BACKGROUND CHECKS & INSIDER

THREATS

Anton Olivier : Border Police

FOUNDATIONS Anton Olivier

34 Yrs Policing Service

26 Yrs Commission Officer

2 x GM Award recipient

(ACSA)

THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO VALUES

& ETHICS

SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING

• SAPS with a clear and critical role in the NASP

• The work of policing demands maximum cooperation with

stakeholders and Government departments

• Departments represented or operational at the airport

Dept of Home Affairs

Dept of Defence

Dept of Agriculture &

Fisheries

Dept of Transport

Dept of State Security

Dept of Environment

DIRCO

SARS

Dept of Health

Dept of

Communications

Dept of Energy

Dept of Tourism

Dept of Public

Enterprise

Dept of Public Works

Tourism Board

Traffic Police

SECURITY CONCEPT AND POLICING

KEY AGENCIES

SACAA Regulatory agency

• Standards

• Practices

• NASP/LASC

• Reporting of Acts of Unlawful Interference

• Implementation and compliance to Annex 17

ACSA - Specific Aviation security arrangements as per NASP

- Infrastructure& coordination of Aviation security role

players

AIRPORT COMMITTEES OF NOTE

• Security at an airport is coordinated through various statutory

committees which include among others:

• Local Airport Security Committee (LASC) Chaired by ACSA

Security

• Joint Planning Committee(JPC) chaired by ACSA(Landlord)

• Joint Operational Coordinating Committee (JOCOM) Chaired

by SAPS.

• Such collective functioning and approach plays a pivotal role

in all measures put in place to counter insider threat in the

environment.

SECURITY APPRECIATION &

CONSIDERATIONS

• SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider:

• SAPS have a command and control responsibility

during security related incidents and operations

• SAPS have a directing and managing responsibility

during security related incidents and operations

• Irrespective of other security deployments SAPS

operate in various critical areas

SECURITY APPRECIATION &

CONSIDERATIONS

• SAPS Border Police in its strategy had to consider:

• Acknowledge the presence of both long term and

short term security contracts taking care of a variety of

safeguarding and processes

• A Variety of airlines utilising contract security to secure

their aircraft and processes

• SAPS had to keep cognisance of their mandate

pertaining to the illegal movement of goods and

people

RECRUITMENT

• SAPS is present and deployed at airports that have

international status.

• Categories due to their status - commercial values.

• The busier the airport, the higher the number of personnel is

deployed.

• Police members recruited to be assigned with border policing

functions are recruited by the broader SAPS and are subjected

to security screening that includes their previous backgrounds;

this recruitment will also include the minimum requirement on

educational aspects.

SAPS PERSONNEL PLACEMENT

All SAPS members deployed at airports -

• Undergo an induction program

• The induction program is conducted in conjunction with ACSA

that includes all aspects of Aviation Safety and Security.

• Subjected to security checks - Z204 forms

• Committed offences or not conforming to the standards set,

are either removed from sector /permits confiscated / removed

from the environment

• Those found to have committed grossly misconduct are dealt

either departmentally or criminally.

SAPS STRATEGY

All operational areas in the airport have been demarcated

into smaller and manageable areas, and this concept has

been designed to cover the whole operational area to

include access points, inner perimeter control, outer

perimeter, terminals, land side and parking areas.

SAPS DEPLOYMENT Outer Perimeter – Access control

Baggage makeup area

Cargo Area /Warehouses

CSC(Crime Prevention)

Terminal Contact points

Valuable Cargo

Passenger movements

Firearm permits

Air side Sector

Land side Sector

OTHER SERVICES

• Permit application checks

• K9

• Intelligence gathering(CIG)

• Specialised

Investigations(DPCI)

• Explosives Ordinance

• Document specialists

• Firearm Officers

• Hostage negotiators

• Incident Investigators

• Response capacity

SAPS PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT

• All members charged with the functioning at air side are

subjected to the same AVOB training in which all stake

holders are subjected to.

• Aviation Learning Program -Understanding the ICAO

security standards , Annex 17 understanding the

corruption concept ,risks & threats

• Subject specialist training

BACKGROUND CHECK

A background check is the process of looking up and

compiling criminal records, commercial records and

financial records of an individual or an organization.

BACKGROUND CHECK

• A background check will investigate an individual`s

background based on criteria determined by their

prospective or current employer.

• A check of an individual`s background may include

previous employment, education, criminal record, credit

history, vehicle and license record checks.

• Each type of check will reveal different information

pertinent to that check and it forms part of the

employment process

• It again becomes part of the permit process

• The check is limited to a criminal background check

ADVANCED FORMS OF BACKGROUND

CHECKS & INVESTIGATIONS

• Banking business

• All forms of communication data

• Tracking

• Lifestyle Audit

• Advanced Linkages

• Polygraph

• Forensic Investigations

• Cloning

INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS

• ID number,Surname and date of birth.

• The information that the system

• retrieves and displays, will

• determine as to what is depth

• the applicant will be scrutinised.

• The information submitted by the applicant i.e. his/her home

address can also be used when scrutinising the information

the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject

criminal convictions.

INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS

• On the crim system the 1st phase check is

running by entering the applicants

surname, date of birth, population

group and gender. (The population group

is a mandatory requirement).

• Again the information that the system retrieves and displays, will determine as

to what is depth the applicant will be scrutinised. The information submitted by

the applicant i.e. his/her home address can also be used when scrutinising the

information the systems retrieves and displays to confirm or reject criminal

convictions.

INSIGHT INTO PERMIT APPLICATIONS

THE 2ND PHASE OF THE SEARCH IS THE APPLICANTS ID NUMBER ONLY.

• Often the applicants do not supply their ID numbers during their arrests.

• Spelling and typing errors also play a crucial role.

• Applicants do not always provide their given names, but nick names or “street

names”.

• Regional and local spelling of names and surnames.

• Applicants do not always provide their correct dates of birth during arrests.

• False ID documents have been presented, male person with female persons ID

number.

• ID fraud has on occasion found, the applicants ID number and/or names have

been used by someone else.

• If necessary conduct and interview with the applicant.

• The police official whom is conducting the checks might have a sense

• which's alerts him/her to conduct an in depth scrutinising of the applicant.

INSIDER THREAT

• An insider threat is a malicious threat to an organization

or industry that comes from people within the

organization, such as employees, former employees,

contractors or business associates, who have inside

information concerning the organization's security,

practices, data and procedures and systems

• In the aviation environment it alludes to the core of

aviation security and safety from within

CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH

• People working for or within our environments are aware of the

mechanisms in place and use this knowledge to circumvent our systems

• There is a gap between initial background checks and the time the

threat is unexpectedly materialise

• We need an approach to address these challenges by delivering these

capabilities in an solution that does not require a long-term data analysis

project.

• We need to know what to do when the warning signs are there

• Law enforcement structures historically focused on `successful` criminal

prosecution

• We need parallel solutions to close the gap between initial background

checks

CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

INSIDER THREAT DETECTION APPROACH

We need to develop a purpose-built program that speak to the heart of the

insider threat,

We need to detect multi high-risk activity, access, and events(activities) in

the aviation environment associated with insider threats.

There should be room for Insider Risk Intelligence within the framework

There is a need for visible rapid matrix indicator that can be populated to

indicate potential insider risk and threat levels

We need to consider a to develop a multi dimensional program that can

be multi populated though suspicious activities witnessed

CURRENT AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

ADVANTAGES

• It serves as an Insider threat intelligence tool to monitor , investigate and

report on risks in the aviation environment

• It serves as a predictive threat detection(Early detection)

• It serves as a contingency to mitigate the impact of a threat

• It serves as a program to close security gaps in a proactive manner

• It address comprehensive threat response and investigation

• It serves as a quantified, non-subjective threat and risk reporting tool

• It clean the industry / Mitigating threats

• It address both risk & loss management

• Industry Claim Credit / Earn respect

INSIDER THREAT CASE STUDIES

Insight in to insider threat incidents:

• Human smuggling/facilitation

• Contravention of Part 108

• Baggage manipulation(CTIA & ORTIA)

• Collaboration between staff

• SAPS Insider threats

• Syndicate linkages

WHEN SAPS & INDUSTRY WORK

TOGETHER

THANK YOU