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P-_/_-

Their quest for a idealistic utopia inevitably becomes apocalyptic fanaticism, as followers attempt tobring the ideal into reality

Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

Think of apocalyptic violence as a form of ultimate idealism, a Quest for spiritual Utopia. The word apocalypse derives fromthe Greek term for "revelation" or "uncovering." In Judaism and Christianity, the apocalyptic revelation came from God andconcerned a powerful event. In Christianity especially, the event came to be understood as the end ofthe world itself, or as a prophecyof that end. What gives these visions their allure is that such an end, involving untold vistas of destJ'uction, only foretold a newbeginning. All-consuming violence in obliterating a hopelessly corrupt world was, in fact, required for the hopeful and loftyrebirth that was to follow.Apocalyptic imagery exists in all the major religions. Since it is most specifically a part of Jewish and Christian doctrine, students ofreligion have rightly warned against invoking Western assumptions when interpreting Islam.But Islam contains its own versions of the apocalyptic, as in fact do secular proj ections of world destruction and recreationfound in extreme ideological movements like Communism and Fascism. Such ima2ery is part of a universal mythology ofdeath and rebirth. As the student of world mythology Joseph Campbell put it, "l)eath-and-rebirth, rebirth through ritual ... isan extremely ancient I ideal in the history of culture." Spiritual rebirth is a goal so desirable that the annihilation of everything elseon its behalf may feel justified. A recent statement by an Islamist zealot offers an indication of how far one might go on behalfof perfect spiritual renewal: "We believe in the principle of establishinghe Islamic moral and criminal code) even if this means thedeath of all mankind."

Examples of apocalyptic violence are everywhere in the world, though not always recognized as such when they come from ourpart of it. For instance, we think of Timothy McVeigh as a lone fanatic who in 1995 blew up the Murrah Federal Building inOklahoma City, killing 168 people, because he was enraged at his government. Such a characterization, however, neglects theapocalyptic dimensions of his act. He felt himself to be one of many believers dedicated to bringing a new world into being. Hisfervent hope was that in destroying a government building he would set off a chain reaction. Others, inspired by him,

Apocalyptic imagination does not have to be violent - we never expressed ours in that manner.Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

FROM TAME TO VIOLENT APOCALYPSE It is important to remember that historically the apocalyptic imagination has usuallybeen nonviolent in nature. Apocalyptic imagery provided assurance that God was in control of histOlY; that there was a "divinelypredetermined pattern of crisis. iudgment. and vindication"; that for those patient enough. a time of cleansing and rebirth was onits way. Indeed, such apocalypticism is "the mother of all Christian theology," and apocalyptic visions, Christian or otherwise,have flourished during times of great suffering. They have been powerful sources of hope for relief from pain. for the appearanceof God's iustice. for evil and suffering to give way to spiritual beauty and perfection.

SD

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REALISM BADMIMESIS KILLS HOPE

P /

Mimesis fails true politics in that it closes off hope for a transversal approach to politics. This is

necessary for understanding alternity,·and changing guaranteed epistemologica1 failure.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509­

533]

What a monstrous lie his brain would have to invent to catch up with and explain state of his senses! Before exploring thesignificance of aesthetic insights it is necessary to juxtapose them, if only briefly, to the prevailing wisdom of it scholarship.One perhaps could, with Jacques Derrida, speak of two nmdamentally different approaches. The first seeks to discover atruth or an originthat somehow escapes the necessity of interpretation.The second accepts or even affinns that representing thepolitical is a fonn of interpretation that is, by its very nature, incomplete and bound up with the values of the perceiver?Much of it scholarship has, undoubtedly, been conducted in the fonner, mimetic mode of representation. The mostinfluential contributions to the discipline, particularly in North America, continue to adhere almost exclusively to socialscientific conventions. They uphold the notion of a neutral observer and a cOlTespondingseparation of object and subject. 1.David Singer proudly announced during the behavioural revolution that 'there is no longer much doubt that we can make thestudy of international politics into a scientific discipline worthy of the name'. Much has changed since then, of course, butrepresentation is still widely seen as process of copin2:which. ideally. erases all traces of human interference so that the'artistic' end-product looks iust like the ori2:inal. Realism has made 'the real' into an obiect of desire, Hayden Whitewould say. Or, as one of the most influential contemporary methodology textbooks in political sciences states: 'the goalis to learn facts about the real world'. Mimetic approaches do not pay enou2:h attention to the relationship between therepresented and its representation. Indeed, they are not really theories of representation. Thev are theories a2:ainstrepresentation. But political reality does not exist in an a priori way. It comes into bein2:only throu2:h the process ofrepresentation. A political event, for instance, cannot determine from what perspective and in what context it is seen.Our effort to make sense of this event can. thus, never be reduced to the event itself. This is why representation'always raises the Question of what set of true statements we mi2:ht prefer to other sets of true statements'. It is a .process throu2:h which we or2:anise our understandin2: of reality. Note as well that even if the ideal of mimesis-aperfect resemblance between si2:nifier and si2:nified-was possible. it could offer us little political insi2:ht. It wouldmerelv replicate what is, and thus be as useless as 'as a facsimile of a text that is handed to us in answer to ourQuestion of how to interpret that text' .

5\

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AL T: TRANSVERSAL DISSENT

p I

Transversal dissent is a better agency to create true global change than analyses of statebehavior.

BLEIKER, 2000 [Roland; Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Ql,Jeensland,"Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg 16]

Questions of a2ency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. Thisbook demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence 210balpolitics at least as much as, say, a diplomatictreatise or a foreil!n policy decision. At a time when processes of 21obalisation are unfoldin2 and national boundariesare becomin2 increasin21y porous, states can no lon2er be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs.Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them.

They suggest, as mentioned above, that I!lobal life is better understood as a series of transversal strul!l!les that increasinl!lychaIlen2e what Richard Ashley called 'the paradi2m of sovereil!n rsicl. Transversal strul!l!les, Ashley emphasises, are not limited toestablished spheres of sovereil!ntv. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between

inside and outside. 18 And they have come to be increasinl!ly recol!nised as central aspects of I!lobal politics. James Rosenau is

among severa] scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of transversal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort

and play out the many contradictions at work in the global soene'.19

SL

ADI2005BRUSCHKE

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LOCAL ACTS OF RESISTENCE CAN LEAD TO GREAT GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE

Bleiker 2000

(Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I)

P /

Manifestations of popular dissent, such as street demonstrations, social movements and civil disobedience, have for longoccupied central positions in most political landscapes. The processes through which they exert human agency, however, haverecently undergone important transformations. In previous epochs, popular protests had a mostly local nature, that is, theirdynamic was one that directly opposed ruler and ruled. Bv the late twentieth century the nature of dissent has changedfundamentallv. The presence of mass media can transform a local act of resistance almost immediately into an event of globalsignificance. Images of a protest march may flicker over television screens worldwide only hours after people have taken to the

'street. As a result, the protest soon takes on a much larger, trans-territorial dimension.

DISSENT IS KEY TO IMPACTING TRANSNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCEBleiker 2000

(Roland, "Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics", pg. I)

Dissent has become a significant transnational phenomenon, reflecting and shaping various aspects of global politics. In fact,dissent has become what could be called a transversal phenomenon - a political practice that not onlv transgresses nationalboundaries, but also questions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the conductof international relations.

The term transversal draws attention to various political transformations that are currently taking place. It has emerged inresponse to a growing need to rethink the manner in which the domain of international relations has traditionallv beenconceptualised. David Campbell, for instance, argues convincingly that globalised life is best seen 'as a series of transversalstruggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or transnational relations'.2 The latter, he points out, !!.!:!:

modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currentlv being questioned. Bv contrast, toconceptualise global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multi-layered interactions thatmake up contemporary life. It is to recognise the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital - in shOlt, 'the increasingirruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons'.3

56

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The greatest movements began by not engaging in direct state politics

Bleiker 200 I

(Ronald, Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics)

p /

But there are still several missing links between an individualistic anarchist revival of la Boetie and a theo,·y of collectiveresistance. Romantic dissent focuses on the primacy of the perceiver and the poetisation of political practice. This pushesromantics, at least according to the influential opinion of Carl Schmitt, towards a situation in which conflicts are notaddressed, but deferred, subjectified, transplanted into a higher realm of aesthetic imagination.3! Some even claim thatromantic thought contains, by definition, a conservative co,·e.32 One can argue with such an interpretations, and I shall do solater. What matters at this point however, is that the anarchist romantic generally does not seek political power, but despises

.and circumvents it. Thoreau engaged in the struggle around slavery by withdrawiDl! from the state that endorses thisrepressive practice. He returned to the woods to Walden Pond, retreating into the ultimate source of the romantic world-view,the Self. This anarchist form of individualism was subversive on many accounts, but it was perceived to lack the element ofimmediate and direct social engagement. From theory to practice, from individual to collective action. Some of the laterromantics tried to add a more direct political dimension to the already subversive Thoreauean foundations. They shifted thepractice of withdrawing consent from detachment to engagement, and from individualism to collective action. With this movearose a coherent tradition of popular dissent and an equally powerful assertion of human agency - one that came to influencepolitical dynamics in ever-more parts of the world.The more la Boetie's legacy spread beyond national boundaries, the more it became intertwined with the emerging anarchistmovement. By the end of the nineteenth century leading anarchist historians, such as Max Nettlau and Ernst Victor Zenker,portrayed la Boetie as an important intellectual precursor to the likes of Pierre Joseph Proud-hon, Mikhail Bakunin, PetrKropotkin, Max Stirner or Emma Goldman.33 One can, indeed, hear la Boetie's voice resonating in Stirner's claim that if thelabourer acts upon the insight that 'his' power is 'his' property, the state simply crumbles.34 By the eady twentieth centuryseveral anarchists started to draw directly upon la Boetie. Gustav Landauer, one of the key figures in the German anarchistmovement, constructed his central arguments around a discussion of the Anti- One. Bart de Ligt, a prominent Dutch anarcho­pacifist relied upon la Boetie, and so did Simone Weil in her unusual fusion of Anarchism, Marxism, Stoicism and Christianmysticism.35 But to understand how radical popular dissent gained prominence in various parts of the world, we must reachfurther back and observe what precisely occurred when la Boetie's intellectual legacy came of age during the transition fromthe nineteenth to the twentieth century.

~

ADI2005BRUSCHKE

REALISM BADAL T: AESTHETICS

Our project employs aesthetics in order to challenge mimesis.

P /

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30; No.3, pp. 509­

533]

Although most approaches to international political theory remain wedded to mimetic principles, an increasingnumber of scholars are confronting the question af representation. One could, indeed, speak af an actual aesthetic turn.To be more precise, this turn has been generated through two interrelated shifts in the production af knowledge aboutworld politics. The first occurred in the 1980s, when so-called postmodern scholars begun to challenge the positivistfoundations af international theory. It then became possible to recognise a number af ensuing political implications,including the reproduction af cultures afviolence as well as their state-centric and masculine nature. A second and equallysi2nificant shift took place in more recent years. as various scholars have started to think throu2h the implicationsof the postmodern critique. They beeun to explore different forms of insi2ht into world politics. includin2 thosethat emeree from ima2es. narratives and sounds. such as literature. visual art. music. cinema and other sourcesthat extend beyond 'hi2h art' into popular culture. Of course, not all of the ensuing endeavours are necessarilyconvincing. Nor do they supersede the need for more conventional social scientific inquiries. But aesthetic approaches haveinitiated an important process of broadening our understanding of world politics beyond a relatively narrow academicdiscipline that has come to entrench many af the political problems it seemingly seeks to address and solve. The keychallenge ahead consists of finding ways to reclaim the political value afthe aesthetic. To do so is no easy task, for themodern triumph aftechnological reason has by and large eclipsed the aesthetic from our political purview. Overcoming theensuing construction of common sense would amount to far more than simply adding an additional, sensual layer ofinterpretation. The aesthetic turn reorients our very understanding of the political: it engenders a significant shift awayIToma model of thought that equates knowledge with the mimetic recognition of external appearances towards an approachthat generates a more diverse but also more direct encounter with the political. The latter allows for productive interactionsacross different faculties, including sensibility, imagination and reason, without any of them annihilating the unique positionand insight of the other.

5'5

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Aesthetics is net beneficial as it is both accessible and allows space for alternatives,

while advancing a framework that challenges mimesis.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.

30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

First, for all their theoretical engagement with the later Wittgenstein, postmodern writings have fallenshort of recognising the practical significance of language games. Many postmodern texts remain buried in ahighly abstract and inaccessible language that has, at times, become as predictable as the practices theyseek to oppose. As a result, the critical insi2ht they may contain has failed to reach the broad audiencenecessary to achieve social transformation. The issue is. of course. not easy. The innovative potential ofa text emerges precisely from its refusal to take existin2 linguistic conventions for granted. from theattempt to search for new ways of speaking about issues that had been rendered un problematicthrou2h a series of worn out metaphors. But a text can. of course. not depart too radicallv from existinglinguistic conventions either: to do so would be to construct a private language that loses its socialdimension. The key task. then. is to walk a fine line between these two extremes; a challenge thatremains by and large unmet. A second and related shortcoming of early postmodern contributions is theirfocus on criticising/deconstructing the shortcomings of dominant Realist and Liberal approaches tointernational political theory. While essential at a time when there was little space for alternative knowledge,this process of critique has nevertheless limited the potential of postmodem contributions. Discourses ofpower politics and their framing of political practice cannot overcome all existing theoretical andpractical. dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodoxapproaches to IR. the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursiveboundaries that were established through the initial framing of these debates.

t;h

ADI 2005BRUSCHKE REALISM BAD

p /

The deployment is necessary to engage gaps in the resolution.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol.30, No.3, pp. 509-533]

Whether in the form of images. narratives or sounds. aesthetics not only adds layers of perceptionor sensation, but also promotes interactions among different faculties. Kant saw judgements ofthe beautiful and the sublime as examples of instances where no faculty rules over others.Aesthetic judgements are Questions of taste that take place somewhere in the 'middle betweenunderstanding and reason'~ without either of these determining the rules for identifying theobject that is to be judged.8oIndeed, Kant went one step fi1l1herand granted the feeling of pleasure or displeasure its own constitutive status,

which is to say that it became irreducible to any other faculty. 81 But even though we perceive and judge a work of art through means that are constitutive, weneed to rely on other faculties, including reason, to process these perceptions and judgements. Even a visual image is never located in a separatedaesthetic realm. The perceived effects of a painting,. for instance, are clearly different rrom the process of understanding and judging them, yet alone

communicating the so-experienced sensation to others. The latter is a linguistic process. even though it originatesin and refers to a non-linguistic realm. This is why understanding art. or politics for that matter.expresses an aesthetic relationship not only to a given object, but also to the 'history of itseffect' .82 Sensibility and imagination can offer an encounter with this history. They can reorientour thoughts in a way that a mimetic process of recognition cannot. It is in this sense that awork of art can serve as an example of thought that generates productive flows betweensensibility and reason, memory and imagination or between 'mind, body and soul, thought,power and desire' .83

51

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A 1+: li0 'Pi:::

P /

Hope and Imagination are interconnected is needed to find a better path of life.

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

IIwrite this book 10 a spirit of hope. tI0pe is alway~ bound

up with the reach of our imagination. We have the capacity

to probe painful truths in connection with all apocalyptic

viol~nce, and to make contact with the human suffering

i~yed. With such imaginative acts, we begin to takesmall steps in alternative directions. That convictionj1as

!:JCenpart of all of my work on twentieth-century excess.

Here I think of an experience I had in the early stages

of my study of Nazi doctors. After my first set of inter­

views in Germany, I went to see a friend of mine, an----------------------Auschwitz survivor who was keenly interested in the

work, As we sat over coffee, I said to him in a tone that

w~~ without a bit of self-pity: "I appreciate your

e~2co_I!.E?K~.::.~S~'!.t the truth is that I've begun to have

terrible dreams. In my dreams I'm behind barbed wire i~some kind of a camp, Worse than that, my wife, and at

times my two children, are there in the camp with me."

My friend looked directly at me and answered in a-----,-------'-------------matter-of-fact tone' that was neither unkind nor especially

sympathetic, "Good, now you can do the st~dy." ~

telling me that unless I took in some sm" 11 part of the pct;U

of the victims, the work would h;Jvt>littlt> si[':ni f)c:ulce.

w ~C;~a

ADI2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

~ ~

p /

Over time, that conversation took on broader meaning

for me. We need to bear witness, compassionately, to the

destructive ev.ents of our era if we are to embark on a~ore humane ~ourse. In that sense the researcher's task------:----- .~

extends ever outward. It is not that any study or set of

~rvations :can themselves bring about measurable

~change. Rath~r, su~ imaginative efforts enter into tIleconfusions and possibilities of collective consciousness. Mybelief is that it takes a certain amount of critical and

e~pathic energy from many directions to enable any

society to begin to chart a wiser course. This is painfully

true of our re'sponses to large-scale killing and dyi nE' and

o~ attempts _ to interrupt that proces0 All this wasimplicit in th~t little conversation ~ith my friend.

9\~

ADI2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

/i \+~',s~0,-'( C{ T3clu{ ({ ss

p I

OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO MAINTATIN AN ILLUSION OF

INVULNERABILITY WHICH PREVENTS THE SUPERPOWER AND WORLDIT ACTS UPON TO BECOME DANGEROUSLY DESTABILIZED.

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)pp 129-120

r ~t the hear;t of the superpower syndrome then is the need

to eliminate a'vulnerability that, as the antithesis-.2f omni po-

"" tence, contairis the basic con tr;:]~ of the syndrome. For

\vulnerabilit;~bn n_<=yer~eelirninated, either by a nation or

ill! indi";d~. In seeking its elimination, the superRo~r

finds itself 0[,1 a psychological treadmill. The idea .of vul­

nerability is i;tolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. ~_

tion is to maintain an illusion of invulllr:rtJkility But theI

s~wer \:hen mn<:..-the danger of taking increasingly9raconian ac:tions to sustain that illusion. For to do oth­

erwise would be to surrender the cherished status ofsuperpower. ,

Other nations have experiences in the world that

render them and their citizens all too aware of the essen­

tial vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influ­

enced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in

the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an

aspect of hl;man mortality. ]:'To such reality can be

acceptetl hy t/,nse clinging to a sense of omnipoten~. ~.At issue is;the experience of death anxiety, which is the

strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep-

seated sense ot vllineraollll)l e<l II ::'Ulllt:LlIllCjut: aCKllUW1­

edged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at

times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that

there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. ~those leaders nonetheless remain committed to elimi­

nating precisely that vulnerability-committed, that is, to

the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is

repeatedly undennined-whether by large-scale terrorist

acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to

American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle

East~both the superpower. and the worJd it acts upon

may become dangerously destabilized.-J...1 ~1J

ADI2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

if

OCUV)

p /

The objection of our "ownership of history" will allow us to rid ourselves of fabricated fear

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)-I To renounce the claim to total power would bring reliefnot

only to everyone else, but, soon enough, to citizens of the

superpower itself. For to live out superpower syndrome is

to place oneself on a treadmill that eventually has to breakdown. In its efforts to rule the world and to determine his­

tory, the United States is, in actuality, working against

itself, subj eeting itself to constant fail me. It becoIn,t::s a Sisy­

phus with bombs, able to set off explosions but unable to

cope with its own burden, unable to roll its heavy stone to

the top of the hill in Hades. Perhaps the crucial step in rid­

ding ourselves of superpower syndrome is recognizing that

history cannot be controlled, fluidly or otherwise.

Stepping off the superpower treadmill would also--enable us to cease beinz ;1 nation ruled by fea:::

l\.enounClng qmnipotence might make our leaders-or at

l~st future leaders-themselves less fearful of weakness]and diminish theIr 1l1ClInatlOnto 1l1still fear in their people

~~means of :enhst1l1g them for military efforts at ilh~ry

world hegerriony. Without the need for invulnerability,everyone wotild have much less to be afraid of.

ADI2K5BRUSCHKE

~

REALISM BADp

\\I

/

What we call the historical process ~gely unpre­

dictable, never completely manageable. All the mor~ at

a time of radical questioning of the phenomenon of na tion­alism and its nineteenth- and twentieth-century excesses.

I~ addition, t&erehas been a general decline in confidence~I C _

in the nation state, and in its ability to protect its peopk1fO~larger world J?roblems such as global warming or weapons

of~1ass-~tr~ction. The quick but dangerous substit~___ T_--; .....--. _ .'.

the superpow:er, which seeks to fill the void with a global-~d, militari~ed extension of American nationalism. The

traditiona ~tate whatever its shortcomings, could at

least claim to be grounded in a specific geographic area and

a.2articular people or cpmbination of peoples. The super­power claims'to "represent" everyone on earth, but it lackslegitimacy in the eyes of those it seeks to dominate, while its

l~aders glust struggle to 1ll:-1sk QLS.l!.j2,presstheir own doubts--" ...". -,

about any such legitimacy._._._---~~The Amei"ican superpower is an artificial construct,"-

widely perceIved. as. illegitirrL,ne"-.whateve,r .the ac~uies-cence it coerCes inothe~. Its reign is therefore inherentlyunst;bk. Indeed, its reach for full-scale world domination

marks the beginning of its decline. A large task for the;~,,-~-----"<.=- -"..,'"world, and for Americans in particular, is the early reco..g-

_~tio~:~~_ hu.:::a~:..:::anage..:nent of that decline.)

/'

~L.~

ADI2KSBRUSCHKE P

REALISM BAD/

A) r DeCoV)SfrUch'oln

ALTERNATIVE

WE MUST DECONSTRUCT POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND ITS DOMINANTREPRESENT ATIONS OF THE WORLD TO FURTHER UNDERSTANDFOREIGN POLITICSCampbell 1992

(Davi~, Prof~ssor of Interna~ional P.olitics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecunty: Ulllte~_States Forelgn_Po~lcy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 7,8)

, ~or the most part, however, thes.e developments have been repre- ;'"sented in ways that do not depart dramatically from those dominant during ':' ; .the cold war. To be sure, they are not represented as being reducible to,

, Soviet behavior, I3ut these challen~es are represented as dangers lo~ed inlI an external and anarc.hic environment which threaten the security of an \

internal and d~s{ic societv, ofttffVia-reeOHfse.to-viOlenn;.-TliiSProvo-Kj'I:~~at functioiis have difference, danger, and otherness played in ';; constituting the identit of the Unit,," ~ta~....a.JnajDf actor in....IDt..\,national politics? To pose the question in these terms, however, is a little

ini!i-re'imiTig~( It is not intended to suggest either that it is a strict functionalrequirement of American identity that difference and danger be articulatedas otherness, or that only certain groups or phenomena can be other. As

!:21L9.lllt_~.rgY.~~_,_~i~_!.~~£ES!:_to ths"S2!lti ne.!.n.~11U1Lrb~!l~n d ",~.ls.;

repression of certain se~'-!.al.p..!'\!s.!iceUrLt~e ni~_~enth century~~s.:y"e.J~.~f'L r:~tio!:!.'D!.tJ.b.£.!~§.!;ilivg.LQ.~-r.e}l.ujj,".ed,.b¥..•.l.I.\l\-.!Jg~"Q,i"~=.iLQ.mWkl!iQ.!'\:,;,1l1~.

bourgeoisie wa~ i~ ~.not".iu_tb"c..m<k<LQ.J;..tl~p'h~eIJ.QQ..£t0!~"ti 19.~atlOn, ut in the Rrocedural.§.Y.ste_ITI..th~<.?..'!g!l..~hich~~UC~.sbl;:'ill.Q.S~~~~!.s..52flZ!$;.5L::J.!1-2£t~_~':>.l..~~~P~,.£~0.0.~the!. thanthose targeted could have been the objects of surveillance and discw.lin~,~~~£~§~h1Zh~~~~edEFn~£§nt~~:~~~'"ac..s~i~~i,

In [his context, for the United States, the current perioA-in world/.~, II politics can be understood ..as being characterized by the representation ofJ<j )-::.ncwe;T"chalienge;fn terms ofrraditwnal analytics, and the varie<rattemptsto

t"> C0iepla-Ce-one-en-cmy·'wl'tll(an')other."1n conseilin~~:th~~argu~m"to-Bl:-I'\"'," ",J, ~;JeheresuggesEnnar~~~L~.~~I~~~~~~~~e~~ \.;c,'j' -=.hallenges; a~?~p~~~:~,.Ls~S~.Q~~.~~2;1~~~!.~I(J.'~WS;;:~'s~~R".t!}J1~· \- ',' ... t r:i!E£J:!~i'.~S~,~~!~~3;;,~,~.~~!!.~~1~,.!9..[,,~,gR~<?.h.s~~l.?~~~!b~,§~qi,lJ\fg~,«~i!.t19.l~H~§'.

. 1 by which they are calculated as dangers, and the means by which they come, .•.• ,""< __i;"t-'f: tto"jcotFler~·'>W~~:-:;~":"'-:!-I"·'>;~-":""f:"!~~'~r.?'-":~:.'~~·,"",~""l;:''''''!':=_1'o'.~~M:1""'~IM-'~:W-""""__.I""'o"""'''''~''''''''__~''''''>·'>':>;.":j''''''''''''''''''''''~;:;:__ ~.

(1) ('!;,j"·~~ing. the ,issue of th~ role dan~er and difference ~.- constItuting the Identity of the UIIlted States lIIvolves 3. deconstructIOn of

.~t\ c.:?.!2..ventionalQolitical discourse and its sdf-presentatio~n,~t

.".-:"'- effected in the practice and analysis of both international relations and

~:;~ ~. forcign pol~n reorienting analy~~ from :he conc<:rn :v~th the inJIT1tio~~"~Ot:~Wacts of pregiven subjects to the Qroblematlc.ofsubJectlvlty,: the argument

~t~ 'beiJ],g made here proposes that. Unit~tes foreign policy be understood

,\~ -. :-:r--.:( as a political practice central to me constItutIOn, proauction, and main.-.c"tv' .' teniiiceof Americ~a_llP(JJitical identi~y. In order to delineate more...p.a:.ci~.

" .' th;7ei'a.iTonshfPbetween foreign po.licy. and political iden~itV" this ar~ument

, ,~~ IS predIcated upon a reconcepruahzatlon of understandmgs to which the'-~tconven!!onarVi~ international reJatio?s ~nd fo~eign .policy is deeply.,'{Ji indebted: most spegfj~econceptuahzat1on of IdentItY and the state.

------'. '1 '

G~

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BADp I

A- \ t:Re'\ e{t Rfy l \'sVvJ___U 1'-.11

em bV'C1ce U1CfJ-Fi/f'V}c:e

We must reject realism and embrace a thinking based on acceptance of differenceCampbell 1992(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecurity: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 4.5)

, "d"Uut there are alternative ways to think, and this book exhibits acommitment to one of them. ~ntrary tSL.!.hectaiC1h'i-IlLcpis.t=ic,.J;e.alislJ.1, r

argue that as understanding, inv?l'::~,L~S.P}J£El!1,g,lb,s"}'))Jfilm!l\.~J.,hl"Eh~,~,S!:JE!,1.~~~; ~·,.,~.t2<2",[:~~iIF~X;,:".t,r,l(2?s:!;r~GY~5;:i~,J:'!.l..JD\?J.~.sE~.~!:?'.,.~,~_!2S«W~.l!,}~;;;n?J;;~5.~.~),?~~..;~~,~.~"

, , ~!2at there i~.,~~.o~!.Jl.DJ!;...£,y,s~.Lg.52,.,.'£,Lg.~~;~;~!,;~~:Contrary to a narratlVlZlOhl':;!:()[logr:.rphv,I employ a mode of historical representation w ich self-conscIOusly adopts a perspectIve. Anu contrary to the 10 IC of eXDlanation:-rembrace a logic 0' II1terpretatlOn that acknowledges the improbability ofcatalo in " calcularing, and specifying the 'real causcs,' and concerns itselfinstead with considenn tIe mam cst po mca consequences of adoptiI?gOlle mOl eo' ' 'p' ',' ' on over another.

As such, the argument being made here is parr of an emergingdissident literature in international relations which draws sustenance from aseries of modern thinkers who have focused Oil historically specific modes ofdiscoursc rather than the supposedly independent realms of subjects and

objects. II Starting from the position that social and political life comprises" aset of practices in which things are constituted in the process of dealing with

them, this dissent docs not(and does not desire to) constitute a discretemethodolOgiC<ll sch601 claiming to magically illuminate the previously darkri:cesses of global l)()!itics. Nor is it the dissent of a self-confident andsingular figure claiming to know the error oLdl previous ways and offeringsalvation from all theoretical sin. Rather, this form of dissent emer~es froma dis Jaratc and sometimes divergent se;;;;~ of encounters"between the

~aditio!ls of internationa re anons an' themes increasingly prominent 111other realms of social and olitical inc uirv. It i.' , .

celebmtes difference; the proliferation of perspectives, dimensions and

approaches to the very real dilemmas of global life. It is a form of dissentWhICh celebrates the artlcularity and context-bound nature of judgements

. and assessments, not because it favors a so-ca e re attvlst retreat into the

i!1eommensura lIt 0 alternatives, but because it recognizes the universal­.. ist conceits of all attempts to force difference mto t e straIt ac et of,identIty. t IS a form of dissent s eptlca, ut not cynical - about the

"/~radltIOns 01 mternational relatiorrtand theIr e)anns of adequacy to reality. 1t~s a form of dissent that is concerned not to seek a better fit between

:hought a?d the world, ,lane:uap'c .ann matt:r, prop,osltlon and facr. vn tl!eontrary, It a form of dlSSe 'uestIons the very way our problems

have been osed in these terms and the eonstramts WIt I .' ey 1ave

beencQnsidered, and focuses inste,adonthe way the world has been made jhistorically posgQle. 13_? ' :=..J

(,ct

ADI 2005BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

P-_/_-

AL T - experiencing animating guilt allows us to overcome the apocalyptic mentality and change theworld

Lifton in 2003 (Robert, Super Power Syndrome)

Like Harry Truman facing his nuclear choice in 1945, most American soldiers sent into battle in Vietnam in those war yearsof the late 1960s found themselyes thrown into an atrocity-producing situation for which they were utterly unprepared. Butwhat I also learned from Vietnam veterans-in the early 1970s I participated in psychologically intense "rap groups" with manywho had turned against the war and wished to examine their behavior in fighting it-was that people need not bepsychologically stuck forever in such moments. Men and women could experience what I came to think of as "animating guilt"and use it as a means of reiecting the overall American mission in Vietnam and their own part in it. They could expresspainful forms of self-condemnation without remaining fixed in a static. mea culpa stance. Rather. they were capable of leavingboth the atrocity-producing situation and the overall apocalvptic mission by transforming those guilt feelings into a sense ofresponsibilitv in opposing the war and revealing its grotesque details to the American people-all the while insisting that ourleaders and our society acknowledge responsibility for what was being done in our name thousands of miles away.

More recently. Israeli soldiers, sometimes citing the American experience in Vietnam as a model. have similarly come tooppose their war, their country's occupation of Palestinian lands and its army's brutal treatment of Palestinians, by refusing tofight in the occupied territories. Calling their group Courage to Refuse. they declare: "We shall not continue to fight beyond the1967 borders in order to dominate, expel. starve, and humiliate an entire people." They too have demonstrated an impressivecapacity to transform guilt feelings into expressions of responsibility in seeking to redirect their society toward a more humanepath.

Both groups had to overcome the psychic numbing associated with their countries' impulses toward violent purification andallow previously suppressed compassionate feelings to surface. A further interesting parallel to these two situations can befound in the animating guilt of people who were involved in the making of, or strategic planning for, atomic and hydrogenbombs and were later able to become powerful and knowledgeable voices warning the world about nuclear dangers.

fat;

ADI2005BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

AfT: PERM; REALISM KILLS LOCAL

p /

Any inclusion of a realist approach necessarily reestablishes the destructive power order as

well as destroying the local.

BLEIKER, 2001 [Roland Bleiker, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2001. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 509­533]

To broaden our knowlede:e of the international does. however. require more than simply addine a few additional lavers ofinterpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thoue:ht and action: a shift away from harmoniouscommon sense imposed bv a few dominant faculties towards a model of thou2:ht that enables productive flows across avariety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter,from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbine: thoue:ht towards approaches that add to our understandine:and. indeed. force us to think into world politics and the tools available to pursue them. They have elevated a few selectfaculties. reason in particular. and e:iven them the power to order all others. The result is the erasure of a crucial location of

political struee:les. the domain of representation. from our purview. This is why Waltz's otherwise commendable attempt tomove away from resemblance and recognition ends up in a science-driven process of abstraction that isolates a few select features

and produces generalities trom them. The problem here is not with abstraction per se for abstraction is an inevitable component ofany process of representation. 'We end up with abstraction whether we want "it" or not', Christine Sylvester stresses.41 ButWaltzian abstraction is obsessed with deduction, categorisation and scientific legitimacy. Rather than celebrating the diversity oflife and drawing from its sensual potentials, as abstraction in art seeks to do, the neorealist version 'blocks the construction of

people in international relations and hinders our view of states as more than the proverbial empty boxes'.42 The result is a narrowand problematic form of common sense. This is why even the more moderate constructivist scholars rely on analytical tools that arelargely confmed to mimetic principles. Consider Wendt's highly indicative position that knowledge needs to be both systematic andscientific to be of any value. He stresses that '[p]oetry, literature and other humanistic disciplines ... are not designed to explainglobal war or Third World poverty, and as such if we want to solve those problems our best hope, slim as it maybe, is socialscience'. Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding ofthe international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry,especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to tmderstand and engage the crucial problem ofrepresentation. We need to employ the full register of hwnan perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of worldpolitics and to address the dilemmas that emanate trom them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greatervariety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretativerepertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once wescrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

0.0

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

Ad :PC'VYrl

P /

AT: PERMSTATE-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS RECREATE THE STATE'S NEED TOEMPOWER ITSELF BY CREATING THREATSCampbell 1992(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecurity: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 11,12)

-~ ~~.~r;:.g;?:~~_Q.Lths;!.s~~P'SSi,~5~_!~~!;~ .~~~I_'!,!12~~understimd national states as unavoidably paradoxical entities which do nonj?ossess "p'reciis~rsive, stabie1(rentm'es~s'-aCOi~nce";-~l!rsta"i:e'r-afe:'n~;'~k;';rb~~~;'T;ili;;;~~tte'nsl';;;';'"bet;~';;'~~thevarious domains that need to be;a igned for an 'imagined )olitical communit ' to come into being - such asterritoriality and the many axes of identity - and the deman t 1at such analignment is a response to (rather than constittJt1ve of) a prior ami stableidentIty. In other WOfdS', states are nev finish as enti· ,the ensi n~1 the demands of i( entitv and the practices that constitute it ~never be fully resolved, because the erforma' of identit cannever e u y revealed. 'Chis paradox inherent to s~ir be~~,,~~~i.!Lpermaner;"t~1eed of rep,~~du~tio.~!;\!5!.I~J;;i£~L?_~~~~~~P,~:51~~m~ and vanea-'pia~tIces that constituj£ the~ reali ty ,y~§. are (arid!1a'ffi..lQJ?$).J1b:v~~~s of be.9omL~ For a sF'!-ts...~end its !2.rac"sLs!<sof representation would be to expose its lack of prediscu rSIve'roUnaations;

Sta$i1CW5TII(:M5'€-dC31l1.5'3""""'-"--~--~"~--"-~--~~··-"':"'-"'"'"~""·~~·'·''.'.~~~~'~i';;~";;;;;g't!le'crrlveto Ex the state's identity and contain challenges tothe state' s ~Rresef17~;~;;t;;;rTy=;;-r-;E'sorureTysuccee(r'KSlde"Tro'mrecog-;;Er~~t~I;';"t"·'~h~;';·i~;;~"aii"exc·eSr'Orbe;ngov'er~appearance tha tcannot be contained by disciplinary practices implicated in state formation,

\\'ere it possible to reduce all being to appearance, and were it possible tobring about the absence of movement which' in that reduction of being toappearance would characterize pure security, it would be at that momentthat the state withers away34 Ai that point all identities would hayecongealed, all challengcs would ]~ve evaporated, and all need for dis~i­plmary authorIties and their fields of force would have vanished. Should the---" .. -------------~._-----.s.tatc project of securIty bc successful in the terms in whiQ.l.Li1j;ulrtjcul~d,t!1Cstatc viotTIucease to eXlst.Secuflty as the absence of movement would'~esult in death ViastasIs. IronIcally, then the in' .. of the state roject'ciT

~Ity to slIccee , IS t e guarantor of the state's continued success as an, . ·'lIing identity.~ .

Col

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

A-d.~~R1/M

P /----

AT: PERM

REALISM CAN NEVER UNDERSTAND DIFFERENCES AS IT SUPERCHARGESIDENTITY PREVENTING ANY UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHERCampbell 1992(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 70-71)

Th~.s2.ral impetus behind the location of threats in the external-'realm -;;mes fro 1;- the fact that the sovereign domain, for all its identifica­iio';1'as :l\verr-orJCrcd and-;:;;'tio;al' entitY:-;sa:~-mucha site of anlbi~ui!~

·ijld§.~~·;;·~0:.~Y~:.~~2.~~~ili1-;;--~€ili~,lLI0TI;~i~~h~SI.:.f~l.~~-Whe~ ~ •.,speak of 'man' we arc refernng to more than Just Individuals or nationaltypes; thc meaning of 'man' incorporates the form of the 'domestic' order,the social relations of production, the various subjectivities to which theygive rise, the groups (such as women) who are are marginalized inJ:b.~process; and the boundaries of legitimate social and political actionjIt iseasier to recognize the constructed character of 'man' in societies other thanour own (consider the attention given to 'socialist man')46 than to acknow­ledge the centrality of this practice to the 'West. ,47 But the~, in

principie at leas t, _a..!~:!~~~i,~!~~~.,2f.":y'~~jD=~~bi9.hS\!QS;fy"...9.~nJJ.£;.J;i)"J.:!~.tLm~s~:the poss ibi I i ties are. 1imi te~<l.\m!yJ?Y"JJ.lewP.J.i!r;.t.!S~4'u~:ll!~!!'JQG.4S,"9.11,J;.c.r.~<J,.HJ

d;·;1~eis:'ii;c'·~·'~;;~;,{6~!JI~~,,,.~E·i..,S9nG.c.\D~"e,~hiQiJe,g~.9y>,,~.b~,"JlniJs~«.§.t,~t~§,'I~;;'iiTg'~;;'tro;1'~I\J'Naturalizati()n Service questionnaire. But such dangers are

Hot objective c()nd~~2 .•E2l.JiD,mlY~~~~R'f~';;$.V$.Ql m..~l.1.~._-- ...•._ •._ ..__ •...~_ ...

.~.J.'~~na.1.reaJm. Threats to identity are equally prevalent in the challenges to

the don1inaiir' enframing of 'man' from within. For some, feminism'~hom?sexuality, and ~..!lJ.?port1'0: social ownership of the reI~.t\.Qn.L2L£.!£­~~~9s:3re.Jhrej,llLtQJ2.~_G.9..D.:>1..Qs:J:f..sLas on a par wi tlUL, for8gl1...£]~rn'y.~,~~rib~,:\1~,dOo!}L~!!lL:2~l~x,J_:!.!'iy~\!}~~l..~~"ism~"''\,y.!Jl<!.~jQ.rl,~pL..t),)£.~gJJ!,."e:;

!!~~2.~~...r,!:~,0,~,1,JLJI"Q.),lbl.s...~~sL'l~n. The interpretations of domesticsocIety resIstant to its inscription must be excluded from the internal reaJm:

'.In effect, differences, discontinuities, and conflicts that might be fOlllly\w~ 01"". oed dm" mn" bo oo",enod ;"'0 '" '"'010<0 dlff,,,"c, ibelWee1l a domam of domestIc socIety, understood as an identity and a >

domain of ~narchy, understood as at once am bigl!.o.us, .il1detenniJ~;te, an~j.,,':

~1gerolls.' s,-,or11ismSf exclllSlon'lSfrultclle<.f by a second, the purpose of\which is to 'hide' the status of the first (IS an exclusion. For the inscription 01'1

domestic society to appear as llnproblematic, it is not possible for it to beunderstood as having the status of one interpretation among many. Allinterpretations that seck to expose the inscription of 'man' as a representa­tion that should be historicized and problcmatized have themselves t.o beexcluded .. :::>

b'6

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

p. ~. ::'l1.? (,(VI, \()\ I v

P /--

AT: PERMFOREIGN POLICY EXCLUDES AL TERNA TIVES OUTSIDE OF ITS PARADIGMCampbell 1992(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 78,79)

,\

r/" M0rco ve r, i!~h e cQll'!:.9LQLF 0rrignJ?9Ji£x..Jb"e_1Qgj.c""Qi.i(t~liitY..J12Q[~, !.<:.~~~.i_~L,~_~.::.s.1f..!J2.1?'§,N~Q_J.b\<.".p()Jitic£".()LL1Cgati ()n.•.anrl..tllcM.thro.l1t\ttiQ!U2f ..Q.J;h.SE.'ness. The claim is not that Foreign P{)Jicy constitutes state identity de lIOVO;

r;;t!1e'r, it is that Foreign Policy is concerned with the reproduction of all~!)~'..t!:~_~.i~!~,r.:~.~t.Xj!.Lt;.Q_~J~Y_s:J.Qfl.ru;..§..~at<;~._~nd !h~_CO}2!.£!.!2'.D e Ill.2LS91;11~}lg~~to that identity. In other words, Foreign Policy does not operate in a domain

freeof en tr;;cl1 cd con tingen cie'S'-or-rc'slstai1CeS:'WhICFi;;~'en~;-~'~~ig;;-P~G~CYpia~.t:;~~.~:~:;:~:J~~·pIi;~·.s.~~~l·.:iJ,\S~x:·:~:E~t~::~~~~~.:~:0,:::?~-i~:~~lii:~.:2~:~~~:;;:S~~D~,eoth er' practices. which nlj.K,lLi.n·1.\.fJ.!JXi.i!J;<;•.q,!J.\1m.'J.tjy~y,.J?g§.~,!,hiJj!;j,\;,~J~R,~j,\4,~.n,ELty;

.arlcrt1i·e"·li]ie;1.~i~~--,~'~-dextensive ~Jatu r~ of tl}e'in£ern~.I' }~f1q,~~;{F.s[n_~I'

··_~.::_II.~~;'i"··~§~:~~~i:ii!l'~~:,:r.G~t'tEG:,~:p.i~ii~'i;,£.o:f¥r"~i~:~iii..iEi~":~!'~~~~:L~~~(:~~:11.~1.!'~,\s.yh!X.•pr.m;,t\.\;.~,"y,.llLJ1],Q£~.qf.t~[ttb.?'.l1,n9"t,!1e,",?J,\i!XP's'I}£J..l"Q,y,,~h~"LSgS~~.~.~.,t~'tion of danger. -::.::::" . ' ... ' ,... ,

«"'''',:''~n,.',,,·,,,, ..•;.,.I''''.'·''·'':'' ,

I';> F ina Ily, '~g,:3\.\?(?.5;',S,-lW~~lc.!]1S.P.t_~1!.:!..9,!-!J.~LuR,t"Q~,"J,'-!;l$s!JpJ,9~"~,~~g~,~£,,.~b,~J,.~..!l<;

!)(JHE~,9~rX~.l?LS.9\~s.i~)g.,J}"rf!;wpaJ!G~$,,,Qt",E.m;~igX!J?9!,i~2:..L~,~,~!,~"..1~...2.?L9,C;;,~~..,,_?~identitythat are cl?af!x.d,;:}l;~l:.~.a_~~_d,si,ng;~lar, and neat. Indeed, Ibiven thein l1efeE1:ly'co'iltiilg(;i1t i9.~l]..ilii.\'y'h iC~:E1!j{,F3S!rr:§Ii!ie-lf~I§lnill:m:::~§Ji.iI~:aa6filaIn'.as .JI1tens"l\;s;.lU1!.L::4tGl1$j;Y,G,.i!~".th!t..ii!)),j;,s:;~.tb.s;~b,(~ill).!l,Q;[j£;'UiJ.Y~ b Iu rred,r11ultii5Je:-aild"~'t;l;;1:J'violent. Gloria Anzaldua offers a particularly con~p~m;;gtrJrmuEitl()';;':-'-""'~-'-""'''--

'~he 1I§'M~n border es ulla herida abierta [is an open wound] where theJ:I:.i,[,sj,jY...2!:!,j,.g!J!.t~,;;;,-i;\ga.iQ~,ub..<:;.1.ir.~.L~_,mi.h!.\.',S'..iliuS.!~d be(2ls.,~";:s~~_E~_r:.:.::.i.S

..h~!~~SJ!Lh,:!I;;~'~Mg,g;i}l!l,_ll.]~.)J[S!?,!£2,\L...8L.,.\,:Y.s?,.,,;,y..2.:L~.T.~,~~l~9_,.~~,.£~;~~,~.,~~~r.?

c;(~..~~.~.~~X,;::.~~,.l;~)!,9;;~,.S\~.l~~!,I\C",j~PI~.$;,E~.,~<~:S..~.SS,.t!£,...;5!~sJ~,~.~..~.!~::.~~~_~~~s.~.!.~,l:;LS~,~~,~,

un~~I,Si,.!.<?',.•~!,~.HQg,m§b..Jt~",fr2~r~,J~ftt;,;.•tU&\,n.!S;J~A§.,\l~,\!m<cj,!.I}g,J'!'Q.<:;",J!"Mr.&Q,~,"~~~

~~s~~~tf~~9~1::~~;~i;,~r~1ir~~~~!~i~,~&~~~r~~\~~f~~,~;~i~~J.~:ffi~i~,~.~.~~~r,¥:~W,",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,",,,,,,,,.'j·W;

Rather than L~iLJ1arrow wpographical line, borders are shifting horizons

;:;:;arked by ftuxand ambigu~ IJ And rather than cIea!'!ydemarc~tingt~d il';iIity-'or"seT{an"a""o'rheG th ey~--;~-i;rt;~;;-i;;r~~e thr;~gh·_·ati1;rlc

relat;ons!i-jp'''wheri''tIle''preseiige-qrlh-q:§e''~ ho'areamoigu ous·"ancrTlffilnai,----"'....."....-< ,~_ """'" ~.""'~.~ ,"""'.,-_._",,-~,~~,..,c:?,~f~~,~;~.~!D:'_~!}22£!S"g£,y.DiJi~.r~,l?l::,;~!.:E~~i~~"'<;L~~!}~iE.E'The d efi ni tlo nof Jdent!ty, in nations and men ... depends for its accomplishment on the

recognition of that which is other, like, and Simultaneously other and like,and on the abstract, objective understanding of the self that follows from

this recognition.,74 It i: the obiee~i.f~!1 ofl~,S.~S.!f th~t".~~J.s.u.r,\.i3~t::~,!~"2L2.~oJ.l,~~,.!!:~£,1:.9"ffiM;~!1.r.2l!.sLb;?1'£'~.;1£'~:""'> ' ., r-r"1·

Coq

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

A~ ~RerihsVY)

P-_/_-

IneVfi C( 01t?

AT: REALISM INEVITABLEREALISM CAN ONLY EXISTS BY DRIVEN FEARCampbell 1992(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247)

Of course, my hope is that the force of this analysis will mollify if notassuage some of these concerns. But it has to be recognized that such adesire is limited - but not precluded - by the nature of the agonism thatexists between the logic of interpretation (which, outlined in the introduc­tion, underpins this analysis) and the entailments of epistemic realism. It isnot a limit that is enabled by the incommensurability of paradigms, or somesuch formulation, for this agonism is not something which can be resolvedon methodological or epistemological grounds. It is a limit commissioned bythe fact that each approach instantiates a different ethic. Epistemic realismcan be considered a commitment designed to contain what Richard

Bernstein has called the 'Cartesian anxiety,' the proposition which assertSlI1~that either we have some sort of ultimate foundation for our knowledge orwe are plunged into the void of the relative, the irrational, the arbitrary, the"nihilistic. As Bernstein notes, the search for a foundation and the anxiety itinculcates is more than an effort to solve the problem of the basis forknowledge and truth: 'It is the quest for some fixed point, some stable rockupon which we can secure our lives against the vicissitudes that constantlythreaten us.' 10 However, this ethical impulse cannot be satisfied, partic­ularly when we remind ourselves (as chapter two noted) that the culttrfeOmodernity necessitates external guarantees but has erased the ontologicalpreconditions for them. It was this situation, after all, which granted to fear'and danger the capacity of securing that which could no longer be reasonedinto existence. As a result, epistemic realism is sustainable only through thefaith of its adherents believing that they are warding off a threat. Inconsequence, it seems that the processes which were implicated in the rise

of the state are now replicated in the traditional discourses of the relatio"liSlbetween srates. The evangelism of fear centered on death grounded the .church's project of salvation; the evangelism of fear articulated in theanxiety about an unfinished and dangerous world secured the state such thatsecurity occupied the position of salvation; now the evangelism of fearenunciated by those hoping to ward off 'foreign' intellectual influences

~s_to contain the instability of their representations of the world.-·

ID

ADI2K5BRUSCHKE Ad. : Req \ isn'l \Vlej.

REALISM BADP /----

AT: REALISM INEVITABLETO BELIVE POLITICS IS ONLY RELATED TO THE STATE JUSTIFIESPA TRIARCHICAL OPPRESSION AND COLONIZATION

Campbell 1992(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 252-253)

Our political.irnagination.hasJ2e.cnJ!!2poverished by the practices associatedwiththcl;~·radigm.of.?overeignty. As discusseu~eof'the sovereignty/anarch'y' di;ti~tioll works to contain contingency throughthe instantiation of a sovereign presence which then acts as a regulativeideal. In terms of the political field, this has meant that the idea of ~

po~cal'_~~.~.b.~~~~.YJ2§!HIled-by-.and n~b 'the st~' In

effect, the state has colonized our understanding of 'the political' byobscuring those practices through which it has been 'fashioned in thelikeness of legislated fear,' and foregrounding in their place its claim to bethe source of authorized articulations of danger.2u Integral to this has beenthe assumption that political modalities - slIch as strength, resolution,boldness, will, vigilance, etc. - associated with the regime of Masculine/feminine (discussed in the introduction) are the natural dispositions ofpolitics. But such a colonization and such an assumption is renderedproblematic by the retheorization of identity central to this study. More

specifically,. such ~._colonizatio~ is rendered ~..di:Tercntunderstandmg----or se·cllnty--Whlch-{..·•.mergcSlfom the retheorizatlon of"- .. ----"

~ntity. ~

REALISM IS INSUFFICIENT TO UNDERSTAND POLITICS

Campbell 1992(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 247-248 )

. O~ercome \:ith tl:is Cartesian anxiety, traditional scholarship inl~ternatlOna~ r~lat~ons wIl! probably continue to forget the silences, omis­SIOns and limitations of the traditional approaches and maintain that

epistemic realism rcsts on more than faith. But the ritual forgetting (whiChmight be characterised as post-Cartesian amnesia) of the insights of diversescholars - such as Wittgenstein, Winch, Kuhn, Habern1as, Foucault and

Derrida, all of whom have in some way contributed to the logic 9.f

interpretation - can only increase the anxi.ety. !1 Besides, only by exorc!5f~glourselves from the unfounded but seductive appeal that SOCialand politicallife has to be organised by recourse to either one option or another, and that

we can locate a secure foundation outside of politics and history, can~emove towards a situation where we are equipped to deal with the issues oflife and death that we confront in ~~obal life .. --"

It

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

ACJ.:· Rect Il'sm wovtjREALIS1Vr RAD

P /

AT: REALISM WORKS

POLITICAL DISCOURSE CAN NO LONGER UNDERSTAND THEINDETERMANACY OF THE SYSTEM, IT CAN NO LONGER SOLVE NORPROVIDE SECURITYCampbell 1992

(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecurity: United.~ates Foreign :policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 19,20) ,. ~ ~The gl~)ba.liza~ionof c~~gencL!~,~;:~:.::;;~.~:::.".~:::~:s~~.~.,t=~den~~e.~ .-,

\ ~.l!.._~qe.o.~m.2,!gHltX\ ..L~,~.S!.~.[,~,I~y~,SY","~.~Q.,-u,~~~X.ti!.!I.)JX,?D.Q.(J.J..J),2,~gS1~.:.,I:~:~~~~!J~,~! !!lese have been long Identified 111academIc IOternatlOnalrelatIOns literature' ~nder the sigoe!('aiiafcfiY,' these cont~fi'Oinwl1iC1i conres tIlciT,. understanding as globalized - can no lon~r fJecoot:une(rWTil\';nestab-IT;~d'~

, i~I.:"~Jl}!.£i.!iL~]]1d.~~I~U!~~!i2!l~P~g~!.~·ili-;;·~~.~~rW~Ls~~l?X~of just being written as 'out there.' Security is not taGe found 'within~' ThisISmore tha;:;UStai-esullorii1terd;:p'~-;;°d~~-c~~~tfie-prollTera'tU;;;'--;;rtru;;ats, 0 rthe overflowing of domestic issues onto the world stage .tI~ convc1Ttiunalresponse). This is an irru~ which renders all estab-

,J' I!,shed contain"~rs proble;nat!.~~Il~ irr~ption do;;-;wtSimpIY invol~e the'­, mQX~f~EE"CQDl.f§Ji[!<D.l~JJ.QW,.•..q.!2S,••~r2i~i1tO'rIie .0tfie'flJUt.,'rafhe:[I:lfie

effective rendering as!ln.Q~r~"9Ithose .doinaln:~ndtr;-;;r entailments, ItmaRes"irttI~·~~'D.seTo"sp~;kof pol;tTc;tocci:iri:i'ng"~;;;;;;ra([tstinct'lnSide'.! ---:I_.t.. "":::.: I --~_._-_._-

, or 'outside' (such as a 'Third Worl§_"YllicJ2J.~~P~ii'!l!y'_beX~':l~..~ur.bor.d~rs;;n,j temporally backwarar-'wnell, for example, US. economic e0Iclesencourage 'Third World eX~.2.£.~~.'c!.!Lfones~I:_'?~_~ngel~swherernanufacturers stamp their auto parts 'made in Brazil' and the clot~lI1ggooas'~ 1al\van' to attract lower tariffs; when the defffiJgfaph~t:...c:IJang~sthat have made non-wlute chIldren majorities in the Gi.rrrorrua and New

York school svstems, and will make whites a ni~nority in the Uni.ted Statesbyrhe year 2056; and when the poverty and poor health care 10 Harlemmakes the area a 'zone of excess mortality' with a death rate for black males

higher than their counterparts in Banglade~h,.ll ...This globaIization of~'!:£';~!..S);',h~L1IJ~..u:P:If\tlQ,P.,.cl.~t£?JJ.,~!,!1~~~:.,,~~.~~

on Iy rencrerspru[;Tei§T'is..~heJ:.radi.tiooals.{.la.ti.;li\z#!.\?E~£,f0wer,.\sg~r..::.~es,

a IU!E...~~_.E:illiliif,JJj\!~tis~Li~:~L~i.~.~J~2.~£.!.Y.,,;l!1~~c!!2's~~!~;.~~:c~~c:~.~;;hich have made those. sgatlahzatlOns of power INssI!?le. fhIS IS.wnar I"Sincan..tby,,,·tI1'e·'''l~';;~~;'~--;·;;f-th-;-;;~;k~;;><;;"f"'Cert~hty"'"12~The irr~Ipt~fcontingency opens u~e possiglllty ofobse~l!1at~~iW2L!&.i!~;;;ow'se; - discourses abom prior, primary" and stable IdentitIes - ~ork !,O....-.•-,--- h' d ... 10 'e name thev OT)erateconstlj:Jlte....t c...J..en.UtJ.G5._l!L':Y.l""__M••"~•••_,, ••,,,,-,"_""" __ ••: .••

'''--Finally this erasure of certainty' brought on by the lffuptJon of, . 'JT .contingency has produced the rarefaction of politic~1discourse,' 0 ~ut It

simply, while they retain some power, ~he conventional (and foun~atlonal)cat<::gQ.{il<!u),L{)J:ds;.ciJ~ilieexhau ~te~j, Th eir !y'Q..~~n._Q.Q.!y~Q!)JJ,!l!lQ._Qy._;;b)'uration_r~~~~E._~an_~ffir~a ti~~_~~y' can. ~u n.~~~::~~_e.2'.!.~!..SD..S.s...~:d· ..··"....·-r·· ,'f' . and excluslons-:tJut they are no longerIdenClty JY speCI ·Ylngexceptlo;~;~=•.....".,~~"",~="•."~,.~1-,..",,,~"_.~~.."~•.~ ..,,".,_..~~'~~~:;~T~---"'~-r"r~'-I)"-Ortn1fermsof a onor and POSItIveIdeal. I:'..Vcnmore.\n e to .':D0 JI}.?~S,,~.~J.J2O<"""'_'''~''''~''_''';n.m);.''''''~'''~~=''~''d''''"~""""""""""f'(j.. 'iiTi;;ort-a'o"tly" the (1~•.ire to order has Itself become a source 0 aI}.g£L!!LQ1!.!"

r '~~'~'1-------.....~_....-....._..,.,."......--:-.. Itime. Political.sI~lll~.~!ib..~P.s~52 ..nlY..2.tm.~~lJJ.~~!£.~t.J.\R~.t.!,I:~~~~;',[--..---C..··-·-'. h - ..-d f attunement normalizatIon, or mastery as tIleJases 0 actIOn, t e nee or --",_ .._d'~'-""'--''''''''''''''~'''~=='''''"--~''~'-'-''f--""--'7"-''';:r-~''-''~''''''-: I' 't or ethiCSas a command; or 0

technolOgIes or or er, or nower as a.~~.£."~""""" __ ~~"~"""""'_~"""''''"''~~'''''_'\. ---'~~~-~"-"-_.'---' ... '. aClt

SOY-;;:r-"'gi1tyand territoriality as the contame r 0 f no.!.!E.!..c,i?~,.h?-~Jp.<~J,H:J".(;,~R~_=.•l'. 'ereu:~-n{ , " 1I".c-t'~'"'WM'''''''-''''V.,..,.,.".7>(.'.r~'''''

::.'Intever'il'a'd'Tt ·:·"E6~p."fo5Iill~:::;:~~[ity':">,,~,.' " ..,'. ",,:;;.~~•....."'_..••.-"',~~~.J,,,;:•.¥""...-~~,...,...•.~,."....••.

IL

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

P /__

REALISM BAD

Ad: EdJ \c ieVll- / [JJOif '?-S

AT: EMPIRICALLY EFFICIENTJUSTIFICATION FOR COLD WAR ONLY LEGITIMIZES THREATCONSTRUCTION AND OTHERIZA TION

Campbell 1992(David, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, Writing Security:United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 249-250)

We are now at an historical juncture where the demise of the Soviet Unionmeans that policy makers in Washington are looking forward to a new era ininternational Lelations, the outlines of which they can barely discern. Whatis clear, however, is that the optimistic view in which it was held that-the so=-----,

called post-cold war period would be a fundamentally different era in world .'politics placed too much credence on the essential qualities of a suppose,~ly

independently-existing other as the basis for an assessment ofthreatst'suCh'\

a view was possible only because it ignored the debt that subjectivity owesto otherness and the role the requirements of identity play in giving rise todiscourses of danger. What the United States-led war in the Persian Gulfdemonstrates is that above all else the cold war was not based exclusivelyupon an orientation towards the Soviet Union:-rnoeed-;-wlJatE!~ntdemonstrat;;a--=- particuriuly when considered in terms of the above analysis,with its. consideration of the themes apparent in the 'discovery' of the NewWorld, the colonization of Ireland, the Puritan settlement in America, and

the subsequent moments of identity conflict from colonial times through tothe red scares of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries - was th.e....Jyay-tn.

w.h!.c~certain targets and techniques of exclusio~common to disparateh~_torical moments. In each of those instances, for all that was specific to the-'time and place, there was mor~Qften,.than-nQUUi.t;.!!se of <:.n~1angerment..ascribed to the activities or-tile orher,_.a.J~ o'f-Internal challenge and ,

subversloil," a tendency to crimil}1J.liz.e..Qrmilitari~a wjlling~ss"Fto tightly draw the lines of superiority/inferiority between 'us' and 'thWl>' . '

(tnere~Jt:utIng 'dO;:;;-estic' and ' m:ci~iteoo~inality), and anaiili1T~t.i_()IJ_..?ftfiese· ratIons and representations to dangers that could be .

located ,~"_0lC external realm sU~Qtions of SOYerelgnt~ere·"<S.!.!~s~ined.Accordi~ly, the cold war was not ~ to one state or 01eideology:- The cold war was a powerful and perva.sive historical configuration

"of thediscucsive economy of identity/difference operating in multiple sites,--- -- -.--

~be ~o_~i:...?X_'.Vhichis outli~Qg....th(;-ae-mise....Q[ its most rece1!LO.hj_~lLQfi\0"~.!W.·_--",

13

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

REALISM BADP /----

A~~:~~e;V\all :k):"d ;,~( t' " ,-\ I'r', •,...., ·0 " ...., .,,-, ..(

r-"'..Lvd

o D,-, 1 .. <: 1/1..,I\.\.'-·t I I..J" I

The global dominance of the United States has lead them to claim "Ownership of History."

Lifton in 2003 (Lifton, Robert. Super Power Syndrome, 2003. ISBN: 1-156025-512-9)

, ~)ut this "global empire" does not follow previolls imperial

models, say, of the British empire from the eighteenth to the

twentieth century. There is no American plan for leaving

elaborate bureaucracies in every country we dominate~

While all previous empires claimed some kind of noble mis­

sion, the new American mission contains a particularly fer­vent rendering of vVilsonian altruism. The National

S<:;curityStrategy statement th;l t dW;ld ministration released

in September 2002 speaks ~randly of the American inten

tion "to extendthe benefits offreedom across the gl9be" andI

"to help make :the world not just safer but better.."- At the same time it makes clear that, into the foresee­

able future, I;\.merica intends to hold absolute military

dominance~dme might say omnipotence-on our planet:

"The United {States," as the National Security Strategy

puts it, "must and will maintain the capability to defea~

any attempt by an enemy-whether state or non-state..actor-to im~ose its will on the United States, our alli~,-;1' our friend~. We WIll maintain the forces sufficient to

support our pbligations, 'and to defend freedom. Our

~orces will be:strong enough to dissuade poten tial adver­saries from PNrsuing a military buildup in hopes of sur­

passing, or egualing, the power of the United States.'~

Bookman con:Curs with many observers in describing this_.

strategy as "a plan for permanent US military and eco-

nomic domination of every region of the globe."~

ADI 2K5BRUSCHKE

\ / \\kkALISM BADVP /__

Tk Bush. administration's projection of American

power extends not only over planet Earth, but through the

mIlItarization of space, over the heavens as well. I ts strate­

gists dream of deciding the outcome of significant world

events everywhere. We may call this an empire ofjtuid world

control, and theIrs ISnothwg less than an inclusive claim to

fFle ownership; of history. It is a claim never made before

because never: before has technology permitted the imag­

imng ot such ;~nenterprise, however illusory, on the part of

a head ot state and ,hIS wner CIrcle ..•

The administration's strategic document quotes a

phras~ from one of the president's speeches concerning the

dangers we face "at the crossroads of radicalism and tech­

nology." What is Ineant by that phrase is the apocalyptic

marriage between ultimate zealotry and ultimate weapons

in our enemies, but the "crossroads" mentioned applies no

less to American policy, specifically as laid out in this doc­ument. The administration's radicalism takes the form of

aggressively remaking the world in an American image.

Our unprecedented world dominance, made possible by

OLlr ul1lque mIlItary technology, becomes our means of

doing so. The fluidity of this version of imagined world

control is consistent with the Rumsfeld doctrine" of a fluid

military. The latter is to sustain the former. Technology

and f] uidity are counted upon to minimize American casu­

;llties and streamline war-making in general. (American

lcaders for instance claimed the victory in Iraq demon­

strates that, to win wars, we no longer have to engage in

saturation bombing of cities as in World War IIJ.j

1t;'

ADI 2KSBRUSCHKE

REALISM BADP /

Ad Cc>\c\ WC1V

AT: COLD WAR

WE NEED TO CONSTANTLY QUESTION THE NEED FOR USING REALISTAND THREAT CONSTRUCTION TRAINS OF THOUGHT IN EMPIRICALEXAMPLESCampbell 1992

(David, Professor ofInternational Politics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecurity: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, pg. 34)

,/'The cold war, then, was both a struggle which exceeded the milita!y'' _ _~_.~ _ .. -,-..,-'--'''-- .•.--.. --- ..~,.-n- ''"~-'''''.•.--' ''r,_

: h r:.~~~~:f, t~:..S (;~~~: .. ,~~~,~~,~}"',~~,9,.~,,,;~E~;K~L~,,.~~!~,~;.,.;y~~L~.h,~lWX,,!J\l.1,1,\Q.);f.,,5?f6°. teI:tial ca[iama tes- ..re gard Ies~.52L£h£ir..?,.t;r,{jX~gU;hG.{j,g~city'"J;Q,."RS;,,'!,..~bJ.ef!t,­were ~1(;·tt~J·"~s";t'th;·~~t':"·"t;;'~"tl~is se~~e, the collapse, overcoming, orsurrc;;dC';:"o(C)'I:;',t'(;rUj6'pfbragonists at this historical juncture does not mean'it' is ovcr. T'hc cold war's meaning will undoubtedly change, but if wcrecall that thc phrase 'cold war' was coined by a fourteenth-century Spanishwriter to represent the persistent rivalry between Christians and Arabs, wecomc to recognize that the sort of struggle the phrase denotes is a struggleover identity: a struggle that is not context-specific and thus not rooted inthe existence of a particular kind of Soviet Union.77 Besides, the UnitedStates-Jed war against Iraq should caution us to the fact that the Western

(and part.icularly American) ~nte~tive dispositi<.:..r::~~.~b-J.2.rS!;t~~mi~n..

the pos t-World War II. ir~.s.LI}.?J!Ql1ill..,,);,!lY,.iW.!lill~,P,t.,;;;,"~.iJ;t""J,1;1~,iL?~~JQ~§}l.!].~Il,~iY;~\;~,:QGni~lii~i[:9w;;~~L~~j,~!2.1,":~~~,~~;';~;~~2LI2,!l2,a,llKSLWJ?1l,~,~,§£K'!9SSL,t,2,,,~r

tl}.S"a,s,~i::!!,!~,~.~L,~,~*'?,5~,~b,~,£I.~~!:.~,fu~LQ,Li!)J~EQ,~~sh~I,IS,~1?S,,~!1~~.~;!£,:::9...:.,s.!g~,.,~h~~~S\U!SL!s):!iLE0,U\S::E\~~S,,,a,lLl~~R,Qm(;$.,,,a!),,~t~!~!1,"~UEri:~~~;~.~,?"~~~~~,~~<?,,,~LI}9;"...?~,~.~E;;.~~sSl,~Y!.!!lfS!js.:,,;'!.~:LS,,~5.~'sS,~.~~,~..:~?,~t,b,2!:;"::;.::y,~!?.,,~~r,,.~£~~~~:;,t~.,~~,~..~~.~te,

6r ons ideolo/'y .. A;.a~o~sequence, we ,need t?rethink the c,?!1ventionaIu nders tand ;;;g.;r.' f~r~ign"'"p'oficy':'an(f"tj~~'l{i';'t~;i~i'ty' "of"t!1e' '~01ct" ;~~ 'i'~P";-iftic~ la'f' ...,.."y::::.,~".,....,....,.,,,.,'.,,......."''' "."".,. ,,::>

1~7Il/il

ADI 2KSBRUSCHKE

REALISM BAD

f\;) :T0irf01t5

eX I' ,5-\-

P /----

w • __ •__ ••••••• ·~_"". •••• _

action or event to provide_ili!<",gI.oJ.!!JJ.!.s..f.Q.u~Q.iDJt;;JPJ:~..~!!Ji.QLtof da!l~£:. T~S...:~ .mere existe ncs ...?L~.!l....ili~.!I!ati.Y.s.....1J!.QJle_o£ ...h.\',':jDg,..-th\',': ..,pJ:\<§J;D'!;~""Q.(.)Y.biG..h •.~'ti:J/r,y

~~I§:£!:~[§I1§.u!!!IS!g.Q.Lj.gs!)J,iti..~"L:),l~Q2~~~jJS"~DS1JhV,li.•deJ1i;U.waE?;¥-\'L£,Q$;. ;~~:;.,-,

~ of a particular id~ntity~~e the tru~~:..~~~~tim;:~ ...!2.'2.?ul?.~~..l~ ;j;;k/')fr~duc~~~ ...~.Ederst!.t;2!22tL~L~..!;§.at.61n conse.quence,. only in these'terms i:'It ISpossible. to understand how some acts of mternatlOnal power pohtlCS Jr'!,

raise no~a whit of concern, while something as seemingly unthreatening asthe novels of a South American writer can be considered such a danger tonational security that his exclusion from the country is warranted. 7 For bothinsurance and international relations, therefore, danger is the conseguence

of a calculation of a":;!.1J~~LlYb.iYJ)_gJ:!k££.iD$~Y.Y!;'!2.t~,....~£iPJine~M.iQ.!1~S' ...•'an'dSequesters"'anideal of thel<!~J1Ji~..9.Lj;h>;_.peQple...said.•t(,) ..•b,<;:"J!t...ti~~.~.;,l.,- ....·~."""'--...v.-· ..,,>.·,_.~"~.•r..,·~"~·~,\,,·j:\,;;;"'·'~;I""'I~..-.,,"".' •••. '.

AT: THREATS EXISTDanger and threats are non-existent, they are socially constructed in an attempt tomaintain social order and justify exterminating the otherCampbell 1992(David, Professor ofIntemational Politics at the University of Newcastle, WritingSecurity: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofIdentity, pg. 2,3)

-,/'Furthermo re, the r~~_0:.iEs,?rprS!:~i0nj'!}..lh.~_!!Lt.i~'l~~!2.!l2.L!4g,ng~!E'nOt' restricte~"t2 .•~tLS)ro,cess by which some risks come to beconsidered

"nl0f'c'iieri"6'U-s,than. oth ~-;;~A;1;;'[;p(j';:tantslte'orii1terpretanon"'ls'tEe-w~y T;;­\vfilcfi"cer't;i'~~';;:;;'d';;:;-Z;{'~-;;presentationcrystallize around referents markedas dangers. Qiven .~~_of.~~ous relationship b~~~!}.1lJl..~~s.",.mr.!:<Jat0J1

of dangSL.fl.JJJL.t.b.9,:SJbiective'incl<JenC'e-ofl)erlavwrsand factors thought toci)'nstrt~s.~.j!,.,th~,,\.:~Il!)S:IhYJ~.!-fi?-4!Ii£uT~r-~isk-tc)~b;'~~p;~;"D"te(r;ll·'rc"iiTls"'o'fa'lilf:lcteristics that are reviled in' the~'~~li;;;-;"iitysaid·;:o-Ge·..tf{reat;~ea.C'anl;e";;I~"i;;p~~Z;;';-i~';petL;s-t;-;;'i~~~'~;;~;'t;'t;-;;~~ordan'ge'r:"A's'r;;~';"~'h;p't~~~w irrdemo!ls trarC:"0ie ab i~!.£it£i~ri~~EI'ihlj;-g~~~~~§;;I;12t.:!?:::.::Esive, dirty,o r ~isb.._h.'!~....9.£9I.u1i~ri!L~?..~~:?..a,r..~!S~~~~S,g~oLci.~.I:J~~~J!L.thS]Sjil.~:~L~an.. ~ ....expenencc.····In ...thl;;·~ontext, ~t is also i,mporrant to note that there need not be an

17,