Barack Obama and Americans’ Racial Attitudes: Rallying and Polarization

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Barack Obama and Americans RacialAttitudes: Rallying and Polarization

Monika L. McDermottFordham University

Cornell BelcherBrilliant corners Research and Strategies

During the 2008 presidential election, and briefly following it, researchers and punditswondered whether the election of Americas first African-American President could createa post-racial America. But while political scientists have done much to analyze the elec-tion itself, we remain largely uninformed about the potential long-term effects of theObama presidency on racial attitudes in America. This paper addresses the effects of theObama presidency using multiple original surveys of the electoral battleground statesconducted from 2008 through 2012. Using a measure of racial antagonism, the analysistests the rally and presidential-popularity cycle theories of public opinion. It demonstratesthat racial sentiments rallied positively behind Obama after his 2008 election but thenspiked to unprecedentedly antagonistic levels during his first term. At the same time,racial antagonism polarized dramatically by party from 2008 to 2012.Polity (2014) 46, 449469. doi:10.1057/pol.2014.8

Keywords racial attitudes; racial polarization; public opinion; Barack Obama;rally events

Americans woke up to a different nation yesterday. In place of old victories builtupon the politics of bitterness and division, in place of the old scourge of racialenmity, a new maturity and responsibility had found its majority. Real change isnow not so audacious a hope.

Editorial, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 6, 2008

The 2008 election, in which American voters elected Barack Obama as their firstblack president, was viewed by many, possibly hyperbolically, as an event thatwould change Americas racial landscape forever, finally leaving behind an uglylegacy of racial discrimination and antagonism. As the editorial board of the

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the Western Political ScienceAssociation, Hollywood, CA.

Polity . Volume 46, Number 3 . July 2014 2014 Northeastern Political Science Association 0032-3497/14www.palgrave-journals.com/polity/

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Post-Gazette put it, the election would usher in a new maturity and responsibilityon race relations. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman went so far as tohail the election as the final battle in the Civil War.1 In the immediate afterglow ofthe election the dream of a post-racial America that had been discussed so muchbefore the election seemed as though it might be coming true.

At the same time, however, there were indications that Barack Obamas electioncould have an effect opposite of the hopes expressed above. As soon as Obamaclinched the Democratic presidential nomination in June 2008, white powergroups cited a dramatic rise in interest in their message of white supremacy,causing concern in many quarters.2 In fact, according to the Chicago Tribune (andother newspapers) Obamas election was closely followed by an unprecedentedrise in hate crimessuch as public displays of nooses, vandalism, and racist graffitiacross the country.3 The FBI reported an 8 percent increase in hate-crime attackson African Americans from 2007 to 2008.4 At that point, fears of a white backlash toObamas election also looked like they may have had validity.

Scores of studies in political science and political psychology have taken on thequestion of what effect, if any, Obamas election has had on racial attitudes inAmerica, and they too have reached conflicting conclusions. Among other studies,research shows that: racial policy attitudes have remained pretty much the same, orat least equally divisive between blacks and whites, as before Obamas election;5

racial attitudes have become more important to political preferences, creating morepotential racial animosity;6 and negative stereotypes about blacks actually decreasedfollowing the election.7 These somewhat contradictory findingspartially stemmingfrom different dependent variablesleave open the question of what reallyhappened to Americans racial attitudes before and after Obamas election.

We take a different approach in this article, one that not only allows for thepossibility that any of these possibilities occurreddecreased antagonism,increased antagonism, or no effect at allbut also for the possibility that all mayhave occurred. Most studies set out to find a unidirectional effect, not allowing forthe chance that the effect of Barack Obama as candidate and President may bemore complicated than a simple shift up or down in attitudes (decreased or

1. Thomas Friedman, Finishing Our Work, New York Times, 05 November, 2008.2. Eli Saslow, Hate Groups Newest Target, Washington Post, 22 June, 2008.3. Howard Witt, Hate Incidents in U.S. Surge: Election Seen as Factor Behind Revival of Klan,

Chicago Tribune, 23 November, 2008.4. Marisol Bello, Hate Crimes against Blacks, Religious Groups Rise, USA Today, 23 November, 2009.5. Vincent L. Hutchings, Change or More of the Same? Evaluating Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era,

Public Opinion Quarterly 73 (2009): 91742; Steven A. Tuch and Michael Hughes, Whites Racial PolicyAttitudes, Social Science Quarterly 77 (1996): 72345.

6. Michael Tesler and David O Sears, Obamas Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-RacialAmerica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

7. Susan Welch and Lee Sigelman, The Obama Effect and White Racial Attitudes, The ANNALS ofthe American Academy of Political and Social Science 634 (2011): 20720.

450 OBAMA AND AMERICANS RACIAL ATTITUDES

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increased racial antagonism) or one isolated effect (such as increasing importanceof racial attitudes). In contrast to these existing approaches, we argue that racialopinions followed a predictable pattern, but one not yet consideredthe patternof public opinion typical to a presidential election and governing cycle.

In order to test such possibilities, we need data that not only measure relevantvariables, but also provide flexibility over time, measuring the variables at key timeperiods. One thing the conflicting findings cited above all have in common is that eachstudy relies on the American National Election Studies (ANES) for its data (Tesler andSears also use the General Social Surveys). The ANES surveys provide a wealth of dataon numerous topics in political science and are an invaluable resource to any politicsresearcher. They are also, however, limited in their ability to capture fast-moving eventsor opinion evolution. The size and breadth of any single ANES survey precludes in-depth focus on a single issue (with the exception of occasional selected topicssurveys) as well as the ability to conduct repeated surveys in short time frames. Studiesrelying on major academic surveys are forced to operate within these confines.

In an attempt to sort out what has happened to racial attitudes over the courseof Obamas 2008 campaign and his first term in office, this paper uses data that arefree from these specific restrictions. We analyze data collected by one of Obamascampaign pollsters (brilliant corners Research and Strategies) over the course of the2008 election and through the election of 2012. These surveys contain measuresspecifically designed to analyze the evolution of white attitudes in response toBarack Obamas candidacy and presidency. As a result, they contain a strong andmore statistically reliable measure of racial attitudes than previous studies, as wellas questions that reflect the changing nature of American politics over this timeframe. The surveys provide a unique opportunity to analyze whites racial attitudesover the course of the Obama campaign and his first term in office in a way thatexisting public datasets cannot.

We hypothesize that racial attitudes during and after Obamas election followedpatterns predicted by two traditional political science theories. The first is themomentous nature of the Obama election and its potential effect as a major politicalevent, or a rally event; and the second is the nature of presidential popularitycycles in general and the tendency for views to polarize throughout a presidentsterm. We demonstrate that shifts in racial attitudes seen over the course of the 2008campaign and through the 2012 election are perfectly consistent with these existingtheories. After each electionmore so in 2008Americans rallied around theirpresident and reached brief moments of post-racial politics. At the same time wehypothesize that, as with all rally event effects, these post-racial attitudes were short-lived. Racial attitudes subsequently followed the path of presidential approval overthe course of any presidency, growing more negative in general, and significantlymore polarized by party. The Obama campaign, election, and presidency all led toAmericans both coming together and coming apart on racial politics.

Monika L. McDermott and Cornell Belcher 451

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This paper proceeds in four parts. First we briefly discuss the relevant literatureon rally events and presidential popularity cycles to establish our hypotheses forwhat effects Obamas candidacy, election, and governing should have had onwhite Americans levels of racial antagonism, according to classic theories.Second, we lay out our method, focusing primarily on the surveys we are usingfor our analysis and the measurement of our key dependent variable: racialantagonism, which is an expanded version of the traditional racial resentmentindex.8 Next we analyze the data, testing the hypotheses spurred by the rally andcycle theories. And finally we conclude with a few thoughts and caveats for whatwe have found and where future research might be productive.

Rallying and Polarizing

When thinking about the election of Barack ObamaAmericas first African-American presidentit is hard to think of it as anything other than monumental.Given our nations troubled history with slavery, civil rights, and race relations ingeneral, it was in some ways unbelievable. As Paul Krugman wrote immediatelyfollowing the election:

Tuesday, Nov. 4, 2008, is a date that will live in fame (the opposite of infamy)forever. If the election of our first African-American president didnt stir you, if itdidnt leave you teary-eyed and proud of your country, theres something wrongwith you.9

Granted, Krugman is a liberal stalwart, but his point is no less true because of hisideology. It was a historic moment.

Political scientists have long studied important moments in American politics andthe effects they have on public attitudes. These are referred to as rally events becausethey involve the American people rallying round the flag, or the president, or an ideal(among other things). Scholars have typically studied incidents that involve foreign,and especially military, affairs as rally events. John Muellers original characterizationof a rally event was one that met three criteria: (1) the event was international; (2) itdirectly involved the President; and (3) it was a specific, dramatic and focused event.10

Since the early days of rally research, the restrictions have been tightened somewhatby adding a requirement that the event receive significant national news coverage(front pages of national papers). At the same time, criterion #1 has been abandoned inorder to include major domestic events, including the passage of major legislation and

8. Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

9. Paul Krugman, The Obama Agenda, New York Times, 7 November, 2008, A35.10. John E. Mueller, Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson, The American Political Science

Review 64 (1970): 1834.


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even elections. For example, Reagans landslide reelection in 1984 had a strongerrallying effect on the public than did international events like the signing of the Parispeace accords on Vietnam.11

Rally events affect Americans opinions by causing them to coalesce, usuallypositively, behind the president. As a result, presidential popularity increasesfollowing rally events, sometimes dramatically: President George W. Bushsapproval rating jumped by as much as 37 points (from 55 to 92 percent) in theweeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.12 Presidential approvalis not, however, the only element of public opinion that responds to major events.Americans not only unite behind the President as the symbol of the nation, theyalso can become more positive in other, related ways. For example, Parker findsthat in response to the Persian Gulf War, Americans perceptions of both theeconomy and their own personal finances improved.13 Additionally, feelings thatare deeper than mere approval of the policies and personalities in the currentadministration like trust in government overall, can also receive a boost.14 Insum, rallies affect a whole host of attitudes related to the specific event.

There are nevertheless important limits to rally effects. Effects on opinion frommajor events are not permanent, and are frequently not even long-lived.John Kennedys boost from the Cuban Missile Crisis lasted eight months, andGeorge H.W. Bushs approval bump from Operation Desert Storm lasted less than ayear.15 The most dramatic event for which we have reliable public opinion datathe September 11th attacksincreased presidential popularity for Bush for two fullyears, falling back around the 50 percent mark leading into his reelection in 2004(although the significance of this event makes it an outlier).

In addition to their temporary nature, rally effects are not experienced evenlythroughout the populationanother limitation of their positive effect. Researchdemonstrates that the effects are strongest among those already predisposed toapproving of the president, meaning his fellow partisans. Independents and out-partisans also exhibit opinion bumps, on average, but of substantially lowermagnitude.16

11. Brian Newman and Andrew Forcehimes, Rally Round the Flag Events for Presidential ApprovalResearch, Electoral Studies 29 (2010): 14454.

12. ABC News polls; http://www.pollingreport.com/BushJob1.htm (accessed 9/12/2013).13. Suzanne L. Parker, Toward an Understanding of Rally Effects: Public Opinion in the Persian Gulf

War, Public Opinion Quarterly 59 (1995): 52646.14. Brian J. Gaines, Wheres the Rally? Approval and Trust of the President, Cabinet, Congress, and

Government since September 11, Political Science & Politics 35 (2002): 531536, at 535; Parker, RallyEffects.

15. Marc J. Hetherington and Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and theWar on Terrorism, Political Science and Politics 36 (2003): 3742.

16. George C. Edwards and Tami Swenson, Who Rallies? The Anatomy of a Rally Event, The Journalof Politics 59 (1997): 20012; John R. Oneal and Anna Lillian Bryan, The Rally Round the Flag Effect in USForeign Policy Crises, 19501985, Political Behavior 17 (1995): 379401. Baum, however, finds the


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While it may be unorthodox, we argue that the election of Americas first blackPresident was a rally event, at least for the purposes of racial attitudes in America.The event certainly fits the criteria for a rally eventit was well-publicized andoccupied the front pages of all of the national newspapers for an extended periodof time. It involved the president, or in this case, the president-elect. And it was avery dramatic and focused event. In other words it was important, obvious, andeasy for people to grasp, exactly the type of event that should affect public opinionin a significant way.

Obamas election also had the potential to bring Americans togetheras atypical rally event doesaround a positive moment in our racial history. Whilemost new presidents receive a honeymoon period in which the American publicgives them the benefit of the doubt and high approval ratings, Obamas electionwas a symbol of much more than simply a new president; it was a coming togetheron racial issues. Limited public opinion data support the potential of Obamaselection as more than a typical election. In December 2008, ABC News found that37 percent of Americans were more proud to be American as a result of theelection of the countrys first black president. This number is not far off of the41 percent who said the same thing in 1983 about the demonstrated rally event17 ofReagan sending troops to Grenada.18 In other words, the election had a similareffect on Americans patriotism as at least one other standard, international rallyevent did. This demonstrates at least the possibility that the election of Americasfirst African-American president had a general rallying effect.

As a result, we expect public opinion to react to Obamas election the wayAmericans typically react to rally events: by rallying around the individual andaround attitudes related to the event. In this case, we are focused on the latterracial attitudes. The election of Obama should have caused whites attitudestowards African-Americans to become significantly more positive immediatelyfollowing the event.19 These relatively positive effects, however, should havereceded within the year or two following the 2008 election, as rally effects do.

We also believe that a similar effect should follow the 2012 election. To someextent, the 2012 election of Obama was even more about America and racialattitudes than was 2008. One reason for this was that there had been no long-term

opposite effect, that out-partisans respond more than in-partisans: Matthew A. Baum, The ConstituentFoundations of the RallyRoundtheFlag Phenomenon, International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002): 26398.

17. Oneal and Bryan, The Rally Round the Flag Effect.18. Sources: ABC News poll, December, 2008; and New York Times Poll, November, 1983. (In both

surveys the majority of respondents said the events had no effect on their American pride.) Data providedby the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

19. We focus on white voters in this piece in order to compare our hypotheses, research, andconclusions with the bulk of the existing research on the effect of Obamas election on racial attitudes.Systematic analyses of black and Latino (among others) attitudes is also necessary and valuable, but sucha project would require much more space and still more specialized data.


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improvement in racial attitudes during Obamas first term (as we will see in theanalysis section below).20 As a Washington Post op-ed writer put it:

It could be argued that Barack Obamas first term will be regarded as disastrousfor U.S. race relations. This is precisely why a second term could be seen as oneof the most important steps forward in this countrys race relations since theheight of the civil rights movement in the 1960s.21

The second effect we expect to see involves both rally-event theory and models ofpresidential popularity through a leaders term in officethe presidential popular-ity cycle. Both theories argue for the same effect over time: a decrease inpresidential popularity following a honeymoon, or rally period; and, perhapsmore importantly, a partisan polarization of attitudes over time.

According to the presidential-election-cycle model, presidents usually comeinto office during a honeymoon period in which their popularity is at relativelyhigh levels, the likes of which they rarely see again (absent a major rally event).These high levels are destined to erode over time, in what Norpoth dubs theinauguration-erosion cycle (he also argues that an inauguration is akin to a rallyevent, hence the inaugural bounce).22

In addition, there is an important elaboration on this literature related topolarization. As part of the presidential-popularity-cycle, opinions of thepresident also polarize along partisan lines over the course of a presidency.Specifically, out-partisans are invariably disillusioned more, and faster, thanin-partisans are.23 This means that no matter how much an election might bringAmericans together, they are destined to re-polarize over the course of agoverning term.

We expect to find that this cycle of partisan polarization holds true for racialattitudes as well. Obamas position as Americas first black president has maderacial attitudes more important in presidential politics than they have beenpreviously (with the obvious, possible exception of the Civil War era), not onlyin voting decisions in the 2008 and 2012 elections but also in terms ofevaluations of Obamas performance in office.24 As Tesler describes it, Obamas

20. Another reason, some speculated, was that Obamas reelection would prove that the first electionwas not just a fluke or an accident. Electing him a second time would reinforce that something real hadchanged in racial attitudes.

21. Keli Goff, Reelection could Signal a Giant Step Forward, The Washington Post, 2 November,2012, B2.

22. Helmut Norpoth, Economics, Politics, and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity, Political Behavior6 (1984): 25373, at 253.

23. Raymond Tatalovich and Alan R. Gitelson, Political Party Linkages to Presidential Popularity:Assessing the Coalition of Minorities Thesis, The Journal of Politics 52 (1990): 23442.

24. For example, Randall Kennedy, The Persistence of the Color Line: Racial Politics and the ObamaPresidency (New York: Random House, 2011).


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presidency is a matter of profound racial symbolism resulting in racializedjudgments by the public.25 It is this heavy entanglement of racial sentimentswith the publics views of Obama as president that leads us to expect that racialattitudes will follow a pattern similar to the one typically found for presidentialapproval. As a result, if we do find a post-racial rally effect immediatelyfollowing the election, then we expect negative and partisan-polarized racialattitudes to return as part of the standard presidential cycle.

The existing presidential approval cycle findings26 reinforce the expectationsderived from the rally events literature, as well as extending them further into thepresidency. We expect racial attitudes to conform to both models. Attitudes shouldbe relatively positive in the immediate post-election period following a rally effect,but then erode after the rally effect. Relatedly, the presidential-popularity cycleresearch leads us to one further expectation: opinions on racial attitudes willpolarize by party across the course of his presidency.

To recap, our main hypotheses are as follows:

H1: Obamas 2008 and 2012 elections should be rally events for the whiteAmerican electorate, causing their views towards blacks to become signifi-cantly more positive following the elections, but then fade back to status quo.

H1a: In-partisans (Democrats) should be more affected by the rally than out-partisans (independents or Republicans).

H2: Over the entire course of the Obama Presidency, racial attitudes should followboth the rally model and the presidential popularity cycle in which out-partisanRepublicans and independents become more negative over time, relative toin-partisan Democrats.27

25. Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama PolarizedPublic Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, American Journal of Political Science 56 (2012): 690704. Wealso find direct evidence (rather than merely relying on the existing literature) for the unique role racialattitudes play in views of Obama. Correlating the ANES feeling thermometer of blacks with evaluations ofpresidential performance, we see that while racial attitudes typically correlate with presidential approval,the correlations are substantially weaker for white presidents than for Obama. Attitudes towards blacksand presidential job approval correlate positively at 0.11 for Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton (1980 was thefirst year the ANES measured presidential approval), and they correlate negatively at 0.08 for Republicanpresidents from 1980 through 2008. In contrast, in 2012 the correlation between attitudes towards blacksand job approval for Obama was more than twice as strong at 0.25.

26. For example, Norpoth, Presidential Popularity.27. An alternative to H2, besides the null hypothesis, is the issue of whether racial attitudes are

actually polarizing by party, or whether individuals are sorting themselves into partisan groups withwhich their racial attitudes are more closely aligned. See Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, PoliticalPolarization in the American Public, Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 56388. The twophenomena can look similar and have caused some academic dispute. We provide a further explanationof the difference and a test of this alternative hypothesis at the end of the analysis section.


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Method

To test these hypotheses we use survey data collected by brilliant cornersResearch and Strategies, a Washington DC-based Democratic polling firm thatworked for the Obama campaign in both 2008 and 2012. There are five surveysin total. The first was conducted in June of 2008 and the final in November 2012.The Appendix contains the field dates and other relevant data for the surveys.The surveys were conducted in what were, at the time (summer of 2008),presidential election battleground states as defined by the campaign: Colorado,Florida, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, New Hampshire,New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Each surveycontains white voters in these states.28 While a national sample would no doubtbe preferable for purposes of generalization, we are restricted by the politicalrealities surrounding the campaign, its strategy, and its polling. We believe,however, that the content, design, and consistency of these surveys outweighpotential drawbacks.

All the surveys included questions measuring racial antagonism. We based ourmeasure on the logic of symbolic racism, more recently called racial resentment,in which racial attitudes are measured through respondents preferences on racialpolicies and outcomes, rather than direct questions about racism that tend tounderestimate racial animosity.29 The questions asked respondents their feelingsabout the position of blacks in society, and about government efforts to help them.The Appendix contains the nine questions used, and each ones modal category(averaged across all five surveys).30

The questionnaires included more questions than the standard ANES four-question racial resentment scale in order to capture more variance in a vitalmeasure such as this, and to more accurately measure these attitudes for thecampaign of the first black major-party nominee for the White House. One goal ofthe surveys was to measure whites antipathy toward blacks, and thereby towardcandidate-then-President Obama, as accurately as possible. The resulting scale hasa Cronbachs alpha of 0.84, well above typical reliability floors for index variables

28. The November 2008 post-election survey was a national sample from which we have eliminatedrespondents from all but these fourteen battleground states for consistent comparison. Additionally, tomaximize the available data, we use all of the 2008 battleground states throughout the analysis, despite thefact that some of these states may not have been true battlegrounds in 2012 as well.

29. Donald R. Kinder and David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus RacialThreats to the Good Life, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981): 41431; Donald R. Kinderand Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1996).

30. There is a possibility that answers to these questions could suffer from a basic agree-response bias,inflating the overall measure. Since the measure is a relative one, however, relying on answers to manyquestions, any such aggregate inflation should be constant and not affect the results or analysis.Additionally, as Table A1 shows, modal answers do demonstrate substantial variance.


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as well as above the ANES four-question racial resentment index (0.73 for the yearsasked in the cumulative data file: every two years from 1986 to 1994, and in 2000,2004, and 2008).

The measure also differs from typical racial attitudes scales, because aftercreating the initial version of our scale we then apply a statistical method toremove the effects of ideology from the measure. Traditional measures ofnegative racial attitudes,31 while guiding the field, have nevertheless beensubject to strong critiques. One of the strongest criticisms comes from PaulSniderman and his colleagues, who argue that aspects of symbolic racismnamely its partial measurement through questions about individualistic valuesare actually aspects of conservative principle, rather than any sort of racism orantagonism.32 As such, critics hold that the attitudes do not represent racistviews at all, whether symbolic or otherwise. In other words, symbolic racismmeasures potentially conflate ideology and racism, and as a result, conserva-tives may be labeled racially resentful by merely answering questions in aprincipled ideological manner.

In an effort to address this criticism, as well as the possible counter claim thatliberal racial attitudes are skewed positively due to principled policy stands, weregress our index on respondent ideology. We also control for interviewer racewith a dummy variable for black interviewers.33 We use the residuals from theregression equation as our final measure of racial antagonism. We then re-centerthe measure to a zero midpoint. The resulting scale ranges from 1.24 to +1.24with higher values indicating higher levels of racial antagonism. Figure 1presents the distribution of index values over all surveys among whites in thebattleground states.

Analysis

We now turn to analysis of our hypotheses. First we examine rally effects in racialattitudes following both the 2008 and 2012 elections, as well as possible partisandifferences in the rally (H1a). Then we turn to tests of the party polarizationhypothesis, including a test of the key alternative hypothesis to polarization:partisan sorting.

31. Kinder and Sears, Symbolic Racism; Kinder and Sanders, Divided by Color.32. Paul M. Sniderman, Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tetlock, and Ann Kendrick. The New Racism,

American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991): 42347.33. For a summary of typical interviewer race effects on racial attitude questions, see: Rachel E. Davis,

Mick P. Couper, Nancy K. Janz, Cleopatra H. Caldwell, and Ken Resnicow, Interviewer Effects in PublicHealth Surveys, Health Education Research 25 (2010): 1426.


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Rally Effects on Racial Attitudes

To test H1 we look at average racial antagonism scores for each survey. We test thedifferences in antagonism from survey to survey with independent samples meanstests. Figure 2 presents these data and results.

As expected, levels of racial antagonism decreased significantly immedi-ately following the 2008 election, from an average 0.014 to 0.049. This not onlydemonstrates the predicted and significant overall drop in antagonism, but thesubstantial movement also resulted in the average level of antagonism fallingbelow the midpoint of the scaleplacing battleground white Americans on thenon-antagonistic (racially tolerant), side of the measure for the first time thatyear. Americans average response to Obamas election was a vast improvementin racial attitudes. This was perhaps the post-racial America some had hopedwould come to pass.

Also as predicted by H1, however, the diminished racial antagonism effect wasnot long-lived. Within two years of this rally effect, levels of racial antagonism hadnot only rebounded, but had become even more antagonistic than prior to the

Figure 1Distribution of the Racial Antagonism Index

Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.


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election of Obama. In other words, while the election of Obama led to an initialdrop in antagonism, actually having Obama as president for two years increasedwhites racial antagonism to much higher levels than earlier during his presidency.While this magnitude of rebound may not be typical to the rally literature, it iscertainly in line with expectations.34

In further support of the rally hypothesis, levels of racial antagonism actuallydropped again following the 2012 Obama election, indicating another electoralrally effect on racial attitudes. This drop, however, is not statistically significant,although it is relatively substantiala drop of 0.058 compared to the 0.063decrease in antagonism following the 2008 election. Dealing with smaller N sizesin the later surveys (as indicted in Table A1) may be responsible for the lack ofstatistical confidence.

These data patterns present an ideal picture of a racial attitudes rally effect forthe election and reelection of Americas first black president. Racial attitudes

Figure 2Racial Antagonism Levels from June 2008 to November 2012

Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.Surveys that share a subscript are significantly different from each other at p0.05 (one-tailed).

34. While this effect is predicted by rally and presidential cycle theories, other forces were no doubtalso at work. For example, the racialization of issues such as health care and the rise of the Tea Partyduring Obamas first term contributed to a racialized atmosphere. For the effects of race and health care,see Tesler, The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care; and for Tea Party effects see Matt A. Barreto,Betsy L. Cooper, Benjamin Gonzalez, Christopher S Parker, and Christopher Towler, The Tea Party in theAge of Obama: Mainstream Conservatism or out-Group Anxiety? Political Power and Social Theory 22(2011): 10537. We leave specific examination of the strength of the rebound and its additional causes tofuture research.


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followed the pattern predicted by rally theory not only for both elections, butalso for the intervening first term. Americans became more tolerant, racially,after the 2008 election only to revert back to higher levels within two yearsof the election, then to decreased antagonism once again following the 2012reelection.

There is one further hypothesisH1ato test regarding the rally theoryspecifically. We now examine whether or not in-partisans and out-partisansrallied to different extents. To test the in-partisan/out-partisan effect, we analyzethe levels of racial antagonism for each survey among each of three partisangroupings: Democrats, Independents and others, and Republicans. Figure 3contains the chart of these data.

According to previous findings in the rally effects literature, in-partisansshould show more of a rally effect than out-partisans, which is preciselywhat we see in Figure 3. While all three party groups decrease their averageracial antagonism directly following the 2008 election, the effect amongDemocrats is more substantial than among independents and Republicans(0.18, compared to 0.03 and 0.05 respectively), as well as significant. Whenit comes to the resumption of pre-rally attitudes, however, it is independentsand Republicans who move back to more racially antagonistic views,while Democrats remain at their same low antagonism levels. In-partisansrallied heavily and persistently, but out-partisans rallied some, although not

Figure 3Racial Antagonism Levels by Party Affiliation

Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.**Significantly different from previous time period at p0.05 (two-tailed);*p0.010 (two-tailed).Democratic and Republican opinions are significantly different in all surveys except October 2008.


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significantly, and then bounced to significantly more negative racial attitudeswithin two years.

One final, unexpected effect evident in Figure 3 is that independents showedthe strongest rally after the 2012 election, becoming significantly more positiveracially, and resuming their post-2008 position at the midpoint of the racialantagonism scale. Democrats, on the other hand, remain the same after 2012 (ifanything becoming slightly, albeit insignificantly, more antagonistic). Overall thedata show some support for the expected in-partisan rally effect, although primarilyin the immediate 2008 post-election period.

Polarization of Racial Attitudes

Our second full hypothesis (H2)that views should polarize by party over thecourse of Obamas presidency, as predicted by both rally and presidential-popularity cycle modelsalso receives support from Figure 3. The racialattitudes gap among the party groups clearly widens from November 2008 toNovember 2010, coming slightly back together after the second election (in thesecond rally effect). Because of the relatively few time points we have in ourdata, to establish a solid trend in attitudes we turn first to Gallup presidentialapproval surveys. Once we have established a typical presidential polarizationtrend from a massive and frequent data source, we can then have moreconfidence in the conclusions we draw about racial attitudes from our fivesurveys.

Gallup presidential approval ratings come from weekly surveys of Americanpublic opinion, making the data appropriate for an initial read on polarization,if not an explicitly racial one, over time. In addition, the popularity cycle modelis about presidential popularity generally, meaning that presidential approvalshould show polarization, if any is there. For these reasons we analyze Obamasapproval ratings for polarization effects before moving on to our less frequent,but more relevant racial antagonism measures. We should re-emphasize thatour overall hypothesis is about racial attitudes polarizing by party, notpresidential approval (although the two are certainly related, as discussed infootnote 5).

Figure 4 shows Gallups weekly public approval ratings for BarackObama from directly post-inauguration in 2009 to early 2013. Not surprisingly,the graph shows party opinion polarizing over time on how well Obamais doing his job as president. While Democrats bounce slightly up and downover timeshowing distinct upwards bumps at election time, in line withthe rally effectRepublican averages demonstrate a clear downward trendover time.


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In Gallups repeated measures we also see a strong statistical relationship. Theparty differentialDemocratic approval minus Republican approvalcorrelatesat a very strong 0.72 with the week of the presidency in which it was measured(from 1 to 216). Presidential approval is becoming more polarized over the courseof Obamas presidency, as one would expect.

Given the strength of this effect, it seems even more likely that indi-viduals racial attitudes will follow this same pattern. While we have farfewer time points with which to work, we do have individual-level data. Inorder to test the relationship between party, racial attitudes, and polarizationwe regress our racial antagonism measure on party identification, the numberof the survey (increasing over time, as polarization should), and the interactionof party and survey. Table 1 contains the results. If the polarization of racialattitudes is as predicted, then the interaction term of party survey numbershould be positive and significant, indicating an increasing partisan effectover time.

The results show that party polarization in racial attitudes increases over thecourse of the Obama presidency, as expected. The interactive variable for surveyand party is significant and positive while the baseline temporal effect (survey) is

Figure 4Gallups Obama Presidential Approval Trend among Democrats and Republicans

Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Approval-Center.aspx (accessed 9 September,2013).


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PYalso significant, and negative. The result is that Democrats and Republicans aremoving away from each other on racial attitudes over the course of Obamas timein the national spotlight.35

While these results (Figure 3 and Table 1) demonstrate a clear pattern ofpartisan racial opinions trending away from each other over the course of Obamasfirst term, there remains a possibility that what we see here is not actuallypolarization but rather what some scholars refer to as sorting.36 Sorting is aprocess through which party coalitions or memberships change as individualschange their party affiliation to match their existing and unchanging opinions. Thedifference between polarization and sorting is a question of whether issue attitudesare changing or party membership is changing, respectively. In the latter case, ifover the course of Obamas presidency racially antagonistic Democrats weremoving to the Republican Party, and racially tolerant GOPers were shifting to theDemocratic side of the aisle, we would see the same effects we see now, but itwould be sorting rather than true polarization.

Proving that polarization is at work is not possible, given existing data, but wecan test whether or not these demonstrated effects are sorting rather than

Table 1The Effects of Time and Party on Racial Antagonism

B s.e.

Survey 0.054* 0.021Party ID 0.012 0.025SurveyParty ID 0.025* 0.010Constant 0.008 0.054R-square 0.02N 2019

Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.*p0.05 (two-tailed).

35. To ensure that these effects are specific to the Obama presidency and not a common presidentialpattern or return to a pre-election baseline, we again analyzed racial attitudes using the ANES. Wecalculated polarization based on the difference between Democrats and Republicans thermometerratings of blacks from 1964 to 2012, a measure common to most years. While the ANES did not conduct amidterm survey in 2010, the data nevertheless demonstrate unprecedented racial polarization during theObama presidency. Prior to Obamas election the highest partisan difference on the black thermometerscale was just under five points (1980). In 2012, in extremely stark contrast, the polarization difference was10 points more than double its highest point since 1964. While not a perfect test, these results lendsubstantial support to the polarization findings in this paper and their uniqueness to the Obamapresidency.

36. For example, Fiorina and Abrams, Political Polarization.


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polarization, by ruling out, or in, an important alternative hypothesis. Fiorina andAbrams define true polarization as a change in the distribution of opinions overtime.37 If the public is polarizing on an issue, then individuals are moving awayfrom the center of the opinion distribution as time progresses. If the public issorting, on the other hand, then the overall opinion distribution on the issue shouldnot change because individuals are changing party affiliations instead. Thealternative hypothesis, HA, is then: The distribution of racial opinions is constantover time, indicating sorting of racial attitudes rather than polarization.

While statistical tests are possible for HA, and are included directly below, theeasiest way to demonstrate whether or not the distributions are the same is visually.Figure 5 contains the distributions of surveys 2 and 4the survey immediatelyprior to the 2008 election and the survey 2 years into Obamas term in officeonthe racial antagonism index.38 Here again, the visual patterns tell a clear story:between October 2008 and November 2010 opinions on racial attitudes polarized.The 2010 distribution (right panel) is noticeably flatter and more uniform than thatof 2008 (left panel), encouraging a rejection of HA.

The differences between the distributions can also be quantified through theKurtosis statistic, a measure of the shape of a distribution (the size of the tailsrelative to the center). A value of 0 indicates a perfectly normal distribution whileincreasingly negative scores indicate distributions approaching a flatter, moreuniform structure, eventually seguing into a perfect bimodal structure at a Kurtosisof 2.39 Comparing two distributions, if one is substantially lower on Kurtosisthan the other, the one with the lower score contains fewer observations in thecenter, with opinion spreading more evenly over the distribution than the higherscored one.

Not surprisingly, the Kurtosis measures for these two surveys support statisticallywhat Figure 5 shows graphicallyracial antagonism in November 2010 was morepolarized than in October 2008. The 2010 survey has a distribution Kurtosis of0.86, compared to a 0.38 for the October 2008 survey. Also not surprising, theleast polarized surveyimmediately following the November 2008 electionhasthe highest Kurtosis (the tightest distribution) at 0.25.

A final test of the alternative hypothesis comes from comparing the equality ofthe distributions through the nonparametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Whilethis test cannot speak to the actual shapes of the distributions, having already

37. Ibid.38. We choose to compare these two surveys because they demonstrate the strongest polarization

effects and thus the best opportunity for testing the alternative hypothesis of party sorting. Because the2012 survey demonstrates a second, if weaker, rally, the effects of polarization are likely to be temporarilymuted.

39. Brad S. Chissom, Interpretation of the Kurtosis Statistic, The American Statistician 24 (1970):1922.


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established the shape differences, above, we can use the KS test as a measure ofthe statistical likelihood of the distributions being the same. Given the nullhypothesis (HA) that the distributions are the same across the October 2008 andNovember 2010 surveys on the racial antagonism variable, the test rejects the nullat a p= 0.006 level. It does the same (at a 0.004 level) when comparing theNovember 2008 and November 2010 distributions. These tests strongly support theconclusions of the graphic and Kurtosis evidence above that the distribution ofracial attitudes changed from 2008 to 2010.

Overall these results firmly reject the alternative hypothesis that the polarizationin racial antagonism evident in these surveys is actually due to opinion sorting.Again, while proving polarization may not be directly possible, providing support-ing evidence for it while definitively ruling out the main alternative hypothesisproduces a persuasive story.

Conclusion

The data in this paper, taken from surveys of white voters in presidentialbattleground states, demonstrate strong support for the idea that one of the resultsof the election of Americas first black president was a strong rally effect. Voters

Figure 5Distributions of the Racial Antagonism Index in October 2008 and November 2010

Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys.


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became significantly less racially antagonistic immediately following the 2008election as they rallied, racially, around Obamas historic election. While this effectwas long gone by two years into the Obama presidency, it did provide at least abrief glimpse of the post-racial America some had hoped would result from theelection. In addition, also in support of a rally theory for racial attitudes,in-partisans responded the strongest to the rally effect.

The second key effect is that racial attitudes polarized over the course ofObamas campaign and first term in office, as predicted by both the rally theoryand presidential-popularity cycle theory. As with arguments for a presidentialpopularity cycle, in-partisans remained relatively positive on racial attitudes whileout-partisans become more negative over time. The result is a stark and significantpartisan polarization in racial antagonism. We also ruled out the possibility thatthese patterns were due to partisan sorting rather than actual opinion change.

There are serious implications from these findings for research into racialattitudes. Standard research treats racial attitudesspecifically resentmentas arelatively fixed sentiment that does not change on average. As a result, there is verylittle research into whether or not these attitudes actually shift over time inresponse to events or national debate. The focus is typically on the relationship ofthese attitudes to other variableseven variables that themselves change overtime, such as party affiliationbut not on the racial attitudes themselves. Theanalysis presented here makes a strong argument for the variability of theseattitudes, specifically in response to a major shift in national racial politics.

The findings also contribute to the burgeoning field of political polarization.Existing research on polarization in the mass public focuses largely on ideologicalpolarization, and reaches differing conclusions. Some argue that there is adisconnect between the striking polarization we see among elites in Washingtonand the bulk of similar, largely apolitical masses,40 while others claim that Americansare following what goes on in Washington and consequently also polarizing in thesame ways as elites.41 Putting aside the focus on ideological polarization, wedemonstrate that Americas first African-American president has produced adifferent kind of polarization: a striking partisan divide in racial attitudes.

Contributions to the literature notwithstanding, our analysis is clearly not thedefinitive word on the subject of racial rallying or polarization under Obama. Manyquestions remain. For example, as mentioned above, our data and results cannotaccount for additional factors that may have influenced racial attitudes, such aswhat roles the media or other elites have played. Research shows that the mediahas the power to prime racial attitudes, and Obamas race is a common, nearly

40. Fiorina and Abrams Political Polarization.41. Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American

Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).


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constant topic in news stories.42 Additionally, it is likely that elites, specificallymembers of Congress, played a role in changing racial attitudes by influencing theatmosphere in Washington. Beyond the specific role played by the Tea Party,43 theoverall rhetoric among Obamas opponents in Congress was racially charged andcontributed to the racial frame dominating politics in the first half of hispresidency.44 Further research into these mechanisms and others, and specificallythe role they may have played in polarizing racial attitudes, is vital to expandingour understanding of racial attitudes under the nations first black president.

Monika L. McDermott is Associate Professor of Political Science at FordhamUniversity where she studies voting behavior, political psychology, and publicopinion. Her work has been published in some of the professions top journals, suchas the American Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Politics, PoliticalResearch Quarterly, and Public Opinion Quarterly. McDermott is also a surveyresearch practitioner, having conducted political and election surveys at The LosAngeles Times Poll and the CBS News Election and Survey Unit. She is an ElectionNight consultant for CBS News and The New York Times.

Cornell Belcher is President and founder of brilliant corners Research & Strategies.He is a political strategist and pollster for progressive candidates and campaigns. Heserved on the polling team for both of Barack Obamas presidential campaigns, andhas worked as senior advisor to the Democratic National Committee, the DemocraticSenatorial Campaign Committee, and the Democratic Congressional CampaignCommittee. Belcher is also a political contributor to CNN.

42. Kimberly Gross, Johanna Harvey, and Claire Low, Racial Framing in Coverage of the 2008Presidential Election, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation, Toronto, Canada, 2009.

43. Barreto et al., The Tea Party in the Age of Obama.44. Matthew W. Hughey and Gregory S. Parks, The Wrongs of the Right: Language, Race, and the

Republican Party in the Age of Obama (New York: NYU Press, 2014).


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Table A1Survey Details

Field dates N

1 June 25July 1, 2008 7322 October 914, 2008 1,0733 November 611, 2008 5524 November 19December 7, 2010 4245 November 913, 2012 351

Table A2Question Wording and Modal Response for the Racial Antagonism Index Elements

Question statement Most frequentanswer

Reverse discrimination, where whites are put at adisadvantage in order to benefit minorities, is a growingproblem today.

Agree somewhat

Blacks and other minorities who cant get ahead in thiscountry are mostly responsible for their own condition.

Agree somewhat

Often people like me feel like we are losing out or beingdisadvantaged because of racial preferences like AffirmativeAction

Disagree strongly

Too often minorities use racism as an excuse for their ownfailures

Agree strongly

As the result of racial preferences, less qualified minoritiestoo often get hired and promoted

Agree somewhat

The government has gone too far in helping minorities to thedisadvantage of other groups

Disagreesomewhat

It is unfair for us to have to sacrifice and pay the price,through government funded programs, today fordiscrimination that happened decades ago.

Agree strongly

African Americans have just as many opportunities as whitepeople these days

Agree strongly

The government has done enough to eliminate racialdiscrimination

Agree somewhat

Appendix


Barack Obama and Americans Racial Attitudes: Rallying and PolarizationRallying and PolarizingMethodAnalysisRally Effects on Racial Attitudes

Figure 1Distribution of the Racial Antagonism IndexSource: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.Figure 2Racial Antagonism Levels from June 2008 to November 2012Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.Figure 3Racial Antagonism Levels by Party AffiliationSource: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys 20082012.**Significantly different from previous time period at p0.05 (two-tailed); *p0.010 (Polarization of Racial Attitudes

Figure 4Gallups Obama Presidential Approval Trend among Democrats and RepublicansSource: http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Approval-Center.aspx (accessed 9 September, 2013).Table 1 ConclusionFigure 5Distributions of the Racial Antagonism Index in October 2008 and November 2010Source: Brilliant corners Research and Strategies surveys.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Hollywood, CA.1Thomas Friedman, Finishing Our Work, New York Times, 05 November, 2008.2Eli Saslow, Hate Grou1Thomas Friedman, Finishing Our Work, New York Times, 05 November, 2008.2Eli Saslow, Hate Groups Newest Target, Washington Post, 22 June, 2008.3Howard Witt, Hate Incidents in U.S. Surge: Election Seen Table A1 Table A2 A1

Barack Obama and Americans’ Racial Attitudes: Rallying and Polarization

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