BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004

DER Briefing, 19 Sep 04

BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004

Situation Overview

A Rolling Emergency

• Main wave of monsoon flooding, started 8 July early, destroying some of the Aus rice crop

• Followed earlier floods in Haor Areas in April that destroyed 80% of Boro rice crop

• Jamuna (Brahmaputra Basin in spate at same time as Surma/Meghna Rivers

• Highest floods for many years (since 98 & 88) – overtopping many embankments, etc.

• Long duration (3 weeks) & rising more than once• Slow recession across country, especially in the

centre, where standing water then STAGNATED…


Losses (Govt figures, 16 Aug 04)

Affected Districts 39 Affected families 7,466,944

Affected Upazila 265 Affected pop. 36,329,939

Affected Unions 2,492 Reported deaths 741

Affected area (km2) 34,583 Livestock deaths 15,121

Shelters Opened 5,382 People sheltered 1,707,925


Crop damage (full) 1,728,129 Crop damage (partial)

1,038,169

Houses destroyed 891,921 Houses damaged 3,388,882

Roads destroyed (km)

14,221 Roads damaged (km)

45,528

Schools/religious instit. destroyed

1,259 Schools/religious instit. damaged

24,236

Embankments damaged (km)

3,158 Bridges/culverts

damaged

5,461

Losses (Govt figures, 16 Aug 04)


CURRENT RIVER FLOOD SITUATION

CURRENT RIVER FLOOD SITUATION


5 DAY FORECAST5 DAY FORECAST

Current rainfall: in some areas 200-300% above normal

Current rainfall: in some areas 200-300% above normal


Worst Case Flood Scenario:

Brahmaputra / Jamuna & Ganges / Padma in spate at same time, bringing Meghna Basin into flood.


Assessments Conducted

• A number of individual agency assessments, but focussing on that agencies’ specific geographical or sectoral areas and information needs

• DER Sub-group Quick Assessment, 23-27 Jul 04– 31 districts in 6 geographical zones – to district level– Convened key agencies in each district and had them

consolidate their info to achieve consensus on impact– Use of short (4 page) RENA format for reporting

• Centre for Policy Dialogue assessment, Aug 04• DER Post-Flood Needs Assessment, 5-14 Sep 04 • Others ?


VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS MAPPING


Vulnerability Analysis (1)

• Percentage of upazila flooded > 0.5 metre on 3 dates (19th July, 24th July & 3rd August):– If 60-100% of area flooded = Extremely Severe– If 30-60% of area flooded = Very Severe– If 15-30% of area flooded = Severe– If <15% of area flooded = Moderately Severe



• Existing Poverty Incidence – based on the percentage of the population in severe poverty (i.e. living on <1800 Kcal /day):– If 37-55% = Extremely Poor Upazila– If 31-37% = Very Poor Upazila– If 25-31% = Poor Upazila– If 0-25% = Moderately Poor Upazila


Combine the two data-sets…

Flooding Poverty Priority

XS or VS XP or VP 1

XS or VS P 2

S or MS XP or VP

S or MS P 3

XS, VS, S or MS MP

Percentage of Poor in Flooded Areas

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00

% of Poor

% o

f A

rea f

loo

ded

th

rou

gh

11 d

ays

Note: Flood extent & duration is based on the forcasted w ater level b y FFWC on 19, 24 & 29 July



• 72 of affected upazila in Priority ONE (High Need)

• 65 of affected upazila in Priority TWO (Moderate Need)

• 175 of affected upazila in Priority THREE (Lower Need)

DER Post-Flood Needs Assessment, 5-14 Sep 04

• Objectives:(1) Identify the short, medium and longer term NEEDS of the poor(2) Obtain detailed information on the NEEDS in each sector(3) Report accurate, independently verified information

• 27 districts in 8 zones – down to upazila level• 8 field teams with 80 members from 16 agencies• Investigating needs in 3-6 affected upazila per district,

through focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and document review

• To submit comprehensive (14 page) reports on each district and affected upazila, by sector

• Still ongoing – aiming for final report on 22 Sep 05

About the Assessment• Weaknesses:

(1) Timeframe for such an in-depth assessment was inadequate(2) Where all the right questions asked for by each Sector Group ?(3) Questionnaire should have been “field-tested” beforehand:

– Some questions too non-specific, others repetitive– Repetitive questions made the interviews & FGDs too long

Others ?

• Strengths:(1) Coverage of the country and affected areas – WIDE(2) Investigation down to upazila and community level – DEEP(3) Coverage of sectors – COMPREHENSIVE(4) Independent multi-agency approach / scope for team initiativeOthers ?

Impact (1)• Findings of the DER Quick Assessment are valid• In health, nutrition and wat/san sectors it is hard to

distinguish acute from chronic needs (the indictors are already so low & the services so poor), e.g.– 20-25% are chronically food insecure malnourished, yet

there is no proper national programme– <40% of Bangladeshis have any form of sanitary latrine– Arsenic contamination vs. unsafe surface water sources – Preventable illnesses & health problems abound– Health centres are under-staffed, funded, & equipped

• Diarrhoea, dysentery, ARI & skin/eye infections increased (x 6) post-flood, but seem under control

Impact (2)• The economic impact of the flood is severe – on

SME and on rural & urban livelihoods • In the absence of agricultural work & day-labour

opportunities, unemployment is very high• The poor have got poorer & further into debt (@ 120

% interest pa !)• Loss of crops, livestock feed & fisheries was high• Seeds are available but not always affordable• There is widespread infrastructure damage – mainly

to roads, bridges, culverts & embankments• River erosion is a severe & continuous problem

Preliminary Conclusions (1)• Govt response was fair, under the circumstances• Shelters, ambulances & rescue boats are lacking• The relief effort so far, has been provided very widely but

not deeply – the poorest affected families need more & for much longer

• Farmers faced a serious seed shortage – the Govt is addressing this quickly & effectively

• Even so, impact on agriculture will last >1 year• Most areas will need food aid until the aman rice harvest

(Dec 04), some until the boro (May 05)• Infrastructure/school damage could be addressed

through FFW & CFW, to provide employment

Preliminary Conclusions (2)•People are not hopeless – they survived the floods & are helping themselves, but they lack options•The poorest are living on relief; they need help not to slip further into poverty employment and credit at reasonable rates support to cottage industries / small farmers subsidised education / exemption from exam fees•Assistance is needed (but yet to be provided) to help poor families repair/rebuild their homes raised concrete plinths will reduce vulnerability•Assistance is needed for restocking, reconstruction & repair of public infrastructure (health centres, schools-cum-shelters) & to be more flood resilient

The Future• Bangladesh is still not equipped to deal with such major

floods which are a regular occurrence• Govt immediate response capacity is lacking

– No rescue boats– Too few suitable flood shelters– No emergency funding for quick response

• Mitigation of future floods and river erosion– Use of vegetation to protect earth embankments– Properly engineered / surfaced river embankments– Creation of new canals & culverts (must be kept clear)– Regular dredging of the rivers– Integrated management of the great South Asia rivers


“We know what to do; but we are just not doing it.”

A District

Deputy Commissioner –

Bangladesh

BANGLADESH FLOODS – 2004

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