Bangladesh in 1980 Strains and Stresses -- Opposition in the Doldrums

8/3/2019 Bangladesh in 1980 Strains and Stresses -- Opposition in the Doldrums

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BANGLADESHIN 1980:STRAINS AND STRESSES-OPPOSITIONIN THE DOLDRUMSAzizul Haque

POLITICSN BANGLADESHN 1980 appeared to be full ofstrains and stresses-social, political, and international. The year endedwith a general sense of insecurity resulting from widespread lawlessness,social tensions, and political unrest.With the rise of the biggest-ever opposition bloc in the parliamentand the installation of a civilian government (in 1979), the three-year-old government of President Ziaur Rahman claims to have "managed tobring some order out of chaos." With vigorous canal digging programsand population control measures in hand, Dacca hopes, for the first timein the nation's history, to be in position to export food grains in thenear future. During 1980 Ziaur Rahman took some positive steps (alongwith his frequent visits to the remotest corners of the country) in ex-panding and strengthening his power base, and won the "allegiance" ofmany people in the countryside. It is to Ziaur Rahman's credit thatDacca, with an improved international image, has usually been skillfulin managing the superpowers. However, the floods, soaring prices,the dissatisfaction of the urban middle class and the small educatedelite (who saw their life-style whittled away by about 15%, nflation), therise of lawlessness, the abortive revolt in the army, political unrestemanating from strikes, outbursts of political violence, widespread dis-orders in jails, and armed action by "miscreants" in the ChittagongHill Tracts put Zia's system under heavy strains. Moreover, the tenseDacca-New Delhi relationship over the sharing of the waters of theGanges and the ownership of the newly raised islands in the Bay ofBengal complicated the situation for Zia and his politics.When the mantle of statecraft fell on Zia, he took advantage of apolitical vacuum to offer the country a stable political system. However,

188? 1981 by The Regents of the University of California0004-4687/81/020188+ 15$0.50


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BANGLADESH 189Zia's mechanism has perhaps backfired. The Bangladesh National Party(BNP) headed by Zia, a hegemonic party of parties hastily organizedaround Zia with all shades of opinion grouped together, runs the risk offalling apart the moment Zia goes out of power. This not only revealsthe organizational weakness of the party but also indicates the rise of a"personality cult" within the party which goes against the institution ofdemocracy Zia purports to support. Although the opposition itself isgreatly to blame, Zia's policies and strategies have had a crippling effecton the opposition. With a very low public image, and posing no viablealternative to Zia's administration, the opposition parties in Bangladesh,many rumored to be externally financed, stand in disarray, nibblinghere and there at the government. Overpoliticization seems to have ledto depoliticization in Bangladesh.The Law and OrderSituation:Social Strains and Unrest

As a result of high inflation, erosion of values, the expansion of thenumber of unemployed and landless, the law and order situation de-teriorated further in 1980. The year was full of robberies, highjackings,murders, abductions, rapes, homicides, suicides, and accidents. Therewere armed clashes, causing many deaths in educational institutions,jails, public meetings, and playgrounds. The already low public image(for alleged corruption) of the police declined further. Some members ofthe law enforcement agency were involved in rapes, murder, and rob-beries. The leakage of question papers of public examinations and theforgery of marksheets and educational certificates became rampant,forcing the government to issue an Examinations (Offences) Ordinancein September. The nightmarish days of the period prior to August 1975had reappeared.

Disorders in jails: Strikes and disorders in jails were important phe-nomena in the politics of Bangladesh in 1980. Overcrowded, filthy, andantiquated jails in Bangladesh drove large groups of inmates to strikesand protests, culminating in armed clashes in some cases.' The Rangpurjail was occupied by some 650 inmates for 12 days. At Rajshahi andMagura, the prisoners clashed with the jail police and wardens overcomplaints of unfair treatment, bad food, and poor sleeping conditions.At Mymensing, policemen charged prisoners in order to break up, thepolice claimed, a fight between two rival groups, resulting in 46 personsinjured. The Khulna jail was held by more than 900 inmates for 10days in October before more than 500 policemen regained control in anearly-morning assault. The indent killed 36 inmates and injured morethan 200 persons, including 125 policemen. A government press releaseclaimed that the police fired tear gas and rubber bullets only, and that1 In one and one half years there were 51 strikes in 21 jails. Ittefaq (Bengalidaily), July 23, 1980.


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190 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981they found, on regaining control, seven injured victims of a seriousclash among the inmates; the public was skeptical.

Unrest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: a tangled web of insurgency: A pat-tern of insurgency has developed in the jungles of the Chittagong HillTracts, causing the government great problems with the rebels fightingto "preserve their identity and autonomy." It is believed that about2000 guerillas in the Shanti Bahini insurgent force (founded in 1973)have collected about Tk. 60 million (US$4 million) from local tradersand villagers over three years to finance the movement.2 Moreover, it isalleged that since 1975 the Shanti Bahini has had close liaison with in-surgent forces in eastern India, that it had received arms from Indiaclandestinely, and that its cadres were trained by India's Border Se-curity Force (BSF) along with supporters of the Kaderia Bahini (led bythe pro-Mujib Kader Siddiqui, living in India).Although over the last few years there had been intermittent armedclashes between the insurgents and Bangladesh forces, the Shanti Bahinistepped up its operation in 1980. In March, 22 soldiers were killed inan ambush while an army offensive led to the destruction of a villageand several deaths later in the month. On April 22, 19 BDR men werekilled in an armed clash between BDR forces and insurgents, and onJune 12 rebels killed two persons, burned 34 houses and ransacked 14;in August they killed another 15 persons. In September, an armed at-tack by the rebels on seven Bengali settlers led to 17 deaths with 25 in-jured.3 The Bengali settlers, as a reaction, moved to contest the situ-ation. On March 28, 28 tribals were killed and more than 30 injuredwhen the settlers went on a rampage around Kaukhali, 31 miles north-east of Chittagong. As a result, the tribals fled in panic into the densejungles, leaving the entire area deserted.In addition to the Shanti Bahini, essentially composed of Chakmatribesmen, the largest among the more than 16 tribes and accounting forabout 40% of the total tribal population of 550,000, there are two otherarmed resistance groups-i.e., the Mukti Parishad, led by SudhartaTangchainga and based on the Tangchainga tribe, and the nontribalsplinter group of the Sarbohara Party (Marxist-Leninist) led by a fugi-tive army officer, Lt. Col. Ziauddin. The Shanti Bahini and the MuktiParishad, although engaged in bloody clashes with each other in thepast, have not concentrated on attacking the government forces.The problem in the Hill Tracts goes back to the early 1960s follow-ing the commissioning of the Kaptai hydroelectric project. The thenPakistan government adopted a rehabilitation program of $51 millionto resettle 100,000 tribals uprooted by the project. However, only about

2 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), May 2, 1980, p. 30.3Ittefaq, September 16, 1980.


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BANGLADESH 191$2.6 million were actually spent with only 2,700 tribal families so farresettled.4 Secondly, during a visit to the Hill Tracts in 1973, SheikhMujib's strong words against tribal autonomy and emphasis on Bengalinationalism and culture offended the tribals. After the coup in 1975, thesituation further deteriorated, as the Indians, then hostile to Dacca,reportedly decided to support and help the insurgents and pro-Mujibforceswho had fled into India. The harassed Dacca administration thendecided to allow Bengali settlement inside the tribal areas, apparentlyto "break the back" of the armed.rebellion there. The unhappy resultwas that the tribal people became more hostile to the government, andaccused it of trying to "eliminate" them from the area by settling "out-siders" on their ancestral land. Although the government claims thatnot many Bengali families took advantage of the opportunity, it alsoreplies that it would not be constitutionally possible to prevent anycitizen of Bangladesh from settling or buying land in any part of thecountry. However, to combat the situation in the Hill Tracts, the gov-ernment adopted a combination of tactics and strategies-peace negoti-ations, the resettlement of uprooted tribals, a development program forthe Hill Tracts, and a military operation (if necessary).

Abortive revolt in the army: There was an abortivecoup attempt onJune 17 when Zia was in London. An opposition member, Sirajul Islam,of the Awami League (Malek) [AL (Malek)] on June 20 disclosed theincident in parliament and alleged that four lieutenant colonels hadbeen taken into custody for the attempted coup while others were ab-sconding. Prime Minister Shah Aziz tried to play down the incident,but admitted that some leaflets repugnant to army discipline had beendistributed and as a result some people had been taken into custody forquestioning. A Muslim League member, Ibrahim Khalil, further re-ported that one of the top leaders of the attempted coup was a ColonelDidar who absconded, but the government denied this.5Zia'sAdministrative trategy

Since the 1979 parliamentary election Zia has seen the oppositiontrying to threaten his authority and system in a more organized way.Moreover, some of his followers in the BNP appeared to be restive,nagging at his leadership. Accordingly Zia directed his efforts towardskeeping the opposition off balance, disciplining the BNP, and expand-ing and strengthening his power base. In early January Zia caused the-unceremonious exit" of deputy premier Moudud Ahmed and state

4 FEER, May 23, 1980, p. 34.5According to a Bengali weekly, there have been 26 coup attempts to toppleZiaur Rahmaan. Khabar (Dacca), October 26, 1980.


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192 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981minister Nur Mohammad Khan in "the larger national and party in-terests."In late April Zia dropped five cabinet ministers, three state anddeputy ministers on "their request," appointed another group of eightstate and four deputy ministers. A day before this reshuffle Zia an-nounced the appointment of 20 MP's as District Development Coordi-nators with the rank and status of deputy ministers and the setting upof a 53-member Envoys Pool. The District Development Coordinatorswould assist in implementing different development schemes in the dis-tricts and would entertain and process public complaints. The membersof the Envoys Pool would undertake visits to foreign countries on as-signments related to foreign aid and allied matters concerning Bangla-desh.

GramSarkar:As part of Zia's village-oriented politics and decentral-ization program, 68,000 Gram Sarkarshad been organized by December.On April 16 Zia had announced that a Gram Sarkar would be formedin each village with effect from May, and on April 30 he inaugurated aGram Sarkar in Savar police station. Zia's government had originatedthis plan in 1976 when it announced the formation of a Gram Parishad,later renamed as "SwanirvarGram Sarkar" under an act of the parlia-ment (June 1980). A village Gram Sarkar,comprised of one Gram Prad-han and eleven members including two female members (all selected),would take care of local problems, maintain law and order, controlpopulation growth, and double food production through a self-relianteconomy. However, Zia's scheme of District Development Coordinators,an Envoys Pool, and Gram Sarkars came under scathing attack from theopposition and the liberal professionals. For some, the District Develop-ment Coordinators, who arouse uneasiness among civil servants, werea new version of the district governors under the BAKSAL program, theone party authoritarian system introduced in early 1975 by SheikhMujib.Critics are skeptical about the potential for success of the GramSarkar scheme. With no clear source of income for a Gram Sarkar andno clear-cut division of powers between a Gram Sarkar and a UnionParishad, the Gram Sarkarscheme is bound to face and invite problems,among them conflicts of power and position between two rival admin-istrative set-ups in rural Bangladesh. Moreover, it is alleged that mostof the Gram Sarkars have been formed by people of questionable char-acter. Hence, it is feared that corruption might be institutionalized, asin the Basic Democracy system under Ayub, if the Gram Sarkars areengaged in development through works programs. Again people arecritical that Zia aims at strengthening the BNP at the village level andexpounding Bangladeshi nationalism through these basic administra-tive institutions. However, Zia, in Ayub's style, is not likely to takemuch note of these criticisms.


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BANGLADESH 193Opposition-Nibbling at the Government

Political moves'6 As the year dawned, the opposition initiated a cam-paign to unseat Zia's government through the generation of social andpolitical unrest. In early February the opposition and independentmembers of the parliament went into a three-day "session" to work outthe means for restoring parliament's "sovereignty" and decided to boy-cott the parliamentary session beginning on February 9 until its 24-point demands were met. A 10-partyalliance7 was formed on February3 to observe an hartal (general shutdown of economic and other activ-ities) to protest the firing in Rajshahi jail. Zia's reaction to these devel-opments greatly defused the tense situation and threw the oppositionoff balance. Through a series of political offers and parleys, Zia got theML-IDL-Gonofront members of parliament to end the boycott on Feb-ruary 22, and another four independent MPs rejoined the session onApril 2.8 Zia's next move was to release nearly 1,000 prisoners, indudingMushtaq Ahmed, Major (Rtd.) A. Jalil, Gazi Golam Mostafa, SerajulAnam Khan, and A. S. M. Rob. This had a divisive effect on the oppo-sition's alliance and unity. Cracks appeared in the 10-partyalliance andthe meeting of the alliance at Baitul Mukarram on April 7 turned intoa battleground owing to protracted clashes among the supporters of thecomponent parties. The bomb explosion on May 23, which killed nineand injured 82, at the Democratic League's meeting in Dacca createdfurther misunderstandings among the major political parties-the AL(Malek), the BNP, and the Democratic League (DL). Headed by Jaliland Rab, the JSD's persistent policy of continuing in the 10-party al-liance resulted in a split of the party and the formation of a new party,the Bangladesh Samajtantric Dal on November 7. The release of formerRed Cross chief Gazi Golam Mostafa (originally imprisoned on chargesof corruption) led to feuds in the Dacca city AL (Malek) resulting in therise of two rival groups-the Mostafa-Moazzemgroup and the Hanifgroup.Zia's policies were able to keep his political adversaries disunitedand weakened, and there could be no real massive movement againsthim. Although he released some political prisoners, he imprisoned anumber of pro-Moscow communists, including Moni Singh and Moham-

6 The names and abbreviations for the parties mentioned in this article are:AL-Awami League; BNP-Bangladesh Nationalist Party; BSD-Bangladesh Samaj-tantric Dal; DL-Democratic League; GONOFRONT-a splinter 7-party allianceformed in December 1978; IDL-Islamic Democratic League; JAGMUI-Jatiya Gano-mukti Union; JSD-Jatiya Samajtantric Dal; KSP-Krishak Sramik Party; ML-Muslim League; NAP-National Awami Party; and UPP-United People's Party.7 The 10-party alliance included the AL (Malek), AL (Mizan), NAP (Harun),NAP (Muzaffar), Jatiya Ekata Party, JSD, Gono Azadi League, Krishak SramakSamajbadi Dal, Gonotantric Andolan, and CPB.8 Ittefaq, April 1 and 5, 1980. The remaining members, however, joined thebudget session which began on May 22.


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194 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981mad Farhad, whisked Col. (Rtd.) Faruq (the man behind the 1975 coup)out of the country, and forced former Air Chief M. A. G. Toab to leavethe country when he suddenly arrived in Dacca by air on July 1.The opposition parties tried to work together, and were successfulto some extent. But on the issue of an alliance they could not come to-gether. There were a number off alliances-10-party, 5-party, 9-partyalliances-so the opposition's call for hartal on February 9 and October22, and the Awami League's (Malek) independent call for hartal onJune 7 and November 3 did not disturb Zia very much. The AL's callfor an hartal on November 3 was denounced by some other oppositionparties as part of a "Baksalite conspiracy."9 Again, owing to differ-ences of opinion among the components of the 10-party alliance, theproposed meeting and the procession in November 28 had to be can-celled. In spite of repeated meetings the JSD and the AL (Malek) in thealliance failed to evolve a common position on Sheikh Mujib's rule andpolitics-one of the basic points of difference between them.Because of a low public image and bitter experience in regard topolitics and parties, people in general in Bangladesh today seem to beless enthusiastic about them. A product of frustration and disgust, thislack of enthusiasm and concern led to a limited response to the opposi-tion's call for hartals. So the opposition failed to dislodge Zia. For ex-ample, only two days after the Khulna jail incident, Zia addressed threewell-attended meetings in Khulna town where the top opposition lead-ers were still staying. Again Ziaur Rahman took the opposition by sur-prise with a novel move: The government put the buses damaged in thehartal on public display and promised compensation for those adverselyaffected by hartals.10By a masterstroke Zia took some wind out of theopposition's sails.

Unable to challenge the government with cohesive, alternative poli-cies, the opposition in 1980 was reduced to "magnifying marginalissues." Attempts to pool strength in the parliament failed, and faction-al strifes hindered a "drive" for mass support.Deeply mistrustful of each other and sharply divided over policies,the opposition groups failed to present a "cohesive" economic policy.Although at times the groups entered alliances on specific issues, realunity on a well-conceived program could not be achieved owing to ide-ological disputes, conflicts, crisis of leadership, clash of personality, anda spirit of accommodation to the party-in-power for selfish ends. As aresult the political movements reached no goal. Hence the oppositiongroups were reduced to harping on certain historical aspects of thecountry's liberation struggle.The main weakness of the premier opposition alliance (10-party

9 Bichitra, December 26, 1980, p. 39.1OOn November 9, 71 BRTC buses were damaged and the financial loss in-curred was Tk. 1.7 million; on October 28, a loss of Tk. .6 million was incurred inthe damage of 10 BRTC buses; and on November 3, 47 BRTC buses were damagedat a loss of Tk. .6 million.


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BANGLADESH 195alliance) was the AL's (Malek) insistence on its own program. For ex-ample, the other components refused to accept the League's demands forjudicial inquiries into the murders of Mujib and four AL leaders in1975. The alliance was, however, agreed on carrying on the movementagainst the observance of March 26 as "national" day rather than "in-dependence" day. The opposition saw the change in name as a deliber-ate attempt by a section within the government to belittle the liberationstruggle. In addition, the government's decision to call nationals Bang-ladeshis instead of Bengalis and to substitute Bangladeshi nationalismfor Bengali nationalism, and Zia's placing a number of people who hadopposed the liberation war into top positions, came under severe at-tack from the opposition. All this indicated that the opposition, amparently incapable of presenting a cohesive economic program, was re-duced to "magnifying" vastly the minor issues, "nibbling" at the gov-ernment here and there.

Political split and merger:The year 1980 witnessed increased factional-ism. Democrats, socialists, Islamists, communists-all stood divided andsubdivided resulting in the formation of new parties and splits in someolder ones. There was also the mad rush to join the Democratic League,particularly after Mushtaq's release from prison, and the BNP.Despite strikes and jail disorders throughout the year, Ziaur Rah-man, helped by a bumper crop and the weakness of the opposition, sur-vived the political movements and unrest. His successand his power indistributing benefits and privileges attracted a large number of politicalelements, including students, into the BNP fold. In May, a faction of theJatiya Janata Party led by Ferdous Ahmed Qureshi merged with theBNP, and Qureshi later on became the joint secretary general of theBNP. The former cultural secretary of the JSD, Harunor Rashid, andthe DL's Mohammadullah (former president of Bangladesh) followedsuit. The former general secretary of the UPP, A. Mannan Bhuiyan,and his supporters joined the BNP in November; Professor Yousuf Ali(general secretary of the AL-Mizan) and Sohrab Hossain (a former min-ister) along with four other MPs joined in December.The Muslim League (ML), the UPP, and the JSD experienced seri-ous rifts and splits during the year. The rift in the ML started as theparty chief Khan A. Sabur nominated Kazi A. Kader as the party'sgeneral secretary. This rift, further widened by separate council meet-ings of the rival groups, finally led to the rise of a second ML (Siddiqui)in June, which was reflected in the Jubo Muslim League and the parlia-ment's ML group. A former minister, T. Ali, formed yet another MLin April. In two years the UPP split four times. In 1978 Rashed KhanMenon and Amal Sen left the UPP when it entered the JatiyatabadiFront. In late 1978 Capt. (Ret.) A. Halim Choudhury and Lt. Col.(Rtd.) Akbar Hossain joined the BNP. In 1979 the rift between KaziZafar (the party chief) and A. Mannan Bhuiyan (the general secretaryofthe party) led to the expulsion of the latter from the party, who then


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196 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981joined the BNP in November 1;980.Another faction of the UPP alignedwith other leftist elements to form the Ganotantric Party in December.

The AL (Malek) experienced serious jolts during the year. M. R.Siddiqui, a rightist minister in the Mujib government, was expelledfrom the party for having signed, when he was ambassadorto Washing-ton, the Dacca-Washington agreement on the U.S. Peace Corps. Thebelief that the dissociation of the right-wing Mizan group from the ALwould discipline the party was belied. The joining by a splinter NAP(M) group-headed by pro-Moscow Motia and Dabiruddin in December1979, and the release of Gazi Golam Mostafa from jail in March 1980intensified the in-group fighting. On his release, Gazi Golam Mostafa(former president of the Dacca city Awami League) aspired to wrestleadership from the existing president A. Hanif; the Dacca generalsecretary, Dr. Moazzem Hossain, supported Gazi Golam Mostafa, andserious conflict ensued. Because of bitter schismswithin the AL (Malek)at the top level the council session of the central Awami League (lastheld in 1978) had to be postponed twice (March-April and November)in order to avert an open split. The council session now scheduled tobe held on February 14, 1981 may be stormy. Although the presentleadership of the AL (Malek) has been maintaining and openly propa-gating the one-party authoritarian BAKSAL line in general, there havebeen some subtle differenceson the question among the leadership. TheRazzak-Mohiuddin-Matiagroup, following a pro-Soviet line, is believedto be more ardent on the BAKSAL program, while the Tofail-JohraTajuddin group, allegedly lukewarm about the BAKSAL program, re-portedly favors a nonaligned foreign policy and the introduction of asystem of "collective leadership" in the party.Another major event in the politics of Bangladesh in 1980 was thebreak-up of the JSD, and the rise of a new political party, the Bangla-desh Samajtantric Dal (BSD), in early November. A series of statements,counter-statements, expulsions, counter-expulsions, resignations, anddissociations between September 14 and September 24 brought abouta complete split in the JSD (the second biggest opposition party), re-sulting in the rise of the BSD on November 7.11 Moreover, some 512students of the Chatra League (Munir-Hasib), the student front of theJSD, joined the BNP's student front on September 18.Along with the factional character of Bengali politics there werealso moves in 1980, particularly initiated by the leftists, for politicalunity. Two groups of the Bhasani NAP led by Nasser and Satter werereunited in April. A new communist party, the Workers' Party (led byHyder Akbar Khan Rono), was organized in June. And after a two-day national democratic convention in December another party knownas the Gonotantric Party was born out of the NAP (Nuru-Zahid),Gono-front (founded in 1978), the factions of the JAGMUI and the UPP. Theparty headed by Nurul Huda Mirza believes in "collective leadership"11On the break-up of the J.SD, see Bichitra, October 30, 1980, pp. 18-35.


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BANGLADESH 197and aims at defending national sovereignty, resisting the Baksalites andthe "authoritarian rule" of Zia, and removing obstacles to building upa self-reliant economy. In order to realize its national democratic pro-gram it would work both inside and outside the parliament.During the year two underground parties-the pro-Beijing PurbaBangla Communist Party (M-L) and the Communist Party of Bangla-desh (M-L)-were reportedly merged to form the Communist League ofBangladesh. There were also moves to bring in two other undergroundorganizations-the Revolutionary Communist Party (M-L) and the Sa-myabadi Dal (M-L) within its fold. A section of the RevolutionaryCommunist Party (M-L) led by Abdul Huq was reportedly opposed tothe unity move, for he was said to be following a pro-Albanian line andhad recently become anti-Beijing.Economic Situation

Although adversely affected by strikes, political unrest, and floods,the overall economy of Bangladesh during 1979-1980 showed some im-provement, with GDP estimated to have grown by 4.82%7os against4.35% during 1978-1979.12 Agricultural output, targeted at 6.9%, roseby only 1.69%. Industrial output rose by 4.5% compared to the pre-ceding year's 4.47%. The power and gas sector and construction sectorachieved growth rates of 11.41%0and 9.09%, respectively. Total foodimports during fiscal 1979-1980 amounted to 2.78 million tons asagainst 1.15 million tons in 1978-1979. During fiscal 1980-1981 the esti-mated total output of food grains will be 13.6 million tons against thedomestic requirement of 14.7 million tons. The import target for fiscal1979-1980, originally fixed at Tk. 18.5 billion (15 Tk. to the U.S. dol-lar) was later raised to Tk. 20.58 billion; for 1978-1979, these figureswere, respectively, Tk. 15 billion and Tk. 14.15 billion. The export andimport targets for fiscal 1980-1981 have been fixed at Tk. 26 billion andTk. 15 billion, respectively.Money supply increased by not more than 16% during 1979-1980,down from a 24% increase in 1978-1979, and thus the rate of monetaryexpansion slowed during the year. The cost of living index for theDacca middle class moved up from 522.85 at the end of June 1979 to587.40 by June 1980, an increase of 12.35% over the year as comparedwith the rise of 14.34%o n the preceding year. In 1980 the price ofpetroleum rose by 45-23%, charges for electricity by 57%, bus fare by40% (twice), domestic air fare by 33%, and the rickshaw fare by 35%.The price rise was attributable to forces working both at home andabroad. The international prices of a large number of important com-modities like cement, pig iron, fertilizer, petroleum, sugar, and tin in-creased significantly during the year and had a substantially adverse im-

12 See Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 1979-1980, Bangladesh Observer, De-cember 28, 1980.


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198 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981pact on the price situation in the country; the imbalance between de-mand and supply was evidenced by the 16% growth in money supply asagainst a growth of 4.82% in GDP during 1979-1980.13On the external front the experience during 1979-1980 was insharp contrast to that of the preceding year. The overall balance ofpayments recorded a deficit of Tk. 1.88 billion during 1979-1980; dur-ing 1978-1979 there was a surplus of Tk. 9.9 billion. Reflecting the pay-ment strains, the convertible foreign exchange reserves declined fromTk. 5.92 billion at the end of June 1979 to Tk. 4.03 billion at the endof June 1980. However, remittances from Bengalis working abroad in-creased significantly during the year, amounting to over Tk. 5.73 billionbetween January 1979 and January 1980.Dacca launched its Second Five-YearPlan on July 1, which aimedat significantly reducing the "level of poverty"'4 in the country andachieving an overall 7.2% annual growth rate, including a 7%,increasein food grain production and 8.6% in manufacturing. This compareswith the annual growth in GDP of 4.3% over the past seven years, wellshort of the 5.5% target for the First Five-YearPlan and 5.6% for thetwo-year interim plan. The plan aims at increasing rice productionfrom 13.5 million tons to 20 million tons, bringing an additional 10.2million acres of land under irrigation, raising jute production from5.4 million bales to 6.5 million bales by 1985, and generating 710,000new jobs, 606,000 in the private sector.Of the total development outlay of $16.5 billion, nearly $9 billionwould flow from external assistance and about $7.6 billion would bemet by domestic resources to be realized through about $4.2 billion inbudget revenue surplus and $3.4 billion from private savings and loansfrom the banking sector.15The private sector was allocated 22% of theplan outlay compared with 11% in the First Five-Year Plan (1973-1978) and 16% in the interim plan (1978-1980).The size of the ADP (capital spending) in- the 1980-1981 budgetwas placed at about $1.74 billion and current spending at about $910million. Against this, revenues were expected to be $1.4 billion, leavinga shortfall of about $1.25 billion to be raised from foreign sources. Theoverall economic growth target for fiscal 1980-1981 was set at 7.6%while GDP was expected to grow at 6.1%, agriculture at 7.2%, industryat 9%, construction at 14%, and per capita income at 3.2%; comparablefigures for fiscal 1979-1980 were: agriculture 4.2%, manufacturing9.3%, and construction 18%.16Foreign assistance to finance development was reduced to 67% infiscal 1980-1981 compared with about 80%7ouring the first five-year

13 Ibid.14 Nearly 85% live below the poverty line, more than 60% are undernourished,35% of the labor force of 28 million are unemployed, and over 50% are landless orown less than one acre.15 FEER, July 4, 1980, p. 97.16 bid., June 20, 1980, p. 40.


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BANGLADESH 199plan and the interim plan. Of the total $1.7 billion in developmentspending in 1980-1981, about $583 million would be made availablefrom domestic sources.

Foreign aid: According to the annual report of the Bangladesh Bank,the total outstanding foreign debt as of July 1, 1980 was $4.75 billion,which included an undisbursed amount of $1.74 billion. The total aidcommitment since independence till June 30, 1980 amounted to $9.15billion of which $4.22 billion were grants. During fiscal'1979-1980 aidcommitments amounted to $1.14 billion, 38.62% lower than the $1.86billion in fiscal 1978-1979. However, the estimated foreign aid disburse-ment at $1.28 billion during 1979-1980 recorded an increase of 26.82%from the level of $1.01 billion in 1978-1979. Disbursement of commod-ity aid stood at $422 million as against $459 million in 1978-1979. Dur-ing the year disbursement of project aid increased by 36.80% to $487million, and a more than 100% increase brought food aid disbursementsto $377 million as compared to $187 million in the previous year.Zia'sgovernment received a blow as the aid consortium for Bangla-desh pledged only $1.3 billion instead of the $2.5 billion sought by Ziafor fiscal 1980-1981. However, Dacca expected about $200 million fromaid consortium members individually and about $500 million fromMuslim countries and East European countries, making a total of $2billion. The World Bank's record in Bangladesh was quite satisfactory;during fiscal 1979 it exceeded its target by $30 million and ended uppaying $271 million. During fiscal 1980, it was expected to exceed itstarget by about $40 million to $265 million,' which would include $75million in commodity and $25 million in fertilizer assistance.ExternalRelations

The boost Dacca received through its election to the UN SecurityCouncil was further exploited during 1980. In its "little way," Bangla-desh tried to play a "big role" both in and outside the Security Council,but many critics felt this placed too heavy a burden on its size andeconomy. Its proposal in early 1980 for a six-nation Regional SummitConference (of South Asia countries) was well received. It was electeda member of the UN Economic and Social Council in October, and itsforeign minister, Shamsul Huq, disclosed in October that Dacca wouldlike to contest for the presidency of the UN General Assembly in 1981.In 1980, as in 1979, the principal diplomatic endeavors were un-dertaken by the president himself. Ziaur Rahman visited New' Delhi inJanuary and September and addressed the UNIDO conference and theRegional Commonwealth Conference. He visited Manila and Belgradein May, Britain in June, China and Japan in July, Paris in August,Morocco and Guinea in November. In August he addressed the UNGeneral Assembly. During the year a number of foreign dignitariesvisited Bangladesh-most notably the King of Nepal (March), the World


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200 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981Bank president (April), the Amir of Kuwait (September), President SekuToure of Guinea (October), and Burmese president Ne Win (Novem-ber).Dacca tried to cultivate good relations with its neighbors and wassuccessful except in respect to India. The Dacca-Rangoon relationship,which had become bitter during 1977-1978, improved; a Bangladesh-Burma Boundary Marking agreement was signed in August and aDacca-Rangoon cooperation agreement in December. The BurmeseHome Minister Shin Liu Yin told a newsman in Dacca in December:"In fact we have no problem now to talk about."17Dacca-Beijing friend-ship intensified as Bengali journalists visited China, Chinese swim-mers came to Bangladesh, Dacca and Beijing signed a five-yeareconomicagreement in March, and a scientific and technical cooperation agree-ment in May. As a part of its policy to develop ties with the Muslimworld, Dacca improved relations with Islamabad. During his visit toDacca in October, the Pakistan foreign secretary, Riaz Piracha, statedthat there was no problem between Bangladesh and Pakistan. It washoped that in the near future the two would agree to the repatriationof nearly half a million Pakistanis trapped in Bangladesh since 1972.In addition to keeping cordial relations with the communist blocand the ASEAN countries, Dacca maintained good relations with theWest, the main source of foreign aid. Britain provided $93 million inboth fiscal 1979 and fiscal 1980 and pledged to provide the same amountfor the next fiscal year; the U.S. pledged to provide $1.3 million asgrants and $18 million as loans for rural electrification programs, and$18 million as grants and $32 million as loans for development of a ferti-lizer project. Since liberation the total U.S. aid commitment to Bangla-desh has amounted to $1636.5 million.During 1980 Dacca's relationship with Moscow and New Delhi was"cool" and at times rather "bitter." During Mujib's rule, the Dacca-Moscow relationship reached its peak. The Russians served as advisersfor the Bangladesh army, and were engaged in salvaging sunken shipsin the Bay of Bengal. However, with Mujib's exit, that "sweet" rela-tionship turned "sour." Moscow was unhappy with Dacca because itdemanded the removal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, labelledthe Soviet action in Afghanistan as an "invasion" of a weaker nationby a stronger one, and allegedly hobnobbed with Beijing, Moscow'snumber one enemy. Moscow was displeased when Zia's administrationdid nothing to control the condemnation by Dacca's press of the Sovietaction in Afghanistan,18and when Zia sent the pro-Moscow communiststo jail for having threatened to stage an "Afghan-style revolution inBangladesh." The Dacca-Moscow relationship became seriously strainedwhen Information Minister Habibullah Khan openly charged the Rus-

17Ittejaq, December 26, 1980.18 Ibid., December 8, 1980.


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202 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XXI, No. 2, February 1981country. Bangladesh abounds in population and parties, but the latterare ineffective. Politics in Bangladesh, as in Pakistan, essentially recoilsin the vacuum.

Bangladesh in 1980 Strains and Stresses -- Opposition in the Doldrums

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Transcript of Bangladesh in 1980 Strains and Stresses -- Opposition in the Doldrums