www.freedomonthenet.org

FREEDOM ON THE NET2016

Key Developments: June 2015 – May 2016

● MessagingappTelegramwasblockedforseveraldaysinFebruaryinanefforttocontainprotestsmarkingthefifthanniversaryofBahrain’s“DayofRage”(seeRestrictions on Connectivity).

● 2Connect,asmallmobileandinternetserviceprovider,haditslicensedrevokedbytheregulatorforfailingtoprovidesecurityagencieswithatooltoaccessusers’data(seeRegulatory Bodies).

● CanadiancompanyNetsweeperwonaBahrainigovernmenttendertoimplementana-tionwidefilteringsysteminamovethatwillboostthesophisticationofinternetcensor-ship(seeBlocking and Filtering).

● FiveusersweresentencedonetofiveyearsinprisonfortweetsthatwerecriticalofSaudiArabia,includingoutrageovertheSaudi-ledairstrikecampaigninYemen,thedeathofhundredsofpilgrimsatthe2015hajj,andtheexecutionofprominentShiiteclericNimral-Nimr.NumerousotherswereprosecutedforinsultingBahrainipublicofficials(seeProsecutions and Detentions for Online Activities).

Bahrain2015 2016

Internet Freedom Status Not Free

Not Free

ObstaclestoAccess(0-25) 11 10

LimitsonContent(0-35) 27 27

ViolationsofUserRights(0-40) 34 34

TOTAL* (0-100) 72 71

*0=mostfree,100=leastfree

Population: 1.38 million

Internet Penetration 2015 (ITU): 93 percent

Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: Yes

Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes

Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes

Press Freedom 2016 Status: Not Free

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

Introduction

Bahrainiinternetfreedomimprovedslightlyin2015-16duetogreaterinternetaccess,althoughthecountryremains“NotFree”amidtightcensorshipandaplethoraofprosecutionsforcriticizingparliamentarians.

InternetaccessrapidlyexpandedinBahrain,currentlyoneofthemostconnectedcountriesintheworld.ThisyearwasmarkedbyanumberofsignificantdecisionsbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA).TheTRAbenttopopularpressureandorderedmobileproviderstoreverserestrictionsonVoice-over-IP(VoIP)inOctober2015.However,providersseemlikelytoaltertheirserviceagreementsinthefuture,makingcustomerspayasurchargeforVoIPcallsinabidtoincreaserevenue.Althoughthemajorinternetserviceproviders(ISPs)tendtocomplywithrequestsfromsecurityagencies,theTRArevokedalicensefromasmallISPforfailingtoprovidesufficientmonitoringcapabilities.TheTRAalsoimplementedgreaterrestrictionsonthepurchaseofSIMcardsinthenameofcounterterrorism,limitingtheabilityofBahrainistouseICTsanonymously.

Meanwhile,thegovernmentmovedforwardwithplanstoimplementanationwidefilteringsolu-tion.AtenderwaswonbyNetsweeper;theCanadiancompanywasreportedlytheonlyonetosubmitabid.Themovewilllikelyboosttheauthorities’abilitytomonitorandcensorbannedcontent,whichincludescontroversialviewsonthemonarchy,religion,andforeignaffairs.Iron-ically,thegovernmentministerinchargeoftheInformationAffairsAuthority(IAA),whichisre-sponsibleformonitoringonlinecontent,wasdismissedfromhispostoveraphotohesharedonWhatsApp.

TensionsbetweentherulingSunnimonarchyandmajorityShiitecitizenryspilloverintotheon-linedomain,particularlysurroundingtheregime’sclosetiestoSaudiArabia.ThreeusersweresentencedtofiveyearsinprisonforthecrimeofspreadingfalsenewsduringwartimeintweetsrelatedtotheSaudi-ledbombingcampaigninYemen,towhichBahrainhascontributed.Oth-erusershavebeenimprisonedfor“insultingabrotherlynation”duetocriticismoftheSaudis’poorcrowdmanagementatthe2015hajjthatledtothedeathofhundreds—somesaythou-sands—ofpilgrims,oroutrageovertheSaudis’executionofprominentShiiteclericNimral-Nimr.Nonetheless,manyBahrainiscontinuetolooktotheinternetasanoutletforexpressingpolitical,economic,andsocialfrustrationsinthecountry.Amidwidespreadcriticismofpoliticians,someparliamentarianshaveeventhreatenedtostopworkingunlessauthoritiestakestricteractionagainstpublicsectoremployeessaidtohaveinsultedthemormembersoftheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC).1

Obstacles to Access

From a technological perspective, Bahrain is one of the most highly connected countries in the world. Competitive broadband prices have led to high levels of mobile internet penetration. Moreover, Bah-rain’s telecommunications regulator pushed back against an attempt by mobile providers to restrict VoIP, although payment for the use of VoIP may still follow in the future. 2Connect, one of Bahrain’s

1 “MPstothegovernment:eitherstrictproceduresagainststaffelectronicabusesorstartnon-cooperation,”[inArabic]al-Watan News,April23,2016,http://www.alwatannews.net/NewsViewer.aspx?ID=120683

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

smaller ISPs, had its license revoked for failing to provide security agencies with a means of monitoring its network.

Availability and Ease of Access

In2015,BahrainrankedfirstintheArabregionintheInternationalTelecommunicationUnion’s(ITU)InformationandCommunicationsTechnologyDevelopmentIndex(IDI)andoneofthetencountriesthathaveseenthemostdynamicimprovementsinIDIrankingoverthepastfiveyears.2Internetaccessiswidelyavailableinschools,universities,shoppingmalls,andcoffeeshops,whereBahrainisoftengatherforworkandstudy.Languageisnotanissue,withadultliteracyatnearly95percent.BahrainisalsopossessahighlevelofEnglishlanguageproficiency,andmanyICTapplicationsareavailableinArabic.3Thegovernmentprovidesfreecomputertrainingprograms,whichhaveserved15,000citizensasofNovember2015.4Thenumberofinternetusershasrisenrapidly,fromapene-trationrateof55percentin2010to93percentin2015.5Bahrainalsohasoneofthehighestmobilephonepenetrationratesintheregionat188percentasofthefirstquarterof2016,representingover2.6millionsubscribers.6

Asofthefirstquarterof2016therewereapproximately2millionbroadbandsubscriptionsinthecountry,ofwhich89percentweremobilebroadband.7Dial-upconnectionsdisappearedin2010,andADSLusehasdeclinedwiththegrowthofmobilebroadband.4GLTEhasbeenavailablesinceSep-tember2013.Pricesformobilebroadbandareamongthelowestintheregion,8whereasubscriptionfor10GBofdataona4GLTEnetworkisavailableforUSD21monthly.9Bahrain’sfixed-broadbandpricesof2percentofaveragemonthlyincomepercapitaarewellbelowtheinternationalafford-abilitytargetof5percent.10Speedshavealsoincreased,astheportionofsubscriberswithspeedsof10Mbit/sorabovegrewfrom2013to2014,accordingtoa2016reportbyBahrain’sregulator.11

Restrictions on Connectivity

AlthoughthereisnocentralizedinternetbackboneinBahrain,allISPsareindirectlycontrolledbythegovernmentthroughordersfromtheTelecommunicationsRegulationAuthority(TRA).Thistightcontroloverthecountry’sICTsectorhasallowedtheBahrainiauthoritiestoimposerestrictionsonconnectivity.Forexample,inyearspasttheauthoritieshaveoccasionallythrottledinternetspeedsaroundcertainevents,suchastheanniversaryoftheFebruary14protests.Whilenoincidentswereseenduringthecoverageperiod,therewereindicationstheauthoritiesimposedaninternetcurfew

2 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),ITU releases annual global ICT data and ICT Development Index country rankings,2015https://goo.gl/doJ1Ic.3 InternationalTelecommunicationUnion(ITU),Measuring The Information Society,2014http://bit.ly/1xrVMi8.4 Bahraine-government,“QuduratTrainingProgram”,accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1IQ1YMIand“E-government:wetrained15thousandcitizensoncomputers,”[inArabic]Alwasat,November30,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1051215.html.5 ITU,“PercentageofIndividualsusingtheInternet,”2016,accessedAugust14,2016http://goo.gl/Fpr41z.6 TelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority(TRA),Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain(Manama:TRA,Q12016),slide4http://goo.gl/riX1l0.7 TRA,Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain(Manama:TRA,Q12016),slide6http://goo.gl/riX1l0.8 TRA, Telecommunications Markets Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain, February 2016http://goo.gl/UQulYz.9 Batelco,“MobileInternetPackages,”accessedAugust14,2016http://batelco.com/internet/mobile/packages/.10 TRA,“Bahraincomparedwellwithdevelopedcountriesinthetelecomprices”,December28,2015,http://bit.ly/1PyGTWT.11 TRA,Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain,February2016,slide30http://goo.gl/XfzgpZ.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

inthetownofDirazbydisablingmobiledataservicesanddisruptingfixed-lineconnectionsinabidtodisruptprotestsoverthesummerof2016.12

Bahrain’sthreemobileoperatorssimultaneouslyblockedVoice-over-IP(VoIP)servicesinOctober2015.13ThethreeoperatorsmovedtoimposeanadditionalUS$13subscriberchargeforaccesstoVoIPservicesofferedbythelikesofWhatsAppandSkype.Afterpublicuproaronsocialmedia,theTRAsentanemergencyordernotingtheoperatorshadfailedtoobtaintheregulator’spriorapprov-alforthechangeintermsofservice.14Providerscompliedwithin48hoursandaccesstoVoIPwasrestored.However,operatorsnowpublicallypromoteVoIPasafreeservicewithanotethatitissub-jecttochangeattheoperators’discretion,meaningadditionalchargesmaybewrittenintofuturecontractsandagreementswithcustomers.15

ICT Market

Batelco,Zain,andVIVAarethethreemobilephoneoperatorsinthecountry,andalsoserveasitsmainfixed-lineinternetservicesproviders(ISPs),alongwithMenatelecom,thefourthlargestISP.ThegovernmenthasacontrollingstakeinBatelco,thelargestofthese,whileotherISPsareownedbyinvestorsfromtheprivatesector,includingnon-Bahrainiinvestors.

Regulatory Bodies

MobilephoneservicesandISPsareregulatedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulationAuthority(TRA)underthe2002TelecommunicationsLaw.TheTRAisresponsibleforlicensingtelecommunica-tionprovidersandfordeveloping“acompetitionledmarketfortheprovisionofinnovativecommu-nicationsservices,availabletoall.”16AlthoughtheTRAistheoreticallyanindependentorganization,inpracticeitsmembersareappointedbythegovernmentanditschairmanreportstotheMinisterofStateforTelecommunications.UntilJune2013,thisministeralsooccupiedthepostofPresidentoftheInformationAffairsAuthority(IAA).17TheIAA,whichreplacedtheMinistryofInformationin2010,overseesbothtraditionalandonlinemediaoutletsinBahrainandisresponsiblefordecisionstoblockwebsites,whicharethenenforcedbyinternetserviceproviders(ISPs).

TherehavebeennoreportedinstancesofISPsbeingdeniedregistrationpermits.Indeed,over31licenseshavebeengrantedsince2003,with11providerscurrentlyinbusiness.18However,inearly2015theTRArevokedthelicensesof14smallICTcompanies,includingsomethatvoluntarilyre-questedtheircancellation.Accordingtoobservers,themajorityofthesecompanieswereofferinginternationalcallingservicesthatwereadverselyimpactedbythegrowinguseofVoIPapplications,

12 PressRelease,“NewInvestigationFindsBahrainISPsImposing“InternetCurfew”inProtestArea,”BahrainWatch,August4,2016,https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2016/08/04/press-release-bahraini-isps-impose-internet-curfew-in-protest-village/,andFatenBushehri,“OngoingInternetCurfewinDurazformorethan100Days,”BahrainWatch,October7,2016,https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2016/10/07/100-days-since-internet-shutdown-in-duraz/.13 AhmedArdah,accessedAugust14,2016https://twitter.com/ArdahAhmad/status/657176883558260736.14 TRA,“TRAissuesanEmergencyOrdertothreemobileoperators,”October22,2015,http://bit.ly/2btjnR2.15 VIVA,“FreesocialforallwithVIVAUnlimitedPlans”,accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2bZCov5.16 TRA,“Vision&Mission,”accessedMarch30,2014,http://tra.org.bh/en/about-us/vision-mission.html.17 InJune2013,Mohamedal-RumaihiwasnamedPresidentoftheIAA,replacingFawazal-KhalifawhoremainedMinisterofStateforTelecom.18 TRA,Telecommunications Market Indicators in the Kingdom of Bahrain,slide6http://goo.gl/UQulYz.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

leadingmanytobankruptcy.19Whiletheofficialreasonforthelicensecancellationswasnotmadepublic,TRAmentionedthattheorderwasinaccordancewithArticle35oftheTelecommunicationsLaw,20whichpermitslicenserevocationincasesof“materialbreachofanyprovisionofthisLaw”or“seriousindicationsorevidencethataLicenseeislikelytocommitsuchbreach,”andifthelicenseefailedtocomplywithTRA’sdirections.21TheheadofTRAsaidthatthenumberofsmallcompaniesinthetelecommunicationmarketwouldbereducedby50percent.22

InFebruary2016,theTRAissuedawarningtothesmallmobileandfixed-lineprovider2Connectfor,amongotherthings,“failingtoprovidealawfulaccesscapabilityplan”23whichwouldallowsecurityunitstoaccessusers’metadatasentoveritsnetwork.242ConnectwasgivensevendaystocomplyandorderedtopayafineofoverUS$4.5million.Afteritfailedtocomply,TRArevoked2Connect’sli-censeasofFebruary25,2016,25andinstitutedagraceperiodupuntiltheendofJune2016tomoveallofitsclientstootherproviders.26

Limits on Content

The level and sophistication of censorship remained stable over the past year, though the government plans to implement a national website filtering solution and a national search engine. Meanwhile, the government continued its efforts to silence online dissidents by forcing them to close their pages or remove content. Self-censorship is rife, particularly on issues related to the monarchy, religion, and relations with the neighboring countries of the Arabian Peninsula. Despite these limitations, many still turn to the internet to collect independent information and to call attention to gross human rights violations.

Blocking and Filtering

TheBahrainigovernmentengagesinextensiveblockingofonlinecontent.Multiplestateorganiza-tions,includingtheIAA,theMinistryofInterior,andtheMinistryofStateforTelecommunication,canordertheblockingofawebsitewithoutacourtorder.TheIAAblockswebsitesthatviolateAr-ticles19and20ofthecountry’sPressRulesandRegulations,whichincludematerialjudgedas“in-stigatinghatredofthepoliticalregime,encroachingonthestate’sofficialreligion,breachingethics,encroachingonreligionsandjeopardizingpublicpeaceorraisingissueswhosepublicationispro-hibitedbytheprovisionsofthislaw.”27Thus,anysitethatcriticizesthegovernment,therulingfamily,

19 “TelecommunicationscompanieslicensesreducedinBahrainby63percent,”[inArabic]Alayam Newspaper,February19,2015http://bit.ly/1UeM406.20 TRA,“RevocationofHawarTelecommunicationsCo.W.L.L’sISLLicenseawardedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority,”pressrelease,February15,2015,http://bit.ly/1VT0ftv.21 TheTelecommunicationsLawOfTheKingdomOfBahrain,LegislativeDecree48,October23,2002,http://bit.ly/1w4edPb.22 “TelecommunicationscompaniestendtomergingtocontinueintheBahrainimarket,”[inArabic]Alwasat,December18,2014,http://bit.ly/1Vzuip2.23 TRA,Article35OrderNo.2of20162Connect’sbreachofArticle24(b),53and78oftheTelecommunicationsLaw,February4,2016,http://bit.ly/2bldqnG.24 TRA,LawfulAccessRegulation,accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2b5Xyb3.25 TRA,“RevocationoftelecommunicationlicensesgrantedbytheTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthority,”pressrelease,February25,2016,http://goo.gl/ZRgbnY.26 TRA,“ExtensiongrantedbyTelecommunicationsRegulatoryAuthorityto2ConnectW.L.Lforprovidingtelecommunicationservices,”pressrelease,April7,2016,http://goo.gl/d01mLS.27 Decree—by—LawNo.47Regardingorganizingthepress,printingandpublishing,October23,2002,http://bit.ly/2blcAaB.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

orthecountry’sstatusquoissubjecttoblockingbytheIAA.Authoritiesrampedupcensorshipafterthe2011protests,inwhichonlinemediaplayedadecisiverole.

YouTube,Facebook,Twitter,andinternationalblog-hostingservicesarefreelyavailable.However,otherapplicationsarepermanentlyblocked,andspecificcontentonsocialnetworkscanbeinac-cessible.ThemessagingserviceTelegramwasblockedforseveraldaysaroundthefifthanniversaryoftheFebruary14,2011popularprotests.28Furtherrestrictionsontheservicewerenotedafterthecoverageperiod.Severallivestreamingservicesareblocked,29suchasPalTalkandMatam.tv,respec-tivelyusedbyBahrainistoconductpoliticalseminars30orbroadcastShiitereligiousceremonies.31However,thelivestreamingservicePeriscopeisavailable.

Accordingtoestimatesfromseveralyearsago,theIAAhasblockedorshutdownatleast1,000web-sites,includinghumanrightswebsites,blogs,onlineforums,andindividualpagesfromsocialmedianetworks.32Acrowdsourcedlistof367blockedwebsitesreportedasofFebruary2016that39per-centofblockedsiteswererelatedtopolitics,while23percentrelatedtotheuseofvariousinternettools,suchasanonymizersandwebproxies.33

AreportfromNovember2015indicatedthatmorethan85percentofBahrainiwebsitesarehostedoutsideofthecountry,34despiteitsexcellenttelecominfrastructure.Websiteshostedoverseasarelessliabletobeingremovedbylocalhostingprovidersincomplianceofgovernmentorders.Whiletheymaystillbeblocked,thesewebsitesareaccessibletoBahrainiusersviacircumventiontools.BahrainOnline,aprominentonlineforum,hasbeenblockedsinceitslaunchin1998.35TheArabicwebportalandblog-hostingserviceAl-Bawabahasalsobeenblockedsince2006.ThewebsitesoftheArabNetworkforHumanRightsInformation(ANHRI)andtheBahrainCenterforHumanRights(BCHR)havebeenblockedsince2006.InNovember2013,followingacampaignbytheBCHRtoex-poseofficialsandroyalfamilymembersinvolvedinhumanrightsviolations,analternativelinktothecenter’swebsitewasblockedaswell.36ThepopularBahrainionlinenewswebsiteBahrain Mirrorhasbeenblockedsinceitslaunchin2011.Accordingtothewebsite’sadministration,thegovernmenthasblockedmorethansixalternateaddressessincethen.

InAugust2013,thecommunicationsministerorderedISPstoblock70websites37thatweresuppos-

28 “TelegramstopworkinginBahrain...NoclarificationfromTRA,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February11,2016http://bit.ly/2btlmoEandUsercomplaintsovertwitter,screenshot,February14,2016https://goo.gl/0nDoPx.29 Thesesitesincludebambuser.com,ustream.tv,andotherwebsitesthatstreamdirectlytoTwitterliketwitcasting.tv,see,Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),http://bit.ly/2b8aYNJ.30 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CrackdowncontinuesinBahrain,BloggersgoontrialinEmirates,”June16,2011,http://bit.ly/1OUSoae.31 BCHR,“Bahrain:The“CyberSafetyDirectorate”MonitorsInternetActivityInStyleSimilartoBigBrother,”November25,2013,http://bit.ly/1FleBho.32 ReportersWithoutBorders,“Bahrain,”inCountries Under Surveillance,2011,accessedJuly16,2012,http://bit.ly/1Jf0EfV.33 “AtaGlance:Bahrain,”Herdict,accessedonFebruary22,2015,http://www.herdict.org/explore/indepth?fc=BH.34 AhmedAlDosari,“Bahrainiwebsitesmigratefromtheirhomeland...Willtheycomebackoneday?,”[inArabic](blog),November21,2015,http://bit.ly/2bSztUN.35 BenBirnbaum,“BahraincontinuescrackdownonShi’iteopposition,”The Washington Times,September14,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQCXLs.“WebStatsDomian-Mail.bahrainonline.org,”WebStatsDomain,accessedMarch19,2013,http://bit.ly/1L7Fyla.36 “BahrainCenterforHumanRightswebsite2ndlinkblocked,”Bahrain Freedom Index (blog),November2013,http://bit.ly/1N5DWwE.37 “Blockinganumberofwebsitesthatpromoteterrorism,aspertherecommendationsoftheNationalassembly,”[inArabic] Bahrain News Agency,August3,2013http://www.bna.bh/portal/news/573943.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

edly“affiliatedwithinternationallyrecognizedorganizationsthatfundandpromoteterrorism.”38Theministeralsoorderedtelecomcompaniestotakemeasuresagainsttextmessagessentfromabroadthatpromoteviolence.39WhilesomesitesaffiliatedwithHezbollah,al-Qaeda,andothergroupswereblocked,othersremainedaccessibleasofJune2016,givingasensethatthefightagainstterrorismisbeingusedasanexcusetocensoronlinecontentfromdissidents.40

InanewdevelopmentinJanuary2016,theTRAawardedaUS$1.2milliontenderfora“nationalwebsitefilteringsolution”toNetsweeper,aCanadiancompany.41Netsweeperproductscananalyzetrafficandblockaccesstowebsitesagainstcustomizedfilters.42Thesystemhadyettobeimple-mentedbytheendofthisreport’scoverageperiod.Websitesarecurrentlyfilteredbasedonkey-worddensity,themanualentryofURLs,andcertainwebsitecategories.AnupdatedlistofblockedwebsitesisregularlysenttoISPs,whichareinstructedto“prohibitanymeansthatallowaccesstositesblockedbytheministry.”43ThroughIAAnotification,theTRAcanrevokethelicenseofanyoper-atorthatdoesnotcooperatewithIAAblockingorders.44

Thedecision-makingprocessandgovernmentpoliciesbehindtheblockingofwebsitesarenottransparent.Thelistofallblockedwebsitesisnotavailabletothepublic.Inaddition,webmastersdonotreceivenotificationsorexplanationswhentheirwebsitesarebanned.Whentryingtoaccessablockedsite,usersarepresentedwiththemessage,“ThiswebsitehasbeenblockedforviolatingregulationsandlawsofKingdomofBahrain,”withnoparticularlawsspecified.Althoughthelawdoestechnicallyallowaffectedindividualstoappealablockwithin15days,nosuchcasehasyetbeenadjudicated.

Content Removal

Newsoutletscontinuetofacepressuretoremovecontent.InAugust2015,al-WatannewspaperremovedanarticlefromitswebsiteinwhichthewriteraccusedtheKuwaitigovernmentoffailingtostandbytheGulfCooperationCouncilagainstwhatshetermedthe“Iranianlobby,”sparkingoutcryfromtheKuwaitipress.Itisbelievedthattheremovalofthearticlefromthepro-governmentnews-paperwasbasedonagovernmentorder.45

Onlinenewspapershavebeenbannedfromusingaudioandvideoreportsontheirwebsitessince2010,apartfromthestate-ownedBna.bh,whichbroadcastsvideofromstatetelevision.46Infurtherdevelopment,TheIAAwarnedal-WasatnewspaperinJanuary7,2016toimmediatelystopupload-

38 “MinistryofStateforCommunicationsToRegulateWebsitesLinkedtoInternationallyRecognizedTerroristOrganizations,”Bahrain News Agency, August3,2013http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/573944.39 Manama,“Bahraintelecomstoldtoblockonlineterrorforums”,Trade Arabia,August14,2013,http://bit.ly/1eJSp3D.40 ThewebsitesaffiliatedwithISISremainaccessibleasofJun2016,see,Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),http://bit.ly/2bx0wVm.41 BahrainTenderBoard,“AwardedTendersMonthlyReportFrom1/1/2016to1/31/2016,”page5,[inArabic]http://goo.gl/ilUJIF.42 “CanadianCompanyNetsweepertoCensorBahrain’sInternetfor$1.2M,” Motherboard, January8,2016, http://bit.ly/1OXEAjl.43 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiveAgainstJournalistsandWebsites,”May14,2009,http://bit.ly/1hDJh2l.44 ReportersWithoutBorders,“AuthoritiesStepUpOffensiveAgainstJournalistsandWebsites.”45 “Al-WatannewspaperdeletesanarticleinwhichSawsanAlShaaerhadoffendedKuwait,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,August18,2015http://bit.ly/2bFagdu.46 BCHR,“BanonaudioprogramsondailynewspaperAl-Wasat’swebsite,”September9,2010,http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/3327.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

ingvideostoYouTubeandembeddingthird-partyYouTubevideosonitswebsite.TheIAAclaimedal-Wasat’slicensedoesnotincludetheabilitytopublishvideos,whilesomenotedthepresslaw47/2002doesinclude“videoandaudioproducts”aspartofthedefinitionofpublications.47Bytheendofthecoverageperiod,thenewspaperhadremovedthevideosectionfromitswebsiteandap-pealedtheIAA’sdecision.

Websiteadministratorsfacethesamelibellawsthatapplytoprintjournalistsandareheldjointlyresponsibleforallcontentpostedontheirsitesorchatrooms.InFebruary2016,theinteriormin-istrystatedthatWhatsAppgroupadministratorsarealsoliableforthespreadoffalsenewsintheirgroups,iftheyfailtoreporttheincidents.48NewsemergedinApril2015ofplanstocreateaBahraininationalsearchenginewiththehelpofRussiantechnologyexperts,basedonRussia’s“Sputnik”searchengine.ThiscouldenabletheBahrainiauthoritiestoeasilyremoveunwantedsearchresultswithouttheneedtosecurecooperationfromU.S.-basedsearchenginecompanies,suchasGoogle.49

Authoritiesalsouseextralegalmeasurestoforciblyremoveonlinecontent.Throughtheuseofar-rests,50detentions,andtorture,51securityforcescoercedmanyonlineforummoderatorsintoperma-nentlyshuttingdowntheirwebsites.52“Bawabatal-Bahrain”(BahrainGateway),anonlinediscussionforumsitethatwassupportingprogovernmentviews,wasclosedbyitsownerinJuly201553afterhewasputontrialforaTwitterpost(SeeProsecutionsandArrestsforOnlineActivities).

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation

Theauthoritiesareknowntomanipulateonlinecontentinordertofabricategreaterpublicsupportforgovernmentpolicies.Accordingtothewatchdoggroup,BahrainWatch,thegovernmenthashired18publicrelations(PR)firmsforpromotionalcampaignssinceFebruary2011,representingatleastUS$32millionincontracts.54AtleastonePRagencywascontractedtoprovide“weboptimiza-tionandblogging”services,55whileotherswerehiredforonlinereputationmanagement.56InOcto-ber2014,oneofthesePRcompaniestriedtoforceThe Huffington PostnottowriteontheUnitedKingdom’sinvestigationoftortureallegationsagainsttheBahrainiking’sson.57Meanwhile,hoax

47 “IAApreventsAlwasatfromusing“Video”andYouTube,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January25,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1072283.html.48 “InteriorMinistry:GroupAdmininBahrain,isresponsibletotheauthoritiesforeverythingpublished,”[inArabic]LualuaTV,February19,2016,http://lualuatv.com/?p=33529.49 “RussiacouldhelpBahraininestablishinganationalsearchengine”,UNLOCKPWD,July30,2015,http://bit.ly/1LNLSRJ.50 Nonexhaustivelistofforummoderatorswhoweresubjecttoarrestfoundat:http://bit.ly/1He9SYQ;accessedvia:BCHR,“Bahrain:Afterdestructionoftheactualprotestingsiteat“thePearl,”thegovernmentshiftstoeliminatevirtualprotests,”May17,2011,http://bit.ly/1LmOd7Y.51 MonaKareem,“Bahrain:TwitterUserJailedfor66DaysforTweeting,“Global Voices,December5,2011http://bit.ly/1JXimWe.52 ModeratoroftheAlDairForumtalksabouthisdetention,sayinghewasforcedtoshowtheinterrogationofficerhowtoclosethewebsite:“Ahmedal-DairiModeratorofAlDairForumsinthefirstepisodeofhistestimony:thuseasedvoiceofZakariaAlAsheeriforever,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,January4,2012,http://bahrainmirror.com/article.php?id=2678&cid=117.53 BahrainGatewayfarewelltweet,accessedAugust14,2016,https://twitter.com/b4bhcom/status/622400160346341376.54 BahrainWatch,“PRWatch–keepinganeyeontheKingdom’sPR,”http://bahrainwatch.org/pr/.55 “Trippi&AssociatesManipulateInternetContentonBehalfofBahrainGovernment,”Bahrain Freedom Index(blog),July20,2011,http://bit.ly/1L7nCqT.56 MarcusBaram,“LobbyistsJumpShipinWakeofMideastUnrest,”Huffington Post,March25,2011,http://huff.to/1ePbiwQ.57 JamesDorsey,“BahrainrattledbyUKcourt’sopeningofdoortoinvestigationoftortureallegations,”The World Post,October21,2014,http://huff.to/10vInwO.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

journalists58spreadpropagandaonTwitterandprogovernmentblogssuchasBahrain ViewsandBahrain Independent.59

Similarly,an“armyoftrolls”hasbeenactiveonTwittersinceFebruary2011,60whenhundredsofac-countssuddenlyemergedtocollectivelyharassandintimidateonlineactivists,61commentators,andjournalistswhovoicedsupportforprotestsandhumanrights.62ThegovernmenttrollshavebeenmoderatelyeffectiveinsilencingorreducingtheactivityofoppositionvoicesbothinsideBahrain63andabroad.64Thetrollshavealsoplayedavitalroleinspreadinginformationthatiscontroversial,offensive,orfalse,65inordertodistorttheimageofprotesters,spreadhateandconflict,ordiscreditinformationpostedonsocialnetworks.66Thesetrollaccountsusuallyhavefewfollowers(orsome-timesnoneatall)andtendtoappearanddisappearincoordinationwithoneanother.InSeptember2015,trollshijackedahashtagdedicatedtoalauncheventofabookontheBahrainiuprising.67

InAugust2013,BahrainWatchrevealedevidenceofconnectionsbetweentheBahrainigovernmentand“extremist”accountsonTwitterandFacebookthatadvocatedviolenceagainstboththegovern-mentandprotesters.68Itwasalsorevealedthatthegovernmentimpersonatesoppositionfiguresonsocialmediainordertosendmaliciouslinks,suchasIPtrackers,toanonymousgovernmentcriticsthatcanbeusedtoidentifyandprosecutethem.69

Thestatealsoissuesofficialstatementswarningagainstthediscussionofcertainsubjects.OnJanu-ary3,2016theinteriorministrythreatenedtotakeactionsagainstanyinsultor“negativediscussion”oftheSaudiexecutionsofSheikhNimral-Nimrand42othermen.70OnMarch26,2015,theinteriorministryalsoissuedastatementwarningitwouldtakestepsagainstanyoneexpressingopinions“againsttheapproachthatBahrainhastaken”insupportingandjoiningtheSaudi-ledcoalitioncon-ductingairstrikesinYemen71(seeProsecutionsandDetentionsforOnlineActivities).Thisisontop

58 MonaKareem,“Bahrain:LilianeKhalil,AnotherBlogHoaxorPropaganda?,”Global Voices, August5,2011,http://bit.ly/1JDPViI.59 “Thehuntfor#lilianekhalil,”YouTubevideo,10:25,The Stream (blog),Al Jazeera, http://bit.ly/1V0eKZf;JustinGengler,“MediaJihad:IfYaCan’tBeat‘Em,Sue‘Em!“,ReligionandPoliticsinBahrain,June15,2011http://bit.ly/1IQaWtf;DrMajeedALAlawi,Twitterpost,January2,2012,2:51am,http://bit.ly/1fSHvJW.60 BobHooker,“Bahrain’sTrollArmy,”Web 3.0 Lab(blog),February17,2011,http://bit.ly/1W8HJN3.61 SeeBrianDooley,“NoStampRequired:AllTooEasyfor#BahrainTwitterTrolls,”HuffingtonPost,September25,2015http://huff.to/1WmSueM,andBrianDooley,“‘Troll’Attackson#BahrainTweetsShowDepthofGovernmentAttemptstoSilenceDissent,”The World Post, November17,2011,http://huff.to/1iVmxf9.62 J.DavidGoodman,“‘TwitterTrolls’HauntDiscussionsofBahrainOnline,”The Lede (blog),The New York Times,October11,2011,http://nyti.ms/1NBl3Sv.63 iManamaa,Twitterpost,May13,2011,7:39am,http://bit.ly/1iCuvtJ;Sultanal-Qassemi,“PioneerBloggersintheGulfArabStates,”Jadaliyya,December20,2011,http://bit.ly/1k4jzR5;BobHooker,“DisturbingDropinTweetinginBahrain,”Web 3.0 Lab (blog), March22,2011,http://bit.ly/1OcDDik.64 “TwitterTrollingasPropagandaTactic:BahrainandSyria,”Jillian C. York (blog),December10,2011,http://bit.ly/1hXiMFN.65 “SoManyTrollsbutsoFewLeaders:TheInformationWarinBahrain,” Marc Owen JonesMarch14,2011,http://bit.ly/1P8SNpf.66 DavidWheeler,“IntheArabSpring’sWake,TwitterTrollsandFacebookSpies,”The Chronicle of Higher Education (blog),November29,2011,http://bit.ly/1Kx8zdJ.67 “TrollsAttempttoHijack#BahrainUprisingTwitterEvent,”Marc Owen Jones(blog),September18,2015http://bit.ly/2btmsk6.68 BillMarczak,“IsBahrain’sGovernmentrunningextremistaccounts?”BahrainWatch,August5,2013,http://bit.ly/1UpiYil.69 BillMarczak,“BahrainGovtusingfakeTwitteraccountstotrackonlinecritics,”BahrainWatch,pressrelease,July31,2013,http://bit.ly/1hXjfrJ.70 “MinistryofInterior(MOI):legalactionsagainstanymisuseorabuseontheimplementationoftheSaudijudicialrulings,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1063913.html.71 “MOIwarnsagainstdivision,sedition,”March26,2015,Bahrain News Agency,http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/660794.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

ofregularwarningsdisseminatedinthepress,ontelevision,andontheradiothattherewillbelegalactiontakenagainstthosewho“misusesocialmedia.”72

Similarly,authoritieshaveurgedprogovernmentuserstopostaboutcertaintopics,sometimeswithunintendedconsequences.InJuly2015,Bahrain’sinteriorministerstartedamediacampaignagainstIranianinterferenceinBahrainiaffairs,whichhasturnedintoahatespeechhashtagagainstShiitecitizens.73InJanuary2014,theprimeministerandtheministeroftelecommunicationsheldseveralpublicmeetingswithprogovernmentuserstoencouragethemto“defendBahrain’srulingsystem.”74

Despitethesenumerousattemptstomanipulatetheonlineinformationlandscape,governmentrestrictionsononlineadvertisinghavenotforcedtheclosureofanyoppositionwebsites.Whileitisdifficultforblockedwebsitestosecureadvertising,popularsitessuchasBahrain Mirror(390,000viewsmonthly)havenotfacedsignificantfinancialpressures.ThisisduetothefactthatmostBah-rainioppositionwebsitesarerunwithlimitedandsometimespersonalresources.Furthermore,thewebsitescontinuetoreceivelargeamountsoftrafficfromuserswithinBahrainthroughtheuseofproxyservices,dynamicIPaddresses,andvirtualprivatenetwork(VPN)applications.However,thegovernmentdoesregularlyblockaccesstocircumventiontools,includingtechniquessuchasusingGooglePageTranslate,Googlecachedpages,andonlinemobileemulators.AdaptiveandinternetsavvyBahrainistendtofindwaysaroundtheserestrictions.

TheinternetremainsthemainsourceofinformationandnewsformanyBahrainis,particularlythoseactiveonTwitterandFacebook.ThenumberofBahrainiusersonFacebookincreasedtoaround700,000asofDecember2015,accordingtoalocalsource.75However,internetusersexerciseahigherdegreeofself-censorship,particularlyasinvestigationsofusers’onlineactivitieshavebeenlaunchedatworkplacesanduniversities.76OnTwitter,onlineforums,andcommentsections,mostusepseud-onymsduetofearofbeingtargetedbytheauthorities.77Manyhavemodifiedtheirprivacysettingsonsocialmediaor“protected”theirTwitterpagesfrompublicviewing.Sometemporarilystoppedtweetingafterreceivingthreatstotheirpersonalsafety.78

Digital Activism

Givenrestrictionsonpressfreedom,thelackofinternationalmediacoverage,andtheinabilityofmanyprominentjournaliststoenterthecountry,79activistsrelyondigitaltoolstobringattentiontoprotestsandhumanrightsviolations.80InJuly2015,theBBCreportedthat21,000tweetswerepost-

72 “MOI:legalactionagainstanyonewhoabusestheuseofsocialmediaandraisessectarianstrife,”[inArabic]Alwasat,June27,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1003344.html.73 “Bahrain’sInteriorMinisterLaunchedHateCampaign..SectarianTakfiriDiscourseReturnedUnderHashtag#No_to_Iranian_Intervention,”Bahrain Mirror,August22,2015,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/25858.html.74 “HRHPremiercallsfortheneedtousesocialnetworkstodefendthenation,”Bahrain News Agency, January14,2014,http://bit.ly/1L7p6S3.75 “Twomillionand200KaccountsinthesocialnetworksinBahrainin2015,”[inArabic]Alwasat,December15,2015http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1057013.html.76 SimeonKerr,“Manamafightsbackincyberspace,”Financial Times,May23,2011,http://on.ft.com/maUYxm.77 NancyMessieh,“Onlineanonymity:Agatewaytofreedomorabuse?”The Next Web,August14,2011,http://bit.ly/1PNCI8x.78 “Bahraindoctor@BAHRAINDOCTORthreatenedwitharrestbecauseofhertweets,”Bahrain Freedom Index (blog), accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1DhPISu.79 “AccessDenied,”aprojectoftheindependentresearchandadvocacyorganizationBahrainWatch,chroniclesthemanyjournalists,researchers,academics,andNGOworkersthatwereexpelledfromordeniedaccesstoBahrainfromthe2011uprisinguntilnow.See,http://bahrainwatch.org/access/.80 AmiraalHussaini,“Bahrain:TweetingAppallingConditionsatJawPrison,”Global Voices,July19,2012,http://bit.ly/1ikgVuE.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

edusingtheArabichashtag#Scholarships_MassacretoexpressangerabouttheunfairdistributionofscholarshipsanddiscriminationagainstShiitestudents.81TheArabichashtag#MassRallies14Au-gusttrendedforseveraldaysinAugust2015,asuserscalledforantigovernmentprotestersontheanniversaryofthecountry’sindependence.82Thatsamemonth,aftertheministerofinteriordeniedthatShiiteBahrainisaresubjecttodiscrimination,ShiiteuserspostedtheirviewsundertheArabichashtag#I_feel_like_a_2nd_class_citizen.83

Inaddition,the“CoalitionofFebruary14Youth”protestmovementcontinuestousesocialnet-works84toorganizeprotestsandbringinternationalattentiontolocalcauses.85YouTubevideosareuploadedtodocumentpoliceattacksonciviliansandtorturetestimonies,86thoughsomearepromptlyblocked.87RelativesorfriendsofdetaineesregularlyuseTwittertocampaignfortheirre-leaseandtoprovideupdatesaboutprisonconditions.88

Violations of User Rights

Violations of user rights in Bahrain were rampant, with at least 32 users arrested, detained, or pros-ecuted over the coverage period. Collectively, 447 months of prison sentences were passed down to 10 users, while others remain on trial or in arbitrarily detention. The top reasons for user prosecution during coverage period was criticizing actions taken by Saudi Arabia, criticizing Bahraini members of parliament, and “insulting the king and instigating hatred of the regime.” Bahraini law does not con-tain adequate protections for free speech, given provisions that ban criticism of the royal family, the spreading of false news during war, or insulting foreign nations.

Legal Environment

Bahrain’slegalenvironmentpresentsmanyobstaclestointernetfreedominitscurrentform.Accord-ingtoArticle23oftheBahrainiconstitution,freedomofexpressionisguaranteed,“providedthatthefundamentalbeliefsofIslamicdoctrinearenotinfringed,theunityofthepeopleisnotpreju-diced,anddiscordorsectarianismisnotaroused.”89Article26statesthatallwritten,telephonic,andelectroniccommunications“shallnotbecensoredortheirconfidentialitybebreachedexceptinexi-genciesspecifiedbylawandinaccordancewithproceduresandunderguaranteesprescribedbythelaw.”90ThePressandPublicationsLawof2002promisesfreeaccesstoinformation“withoutprejudicetotherequirementsofnationalsecurityanddefendingthehomeland.”Bahrainijournalistshavear-guedthatthesequalifyingstatementsandloosely-wordedclausesallowforarbitraryinterpretation

81 “BBC:21thousandtweetsonHashtag#Scholarships_MassacreinBahrain,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,July21,2015,http://bit.ly/2bbWOwR.82 NadaRamadan,“BahrainioppositionheadtoTwittertocallforprotests,”TheNewArab,August13,2015,http://bit.ly/2bFwYSz.83 “BahrainisrespondtotheMinisterofInterioron#I_feel_like_a_2nd_class_citizen,”[inArabic]BahrainMirror,August23,2015,http://bit.ly/2b8t19K.84 Coalition14Feb,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/COALITION14.85 TobyC.JonesandAla’aShehabi,“Bahrain’srevolutionaries,”Foreign Policy,January2,2012,http://atfp.co/1JBnf7R;U.S.EmbassyBahrain,“DemonstrationNotice3–January17,2013,“newsrelease,January17,2013,http://1.usa.gov/1JDUPMH.86 BCHR,“BlockingtheDocumentary‘SystematicTortureinBahrain’onYouTube,”February8,2011,http://bit.ly/1NBlaO4.87 JillianYork,“BahrainBlocksYouTubePagesandMore,”Global Voices Advocacy,February14,2011,http://bit.ly/1OcIEYf.88 BahrainDetainees,TwitterAccount,https://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/lists/bahraindetainees.89 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.23,http://www.shura.bh/en/LegislativeResource/Constitution/Pages/default.aspx.90 ConstitutionoftheKingdomofBahrain,art.26.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

and,inpractice,thenegationofthemanyrightstheyseektouphold.91Inaddition,thereisnolawthatdefinesclearpenaltiesforviolatingtheprivacyofinternetusers,aconcernformanybloggerswhobelievethisallowsforabuse.92

Therewerenonewlawspassedoverthecoverageperiod,althoughtherewerediscussionsovernewmediaregulations.InAugust2015,theministerofinformationaffairsindicatedthatanewPressandPublicationsLawmightregulatesocialmediapublishing.93Onemonthlater,thecabinetapprovedaproposalfornewregulationsonalloutletsprovidingaudio,video,writtenandelectronicnewscontent.Amongotherrestrictions,thenewproposalstatesalloutletsmustrespectthesovereigntyofthekingdomofBahrain,aswellasitsregime,figures,andinstitutions.Italsobansbroadcastinganyinformationthatwouldleadtodisturbingthekingdom’srelationswithothercountries.Thisregulationcomplementstheexistingpublicationslawuntilanewoneisapproved.94

InSeptember2013,thecabinetgreenlightednewlegislationthatwouldcriminalizeanyonewhoestablishesawebsite,publishesinformationonline,orusesanyinformationtechnologytooltoassistoraidcommunicationswithterrorcellsortopromotethedisruptionofpublicorderormorale.95AsofMay2016,thelawhadnotyetbeenpassed.96InAugust2014,theprimeministerrenewedcallstotakeimmediatemeasurestocontroltheusageofsocialmediaandtoholdthe“abusers”ofthesenetworksaccountable.97Thiswasfollowedbysimilardirectivesfromthekingtofightthe“wrongfuluse”ofsocialmediabylegalmeans.98Duringthepastyear,similarofficialstatementsweremade.

Onlinecensorshipandcriminalpenaltiesforonlinespeecharecurrentlyenforcedunderthe2002PressandPublicationsLaw,99whichdoesnotspecificallymentiononlineactivitiesbutwasextendedtomobilephonesin2010.100Thelawallowsforprisonsentencesfromsixmonthstofiveyearsforrepeatoffenders,forpublishingmaterialthatcriticizesIslam,itsfollowers,ortheking,aswellascontentthatinstigatesviolentcrimesortheoverthrowofthegovernment.101Inaddition,the2002TelecommunicationsLawcontainspenaltiesforseveralonlineactivities,suchasthetransmissionof

91 IREX,“Bahrain,”Media Sustainability Index 2008, 2009,https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/MSIMENA08_Bahrain.pdf.92 “Alial-Moussawi,“OntheoccasionoftheWorldDaytocombatelectronicsurveillance,”[inArabic]Al Wasat,March12,2012,http://bit.ly/1Kr62gI.93 “Alhammadi:Noderelictionindealingwiththecomplaintsofthemisuseofsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,August4,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1013575.html.94 “Cabinet:standardsformonitoringofmediacontent,”[inArabic]Alwasat,September22,2015,http://bit.ly/2bChvBq.95 “HRHthePrimeMinisterChairstheWeeklyCabinetMeeting,”Bahrain News Agency,September15,2013,http://bit.ly/1JQ2RDp.96 MohamedAlA’Ali,“Cybercrimelawamendmentset”,Gulf Daily News,September16,2013,http://bit.ly/1Mhjg3m.97 “HRHPremierdirectstostopexploitingplatformsinincitingsectarianism,sedition,”Bahrain News Agency,August26,2014,http://bit.ly/1N5v3mI.98 “HMtheKingvisitstheGeneralCommandoftheBahrainDefenceForceanddirectstotakethenecessaryimmediateactionsagainstthosewhoinstigated,mall,abused,orharmedthesecurityofthehomelandanditsstabilityandnationalunity,”[inArabic]Bahrain News Agency,September3,2014,http://www.bna.bh/portal/news/631246.99 Forcaseswheretheauthoritieshaveusedthe2002presslawtocensoronlinewebsites,seeBCHR,“Websiteaccusedofviolatingpresscode,BCHRconcernedthatmoveisaimedatsilencingcriticalvoices,”October1,2008,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/2446;“Closingablowtofreedomofopinionandexpression,”[inArabic] Alwasat,April25,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA;“Blockingusers‘Twitter’causedbyaviolationoftheCopyrightAct,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January3,2010,http://bit.ly/1JQ3ahA.100 HabibToumi,“BahrainimposesblackoutonBlackBerrynewssharing,”Habib Toumi (blog),April8,2010,http://bit.ly/1IBqlM4.101 PressandPublicationsLawof2002oftheKingdomofBahrain(No.47of2002).

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

messagesthatareoffensivetopublicpolicyormorals.102However,sentencescanbelongerifusersaretriedunderthepenalcodeorterrorismlaws,especiallywhenitcomestosocialmediacases,wherethecurrentpressandpublicationlawisnotused.103Forinstance,underthepenalcode,anyuserwho“deliberatelydisseminatesafalsestatement”thatmaybedamagingtonationalsecurityorpublicordermaybeimprisonedforuptotwoyears.104Thegovernmenthasusedthesevagueclaus-estointerrogateandprosecuteseveralbloggersandonlinecommentators.

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities

BetweenJune2015andMay2016,atleast32onlineuserswerearrested,detainedorprosecutedfortheirICTactivities.105WhilemanyusersarestillontrialasofMay2016,447monthsofprisonsen-tenceswerecollectivelypasseddownon10Bahrainiusersincasesdirectlyrelatedtoonlinepostsduringthecoverageperiod.TenusersremainedinjailasoftheendofMay2016,includingthreeuserswhowereservingsentencesfrompreviousyears.

AuthoritiestargetedcriticismoftheSaudi-ledcoalition’smilitaryinterventioninYemen.

• OnMarch26,2015,FadhelAbbas,GeneralSecretaryoftheDemocraticUnityGatheringSo-ciety,wasarrestedshortlyafterthesocietyreleasedastatementonTwittercondemningthewaragainstYemen.106HewassentencedtofiveyearsinprisoninJune2015for“spreadingfalseinformationthatcouldharmthemilitaryoperationsofBahrainanditsallies”inYemenbasedonArticle133oftheBahrainipenalcode.107

• OnSeptember7,2015,prominentTwitterusersYousifal-Amm(@14kilogramme)108andHussainKhamis(@BuKhamis)werearrestedandhadtheirdevicesconfiscatedfor“insultingBahrainisoldiersparticipatingintheSaudiArabia-ledArabCoalition”throughtheirtweets.BothweresentencedtofiveyearsinprisononFebruary18,2016underArticle133ofthepenalcode.109

CriticismofSaudiArabiawasafrequentmotiveforarrestinBahrain.

• EbrahimKarimi,aBahrainicitizenwhowasstrippedofhisnationalityin2012,wassen-tencedtotwoyearsinprisonfortweetscriticizingSaudiArabia’smanagementoftheHajj

102 TheTelecommunicationsLawOfTheKingdomOfBahrain,LegislativeDecree48.103 “Alhammadi:Noderelictionindealingwiththecomplaintsofthemisuseofsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,August4,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1013575.html.104 BahrainPenalcode,1976,art.168,http://bahrainrights.org/BCHR/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Bahrain-Penal-Code.doc.105 Listofprosecutedonlineusers2015-2016:http://bit.ly/2bcefvN,accessedviabahrainrights.org.106 BCHR,“CeaseArrestsOverTalksofWarandRespectInternationalHumanitarianLaw,”March28,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7463.107 Article113ofthepenalcodeproscribesaprisontermofuptotenyearstoanyonewho“deliberatelyannouncesinwartimefalseormaliciousnews,statementsorrumorsormountsadversepublicitycampaigns,soastocausedamagetomilitarypreparationsfordefendingtheStateofBahrainormilitaryoperationsoftheArmedForces,tocausepeopletopanicortoweakenthenation’sperseverance.”BCHR,“BCHRCondemns5-YearPrisonSentenceAgainstPoliticalLeaderFadhelAbbas,”July3,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7560.108 Yousifal-Amm(@14kilogramme),alsoknownas“HajiAhmed,”hassome11,000followerswhileHussanKhamishas24,000followers.109 “5yearsimprisonmentfor«AbuKhamis»and«HajiAhmad»becauseof«Twitter»,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February19,2016,http://bit.ly/1XATeNPand“5yearsimprisonmentfor«HajiAhmad»,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February19,2016,http://bit.ly/2bF4qI5.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

Seasonin2015,specificallyblamingtheauthoritiesforthedeathsofhundredsofpilgrims.110Thetweetswerepublishedbytheanonymousaccount“FareejKarimi,”111withwhichKarimideniedanyconnection.HehadbeenarrestedinSeptember2015andchargedwithmis-usingtelecommunicationdevices,and“insultingabrotherlycountryandincitinghatredagainsttheregime”underarticles290,165and215.112

• InApril2016,Dr.Saeedal-Samaheeji,whotweetsunderhisrealname,wassentencedtooneyearinprisonfor“misusingelectronicnetworkstoinsultasisternationandincitingunpermitteddemonstrationswhichhadledtodemonstrationsaccompaniedbyviolentacts”underarticle168and215ofthepenalcode.113HehadbeenarrestedduringahouseraidatdawnaftercriticizingSaudiArabiaforexecutingSheikhNimral-NimranddozensofothersinJanuary2016.Al-Samaheeji’stweetscoincidedwithpublicprotestsagainsttheexecutions,althoughanylinkwastenuous.

InJuly2015,atleastfoursocialmediauserswerearrestedfor“insulting”or“defaming”Bahrainimembersofparliament(MPs)aftertheapprovalofthestatebudgetfor2015and2016,whichcon-tainedayearlydeficitofaroundUS$4billion,aswellascutstosomesubsidies.114Severalnewcom-plaintswerefiledwiththepublicprosecutorinJanuary2016aftertheparliamentapprovedincreasestofuelprices.115EightuserswereidentifiedandchargedbytheElectronicCrimesGeneralDirector-ate,116resultingsofarinonethree-monthsentence,afineofUS$1,300,andafineofUS$530,thelatterforanInstagrampost.117Allarechargedunderarticle216ofthepenalcode,whichspecifiesthat“apersonshallbeliableforimprisonmentorpaymentofafineifheoffends,byanymethodofexpression,theNationalAssemblyorotherconstitutionalinstitutions(..)”aswellasarticles364,365,and366whichproscribeprisonsentencesofuptotwoyearsfordefamingapublicemployee.Finally,theownerofthewebsite“Bawabatal-Bahrain”[BahrainGateway]wasfinedUS$265inNovember2015118forallegedlydefamingacandidatetoparliamentinatweetoneyearearlier.119Healsoshutdownhiswebsiteandsocialmediaaccounts(SeeContentRemoval).

Atleastsevenuserswerearrestedorsentencedfor“instigatinghatredoftheregime,”“insultingtheking,”orbothduringthecoverageperiod.

• Jalilaal-SayedAminandAlial-Maqabi,respectivelydetainedsinceJanuaryandFebruary

110 ElizabethWhitman,“SaudiArabiaHajjTourismCrisis2015:AfterDeadlyStampede,WillRoyalFamilyImproveSecurity?,“International Business Times,September30,2015,http://bit.ly/1VKyZQC.111 FareejKarimiistheunofficialpopularnameofaneighborhoodinMuharraq,Bahrain,inhabitedbymembersofKarimifamily.112 BahrainCenterforHumanRights,“Moreprisonsentencesandinterrogationsforfreeexpression“crimes”inBahrainsuchas“insultingtheking”,”April7,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7780.113 AmnestyInternational,“UrgentAction:ActivistdetainedforprotestingonTwitter,”January8,2016,http://bit.ly/2bF5mMy.114 BCHR,“Bahrain:PrisonAwaitsforInternetCriticismofRegime,MinistryorEvenYourElectedMP,”July19,2015,http://bit.ly/1iCyKpk115 “TheParliament:weraisedcomplaintsagainstusersofsocialnetworksforbypassingtheguaranteedrighttofreedomofopinionandexpression,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January29,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1073667.html116 “«Prosecution»:Theparliamentfiled61complaintsagainsttheownersofaccountsonthesocialnetworks,”[inArabic]Alwasat,April25,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1106486.html117 “200dinarsfineforayoungmanwhoinsultedtheHouseofRepresentativesoverInstagram,”[inArabic]Alwasat,March22,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1093565.html118 “TheownerofaWebsiteisfinedfordefamationandpublicationthataffectsthedignityofacandidateforelection,”[inArabic]Alwasat,November3,2015,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1041776.html119 “Trialofdefendantaccusedofdefamingacandidatefortheparliamentaryelectionsthroughhiswebsite,”[inArabic]Alwasat,September4,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1022613.html

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

2015,werereleasedinJanuary2016butremainontrialfor“insultingthekingandincitingviolence”onTwitter.120

• Similarly,18-yearolduniversitystudentSaeedAl-Singaceremainedontrialfor“incitingha-tredoftheregimethroughhisphone.”121Hewasarrestedduringa3amhouseraidinJune2015,duringwhichauthoritiesconfiscatedhiselectronicdevices,andheldhimuntilthatNovember.

• On10March2016,HussainMahdi,theownerofthesatiricalTwitteraccount“@Takrooz,”wassentencedinabsentiatofiveyearsimprisonmentandafineofUS$26,525for“insultingtheking.”122HeisthefirsttoreceivesuchaharshsentencesincethemodificationofArticle214ofthepenalcodeinFebruary2014.123Hewasdetainedfor11monthsfromJune2014toApril2015,duringwhichhewasreportedlytortured;heleftthecountryinmid-2015.124Giventhepopularityoverhisaccountwhichhadover97,000followers,theharshsentencewasperceivedtobeawarningmessagetotherestofBahrain’sonlinecommunity.

• On10April2016,HabibJaafarAhmed,a45-year-oldmilitaryofficer,wasarrestedandchargedbythemilitaryprosecutionwithincitinghatredagainsttheregimeandsecurityforcesviaTwitterandFacebook.125HewasstillontrialasofMay2016.

Prisonershaveevenbeeninterrogatedfortweetsemanatingfromaccountsholdingtheirname.InJanuary2016,ShaikhAliSalman,leaderofthelargestpoliticalgroupinBahrain,whoisalreadyim-prisoned,wasbroughtfromdetentiontobequestionedbythepublicprosecutorabouttweetson“democracy”and“reform”postedbyhisaccount@AlwefaGSonMartinLutherKingDay.Thepublicprosecutorsaidtheaccount“inciteshatredagainsttheregime,promotes disobedienceofthelawandcalls forholdingunauthorizedprotests.”Noofficialchargeswerepressed,althoughaninves-tigationintotheaccountoperatorwasordered.126Afewdayslater,theTwitteraccountofSalman’swifewashacked(SeeTechnicalattacks).127

Thecourtsoftenproscribedmorelenientsentencestooffenderswithlinkstothegovernment.Forinstance,theownerofalargelyprogovernmentTwitteraccount,@mnarfezhom,wasputontrialonseveraldefamationchargesin2015,resultinginonlysmallfinesaslowasUS$132128orsuspended

120 “ReleaseofJalilaAlsayedAminandAliAlmqabi,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January31,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1074582.html121 BCHR,“Bahrain:PrisonAwaitsforInternetCriticismofRegime,MinistryorEvenYourElectedMP,”July19,2015,http://bit.ly/1iCyKpk122 “5yearsimprisonmentandafineof10thousanddinars,fortheownerofTakroozaccountforinsultingtheking,”[inArabic]Alwasat,March11,2016,http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1089115.html123 Article214proscribes“apunishmentofimprisonmentforaperiodofnolessthanoneyearandnomorethansevenyearsandafineofnolessthanBD1,000andnomorethanBD10,000willbeinflicteduponanypersonwhooffendsinpublictheMonarchoftheKingdomofBahrain,theflagorthenationalemblem.”BCHR,“BahrainKing:Upto7YearsImprisonmentifYouInsultMe!,”February9,2014,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/6747124 “Takroozrevealshimself:Iamasituation..Idonotletthewordchokedinmymouth,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,March14,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/30001.html125 BCHR,“MorearrestsandjailsentencesinBahrainoversocialmediaposts,”June20,2016,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7919126 “BahrainPublicProsecutionOrdersInvestigationintoWho’sRunningAl-WefaqLeader’sTwitterAccount,”Bahrain Mirror,January25,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/28974.html127 “TwitterAccountofthewifeofSheikhAliSalmanishacked,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,February13,2016,http://bit.ly/2ba15iG128 “Ownerofaccount“mnarfezhom”fined50dinarsfordefaminglawyerHashem,”[inArabic]Alwasat,February1,2016,http://bit.ly/2ba1bHc.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

sentencesofafewmonths.129TheowneroftheaccountisbelievedtobeMohamedSalmanSaqeral-Khalifa,amemberoftheroyalfamily.130Theaccount,whichnolongerexists,oncehadsome100,000followersandcriticizedcertaingovernmentpolicieswhilemaintainingastaunchlyprogov-ernmentmessage.

NabeelRajab,oneofBahrain’smostprominenthumanrightsdefendersandmostfollowedBahrainiTwitteruser(@NabeelRajab),131hasbeeninandoutofprisonsince2012forvariouscaseslinkedtohistweets.132HewasimprisonedfromApril2,2015toJuly13,2015aspartofasix-monthsen-tence133onchargesofinsultingpublicinstitutionsunderarticle216ofthepenalcode134foratweetinwhichhequestionedwhetherBahrainisecurityinstitutionsare“ideologicalincubators”fortheso-called“IslamicState”terroristgroup.135HewasreleasedthatJulyforhealthreasonsbutplacedonatravelban.136Hestillfacesupto10yearsonchargesof“spreadingfalsenewsduringatimeofwar”and“insultingastatutorybody”137fortweetsdatingfromApril2015abouttheSaudi-ledcoalitionairstrikesinYemenandtheallegedtortureofdetaineesatJawprison.138RajabisthepresidentoftheBahrainCenterforHumanRights,anongovernmentalorganizationthatremainsactivedespitea2004governmentordertocloseit.139

Inaddition,thepublicprosecutorhasbeguntousealegalprovisionthatcallsfortheprosecutionofteenagers’parentswhentheirchildrenarearrestedforcriminalactivities,suchas“misusingsocialmedia.”140

Everyyear,anewnameisaddedtoagrowinglistofBahrainiphotographerswhofacedreprisals,of-tenusingtrumpedupcharges,fordocumentingprotestsandpostingtheirimagesonline:

● In2013,award-winningphotographerAhmedHumaidan,whowasarrestedin2012,wassentencedto10yearsinprisonforallegedlyparticipatinginanattackonapolicestationinthedistrictofSitra,141thoughitisbelievedhewastargetedforphotographingprotests.142

129 “Sentencesofmnarfezhomreachuptototaloneyear,”[inArabic]Alwasat,May25,2016,http://bit.ly/2b8PUv5.130 “MohammedAlKhalifa,fromanarmyofficertoanarmsdealerandeventuallyinsulterofchastewomen,”[inArabic]Alfateh News,October26,2012http://bit.ly/1IaUxfA.131 Rajabwasrankedthe“mostconnected”TwitteruserinBahrainaccordingtoasurvey,withover260,000followersasofMay2015.See:Wamda,How the Middle East Tweets: Bahrain’s Most Connected ReportDecember3,2012,http://bit.ly/1Jf8vdo.132 NabeelRajabwasfirstarrestedonMay5,2012andheldforoverthreeweeksfor“insultingastatutorybody”inrelationtoacriticismdirectedattheMinistryofInterioroverTwitter.OnJune9,2012,hewasarrestedagainaftertweetingabouttheunpopularityofthePrimeMinister(alsoamemberoftheroyalfamily)inthecityofAl-Muharraq,followingthesheikh’svisitthere.AgroupofcitizensfromthecitypromptlysuedRajabforlibelinashowofobediencetotheroyalfamily.OnJune28,2012,hewasconvictedofchargesrelatedtohisfirstarrestandorderedtopayafineofBHD300($800).Shortlyafterhewasreleasedonbail,hewasre-arrestedonJuly9,2012afteracourtsentencedhimtothreemonthsimprisonmentfortheAl-Muharraqincident.ThecourtofappealslateracquittedRajab,althoughhehadalreadyservedmostofhissentence.HewaskeptinprisonuntilMay2014toservetwo-yearsentencefor“callingforillegalgatheringsoversocialnetworks.”133 “Bahrain:NabeelRajabsentencedforatweet,”Index on Censorship,January20,2015,http://bit.ly/2b8wRfX.134 BCHR,“Bahrain:OngoingdetentionofleadinghumanrightsdefenderNabeelRajab,”October20,2014,http://bit.ly/1KW9oPw.135 NabeelRajab,Twitterpost,September28,2014,3:55AM,https://twitter.com/NABEELRAJAB/status/516179409720852480.136 “Bahrain:ContinuoustravelbanofMr.NabeelRajab,PresidentoftheBahrainCentreforHumanRights(BCHR),”OMCT,December21,2015,http://bit.ly/1RE084G.137 Nabeel.Rajab,Instagrampost,August2015,https://instagram.com/p/5aXYEGyGET/.138 BCHR,“NabeelRajab’scaseupdate,”May6,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7517.139 BCHR,“AboutBCHR,”http://bahrainrights.org/en/about-us.140 “MOI:arrestofnumberofthosewhoabusedsocialmedia,”[inArabic]Alwasat,January4,2016,http://bit.ly/2b9ULdQ.141 “PublicProsecution/Statement,”Bahrain News Agency,January5,2013,http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/540555.142 CommitteetoProjectJournalists,“Bahrainarrestsphotographerwhodocumenteddissent,”January9,2013,http://cpj.org/x/5198.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

● In2014,photographerHussainHubail,detainedsinceJuly31,2013,wassentencedtofiveyearsinprisononchargesof“incitinghatredagainsttheregimethroughsocialmedia,andcallingforillegalprotests”afteratrialthatlastedaroundfivemonths.143

● InDecember2015,award-winningphotographerSayedAhmedal-Mousawiwassentencedto10yearsinprisonandstrippedofhisnationalityover“terrorism”chargesthatincluded“takingphotosofprotestsandgivingSIMcardstoterrorists.”144HewasdetainedinFeb-ruary2014andreportedlysubjectedtobeating,hanging,andelectrocutiontoforcehisconfessions.145

● AndinFebruary2016,thecourtofappealupheldthreemonthsentencesagainstphotog-rapherAhmedAl-Fardan,146whopublishedhisimagesonplatformslikeInstagramandDe-motix.Hewaschargedfor“intendingtoparticipateinillegalgatherings.”147HisearlierarrestinDecember2013reportedlylefthimwithtwobrokenribsasaresultoftorture.148

Meanwhile,thetwoharshestsentenceseverpassedonBahrainiinternetusersremainedinplaceagainstbloggers,Abduljalilal-SingaceandAliAbdulemam,whowereseparatelychargedwithpos-sessinglinkstoaterroristorganizationaimingtooverthrowthegovernment,149disseminatingfalsenews,andincitingprotestsagainstthegovernment.Al-Singace,aprominenthumanrightsdefenderandblogger,hasbeenservingalifesentencesinceMarch2011,150andhisbloghasbeenblockedsince2009.151Abdulemam,theownerofBahrain’spopularblockedonlineforum,BahrainOnline,re-ceiveda15-yearsentenceinabsentiain2011andiscurrentlyapoliticalrefugeeintheUK.HehadpreviouslyspenttwoyearsinhidinginBahrain.152Bothreportedexperiencingtortureatthehandsoftheauthorities.153

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity

ThegovernmentofBahrainisknownforactiveusageofspywareagainstdissidents.InNovember2015,newevidenceshowedthatBahrainhadusedRemoteControlSystem(RCS)fromItaliancybersecurityfirmHackingTeamduring2014.Thespywareallowsremotemonitoring,includingrecordingphonecalls,loggingkeystrokes,takingscreenshots,andactivatingcameras,among

143 ReportersWithoutBorders,“JudicialpersecutionofBahraininewsproviderscontinues,”April28,2014,http://bit.ly/1UuLKJ5.144 BCHR,“NGOsCondemnImprisonmentandNationalityRevocationofPhotographerSayedAhmedal-Mousawi,”November25,2015,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/7661.145 BCHR,“Bahrain:TheAuthoritiesinBahrainContinuetheirCampaignagainstPhotographersbyArrestingandTorturinganotherPhotographer:AhmedAl-Mousawi,”February28,2014,http://bahrainrights.org/en/node/6779146 “ReportersWithoutBorderscondemnstheupholdingofimprisonmentsentenceagainstphotographerAhmedAl-Fardanfor3monthsbytheCourtofAppeal,”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror,February3,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/29153.html147 AmnestyInternational,“Bahrain:Photojournalistarrestedandtortured:AhmadFardan,”January7,2014,http://bit.ly/1kEFYrL.148 “PhotographerAl-Fardan:Iwastorturedandbeatenat«CriminalInvestigationDepartment,”[inArabic],Al Wasat News,January11,2014http://www.alwasatnews.com/4144/news/read/846318/1.html.149 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike,”September6,2011,http://bit.ly/1N5BjuP.150 ReportersWithoutBorders,“DetainedbloggerAbduljalilAl-Singaceonhungerstrike.”151 BCHR,“ActivistAbduljalilAlsingace’sblogblockedbyauthorities”,February13,2009,http://bit.ly/1Vzs497.152 PeterBeaumont,“BahrainOnlinefounderAliAbdulemambreakssilenceafterescapetoUK,”The Guardian,May10,2013,http://bit.ly/1Xl7OtN.153 “People&Power–Bahrain:Fightingforchange,”YouTubevideo,24:30,postedbyAlJazeeraEnglish,March9,2011,http://bit.ly/1Flun6y.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

otherfunctions.154MaliciouslinksareoftensentfromTwitterandFacebookaccountsimperson-atingwell-knownoppositionfigures,friends,155orevenaccountsofarrestedusers.156InOctober2015,atleastfourcaseswererecordedinwhichoppositionmembersreceivedemailscontainingmaliciousspyware.157

Giventhattheauthoritieshavebeenquicktoidentifysocialmediauserswhooperateunderapseudonym,manyusersareconcernedaboutrestrictionsontheabilitytouseICTsanonymously.TheTRArequiresuserstoprovideidentificationwhenusingWi-FiandWiMaxconnections,andthegovernmentprohibitsthesaleoruseofunregisteredprepaidmobilephones.158FurtherrestrictionsonthesaleofSIMcardswereintroducedinDecember2015.TheTRAissuedaregulationthatlimitsindividualsfrompurchasingnomorethan10pre-paidSIMcardsfromasingleserviceprovider.TheindividualsmustbepresentinpersonwhenregisteringtheSIMcardsandprovidersmustre-checktheidentityofallsubscribersonannualbasis.Fingerprintswillbeusedforsubscriberidentification.159Additionally,SIMcardswillonlybeavailableforsaledirectlyfromserviceproviders.160ThemovemayhaveaconnectiontorecentprosecutionsofindividualsaccusedusingSIMcardsinbombattacks.161

SinceMarch2009,theTRAhasmandatedthatalltelecommunicationscompanieskeeparecordofcustomers’phonecalls,emails,andwebsitevisitsforuptothreeyears.Thecompaniesarealsoobligedtoprovidethesecurityserviceswithaccesstosubscriberdatauponrequest.162Followingim-plementationoftheNationalSafetyStatusemergencylawinMarch2011,securitypersonnelbegansearchingmobilephonesatcheckpoints,behaviorthatwasdocumentedonYouTube.163

Cybercafesarealsosubjecttoincreasingsurveillance.Oversightoftheiroperationsiscoordinatedbyacommissionconsistingofmembersfromfourministries,whoworktoensurestrictcompliancewithrulesthatprohibitaccessforminorsandrequirethatallcomputerterminalsarefullyvisibletoobservers.164InMay2014,thegovernmentannouncedthatitisconsideringnewrestrictionsoncybercafes,includingtheenforcementofsurveillancecamerasaswellasstorageofuser’spersonalidentificationandactivity.165

ACyberSafetyDirectorateattheMinistryofStateforTelecommunicationsAffairswaslaunchedin

154 BahrainWatch,“HowTheGovernmentofBahrainAcquiredHackingTeam’sSpyware,”November13,2015,http://bit.ly/2bVNSQ5155 BahrainWatch,“TheIPSpyFiles:HowBahrain’sGovernmentSilencesAnonymousOnlineDissent”,May15,2013,accessedMarch31,2014,https://bahrainwatch.org/ipspy/viewreport.php.156 BahrainWatch,TwitterPost,March13,2015,12:28PM,https://twitter.com/BHWatch/status/576464787422339072.157 BahrainWatch,“UrgentSecurityAlertforBahrainiActivists,”October18,2015,http://bit.ly/2ba422J.158 GeoffreyBew,“TechnologyBillRapped,”Gulf Daily News,July20,2006,http://bit.ly/1UduN5E.159 “Adoptionoftheuseoffingerprinttorecordphonechip,”[inArabic]AlayamNewspaper,July28,2016,http://goo.gl/ytz8Zu.160 TRA,“TRAissuesSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”February7,2016,http://bit.ly/1Q1eK8l.andTRA,“ResolutionNo.(13)of2015,PromulgatingtheSIM-CardEnabledTelecommunicationsServicesRegistrationRegulation,”accessedAugust14,2016,http://bit.ly/2bv8bmV.161 “7and3yearsimprisonmentforthreeBahrainiswhohaveregisteredphonechipsinthenamesofAsians,”[inArabic]Alayam,November9,2015,http://goo.gl/hHqupc.162 GeoffreyBew,“BigBrother’MoveRapped,”Gulf Daily News,March25,2009,http://bit.ly/1MULfsL.163 pastdrivingwomanaofcontentmobileprivatethecheckingPoliceman]”,ةأرمافتاهشتفتماظنلاةقزترم:تارديونلا“acheckpointinareaofNuwaidrat]YouTubevideo,1:05,postedbyNuwaidratFeb,January2,2013,https://youtu.be/9an_lK57QTU.164 ReportersWithoutBorders,“CountriesUnderSurveillance:Bahrain.”165 “ThegovernmentplanstoinstallcamerasinInternetcafesandrecordidentity«forsecurityreasons»”[inArabic]Bahrain Mirror, May24,2014,http://bahrainmirror.com/news/16145.html.

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

November2013tomonitorwebsitesandsocialmedianetworks,ostensiblyto“ensuretheyarenotusedtoinstigateviolenceorterrorismanddisseminateliesandfallaciesthatposeathreattothekingdom’ssecurityandstability.”166TheIAAhadearliercreatedaunittomonitorsocialmediaandforeignnewswebsitesto“respondtofalseinformationthatsomechannelsbroadcast”in2011,whenitwasrunbythetelecommunicationsministry.167Ironically,theheadoftheIAA,IsaAl-Hammadi,wasdismissedfromallofhispositionsbyroyaldecreeinMarch2016168becauseofaphotohesharedoveraWhatsAppgroupandthencirculatedwidelyonsocialmedia.Thephotoshowedarudefingergesturewithabackgroundtextof“GoSports,”mockingasportseventsponsoredbytheking’ssonNasserbinHamad.169

AcomputercrimeslawwasapprovedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandratifiedbythegov-ernmentinDecember2014.Thelaw(60/2014)criminalizestheillegalaccessofinformationsys-tems,illegaleavesdroppingovertransmission,andtheaccessandpossessionofpornographicelectronicmaterials.170ItalsocriminalizestheencryptionofdatawithcriminalintentionsatatimewhenfreedomofexpressionisoftenconsideredacriminalactinBahrain.

Intimidation and Violence

Typically,arrestsofBahrainiusersinvolveextralegalmethodsofintimidation,suchasphysicalvi-olenceandtorture.Jaleelaal-SayedAmeen,whowasarrestedandputontrialforincitinghatredagainsttheregimeandinsultingtheking,wasreportedlysubjectedtoill-treatmentwhileheldatthecriminalinvestigationdepartmentandwaslatertakentotheprisonhospital.Shewasdeniedcon-tactwithherfamilyorlawyerforseveraldaysafterherarrestanddeniedvisitsfromherfamilyuntilthebeginningofMarch2015.171

Thegovernmenthasalsousedextralegalmethodstopunishusersfortheironlineposts.OnJanuary31,2015theministryofinteriorrevokedthecitizenshipofrenownedbloggerAliAbdulemam,172aswellasAlial-Dairi,thefounderofthepopularnewssiteBahrain Mirror.173Botharecurrentlylivingabroadandcontinuingtheirdigitalactivismfordemocracyinexile.InFebruary2016,AbdulkhaleqAbdulla(@Abdulkhaleq_UAE),aUAEcitizenandaprofessorofpoliticalsciencewasdeniedentryatBahrainairport,andwastoldheis“Personanongrata”174becauseofararetweetinwhichheindi-rectlycriticizedtherevokingofcitizenshiptohundredsofBahrainicitizens.175

166 “ShaikhFawazpraisesCyberSafetyDirectorate”,Bahrain News Agency,November18,2013http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/588716.167 AndySambridge,“Bahrainsetsupnewunitstomonitormediaoutput,”Arabian Business,May18,2011,http://bit.ly/1JmHKqP.168 BahrainMirror,“Bahrain’sKingDismissesInformationMinisterfromAllhisDuties,”March4,2016,http://bit.ly/2bgnzjX169 BahrainMirror,“Al-Hammadi’s“Finger”toNasserbinHamadCostedhimhisJob,”March4,2016,http://bahrainmirror.org/news/29814.html170 GeneralDirectorateofAnti-Corruption&Economic&ElectronicSecurity,LawNo.(60)fortheyear2014oninformationtechnologycrimes,[inArabic]accessedJuly31,2015,http://bit.ly/1QMpBFD.171 BCHR,“MarchChampionsforJustice:Bahrain’sImprisonedWomen,”March6,2015,http://bit.ly/1JQAf8T.172 “AliAbdulemam:‘IHaveNotLostMyIdentity.IAmBahraini.’,”Global Voices,February20,2015,http://bit.ly/1JQdXZd.173 BCHR,“Bahrainrevokescitizenshipof72people,includingjournalists,doctorsandactivists,”February02,2015,http://bit.ly/1Kr9isH.174 AbdulkhaleqAbdulla,TwitterPost,February18,2016,10:37AM,https://twitter.com/Abdulkhaleq_UAE/status/700388653755981825175 FreedomPrayers,TwitterPost,February19,2016,12:34AMhttps://twitter.com/FreedomPrayers/status/700599258370670592

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2016

www.freedomonthenet.org

BAHRAIN

Technical Attacks

Cyberattacksagainstoppositionandprogovernmentpages,aswellasotherwebsites,arecom-moninBahrain.AccountsoperatedbytheoppositionarefrequentlysubjectedtomassreportingcampaignstohavethemclosedbyTwitter.176InJune2015,BahrainiHumanRightsWatchSociety,agovernment-ownednongovernmentorganizationworkingtopromoteapositiveimageofthegov-ernment,statedthatitswebsiteandTwitteraccountwerehackedafewdaysbeforeitsparticipationinthe29thsessionoftheUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil(HRC)inGeneva.177InAugust2015,theTwitteraccountoftheFebruary14Coalitionwastemporarilyhacked.178InDecember2015,areportmentionedthattherearearound2,000to3,000electronicthreatspermonthonBahrainifirms.179Further,therewasanaverageof120weeklycyberattacksone-governmentsystemsinBah-rain,mainlyemanatingfromIran.180

176 BahrainDetainees,Twitterpost,May12,2015,8:23AM,Atweetmentioningoneoppositionaccountsthathasbeensuspendedduetoreports,accessedJuly31,2015https://twitter.com/BH14Detainees/status/598146464934547456.177 “Bahrainhumanrightswatchdogsaysvictimofhacking,”Arabian Business,June15,2015,http://bit.ly/1GWK7Rp.178 ManamaPress,TwitterPost,August14,2015,6:38AMhttps://twitter.com/ManamaPress/status/632184478325084160179 “Bahrainifirmsfacingcyberattackthreats,”Dilmun Times,accessedAugust14,2016,http://www.dilmun-times.com/?p=22072180 “EGovernmentAuthorityorganizesthefirstmeetingof“Hawksofinformationsecurity”tocounterelectronicintrusions,”[inArabic]BahrainNewsAgency,May12,2016,http://www.bna.bh/portal/news/726988.