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183

13 PainismA New EthicsRichard Ryders MoralTheory and Its Limitations

Hans Werner Ingensiep

IntroductIon

The British psychologist Richard D. Ryder (born 1940) is amous or his role as one

o the pioneers o the modern animal liberation and animal rights movement. Ryder

is well known or the introduction o new ethical ideas in the past 30 years and espe-

cially or coining o the term speciesism, which he rst used in a privately printed

leafet in Oxord 1970 and then in many subsequent publications (1,2). In Cavalieri

contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................ 183

Can They Suer? ................................................................................................ 184

Ryders Painism: A Middle Way between the Scylla o Utilitarianism and the

Charybdis o Rights Theory? ................................................................................. 185

Is Pain Necessary or Sucient or Moral Status? ................................................. 186

Painism and Sentientism ........................................................................................ 187

Hurting and Harming ............................................................................................. 188

PainThe Only Evil? ............................................................................................ 188

Pain in Nonhuman Others: SpeciesismNormative and Descriptive

Dimensions ............................................................................................................ 189

Species, Individuals, and Pain ................................................................................190

PainismSome Applications and Questions ......................................................... 191

Painism and Biotechnology ............................................................................... 191

Painism and Environmental Ethics.................................................................... 191

Painism and Plants ............................................................................................192

Painism and Euthanasia ..................................................................................... 192

Brain, Pain, Persistent Vegetative State, and Extreme Cases ............................ 193

Who Is the Maximum Suerer? ......................................................................... 194

Concerning the Vegetative Language about Human Beings beyond

Sentience and Pain ............................................................................................ 195

Conclusion .............................................................................................................196

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. 197

Reerences .............................................................................................................. 197

2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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184 Maldynia: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Illness of Chronic Pain

and Singers Great Ape Project and other papers, Ryder argued or Sentientism

(2) against the leading moral concepts emphasizing that only the capacity to eel

pain is morally relevant. In 1990 Ryder coined the term Painism to describe A

Modern Morality (35). For Ryder, pain is always pain o an individual and can-

not be aggregated. Painism argues not only against the traditional anthropocentric

personism based on qualia o persons like consciousness, intelligence, or rationality

(e.g., Kant) but also against modern utilitarianism (6,7) and against an animal rights

position based on an inherent value o each individual (8). Ryder, Singer, and Regan

try to integrate pain into their ethical concepts in dierent ways. They all criticize

the speciesism o traditional ethics and try to extend their approach to general ethics

and politics.

cAn they suer?These contemporary approaches to animal ethics and bioethics are the recent prod-

ucts o a long historical and cultural debate in Western societies about the role o sen-

tience, pain, and suering. Concerning animals, or instance, Plutarch or Montaigne

inspired the discussion about Descartes concept o beasts as machines and led, in

the Enlightenment, to extensive philosophical debates on animal pain that became an

important ethical bridge between animals and humans (9). Pain, in general, played

an important role in culture (10) and has also been recognized as a actor in the

history o the modern sensibility (11) (e.g., concerning the problem o vivisection).

While perhaps most amous is Jeremy Benthams crucial question in a ootnote:Can they suer? (12, p. 412), less known is the dictum o Humphry Primatt, one

o the pioneers in animal ethics in the eighteenth century: Pain is painwhether it

be inficted on man or beasts (13, p. 21). But, on the other hand, according to John

Stuart Mill, it is better to be a human being dissatised than a pig satised (14,

p. 18), indicating that there seems to be a dierent quality concerning pleasure and

pain in animals and humans. These statements illustrating the ethical and cultural

bridge between humans and animals are an important oundation or current eorts

to integrate all sentient beings into general ethics.

This chapter ocuses on ethical aspects and problems in Ryders Painism. Thereare many problems with the denitions and distinct boundaries or nonhuman organ-

isms having a moral status within bioethics (15,16), and these give rise to conficts

with traditional concepts o ethics (e.g., Kants deontology concerning animals and

plants) (17,18). Kantian ethics seems to be a prototype or a deontologic personism

that attracts reproaches oanthropocentrism and speciesism. Conversely, the new

ethical model o an expanding circle (19) o entities having values or rights leads

to boundary problems, reductions, and allacies in argumentation, and unicriterial

approaches to what and why beings have moral status (16). In one respect, the new

concept o painism seems to be such a reductionistic and unicriterial approach to eth-ics. Yet, pain and suering are important actors in modern bioethics (20,21), both

in theory and practice (22,23). The patient with pain becomes the person dened

by pain, as James Giordano points out the complex situation o pain as a disease

process versus pain as an illness phenomenon (23, p. 407). In general, it is not easy

to bridge the dualism o pain as a disease with objective maniestation, and pain as a


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PainismA New Ethics 185

subjective illness phenomenon. Far more dicult is the attempt to integrate all kinds

o problems in human and nonhuman ethics (abortion, euthanasia, war, biotechnol-

ogy, environmental protection, etc.) into a uniying concept o painism, as Ryder

does. In order to connect these domains, Ryder uses the termpain in a very broad

meaning. Nevertheless, he is able to knowledge the dierences and diculties o

(the term)pain. Thus, he interprets pain broadly to include all negative experiences,

that is to say, all orms o suering, mental as well as physical. So, the words pain

and suering are interchangeable (5, p. 26). Only under these conditions is it

possible to include moral problems related to sentient animals and humans within an

expanding circle o beings having a moral status.

I believe that it is important to consider some general philosophical aspects and

questions regarding Ryders proposal o painism. First, a crucial systematic question

or ethics: is pain necessary or sucient to establish moral status? I compare the

three approaches o Singer, Regan, and Ryder to provide some insight to questionsconcerning the role o pain and speciesism in modern ethics. This question is not

crucial or a pure biomedical ethics, where pain oten is subordinate to the prin-

ciple o nonmalecience (24) and to the question Why do no harm? (25). But it is

equally important to note that pain is not an important actor in nonhuman ethics o

biocentrism or ecocentrism. As Warren thinks, the human and animal privilege o

sel-consciousness, sentience, or pain, biocentric ethicists like Paul Taylor (26) could

ask: why should the non-sentience o organisms automatically mean that a moral

agent cannot have moral obligations towards them (16, p. 433)? From an anthro-

pocentric, biocentric, or ecocentric point o view, ethics sentience and pain are notnecessary or a moral status.

In light o this, I will discuss examples or the application o Ryders painism in

applied ethics, human ethics, biotechnology, and environmental ethics. In particular,

I look at borderline cases in medicine that illuminate an old thinking pattern about

humans in a vegetative state as being beyond pain and sensibility. My question is:

what kind o role does pain play in ethical judgements about persons sometimes

called human vegetables (42)?

In short, my thesis is that Ryders rame o painism is too narrow or a general

theory o ethics. To build his argument, I compare Ryders painism with the posi-tions o Singer and Regan, and then deliver examples, exegesis, and criticism in

more detail. The general problem is that an ethics reliant solely upon pain may be

insucient, or perhaps at the very least, unsatisying. The most dicult question or

psychologists and biologists seems to be: what is pain? And or painists: how ar does

pain extend within the expanding circle o sentient beings? In sum, I ask i painism,

as an unicriterial approach, is a useul starting point or ethics.

ryders PAInIsm: A mIddle wAy between the scyllA o

utIlItArIAnIsm And the chArybdIs o rIghts theory?

A crucial question or ethicists seems to be: is pain necessary or sucient to estab-

lish moral status? In answering the question, Ryder steers between the Scylla o

Singers utilitarianism and the Charybdis o Regans rights theory. In common with

Singer, Ryders painism holds that pain is a basic criterion. Ryders painism also


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shares Regans emphasis on the individual and rejection o utilitarian aggregation.

Ryder tries to nd a position in between and to establish painism as new morality or

guiding the treatment o both humans and animals. Thus, he rejects the utilitarian

justication o pain by Singer, i the aggregated benets o all those aected by the

action outweigh the pain (5, p. 48). According to Ryders pain-based undamental-

ism, pain is the only evil and the moral objective is to reduce the pain o others

(5, p. 27). An aggregation o pains across individuals does not make sense. For each

individual, only that individuals pain is real. For painists, pain within the same indi-

vidual is paramount; thus, the quantity o pain suered by the maximum suerer

matters ar more than the quantity o individuals eected (5, p. 28). For Ryder, this

is an implication rom his rule: speciesism is always wrong and the aggregation

o pains and pleasures across individuals is meaningless (5, p. 29). Ryder sets an

example. Killing 100 people painlessly becomes less wrong than torturing one o

them to death. For Ryder, the key question is: how much pain was experienced bythe individual who suered most (5, p. 28)?

Against Regans rights theory, Ryder sees no clear justication o an inherent

value and a undamental right to be treated with respect. Moreover, he criticizes

the problem oprecedence in conficts when Regan says that the only thing that can

override one right is another right. For Ryder, there is a problem with the hierar-

chy o rights: Without such rules, rights theory has a hollow centre. When aced

with conficting rights, which right do we choose (5, p. 48)? But the main ailure in

Regans rights theory, Ryder points out, is its oundation in mysterious reerences to

telos (purpose) or to intrinsic values (5, p. 50).

Is PAIn necessAry or suIcIent or morAl stAtus?

As mentioned, in a utilitarian approach to pain and pleasure, Benthams question

Can they suer? is crucial. Pain and suering are the main antagonists o pleasure,

and both are connected to the capacity or sentience. According to Warrens descrip-

tion o Singers concept, this capacity is both necessary and sucient or having the

same moral status applied to all sentient beings (16, p. 442). The argument is that only

sentient beings can be cognitively aware o what happens to them, so that Althoughthe ability to experience pain is valuable to mobile organisms, serious pain is itsel a

harm. Pain is an inherent evil to the being that experiences it, and pleasure an inher-

ent good. Yet Warren objects to both strong sentience theory and a weaker version,

because although sentience may be sucient or moral status o some organisms, it

may not be necessary to instantiate moral regard or plants and nonsentient animals

(as in biocentric or ecocentric approaches to ethics) (16, p. 443).

In his Practical Ethics, Singers preerence utilitarianism describes three

classes o living beings: sel-conscious beings like most adult humans, great apes,

and perhaps other higher animals like whales, dogs, or cats; non-sel-conscious ani-mals like most birds or sh; and beings without any sentience like mollusks, micro-

organisms, or plants. Singers concept guarantees primary moral status to persons

with sel-consciousness; that is, they are guaranteed ull protection against being

killed because o their uture options, interests, and preerences. This indicates that

it is not necessary to have pain or moral status. In the second class, the case


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against killing is weaker (7, p. 132) because o the possibility that these animals

could be killed painlessly such that the killing o non-sel-conscious animals may

not be wrong, i they can be killed painlessly (7, p. 132). But this is only an argu-

ment at the level o theoretical ethics, not o practice in animal arming or animal

experimentation. The painless-replaceability argument indicates that moral statusor Singer allows painless killing i all interests are weighted and i the ethical cal-

culation o interests leads to more pleasure in the world. Thus, sentience and pain

are necessary to take these beings into account, but neither are sucient to protect

them against being harmed or killed. The third class (beings without capacity or

sentience and pain) o beings are, or Singer, morally irrelevant, and no necessity

exists to take them into account.

In summary, rom Singers point o view, either sentience or sel-consciousness

is sucient to establish moral status. Thus, the capacity or pain is not necessary. A

survey allows comparison o dierent positions and answers to the crucial question(see Table 13.1). Further embellishment o Ryders account will be provided later in

this chapter.

PAInIsm And sentIentIsm

Ryder claims that Painism supersedes sentientism and explains why he rejects

the earlier preerred term sentientism as a descriptor or his moral position (2,5,

p. 34). The advantages o the new term are very dierent, in both principle, and on

a pragmatic level. First is that sentientism might be deemed to reer to any sort oeeling or sensationor even to sentient beings incapable o experiencing pain at

all (5, p. 34). He speculates that, or instance, lie-orms on other planets may have

evolved systems in order to avoid danger without the subjective experience o pain.

For Ryder, the subjective experience o pain is necessary and sucient regard-

less as to who or what that experiences it; i one day painient machines may be

produced, they, too, will become morally considerable (5, p. 34). Thus, or Ryder,

the term individual includes all existing and uture systems that are capable o

eeling pain. We must conclude that existing biological things, or instance, plants,

or even uture iterations o machines or organic-synthetic chimerasi possess-ing the capacity or paincan be integrated in Ryders painism. Obviously, Ryder

wants to avoid any kind o speciesism and a narrow concept o a moral circle, and

thus preers the termpainism.

The terms painism and painient seem to be more popular and easier to

understand than sentientism, and pragmatically, these words useully ll some

tAble 13.1

I Pai na sfi ma sa?

Pii I Pai na? I Pai sfi?Utilitarianism (Singer) No Yes

Painism (Ryder) Yes Yes

Rights Theory (Regan) No No


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signicant gaps in the English language (5, p. 34). This is why Ryder rejects

the termpathocentrism rom the Belgian Philosopher Johan Braeckman; its wider

meaning inclusive o disease and emotion without any attendant pain becomes

conusing. For Ryder, the capacity or pain is not only necessary but also sucient

or conerring moral status.

hurtIng And hArmIng

Tom Regan attempts to elucidate the dierence between hurting and harming

so as to allow ocus on the role o pain in his rights theory (27, p. 202). Regans

assumption is that every subject o lie has dignity or an inherent value as an

individual. Regan tells a ctional story about a scientist testing a new drug on chim-

panzees, and argues against such research when anesthetics or other palliatives are

not used to eliminate or reduce suering: to cause an animal to suer is to harmthat animalthat is to diminish that individual animals welare. But there may

be an important dierence between harming and suering. An individuals wel-

are can be diminished independently o causing him or her to suer, as when, or

example, a young woman is reduced to a vegetable by painlessly administering a

debilitating drug to her while she sleeps. According to Regan, harm has been done

to her, although she did not suer. Not all harms hurt, in other words, just as not

all hurts harm (27, p. 202). From his point o rights theory, this is a deprivation

o individual reedom and lie, and it does not matter that this subject o lie has

been killed humanely, without pain. This ction illustrates that pain is neithernecessary nor sucient or the moral status o individuals in Regans theory (see

Table 13.1), rather, on the contrary, grounding ethics in pain (i.e. suering)as the

only evil (5, p. 27) would be impossible or Regan.

PAInthe only evIl?

This brings us to address possible philosophical problems within Ryders concept

o painism, and its connection to naturalism, Darwinism, neurocentrism, and inde-

terminism. Ryder preers both a very broad concept o pain to include all kinds osuering and a very general concept o morality, which is only about the right

and wrong treatment oothers (5, p. 4). This seems to be a morality without a

ree moral agent who has responsibilities and duties, or instance, the duty to act

morally. Here, he deaults to a reductive materialist stance in his claim that we are

entirely the slaves o our brains and our ree will may be a product o unpre-

dictable events at the quantum level (5, p. 51). Yet, he argues or a natural source o

ethics: ethical standards are thus inspired by compassion, an innate compassion

exists, and the history o ethics can be seen as an ever-expanding circle o compas-

sion (5, pp. 15, 17, 62).For Ryder, to answer the question, why is pain bad? (5, p. 35), he states that pain is

bad because it is badseemingly a circular answer. From this, he derives that a bad

thing is that which causes pain, and so, morality derives rom this act (5, p. 36). I

the moral premise o painism is based on acts or causes, it seems to be not ar rom a

naturalistic allacy starting with natural or psychological acts (pain is bad) and then


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deriving value judgments or duties: or painists the primary duty is to alleviate pain,

specically the pain o the greatest suerers (5, p. 37).

There is a dierence between pain (at the physiological or psychological level) as

a natural evil and pain as a moral evil. Toothache can be a physiological and psy-

chological evil, but it is only a moral evil i the pain is induced by a moral agent, or

instance, a torturer. Then we need another ethical criterion and a value judgement, or

instance, that a person should be treated as an end in onesel (Kant). Ryder grounds

his moral revolution in analogies between the crucial similarity o humans with

other animals: rom this fows the conclusion that whatever is right or wrong in our

treatment o other human beings is also right or wrong in our treatment o painient

individuals o other species, however small they may be (5, p. 118). Despite the

ambiguityor perhaps allacyo Ryders argument in structure, it is important to

assess its content as relates to the value o pain in the moral consideration o both

human and nonhuman others.

PAIn In nonhumAn others: sPecIesIsm

normAtIve And descrIPtIve dImensIons

The term speciesism was introduced in the 1970s as a normative term in ethics and

politics. For Ryder, this term is still very important to his concept o painism. A

dierence in species is as morally irrelevant as are dierences in race, age or gen-

der (5, p. 118). When introduced, the term speciesism also had a political unctionin the animal rights movement, to eliminate the unair conditions o animal mass

arming and animal experiments in biological or medical research. Thus, it was cre-

ated and mediated to prevent discrimination and to demand equal moral treatment

and rights to humans and nonhumans. But the term has a theoretical background

and a descriptive dimension as oten emphasized by Ryder, Singer, and others.

Antispeciesism and painism belong to the moral implications o Darwinism

and indicate that animals and humans are in the same moral category (5, p. 44).

Darwinian evolution implies that the human species is but one o many species

and that pain is the common enemy o all animal species (5, p. 45). In this con-text, species is used as a biological term with descriptive dimensions, and still we

must consider that the term has been used to convey very dierent meanings in his-

tory and contemporary biological contexts. For example, in pre-Darwinian times,

species had sometimes been understood as an essentialistic logical, or ontological

term. Ater Darwins Origin o Species, it became more o a classicatory unit or

biological entities with special morphological, physiological, or genetic properties.

There is a complex discussion in philosophy and evolutionary biology as to whether

species reers to an individual or a set o organisms (28). Whatever species is, it is

a theoretical concept in biology and not a normative term to engender judgementas oten used in applied ethics. As a descriptive term, it characterizes all kinds

o organismshumans, animals, plants, and microorganisms. Thus, the biological

term species is not restricted in its use.

Does the reproach speciesism in modern ethics mean more than anthropo-

centrism? It obviously does not, i speciesism is dened as in the Oxord English


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Dictionary o 1985, as discrimination against or exploition o certain animal spe-

cies by human beings, based on an assumption o mankinds superiority (5, p. 44).

But rom the theoretical point o view, speciesism is not limited to homo sapiens

sapiens but must be extended to all species o organisms that try to dominate others,

or instance, when higher sentient animal species discriminate or exploit lower

nonsentient animals or plants. In other words, i the principle regardless o spe-

cies is introduced into ethics, it concerns all organisms, not only sentient animals

as Ryder and others posit. From an evolutionary point o view, there is no reason to

discriminate against any speciesthe continuity o the species does not allow us to

draw discontinuous borders in organic nature. From this point o view, the border

between painient and nonpainient individuals could be seen as arbitrary.

sPecIes, IndIvIduAls, And PAInRyder asserts that Painism ocuses upon individuals and not on the conservation

ospecies as a biological entity. He criticizes the anthropocentric and ethnocentric

views o some environmentalists as irrational i they avor the extermination

ospecies ooreign plants, which are not endemic in the ecosystem (5, p. 116).

From his point o view, this seems to be a kind o speciesism and anthropocentric

discrimination. Thus, this critique does not ollow rom his construct o painism,

because painism does not include non-painient plant lie (5, p. 46). This makes

clear the tension between speciesism and painism in Ryders concept. As well,

the concept produces other diculties. Ryder maintains that moral standardsshould apply equally to all painient individuals regardless o species (5, p. 119). I

regardless o species means only regardless o the human species and not o all

species (including sentient animals), then we must recognize an inconsistent use

o the biological term species. I regardless o species reers only to the human

species, it is used as a normative political term and not as a biological term. In this

case, it does not aord any deeper meaning than the notion oanthropocentrism in

animal ethics. Why should we only consider painient individuals o some species?

Is that not another version ospeciesism being asked by a collective o higher pain-

ient animals with nervous systems? Ryders painism may render the same questionas raised by Heta and Matti Hyriwho is like us? (30). We should classiy this

position as a orm o neurocentric speciesism. Yet, i we accept that pain is the

only evil, and thus is oundation o ethics, why do we not have a duty to protect all

victims o natural predators that kill painient animals or ood? I pain is the only

quality upon which to establish moral status, we should prevent these evils in any

circumstance. I know, this is not the intention o painism. But such considerations

demonstrate that painism as a modern ethics must also acknowledge some orm o

natural order i it is to be meaningul.

I pain is a natural phenomenon and an arbitrary product o natural selection thatconers advantages or some species o higher animals, then painism can be seen as

a new kind o zoocentric speciesism, i not a new naturalism. But the problem or

ethicists is not pain as a natural phenomenon; the crucial question is whether pain, as

a unicriterial approach, is a necessary and sucient starting point or ethics.


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PAInIsmsome APPlIcAtIons And questIons

painismand bioteChnology

Fred Giord begins an address on biotechnology with a ctitious dialogue aboutFootball Birds or Egg Machines created by agricultural science. These entities

lack any ability to move and have no sensory input to the brain (31). Giord stated:

The main issue might seem to be the way the animals are treated but in act no

harm comes to the animals or they have no conscious experience o pain or stress

So just what could be wrong about it (31, p. 197)? How would Ryders painism

decide this question?

For Ryder, it is surely, morally desirable to alter nature in certain ways. There

is no moral objection per se against genetic engineering and cloning o designer

organisms under the ollowing conditions: that the process o production entails no

suering, that the produced individuals do not suer increased pain or distress

due to their altered natures, and that such organisms do not cause harm to others

(5, p. 114). Rather, Ryder explicitly welcomes the potential o genetic engineering to

reduce the capacity or pain, i, or example, it becomes possible to produce people

and animals with reduced painience. What a revolution this will be! Ultimately there

is the prospect o a painless uture! (5, p. 114). In this case, Ryder expresses his

anthropological utopia, a vision o a painless uture, and he speculates about the

trick o eliminating pain on the one hand, and maintaining the eeling o joy and

compassion on the other hand, so as to enable, i not ortiy, moral concern or oth-

ers. But, as Giordano (32) noted, while an emphasis upon the capacity to eel pain

may be essential to any moral regard or ethic, it is also important to recognize that

the elimination o pain, in part or in whole, raises additional philosophical, ethical,

and practical issues and concerns. These include the extent o pain that should be

eliminated; in whom; by what criteria; and how the lack o painience might aect

or alter notions o existential gain and loss, nonharm, and, ultimately, the regard and

treatment o others.

painismand enVironmental ethiCsRyders work indicates a distance and dierence between modern environmental

ethics and painism. Modern environmentalism began earlier than animal ethics, but

as Ryder points out, its philosophical basis is oten thin and anthropocentric, driven

oten by assuming a sel-interest human or mystical quality concerning lie in

general, including nonpainient plant lie (5, p. 46).

Painism is grounded in the pain o individuals; the classical approaches o animal

liberation, humanism, and environmentalism are subordinate to painism in that

they give rise to compassion (5, p. 46). In this case, Ryders painism is similar to

Singers preerence utilitarianism, where the environment is only relevant i sen-tient beings are concerned: as Singer asks, is there value beyond sentient beings?

Once we abandon the interests o sentient creatures as our source o value, where do

we nd value (7, p. 277)? For Ryder, it is not the utilitarian aggregation and calcula-

tion, but only the existence o a maximum suerer, whether the suerer is an animal


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or a human being. For both Ryder and Singer, plants have no value, no interest, and

no right to moral regard because they are not capable o sentience or eeling pain.

Thus, Ryder and Singer would oppose those environmental ethicist like J. Baird

Callicott, Paul Taylor, or Christopher Stone, who argue or rights or respect or

plants. For instance, Christopher Stone (33) argues or guardianship, legal rights,

moral worth, and dignity o nonsentient beings like plants. Is this tenable within the

context o painism?

painismand plants

Mary Anne Warren summarizes the skeptics position concerning plants in modern

ethics: As ar as we can tell these organisms have neither sense organs nor nervous

systems; and their behaviour rarely seems indicative o a capacity or pleasure or

pain. Thus, while it is impossible to be absolutely certain that these organisms arenot sentient, it is a good bet that they are not (15). Here, Warren adressed Tompkins

and Birds (34) Secret Lie o Plantsindeed a dubious concept rom a modern

scientic point o view. But serious scientists organized the rst symposium on

Plant Neurobiology in Florence in 2005, and the acknowledged plant physiologist

Trewavas tried to deend plant intelligence (35,36) in a discussion about cell-to-cell

communication by means o phytohormones as neurotransmitter-like substances, the

role o electric membrane potentials, and ion channels, unctioning like brain pro-

teins to orm plant synapses: actin-based domains or cell-to-cell communica-

tion (37,38). I mention these theories and acts in order to point out the hypotheticalboundary o sentience o Ryders and Singers ethical position. I science would

someday nd something like sentience orpain, it could initiate problems with plant

experiments or vegetarianism. An ethical approach like Ryders cannot accommo-

date environmental value and protection, but Singers can i it serves utility but is

still neurocentric. I do not expect that plants can eel pain, but the hypothetical ques-

tion clearly indicates that ethical theories like Ryders or Singers are ounded in

zoocentrism and neurocentrism. In short, no nervous system, no sentience, no pain,

no interests, no moral value, no rights.

However, this kind o neurocentric approach may exclude not only plants romany moral status, but also humans beyond the boundary o sentience (e.g., patients

in apersistent vegetative state sometimes called human vegetables) (see below). It is

curious that the approach to environmental ethics advocated by Christopher Stone

was just the other way around. I it is possible that human vegetables have rights,

Stone concludes analogously that it is also possible or plants to have some type

o moral status. He considers the case that legal guardianship is possible or both

human vegetables and real vegetables (33). This consideration is not provided in

Ryders painism; thereore, it becomes important to address painism in the context

o euthanasia and concepts o negative states and human vegetables.

painismand euthanasia

Ryders treatment o euthanasia illuminates new aspects o painism and the role

o pain in ethics. Ryder provides cases o brain-dead persons being used as organ


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donors, in which organs were removed without the use o anesthesia. This is dubi-

ous because even a brain-dead person could have intact neural pathways that are

activated by extreme stimulation. Such cases illustrate the call or the precaution-

ary principle that, wherever painience is uncertain in a living animal it should be

assumed to exist (5, p. 70).

Yet, painism justies euthanasia, or nonhumans and those human cases where

unconsciousness seems to be irreversible in accordance with some o the prior work

o Callahan, such that Wherever death is perceived to be the greater good or lesser

evil or the patient (except where there is evidence o specic opposition to eutha-

nasia by that individual patient) then it should be allowed to proceed. Concerning

passive euthanasia, Ryder maintains that I withholding anything causes pain or

distress then it ought not to be done. The argument that suering does not matter

because this patient is dying anyway is entirely irrational and deeply immoral (5).

For Ryder, anesthesia, analgesia, and euthanasia should be developed, and discrimi-

nation o age is irrational and wrong (5, p. 72).

brain, pain, persistent VegetatiVe state, and extreme Cases

This leads to other aspects and problems o painism as relates to extreme cases in

human ethics. For example, what about persons near or beyond the boundary o sen-

tience, such as in a persistent vegetative state (PVS)? Does pain play a role in this ethi-

cal issue? According to Ryder, we must expect that even rudimentary pain guaranteesa moral status, but the question remains: what is the consequence? From the classical

rame o the our principles (24), there oten is no clear answer possible because o

the complexity o the situation. Sometimes it seems that principles o autonomy and

justice dominate benecence and nonmalecence. With respect to extreme cases (like

brain death or PVS), ethicists must consider whether burdens o treatment outweigh

benets and that the principle o nonmalecience does not imply the maintenance

o biological lie, nor does it require the initiation or continuation o treatment with-

out regard to the patients pain, suering, and discomort (24, p. 135).

In general, it is accepted that PVS is a orm o deep unconsciousness causedby ailed operations in the cortex responsible or activities that we recognize as

specically human (39, p. 197). Nevertheless, the brain stem is still unctioning and

controlling involuntary unctions. The crucial question in this context is whether

PVS patients have pain. It is not easy to address, because it depends on the way in

which we view pain (40). I we distinguish pain as a physical sensation, the response

o the PVS patient to noxious stimuli would indicate that there is a physical response

to pain or discomort but that the aective level o human suering is not present.

Experience with such patients shows no behavioural indication o such suering

(39, p. 205). Yet, Caplan admits that we have no way o knowing what is going on inthe mind o the unconscious person. I we could indeed establish that there is pain,

and that there is, in act, considerable pain, then our answers might be quite dierent.

That question, however, remains to be answered, although present consensus argues

against the existence o such pain, mental or physical (39, p. 206). Even the issue o

physical pain sometimes seems to be presented inconsistently.


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In the PVS case o Nancy Cruzan, the State Supreme Court described her medi-

cal condition as oblivious to her environment except or refex responses to sound

and perhaps painul stimuli, suggesting that her highest cognitive brain unction

is exhibited by her grimacing perhaps in recognition o ordinarily painul stimuli,

indicating the experience o pain and apparent response to sound (39, p. 52). In this

case, the Supreme Court considered best interest standards and declared that the

burden o a prolonged lie measured by the experience o pain and suering mark-

edly outweighed its satisactions; thereore, treatment could be terminated under a

limited-objective standard (39, p. 48). This indicates the complexity o the situation

but clearly stresses the burden o a prolonged lie rom the experience o pain and

suering as an important actor in balancing dierent principles in ethical judge-

ments about PVS.

From the viewpoint o Ryders painism, two statements are relevant. The rst

concerns the approach to euthanasia and brain death. Wherever painience is uncer-tain (as in the case o brain death), the precautionary principle conrms a duty

not only to administer enough analgetics to remove all pain but also to administer

all appropriate psychoactive drugsnot only to alleviate pain but to induce eupho-

ria (5, p. 51). Is it ethically allowable to actively induce the dying process o a PVS

patient whose lie could be extended several decades? This question leads back to the

roots o Ryders painism and his engagement or the treatment o animals. As Ryder

emphasizes, nonhuman euthanasia is accepted and justied in the West. In human

cases like severe dementia, severe head injury, and whenever unconsciousness is

expertly deemed to be irreversible, the moral case is similar (5). But what about thecases o dementia, PVS, brain death, and so orth? I the patient, signicant others,

and kin would suer greater distress i euthanasia occurs than the distress they

are already suering, then euthanasia is unethical, but i not, euthanasia should

proceed. This statement sounds like a utilitarian weighting o interests on the basis

o pain. However, i the patient has issued inormed directives regarding termination

o lie support, then euthanasia is permissible. Ryder asked, Where is the ethical

diculty (5, p. 71)? I hold that one diculty is the conusion o heterogeneous

principles. In these cases, Ryder introduces the criterion respect or autonomy to

solve ethical problems, but neither a utilitarian weighting o pain nor the principle oautonomy is justiable in a pure painism that is grounded solely on the presence o

pain in human and nonhuman beings.

who Is the mAxImum suerer?

With respect to the important role o individual pain, we have to remember Ryders

other basic statement: the moral objective is to reduce pains o others. But who are

these others? Ryder rejects any aggregation o pains and pleasures across individu-

als as is possible in utilitarianism (5, p. 27), claiming that The moral priority is totry to reduce the pain o the maximum suerer in each case and not to maximize

the pleasure o all aected individuals. The number o individuals is irrelevant, but

the aggregation o pain and pleasure in the same individual is meaningul. According

to this rule, killing 100 people painlessly becomes less wrong than torturing one

o them to death. This sentence indicates that there is no right to lie, protection


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o lie, or sanctity o lie in painism, per se. In this case, the question seems to

be only: how much pain was experienced by the individual who suered most (5,

p. 28)? This is a narrow monocriterial approach and leads to the question, who is the

maximum suerer? For instance, rom the viewpoint o painism, i we know that a

particular PVS patient (e.g., with no pain) has a dog who loves her, and who would

pine i the PVS patient died, then it would be justied to keep the PVS patient alive

to protect this animal as the potential maximum suerer, given Ryders rule that we

try to act, thereore, as though human interests count or no more than nonhuman

interests (5, p. 29). But here we see an apparent imbalance that touches moral senti-

ments. Obviously, some clarication is needed i we are to take painism as a valid

ethical construct.

ConCerningthe VegetatiVe language about

human beingsbeyond sentienCeand pain

The ctitious case shows that animals count in painism, but nonpainient beings like

plants do not. In this context, I would like to add an observation about the dierent

language used to dene people in these borderline cases. Obviously, we use a spe-

cial language to characterize natural beings that lack the capability or pain. This

language is o bioethical relevance. For instance, the lie o humans in a persistent

vegetative state has been compared with a vegetables lie, and in cases o brain death

or dementia, oten we nd the statement that they vegetate. This kind o language

includes descriptive and normative judgements. As mentioned, or Singer or Ryder,there exists no inherent or intrinsic value beyond the border o sentience (e.g., as in the

case o plants). The moral status o plants seems to be similar to the situation o the

PVS patients: I they have no experiences at all, and can never have any again, their

lives have no intrinsic value. Their lies journey has come to an end. They are bio-

logically alive, but not biographically (7, p. 191). In ordinary language, these persons

sometimes are called human vegetables, and even the scientic term vegetative state

contains an allusion to the plant metaphor. In Internet dialogues about the Schiavo

case, the ollowing sentences appeared (March 20, 2005): (A) I would think the most

oensive comparison would be comparing Terri to a piece o broccoli (B) A veg-etable, which she is, and courts and doctors have determined she is. I call this kind o

language about human beings beyond sentience or pain vegetative language and here

eel it is important to add a ew remarks rom historical and ethical points o view.

A common assumption in this kind o vegetative language is that it reers to a

state beyond sentience and pain. Since the end o the 1960s, discussions about brain

death included the term human vegetable, and this has been criticized (41). The

origins o this vegetative language derive rom the Aristotelian and scholastic term

anima vegetativa, the vegetative soul, which is responsible or nutrition, growing,

and propagation o organisms (42). According to Aristotle, all human beings possessa vegetative soul, but their telos is to live a rational lie. The telos o animals is to

realize the capacities o a sensitive soul, including pleasure and pain. This tradition

in metaphysics infuenced the introduction o the term vegetative nervous system in

the early nineteenth century by the German physician Reil, which was then replaced

in the English language by the term autonomous nervous system. Nevertheless,


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Jennet and Plum still avored the new termpersistent vegetative state in their 1972

paper, which has led to several misunderstandings. They wrote: the word vegetative

itsel is not obscure: vegetate is dened in the Oxord English Dictionary (29, p. 76)

as: to live a merely physical lie. But Jennett and Plum emphasized the point o

being devoid o intellectual activity or social intercourse. As urther explanation,

they added: It suggests even to the laymana limited and primitive responsiveness toexternal stimuli; to the doctor it is also a reminder that there is relative preservation

o autonomic regulation o internal milieu (43, p. 736). This is a version o special

language about a status beyond pain, but it suggests to both the layman and the physi-

cian that there is no pain to consider.

From a philosophical point o view, these vegetative terms and statements can

allow one to recognize an ontological paradigm or the moral status o real vegeta-

bles and human vegetables. In this context, only the ethical role o pain is important.

Whatever is possible or impossible concerning the state o pain and suering o PVSpatients, it seems to be incorrect to describe the state o these patients by vegetative

terminology. They are not plants, they do not live the lie o plants; rom a biologi-

cal point o view, plants are completely dierent organisms than animals. Further, it

remains an open question whether PVS patients have a biography, because it is pos-

sible that some o these patients live in a border region with rudimentary cognition

and pain (44).

Thus, experts should be cautious when using this vegetative language in state-

ments about people in borderline situations (e.g., PVS, brain death, dementia, or

within the dying process), because this language can easily lead to a total misun-derstanding o the complex medical and ethical situation. The animal ethicist Tom

Regan used this vegetative terminology merely as a ctitious analogy and metaphor

to illustrate his view about hurting and harming a person who is killed in his or her

sleep without pain. The environmentalist Christopher Stone used this vegetative lan-

guage as a strategic analogy to deend rights or trees, corresponding to the rights or

human vegetables as represented by their guardians. But or Peter Singer, it is more

than a metaphor or strategy i he compares plants with humans who are beyond the

border o pain. Here it is an essential ontological analogy, indicating a substantial

parallelism o the moral status o plants and those patients in situations beyond sen-tience and pain. This is a kind o neurocentrism and zoocentrism, which now ollows

the traditional speciesism in anthropology (45).

conclusIon

Richard Ryders painism is one o the more interesting concepts in modern bio-

ethics, and indeed Ryder was an important thinker in the last 30 years. His term

speciesism was inspiring or animal ethics. For Ryder, pain is necessary and su-

cient to establish moral status. This monocriterial basis o ethics leads to sev-eral tensions with Ryders speciesism and allows only a narrow ramework or the

solution o the dicult problems in modern environmental and biomedical ethics.

Ryders painism provides no starting point or the principle o autonomy and or

the protection o lie. Ryder emphasizes the aggregation o pain only within each

individual, but rejects any aggregation o pain between individuals as utilitarianism


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does. This position leads to the question: who is the maximum suerer? When

considering biotechnology, euthanasia, or PVS, principles other than pain are likely

to be necessary to understand the complex situations and engage descriptive and

normative judgments.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Virginia A. Sharpe, Heike Baranzke, and James Giordano or

their helpul comments on earlier versions o this chapter.

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