Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 2.2

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1 the stanford journal on muslim affairs a v icenna vol 2 no 2 winter 2012

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Volume 2 Issue 2 - Winter 2012

Transcript of Avicenna - The Stanford Journal on Muslim Affairs 2.2

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avicennavol 2 no 2

winter 2012

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avicennaTHE STANFORD JOURNAL ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFSahar Khan ’13

ASSOCIATE EDITORSHana Al-Henaid ’14Sayeh Fattahi ’14Izzah Farzanah ’15

CONSULTING EDITORIrteza Binte-Farid ’13

DESIGNERJustin Calles ’13

WEBMASTERSalahodeen Abdul-Kafi ’12

PUBLICITY MANAGERMohammed Omer ’12

WINTER 2012VOL 2 NO 2

Front  cover:  Granada  from  Alhambra  (Granada,  Spain)  by  Hanni  Hanson  ’13

Back  cover:  The  Giralda,  a  minaret  converted  into  a  bell  tower  at  Sevilla  Cathedral  (Sevilla,  Spain)  by  Hanni  Hanson  ’13

All  images  in  this  journal  are  in  the  public  domain  with  Creative  Commons  copyright  licenses  unless  otherwise  noted.  

More  information  about  these  licences  can  be  found  at  http://creativecommons.org/licenses/.

Avicenna—The  Stanford  Journal  on  Muslim  Affairs  would  like  to  thank  the  ASSU  Publications  Board  for  their  support.

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CONTENTS

Editorial Note SAHAR KHAN

Muslim-American Citizens, Not OutliersBRITTA ELLWANGER, MOHIT THUKRAL, THOMAS HENDEE

Muslim Women’s Marriage ChoicesAISHA ANSANO

Connected Pasts: Islam in SpainPhoto spread by ANISSA IMANE CHITOUR

Imran Khan: Pakistan’s New Hope?ASFANDYAR ALI MIR

Islam in the West: A Look at Cedar RapidsFATIMA WAGDY

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We are dealing with a (brave?) new world.

!at is what I was going to write about—new horizons, new worlds—just good old generic novelty, because novelty is intriguing for all and amenable enough for me to soliloquize about at length. !e New World at the discovery of the Americas, the New Economic Pol-icy in 1920s Soviet Union, the New Deal in 1930s America, the New World Order and….Well, need I say more? Novelty’s track record points towards its own magnetic charm that captivates the imagination of everyone, anyone and yet, leaves out many more than just some.

However, that is what I broached with the closing of my last editorial. So, new is old and it is time for us to move on because, if hindsight gives us any vision it is that of a perennially new world. Is that a relatively more interesting, obscurantist and potentially “new” angle? We should discuss further.

I am not entirely sure where to begin, but o"en we speak about this new world but not enough about new ideas and perceptions that undergird this new world. We talk about the new condition and enacting these conditions, but not nearly enough about new ways of conceptualizing this condition and what it should be (ideally). We need to take a moment to think and live with the ideas behind reality. So, we propose to shine the spotlight on the ideas and their connection to reality. It is important to be able to report on the reality at hand and mold our ideas to thereby mold reality. In this edition, Avicenna reports on the condition seen at home and abroad of Muslims in America as compared to Muslims in Europe. We travel as far as Spain and Pakistan – to Spain for the fascinating relics of a his-torical Muslim presence and to Pakistan for a possibly more hopeful future. It is interesting, isn’t it, that we are travelling through time and space? From distant geographical locations, we return to more intimate topics like Muslim women’s marriage choices and other original research that gives a unique lens into the signi#cant though forgotten history of a Muslim community in Cedar Rapids, a small town of Iowa.

As we look at the past, we realize that there are no cut-o$ points in the reality of transitions and many ideas and actions %ow freely from one era to another in spite of “change.” It is nothing to lament; it might be such an organic and smooth process that we should embrace

Editorial  Note

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it. !ere are no hard and fast separating barriers between old and new or yesterday, today and tomorrow. Similarly, there is no unequivocal demarcation between the realm of ideas and the realm of reality as our ideas have the power to set reality’s agenda. And, it is in this nebulous space between idea and reality that our current repertoire of Avicenna articles, art, and photography dwell.

Yours,

Sahar Khan ’13Editor-in-Chief

Avicenna  on  a  plaque  in  Uzbekistan—by  Allen  Grey  (Flickr  user  Allen_Grey)

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In November of 2011 the Bing Overseas Studies Program held a workshop for Stan-ford’s European campuses (Oxford, Paris, Berlin, Florence, Madrid, and Moscow) with a special invitation made to a del-egation from Stanford in Washington. !e conference, Islam in Europe November 2011, was held in Cordoba Spain over two days and focused on the Muslim experience in respective countries of Europe. By exam-ining the Muslim American Experience, our team hoped to better understand the challenges posed to societies regarding the dynamic interplay between various cultures and religions. !rough our research, we hoped to better understand the American system and the way that minorities exists as a part of the American social and politi-cal framework. We found that by multiple standards Muslims are already an integral part of American society, and re%ect the norms of the general American public. Our presentation, Islamophobia in the Midst of American Exceptionalism, hoped to address the existence of Islamophobia in the United States, when by all standards the integration of Muslim Americans is exceptional.

According to the 2010 Pew report, !e Fu-ture of the Global Muslim Population, there are an estimated 2.6 million Muslims liv-ing in the United States, which means that Muslims account for about 85 percent of the American population. !is propor-tion of Muslim citizens is small compared to some of the populations found in Eu-rope and other non-traditionally Muslim

nations; countries such as France and Germany for example, have a Muslim im-migrant population that accounts for 6.9 percent and 5 percent respectively of their populations. !ere are many reasons that may explain this di$erence, including the American Visa regime, the lack of formal U.S. colonial ties with predominantly Mus-lim countries, and the network e$ects of immigration, which show that immigrants are more likely to go to a country that con-tains a relative. Another area where the American and European Muslim popula-tions di$er is citizenship status. Within the Muslim-American population 63 percent are #rst generation in the United States; however, even with this high rate of im-migration, 88 percent of Muslims are citi-zens of the United States. In countries like Italy, France, and Germany the proportion of Muslims that are citizens is much lower. !erefore, any comparisons between the condition of Muslims in Europe and the U.S. need to take into account these signif-icant di$erences in the number of Muslims and the diversity among Muslims between the two continents. However, there may also be important lessons to be learned from the experience of American Muslims since the basic contours of the supposed “problem” of Muslim integration remain the same across continents.

In spite of being a largely immigrant com-munity, the income pro#le of American Muslims is similar to that of the general population. American Muslims, in terms

Muslim-­American  Citizens,  Not  OutliersBritta Ellwanger (Political Science ’13)Thomas Hendee (Human Biology ’13)Mohit Thukral (Economics ’13)

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of their income pro#le seem to be inte-grating well with the American popula-tion - they are almost as likely to earn more than $100,000 per year. Moreover, the proportion of American Muslims seen as “middle-class” (middle income brack-ets) was similar to the overall population. European Muslims, on the other hand, are more likely to be poorer than the general populations of their respective countries. For example, British Muslims are 20 per-cent more likely to be in the lowest income bracket compared to the general popula-tion. !ese widely divergent statistics not only point to the successful economic inte-gration of Muslims into American society but also serve to highlight the lack of said integration among Muslims in Europe.

One of the factors explaining these similar income levels is the correspondingly similar educational achievement between the two groups in the United States. In addition, the percentage of American Muslims having achieved some sort of graduate study is actually higher than the general population due to immigration laws that favor the highly educated. !e American Muslim population statistically here shows how well they have integrated as a minority population, but behind this statistic is also the explanation that the U.S.

more rigorously regulates who it allows in. E$ectively, this means that the U.S. “hand picks” those who are already more likely to be able to succeed given their advantaged educational and economic background. Overall, the similarity in pro#les between these two groups is in stark contrast to anecdotal accounts of di$erences between educational achievement between European Muslims and the general European populace. Given the restraints placed upon the collection of data based on religion within most European countries, no direct comparisons can be made.

In terms of religion, religious indicators show that though Muslim Americans are religious, their degree of religiosity is not any di$erent than that of an American Christian. In response to the question “How do you think of yourself #rst?” 49 percent of Muslims Americans responded Muslim #rst.1 !is would seem to suggest what Eu-ropean countries like France already fear— that Muslims are a minority population unable to integrate because their religious identity precedes their national identity. However, in the United States, the exis-tence of dual identities and a preference for 1 Muslim Americans. Rep. Pew Research Center, 30 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-Ameri-can-Report.pdf>, 7.

Photo  of  Moroccan  mosaic—by  Mikolaj  Pasinski  (Flickr  user  aworkpl)

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an identity other than one’s nationality is not rare. In the same poll, Pew also asked Christian-Americans what they thought of themselves; 46 percent responded saying they think of themselves as Christian #rst.2 !e Muslim-American preference for their religious identity is not an outlier in the American social landscape.

Some might still argue that it is not that Muslim-Americans identify with a reli-gion but the religion itself that necessitates concern. !ough many Muslim-Amer-icans are clearly religious, this in no way correlates to Muslim-Americans believing in the extremist ideals Islamaphobes de-cry. Seventy percent of Muslim-Americans have “very unfavorable” views on al Qaeda and 81 percent believe that suicide bomb-ing is never acceptable.3 Furthermore, Muslim-Americans show signs of adopt-ing a religious perspective that #ts beneath the broader umbrella of American reli-gious liberalism, with 56 percent believing di$erent religions can lead to eternal life and 57 percent saying there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam.4 Muslims-Americans are neither exceptionally “more religious” than the mainstream American Christian popu-lation nor adherents to beliefs that radi-cally oppose American religious and social standards. Muslim-Americans seem to be comfortably falling under a broader iden-tity as “religious” Americans able to trans-late personal religious beliefs into broader American religious and social norms.

So, how does this religious identity a$ect Muslim Americans’ civic responsibilities

2 Muslim Americans. Rep. Pew Research Center, 30 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-Ameri-can-Report.pdf>, 7.3 Muslim Americans. Rep. Pew Research Center, 30 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-Ameri-can-Report.pdf>, 4.4 Ibid., 10.

as Americans? It does not. When look-ing at the number of Muslim-Americans registered to vote as an indicator of their commitment to their civic responsibility, one can see that they again align with the general U.S. population. Sixty-#ve percent of the general population is registered to vote, 66 percent of Muslim Americans are registered to vote.5

With the relative normalcy of Muslim-Americans, why then does Islamophobia exist? !e #rst major incidents of Islamic extremist violence in%icted against the United States occurred under President Clinton with the #rst World Trade Center bombing in 1993 followed by the USS Cole bombing o$ the coast of Yemen in 2000. !ese and other recent events seem to provide ample evidence for Samuel Hun-tington’s theory that the primary source of con%ict within and amongst societies in the post-Cold War era would evolve through and arise from the inability for di$erent cultures and religions to coex-ist. While these events were not insigni#-cant at the time that they happened, they gained an entirely new importance a"er 9/11. !e attacks on the World Trade Cen-ter in 2001 cemented the Middle East-West divide; and led to a proliferation of news headlines and books, from Christo-pher Caldwell’s Re"ections on the Revolu-tion in Europe, Ian Buruma’s Murder in Amsterdam, Ayaan Hirsi’s In#del, to the French banlieue riots and headscarf de-bate. !ese and many other instances gave voice to this divide and quickly drove the tension closer and closer to home— to the question of whether Muslims are able to coexist in liberal Western societies. From this question arose the growing trend of Islamophobia, particularly amongst the post-9/11 American public.5 Muslim Americans. Rep. Pew Research Center, 30 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-Ameri-can-Report.pdf>, 8.

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A 2010 Washington Post-ABC News poll revealed that 49 percent of Americans held an unfavorable view of Islam, which according to the Center for American Progress was a 39 percent increase from 2002.6 And, organizations like Stop Islam-ization of America claim that the existence of Islam in America threatens “American values”. So, it’s fair to say that Islam is a loaded term in America and for at least half of the American population remains a serious concern and tension. With the media playing a very large role, Muslim-Americans are being constructed as the “other” of this century. One example of this is seen in the accusatorily intended rumors that President Barack Obama is a Muslim. Right-wing media have latched onto the idea that categorizing someone as a Mus-lim is harmful to their image. Last No-vember, Fox News showed a group of Iowa caucus voters that were concerned that President Obama was a Muslim and that this belief fundamentally shaped the way he approached his Presidency. Further-more, former Presidential candidate Her-man Cain stated that he would not hire a Muslim as part of his cabinet unless he/she #rst made a pledge to abide by the Consti-tution of the United States.7 Other exam-ples of Islamophobia include the Ground Zero Mosque in New York City, the inclu-sion of anti-Sharia law amendments in state Constitutions, and the prohibition of Mosques in various communities. !us, we pose the question of what the future for Muslim-Americans will be in this country.

!rough using indicators to judge Muslim-Americans’ religious, political and social integration, we have shown that as far as the 6 Wajahat, Ali, Eli Clifton, Matthew Duss, Lee Fang, Scott Keyes, and Faiz Shakir. Fear Inc: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America. Tech. Center for American Progress, Aug. 2011. Web. 7 Feb. 2012.7 Muslim Americans. Rep. Pew Research Center, 30 Aug. 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-Ameri-can-Report.pdf>, 56.

Pew 2011 polls re%ect, Muslim-Americans form a minority that has integrated exceptionally well into American society. Our study does not show any evidence of being the source of cultural and religious opposition that some news and political pundits portray. It is up to American society to shape the rest of the conversation and defend our fellow citizens. !e United States cannot allow media propaganda and what the American Center of Progress has coined the Islamaphobic political elite to ostracize Muslims as the “other,” when in reality Muslim-Americans are fully a part of this society. Already we are seeing Muslim-Americans actively change this negative im-age perpetrated by elite political actors and the media through a ballooning of political activist groups like the Muslim Public A$airs Council, Council on American-Islamic Re-lations, and the Christian-Muslim Consulta-tive Group. In addition to actively working to better the Muslim-American experience in the U.S., these organizations have man-aged to further prove their commitment to social and religious integration by working in coalitions with a diverse assortment of activist groups from the Council on For-eign Relations to MALDEF, the Latino Le-gal Voice for Civil Rights in America to get their opinions and voices heard on a vari-ety of social, political and religious issues.

Muslim Americans have proven to not only integrate well into society at large but also mobilize themselves into the American political system. And, it is the combination of these two that proves that Muslim-Americans as a minority population are nothing but Americans. !ey are able to maintain their own beliefs and way of life within the broader American framework and use that framework to reach people from di$erent immigrant, religious, social and political backgrounds to enhance the on-going dialogue for how to make the United States an ever better democracy. a

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!is article is a section of my in-progress Religious Studies senior honors thesis. My thesis examines the lives of young Muslim women living in the United States and how they negotiate their identities as both Amer-ican and Muslim. While I use academic sources, my primary sources of information are 11 interviews I conducted with Muslim women aged 18-40 living primarily in New York City, as well as other American cities. In basing my interviews on a broad repre-sentation of the group I am trying to study, I aim to allow my writing to be informed by their experiences and opinions. In al-lowing these women’s voices to contribute to my understanding and analysis of the issues they themselves face and American Muslim women, I hope to provide deeper insight into what it means to be a young Muslim woman living in the United States. Per agreement with each woman, the inter-viewees are identi#ed solely by #rst name, some of which are pseudonyms.

Over the course of my interviews with eleven Muslim women, almost all of them agreed completely on one topic: who they would and would not feel comfortable marrying. While the women typically an-swered the question “Would you consider marrying a non-Muslim man?” with a short and unelaborated “No,” they o"en discussed the topic further in other parts of the interview. Masooma said that while she would not have a problem marrying a man of another ethnicity, “he would have to be a Muslim follower,” and Alexandra—a convert already married to a Muslim

man—says that in the event that some-thing were to happen to her husband, she imagines herself “with another Muslim, but God only knows.” As these women’s responses demonstrate, despite o$ering various caveats, the women I interviewed were fairly unambiguous in the fact that they would not marry a non-Muslim man.

!ough, several of my interview subjects were not necessarily personally averse to marrying a non-Muslim man, but they maintained that the family pressure they face on the topic of marriage is very strong. Mona admitted that while she might have considered it otherwise, when she got mar-ried she didn’t feel “like [marrying a non-Muslim man] was an option.” Amira said that she had considered marrying a non-Muslim man for some time, as #nding a Muslim man in the places she lived and worked was proving very di&cult, but she eventually found a male convert to marry. She says that even this upset her mother, though “it would have been even worse if it hadn’t been a Muslim,” she clari#es. Only two interviewees said that they still consider it a possibility to marry a non-Muslim man. Reem, who no longer con-siders herself a practicing Muslim, simply does not #nd religion to be as important in looking for a spouse, choosing instead to focus on a man’s “character, passion, and the goals they wish to achieve.” Even so, she concedes that her family would be an-gry were she to marry a non-Muslim, and her mother might stop speaking with her. Rhea explicitly stated that she would cer-

Muslim  Women’s  Marriage  ChoicesAisha Ansano Religious Studies ’12

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Muslim  Women’s  Marriage  ChoicesAisha Ansano Religious Studies ’12

tainly consider marrying a non-Muslim, as long as there is mutual respect and they are open and discuss their di$erences, “es-pecially with regards to children.” !ough she did not speci#cally speak to her par-ents’ reactions if she chose to marry a non-Muslim, her mention of a non-Muslim sister-in-law points to the possibility that they may be accepting.

!e fact that the Muslim women with whom I spoke face strong personal convic-tions and family pressure to marry Muslim men led me to question what the reasons behind this practice might be. As Sara al-luded to when she said that “a marriage be-tween myself and a non-Muslim wouldn’t be recognized, Islamically,” Islamic custom typically prohibits the marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. I was interested in exploring the origins of this stipulation, and whether it was a Qur’anic mandate, a part of hadith1 or shari’ah,2 or simply a practiced custom. Each of these would hold di$erent weight for Muslims, and the women might feel more comfortable “breaking” the tradi-tion if it was simply a practiced custom than they would if it were mandated in the Qur’an or in Islamic law.

!e Qur’an speaks several times on the issue of the marriage of Muslims to non-Muslims. In the second surah (chapter), both Muslim men and women are explic-itly prohibited from marrying “those who associate partners with God,” 3 or “idola-tresses and idolaters.” 4 In addition, Mus-lim men are given permission to “marry virtuous women…from among those who have received scriptures in the past,5” these

1 The teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.2 Islamic law and legal tradition.3 Kecia Ali, Sexual  Ethics  &  Islam:  Feminist  Reflec-­tions  on  Qur’an,  Hadith,  and  Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), page 14. 4 Qur’an 2:221 (Abdel Haleem translation)5 Ali, Sexual  Ethics, 14.

being the so-called “People of the Book.”6 Finally, Surah 60 “prohibits sending fe-male converts who have come to the Mus-lims back to their unbelieving husbands,”7 saying that these men are not their “lawful husbands.”8 Based on these Qur’anic in-junctions—that Muslims shouldn’t marry idolaters, that Muslim men are explicitly permitted to marry women of the People of the Book, and that women who convert to Islam should not be sent back to their non-Muslim husbands—legal scholars have extrapolated that Muslim women are only allowed to marry Muslim men, though that is never explicitly stated in the Qur’an. !e tradition also drew from the norms of the era and society from which Islam arose, in which “children derive[d] their religious identity from their father”9 and the growing Muslim population want-ed to ensure that the o$spring of Muslims were raised Muslim to allow their num-bers to grow. !e combination of Qur’anic interpretation and societal customs lead to the institutionalization of the prohibi-tion into the legal code, widely accepted through various schools of law.

While the conclusion that Muslim women are not permitted to marry non-Muslim men has been interpreted, and widely ac-cepted, to logically follow the dictates of the Qur’an, the fact remains that nowhere in the Qur’an is the prohibition explicitly stated, and it could equally follow logi-cally that non-convert Muslim women are permitted to marry People of the Book, as are Muslim men. In essence, the prohibi-tion stems in large part from an ancient custom which may no longer hold true.

6 Qur’an 5:5. The phrase “The People of the Book” is traditionally understood to mean Jews, Christians, and Muslims, though in some cases it is used to refer to others.7 Ali, Sexual  Ethics, 14.8 Qur’an 60:10. 9 Encyclopedia  of  Religion  in  America, ed. Charles H. Lippy and Peter W. Williams (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), s.v. “Women: Muslim.”

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In the present-day United States, if a Mus-lim woman marries a Christian or Jewish man, or even one of another or no religion, they could conceivably reach a conclusion to raise their children as Muslim, negat-ing one of the underlying reasons for the original restriction. On the other hand, while in contemporary American culture, children may not automatically inherit the religious tradition of their father over that of their mother, it can o"en be easier to guarantee that the children will be raised

in a certain tradition if both parents prac-tice that tradition—a situation which may explain why many Muslims, both men and women, are typically encouraged by family to marry other Muslims, and o"en want to do so themselves. As Maryum explained when discussing raising potential children, the easiest way she can make sure her chil-dren will be raised in a Muslim lifestyle is to marry “someone who shares the faith,” so that there is no need to discuss in which tradition the children will be raised.

Painting  of  Malaysian  woman—by  epSos.de  (Flickr  user  epSos.de)

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!e topic of conversion adds some interest-ing twists to the norms of marriage among Muslim women, and it came up in several di$erent ways over the course of my re-search. !e #rst is a common assumption among non-Muslim-Americans: that the majority of women who convert to Islam do so because they wish to marry a Muslim man. It is true that approximately half of the women who marry Muslim men convert to Islam themselves.10 Alexandra, an interview subject who recently converted to Islam, had been dating a Muslim man before she converted and married him a"er her con-version, though she did not explicitly say that she converted because of him or in order to marry him. Women convert for a large number of reasons, and many do so long before they meet a Muslim man they want to marry. Megan said that she decided to convert “for a multitude of reasons,” the main one being “the character of Muslims themselves” whenever she encountered them throughout her life, and she had been Muslim for six years before she got mar-ried. Megan converted long before, and for reasons other than marriage, a trend that Jane Smith found to hold in the surveys she conducted of female converts to Islam.11 !ere is no requirement in Islamic law for Christian or Jewish women who marry Muslim men to convert to Islam—as we saw, the Qur’an explicitly states that Mus-lim men may marry women of the Book. However, it is common for these women to convert, whether because of pressure from their husband or his family, because they wish to share in the same practices as their husbands and potential children, or simply because being in close proximity to the re-ligion allows them to develop an apprecia-tion for it.10 Yvonne Y. Haddad and Jane I. Smith, “Islamic Values Among American Muslims,” in Family  and  Gender  Among  American  Muslims:  Issues  Facing  

Middle  Eastern  Immigrants  and  Their  Descendants, ed. Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilgé (Philadel-phia: Temple University Press, 19960, 66.11 Haddad and Smith, Islamic  Values, 66.

A far less discussed link between conver-sion and marriage is the conversion of a non-Muslim man in order to marry a Muslim woman. During her interview, Mona mentioned in passing that her father had converted upon meeting her mother and wanting to marry her, and later told me that her husband had converted in or-der to marry her, because the family pres-sure she faced to marry a Muslim man was very strong. If according to shari’ah, Mus-lim women are only permitted to marry Muslim men, one might assume that there is a sizable population of non-Muslim men who wish to marry Muslim women and therefore convert in order to be permitted to marry them. However, the two instances in Mona’s family were the only times I en-countered this phenomenon, both within my interviews and in my wider research. In the future, I hope to explore this phe-nomenon further; I believe that the lack of discussion of the conversion of non-Muslim men in order to marry Muslims may point to the fact that Muslim women who would not marry non-Muslims are hesitant to have romantic or intimate re-lationships with non-Muslims, thus mak-ing the conversion of non-Muslim males moot, as there would be few in relation-ships with Muslim women who would like to get married.

My #ndings on marriage lead to some interesting implications for the way that Muslim women in the United States might negotiate their hybrid identities. !ese women may seem on the surface to choose their Muslim identity over their American one, as in American culture it is typically accepted that a person may marry whom-ever they wish. However, other religious Americans, such as members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, are similarly inclined to marry people of the same faith,12 and many Americans prefer 12 In fact, no one may participate in or view a

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to marry people of the same ethnicity or race. 13 While many Americans may, at #rst glance, see the restrictions on marriage posed by Islam as very conservative, the fact remains that conversion is always an option, making the Islamic laws on mar-riage much less restrictive than American customs of #nding a marriage partner like oneself. Unlike with race, ethnicity, class, or gender—characteristics which many Americans look for in marriage partners, whether consciously or not—religion is relatively simple to change, and conver-sion provides a venue for non-Muslims to marry Muslims. It does not come without its own problems, including negative reac-tions from the convert’s family as well as potentially from the birth Muslim’s family, but in many ways the option of conversion to Islam makes the Islamic laws on mar-riage much less restrictive than they may seem at #rst glance.

!e Islamic laws and customs on marriage, and the ways in which young Muslim American women in the United States re-spond to and act upon them, are indicative of one way in which American Muslim women negotiate their hybrid identities: by choosing the practices and customs that marriage in a Temple of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, without “a valid and current temple recommend,” which is only granted once someone “has been a member of the Church for one year.” Jay M. Tom, “Information for Brides and Grooms Planning a Temple Mar-riage,” The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, <http://www.lds.org/new-era/1971/06/information-for-brides-and-grooms-planning-a-temple-marriage?lang=eng> (accessed February 19, 2012).13 A recently-released study from the Pew Research Center shows that 15% of marriages in 2010 were interracial, up from 6.7% in 1980. While the percentage of interracial marriage has more than doubled 30 year period, the fact remains that 85% of all marriages in 2010 were between people of the same race or ethnic group. Wendy Wang, “The Rise of Intermar-riage: Rates, Characteristics vary by Race and Gender,” Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/?src=prc-headline> (accessed February 19, 2012).

will allow them to evade the stronger, or more personal, pressure they face on the matter. In the case of marriage, the women are faced by two pressures: from society to embrace the American freedom of choice in marriage, and from their family and/or religious community to follow Islamic law and customs. While societal pressure to assimilate can be very strong, pressure from family members can be more in%u-ential because of its highly personal nature. !erefore, although these women may not be personally invested in following the Islamic traditions of marriage, they may continue to perpetuate these traditions in order to avoid familial disapproval or dis-appointment. !is allows these traditions to continue to %ourish although belief in them may not be perpetuated.

BibliographyAlexandra. Interview in person by author. New York

City, July 15, 2011.

Ali, Kecia. Sexual  Ethics  &  Islam:  Feminist  Reflections  on   Qur’an,   Hadith,   and   Jurisprudence.   Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006.

Amira. Interview via Skype by author (audio and video). September 17, 2011.

Haddad, Yvonne Y. and Jane I. Smith. “Islamic Values Among American Muslims.” In Family  and  Gender   Among   American   Muslims:   Issues   Facing  

Middle  Eastern  Immigrants  and  Their  Descendants,  

edited by  Barbara C. Aswad and Barbara Bilgé, 19-40. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996.

Lippy, Charles H. and Peter W. Williams, eds. Encyclopedia  of  Religion   in  America. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010.

Masooma. Interview in person by author. New York City. July 19, 2011.

Maryum. Interview in person by author. New York City, July 18, 2011.

Megan. Interview in person by author. New York City, July 15, 2011.

Mona. Interview via Skype by author (audio only). September 8, 2011.

Reem. Interview in person by author. New York City. August 2, 2011.

Rhea. Interview via Skype by author (text only). October 2, 2011.

Sara. Interview in person by author. New York City, July 11, 2011.

a

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Connected Pasts: Islam in Spain Photos  from  Granada  and  Cordoba,  Spain  by  Anissa  Imane  Chitour  ’13  

“Late  November”

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“Bright  colors  of  Southern  Spain”

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Left:  “Alcázar  gardens”

Right:  “Alhambra:  Cathedral  or  Mosque?”

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20 avicenna“Walking  through  the  Mezquita-­Catedral”

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Imran  Khan:  Pakistan’s  New  Hope?Asfandyar Ali MirEconomics ’12

!ey said “Imran Can’t” when he came into cricket #rst. With sheer hard work, com-mitment and charisma, he proved them all wrong. !ree decades later, as he stands at a political crossroads, similar voices echo again, “Imran Can’t, Imran Can’t.” But, the people of Pakistan might di$er in saying “Yes, we can, because we have the Khan.” In the last eight months, Imran Khan has emerged as the most popular politician in Pakistan. He is a frontrunner for Pakistan’s next Prime Ministerial elections. But, he is not new to the political scene. His Justice Party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, has been clamoring with the same agenda for the last #"een years without much trac-tion. For the #rst time, however, his mes-sage, rhetoric and appeal seem to be hitting all the right chords. People are attracted to what he stands for—an alternative to the existing political system dominated by feudalism and traditional politicians. Call it the Arab Spring away from Arabia or the Movement of Hope in the land of no hope, Imran Khan in 2012 is the torchbearer of “Change” in Pakistan. But to understand Imran and why he is the “Change,” it is important to go back in time and trace the genesis of Imran Khan, the phenomenon. Imran, #rst and foremost, was Pakistan’s most famed and successful cricketer. As a player, he was the greatest all rounder of his time: a fearsome fast bowler and

a tenacious batsman. As Captain of the Pakistan team, a role he was in for almost a decade, he inspired a #ghting spirit that was uncommon and unseen in cricket; he would call his players “Cornered Tigers” and expected them to #ght, and #ght hard. He earned Pakistan many laurels and es-tablished the country’s name as a cricket-ing nation internationally at a time when the English, West Indies and Australians dominated the cricketing scene. !e high-light was the Cricket World Cup in 1992, a victory and achievement that united Paki-stan like no other event ever has in its 65 years of history. Imran the cricketer is immortal in the eyes of the Pakistani people. A deeply religious society like Pakistan condoned the fact that Imran had the reputation of an inter-national playboy. !at his name appeared o"en in the tabloids of the West did little to dent his heroic status in Pakistan. He drew sympathy of the masses when his name appeared in a lawsuit alleging him to have fathered a daughter illegitimately. !ey even accepted him wholeheartedly for doing the unthinkable: marrying a Jewish woman. Imran thus a$ected the psyche of the people with his de#ance, charisma, tenac-ity and success. !e people of Pakistan re-vered him with a fervor and a passion that no individual had ever enjoyed. He, to his credit, used that reverence positively as a philanthropist. He built in Pakistan the

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#rst ever state of the art cancer hospital in the city of Lahore, all with donations of the Pakistani people. !e hospital stands unparalleled in providing quality health care, especially treatment of cancer, to the poor and downtrodden. From cricketing legend, with the success of his hospital, he transformed his image to that of a Saint who could rise to the aid of the Pakistani people. In 1996, Imran joined politics on popu-lar demand. His agenda was limited and

concise: #xing Pakistan’s most pressing problem—corruption. With the slogan of “Justice” for all, he o$ered an alternative to the politics of deceit that had come to dominate Pakistan in that era. But, despite his cricketing genius and Saint-like status, his #rst foray into politics was a failure. He underestimated the complexity of Paki-stan’s political landscape, the power of the feudal landlords, and their grip over the electoral system. He was naïve too and more idealistic than real. Riding on the wave of popular support and sentiment

Photo  of  Imran  Khan—by  die  Heinrich-­Böll-­Stiftung  (Flickr  user  boellstiftung)

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from his cricketing and philanthropy days, he had the illusion that he could change Pakistan with the wave of a wand. He remained under this illusion for a long time and met failure a"er failure in politics. From being a national hero, he became a non-entity because of his poli-tics. But, he persevered. A"er supporting the military dictator Pervez Musharraf initially, Imran took to defying him and his regime. He stuck to his ideals of “Rule of law” and steadfastly supported the wa-tershed lawyer’s movement of 2007–08, which ended Mushrraf ’s military rule. At the same time, he took critical political positions by criticizing the “War on Ter-ror” and Pakistan’s military operations in the tribal areas. He contended that terror will only proliferate with use of the mili-tary machine, and that political dialogue is the only way out. For this position, he scared many in the West, and also has earned the nickname of “Taliban Khan” from the Pakistani liberals. Imran’s politics, though a struggle of de#-ance without the traditional support sys-tems other Pakistani politicians enjoy, has been marred by contradictions and naive-ty. He speaks of spirituality and social jus-tice for all but seeks an Islamic social wel-fare system in the country, a blueprint of which has not yet been seen by anyone. He aims to eliminate corruption in Pakistan in 90 days, but lacks a clear road map as to how he will do that. He says that he will rid Pakistan of aid by collecting taxes, but says

little about how he will tax the rich and the feudals who have and will continue to dominate Pakistan’s politics. No one knows what will become of the battle-hardened militants and terrorist groups, which are armed to the teeth once he comes to power and stops all military operations. He calls for withdrawal of US forces from Afghani-stan but who will check the resurgent Tali-ban and their stone-age worldview? He has no answer to this question. Despite not having many answers to how his agenda will manifest in real politick-ing, his positions have an appeal with the masses. !ey like him for his Anti-Amer-icanism. !ey love him for his fusion of Islamic rhetoric and secular and modern ideals. Corruption is so endemic and so frustrating for Pakistanis that they can not help but be drawn to the idealism of his anti-corruption agenda. !e economy is in such tatters that talk of revival draws everyone, even his skeptics. Hence, he of-fers hope. Pakistan desires change. For too long it has been held back by corrupt politicians and two-faced generals. !e people of Pakistan will not tolerate the traditional politicians in o&ce again and they will not take an-other military dictator either. People want democracy, which functions and can de-liver. So, they will vote for Imran, despite his faults, for he characterizes all traits Pakistani: de#ance, tenacity, contradic-tions and idealism, and hope that “change” will come. a

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In a time when Islamophobia is rampant, it is easy to think that Islam must be a relatively new religion in this country. Communities across America are pro-testing the building of mosques in their neighborhoods. One might think that it is just now that Muslims are starting to es-tablish themselves, but this is not actually the case. !is clash between Muslims and non-Muslims in many communities in America suggests that there may be an in-herent incompatibility between Islam and the West. Many people have extrapolated from this idea to imply that Muslims are not really American and that their way of life is antithetical to America. We see rem-nants of this idea in the recent Republi-can debates; candidates were asked about whether they would ever hire a Muslim, and most of the candidates answered in a way as to suggest that Muslims cannot be trusted because their loyalties lie else-where. !is further suggests that Muslims cannot ever e$ectively integrate into this country. !e Florida Family Foundation lobbied major companies to pull their ads from a TV show called “All American Muslim.” !is is a show that follows the lives of American Muslims in Dearborn, Michigan. !ey claimed that by following normal-seeming Muslims in America, the show belittles the threat Islam poses to the West.

However, this idea of incompatibility is not only found in these politically conser-vative pockets of the country; in ivory tow-ers across the world, academics discuss the compatibility of Islam with the free, West-ern structure of society. !ey probe the possibility of a causal relationship between Islam and underdevelopment. Amidst an understanding that all countries should aim for a Western-style democracy is the question of Islam. Can Islam and a true progressive Western-style democracy co-exist? It is a question that professors pon-der in their o&ces and seminars, the topic of university lectures. But, to me, the ques-tion is nonsensical. !is question presup-poses that Islam is a monolith bere" of a diversity of belief and discourse, and that we know exactly what it means to be West-ern. It fails to understand the complexity that is in any religion and how it relates to people in any society. It fails to appreciate the diversity of religious experiences in America in general. But mostly, it fails to understand the West in the same way that Islamophobes in America fail to realize how Islam has developed in their country for over a hundred years. In this essay, I will illustrate a little known history of Muslims in America. Hopefully, the details and nu-ances of this history will demonstrate that the misunderstandings described above have no basis. One need only look at a

Islam  in  the  West:  A  Look  at  Cedar  Rapids

Fatima WagdyEconomics/International Relations ’12

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small town in the heartland of America to see that these issues are much more com-plex than they seem and that the West and Islam are not in fact incompatible, nor is Islam a new phenomenon in this country. In fact, this history will show the extent to which Muslims have and can integrate into this country. And perhaps then we can un-derstand a little bit more about “Islam and the West” through people who are living it. What this history will not do is de#nitively answer the aforementioned question, but instead shed light on what Islam in the West sometimes looks like.

!ere are many stories about Islam in the West, but I will start with what I know, the history of my own city. What I know is that there has been a mosque in my city of Cedar Rapids, Iowa since 1934.1 !e mosque is still nestled in the middle of a neighborhood of old homes. It is the old-est standing mosque in North America and is recognized as a historic landmark. When it was built, it even had a dome with a crescent at the top; in other words, it possessed the architectural features of mosques found around the world today. And this was in the middle of Iowa in the 1930s. !is mosque and community have so much to teach us about Islam in America. Sadly, it is a little known his-tory, despite the fact that it represents one of the oldest Muslim communities in the entire country. Perhaps people might view it as insigni#cant because this is in Iowa, a less well-known state. But, in fact, the location makes it an even more inter-esting case study because Iowa is in the heartland of America (heavily in%uences elections, etc.). !e state seems to be able to represent much that is stereotypically American. But I think it will be di&cult to convince you why this community is so signi#cant, so I will just show you what this community is all about.1 <http://mothermosque.org/page.php?2>.

!roughout the late 1800s, many Leba-nese and Syrian immigrants came to Ce-dar Rapids in search of work. !ey came through Ellis Island just like millions of other immigrants did at the time. What one must realize about this time in history is the fact that while these people currently consider themselves Lebanese and Syrian, they le" the Middle East at a time when Lebanon was not even a country; they came from very particular regions within the Ottoman Empire. !ey le" at a time when the French and British forces had begun to in%uence the region. However, it was not until 1920 that the countries of Lebanon and Syria were o&cially made into the nation-states that they attempt to be today. In 1919, the British and French implemented the Sykes Picot agreement which created the states we have come to know in the Modern Middle East today. !is is extremely signi#cant because the particular nature of Islam and how it relat-ed to the state changed dramatically in the last 100 years. !e region slowly became characterized by a series of new phenom-enon, whether it was the Islamic Revival, a new pan-Arab nationalism, or a newly cre-ated nationalism.

In this century, while this community was living in America, Islam began to take on a new look. !is century has seen the rise of religious extremism and new kinds of Islamist ideologies. !ese new ideologies and misguided practices permeated soci-ety in a way that changed forever the way religion was practiced. But it is impor-tant to note that while the nature of Islam changed in the Middle East, it is not fair to say that the communities in the US were therefore less Muslim. To say this would imply that prior to reinterpretation of Is-lam in the past 100 years, people were not really Muslim. Nazih Ayubi, a prominent political scientist, explains this phenom-enon when he says: “!e Islamist doctrine

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was not a readymade body of knowledge that was simply neglected in the past and was now being re-adopted. !e Islamists have had to “dig” for the sources and to struggle over re-interpreting and re-constructing them. For the last hundred years or so, Islamic jurisprudence has not formed part of the standard learning or reading of the average educated person in the Arab countries most a$ected by radical Islamism. !us, the Islamists were not peeling away a thin veneer of “West-ernization” that was concealing an intact treasury of “traditional” Islamic learning; rather, they were going through a process of rediscovery and reassembly of pieces long since shattered and dispersed”2

!e idea of an inherent clash between Western society and Islam only emerged

2 Political  Islam:  Religion  and  Politics  in  the  Arab  World, p. 93.

in the particular way it is promoted today. !ese people who le" the region prior to 1920, which was a sizable enough com-munity of people to form the community that was o&cially established with a physi-cal mosque in 1934, did not grow up in an environment characterized by what we might call a new Islam in the Middle East and world. At the time, communica-tion was not as simple as it is today. !ey e$ectively lived in isolation in Iowa for many years. !ey brought their religion, Islam, with them to Iowa. And they prac-ticed what Islam meant to them. No matter how much they wanted to be in%uenced by their home country, it was impossible for them to develop in the same way as the people did in their own country. Just like it is impossible to think that Italians in the US who came at the same time were able to maintain Italian culture and society as it is known today in Italy. !ey created their

Islamic  mosaic  pattern—by  Jörg  Reuter  (Flickr  user  stachelig)

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own society here in the US. !eir way of practicing Islam became a uniquely Amer-ican Islam. But they maintained their identity and were proud to be Muslims. Some might want to claim that they are an anomaly, and that their history is insig-ni#cant. But, as I will explain, the extent to which this small community contributed to the history of Islam in America is re-markable. !ey should be allowed owner-ship of their unique position as holders of “Islam in the West”.

!ese people established themselves through grocery stores and other local businesses in Cedar Rapids. And, many of these families and their o$spring have been in Cedar Rapids ever since. I am part of this Muslim community home to sec-ond, third, fourth, and even #"h genera-tion Muslims in America who have always been Muslim. Today, one can look around the city and see everything from furniture stores to printing companies, and meat-packing plants that have been started by and run by Muslims in our community for years. While not all have remained Mus-lim mostly due to intermarriage, many have. I have come to know these people very well, and they are as American as can be under any de#nition of the word. !ey have served this country, are proud to be American and Muslim, and en-compass and do everything that one may consider to be uniquely American. A lot of them even have Americanized English #rst names like Bill or Albert despite their Lebanese heritage. !ey have almost all but lost the Arabic language in the later generations. !ey are like any immigrant story in America from the time. In the sto-ries from this community, I hope people will realize the extent to which Islam and “the West” have been and can be compat-ible. And the suggestion that they are not a new phenomenon either here in the US or in the Muslim World.

Amongst these Muslims who settled in Cedar Rapids are family friends who went to high school with the parents of my non-Muslim neighbors; the same high schools we go to today. !ere are former wrestling state champs, football fanatics and more. !ere are the children of veterans who served in World War II. !ere’s Abdullah, a vet who lead religious services and Quran classes in the community. !ere’s Bill, the #rst Muslim to serve in the Peace Corps in 1963, and who later founded Midamar, the #rst Halal Meat company in America. !e mosque even had a baseball team that competed in an informal Church baseball league. Over time, they became very in-tegrated into American culture. And, one might think that this necessarily means that they were nominally Muslim, if that even means anything.

But, this was not the case because they were proud of their Muslim identity and prac-ticed what they knew Islam to be. Just like any mosque, they had prayers and Quran lessons. !ey were pioneers of the Ameri-can Muslim community and proud to represent their religion and country at the same time. For example, Abdullah Igram, a Muslim man of Lebanese descent, was born and raised in Cedar Rapids Iowa. He served in the American military in World War II. When getting his dog tag made, he was asked to state his religious a&liation. At the time, there were three choices, P for Protestant, C for Catholic, and J for Jew-ish. He asked for an M to be engraved on his tag for Muslim. At the time it could not be done, but when he returned safely from his service, he sent a letter to President Eisenhower asking for the M option to be added for military dog tags. Soon enough, Igram received a letter from the President’s secretary that the option was added. Igram was one of the #rst Muslims in the com-munity to memorize the Quran and taught Quran classes to the congregation. He also

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served as the President of the Interna-tional Muslim society of the United States and Canada. Old newspaper articles from Cedar Rapids, Iowa highlight these and many other stories from these times (see attached pictures). 'Not only did Abdullah Igram serve his country and his local Mus-lim community, he engaged with other religious communities as a representative of Muslims. He met with local pastors to discuss the relations between di$erent reli-gious communities. One then can also call him an early pioneer of interfaith relations in the United States.

!e daughter of Abdullah Igram, Fatima Smejkal, still lives in Cedar Rapids, Iowa and maintains the memory of her father. She grew up in the city but is now at least around 50 years of age, but she looks much younger. I remember her when I was young; she maintained our Sunday School tradition of the Olympics. !e Olympics were a yearly tradition held at the end of the year for all the kids to compete in a bunch of sports. She also has started a scholarship program for the high school seniors of the community in memory of her late father and husband. She is one of the most wonderful people I’ve met. It is clear that her life as a Muslim in America is a unique experience; many of the people who currently comprise our community are recent immigrants. But, through Aunt Tima (as we call her), we relate. She can understand what it’s like to go to high school as a Muslim; and she knows what it’s like trying to maintain one’s faith and culture in America. She lived in my city all of her life, and has still retained her faith and religion. Her beau-ty and wisdom inspire me.

Bill Aossey, the CEO of Midamar, is de-scended from Yahya Aossey, who came to the US in the late 1800s from the present-day Syria of the Ottoman Em-

pire. He has an unmistakable Midwest twang (if there was really one to speak of in general). He founded Midamar after serving in the Peace Corps in Senegal in the 1960s. It is the first Halal meat com-pany in the country. I suppose it is some-thing uniquely Iowan to do; Iowa is well known for its agricultural industry, and meat production in particular. This may not seem significant, but a look at any grocery store that sells Halal meat in the US will explain why this is significant. Anywhere in the country where there is Halal meat, there is Midamar. A close look at the package will show you that it is packaged in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. This demonstrates two things; first that that these people maintained their religious identity. They saw Halal meat (meat pre-pared according to Islamic rites) as an important part of being a Muslim and worked to establish a Halal Meat com-pany. Even though the people who estab-lished this company were at least second generation Americans, they maintained their identity.

Another family serves as a simpler ex-ample of this community’s integration into American culture. I went over to a friend’s house, and saw her grandparents watching football. Imagine those heated people in sports bars yelling at the TV; this was exactly what her grandfather looked like. I’ve known him from living in Cedar Rapids since I was five. I always used to see him at the mosque.

I also knew that from whenever he gave the call to prayer, he could not pronounce the words in Arabic completely correctly. He sounded like the average American trying to say something in Arabic, but slightly better. He also grew up in our city and he absolutely loves sports, especially football. He was a weight-li"ing champ back in his younger days. To the extent

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that football is America’s favorite past time, Naji embodies the stereotypical old man who loves football.

Another clear sign of this community’s establishment in America is the Muslim National Cemetery. Traditions around death are an important part of any com-munity, and the Muslim community in Cedar Rapids was no di$erent. !e Mus-lim National cemetery was established in Cedar Rapids in 1948 on 12 acres of land donated by Yahya Aossey in 1948. All the graves face Mecca. It is the #rst Muslim National cemetery in the US. Many Muslims have been buried there across the years and are still buried there today. One of these people who was bur-ied there relatively recently (2007) is Hussein Sheronick. He was born in 1927 and grew up in Cedar Rapids, Iowa; he graduated from Wilson High School in 1945. His memorial demonstrates the extent to which even those people many generations ago embrace their religious and cultural practices when it comes to death: “Hassein Ali Sheronick was born April 14, 1927, in Toledo, Ohio, the son of Ali and Negebe Sheronick. He was a 1945 graduate of Wilson High School in Cedar Rapids. He served in the U.S. Ma-rine Corp from 1945-1948 in the South Paci#c. Sam married Aziza K. Alwan on November 14, 1958, in Cedar Rapids. Sam was a route salesman and district manager for Mc Garvey Co$ee Compa-ny for 30 years. He was a member of the Islamic Center of Cedar Rapids, a 32nd Degree Mason and a member of the Miz-pah Lodge and a member of the ElKahir Shrine in Cedar Rapids. His memorial also shows that even though Sheronick served in the Marine corps, he was part of society in various ways; he was an American who was also-Muslim.3

3 <http://www.cedarmemorial.com/obitu-ary/1791/hussein--sheronick-cedar-rapids-ia/>.

!e community has been engaged with the broader Cedar Rapids community in many ways for many years. !e most clear indicator of such involvement are Fatayer sales. !e community has a long history of selling Lebanese meat pies (fatayer), and they are known amongst many in Cedar Rapids. Ever since I was young, I can re-member that one Saturday a month, these old women in the community would come together to bake meat pies at the mosque. All sorts of people would come to buy them, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. And, many of these people had been buy-ing these meat pies for years. !ese old women would reminisce about the old days at the mosque. !ey all knew each other back then as they grew up together in this community.

I’ve only described a few members of this community, but there are many other sto-ries. And, many more stories are lost in the history of this town. !is was a com-munity though, not just a few individu-als. !e unique way in which this com-munity of people integrated themselves in this country was as a Muslim community. While the community in Cedar Rapids to-day has changed dramatically, it has a rich history that can teach us so much. !ere are many reasons this community was able to integrate into the country the way they did. Perhaps among these are the fact sthat these people “looked white.” !ough they had a di$erent culture and religion, they were e$ectively white to any person at #rst glance. And, perhaps for this reason they did not face the same kind of discrimina-tion that many Muslims in America face today.

But, more importantly, this glimpse of history should help us recognize a few things. First, it is an example of how and why Islam is not a new phenomenon in this country. And, it is not necessarily the

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case that Islam and the West cannot coex-ist. !is history shows us how generations of Muslims have lived in the US and been able to balance their culture and religion in a new environment. Who they became was a uniquely American Muslim experi-ence as they could no longer fully identify with the Muslims overseas. !e nature of the world at the time made it impossible for them to visit o"en and maintain their same way of life. Second, this history shows us the extent to which these people have been a part and parcel of the Ameri-can narrative. !eir stories highlight im-portant facts about Muslims in America that few even know or recognize. !ese facts demonstrate the extent to which these people were not just Muslims who happened to be American, they were American Muslims. In their existence, they became part of and contributed to what is the West. Finally, these people and their practice show us the diversity of religious experience and practice that can be found within Islam. Perhaps it is obvi-ous that Islam is a diverse religion, and that a new culture and society can change religion in new ways as does time. But, these people exemplify this diversity.

While it is evident that these human por-traits can show us so much, there is still so much more missing. !is community has a very deep history in the city and in America, but unfortunately, it has not been well-documented. As the older gen-eration continues to pass, and the new

generation forgets, we lose the history. But, by seeing just this glimpse of the his-tory we can try to remember that Mus-lims have a rightful place in this country and they have found a way to integrate in ways that most in this country have not seen or understood. !e community in Cedar Rapids today has changed drasti-cally; just as new waves of immigration hit the entire country, Cedar Rapids wel-comed new waves of immigrants as well. !ose immigrants who were Muslim were Muslim in a completely di$erent cultural context; they lived in Middle Eastern and South Asian countries through the rise of Political Islam, Nationalism, and a chang-ing global political scene. !is was their context, and their way of practicing re-ligion stemmed from this context. !ey brought their Islam and changed the na-ture of this community in Cedar Rapids. !is is what happens in a globalized world where people move and culture changes. But this community has retained a sense that there is no inherent con%ict between being Muslim and American. !is idea is not even necessarily a conscious decision, but a statement of fact.

!eir history and presence in the city is unique, and these people embody the fact that they are Muslim and American. While many #rst-generation Muslims around the country grapple with their sometimes con-%icting identities, this community seems to have dealt with this immediate struggle long ago. a

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Decoration  piece  from  Abdul  Aziz  Khan’s  madrasah  (Bukhara,  Uzbekistan)—by  Flickr  user  dalbera

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A P E O P L E ’ S P U B L I C AT I O N