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Contents:

Peiion for Review by he EPO Enarged Board of Appea jus for eing off seam? 2

Sofware invenions: How o draf one appicaion for boh Japan and Europe 4

Amendmen of paen caims in preiminary injuncion proceedings under Swedish aw 6

Skied person in Danish uiiy modes 8

Seecion invenions: Is a paricuar echnica effec required under he EPC? 9

Divisiona appicaions: Some commens on he new regime under Rue 36(1)(a) EPC 10

New Rue 141 EPC revisied: Duy of discosure in Europe 12

Page

1

EDItORIAl BOARD:NiklasMattsson,PeterKenamets,MattiasPierrou,TorbenRavnRasmussenandMagnusHallin

AWA IP ReviewcontainscommentsandanalysesrelatingtotheverylatestdevelopmentsinIPlaw.Allthearticlesarewritten by IP specialists at Awapatent who have extensive experience in a number of key elds. To become a subscriber,

visitwww.awapatent.comorsimplye-mailyournameande-mailaddresstonewseditor@awapatent.com.

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REPORTS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW #1 2011

| Bellevuevgen 46, P.O. Box 5117, SE-200 71 Malm, Sweden | Phone +46 40 98 51 00 | www.awapatent.com

the number of Peiions for Review by he Enar-ged Board of Appea under Arice 112a EPC

reached he 50 mark ae as year, suggesing i

is ime o have a ook a he use of he sysem so

far.

Withasteadyaverageof17petitionsperyearsincetheEPC2000cameintoforceon13December2007,areasonablebalancebetweenthelegalrightsofthepartiestoBoardofAppeal(BOA)proceedingsandtheworkloadontheEnlargedBoardofAppeal(EBA)hasbeenobtained.

Of the 56 petitions led at the time of writing this,14werestillpending.Oftheremaining42,mostwereturneddownbytheEBA,9forbeinginadmis-sibleand26forbeingunallowable.Only1petitio-nerwassuccessfulandhadtheBOAproceedingsre-opened.

Inthecasere-opened,aletterinformingoneofthepartiestotheappealproceedingsofthegroundsforappealandhencethetermforreplyhadneverbeen

Peiion for Review by he EPO Enarged Board of Appea Jus for eing off seam?

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sent. This is clearly in conict with Article 113 EPC,andanexampleofthetypeofsituationforwhichthereviewsystemwasintended.

Ofthepetitionsdeemedinadmissible,threefellonformalities, such as being led too late, but the

majoritywasfoundtonotcomplywithRule106EPC.Inotherwords,itcouldnotbeproventhattheBOAhadbeenmadeawareoftheproceduraldefect,whichwasallegedtohaveoccurredduringtheappealproceedings,andhadchosentodismissit.Fromthedecisionshandeddownsofar,itcanbeconcluded that it is not sufcient to state during

oralproceedingsthatonedoesnotsharetheboardsviewonaparticularsubject.AseparateobjectionisrequiredinordertogivetheBOAanopportunitytorevisetheallegedproceduralde-fect.1Tobeonthesafeside,anexplicitrequestshouldbemadethatitisnotedintheminutesoftheoralproceedingsthatacertainquestionhasnotbeenconsidered.Keepinginmindthatoralprocee-dingsareoftenaratherintenseprocessandcer-tainlydemandingonthepersonmakingtheargu-ments,itisnotsurprisingthatsuchrequestsarenotalwaystimelysubmitted,andafearofoffendingtheboardmightevencauseareluctancetomakesuch

requests.

Seenfromtheperspectiveofanon-petitioner,itisworthnoticingthattheproceedingsare,infact,atwo-stage procedure. In a rst stage, which is

conductedasexparteproceedingsbeforeathreememberboard,itisdecidedwhetherthepetitionisadmissibleandallowable.Onlyifthisisthecasethesecondstageinititates,whichisconductedasinterpartesproceedings before a ve member board.2

The rst stage was intended to be a quick screening

processinordertorejectpetitionsthatclearly

cannotsucceed.Intheory,theprocedureshouldfavourrespondentsbynotrequiringthemtotakeanystepsinresponsetoapetitionuntiltheEnlargedBoard had been satised that it is not to be rejected

asclearlyinadmissibleorunallowable.Inpractice,however,thenon-petitionermayfeelthathisrighttobeheardhasbeenjeopardized.

The rules of the rst stage of the petition for review

areclear,indicatingthattheEnlargedBoardofAppealshalldecidewithouttheinvolvementofotherpartiesandonthebasisofthepetition.Astheminutesusuallyarebriefandthewrittendeci-

sionfocusedonthefactsthatsupporttheviewoftheEnlargedBoardofAppeal,thenon-petitioneris

leftwithdisadvantagesinthesubsequentsecondstage.Theimbalanceofinformationbetweenthepetitionerandtherespondentmay,insubsequentre-openedproceedingsbeforetheBoardofAppeal,be the decisive factor for the nal outcome of the

case.

Thisisofcourseparticularlysoincases,wherethemattersdiscussedbeforetheEBArelatetothesubstanceofthecase.Asolutionforthenon-petitionermaythenbetoattendtheoralprocee-dingsasamemberofthepublic.Thoughnotabletospeakattheoralproceedings,thenon-petitioner

canthenatleasthearwhatissaidbythepetitionerandtheEnlargedBoardofAppeal.

OneoftheauthorsofthisarticletriedusingthisapproachbyannouncinghispresenceatoralproceedingsinR08/10,wheretheEBAwastoreviewtheBOAsrefusaltorevertanallegedlynewinventivestepargumenttotheOppositionDivision.Inthiscase,itwasexpectedthattheEBAcouldnottakeadecisionwithouthavingtoconsidertheactualcontentandcircumstancesofthepieceofpriorartinquestion,andthattheEBAcouldthere-forepotentiallyhearorexpressargumentsthat

mightbecomerelevantlateron.Regrettably,thepetitionforreviewwaswithdrawnshortlybeforetheoralproceedings,whichwereconsequentlycancelled.Thepossibilityofappearingasamemberofthepublichasprovedappropriateonseveraloccasions,however,andisevenmentionedasanoptioninR05/08.

1R09/092ElaboratedinR05/08

ReportedbyVibekeWarbergRohdeandTorbenRavnRasmussen,Partnersand

European Patent Attorneys, Copenhagen Ofce.

3

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Sofware invenions:

How o draf one appicaion for boh Japan and Europe

4

las year, he paen communiy was peased osee he ega posiion on compuer-impemened

inventions (CII) claried by two landmark deci-

sions. the Enarged Board of Appea auhoriai-

vely conrmed1 ha he EPOs exising pracice

consiues a consisen approach o examining

CII. A few weeks aer, in Bilski,2 he U.S. Supre-

me Cour gave is opinion regarding he condi-

ions under which a CII can quaify as sauory

subjec-maer. the debae on sofware pa-

tents preceding each of the decisions was erce

a imes and araced a grea dea of pubic

ineres.

Parallelwiththis,althoughinlessspectacularfashion, the Japan Patent Ofce (JPO) has also

developedastableCIIexaminationpractice.TheprinciplesareexplainedinpartVIIoftheJPOExami-nationGuidelines.TheJapanesemarketisalsoawarethatCIIpatentscanbesuccessfullyenforced,asdemonstratedbythefamousrulinginMatsushitav.Justsystem.3

AJapaneseapplicationdraftedinperfectconfor-mitywiththenationallegalframeworkmaynevertheless face difculties before the EPO even if

itissuccessfulinJapan.TheEPOisunlikelytorefuseitforbeingdirectedtosoftwareassuch(anon-inventionunderArticles52(2)and52(3)EPC),butmayconsiderthatthesubject-matteroftheclaimseveninamendedformlacksaninventivestepbyapplyingtheso-calledComvikapproach4.Simi-larly,anapplicationthatgetsfavourablefeedbackinEuropemaybeheldnon-statutoryunderJapa-nesepractice.

TheJapaneseconceptofasauory invenionisacreationoftechnicalideasutilisinglawsofnature5.This succinct denition excludes any technology

designedonlytofollowman-maderulesormakeoptimal use of them, such as pension benet regula-tionsandphonecallcharges.Morehands-on,theGuidelines tell us that this is fullled as soon as

informationprocessingbysoftwareisconcretelyrealisedbyusinghardwareresources6.Eachoftheexamplesdiscussingthisdoctrineendsbysayingthattheinventionisstatutorybecausesoftwareandhardwareresourcesarecooperativelyworking.Basedonthis,acautiousJapaneseattorneywilltendtodraftclaimsthatspecifyallofthefollowing:

aprocessingmeansreceivesdata,

the processing means performs specic opera-tions,

indoingso,itusescertainhardwareresources,and

theprocessingmeansoutputsdata.

Articles 52(2),(3) EPC dene certain subject-matter

asnon-inventions.Astheseparagraphshavecometobeinterpretedinthejurisprudence,theysetthebarrelativelylow,sothatsuchaclaimshouldpasswithout difculty. One single technical feature may

beenough.7Evidenceoftechnicalconsiderationsis probably still sufcient too.8

Iftheinventionisconsideredstatutory,theJapanese

examinerdeterminesthegapbetweentheinven-tionandthepriorart.(S)heistheninapositiontojudgewhethertheinventioninvolvesaninvenivesep,namelybyconsideringwhetherapersonofordinary skill would ll in the gap. The Guidelines

give a number of CII-specic examples of certain

types of gap-lling that are never inventive: a

computerisedtoolalreadyinuseinoneapplicationeld (e.g. medical record-keeping) is applied in a

further application eld (e.g. CRM), a commonly

knownmeansisadded,afeatureisreplacedbyanequivalent,aknowneventisreproducedincompu-terisedvirtualspace,orhumantransactionsaresystematised.9

Indetermininginventiveness,thereisnolegalbasisfortreatingtechnicalandnon-technicalfeaturesdifferently,particularlynotifadvantageouseffectshavebeenmentioned.TheJPOmaythereforegrantpatentsforCIIwhosecontributionoverthepriorartisessentiallynon-technical.Forinstance,itisnotapparenttoushowarefusaloftheapplicationconsideredinT258/03(Auctionmethod)couldbesubstantiatedunderJapaneselaw.10

InEurope,ontheotherhand,onlytechnicalfeatu-resaredeemedtocontributetoaninventivestep.Ifthetechnicalfeaturesonlyrelatetoagenericcomputersystem,anEPOexaminerisentitledtodenyinventivestepwithoutcitingapriorartdocu-mentdirectedtoasimilarpurposeandwithoutworkingoutthedetailsofaproblem-solutionreasoningbasedonthatpriorartdocument.11

Ifcarehasbeentakentoincludeadescriptionofaspecictechnicalcontextfortheclaimedmethod,theExaminerprobablycannotrefusetheapplica-tioninasummarymanner,e.g.,bysayingthatthedistinguishingfeaturesarenotoriousincomputertechnology.(S)heshouldinsteadtakethepurpose

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oftheclaimedinventionintoaccountwhensear-chingforpriorart,andtheresultingproblem-solutionreasoningislikelytobemoreinvolved.Whileinvolvedmaynotalwaysmeanfavourabletotheapplicant,suchreasoningismorelikelytocontain aws open to a line of counter-arguments

fromtheapplicant.

Thus,toincreasethechancesofhavingapatentgrantedforaCIIinbothJapanandEurope,itisadvisableto:

Besuretoincludeaconcretelinkbetween

softwareandhardwareintheclaims.Carefullydescribealladvantageouseffectstechnicalandnon-technicaloverthepriorartintheapplication.

Describe a specic and concrete technical

contextfortheinvention,withadetaileddescription of specic technical means used to

implementtheinvention,andinteractionsbetweensuchtechnicalmeans.

ThinktwiceaboutEuropeifyourinventionisjustabusinessmethod.

1

G3/08,publishedinOJEPO2011,1059;reportedinAWAIPReview2/20102Bilskiv.Kappos,561U.S.__(2010);reportedinAWAIPBlogon20May201032005(Ne)10040.Note,however,thatMatsushitaspatentwaslaterdeclaredinvalidbytheIPHighCourt.4T641/00(Twoidentities)5Art.2(1)oftheJapanesePatentLaw6ExaminationGuidelinesforPatentandUtilityinJapan(June2010),partVII,chapter1,2.27Examinationofcomputer-implementedinventionsattheEuropean Patent Ofce with par ticular attention to computer-implementedbusinessmethods,OJEPO2007,5946008T769/92(General-purposemanagementsystem)9op.cit.,partVII,chapter1,2.3.410ForfurtherexampleswhereCIIapplicationsofJapaneseoriginhavebeendeniedinventivestep,seeT367/91

(Electronic document information ling system) reasons 5.5, T10/95(Documentprocessingapparatus)r.4.1,T243/95(Translationsystem)r.4,T824/99(Imagecommunicationmethodandapparatus)r.7,T1567/05(Apparatusforindicatingstrengthofbuildingstructure)r.3.43.9,T1569/05(Methodandapparatusforretrievingdata)r.3.8,T390/06(MRIsystem)r.7,T1029/06(Environmentalimpactestimationmethodandapparatus)r.1516,T581/07(Dynamicimagecontentsearchinformationmanagingapparatus)r.4.2andT156/09(Searchinformationtransmitt-ingapparatus)r.6.16.3.11Examinationofcomputer-implemented(seeabove)

ReportedbyDanielFritsche,PartnerandEuropean Patent Attorney, Gothenburg ofce

andAnders Hansson, Patent Attorney, Stockholm ofce

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A decision by he Svea Cour of Appea1

hasseed an ineresing quesion, namey o wha

exen a paenee is enied o imi his paen

caims by inroducing amended caims as auxi-

iary requess during proceedings for a preimi-

nary injuncion. this case wi be discussed

furher beow.

the siuaion before he new decision from he

Svea Cour of Appea

BeforeamendmentsmadetotheSwedishPatentActin2007,therewasnowaybyvirtueoflawto

limitpatentclaimswiththeSwedishPTObeforeinitiating,orduring,patentlitigation.Infact,beforetheamendments,thePatentActdidnotexplicitlymentionanypossibilityatalloflimitingapatentsscopeaftergrantofthepatent.

However,therewereafewbriefstatementsinthepreparatoryworkstothePatentActthatdiddiscussthepossibilitytolimitpatentsaftergrant.ThesepreparatoryworksthereforeformedthelegalbasisforafewdecisionsfromtheDistrictCourtofStock-holm (the only court of rst instance that tries

patentlitigationcasesinSweden)andtheSvea

CourtofAppeal,whichstatedthatsection52ofthePatentActcouldbeconstruedinsuchawaythatitallowedapatenteetolimittheclaimsiffacedwithaninvalidityaction.Thispossibilitywas,however,onlyavailableinsimplecases,andthecourtswereveryrestrictiveinapplyingit.

However,theabovedidnotdealwithlimitationsduringatrialofarequestforapreliminaryinjunc-tion.Infactinacasefrom2006theSveaCourtofAppealexplicitlystatedthat,whentryingarequestforapreliminaryinjunction,thetrialhastobebasedontheregisteredpatentclaims.

Amendmens o he Paen Ac inroducing

imiaion of paens afer gran

Forsometime,theSwedishgovernmentandparlia-menthaverealizedtheneedfortheSwedishPatentActtobeharmonizedwithinteraliatheEPC.

InorderfortheSwedishPatentActtobebroughtmoreinlinewiththelawsinmanyotherEuropeancountriesandwiththeEPC2000,theSwedishParliamentdecidedtoallowadministrativeamend-mentsofpatentsbeforetheSwedishPTO.Thus,today,newsection40aoftheSwedishPatentAct

enablesapatenteetolimitapatentbeforetheSwedishPTO.Thisoption,however,isonlyopentothepatentee.

Furthermore,section52ofthePatentActtodayexplicitlyallowsacompetentcourttolimitapa-tent,ifitisfoundtobeonlypartiallyinvalid.

However,evenwiththeamendmentsofthePatentActabove,thedecisionintheSveaCourtofAppealcasefrom2006wasstillvalid.

ThishasnowchangedsinceadecisionfromtheSveaCourtofAppeallastspringtakesthepossibilitytolimitthescopeofapatentevenfurther.

the reevan decision of he Svea Cour of Appea

Thebackgroundtothecasewasthattwocompa-nies(McNeilABandNiconovumAB)werebothmarketingproductsthathelppeoplequitsmoking.

Theplaintiff,McNeil,(patentee)initiatedinfring-ementproceedingsbeforetheDistrictCourtofStockholmandsoughtapreliminaryinjunction(interpartes)toprohibitthedefendantfrominteraliamanufacturingandsellingtheallegedlyinfring-ingproduct.

Thedefendant,Niconovum,contestedMcNeilscase,aswellasthepreliminaryinjunction,allegingboththattheirproductdidnotfallunderthescopeofthepatentandthatthepatentwasinvalid(inSweden,theinvalidityofapatentcanonlyberaisedasagroundifaninvalidityactionisinitiated).

TheDistrictCourtgrantedapreliminaryinjunction.ThisdecisionwasappealedbyNiconovum,whobythenhadinitiatedlitigationinordertoinvalidatethepatentduetolackofnoveltyandinventivestep.

TheSveaCourtofAppealfoundtheappealadmis-

sibleandorderedthatthepreliminaryinjunctionwasunenforceableforthetimebeing.

Duringtheappealcourtproceedings,Niconovumpresentedareportofanewinvestigationperfor-medbytheUniversityofCopenhagenregardingthemouthsprayQuit(earlierinvestigationsregardingQuithadbeendismissedasinadequatebyMcNeil),whichtheyclaimeddestroyedthenoveltyofthepatent.McNeilmaintaineditsargumentsfromtheDistrictCourt,butalsoputforwardarewordingoftheclaimsofthepatentasanauxiliaryrequestintheinvaliditycase.

Amendmen of paen caims in preiminary injuncion proceedings under Swedish aw

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Niconovumopposedtheamendedclaimsoftheauxiliaryrequest,andarguedthattheyshouldnotbetakenintoconsiderationwhendecidingonthepreliminaryinjunction.Niconovumcontinuedbyclaimingthateveniftheauxiliaryrequestwasconsidered,thepatentwasstillinvalidforlackofnoveltyand/orinventivestep.

Initsdecision,theAppealCourtcommencedbystatingthatitsharedtheDistrictCourtsopinionthatNiconovumsproductinfringedthepatentifthepatentwasindeedvalid.

TheAppealCourtcontinuedbystatingthat,when

decidingonarequestforapreliminaryinjunction,itisimportanttodetermineatthisearlystagethelike-lihoodthatthepatentwillbeheldinvalid.Accor-dingtotheAppealCourt,thisfactisdecisiveforthequestionofwhetherMcNeilsauxiliaryrequestscouldbeconsideredatthisstage.

TheAppealCourtstatedthatthepatentmostlikelylackednovelty.Thereafter,theAppealCourtpoin-tedoutthattherenowexistsastatutorypossibilitytolimitapatentsscopeduringinvalidityprocee-dings.NosimilarpossibilityduringproceedingsforapreliminaryinjunctionisexplicitlystatedinthePatentAct.TheAppealCourt,however,heldthatsincethevalidityofthepatentisevaluatedduringproceedingsforapreliminaryinjunction,nothingshouldpreventthecourtfromalsotakingintoconsiderationaproposedlimitationofthepatent.

RegardlessoftheAppealCourtspositiononthisissue,however,thelimitationsdidnothelpMcNeil,astheAppealCourtcametotheconclusionthat,evenwiththelimitations,thepatentmostlikelylackedbothnoveltyandinventivestep.

Concusions and remarks

ThedecisionbytheAppealCourt(whichhasbe-come nal and legally binding) opens up new

possibilitiesforpatentees.

Theestablishedcaselawmakesitpossibleforpatenteeswithweakorshakypatentstoinitiateaninfringementcaseandaskforapreliminaryinjunction,sincethereisstillapossibilitytolimitthepatent claims without rst having to request limita-tionofthepatentbeforethePTO.Thiscouldofcoursebeofgreatimportancetoapatenteeinurgentcircumstances,whichisnormallythecaseifapreliminaryinjunctionissought.Insuchcases,

timecanbesavedbyskippingtheadministrative

optionforlimitationofapatent,providedthatthepatentee has already identied which claims couldbeputforwardasauxiliaryrequestsduringprocee-dingsforapreliminaryinjunction,shouldthedefen-dantinitiateinvalidityproceedings.

ReportedbyMartinTranlv,PartnerandAttorneyatLaw,

andPeterHermansson,

Attorney at Law, Gothenburg ofce

7

1Caseno.9316-09NiconovumABv.McNeilAB(deliveredon3March2010)2Caseno.1674-06Arrowv.Merck

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8

A judgemen1

(Powder Sow A/S v Board ofAppea) of he Danish Mariime and Commercia

Court (DMCC) conrms utility model protec-

ion in Denmark as a vauabe oo ha is usefu

boh as a suppemen and as an aernaive o

paen proecion. Compared o a paen, he

cour decided ha a ower invenive sep is

required for a uiiy mode.

WhereaspatentprotectionisavailableinallstatespartytotheParisconvention,utilitymodelprotec-tionisanoptioninonlyasmallnumberofthosestates.Whileinternationaleffortsaremadetostandardizethepracticeofpatentprotection,utilitymodelsmaintaintobetreateddifferentlyindiffe-rentstates,forexampleinregardtothequestionsofnoveltyandinventivestep.

TheDanishUtilityModelActenteredintoforcein1992andwasinspiredbythemucholderGermanutilitymodelsystem.IncontrasttoGermany,globalnoveltywasrequiredforDanishutilitymodelsaswellasforpatents,buttherequiredlevelofinven-tivestepwasintendedbythelegislatortobelowerforutilitymodelsthanforpatents.

IntherelevantDanishactsthisisexpressedinthewordingofthelaw.WhereastheDanishPatentActrequiresaninventiontodiffersubsaniayfromthepriorarttobepatentable,theDanishUtilityModelActrequiresaninventiononlytodifferceary from the prior art to be qualied for registra -tionasavalidutilitymodel.

InGermanytheSupremeCourt(Bundesgerichtshof)hasadoptedthepracticethatinventivestepisevaluatedequallyforpatentsandutilitymodels,with the exception that prior art is dened diffe-rentlyforpatentsandutilitymodelsinrespectofnon-writtendisclosure.2Conversely,thejudgmentof10November2010bytheDMCCdecidedthe

levelofinventivenessrequiredforautilitymodeltobelowerthanwhatisrequiredforapatent.

In its judgement regarding fullment of the clearly

different-requirementofautilitymodel,theDMCCappliedtheproblem-and-solutionapproachasdevelopedbytheEPO3,butconsideredthetechni-calareaknowntotheskilledpersontobenarrowerthanitwouldbeinthecaseofapatent.

Theactualcaserelatedtoaconveyorforloadingand unloading luggage in an airplane under con-nedworkingconditions.

TheBoardofAppealoftheDanishPatentandTrademarkAuthorityhadinapreviousdecisionof7

January20084

statedasanimplicationofthelowerlevelofinventivestep:,apersonskilledintheartinrelationtoaUtilityModelmus be a person wiha narrower knowedge of prior ar han a person

skied in he ar of a paen [emphasisadded].Inthepresentcaseitfollowsthattheknowledgeoftheskilledpersonislimitedtoapparatusesrelatedtoloadingandunloadingluggageinairplanesunderconned working conditions.

TheBoardofAppealwassuedbeforetheDMCCwho,however,upheldthedecisionstating:Itfollows[fromthelowerlevelofinventivestep]thatthetechnicalareaknowntotheskilledpersonattheoutsetwillbenarrowerthanthatwhichisrelevantwhenassessingapatent[...]TheCourtagrees[]thattherelevantskilledpersonworkswithloadingandunloadingairplanesandisthusaware of the special and conned working condi-tions []. The Court does not nd [] that the area

oftherelevantskilledpersoncanbeexpanded,suchastoincludetrucks.

Throughitsjudgement,theDMCCprovidesapracticalsolutionfordeterminingalowerinventivestepforautilitymodelrelativetotheinventivestepforapatent.Theskilledpersoninautilitymodel

caseisnotabletoseekpossiblesolutionstoagivenproblem in neighbouring technical elds, which

reducestheamountofpriorartavailableforacompetitorseekingtoinvalidateautilitymodel.Thus,inDenmark,autilitymodelisatoolforobtain-ingprotectioninasituationwhereapatentmightfailduetolackofaninventivestep.

Apart from the regular ling of a utility model

application,aDanishutilitymodelcanbebranchedofffromapendingnationalDanishpatentapplica-tionorapendingEuropeanpatentapplicationdesignating Denmark for 10 years from the ling

dateofthepatentapplication.ThejudgementoftheDMCCwasappealedtotheSupremeCourton24November2010.Wewillmonitortheoutcomeofthisappeal.

1T-6-08,deliveredon10November20102XZB27/05,deliveredon20June20063GuidelinesforexaminationintheEPO,PartC,IV,11.74AN200700003

ReportedbyBjrnBarkerJrgensen,PartnerandEuropean Patent Attorney, Copenhagen Ofce

Skied person in Danish uiiy modes

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9

AfundamentalrequirementoftheEPCisthatEuropeanpatentsshallonlybegrantedforinven-tionsthatarenew,soastopreventthestateoftheartfrombeingpatented.Nevertheless,patentsmayalsobegrantedforsubjectmatterthatconstitutesaselectionfromthepriorart,e.g.asubsetofstructu-rallyandfunctionallydistinctmoleculesfromalargerlibraryoforganicmolecules,oramethodthatisfavourablycarriedoutataparticularsubrangeofalarger,previouslyknownintervalofwavelengths.Thebasisforthispossibilityisthepracticethatapriorartdisclosureofabroadrangedoesnotnecessarilyrepresentadisclosureofasubrange

withinthatrange.Toestablishnovelty,adifferencemerelyinwordingisnotenough.Ithastobedeter-minedonacase-by-casebasiswhetherthestateoftheartrevealstheinventiontotheskilledpersoninatechnicalteaching.1

Asguidanceindeterminingthis,establishedcaselaw2impliesthataselectionofasubrangeofnume-ricalvaluesfromaknownbroaderrangeisconside-rednovelwheneachofthefollowingcriteriaissatised:

Theselectedsubrangeisnarrow

The selected subrange is sufciently far remo -vedfromtheknownrange,asillustratedbymeansofexamples

Theselectedareaisnotanarbitraryspecimenfromthepriorart,i.e.notamereembodimentofthepriordescription,butanotherinvention(inotherwords,itmustresultfromapurposiveselection).

Whereas the rst two criteria may well involve

subjectivereasoninginordertodeterminewhetheraninventioninvolvingasubrangeisdistinguishablefromthepriorartdisclosure,thethirdcriterionmost

frequentlyinvolvesambiguityanduncertainty.Althoughasubrangeisnotconsiderednovelbyvirtueofatechnicaleffectwhichoccursonlywithinit,itisheldthatsuchaneffectpermitstheinferen-cethatwhatisinvolvedisnotanarbitrarilychosenspecimenfromthepriorartbutanotherinvention.3However,caselawalsoholdsthattheexistenceofaparticulartechnicaleffectwithinasubrangeisneitheraprerequisitefornovelty,norcanitassuchconfernovelty.4Isthepresenceofsuchaneffectonly a conrmation of the novelty of the subrange,

canorshouldtheeffectbeignoredwhenassessingnovelty,oristhepresenceofaneffectmandatory

forestablishingnovelty?Aparticularlyproblematicaspectofthethirdcriterionisthatthearguments

i.

ii.

iii.

tendtoresembleinventivestepreasoning,despitenoveltyandinventivestepbeingconsideredasdistinctrequirementsforthepatentabilityofaninvention.

Itisthereforenotablethattherecent,well-reaso-neddecisiont230/07reinforcesthefactthatdifferentcriteriaapplyfortheassessmentofnoveltyandinventivesteprespectively-alsowithregardtoselectioninventionsinvolvingasubrange.AEuro-peanpriorright,5whichisrelevantonlyforthepurposeofdeterminingnovelty,disclosedamethodinvolvingamolarratioofsilicatoaluminaof>1,i.e. from 1 to innity, whereas the patent under

appealclaimedamethodutilisingthesubrangeof2to12.Basedonthesefacts,thesubrangewasconsiderednarrowandfarremovedfromthebroaderrange>1.Thedecisionemphasisesthatthepresenceorabsenceofatechnicaleffectwithinthissubrangeisnottobetakenintoaccountintheassessmentofnovelty.Rather,theexaminationofthepresenceandrelevanceofaneffectoccurringinthesubrangeistobemadeintheassessmentofinventivestep.

Thus,forestablishingthenoveltyofasubrangeofnumericalvaluesfromabroaderrange,thecriteria

remainthattheselectedsubrangeshouldbenarrowand sufciently far removed from the known broa-derrangeillustratedbymeansofexamples.Howe-ver,decisionT230/07reportedheresuggeststhatthethirdcriterion(purposiveselection)isirrelevantindeterminingnovelty.IfthisturnsouttoindeedmarkachangeinpracticebytheEuropeanPatentOfce, it will be highly relevant for an applicant in

caseswhereaninventivestepcanreadilybeack-nowledgedoncenoveltyhasbeenestablished,e.g.whenthepriorartbelongstoaremotetechnicaleld or is a European or national prior right.

1T198/842T279/893T198/844T666/895 Prior right: An earlier patent application that was led, butnotpublished,priortotheapplicationdate.Theclaimedsubjectmatterinthelaterpatentapplicationmustbenewbutneednotinvolveaninventivestepinrelationtowhatisdisclosedintheearlierapplication.

ReportedbyMikaelHenriksson,European Patent Attorney, Stockholm Ofce

Seecion invenions: Is a paricuar echnica effec required under he EPC?

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As of 1 Apri 2010, he EPC has se a ime imi

for the ling of divisional applications. Previously,

a divisional application could be led from any

European paen appicaion as ong as he

earier appicaion was pending. Rue 36(1) EPC

as amended puts a stop to the ling of divisional

applications later than 24 months from the rst

communicaion issued by he Examining Division.

Rue 36(1)(a) EPC deas wih vounary division,

whereas Rue 36(1)(b) EPC deas wih mandaory

division foowing a non-uniy objecion. the

reguaions regarding vounary division warran

a coser ook.

Today,Rule36(1)(a)EPCreads:Theapplicantmayle a divisional application relating to any pending

earlierEuropeanpatentapplication,providedthatthe divisional application is led before the expiry of

atimelimitoftwenty-fourmonthsfromtheExami-ning Divisions rst communication under Article 94,

paragraph3,andRule71,paragraph1and2,orRule71,paragraph3,inrespectoftheearliestapplicationforwhichacommunicationhasbeenissued.

Theeffectoftheamendedruleisstraightforwardwhen ling the rst divisional application. If no

communicationhasbeenissuedfortheparentapplication,andtheparentapplicationispending,adivisional application may be led. This is also true

in cases where a rst communication was issued for

theparentapplicationnomorethan24monthspreviously,stillprovidedthattheparentapplicationispending.

However,interpretationoftheruleismorecompli-catedwhenitcomestoasequenceofdivisionalapplications. A divisional application may be led

before the expiry of 24 months from the rst com-municationinrespectoftheearliestapplicationforwhichacommunicationhasbeenissued.Which,

then,istheearliestapplicationforwhichacom-municationhasbeenissued?Willthisalwaysbethesameapplication,orcanitchangeovertime?Incases where the rst communication is issued for

the rst application in the sequence, let us say the

grandparent,beforeanycommunicationisissuedforanyofthedivisionalapplications,suchaspa-rentorchild,thereisstillnoprobleminvolvedincalculating the time limit for ling a grandchild. As

longasnomorethan24monthshavepassedsincethe rst communication was issued for the grandpa-rent, a divisional application may be led from the

grandparent,fromtheparentorfromthechild,

providedthattheapplicationbeingdividedisstillpending.Here,thegrandparentwillbetheearliest

Divisiona appicaions: Some commens on he new regime under Rue 36(1)(a) EPC

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applicationforwhichacommunicationhasbeenissued.

If, instead, the rst communication is issued earlier

fortheparentthanforthegrandparent,theparentwillbetheearliestapplicationforwhichacommu-nicationhasbeenissuedandwillstartthe24-month time limit. But what happens if a rst com-municationislaterissuedforthegrandparent?Willthischangethestatusofearliestapplicationforwhichacommunicationhasbeenissuedandtherebystartanew24-monthtimelimit?Orwilltheearliestapplicationforwhichacommunicationhas

beenissuedstillbetheparent,suchthatthe24-monthtimelimitisstartedonceandonlyonce?ThelanguageofRule36(1)(a)canbeinterpretedeitherway.Supportersoftheoneinterpretationmayarguethattheamendedrulecouldhavebeendrafteddifferentlyiftheintentionhadbeentostipulatetheotherinterpretationandviceversa.Ontheonehand,itmaybesaidthatadivisionalapplicationisgenerally more limited in scope than the rst

applicationandthatthereforeitisreasonablethatanew chance to le divisional applications should be

givenwhentheExaminingDivisionsviewontherst application is revealed later than their view on

anydivisionalapplication.Ontheotherhand,adivisionalapplicationmayverywellbelesslimitedinscopethantheearlierapplicationfromwhichitisdivided,andthenthereshouldbenoreasontogivethe applicant a new go at ling divisional applica-tionsjustbecausetherelevantcommunicationshavenotbeenissuedinthesamechronologicalorder as the applications were led. Unfortunately,

theGuidelinesforExamination1donotprovideanyclearandconvincingevidenceforeitherside.

AmendedRule36(1)enteredintoforceon1April2010,butwasamendedagainalreadyon26October2010inordertoclarifyexactlywhichcommunicationsstartthetimelimit.Sofar,wehavenotseenanyamendmentclarifyingifthetimelimitendsonceandforall,orifanewtimelimitmaystart when a rst communication is later issued for a

grandparent application after a rst communication

hasalreadybeenissuedforaparentapplication.Possiblythequestionwillonlybeansweredwhenthe Boards of Appeal hand down the rst decision

onanoppositionagainstaEuropeanpatentthatwas led as a divisional application less than 24

months from the rst communication for the rst

applicationinasequenceofdivisionalapplications,

but more than 24 months from the rst communi-cationinoneofthedivisionalapplicationsalreadyled.

Until we have a denite answer from the EPO, be it

byaBoardofAppealdecisionorbyafurtheramendmentoftherule,itwouldbeadvisabletofollow the safer interpretation of the rule and le

anyandalldesireddivisionalapplicationsbeforetheexpiry of the rst 24-month time limit. Still , in cases

where24monthshavealreadypassedandaneedto le a divisional application arises, it may be worth

tryingtomakeuseofa24-monthtimelimitstartingfrom a rst communication issued later in the rst

applicationinthesequence.

1

GuidelinesforExaminationAIV,1.1.1.4

ReportedbyNinaMilanov,Partner and European Patent Attorney, Malm ofce

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12

Aspreviouslyreported,newRule141EPC,whichrequiresapplicantstosubmitinformationonpriorsearches to the European Patent Ofce (EPO), came

intoforceon1January2011.Sincethen,severalnational patent ofces have chosen to assist appli-cantsandtransmitsearchreportsdirectlytotheEPO.Thisisnodoubtaninitiativethatcontributestoquickerandlesstroublesomehandlingofcasesforallpartiesconcerned.

Atpresent,thisserviceisbeingofferedbythepatent ofces of Japan, the United Kingdom and the

UnitedStatesofAmerica,andmanymoresuppo-sedlypoisedtofollow.Butwhatiskeepingsomenational patent ofces from doing so?

We have contacted the patent ofces of Denmark

andSweden,bothofwhichtraditionallyhavehadaverypositiveapproachtocooperationwiththeEPO,andaskedthemthisquestion.

Theanswerisfairlysimple:Untiltheapplicationhasbeenpublished,nationallawpreventsthenationalauthoritiesfromsharinginformationwithanyone,includingtheEPO,withouttheconsentoftheapplicant.

ThisproblemisnotuniquetoDenmarkandSweden;

itappliestomostEuropeancountries,andtalksarebeing held between ofcials of the different patent

ofces on how to resolve it.

Sowhatcouldbeapossiblesolution?

Onesolutionwouldofcoursebetochangethelaw,ashasbeendoneintheUnitedKingdom,butthismay be a rather complex task and will denitely

taketime.Anotherpossibility,whichseemstobegainingsupportatleastintheScandinaviancountriesistoincludeontheapplicationformacheckbox,whichtheapplicantmayusetogivetherequiredconsent.Thecheckboxmaybepresent

either on the application form used when ling thenationalapplicationoronasubsequentEuropeanapplicationform.Thelatteroptionhastheadvan-tagethatthedecisiononwhethertoallowthetransferofinformationdoesnothavetobemadeuntil the European patent application is led, and of

courseoneoptiondoesnotexcludetheother.

Onlytimecantellwhattheresultwillbe,butthereseemstobeagreatpoliticalwilltoreachanagre-ement,soitishighlylikelythatwewillnothavetowaitverylong.

ReportedbyVibekeWarbergRohdeandEvaCarlsson,PartnersandEuropeanPatent

Attorneys, Copenhagen Ofce

New Rue 141 EPC revisied: Duy of Discosure in Europe

AWA ipReview_1_2011

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