Avoiding Cyberterrorism Threats Inside Hydraulic Power Generation Plants

Avoiding Cyberterrorism Threats Inside Hydraulic Power

Generation Plants

Manuel Humberto Santander Pelá[email protected]

Agenda

• Introduction• Power Plant Generation SCADA• SCADA protocols• Cyber Terrorism Risks• Remediation

SCADA

• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

• Platform used to monitor and control all the variables of a real-time process

• Several variables to monitor– Vibrations on the turbine rotor– Flow speed of oil inside a turbine rotor– Amount of electric charge passing inside an

electricity transmission line

Electrical process

• Three big steps– Generation– Transmission– Distribution

• Energy is created using any of the following methods– Thermoelectrical plans– Nuclear plants– Hydro electrical plants

Electrical process (2)

• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when generation takes place:– Ensure turbines are not having

revolutions more than supported– Generators are not working overloaded– Energy being generated matches the

amount of energy that the transmission line can handle


• Transmission– Energy being generated needs to be

distributed to reach the final users– 115 KV is the power used to transmit in

the wire lines– Final destination are the substations that

handles energy of a specific amount of instalations

– Large number of blocks in a city


• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when transmission takes place:– Monitoring of voltage in transmission

lines looking for high amount of electricity flowing

– None of them can get overloaded because protections get activated and a blackout appears in all the installations that are controlled by the affected substations


• Distribution– Energy being generated needs to be

distributed to reach the final users– 115 KV is the power used to transmit in

the wire lines– Final destination are the substations that

handles energy of a specific amount of instalations

– Large number of blocks in a city


• SCADA platform is vital to perform the following when distribution takes place:–Monitoring of voltage in transmission

lines looking for high amount of electricity flowing

–Monitoring of voltage in user meters looking for high amount of electricity flowing

Electrical System

Source: United States Department of Energy

Hydroelectrical Plant Process

Source: circuitmaniac.com

Hydroelectrical Turbine

Source: United States Army Corps of Engineers

Agenda


SCADA Network inside Power Plant

Unit Controller

Turbine SpeedRegulator

VoltageRegulator

Generator Protection Controller

Cooling and oil pumpcontroller

HMI Console

Substationcontroller

SwitchController

Voltage MeterReader

HMI Console

ProtectionController

SUBSTATIONSCADA

GENERATION POWER SCADA

SCADA Network inside Power Plant (2)

• Generation Power Plant– Unit Controller: Controls all the

subsystems making the generator to be able to inject active power to the electrical network

– Voltage regulator: Controls the frequency of the active power being produced by the generator. Must match the frequency in the electrical network


• Generation Power Plant– Turbine speed regulator: Controls the

speed of the turbine– Cooling and oil pump controller: Controls

refrigeration and lubrication of the rotor system of the turbine so there’s no heat or friction

– Generator protection controller: Controls excessive voltage changes in the generator


• Substation SCADA– Substation Controller: Controls all the

systems to make possible the energy being transmitted all across the electrical network

– Switch controller: If there is too much energy on a line trying to overcome its capacity, the switch opens the circuit and the energy stops flowing


• Substation SCADA:– Voltage meter: Meters the amount of

electricity flowing in the input and output lines so the Substation Controller can tell if there is a problem regarding the transmission line capacity being overcome its capacity

Agenda


SCADA Protocols

• Modbus• IEC 104• DNP3

Modbus

Source: Practical Industrial Data Communications

Modbus (2)

• Client/server protocol which operates in a request/response mode

• Three variants:– Modbus serial RS-232/RS-485: Implemented on

serial networks – Modbus TCP: Used for SCADA platforms where

delay is not an issue (Water supply)– Modbus UDP: Used for SCADA platforms where

delay is a big issue (Energy)

Modbus (3)


Modbus (4)

• Modbus protocol structure

– Address field: • Request frames: Address of the device being targeted

by the request• Response frame: Address of the device responding to

request

Modbus (5)


– Function field• Function requested by the HMI to be performed by the

field devices• In response packets, when the function performed is

succeeded, the field device echoes it. If some exception occurred, the most significant bit of the field is set to 1

Modbus (6)

Function NameFunction

CodePhysical Discrete Inputs Read Discrete Inputs 2

Read Coils 1Write Single Coil 5Write Multiple Coils 15

Physical Input Registers Read Input Register 4Read Holding Registers 3Write Single Register 6

Write Multiple Registers 16

Read/Write Multiple Registers

23

Mask Write Register 22Read FIFO Queue 24Read File Record 20Write File Record 21

Type of access

Data Access

Bit access Internal Bits or Physical Coils

16-bit access

Internal Registers or Physical Output Registers

File Record Access

Modbus (7)

Function NameFunction

CodeRead Exception Status 7Diagnostic 8Get Com Event Counter 11Get Com Event Log 12Report Slave ID 17Read Device Identification

43

Encapsulated Interface Transport

43

Type of access

Diagnostics

Other

Modbus (8)


– Data field• In request paquets, contains the information required

to perform the specific function• In response packets, contains the information

requested by the HMI

Modbus (9)


– Error check Field• CRC-16 on the message frame• If packet has errors, the field device does not process it• Timeout is assumed, so the master sends again the

packet to attempt again a function execution

IEC 104

• Standard for power system monitoring, control and communications for telecontrol and teleprotection for electric power systems

• Completely compatible with:– IEC 60870-5-1: Transmission frame formats for

standard 60870-5– IEC 60870-5-5: Basic application functions

IEC 104 (2)

• It has the following features:– Supports master initiated messages and

master/slave initiated messages– Facility for time sinchronization– Possibility of classifying data being transmitted

into 16 different groups to get the data according to the group

– Cyclic and spontaneous data updating schemes are provided.

IEC 104 (3)


IEC 104 (4)


IEC 104 (5)


IEC 104 (6)

• Link levelLink service

class Function Explanation

S1 SEND / NO REPLY

Transmit message. No ACK or answer required

S2 SEND / CONFIRMTransmit message. ACK required

S3 REQUEST / RESPOND

Transmit message. ACK and answer required

IEC 104 (7)


IEC 104 (8)


• Control field for unbalanced transmissions

IEC 104 (8)


• Control field for balanced transmissions

DNP3

• Set of communication protocols used between components of a SCADA system

• Used for communications between RTU and the IED (field devices)

• Implements the communication levels established by the enhance performance architecture (EPA)

DNP3 (2)

• Enhance performance architecture (EPA)


DNP3 (3)

• Message exchange


DNP3 (4)

• Frame format


DNP3 (5)

• Control Byte


Agenda


Cyberterrorism Risks

• Many awful thins can happen to a power plant– Stop generation because of partial or

total damage to the generator– Stop generation because of partial or

total damage to the transmission substation

– Stop generation because of partial or total damage to the turbine

Cyberterrorism Risks (2)

• Many awful thins can happen to a power plant– Transformer explosion because lack of

transmission line protection capacity–Massive water leakage because of

explosion of the turbine container

• All of them can happen because of unauthorized manipulations of the HMI and after the configs are updated

Network technologies in SCADA Systems

• Many SCADA networks still use RS232/RS485 bus to communicate all components– But also because of the need to access

data in a fast way, we also have serial-to-ip gateways to access serial RTU and IED

– Lots of hybrid SCADA networks having serial and IP components

– Access is open to anyone with connectivity access

Network technologies in SCADA Systems (2)

• Many SCADA networks still use RS232/RS485 bus to communicate all components– Admin protocols is not being crypted, so

anyone can sniff all the contents, perform a MITM and send to client/server fake content to each other. Insecure services like telnet are mandatory because lack of support

– Latency is an issue

Lack of authentication in application protocol

• The SCADA protocols does not perform bi-directional authentication to ensure that all parties are trusted– Only commands are sent– Data is sent to the IP address configured

as master– All the IP spoofing vulnerabilities works

on any MTU or Field device– Any command can be sent

Default configurations in HMI

• Insecure services used– rlogin– rcp– rexec

• OS Admin privileges used to operate• Trust perimeter created within HMI

and external RTU and IED to manipulate configuration parameters

What could be done?

• Reset a link state communication or send Test Communication packet several times provoking temporal DoS to the IED controllers– Spoof the HMI IP address and send the

following using TCP: 0x56405c00100020074e3

– Spoof the HMI ip address and send the following using TCP: 0x56405f201000200b717

What could be done? (2)

• Send commands to the IED controllers– Registers are linked to turn on and off

specific devices like oil and refrigeration pumps

– A Modbus command to change registers is enough to disable any of those pumps

– Command depends on the place where the pump is configured


• Execute metasploit to the HMI and try to find remote admin exploits– No patches are installed– Too much vulnerabilities around– The odds of finding remote privilege

escalation vulnerabilities are too high– Are passwords strong enough in the HMI

software and OS?– Is there any password at all configured?


• MITM attacks to the substation elements and generation plant elements– TCP sequence prediction on this

elements is pretty high– Prone to session hijacking (http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_XD8heYNrc)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_XD8heYNrc



Agenda


What you cannot do with SCADA

• Protocol delay is usually a BIG issue in SCADA– Water supply and Oil SCADA tolerates big

delays because it does not have consequences in the process

– Power SCADA is critical. A delay higher than 12 miliseconds could end in a massive blackout because of failure to open a breaker in a substation

– Be careful on what you do to protect your SCADA

SCADA Network inside Power Plant

Unit Controller

Turbine SpeedRegulator

VoltageRegulator

Generator Protection Controller

Cooling and oil pumpcontroller

HMI Console

Substationcontroller

SwitchController

Voltage MeterReader

HMI Console

ProtectionController

SUBSTATIONSCADA

GENERATION POWER SCADA

Monitor your network

• Control Access from outsiders– SCADA Network needs to send

information for reports and status checking

– You can establish a secure way to get into the SCADA Network for remote support

– If no commands need to be sent, one-way communications using waterfall works pretty good.

Monitor your network (2)

Source: Waterfall Security


• Use Network Intrusion Prevention System– You definitely can use conventional IPS if they

are fast enough to avoid delays in your network

– Not all of them support SCADA protocols– If you have snort, you can write rules for

Modbus and DNP3. Otherwise, you need to write your own rules

– Industrial Defender Solution works pretty good as it includes lots of SCADA signatures


• Control Access from outsiders– Energy market central regulators are

able to control your power generation SCADA and make you generate what you won at the electricity market

– Be able to override control from your local market control center if for some reason you notice abnormal operations that put your generation infrastructure in risk


Source: FERC

• SCADA platforms are designed to last from 10 to 20 years– Too many technology changes happens

in that time– Lots of security issues to deal with– Need a solution to avoid any changes

inside computers, as intrusions perform changes in filesystem, configurations and system process

Control unauthorized changes to Master Terminal Unit

Control unauthorized changes to Unit Controllers and IED controllers

• Configuration and firmware changes can be done on-site and remotely

• Can you tell all the times where those changes have been done for all the IED and Unit controllers?

• Can you tell if that change actually contains the valid firmware and/or configuration?

• Check IndustrialDefender Manage

Control unauthorized changes to Master Terminal Unit (3)

• Control any changes inside your SCADA servers–Mcafee Integrity control works pretty

good– Defines what can be changed by who– Lots of custom logs to choose from– Can send events to any SIEM configured

in the Network

Monitor attacks to Master Unit

• Host IPS is definitely needed as any attack could change the integrity and stability of a process

• Availability is critical to a SCADA system and cannot be altered

• Conventional Host IPS performs extensive use of CPU and can affect performance inside SCADA

Monitor attacks to Master Unit (2)

• Industrial Defender Protect works pretty good

• Works seamless with Siemens Spectrum Platform

• Does not load the machine or needs extensive bandwith to perform its checks

• Central console to perform operations inside the platform

Questions? Comments?

Manuel Humberto Santander Peláezhttp://manuel.santander.name

http://twitter.com/[email protected] / [email protected]

Avoiding Cyberterrorism Threats Inside Hydraulic Power Generation Plants

Technology

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