beforethe attack, the squadron history indicates it never hadmore than 14 P–40Bs. In any case, 18 seems too high.Dorr has Welch making three sorties (78). No document Icould find indicates substantiates more than two sorties,


NOTES

resenting Lloyds of London. He has been fullyretired since 1985. He now resides in Anchorage,Alaska and Green Valley, Arizona.

General Taylor’s words about December 7thspeak volumes about the man and to us, “Ibelieved I was a better trained pilot than the ene-

my. I had good equipment and I was proud of it.And I doubt that [today’s pilots are] the least bitconcerned about being outnumbered by theenemy. I wasn’t.”62 That spirit is characteristic of aman and a day that deserves our efforts to clearthe fog of war. ■

including Welch’s DSC citation and his Congressionaltestimony.26. Lord, 152; Prange, Dawn, 533; U.S. Congress, 249-56; van der Vat, 125.27. Leatrice R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn, 7December 1941: The Air Force Story (Washington, D. C. :U. S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 76; History, PartI, 5-6; Van Elsberg, 37; Wolf, 60; Arakaki and Kuborn listTaylor as a 1st Lieutenant vice 2nd Lieutenant inAppendix E of their work.28. U.S. Congress, 252-3, 255.29. Hafemeister, 36; History, Part I, 5-6.30. Van Elsberg, 38; Wolf, 60; There is wide disagree-ment on exactly what type of aircraft Welch and Taylorshot down. Though Wolf’s account is the most detailed inthis regard, it disagrees with Van Elsberg’s interviewwith Taylor. Wolf’s account also seems to disagree withthe location of enemy aircraft at the time of the attacks.Even the squadron history lists only aircraft victories forthat day without providing further detail. Wolf’s accountis complete, but lacks footnotes or any source citations toverify his assertions. I have adhered to the interview withTaylor as being the most authoritive during the firstattack with regards to the types of aircraft shot down.31. Van Elsberg, 38.32. Wolf, 60; Wolf’s work contains math errors andinconsistencies between the article and the “Chronologyof American Aerial Action” chart.33. U.S. Congress, 254.34. Mr. John Martin Meek, to Tony Thornton and for-warded to Major George Farfour, ACSC student, email,subject: Ken Taylor, 11 April 2003; Wolf, 62.35. Dorr, 78; Hafemeister, 36; Taylor Interview.36. Van Elsberg, 38.37. Amazing, 4.38. History, Part I, 6; Gordon W. Prange, Donald M.Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon, December 7, 1941:The Day The Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (New York,N. Y. : McGraw-Hill Book Co. ,1988), 289; Van Elsberg,38; December 7, 1941; The Day The Japanese AttackedPearl Harbor is essentially the same work as At DawnWe Slept from the perspective of Taylor and Welch’sactivities.39. History, Part I, 6; Prange, Dec 7, 289; Van Elsberg,38.40. Hafemeister, 36; Van Elsberg, 38-9; Some accountscontend that Taylor landed after he was wounded toreceive medical attention. In fact, Taylor continued tofight after being wounded and landed only after he ranout of ammunition. Taylor characteristically downplayedhis injuries describing them as mainly scaring him andbeing of little account.41. Amazing, 4; History, Part I, 6; Wolf, 63.42. Hafemeister, 36; Van Elsberg, 39.43. Prange, Dawn, 534.44. Arakaki, 63, 76; Gailey, 83; History, Part I, 4; Lord,116; van der Vat, 125; van der Vat fails to list Haleiwa air-field on any of his book’s maps.45. Prange, Dawn, 534; Stanley Weintraub, in his work,Long Day’s Journey Into War: December 7, 1941, states onpage 273, referring to Haleiwa, “[t]he primitive field wasnot on the list of Japanese targets…”.46. Michael E. Haskew, “Two Heroic American AviatorsLed a Spirited Defense Against The Japanese At PearlHarbor On December 7, 1941,” World War II 12, Issue 5(January 1998): 6; Donald M. Goldstein, Katherine V.Dillon, and J. Michael Wenger, The Way It Was: PearlHarbor—The Original Photographs (Washington, D. C. :Brassey’s (US), Inc. , 1991), 2; Prange, Dawn, 533-4;Haskew refers to the P–40 as a Tomahawk vice aWarhawk.47. History, Part I, 4; Wolf, 63-4.48. Hafemeister, 36; Meek email; Prange, Dawn, 538;Taylor Interview; U.S. Congress, 251, 255; Numerous

accounts, including Taylor’s Congressional testimonyindicate Major Austin, the 47th Pursuit Squadron’s com-mander was deer hunting on nearby Molokai when theattacks occurred. Major General Gordon H. Austin,USAF, Ret., in interviews given and verified by Mr. JohnM. Meek indicated he was duck hunting, not deer hunt-ing.49. Amazing, 3.50. History of the 47th Fighter Squadron, Part II, iv-1,SQ-FI-47-HI 2 Apr 44 – Monthly supplements (no enddate), IRIS No. 00056536, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 1;Taylor Interview; Haskew, Weintraub and both Prangeworks claim Taylor and Welch are credited with sevenkills on 7 December. The squadron history, among numer-ous others credit the pair with six—four for Welch andtwo for Taylor. Even if Taylor’s two probables were added,the correct number would be eight. This inaccuracyapparently comes from a careless reading of the referencecited in both Prange works. The Pearl Harbor Attack:Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigationof the Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 1, page 55 states,“Between 8:15 and 10 a. m. two flights were made, eachconsisting of four P–40’s and one P–36. Four enemyplanes were downed by the first flight while the secondflight downed three. ” The reference does not mentionTaylor and Welch by name and obviously includes the vic-tory of fellow 47th Pursuit Squadron pilot SecondLieutenant Harry M. Brown which would bring the totalof all three pilots to seven. Brown managed to fly a P–36off of Haleiwa Field as well.51. Wolf, 64.52. Author unknown, “Heroes of Air Battle OverWheeler,” and “Army Fliers Get DSC For Heroism inRaid,” Honolulu Advertiser, Dec 17, 1941; There is amovement to award Welch and Taylor the Medal ofHonor. Many works describe a Medal of Honor recom-mendation for Welch being rejected because he took offwithout orders. I cannot find a single footnote, reference,or official document to verify these statements. The onlydetail that may infer a Medal of Honor recommendationis that some sources indicate Welch did receive aDistinguished Service Medal (DSM) in addition to theDistinguished Service Cross (DSC). Even that contentionis in doubt. The squadron history does not indicate Welchreceived more than the DSC for his activities on 7December 1941 and I cannot find any documentation toconfirm Welch received a DSM for his activities on Dec 7,1941. Dorr’s article agrees with this assessment (pp. 78-79). However, as to the 15 other Medal of Honor recipi-ents, they were all given to US Navy personnel.53. History, Part 1, 5.54. Arakaki, 174; Wolf, 61.55. Amazing, 6; Arakaki, 78; History, Part I, 11;Goldstein, 145; Author unknown, “2 Army Fliers Get D. S.C. ,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Dec 17, 1941; Authorunknown, “2 Fliers Who Downed Planes Receive DSO[sic],” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Jan 9, 1942; HonoluluAdvertiser, 1; Wolf, 61.56. History, Part I, 13.57. Ibid. , 14.58. Wolf, 64.59. History of the 44th Fighter Squadron, 1-6, SQ-FI-44-HI 1 Jan 41 – 31 Dec 43, IRIS No. 00056474, in USAFCollection, AFHRA, 4; World War II Victory Credits, TheAir Force Historical Research Agency On-Line, 2003, on-line, Internet, Apr 2, 2003, available fromhttp://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/wwwroot/aerial_victory_cred-its/avc_wwii_tab_tem. html, names beginning with TABand ending with TEM, 2.60. Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, AFHRA, to Maj GeorgeFarfour, ACSC student, email, subject: RE: AerialVictories, 4 April 2003; Taylor Interview.61. Van Elsberg, 39.62. Ibid.



American Combat Planes of the 20thCentury. By Ray Wagner. Reno, Nevada:Jack Bacon & Co., 2004. Photographs. Tables.Bibliography and source notes. Index. Pp. x,758. $65.00 ISBN: 0-930083-17-2.

Ray Wagner’s American Combat Planeshas been an indispensable reference worksince it was initially published in 1960; thetext was revised and updated in 1968 andexpanded again in 1982. This handsome(and hefty) new edition continues to pursuethe same monumental goal that Wagnerfirst set for himself over four decades ago.That is, to describe and illustrate in a singlevolume “every aircraft—experimental, oper-ational, sea or land based—that was everdesigned to carry Americans to war in theskies,” as Wagner’s publisher claimed in the1982 edition. No other author has come soclose to achieving such an ambitious intent.

As before, Wagner has arranged hismaterial thematically by mission area andbranch of service within a given chronologi-cal period. Part One, called “The BiplanePeriod, 1917 to 1932,” consists of ten essaysand their accompanying photographs.Among the essay topics are titles such as“Close Support for the Army, 1917-1923,”“Multi-Engine Bombers, 1917-1932,” “FlyingBoats for Navy Patrols, 1917-1934,” and“Adapting Fighters to Flight Decks.” PartTwo, “Monoplanes for World War II, 1931-1945,” includes 14 essays. Among the essaytitles are “Army Attack Monoplanes fromA–7 to A–41,” “Navy Scout and ObservationAircraft, 1932-1946,” “Crisis-Born FighterProjects, XP–48 to XP–77,” and “Very HeavyBombers End the War.” The nine essays inPart Three (“Air Weapons for the Cold War,1946-1962”) include “Navy Patrol Planesfrom Neptune to Orion,” “Strategic AirCommand’s First Bombers,” and “SupersonicFighters, F–100 to F–108.” The final sectionis entitled “An Awesome Generation since1963.” This fourth chronological division isthe shortest in length; among its five essaysare “The Cold War, 1963-1991,” “AttackPlanes for Small Wars, 1963-1991,” “Bom-bers from the B–70 to Stealth,” and “FromIraq to Afghanistan.” In addition to the 34mission area essays, Wagner also includesan essay on aerial weaponry development ineach of the four chronological sections.

Wagner’s ability to encapsulate U.S.military aviation history in concise, well-written essays is impressive, but it is morethan matched by his skill at ferreting outhigh-quality imagery. There are about 1,700photographs interspersed among 722 pagesof descriptive text in this new edition, butwhat impresses the experienced eye is thatthey are consistently fresh and well-focused,type-representative, and accurately identi-fied—and that their contribution is ensuredby high-quality printing on coated paperstock. Each image is “sourced,”and its cap-tion provides standardized data entriesreflecting dimensions (including wing area),

weights (include fuel capacity), and perfor-mance parameters. The result is synergistic:the value of the whole is greater than thesum of its parts.

That said, there remains the criticalquestion: to what extent has Wagner suc-ceeded in achieving his goal of producing asingle-volume reference describing and illus-trating all of America’s warplanes of theTwentieth Century? Some specialists maycomplain that he did not include many of theU.S.-built aircraft types offered to, oracquired by the U.S. Army and Navy beforeWorld War I, including those flown opera-tionally in quasi-combat roles in Mexico—orflown by the Services during that War butnot actually used in combat operations. Buteven specialists must agree that those minortypes could hardly be called ‘warplanes’when compared to their European contem-poraries. Similarly, those who are fascinatedby U.S. military aviation’s ‘what ifs’—thoseoften exotic projects which never amountedto anything more than draftsmens’ drawingsor wood and metal mockups—will find anoccasional gap in text or image. But theseare quibbles. Certainly every U.S. militaryand naval combat aircraft (and many sub-variants) of any genuine consequence post-1917 is presented here, as are many lessermachines that had little real influence onthe development of American airpower. Likeits predecessor editions, Wagner’s latest ver-sion of American Combat Planes is an essen-tial reference. If your U.S. military aviationbookshelf can only support the addition ofone more title this year, this is it.

George Cully is a staff historian assigned tothe Air Force Historical Studies Office,Bolling AFB, DC.

Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose:Developing Air Power for the UntiedStates Air Force during the FirstCentury of Powered Flight. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Aeronautical SystemsCenter History Office, 2002. Maps. Photo-graphs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xvii, 508 ISBN 0-16-067599-5

Lavishly illustrated, this tome is not acritical history but rather a chronologicalcelebration of the USAF’s role in developingpowered flight. Just roaming through thephotography alone makes this book a worth-while addition to any aviation enthusiast’slibrary. As a scholarly text though, it servesas the “initial marker” on a glide-slopetoward deeper research. On the cover is aphoto of a sign from the early days posted onthe front of a rickety looking hangar, “THISFIELD IS SMALL-USE IT ALL.” In realcontrast, this book is huge. so don’t expect tosit down and peruse it all at one sitting.

As General Bernard Schriever notes in

the Foreword, the book is fascinatingbecause it takes the warfighter’s perspec-tive—rather than a politician’s or a bureau-crat’s—in telling the story. The book spendsno time debating the need for the work itdescribes. Instead, it focuses squarely on the“who, how, where, when, and what” of deliv-ering the finest military aviation capabilitiesthe world has seen over the better part of acentury.

I was particularly taken by three facetsin the book. First was the depth of therecounts of the early years. Having beendiluted and redacted by hour-long televisionprograms of dubious parentage, this periodof military aviation history has been reducedto a string of sensational pearls in the mindsof the broader audience. Here, instead, is abook that, true to its title, describes theunswerving purpose and the attendant pas-sion and dedication of the previously name-less (and often thoughtlessly characterizedas un-heroic) men and women who laboredto ensure the solid technical string was thereto connect those pearls.

Second was the period that covered myfather’s “greatest generation.” I knew fromhis stories and all the reading through theyears that only one type aircraft for 8-10developed during the war years? made it tocombat. This book helped shape for me theeffort it took to accomplish the feat. The sto-ries of individual aircraft and leaders arewell known to us; the story of the next tier ofcontributors is less so. This book helpsredress that. One gets a sense of the sheervolume of their efforts where other bookshave focused on their intensity.

Third was the period covering my ownyears of service. Here I began to run into thecommon phenomenon of “that’s not how Iremember it!” Once I got past that reaction,I actually began to discover some of theforces acting on programs I was responsiblefor that were opaque to me at the time. Thisis where the book lets the reader down justa bit. My own experience with history offices(not this one in particular) is that they sel-dom have access to all information theymight need to truly write a history. This iswhy I characterize the book as a chronologi-cal celebration.

And what a lovely, photographicallyrich celebration it is. Enjoy it and reflect onwhat a special country it takes to producethe people this book is really about.

Col. Christopher A. Waln, USAF (Ret), SectorVice President, Strategy, Northrop Grum-man Information Technology

Today’s Best Military Writing: TheFinest Articles on the Past, Present,and Future of the U.S. Military. ByWalter J. Boyne. New York: Forge, 2004.Notes. Index. Pp. 397. $26.95 ISBN: 0-765-30887-8

Book Reviews

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The market for yearly anthologies ofthe “best” articles in various genres appearsto be insatiable. A quick search of Books inPrint reveals such titles of as The BestAmerican Short Stories 2004, The BestAmerican Mystery Stories 2004, The BestAmerican Travel Writing 2004, and The BestAdventure and Survival Stories 2003. “Bestof” collections promise to deliver the finestwriting in a given field to readers over-whelmed by the volume of articles beingpublished. Consequently, it comes as no sur-prise that some enterprising author wouldeventually publish an annual anthology ofthe best military articles. The 2002 edition ofthe Standard Periodical Directory listedover 450 military related magazines andjournals, excluding military history journals.No military professional can possibly keepup with all this material, especially duringwartime. Walter Boyne’s new volume will begreatly welcome by officers, enlisted person-nel, and DOD civilians trying desperately tokeep up with all the new ideas and informa-tion being generated in this field.

No single theme dominated Boyne’schoice of articles, but he is sensitive towardsthe needs of war-fighters engaged in theGlobal War on Terrorism (GWOT). Navy per-sonnel involved in maritime interceptionoperations, for example, will find insightsfrom Spencer Tucker’s essay, “LieutenantAndrew H. Foote and the African SlaveTrade.” In trying to interdict slave traders ofthe coast of Africa during the middle of theNineteenth Century, Lieutenant Foote con-

fronted many of the same challenges thatdestroyer commanders grapple with today,in trying to intercept terrorists in thePersian Gulf and Red Sea. Army soldierswill enjoy “No Master Plan: The Employ-ment of Artillery in the Indian Wars, 1860-1890” by Prisco R. Hernandez, and see cor-relations between how field artillery wasemployed in the Indian Wars and how it isemployed today in Iraq. Forward deployedMarines at embassies and other outpostswill similarly benefit from David Ulbriich’s“Clarifying the Origins and StrategicMission of the US Marine Corps DefenseBattalion.”

Thirteen out of twenty-one articles inthis anthology focus on historical events.The balance cover more current operations.One of the most chilling contemporary arti-cles is Rex Kiziah’s “The Emerging BiocruiseThreat.” Another one that air power profes-sionals will appreciate is Darrel Whitcomb’s“Combat Search and Rescue: A LongerLook.” Whitcomb not only discusses the evo-lution of CSAR, but why it is critical for theArmed Services today and how it shouldchange to meet to the emerging challenges ofthe GWOT.

A retired Air Force colonel, the formerdirector of the National Air & SpaceMuseum, and the author of numerous mili-tary history books, Boyne points out in hisintroduction that many of the articles in hisvolume received awards, but that he neverallowed these prizes to dictate his selections.One of the few shortcomings of his book is

that he relied only on his own expertise tochoose the best military writing of the pastfive years. For subsequent volumes, ColonelBoyne might consider enlisting a panel ofexperts to help him sift through the volumi-nous literature of this field. If formed, thispanel also may want to consider translationsof foreign articles, as well as web publishedmaterial in its selection process. The ArmedForces desperately need works like this oneand Walter Boyne has proven himself to beup to the task. With some refinement in hismethodology and annual updates, Today’sBest Military Writing promises to emerge asa “must-read” for anyone in the field.

John Darrell Sherwood is a historian withthe Naval Historical Center. His most recentbook, Afterburner: Naval Aviators and theVietnam War, was published in 2004 by NewYork University Press.

The First Space Race: Launching theWorld’s First Satellites. By Matt Bille andErika Lishock. College Station: Texas A&MUniversity Press, 2004. Illustrations.Photographs. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xviii, 214. $19.95 PaperbackISBN: 1-58544-374-3

Nobody should assume the history ofAmerican and Soviet space programs duringthe 1950s has been chiseled in stone. Theauthors make this clear. Through thoughtful

THE BATTLE OF BRITAINAir Defence of Great Britain, Vol. II

T C G James Edited and with an Introduction by Sebastian Cox, Head of the AirHistorical Branch of the Ministry of Defence Foreword by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire‘there can be nothing but praise for such a majestic, seminal historyas this one.’ Air Pictorial

This volume offers the reader access to the RAF’s detailedcontemporary day-by-day account of the Battle. 456 pages illus 20000 7146 5123 0 cloth $62.50/£45.00 0 7146 8149 0 paper $26.50/£18.50Royal Air Force Official Histories

COURAGE AND AIR WARFARE

The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War

Mark K Wells, Deputy Head of the United States Airforce Academy’sDepartment of HistoryWinner-Society for Military History Distinguished Book of the Year 1997‘Courage and Air Warfare is well written and well researched.It is relevant especially to those who would aspire to the commandof flying units. Give it a very high place on your reading list.’

Dr David Mets, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Airpower Journal

256 pages illus 1995 repr. 1997, 2000 0 7146 4618 0 cloth $59.50/£42.50 0 7146 4148 0 paper $24.50/£17.50

Frank Cass PublishersNorth American Orders: ISBS, 5824 NE Hassalo Street, Portland,

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AIR POWER HISTORYTurning Points from Kitty Hawk to KosovoPeter Gray, Director of Defence Studies for the Royal Air Force andSebastian Cox, Head of the Air Historical Branch of the Ministry ofDefence (Eds)Contributors from academia and the services examine the theory andpractice of air power from its earliest inception. 288 pages 2002 0 7146 5291 1 cloth $64.50/£45.00 0 7146 8257 8 paper $26.50/£18.50

STRATEGIC AIR POWER AND THE GULF WARJohn Andreas Olsen, Royal Norwegian Air Force AcademyOlsen provides a comprehensive examination of the origins, evolutionand implementation of ‘Operation Desert Storm’ using official militaryand political documentation, interviews with US Air Force officers andIraqis with experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime. 256 pages 2003 0 7146 5193 1 cloth $62.50/£45.00 0 7146 8195 4 paper $26.50/£18.50

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analysis of events familiar to space histori-ans and vigorous pursuit of details obscuredby the passage of time, they supply newinsights to one of the Cold War’s most dra-matic chapters. As the legendary James VanAllen admits in the Foreword, this volumeeven provides still-living participants in thatrace with a much improved context for theirown fragmentary knowledge.

Laying the foundations for successfullaunch of the first artificial, Earth-orbitingsatellites took several centuries. During the17th century, Johannes Kepler and Sir IsaacNewton formulated the necessary theories ofmotion. Edward Everett Hale and other sci-ence-fiction writers in the 19th centuryinspired serious spaceflight theoreticianslike Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, HermannOberth, and Robert Goddard at the dawn ofthe 20th century. The pace of hardwaredevelopment quickened at mid-centuryunder the leadership of brilliant engineerslike Wernher von Braun, Sergey Korolev,Theodore von Karman, and others. Long-range rockets built by the U.S. and USSRcould travel through outer space to deliverthermonuclear warheads halfway aroundthe globe. Informed visionaries recognizedthe feasibility of using those same rockets tolaunch satellites.

While long-range rocket and satellitedevelopment occurred within the U.S. andSoviet military establishments, plans for theInternational Geophysical Year (July 1957-December 1958) committed both countriesto launching satellites for scientific research.The Soviet Academy of Sciences created aCommission for Interplanetary Communica-tion, chaired by academician Leonid Sedov,to oversee its IGY satellite program.Meanwhile, a committee headed by the JetPropulsion Laboratory’s Homer Stewartselected the U.S. launcher and satellite fromamong several proposals by the military ser-vices. On October 4, 1957, the USSRlaunched Sputnik, the world’s first artificialsatellite. After the U.S. Navy’s failure tolaunch a Vanguard satellite on December 6,the Army put America’s first satellite,Explorer 1, into orbit on January 31, 1958.Both nations commenced “storming theheavens” with civil and military satellites.

Bille and Lishock drew informationfrom a variety of sources (written and oral,primary and secondary, older and recent) totell this complex story in a relativelystraightforward style. They discuss howerroneous “facts” crept into the literatureover time. For example, the color scheme onmuseum models of Explorer 1 differs fromthe actual flight article. Furthermore,Goldstone could not have confirmed thatExplorer 1 was in orbit, because the Gold-stone tracker became operational monthslater to support the Pioneer lunar probes.The authors analyze the Stewart Commit-tee’s choice of the Navy’s proposal over theArmy’s, the relationship between early mili-tary and civil satellite programs, and thequestion of whether the U.S. purposely

refrained from becoming first to launch asatellite. Finally, they describe NOTSNIK, a“secret competitor” who aimed to place tinysatellites in orbit via a five-stage boosterlaunched from a U.S. Navy fighter aircraft.

Readers will have difficulty puttingdown The First Space Race before turningthe last page. The authors have achieved awonderful balance between the Americanand Soviet sides of the story. Their newresearch and refreshing analyses correctinaccuracies that have crept into the litera-ture over the years and prompt space histo-rians to question causal connections oncetaken for granted.

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy CommandHistorian, HQ Air Force Space Command,Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Air Fare: Stories, Poems & Essays onFlight. By Nickole Brown and Judith Tay-lor, eds. Louisville, Ky.: Sarabande Books,2004. Pp. xv, 237. $16.95 Paperback ISBN 1-889330-99-X.

I read this book on a flight from AustinTX to Dayton OH via Atlanta to attend aconference. For both legs, I was on small jets;the flights were full so the airline could max-imize efficiency and profit. I understood this,but I resented the fact that the airline alsowas minimizing comfort. We left late, and Ibarely made my connection. Frequent trav-elers know that time and airlines wait for noman, but I made my connecting flight in thenick of time. I missed lunch in the process,but had a yummy snack on my flight toDayton. I stopped drinking airline coffeeyears ago because it’s so bad, so the bottledwater or a cranberry mix has become mydrink of choice.

Most of the stories and poems in AirFare could have been written by the peopleseated next to me. While we were on thesame planes, all of us had a different reality,different experiences, different journeys.Compiled in the post-9/11 era, this collectionof poems and short stories recalls a differentworld. Jeffrey Harrison’s “Pale Blue City,”written in December 2000, reminds us howthe towers of the World Trade Center used topeek above the early morning clouds as wemade our descent into JFK airport. His lastline, “Here: take it before it disappears,” isprescient in a way he could not imagine.

In our takeoffs and landings, the past,present, and future collide. We leave “some-one” or “someplace” looking for more. Or wego, someplace…anywhere, perhaps, expect-ing to learn something, to experience some-thing, to become better, to become wiser. Toooften, our expectations—our hopes—exceedthe reality of our experiences. Our one-waytickets express our discomfort with the past,our dreams of the future. And if we return,as most of us do, we come home changed.Regardless of the reason for our leaving in

the first place, even if it’s only because we’veventured away from home, from our every-day workplace, from our family and friends,we are changed by the experience of travel-ing.

The selections in this short volumespan the galaxy—looking at wartime flight,commercial aviation, private flying experi-ences, ballooning, and space flight. Theauthors are exultant, pensive, comic, andtragic in turn. While most of us, thankfully,will never experience a hijacking or a dog-fight to the death against an enemy, weshare common experiences with the millionswho fly. The hub cities of our connectingflights offer us choice. Do we follow our cho-sen path or improvise? (Colson Whitehead,from John Henry Days.) Is knowing that“the world will let us down many times butit will never run out of coffee” a good thing ora bad thing? (Joshua Beckman, “Ode to theAir Traffic Controller.”) There are morequestions than answers in the experience ofAir Fare. And that’s a good thing for a flightfrom Austin to Dayton, with a mind partial-ly engaged in what I will experience duringthe conference, partially wishing I werehome, and partially imagining the endlesspossibilities.

Bruce Ashcroft, Air Education and TrainingCommand History Office

Mario Calderara Aviator and Inventor:The First Italian Pilot Pupil of WilburWright. By Lodovico Calderara and AttilioMarchetti. Translated by Lodovico Calde-rara. Trento, Italy: Museo Aeronautico“Gianni Caproni” di Trento, 2003. Illus-trations. Photographs. Bibliography. Pp. 304.ISBN 88-87621-41-1.

Mario Calderara is best known toEnglish-speaking readers as the studentwho Wilbur Wright distrusted because hewas “a cigarette fiend.” However, this volumeby his son, a labor of love rather than ascholarly biography, reveals Calderara to bemuch more; he was a significant figure inearly Italian military aviation.

Born in 1879, Calderara entered theItalian Navy in 1902, as an officer and engi-neer. The navy became interested in aviationas means of observation, and the young offi-cer used that as an entrée into flight. In 1907,he constructed a biplane mounted on a rafttowed behind a speedboat in which he “man-aged to obtain a controlled lift to a certainheight.” (p. 55) Caldera then took leave towork in Paris as a designer with pioneer air-plane manufacturer Gabriel Voison. Thisstep led in March 1909 to theCalderarA–Goupy, the first successful tractorbiplane at a time when most aircraft weremonoplanes or pushers. He then returned toItaly, where he became Wilbur Wright’s firstItalian student, soloing on April 29, 1910.Subsequently, the navy assigned him to

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design and build a seaplane. His creation, alarge monoplane on floats, powered by a 100h.p. Gnome rotary engine, flew successfullyin March 1912.

The seaplane was the zenith ofCalderara’s contribution to aircraft design,but he was not done with aviation. He leftthe navy in 1913, but was recalled duringWorld War I and in late 1917 took commandof the flying school at Lake Bolsena, whereU.S. Navy pilots trained to fly seaplanes.Calderara served as Italian air attaché inWashington, D.C., from 1923 to 1925, andfrom 1925 to 1939, he was the internationalrepresentative in Paris for the PioneerInstrument Company, a division of theBendix Corporation, which manufacturedaircraft instrumentation.

The author demonstrates that hisfather was a better than competent pilot andan innovative designer. In September 1909,barely five months after soloing, Calderaracompeted in the aviation meet at Brescia,winning four prizes, including the King’sCup, and finishing second to AmericanGlenn Curtiss for the International Prize. Asfor his designs, both the 1909 biplane andthe 1912 seaplane were successful, thoughthey were never exploited. A 1911 sketch ofa “future seaplane” (p. 178) suggests thelines of the world-girdling flying boats of the

late 1930s, then far in the future.The book is unclear as to why

Calderara made little further contribution tothe progress of aviation in Italy after 1912,but offers several possibilities. Especially,his son recognizes “that certain aspects ofmy father’s character did expose him to neg-ative reactions on the part of his colleaguesand superiors.” (p. 151) The book bears thisout. Several disciplinary episodes suggest ayoung man who sometimes failed to showproper respect for his superiors. And WilburWright noted that the flights Calderaramade before the King of Italy and the publicadulation in 1909 appeared to go to his head.All this earned him enemies, andCalderara’s claim that jealousy on the partof his superiors and other officers sidedtracked his career may not be far off themark. Additionally, Calderara apparentlysaw limits to his opportunities. He wroteWilbur, in 1912, that he intended to resignfrom the navy and leave Italy, because of thelack of industrial development and becausehis “work has never been sufficiently freeand independent so as to allow me to over-come all the bureaucratic impedimentswhich in Italy, as you know, are unending.”(p. 179)

Lodovico Calderara has produced a use-ful and interesting biography. The large

number of typos detracts, and the transla-tion is not always as clear as one would pre-fer. It badly needs a real index; the “index” atthe end is actually the “table of contents.”But the book’s strengths offset its weakness-es. Attilio Marchetti, author of Il golfo degliidrovolanti [The Gulf of Seaplanes] has pro-vided an extensive set of footnotes that addmuch detail, clarity, and value to the narra-tive. The illustrations—mostly photographsfrom family albums, newspaper articles, anddocuments—are worth the price. Most inter-esting is the photo of a Wright-type pushercrashing at the moment the wing tip touch-es the earth (p. 126), and a December 8,1930, letter from Orville Wright (p. 256) thatsheds some light on changes to the Wrightcontrol system in 1908.

Mario Calderara Aviator and Inventorwill be an enjoyable addition to the library ofany reader interested in the history of theearly “bird men.”

Roger G. Miller, Ph.D., Air Force HistoricalStudies Office, Bolling AFB, Washington,D.C.

Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The CentaurUpper Stage Rocket, 1958-2002. By

Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature

Air Power History (along with its predecessor Aerospace Historian) is one ofnearly 350 publications indexed and abstracted in the bibliographic databaseLancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature. This informationis produced by Military Policy Research Ltd., of Oxford, England, and can befound at www.mpr.co.uk. It contained over 90,000 citations and abstracts as ofthe end of May 2002, and is increasing at the rate of around 10,000 per year.

The Lancaster Index database is primarily designed for information profes-sionals in the defense and security sector, and can appear somewhat dauntingto the casual visitor. A look at the User Guide, downloadable from the site, isrecommended. Free access, using the global index, scans the whole database,but returns literature citations that exclude the volume, issue, and page refer-ences. Researchers who need these references for serious research purposeswill need to take out a paid subscription. Individual rates range from $9.95 fora 24-hour pass to $99.95 for a 365-day pass.

Military Policy Research Ltd.

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Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. Bowles.Washington, D.C.: NASA History Office[NASA SP-2004-4230], 2004. Tables. Index.List of Interviews. Pp xiii, 289.

This is another book in the NASAHistory series, specifically in the ProjectHistory sub series. It won the 2004American Institute of Aeronautics andAstronautics History Manuscript Award.Professor Dawson has already publishedanother book in the series, while Dr. Bowlesis currently at work on yet another NASAhistory book. Centaur had a long difficulthistory, being cancelled or reassignedbetween NASA Centers several times. As aresult, relevant documentation was pre-served at different stages. Of course, otherfiles were purged, so that available sourcematerial depends upon other people’s senseof what is important. To supplement thewritten record, the authors interviewed over60 government and contractor personnelwho played a role in the Centaur story.

Centaur began as a contractor proposal(before there was a NASA) to increase theability of Atlas to orbit heavier payloads andto provide a means of sending more capableprobes almost anywhere in the Solar System.It ended because of a marketing decision tosell a family of Atlas launch vehicles, some ofwhich had an unnamed upper stage verysimilar to the old Centaur. In between,Centaur was praised and cursed, manage-ment moved between NASA Centers, ver-sions started and stopped (Titan-Centaurand Shuttle-Centaur), and it finally returnedto the private sector. Even there, the consoli-dation of the aerospace contractors moved itfrom General Dynamics to Martin Mariettato Lockheed Martin. Through it all, Centaurwas the upper stage of choice for demandingmissions.

The history is told at several levels. Forthose interested in organizational and polit-ical matters, the relations between NASAand Congress, NASA and other parts of theExecutive branch (primarily the Air Force,but also the Department of Transportation),Headquarters and the Centers, and NASAand its contractors are described very welland honestly. For C-SPAN junkies, this is agood read.

For technologists and project manage-ment fans, the story of translating the theo-retical advantages of liquid hydrogen (LH2)as a fuel into reality is entrancing. The suc-cess of Apollo can be laid at the feet of liquidhydrogen upper stages. The Soviets did nottest an LH2 upper stage until the 1980s.Centaur’s first test flight was in May 1962.That flight ended with an explosion 54 sec-onds after launch, but the problems weresolved and enabled Surveyor to be success-ful. The lessons learned enabled the S-II andS-IVB stages to use LH2 to put men on themoon. But where did all the LH2 come from?In 1956 the U.S. could produce 500 poundsper day. By 1959, the rate had jumped toabout 68,000 pounds per day. The USAF had

looked at a liquid-hydrogen fueled replace-ment for the U-2 and foresaw a vast increasein fuel requirements. That project did notwork out, but the production facilities helpedCentaur and Apollo.

One of America’s greatest strengths isits ability to find people willing and able tosolve problems and make things work.Usually only their coworkers know whatthey have achieved. There are several suchstories here. By their dedication, sacrifice,and ability, America can brag aboutSurveyor, Viking, Voyager, a series of com-munication satellites and the lead in theroutine use of LH2 upper stages.

I enthusiastically recommend this bookfor anyone interested in space history.

James A Painter, Docent, National Air &Space Museum, Washington, D.C.

Thatch Weave: The Life of JimmieThatch. By Steve Ewing. Annapolis, Md.:Naval Institute Press, 2004. Photographs.Notes. Appendices. Bibliography. Index, Pp.x, 338. $34.95 ISBN: 1-59114-248-2

James Mitchener concludes his novel,The Bridges at Toko-Ri, with a question byAdmiral Tarrant: “Where did we get suchmen?” Professor Ewing is the senior curatorat Patriots Point Naval and MaritimeMuseum, Charleston Harbor S.C., and theauthor of several books on naval history. Heanswers the question with this biography.One man the admiral might have had inmind was John S. “Jack” Thatch, who wasdubbed “Little Jimmie” at the Naval Acade-my and will forever be know as “Jimmie.”

During his aviation career, Thatch test-ed aircraft; commanded squadrons andships; planned combat operations in thePacific during World War II; led Task ForceAlpha (the Navy’s first experimental taskforce devoted to antisubmarine warfare) inthe early stages of the Cold War; and wasDeputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) andCommander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces,Europe. He was a powerful spokesman forthe Navy during the debate concerning uni-fication of the services (especially aviationservice) and the Revolt of the Admirals. Hewas articulate in the need for the mobile airforces of the Navy. He retired after fortyyears of service as an admiral.

Thatch graduated from the Academy in1927 (the year the Navy commissioned its firstaircraft carrier, the USS Langley) and servedon the battleships USS Mississippi and USSCalifornia. He then went to Pensacola tobegin his remarkable aviation career. Afterreceiving his wings, he flew the Loening OL-8 amphibian observation aircraft—hardly anauspicious beginning for the man mostknown for fighter tactical development.

At the start of World War II, naval avi-ation faced the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, a

Japanese aircraft superior to the GrummanF4F Wildcat. At the time, pursuits in the airarmies of the world were closely bunched ingroups of three to increase firepower. Aircombat quickly degenerated into a meleebetween individuals. Combat outcome wasdetermined by individual skills, dominatedby aircraft performance.

Naval scout bombers and torpedo air-craft required fighter escort. Navy fightersalso had to defend their mobile airbases.Thatch worked out a solution using match-sticks on the kitchen table. Fighter pilotstoday would recognize his formation with adivision of four aircraft divided into twomutually supporting sections of two aircrafteach—today called the “fluid four.” Theresult was that look out was improved. Byobserving the maneuver of the other section,the tactical situation was obvious withoutradio communication. An attacking aircraftwould in turn find itself under attack fromthe supporting section. Teamwork was thesecret to winning against a superior foe.

Training was essential to the Thatchapproach. Fighter training included targetpractice against towed banners and gunsight films; as well as tactical training.When Thatch learned that the Army AirCorps practiced against static targets on theground, he made available the equipmentused by his squadron. He went to Hollywoodto make films to train the large number ofnaval pilots required.

Experimentation was also an importantelement. Thatch tested his tactics withButch O’Hare, a natural pilot. Later in hiscareer he applied the same principals ofteamwork, training, and experimentation infacing the Soviet submarine challenge.

Readers familiar with doctrine develop-ment from the top should note the Navyencouraged very junior officers to developtactics. This freedom to let the fleet aviatordiscover the solution to tactical problemscontinues to this day.

Thatch’s combat record was impressive.He led the Grim Reapers during the Battleof Midway. He served as Task ForceOperations Officer during the GreatMarianas Turkey Shoot. To counter the sui-cide attacks of the Kamikaze,Thatch devisedtactics that deserve as much recognition ashis Weave, the Thatched Roof. During Korea,he commanded an escort carrier, USS Sicily(CVE-118), with embarked Marines, thefamous Blacksheep, Marine Fighter Squa-dron 214 (VMF–214). Once again, his em-phasis was on teamwork.

This biography completes Ewing’s Navyfighter pilot trilogy on Butch O’Hare, JimmyFlatley, and Jimmie Thatch—books thatanswer Admiral Tarrant’s question. It is aneasy read, but thought provoking.

Cdr. Robert W. Covey, USN (Ret.), USNA1962, Naval Aviator V-20499.

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The Ploesti Raid: Through the Lens. ByRoger A. Freeman. London: Battle of BritainInternational, 2004. Maps. Tables. Dia-grams. Illustrations. Photographs. Index. Pp.160. £24.95 (approx. $47.00) ISBN: 1-870067-55-X

Freeman aptly describes the PloestiRaid of August 1, 1943, as “the most ambi-tious, the most daring, the most foolhardy,the most disastrous, and most historic…”His book is a planning, logistical, tactical,and most importantly a photographic histo-ry of the raid. It is enlightening and educa-tional in that virtually all photographs andmaps are from the period.

In the planning stages, there was muchdiscussion and division within the U.S.bomber command on what altitude to fly themission: high, with consequent bombinginaccuracies, or low and accept higher air-craft losses in order to attain greater bomb-ing accuracy. They decided to fly in at lowlevel and fly no pre-strike reconnaissanceflights that would tip off the Romanians.Even so, intelligence was quite good sinceBritish, Dutch, French, and U.S. companieshad operated the refineries before the war

that the Allies were going to bomb. Thedegree of preparation that occurred was sur-prising. For example, in the space of oneweek, the RAF constructed several models ofthe targets in 1:5,000, 1:50,000, 1:500,000scale. U.S. bomber crews were impressed bytheir quality and immediately understoodthat the mission was important, becausethey had never seen such a degree of prepa-ration.

Freeman gives the reader a good senseof what it was like to prepare and fly theraid, but sometimes tells the story poorly.For example, he quotes Maj. Gen. Brereton’sorders justifying the use of a low-levelattack, but presents it as a photo captionthat runs two-thirds of a page long. Anotherphoto caption lists all bomb loads and fusedelays for each attacking formation. Atanother point, he shows all fourteen pages oftarget diagrams for the seven-target strikeforces.

He gives a more personal view of theattack by quoting various crewmembers inside-bars throughout the book. But, thequotes sometimes create more questionsthan they answer. For example, the copilot of“Vagabond King” complains that the charts

used shades of blue and purple rather thanthe usual shades of brown. Was the colorcoding scheme not adequately explained?Did the crews understand the new color cod-ing but have trouble reading the maps intu-itively when they were under the pressure offlying an actual mission? Or did the crewssimply never ask what the new codingmeant?

Before reaching Ploesti, the 376thBomb Group made a wrong turn at a criticalmoment. In the lead ship, the interactionbetween General Ent, Colonel Compton, andthe navigator is suggested, but notdescribed. The circumstances are importantbecause the force got separated andattacked the refineries at different times,giving anti-aircraft gunners plenty of warn-ing. A map showing the 376th and 93rdBomb Group’s incorrect turn is on one page,but the map showing the other three groups’route is sixteen pages later, without anyphoto caption.

Freeman created detailed diagrams ofaircraft formations and spent an inordinatetime discussing them. Does this really con-tribute to the story? Would making part ofan appendix have been better? In one photo


caption he describes Ploesti’s topographywith positions and fields of fire for all anti-aircraft batteries. The task was doomed tofailure; it is impossible for the reader toremember the topography and visualize theplacement and fields of fire of all the batter-ies. Creating a map showing what wasdescribed would have been better.

This very knowledgeable historianclearly went to great lengths to research hisunusual book. In his introduction, he statesthat “This volume provides a straightfor-ward, historical account and makes noattempt to do other than present the knownand reported facts to support its main pur-pose, a chronological presentation of photo-graphic images relative to the mission.”Unfortunately this does not relieve the his-torian’s duty to the reader of weaving a taleand telling a story in a concise, understand-able manner.

Ramsey Gorchev, Docent, National Air andSpace Museum’s Udvar-Hazy Center, Dulles,Virginia.

Ask the Chief: Backbone of the Navy. ByJ.F. Leahy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval InstitutePress, 2004. Photographs. Notes. Glossary.Biography. Index. Pp. xiv, 230. $27.95 ISBN:1-59114-460-4.

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard veteranLeahy has taken on the task of informingthe world how important chief petty officersare to the running of the Navy. While thework is both admirable and useful, one canenvision Navy chiefs the world over provid-ing the book with an honored place in theirhomes, while senior enlisted members of theother services are scratching their headsand wondering why someone would botherto publish the work in the first place.

To research his work, Leahy gainedaccess to a large number of Navy chiefs,including the entire contingent aboard thecarrier George Washington, while on aMediterranean cruise. Through these inter-views he manages to put together an engag-ing narrative of what it’s like to be a chief,including the importance of the Chief’s Messin resolving ship’s problems and mentoringyoung sailors. Leahy also explores relationswith junior officers and mustangs (enlistedpersonnel who have received commissions).

Clearly the book’s most important partsare those that describe to the reader what itis like to be a Navy chief. Leahy covers howone makes chief and, when one does, how heor she is initiated into the chief’s communi-ty. Both the chief initiation process and theinner workings of the Chief’s Mess aresteeped in tradition, and here the men andwomen with whom Leahy spoke give one asense of how important those traditions are.

Leahy culminates his work by describ-ing several of the former Master Chief Petty

Officers of the Navy and their individualcontributions to Navy enlisted personnel.Lastly, he describes the actions of severalchiefs who in the past were noted for gal-lantry and bravery.

Written in an easily readable manner,Ask the Chief gives the reader a sense of theinner workings of the Chief’s Mess and therank itself. The reader quickly picks up thatto be a chief means one has to rely upon thechief fraternity as well as the tradition thataccompanies it. Unfortunately, the authorwas never a chief. Because of that, his writ-ing is tainted with hero worship whichdetracts from the book’s overall effective-ness. In a number of instances Leahy notesthat the typical Navy chief has powers andresponsibilities far beyond those of seniorNCOs of the other services. In fact Air Forceand Army senior NCOs and Marine Corpsstaff NCOs are equally charged with theresponsibility of managing duty sectionsand mentoring junior officers. The only dis-cernable difference between chiefs andother senior enlisted personnel is in the waythe communities view themselves internal-ly. Once an individual becomes a chief itdoesn’t matter whether that person is an E-7, E-8, or E-9—he or she is member of thechief’s community. In the other servicesthere is a decided break between E-8 and E-9. That difference aside, they are all chargedwith basically the same responsibilities. Iwas once assigned to a U.S. Navy base, liv-ing with chiefs, and quickly came to appre-ciate the influence they have on the Navy. IfLeahy would have left it at that andrefrained from denigrating other services’senior enlisted members, this would havebeen a much better book.

MSgt Dennis Berger, USAF (Ret), historyteacher and graduate student in militaryhistory, Lubbock, Texas.

Amelia Earhart: Case Closed? By Wal-ter Roessler and Leo Gomez, with GailLynne Green. Hummelstown Pa.: AviationPublishers, 1997. Maps. Illustrations.Photographs. Appendices. Pp. 206. $16.95Paperback ISBN: 0-938716-24-7

My favorite aviation personality to studyand discuss with National Air and SpaceMuseum visitors is Amelia Earhart (AE), so Ijumped at the chance to review this book.Theultimate fate of AE and her navigator FredNoonan when they crossed the southernPacific on their round-the-world flight in July1937 has become one of aviation’s enduringmysteries. Almost as soon as they disap-peared, and continuing to this day, scenariosabound concerning their tragic end. Theseinclude:ditching and either dying in the crashor of exposure awaiting rescue, capture andexecution by the Japanese for flying over sev-eral of their mandated islands, and one that

had AE living under an assumed name inNew Jersey as late as 1970!

Using sixty-seven years of combinedexperience flying Lockheed 10E Electras orsimilar aircraft, the authors explain thenavigation and communication skillsAmelia and Fred would have used anddescribe aircraft parts that figure promi-nently in their two circumnavigationattempts (e.g., propellers, autopilot, andradio direction finder) in easily understand-able terms.

Once the characters have been intro-duced, the story shifts to AE’s first round-the-world attempt in March 1937. Havingflown from Oakland, California, to LukeField, Hawaii, on the first leg of the trip, shelost control of the Electra when attemptingto take off several days later. Numerousaccounts (Air Corps accident review board,civilian eye witnesses, and newspaperreports) are included, detailing the abortedtakeoff due to equipment failure.

With the Electra again airworthy, thesecond attempt began in May 1937, againfrom Oakland, but heading in the oppositedirection (a world map is included showingtheir route). This trip, lasting forty-twodays, ended somewhere in the vicinity ofHowland Is. Having twenty hours of fuel tomake Howland, their luck apparently ranout; jet lag, radio communications problems,and unexpected head winds combined tobring this trip to a premature end. Theauthors included the radio logs of the CoastGuard’s cutter Itasca which was stationednear Howland to provide radio signals toguide the Electra. At this point, they tietogether all of their material and present achilling, albeit short, conclusion on whatthey believe ended the journey.

Other possibilities—AE’s capture bythe Japanese, secretly living under anassumed name, and reports that AE hadbeen found—are recounted in a subse-quent chapter. Amelia’s short, ten-yearaviation history is summarized in the finalchapter.

This book, with its large text, abun-dance of pictures (some of which were newto me), and route maps is perfect reading forthe novice AE or aviation fan. An AE schol-ar will learn little from this book and shouldlook elsewhere for a more detailed accountof her final flight. The narrative is fine, butseveral layout changes would improve latereditions. The accident reports and newspa-per and eyewitness accounts should be in anew appendix. Currently, these are in a sim-ilar pitch and font as the narrative, makingit difficult to differentiate them from thenarrative. Also needed are source notes forsections of the book not covered by the vari-ous reports of her flights and an index foreasy fact finding. The book also contains anunneeded introduction of early flights byother aviators and the poem “High Flight”that could easily be deleted.

After some sixty-five years, AE is still“the” name when talking of an aviatrix; her

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disappearance is the most studied aspect ofher life. This book continues the trend. Foran introduction to aviation’s biggest mys-tery, it is a great place to start!

Scott R. Marquiss, Docent, NASM’s NationalMall and UHC Facilities

Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman’sGlory Days Faded. By George M. Skurlaand William H. Gregory. Annapolis Md.:Naval Institute Press, 2004. Photographs.Index, Bibliography. Pp. xiv, 225. $32.95ISBN: 1-55750-329-X

This book provides an inside view of thetriumphs and disappointments of America’sonetime top aerospace company. Its thirteenchapters define how the company got start-ed, grew through World War II into the ColdWar era, and faded from its glory days as theCold War ended. Grumman’s former presi-dent and chairman, George Skurla, andWilliam Gregory, a former editor of AviationWeek and Space Technology, trace the com-pany’s rise from its humble beginnings inthe 1930s, through World War II, to the suc-cess of the Navy’s A–6 Intruder, E–2CHawkeye, EA–6B Prowler, F–14 Tomcat,and NASA’s Apollo Lunar Module. Theauthors describe how Grumman’s formerpresident, Lew Evans, bought into the F–14contract which nearly bankrupted the com-pany and led to the Navy’s lightweight fight-er dilemma. They describe how the F–14program was fixed and how the F–14 wassold to Iran by putting on a better flightdemonstration at Andrews AFB than theF–15 could do for the Shah. Grumman’schallenges at Kennedy Space Center duringthe lunar landing missions are discussed asare problems of coping with Congress andthe customer. The well established companyfailed to keep itself together and was even-tually taken over by one of its biggest com-petitors. Written as part history and partmemoir, the book describes the rise and fallof Grumman through the eyes of Skurla whobegan his career as an apprentice engineerin 1944, then worked as a mid-level engi-neering manager and, ultimately, as presi-dent and chief executive officer ofGrumman. He retired in 1986 and died in2001.

This is a case study of how a multibil-lion-dollar business declined through lack ofintegrated business planning, internal scan-dals, misguided investments, and stark dif-ferences between making and marketingmilitary products versus commercial prod-ucts. Skurla’s candid comments from theshop floor, the carrier deck, and the execu-tive board room are provided along withremarks from top naval aviators and otherGrumman personnel to explain why thecompany wound up as a junior partner inanother firm. Of particular interest are theoral history remarks compiled by the

National Air and Space Museum of the lateGeorge Spangenberg, the Navy’s Mr. Fighter,which cite how the intrusion of politics upsetthe planned procurement of the F–14 andimposed an unreasonable fixed-price ceilingin the original contract. Skurla lamentsabout the spin off and sale of the successfulGulfstream business aircraft program whilewatching the progressive write-off of nearlya half billion dollars over ten years on faileddiversification programs for Flexible buses,hydrofoil boats, Dormavac cold storage mod-ules, windmills, waste disposal systems, andother non-aerospace technologies. As aresult, some aerospace technologies were notdeveloped (e.g., missiles and stealth), andsome business opportunities were allowed topass by, such as teaming with BritishAerospace on its V/STOL Harrier aircraftthat the U.S. Marine Corps eventuallybought. Of course, the successful formationof Grumman Data Systems and winning theUSAF J-STARS target detection aircraftprogram were attractive assets for the even-tual merger with Northrop. Skurla musedabout Grumman’s unfulfilled destiny. Hadthe right men made the right decisions atthe right times, there might be a GrummanNorthrop or even a Grumman BoeingNorthrop Corporation today.

Included are the insights of many ofSkurla’s coworkers and contacts within theNavy, USAF, and NASA. While the ending issad, this book is bound to be of great interestto former Grumman employees who “workedtheir tails off” trying to retain the company’sglory as well as everyone on the outside whodealt with Grumman and its products. Atthe very least, it provides an interestingaccount of how lack of good business strate-gy and planning for diversified products canlead a high-tech company astray.

Ronald W. McCaffrey, retired Grummanengineer.

Then There Were Six: The True Story ofthe 1944 Rangoon Disaster. By KarnigThomasian. Bloomington Ind.: Author House,2004. Illustrations. Photographs. Pp. ix, 160.$20.00 Paperback ISBN: 1-4184-4931-8

This book is a personal memoir of theWorld War II service of Karnig Thomasian, aB–29 gunner. Captured by the Japanese inDecember 1944, Thomasian describes hisharrowing experience as a prisoner of war(POW). As World War II history, it providesthe reader with an interesting first-personaccount by a B–29 crewmember but givesfew details on the overall B–29 program andoperations. However, for those readers whotypically associate the B–29 with firebomb-ing raids on Japanese cities and the atomicbombs, Thomasian provides a glimpse intothe earlier, generally unsuccessful, B–29efforts from India and China.

The book’s subtitle refers to a December

14, 1944, mission to Burma. Four B–29swere lost and seven others damaged whenbombs collided and exploded in mid-air.Thomasian and five of his crewmates wereamong the twenty-nine airmen who sur-vived to be captured by the Japanese (hencethe title “Then There Were Six”). After ashort biographical introduction and somedetails on his training and deployment toIndia, he jumps to the Burma mission andhis bailout and capture by the Japanese.Details on his prior combat missions anddaily life in India are unfortunately missing.

Thomasian’s story after his capture isone of perseverance and faith overcomingthe brutality so often faced by Allied POWsin the Pacific. He relates several poignantincidents, including the singing of “SilentNight” by a fellow POW on Christmas Eve1944 and a secret Easter service conductedwith the help of the dozen Jewish POWswho distracted the Japanese guards.Included are several drawings by Thomas-ian himself, who studied art after the war.

He finishes the book with a briefdescription of his return home to New YorkCity following his liberation in May 1945and his postwar career and family life. Sinceretirement in 1996, he has worked with ex-POWs and other veterans on disability com-pensation.

Then There Were Six lacks an index andbibliography. For additional background onB–29 operations, the best source is KennethP. Werrell’s Blankets of Fire: U.S. bombersover Japan in World War II, published by theSmithsonian Institution. His book includes ashort description of the December 14, 1944,Burma mission.

Maj. Jeffrey P. Joyce, USAF (Ret), Docent,National Air and Space Museum.

Rockets and Missiles: The Life Story ofa Technology. By A. Bowdoin Van Riper.Westport, Ct. and London: Greenwood Press,2004. Photos. Illustrations. Glossary. Index.Pp. xvi, 176. $45.00 ISBN: 0-313-32795-5

I perused the book, Rockets and Mis-siles, but focused on Chapters 5 and 6.Entitled, “Rockets for Research, 1945-60,”Chapter 5 surveys postwar research by theU.S. Army and Navy. Curiously, it fails tomention the research performed by theArmy Air Forces (AAF), the predecessor ofthe United States Air Force. (Elsewhere inthe book, the author mentions the AAF, butmistakenly calls it the Army Air Force—sin-gular.) Thus, the reader is left with theimpression that no research was performedby the AAF, or later by the United States AirForce. Similarly, only brief mention is madeof the contributions of the world famousaerodynamicist Dr. Theodore von Karman,but not with reference to the AAF or hislong-term association as chairman of theAAF Scientific Advisory Committee, later

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the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board.Chapter 6, “Ballistic Missiles and the

Cold War, 1945-1990,” also fails to mentionthe role of the Air Force in missile R&D. Thischapter starts with the story of theGermans’ V-2 and then segues to the Sovietpostwar program, also beneficiaries of theGerman V-2 experience. The next logical,central figure in the U.S. account is the for-mer top scientist of World War II NaziGermany’s missiles program, Dr. Wernhervon Braun. Van Riper devotes much atten-tion von Braun and his work on the U.S.Army’s Redstone ballistic missile. In pass-ing, Van Riper makes mention of the Thorintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM),but neglects to point out that the missile wasdeveloped and fielded by the U.S. Air Force.

Perhaps the oddest episode in this bookis the case of the Atlas intercontinental bal-listic missile (ICBM). As most readers of AirPower History know, the Atlas was the firstICBM developed by the United States,specifically the by the Air Force. It had itsgenesis in the MX-774B program, an effortbuilt on the V-2 but improved considerablybeyond it by the Air Force. Under contract tothe Air Force, Dr. Karel J. Bossart of Convairmade several major changes in the design ofthe V-2 by replacing its individual tankageand employing, instead, the MX-774’s skin tohouse the oxidizer and propellant liquids.Bossart also installed swiveling engines, andmade the warhead separable. He therebyimproved the missile’s weight, control, andsurvivability.

Moreover, as the Air Force continued itsmissiles development, it also created theinfrastructure for the ICBM program bydeveloping liquid rocket engines far morepowerful than those on the V-2, it built teststands and firing ranges, fabricated new air-frames, designed multiple stage missiles,

introduced computers into the missiles,developed an array of guidance instruments,developed liquid and solid rocket fuels, cre-ated launch stands and underground launchfacilities, refined accuracy, improved reliabil-ity… the list goes on and on.

Again, Van Riper’s research comes intoquestion as he makes no mention of theTeapot Committee, a study group underOSD auspices organized, funded, and staffedby the Air Force in 1953, to shake out themissile programs for all of the services. Theresultant was to designate the Air Force asexecutive agent for the ICBM program;President Dwight D. Eisenhower subse-quently assigned to USAF the Nation’s toppriority. Nor is any mention made of theman who led that effort—Gen. Bernard A.Schriever, USAF, and who headed theWestern Development Division. This organi-zation and its successors produced the Atlas,Titan, Thor, and Minuteman long-range bal-listic missiles—to name the most promi-nent—that stood guard for the Nationthroughout the Cold War.

Typical of the book’s egregious omis-sions of the Air Force’s role appears in a pho-tograph of an Atlas ICBM (page 78). Thecaption clearly shows the Atlas, but fails tomention its lineage. Instead, the captiontalks only about NASA. Similarly, not untilpage 82 does the author acknowledge theThor IRBM as belonging to the Air Force,but muddies the subject by labeling Thor as“undistinguished.” What in the world is anundistinguished missile? Actually, Thor hadquite a career, serving as part of one leg ofAmerica’s Triad of deterrence at the heightof the Cold War. Indeed, OSD chose to fieldboth the USAF’s Thor and Army’s Jupitermissiles (it assigned Jupiter to the USAF) tobe deployed to the UK, Italy and Turkey.

I suspect that the problem with this

book is due to the author’s limited research.Dr. Van Riper, a history of science professorat Southern Polytechnic State University inMarietta, Georgia, could and should haveread more and a greater selection of books.

For a corrective to many of the mistakescited in the book above, readers are referredto:

Blazing the Trail: The Early History ofSpacecraft and Rocketry. By MikeGruntman. Reston, Va.: American Instituteof Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004.everything pp. xiv, 503. $59.95 ISBN: 1-56347-705-X

Although not a historian, Mike Grunt-man—a professor of aerospace engineeringat the University of Southern California—manages to get the history right. Gruntmangot it right because he conducted his re-search more thoroughly than did Van Riper,especially with respect to consulting officialhistories. The latter are based largely on pri-mary documentary sources and oral historyinterviews with participants.

Writing in a “compressed lecture-notesstyle,” Professor Gruntman’s intended audi-ence are college and high school instructorsand students. Gruntman’s book is a compre-hensive account from the beginning of rock-etry to the entry into space in the 1960s. Itis accurate and detailed, without being over-ly technical, and honest (showing failures aswell as successes). The book makes excellentuse of sidebars to provide technical details indigestible, bite-sized bits. It is easy to readand makes an excellent reference work.Blazing the Trail is highly recommended.

Jacob Neufeld, Potomac, Maryland.

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Lynch, Kristin F. et al. The Air Force Chief of StaffLogistics Review: Improving Wing-Level Logistics.Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 2005.Tables. Dia-grams. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. Pp. xxi, 178. $20.00 ISBN: 0-8330-3658-0

Mahbubani, Kishore. Rebuilding Trust betweenAmerica and the World: Beyond the Age of Innocence.New York: Public Affairs, 2005. Notes. Appendices.Index. Pp. xx, 235. $26.00 ISBN: 1-58648-268-8

Mitchell, William P. From the Pilot Factory. CollegeStation: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x,195. $32.95 ISBN: 1-58544-387-5

Peszke, Michael Alfred. The Polish UndergroundArmy, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Stra-tegic Unity in World War II. Jefferson, N. Car. andLondon: McFarland & Co., 2005. Photos. Notes.Appendices. Bibliography. Index. pp. x, 244. $45.00ISBN: 0-7864-2009-X

Shaw, Frederick J., Ed. Locating Air Force BaseSites: History’s Legacy. Washington, D.C.: Air ForceHistory and Museums Program, 2004. Maps.Tables. Diagrams. Photographs. Notes. Appen-dices. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 215.

Stein, Allan T. Into the Wild Blue Yonder: My Lifein the Air Force. College Station: Texas A&M Uni-versity Press, 2005. Maps. Photographs. Index. Pp.xi, 181. $29.95 ISBN: 1-58544-386-7

* Tripp, Robert S. et al. Supporting Air and SpaceExpeditionary Forces: Lessons from OperationEnduring Freedom. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Rand2004. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Pho-tographs. Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xlvii, 119. $20.00 PaperbackISBN: 0-8330-3517-7


Arnold, David Christopher. Spying from Space:Constructing America’s Satellite Command andControl Systems. College Station: Texas A&M Uni-versity Press, 2005. Photographs. Notes. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. xiii, 209. $32.95 ISBN: 1-58544-385-9

Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People, Vol. I.Washington, D.C.: NASA History Division, 2005.[NASA SP-2005-4110] Photographs. Notes. Glos-sary. Index. Pp. xxix, 402.

Cornelius, Wanda and Thayne Short. Ding Hao:America’s Air War in China, 1937-1945. Gretna,La.: Pelican Publishing, 2004. Photographs. Ap-pendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 505. $19.95Paperback ISBN: 1-56554-523-0

Dawson, Virginia P. Ideas into Hardware: A His-tory of the Rocket Engine Test Facility at the NASAGlenn Research Center. Cleveland, Ohio: NASAGlenn Research Center, 2004. Photographs.Appendices. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xv, 144.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, National Security Confe-rence, 2004: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: TheAtlantic Council, et al., 2004. Pp. 103. www.eisen-howerseries.com

Hodgson, Marion Stegeman. Winning My Wings: AWoman Airforce Service Pilot in World War II.Albany, Tex.: Bright Sky Press, 2004. [Originally,Naval Institute Press, 1996] Photographs. Pp. xi,286. $24.95 ISBN: 1-931721-47-5

Hua, H. Mike. Lost Black Cats: Story of Two Cap-tured Chinese U-2 Pilots. Bloomington, Ind.: Au-thor House, 2005. Photographs. Pp. x, 208. Paper-back ISBN: 1-4184-9917-X

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listedabove is invited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret.)3704 Brices Ford Ct.Fairfax, VA 22033Tel. (703) 620-4139e-mail: [email protected]

* Already under review.

Books Received

The President’s Report

By Lt. Gen. Michael A. Nelson, USAF (Ret.)

Whether by GPS, Mapquest, or the old folding paper variety, we all use maps tohelp us get where we want to go. Okay, some of you, mostly male, won’t use a mapbecause—well, because. But most sensible people use maps and we, who are privi-leged to lead this Foundation, certainly count ourselves among the sensible. So, wehave built our own Roadmap for 2005, using as our guide the Foundation’s StrategicPlan, approved by the Trustees last fall.

What’s in it? Well, the highlights can be found in these six objectives: 1) increaseour outreach by a variety of means; 2) strengthen our ties with the USAF; 3) pre-serve Air Force heritage, in this case by developing a companion Chronology of AirForce History to go with our popular coffee table book, Air Force; 4) upgrade ourtechnology aggressively, primarily by creating a brand new website; 5) expand ourmembership; and 6) seek sources of funding for our activities.

How are we doing? Well, pretty well so far. You’ll soon be able to look at our com-pletely new, user-friendly website, opening this summer. Eventually, we want thisto be a premier site for anyone interested in the heritage of the USAF, as well as aplace to join the Foundation, change addresses, buy stuff, get up-to-date news aboutmilitary aviation history—and more.

We have already taken steps to strengthen our ties to the active Air Force andwill continue this campaign indefinitely. And I’m happy to say the Chronology bookis now under contract with a well-known and respected military aviation expert.

We’re showing less progress thus far in attracting new members, but I am con-fident that the result of all our efforts will be increased recruitment. Certainly ourflagship, this magazine, has been so good consistently that it alone should be a peo-ple magnet. We only need to market it better, which our website and other initia-tives will do.

Now, about the funding. We are looking at a variety of sources of income, and Iexpect these to produce results to help us get airborne. We’re are on the takeoff rolltoday because of some very generous Trustees who have challenged each other andthe membership at large to ante up the funds needed to get where we’re going. Infact, Lt. Gen. John Conaway, USAF (Ret.) has an open $5,000 challenge, which stillhas some space to be filled, and Maj. Gen. John Patton, USAF (Ret.), is ready to tossout his own $5,000 challenge once we fulfill General Conaway’s.

If you’d like to help us on our way, please mail a check to the Foundation. We candouble our income through one of these challenges.

To sum up, we have established ambitious targets and a clear map with whichto get there. Now, we are assembling an airplane capable of flying the route. I urgeeveryone to help if you can, but in any case, enjoy this magazine and tell othersabout it and about the Air Force Historical Foundation.


Foundation Notes

Jun 28-30The Association for Unmanned Vehicle SystemsInternational will host its annual symposium and exhibi-tion entitled Unmanned Systems North America2005 at the Baltimore Convention Center in Baltimore,Maryland. Contact:

AUVSI2700 S. Quincy Street, Suite 400Arlington, VA 22206(703) 845-9671, Fax x9679e-mail: [email protected]: www.auvsi.org

Jul 15-17The Center for the Study of War and Society andthe University of Tennessee Press will host a con-ference on the 60th anniversary of the atomic bomband the impact of the development of nuclear weaponson American society and culture. Contact:

Prof. G. Kurt Piehler, DirectorCenter for the Study of War and Society220 Hoskins LibraryUniversity of TennesseeKnoxville TN 37996-0128(865) 974-7094e-mail: [email protected]: web.utk.edu/~csws

Jul 21-24The Aircraft Engine Historical Society will hold its2nd annual convention in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Contact:

AEHS, Inc.1019 Old Monrovia RD NW, # 201Huntsville, AL 35806(256) 683-1458e-mail: [email protected]:www.enginehistory.org

Jul 24-30The International Committee for the History of Tech-nology will present Electronics in the 20th Century: aSymposium as a part of its participation in the XXIIndInternational Congress of History of Science. This year’stheme is “Globalization and Diversity: Diffusion ofScience and Technology throughout History.” The meet-ing will be held in Beijing, China. Contact:

Alexander Magoun David Sarnoff Library 201 Washington Road Princeton NJ 08543-5300 609-734-2636, Fax: 609-734-2339e-mail: [email protected]: http://2005bj.ihns.ac.cn/index.frame.htm

Aug 5-7The Yankee Air Museum will host its 7th Annual‘Thunder Over Michigan’ Fly-in and WWII AviationSymposium at Willow Run Airport, in Belleville,Michigan. This year’s program will feature the world’slargest gathering of flyable WWII-era bombers, including

7 B–17s, 5 B–25s, 2 B–24s and a B–29, along with fight-ers, transports and amphibians. Contact:

The Yankee Air MuseumP. O. Box 590Belleville MI 48112-0590e-mail: [email protected]: www.yankeeairmuseum.org

Aug 5-21The Society of American Archivists will hold itsannual meeting at the Hilton New Orleans RiversideHotel in New Orleans, Louisiana. Contact:

Society of American Archivists527 S. Wells St., 5th FloorChicago, IL 60607(312) 922-0140, Fax 347-1452website: www.archivists.org/

Aug 11-14The 8th International Mars Society convention willbe held on the campus of the University of Colorado atBoulder. Contact:

The Mars SocietyP.O. Box 273Indian Hills, CO 80454website: www.marssociety.org

Aug 30-Sep 1The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-nautics will host its Space 2005 conference at the LongBeach Convention Center in Long Beach, California.Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr., Ste. 500Reston VA 20191-4344(703) 264-7551website: www.aiaa.org

Sep 8-9The Centre for Second World War Studies will host aconference entitled “Defeat and Memory.” The conferencewill be held at the University of Edinburgh in Edinburgh,Scotland. Contact:

Dr Jenny MacleodCenter for Second World War StudiesUniversity of Edinburgh24 Buccleuch PlaceEdinburgh Scotland EH9 9LNe-mail: [email protected]

Sep 8-11The Tailhook Association will hold its annual navalaviation symposium and reunion at the Nugget Hotelin Sparks (Reno), Nevada. Contact:

The Tailhook Association9696 Businesspark Ave.San Diego, CA 92131(858) 689-9223 or (800) 322-4665website: www.tailhook.org

Sep 23-25The Great War Society will hold its 16th AnnualNational Meeting at the Virginia War Museum inNewport News, Virginia. This year’s theme commemo-rates the Society’s 25th anniversary. Contact:

Dr Steve Gehnrich608 Grasson LaneFruitland MD 21826e-mail: [email protected]: www.wfa-usa.org

Sep 28-Oct 1The Society for Military History will sponsor a slate ofpresentations at The Northern Great Plains


Compiled by George Cully

History Conference to be held at the Plaza Hotel inEau Clair, Wisconsin. Contact:

Joe FitzharrisDepartment of History – Mail #4018University of St. Thomas2115 Summit AvenueSt. Paul, MN 55105 USA651-962-5734 fax: 651-962-6360e-mail: [email protected]: personal2.stthomas.edu/jcfitzharris/NGPHC/

Sep 28-Oct 1The Society of Experimental Pilots will host its49th annual symposium and reunion in Anaheim,California. Contact:

SETPP. O. Box 986Lancaster CA 93584-0986Tel.: (661) 942-9574, Fax 940-0398e-mail: [email protected]: www.setp.org

Sep 29-Oct 1The Canadian Science and Technology HistoricalAssociation will hold its 14th biennial conference atthe Canadian Museum of Science and Technology inOttawa, Canada. Contact:

Edward Jones-ImhotepDepartment of HistoryUniversity of GuelphGuelph (Ontario) N1G 2W1Canadae-mail: [email protected]: www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20430/ahstc-cstha/

english/ home.html

Oct 3-6In honor of the 100th anniversary of its involvementwith, and support of aviation in the U.S., the Society ofAmerican Engineers will sponsor 2005 SAE AerotechCongress and Exhibition. Its theme is “Where TechnologyTakes Off,” and it will be held at the Gaylord TexanResort and Convention Center in Grapevine (Dallas/Ft.Worth region), Texas. Contact:

SAE International400 Commonwealth Dr.Warrendale PA 15096-0001website: www.sae.org/aerotech

Oct 5-6The U.S. Naval Institute will host its 10th AnnualNaval Warfare Symposium and Exhibition in VirginiaBeach, Virginia. Contact:

U.S. Naval InstituteBeach Hall291 Woods RoadAnnapolis MD 21402Tel.: (410) 295-1067, Fax x1048e-mail: [email protected]: www.usni.org/

Oct 5-9The National D-Day Museum will host an InternationalConference on World War II with a theme entitled “TheWar That Changed The World.” The conference alsoincludes a World War II Film Festival; it will be held at theNew Orleans Hilton Riverside and the Ernest N. MorialConvention Center in New Orleans, Louisiana. Contact:

The National D-Day Museum945 Magazine StreetNew Orleans LA 70130(877) 813-DDAY, Ext. 226e-mail: [email protected]: www.ww2conference.org


Oct 8-10The George C. Marshall Foundation, working in con-junction with the McCormick Tribune Foundationand the History Department of the Virginia MilitaryInstitute, will host “From Quagmire to Détente: TheCold War from 1963 to 1975.” The conference will be heldat the Marshall Center in Lexington, Virginia. Contact:

Prof. Malcolm Muir, Jr.Department of HistoryVirginia Military InstituteLexington VA 24450(540) 464-1224e-mail: [email protected]

Oct 14-15The 2006 topic for the annual conference of the Centrefor Conflict Studies will be “Terrorism in History: TheStrategic Impact of Terrorism From Sarajevo 1914 to9/11.” This gathering will be held at the University ofNew Brunswick, Fredericton, NB, Canada. Contact:

Dr. David Charters Centre for Conflict Studies University of New Brunswick (506) 453- 4587, Fax (506) 447-3175e-mail: [email protected]: www.h-net.org/announce/show.cgi?ID=144293

Oct 27-28The Center for Cryptologic History will host its 2005Symposium on Cryptologic History near Baltimore,Maryland. Contact:

National Security AgencyCenter for Cryptologic HistorySuite 6886Fort Meade, MD 20755301-688-2336e-mail: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]: www.nsa.gov/cch/

Nov 3-6The Society for the History of Technology will co-locate its annual meeting in conjunction with theHistory of Science Society; the meeting will be heldin Minneapolis, Minnesota. Contact:

Dan HolbrookMarshall UniversityDept. of HistoryOne John Marshall Blvd.Huntington, WV 25705e-mail: [email protected]: www.shotprogram.org

Nov 10-12The Rothmere American Institute at Oxford Univer-sity will host a conference on The United States in the1980s: The Reagan Years, including panel presentationson “Reagan and the American Military.” Contact:

Ruth Parr,Assistant Director,Academic ProgrammeRothermere American Institute,Oxford, OX1 3TG United Kingdome-mail: [email protected].

If you wish to have your event listed, contact:

George W. Cully10505 Mercado WayMontgomery Village, MD 20886-3910e-mail: [email protected]


Lt. Sean Atkins’ article, “UnwantedAllies,” in the winter edition [Vol. 51, No.4] of Air Power History, was of great inter-est to me. I was the Deputy Director of theGround Launched Cruise Missile Plan-ning Group in the Air Staff (AF/XOXXG),1981-82, and this article brought back tomind a period of intense activity andeffort, as we simultaneously tried to com-plete the development, infrastructure,training, governing policy and deploy-ment of this important NATO nucleardeterrent.

As near as I can recall, Atkins coversthe issues concerning our deployment tothe UK rather completely, with one signif-icant exception: that of the massive fund-ing of the anti-nuclear “movements,” inthe U.S. and in Europe, by the Soviets-asdocumented in the Verona Reports andother sources that became available uponthe collapse of the Soviet Union, especial-ly in the recovered secret records in EastGermany.

To cover in such detail the anti-nuclear campaign waged in Britain andelsewhere, without reference to the sourceof much of the financial and material sup-port that facilitated these protests is topresent an incomplete picture of theseevents. The protests made our effortsmuch more difficult, and the courage anddetermination of our NATO allies, Bri-tain, Belgium, Italy and Germany, muchmore significant, in the ultimate successof the program—the decision by theSoviet Union to withdraw the very dan-gerous SS-20 missile system from Europe.

Lt. Atkins has made an importantcontribution to our understanding of thepolitical and policy issues of overseasdeployment of U.S forces and systems,especially as they apply to current andfuture requirements for such basing.

Col. Frederic H. Smith, III, USAF (Ret.),Peachtree City, Georgia

Author’s Reply

I would only like to thank Colonel Smithfor his insightful comments. My researchwas primarily focused on domestic issuesand did not give proper weight to theinfluence of Soviet funding to the anti-cruise missile protest. Additionally, out-side support would likely be a significantinfluence on current and future negativedomestic reactions. Iranian support toIraqi insurgents or Al Qaeda funding todomestic terrorist groups in states that

host U.S. forces are just a couple examplesthat come to mind. Outside support andfunding will certainly be considered infuture research and writing I do on thissubject.

Lt. Sean Atkins, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

And the Winner is . . .

The Foundation’s Publications Com-mittee met this spring to select the Out-standing Article in Air Power Historypublished during 2004. Chaired by John F.Kreis, a Foundation Trustee, the commit-tee included Kenneth Alnwick, DonBaucom, Al Hurley, Don Lopez, JohnShaud, and Robert Vickers. The winningarticle was “Fighting Machines for the AirService, AEF,” appearing in the Fall issue,Volume 51, Number 3. Theodore M.Hamady, (see picture below) the authorof the article will be awarded a $500 prize.

Mr. Hamady’s article bested fourother contestants: Don Baucom’s, “Eisen-hower and Ballistic Missile Defense: TheFormative Years;” Dino Brugioni’s, “TheEffects of Aerial and Satellite Imagery onthe 1973 Yom Kippur War;” JamesCorum’s, “The Luftwaffe and its Allies inWorld War II: Parallel War and the Failureof Strategic and Economic Cooperation;”and Manny Horowitz’s, “Were ThereStrategic Oil Targets in Japan in 1945?”

The committee members consideredand scored each of the nominated articlesin the categories of relevance and impor-tance of the article, logic in constructionand presentation of facts, readability, the-sis construction and development, andscholarship. The judges praised the highquality of the articles published through-out the year 2004.

Another Air Power History Article isa Finalist

The Army Historical Foundation an-nounced that Dr. Daniel L. Haulman’sarticle, “Before D-Day Dawn: Reassessingthe Troop Carriers at Normandy,” APH,Vol. 51, No. 2, Summer 2004, has beenselected as a finalist for the DistinguishedWriting Award. The winners will beannounced in June.

Martin Blumenson (1918-2005)

One of the foremost historians ofWorld War II, Martin Blumenson died ofcancer on April 15, 2005. He was eighty-six.

Blumenson wrote more than twentybooks, but is best known for his biogra-phies of Gen. George S Patton, Jr. Born inNew York City, Blumenson was raised inNew Jersey. He received BA and MAdegrees in history from Bucknell Univer-sity in Pennsylvania, and a second MAfrom Harvard. A talented pianist, Mr.Blumenson performed at Carnegie Hall asa youth. He also formed and played in ajazz band.

During World War II he was an officerand a U.S. Army historian, serving atPatton’s Third Army headquarters. Heremained in Europe after the war, wherehe met and married Genevieve Delbert.Asan Army Reservist, he was recalled toactive duty during the Korean War. In1954 he moved to Washington andremained there permanently. He workedfor the Army’s history office until 1967.Blumenson also wrote biographies ofGenerals Eisenhower and Mark Clark. Hebecame an independent scholar and writerin 1970.Among his books at the time is hishistory of the Air Force in Viet Nam. Helectured and taught at George WashingtonUniversity, West Point, and the Army andNavy War Colleges.

His final work, “Heroes Never Die,” isa collection of essays about military com-manders.” Mr. Blumenson’s wife died in2000. He is survived by his son John J, G.Blumenson of Toronto.

The Edward S. Miller ResearchFellowship in Naval History.

The Naval War College Foundationintends to award one grant of $1,000 to theresearcher who has the greatest need andcan make the optimum use of researchmaterials for naval history located in theNaval War College’s Archives, Naval

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News

Notices


The 20th Fighter Wing and 20th Figh-ter Group Associations will hold theirreunion on October 26-30, 2005, in Tucson,Arizona. Contact:

Ray L. Rider5031 South Auckland CourtAurora, CO 80015-3911

orDennis L. Schaan5645 Nicole CourtLas Vegas, NV 89120-2226

The TAC Missileers will hold theirreunion in 2005 in Nashville, Tennessee.Contact

Joe Perkins(904) 282-9064e-mail: [email protected]

USAF Pilot Training Class 56-D willhold its reunion November 3-6, 2005, atColorado Springs, Colorado. Contact:

Troy Hanson6547 No. Academy Blvd. #451Colorado Springs, CO 80918(719) 632-1179e-mail: [email protected]

Troop Carrier Homecoming for alltroop carrier veterans from World War IIthrough Vietnam, Galveston, Texas,November 9-13, 2005. Contact:

Sam McGowan3727 Hill Family LaneMissouri City, TX 77459e-mail: [email protected].

Historical Collection, and Henry E. EcclesLibrary. A guide to the College’s manu-script, archival, and oral history collectionsmay be found on the Naval War College’swebsite http://www.nwc.navy.mil . Click on“Library,” then “Library Publications,” then“Naval Historical Collection.” Furtherinformation on the collections and copies ofthe registers for specific collections areavailable online or on request from theHead, Naval Historical Collection. E-mail:[email protected]. mil.

The recipient will be a ResearchFellow in the Naval War College’s Mari-time History Department, which will pro-vide administrative support during theresearch visit. Submit detailed researchproposal that includes statement of needand plan for optimal use of Naval WarCollege materials, curriculum vitae, atleast one letter of recommendation, andrelevant background information to MillerNaval History Fellowship Committee,Naval War College Foundation, 686Cushing Road, Newport RI 02841-1207, by1 August 2005.

For further information, contact thechair of the selection committee via e-mailat [email protected] Employees of theU.S. Naval War College or any agency of theU.S. DoD are not eligible for consideration;EEO/AA regulations apply.

The 22d Tactical Fighter Squadron willhold its reunion on June 2-5, 2005, inScottsdale, Arizona, Contact:

Carl G. Schneider(480) 595-7668e-mail: [email protected]

The 394th Bomb Group 584th, 585th,586th, and 587th Bomb Sqs. (World WarII B–26) will hold its reunion on June 3-5,2005, in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania,Contact:

Elden ShookPO Box 77Enon, OH 45323(937) 864-2983e-mail: [email protected]

FB–111A (Aircrew and staff) reunion willbe held July 21-24, 2005, in Portsmouth,New Hampshire. Contact:

Dave Dowe-mail: [email protected]:http://members.cox.net/fb111reunion

The 106th Veterans of Foreign Warsannual convention will be held August 20-

25, 2005, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Contact:Vanessa Kane, CMPe-mail: [email protected] orDiane Putthoffe-mail: [email protected].

The Sampson AFB Veterans Associa-tion will hold its reunion on September 8-11 at Sampson State Park, on SenecaLake, Romulus, N.Y. Contact:

Chip PhillipsPO BOX 331Williamsville, N.Y. 14231-0331(716) 633-1119e-mail: [email protected]

The 27th Fighter Wing Association(Kearney/Bergstrom era) will hold itsreunion on September 22-24, 2005, in SanAntonio, Texas. Contact:

John McConnell(210) 824-1329e-mail: [email protected]

The 459th Bomb Group Association(World War II, Fifteenth Air Force), willhold its reunion on September 29-October2, 2005, in Shreveport, Louisiana. Contact:

Charles “Skip” Johnson #1388PO Box 6419Bossier, LA 71171(318) 549-0522

orJohn Devney #00290 Kimbark RdRochester, NY 14610-2738(585) 381-6174

The 27th Air Transport Group (310,311, 312, 325th Ferrying Sqs; 86, 87, 320,321st Transport Sqs.), will hold its reunionon September 29-October 2, 2005, in SanAntonio, Texas. Contact:

Fred Garcia6533 West Altadena Ave.Glendale, AZ 85304(623) 878-7007

The Fina-Commemorative AIRSHO2005 will take place October 1-2, 2005, atthe Midland (Texas) International Airport.Contact:

Tina CorbettCAF HeadquartersPO BOX 62000Midland, TX 79711-2000(432) 563-1000 ext.2231www.commemorativeairforce.org

The 306th Bomb Group reunion will beheld October 19-20, 2005, in San Antonio,Texas. Contact:

Royce Hopkins35427 Pontiac Dr.Brookshire, TX 77423-9541

Reunions


The readers of Air Power History know theirairplanes. Once again, they proved it by identify-ing last issue's "What Is It?" flying machine. Four-teen readers, including many of the usual sus-pects, sent in postcards. All but one got it right.

Last issue's mystery plane was an Army AirCorps Grumman OA–9 amphibian, photographedin the late 1930s by Steve Savko.

OA–9 was the Army's term for the "observa-tion, amphibian" military version of the twin-engine Grumman G–21 Goose, a utility transportthat made its initial flight on May 29, 1937. In mil-itary circles, the plane is more familiar as the JRF,its name in Navy and Coast Guard service.

Our follow-up photo, taken by J. Meyer andprovided by Norman Taylor, shows another OA–9Goose (serial no. 38-581) assigned to the 71st AirBase Squadron at Gander, Newfoundland, andseen on the Humber River in Newfoundland inSeptember 1943.

A typical Goose was powered by two 450-horsepower Pratt & Whitney R-985 radial engines.The first aircraft in the series went to civilian own-ers in July 1937, only weeks after its initial flight.

The Royal Canadian Air Force subsequentlybecame the first military buyer, but it was theArmy Air Corps that invested in the Goose in sig-nificant numbers, buying twenty-six of the planes.During the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack onPearl Harbor, two OA–9s were destroyed on theground. The Army later acquired five more OA–9and five OA–13 models.

The Navy acquired several hundred Gooses inJRF-1 through JRF-6 versions, some of which werestill in service in the 1950s. Grumman manufac-tured 345 examples of this aircraft in all of its civil-ian and military guises.

Our "History Mystery" winner is Steven P.McNicoll of De Pere, Wisconsin. Thanks to all read-ers who joined in our "name the plane" exercise.

Once more, we present the challenge for ourever-astute readers. See if you can identify thismonth’s “mystery” aircraft. It's a helicopter thistime. But remember, please: postcards only. Therules, once again:

1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail thepostcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124.

2. Correctly name the aircraft shown here.Also include your address and telephone number,including area code. If you have access to e-mail,include your electronic screen name. Note, howev-er, that History Mystery entries should not besubmitted by e-mail.

3. A winner will be chosen at random from thepostcards with the correct answer. The winner willreceive an aviation history book as a prize.

This feature needs your help. In that attic orbasement, you have a photo of a rare or little-known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?Send your pictures or slides for possible use as“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.

ThisIssue’sMysteryPlane

History Mysteryby Robert F. Dorr

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