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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 16, 20UO

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COMMIITEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman DON YOUNG, A1ask6 THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin SHERWOOD L. BOE:HLERT, New York HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland STEPHEN HORN, California BOI> FR.A.'lKS, New Jersey JOHN L. MICA, Florida JACK QUINN. New York TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida VERNO~ J. EHLERS, Michigan SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama STEVEN C. LATOURETI'E, Ohi;;. SUE W. KELLY, New York RAY LAHOOD, Illinois RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire ROBER·r W. NEY, Ohio JACK METCALF, Washington EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas MERRILL COOK, Utah JOHN COOKSEY, Lousiana JOHN R THUNE, South Dakota FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New ,Jersey JERRY MORAN, Kansas JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania GARY G. MILLER, CaliforniA JOHN E:. SWEENEY, New York JIM DEMINT, Sollth Carolina DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho JOHNNY iSAKSON, Georgia DA ''lD VITTER, Louisiana

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia ROBERT A. BOR."iKl, Pennsylvania WILLIAM 0. LIP{~SKI, Illinois ROBERT E. WISE, J!t., West Virginia JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., Ohio PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Distnct of

Columbia JERROLD NADLER, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN. Florida JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan BOB FILNER, California EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,

California ELIJAH E. Cl.i'MMINGS, Maryland EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon MAX SANDLIN, Texas ELLEN 0. TAUSCHER, California BILL PASCRELL, JR., No:-w Jersey LEONA.RD L. BOSWELL, Iowa JAMES P. McGOVERN, M'lssachusetts TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania NICK LAMPSON, Texas JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine MARION BERRY, Arkansas RONNIE SHOWS, Mississippi BRIAN BAIRD, Washington SHELLEY BEaJ.{LEY, Nevada

(II)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, Chairman JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York, Vice

Chairman DON YOliNG, Alaska THOMAS E. PETRI, Wi,ijcon.sin THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois JOHN L. MICA, Florida JACK QUINN, New York VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama RAY LAHOOD, Illinois CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JACK METCA!Jo\ Washington EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas ME .UULL COOK, Utah JeiiN COOKSEY, Louisiana JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota FRANK A. LoBIO~'OO. New Jersey JERRY MORAN, Kanus JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania GARY G. MILLER, California JIM DEMINT, South Carolina STEVEN T. KUYKENDALL, California MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia DAVID VITI'ER, Louisiana BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

rEx Officio)

WILLIAM 0. LIPINSKI, Illinois JERRY F. COSTELLO, lllinoi• COR~ BROWN, Florida EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texa" JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,

California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine MARION BERRY, Arkansaa ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey El-LEN 0. TAUSCHER, California JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massaehusetta NICK LAMPSON, Texas NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., Ohio PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon PAT DANNER, Miasouri BOB FILNFR, California MAX SANDLIN, Texas TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota fE~ O{fkio)

(III)

. . (/

CONTENTS TESTIMONY

Dillingham, Dr. Gerald L., Associate DirectJr, Transt'ortation Issues, fte. sources, Community, and Economic Development D1vision, U.S. General Accounting Office ............................................................................................... .

Doubrava, Richard J., Managing Director of Security, Air Transport Associa-tion ....................................................................................................................... .

Ftreder~tA~:!i~na~~i~~~: ~~-i-~~-~-~~--~~~--~~~--~~~~~~--~~: Gilchrist, Bill, Pre-Board Securil;y Screener, International Total Services, Inc. Hartwick, Dr. Thomas S., Chairman, Committee on Assessment of Tech-

nologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, National Research CounciV National Academy of Sc1ences ........................................................................... .

Rizkalla, Cherif, President & Chief Executive Officer, Heimann Systems ........ . Stefani, Alexis M., Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, United States

Department of Transportation ........................................................................... . Vaiden, Thomas M., President, Aviation Division, International Total Serv-

ices, Inc ................................................................................................................ .

p ...

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Johnson~ Hen. Eddie Bernice, of Texas ................................................................. . Kuykenaall, Hen. Steven T., of California ........................................................... .. Oberstar, Hen. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................ .

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

w~~7'Ad~i~al· 8:r::~t ~ .. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Hartwick, Dr. Thomas S ........................................................................................ . Rizkalla, Cherif ....................................................................................................... . Stefani, Alexis M ................................................................................................... .. Vaiden, Thomas M .................................................................................................. .

ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

Slaughter, Hen. Louise M., a Representative in Congress from New York, statement ............................................................................................................. .

Chopra, Deepak, Chairman, 081 Systems!Rapiscan Security Products, Inc., statement ............................................................................................................. .

Letters from the governments of Germany and Switzerland concerning the Hatch Amendment .............................................................................................. .

Schroeder, Thomas J., CEP, T.J.S. and As30Ciates, Consulting Engineers, letter, May 30, 2000 ............................................................................................ .

Sun Country Airlines, Bill LaMacchia, Jr., President and CEO, letter, June 23,2000 ················································································································· National Association of Security and Investigative Regulators, Donna W. Hancock, President, letter, August 9, 2000 ....................................................... .

InVision TechnolOJP.es, Inc., statement ................................................................. . Threat Image ProJection Ready X-Ray Contract Award ...................................... . FAA News, FAA Names Harvey National Screener of the Year ........................ .

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85 89 90

43 56 69 96 99

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135 136 137 138

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81::e~i~~tP~~:.~~ce ~~::a~o~ ~~~~.~~~: .. ~~~~~~~~.~~-~~~~.~.~~~: H.R. 4529, to amend title 49, U.S. Code, to prohibit the em~loyment of cer'"..ain

individuals in positions affecting air transportation secunty ......................... .

(VI)

P..,

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143

AVIATION SECURITY (FOCUSING ON TRAINING AND RETENTION OF SCREENERS)

Thursday, March 16, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, at 10:13 a.m. in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John J. Duncan, Jr. [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. DUNCAN. OK. I have already called the subcommittee to order when we started the closed portion of this hearing at 9:30, and we had many Members here for that, and we will go ahead now and proceed with the open session.

Today's topic is aviation security, with a particular focus on the screeners who check our luggage.

Some time ago, I had the opportunity to tour the FAA tech center in New Jersey with Congressman LoBion•'o and Administrator Garvey. While on the tour, we spent some time meeting with those who worked on and developed new technology for aviation Recurity. We were told of many new developments in aviation security technology; however, we also learned that in many cases it is very difficult to train screeners to operate this new equipment, and those who did learn to use it often 1eft for another job soon thereafter. There is such a high degree of turnover that it is becoming very difficult to find people to perform the work.

The FAA has spent at least $145 million purchasing sophisticated machines to screen checked baggage; however, in 1999 the average number of bags checked or scre~ned ranged from 234 to 275 per day per machine. This raises a serious question as to whether taxpayers are getting their money's worth in the development of these very expensive machines.

Currently, the airlines contract with private security companies to handle the screening of passengers. According to a National Academy study, there are 15,000 screeners who work in the United States. The average pay for these employees ranges from $5.25 per hour to $6.75 per hour. Most of these employees turn over every two or three months. Many leave to work at fast food restaurants in airports where they can make more money.

It has been reported that the turnover rate in some cities runs as high as 400 percent a year. I have seen various figures---300 percent, 400 percent. One figure I saw said an average of 170 percent. So there are varied figures, but it is an extremely high turnover rate.

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Under existing requirements. there are no regulations specifically governing screening compauies. On January 5th of this year, the FAA issued the certificatior. of screening companies notice of proposed rule-making. Basically, this rule would establish guidelines to certify screening companies. I think this is an important start in this process.

The screening companies a1'd the Air Transport Association support the rule, even though the FAA estimates the rule will cost the airlines $300 million over 10 years. A big concern, though, is that this proposed rule would increase the screening companies' operating cost. With their gross marg~ns anywhere from 4 to 7 percent, I have been told that it will be ·rery difficult for some, especially the small ones) to stay in busi aes~.

We are pleased to have today <>n the firat panel Admiral Catha! Flynn, the FAA's associate admh1istrator for civil aviation security, to give us an update on where the FAA is on aviation security. I understand he is retiri11g later this year, and I would like to say how much all of us on this subcommittee have been impressed with and appreciate the job that he has done and the dignity and integrity that he has brought to his public service, both in the military and with the FAA.

Admiral Flynn is a true public servant, and, although the F AA:s security program may have some critics, we know that he has done everything possible to make it better.

We will also hear from representatives of the GAO, the transportation IG, and Dr. Thomas S. Hartwick, chairman of the National Academy of Sciences panel that assessed the technologies deployed to improve aviation security.

On the second panel we are honored to have Mr. Richard Doubrava of the Air Transport Association repreBenting the airlines; Mr. Cherif Rizkalla of the Heimann Systems and a member of the Safe Skies Alliance, which manufactures security screening equipment.

We also did have lined up Mr. Offer Einav, the head of North American Security for El AI Airlines, but he has just notified us that he i& ill and will not be able to be with us today.

We will also hear from Mr. Thomas Vaiden, president of the Aviation Staff and Services for ITS Worldwide, which employs over 13,000 screeners, and Mr. Bil; Gilchrist, the FAA Screener of the Year.

I want to thank everyone who is here with us today and turn now to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Lipinski.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for i10lding this very important hearing today.

We have many knowledgeable witnesses here, so I will keep my opening statement brief.

The United States has a very safe, secure aviation system; however, we must do everything in our power to ensure that it remains a safe and secure system. The security of our aviation system io only as strong as our weakest link.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad that we are going to focus today on the role of the security screeners. I have longstanding concerns about the quality of our Nation's security screeners. Screeners today are contract employees who are not very well paid. As a result, turn-

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over of screening personnel is extreme!> high; yet, training of new screeners is done on an ad hoc basis.

I understand that the FAA has a notic" of proposed rule-making that will improve the training of screeners. I think thjs is a very good first ~tep in improving the qualities of our Nation's security screeners.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today to see if there i3 even more we in Congress can do to improve the quality of screeners.

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Does anyone else wish to give an opening statement at this time? Dr. Ehlers? Mr. EHLERS. Just a very brief one. I appreciate the closed hearing we just had and the progress re

port we have heard. Tllis is an incredibly important issue. I think we have been very, very fortunate we have not had any major explnsions in the past several years. I appreciate the increased security efforts, but obviouely we have much, much more to do to make our system really secure, not only here, but even more so in other countries.

I yield back. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Johnson? Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. l was going to make a few opening remark•, but I will make it

very brief. Let me thank you, because this is of great concem in my area,

and I think, generally speaking, of the flying public, that the security screening program in the Nation's airports is really being questioned. Everyone has seen the stories on the news and in the papers about the high tumover and the low salary. It leads me to say we get what we pay for.

The public does have a right to be concemed, because inadequate training and low morale among screeners threaten safety and security in the skies, and the men and women who stand at security check points are forced to work long, constant hours at minimum wage.

The flying public really does deserve better, and we do need to have a standardized training, and perhaps even seriously consider increasing the salaries so that we can increase retention and gain some experienced screeners.

Further, I think we should pursue the best and newest technology possible to screen checked and carry-on baggage. The FAA's notice of proposed rule-making is a step in the right direction. Providing uniform training for security screeners I think is absolutely necessary.

I think this hearing is important, and I thank you very much for holding it. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. If there are no other opening statements, we will proceed with

the first panel.

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We have on the first panel Dr. Thomas S. Hartwick, who is chairman on the Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security for the National Research Council, Academy of Sciences; Ms. Alexis M. Stefani, who is an assistant inspector general for auditing, United States Department of Transportation; Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, associate director, transportation issues, of the General Accounting Office; and Admiral Catha! Flynn, who is a"sociate administrator for civil aviation security for the Federal Aviation Administration.

We will proceed in the order listed on the call of the hearing, and that means, Dr. Hartwick, you will be the first witness. You may proceed with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF DR. THOMAS S. HARTWICK, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGIES DEPLOYED TO IMPROVE AVIATION SECURITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIUNATIONAL ACADEMY 01'' SCIENCES; Al.EXIS M. STEFANI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; DR. GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION ISSUES, RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DMSION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND ADMIRAL CATHAL FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMJ.NISTRATOR FOR CML AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION Dr. HARTWICK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski,

members of the committee. As you know, I "m chairman of the National Research Council

Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security. We are your volunteer force that is volunteering to check up on issues to make sure we are safe.

The committee was convened in 1997 at the request of the FAA and request of Congress to review t!:te FAA's deployment of technologies to improve aviation security.

In November, 1999, we published our first report. I think you have bad that distributed to you. You have also been provided with documentation which describes our charter.

To paraphrase that charter, our job has been to assess the weapons and explosive detection technologies being deployed with respect to their effectiveness, and that means all aspects, to identify areas of improvement, and to assess the status of the hardened cargo container develor,ment as an element of aviation security.

To that end, we he d several fact-finding meetings, visited airports, interacted vigorously with the FAA, visited the tech centers, and we tried to elicit the best possible appraisal.

We interpreted your request for the study to mean a peer review of the available explosives detection an<l containment technologies relative to the deployment environment. Therefore; we assembled a con.mittee with experts who can address the various aspects of the probi~m.

Now I will get a little bit technical here to indicate the areas of expertise.

We have had members that are expert in airport and airline operations, detection technologies, equipment testing, evaluation cer-

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tification, human factors, computer-based training of operators, systems analysis, statistical data analysis, and aircraft hardening co"cepts using hardened cargo containers. So we tried to cover the wateri"ront to make sure that the deployment WIIB going OK. My own background is in device research and development, which ap.J?!Y to aavance complex DOD systems.

We viewed our task as not just a progress audit function, which Ms. Stefani conducts, but we tried to ask and anJJwer the tough questions that impact aviation security that lie within our statament of task.

I can state qualitatively the committee position that the FAA has done a good job bringing the various security technologies on line and has substantially improved aviati&n security since the start of the deployments.

Although the schedule has been compromised, that has not entirely been their new problem. They are bringing new technologies on line.

Our committee recognizes that airline/airport security is a complex system problem, and, working under these constraints, they proceeded as rapidly as they could.

I will briefly highlight three major areas of concern. First is " need to treat the entire airport security scenario as a

complex system, not break it down in its parts. It is a system from beginning to end.

Up till now, the FAA has not had the luxury to do this systematically because of the time urgency to get the equipment deployed; however, one should plan to deploy all future security enhancements from a system point of view. In other words, try to get the biggest, most bang for the buck.

Second is the need to create a coordinated five-year plan. That is with the principal stakeholders-the airl!nes, the airports, and so forth. Many of us saw a very efficient team working together in the SEIPI', consisting of the FAA, airlines, and contractors, but those are short-term efforts.

In a complex management structure with policy inter-leaving with planning requires a better long-range plan, so we believe that that coordinated plan has to be developed.

Third is the need to improve operator performance, particularly with respect to operation of the FAA certified bulk explosive detection systems based on X-ray-computed torn<:>graphy. That is the check baggage system we heard about earlier.

You certainly realize from your own experience at check-in gates the quality of personnel does not always appear to match the level of reliance we all need to make sure that wo are safe. Machines only take you so far. Humans have got to be in the loop. An iii!mediate dividend will be paid if we could improve the quality of the screeners.

Well, to summarize, we had a very active committee. We have held two fact-finding meetings ju•t this past three months, two more planned this year. We are finding that the FAA is responsive. They participate with us, and we plan. to issue a second report at the end of the year.

Thank you very much. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Hartwick.

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Ms. Stefani? Ms. STEFANI. Mr. Chainnan, members of the subcommittee, good

morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss aviation security. Aviation security is dependent on the wordlns.tion of the airport and air carrier security operations, as well as the integration of people and technology. Perhaps the most important factor in an effective security program is a well-<rained work force of motivated screeners, baggage handlers, and other employees who process passengers, or have access to secure areas of the airport.

Today I would like to discuss four areas. The first area is deploying and using technology to enhance

screener perfonnance. Since 1997, Congress has authorized more than $350 million for the research, development, and deployment of advanced security technologieR, and we commend FAA for it<> progress in getting both bulk-explosives detection equipment and trace detection deviroa to our airports.

Although advanced security technologies are effective in detecting explosives, they are ultimately dependent on the human element.

FAA test results indicate that these new technologies can correctly identify a potential threat in a bag, but a screener can make the wrong decision and clear it.

In May of 2001, FAA expects to issue a final rule establishing training requirements for screeners and requiring screening companies to be certified. However, to achieve this, FAA must have a means to measure perfonnance and methods of providing initial and recurrent screener training.

To implement this rule, FAA "ill rely on threat-image protection, or TIP. TIP will help FAA to measure the perfonnance of individual screeners and certify screening companies.

TIP ia cun-ently installed on bulk-explosives detection equipment, or CTX's, used to screen checked bags. But TJP is not yet ready for the X-ray machines used to screen for your carry-on bags. It is still being tested, and then it will have to be deployed.

FAA will also be ,..,lying on computer-based training (CBT), which will enable the screeners at the airport to receive recurring training. It will also provide a means to evaluate and monitor screeners' performance.

FAA has deployed CBT to 37 airports, but of an additional 42 platfonns are needed to complete the deployment of CBT to all 79 large airports.

Our recent work has found that the CTX machines are still under-used. Over half of the deployed machines etill screen fewer than 225 bags per day, compared to the certified rate of 225 bags per hour. Under-utilization of these r,:>achines may cause screeners to become less proficient, becausP. under-practiced skills often deteriorate.

In our report in 1998, we recommended that FAA conduct a study to detennine the minimum daily processing rates needed to ensure CTX operator proficiency. To date, the study has not been done.

We have also completed recent work on background-investigation requirements. Employees at airports that go into secured areas must have a background check, but, in our opinion, the current re-

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quirements are ineffective. For example, there is a rule that requires an FBI criminal check if there wu an unexplained gap of employment of 12 months. This rule was designed to identify individuals who were Incarcerated for committing a serious crime. However, according to Department of Juatioo figures, 61 percent of all State and Federal felony convictions result in probation, or an average jail time of six months.

Also, the list of 25 crimes that would disqualify an employee from getting an ID allowing access to secure airport areas is insufficient. A recent example is at an Rirport where the Department of Justice investigated smuggling contraband onto aircraft. Fourteen of the 53 employees had criminal records, but for crimea that were not disquali!Ying. These crimea included larceny, possession of drugs, and creditcard fraud. We support FAA's initiatives to revise these requirements.

The third area deals with access control. When we did our teats in late 1998 and early 1999, we were successful in entering secure areas 68 percent of the time at the airports we visited. Since then, FAA has undergone an aggressive program of testing at the airports. In their most recent tests at 80 airports, they only entered secured areas 32 percent of the time without being challenged.

We want FAA to continue this program of testing, but we also think that they must proceed to issue rules for individual accountability, which would provide for enforcement actions against employees for not doing their j~b. Better training and reward systems are also needed.

The final area, Mr. Chairman, is the need for an integrated security plan. FAA is continuing, at this point, to focus on acquisition and de~loyment. We feel they need to "'1ove on to integrating the various aspects into a comprehensive, seamless security program. At this point, FAA is about halfway through a billion-dollar effort and plans to spend an additional 600 million through the year 2004. In our opinion, they need a better plan.

Thank you. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Dr. Dillingham? Dr. DILLINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lipinski, Mr.

Oberstar. We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to dis~uss the work that we are doing on pre-board aviation security screenera.

The basis of our testimony this morning is an ongoing review that we are doing at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation. The focus of the review is an examination of the trends in security screener performance over the last decade.

In regard to our findings about performance, or how well do they do their job, I believe that most knowledgeable people, including the FAA, would generally agree with our study's conclusion that we would have to overcome some relatively significant challenges if we are to achieve the desired performance level for those individuals who are considered by some as the last line of defense for our Nation's air transport system.

This morning I would like to briefly focus on three areas that are related to our findings on screener performance: one, the causes of

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screener performance problems; two, the stetus of FANs efforts to address these causes; and screening practices In other countries.

Regarding the causes of performance problems, we found thut two of the most important causes of screener performance problems are the relatively rapid turnover among screeners and the relaUve inattention that has been paid to human factors Issues involved in their work.

Turnover exceeds 100 percent at most large airports and has topped 400 percent at one of the busiest airports in the Nation. At one airport we visited, nearly 1,000 screeners had been trained during the course of one year, but at the end of that year only about 140 were still on the job.

The effect of this high turnover rate is to have a significant proportion of screeners on the job with relatively little experience. It also has the effect of mitigating the impact of the sophisticated and expensive equipment that is being deployed to the Nation's airports.

We believe that two of t.he most important but certainly not only reasons for these turnover rates are low wages and the few benefits that the screeners receive.

The human factors issues are those elements of the screeners' job that are influenced by human capabilities and constraints. In this caae, it is being tied to a repetitive, monotonous, and stressful task that requires constant vigilance.

Although the effect of human factors has been recognized for decades, it is only recently that significant efforts have been initiated to address these issues.

As you have heard, FAA now has several inter-related initiatives underway to address the causes of screener performance problems. These initiatives include establishing a screening certification program, installing the TIP program, and, in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act, establishing goals for improving performance.

Additionally, FAA is developing a battery of tests that can be used by screening companies to assist in the selection and training of screening candidates. Unfortunately, none of these initiatives have been fully implemented and most are behind schedule.

For example, the screening company certif:cation program is two years behind schedule, and FAA will not begin to certify companies until 2002. Partially as a result of these delays, FAA has fallen short in meeting its screener improvement goals.

Another aspect of our work is a search for potential best practices or lessons to be learned for improving screener performance. We reviewed screening operations in several other countries and also looked domestically for models. Generally, we found that screeners in foreign countries are required to have more-extensive qualificationfl, to meet higher trainmg standards, screeners are paid more, benefits are provided, and organizationally, these countries generally place the responsibility for screening with airports on the government instead of with air carriers.

The question is: doea it make a difference? The answer is maybe. The five countries we visited had significantly lower screener turnnver and may have better screener performance. The "may have" is because there is very limited evidence to examine.

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'l'he one example that we have is a joint screener test with the USA and the European country wherein the European screeners detected over twice as many test objects as the American screeners.

Additionally, there are some models that suggest a reorganization of the current passenger 5creening responsibilities, and models like the Chica11o Department of Aviation, which focuses on restructuring the entire process of selecting and training screeners.

We recognize that screener performance problems do not fall solely on FAA's shoulders. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, FAA does have a leadership responsibility for aviation security and it will be up to the agency to provide the guidance and oversight for improving the performance of screeners.

In our view, the actions FAA currently has underway are strong steps in the right direction, and, when fully implemented, may provide the needed improvement. However, it is critical that the Congress maintain vigilant oversight of FAA's efforts to ensure that it implemente these actions in a timely manner and achieves its performance improvement goals.

If performance improvements are not achieved, FAA and the Congress may want to consider other alternatives, such as some of the practices being used by other countries or other models to improve screener perfonnance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dillingham. Admirai Flynn? Admiral FLYNN. Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, mem

bers of the Subcommittee, good morning. First, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the very kind remarks. I

found in the Navy and in the FAA that any success that seems to come was due entirely to the gifted and courageous people with whom I worked.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today on the issue of aviation security. I will discuss several important security initiatives, but I understand the focus of this hearing is on training, performance, and retention of airline security screeners at airports.

I would like to locus my oral statement on our efforts in that area, particularly our ongoing rule-making that would require screening companies to be certified, and note that other elements of our security efforts are more fully described in our written testimony that has been submitted for the record.

Let me first emphasize that the threat to our Nation's aviation community has not diminished. It remains a dangerous world. Governments, airlines, and airports must work cooperatively to achieve our common goal of safe and secure air transportation worldwide.

The number of incidents worldwide of unlawful interference with civil aviation-hijackings and sabotage, bombings-has decreased over the last 20 years, while the number of flights, enplanements, and passenger miles flown, of course, have increased greatly.

However, as graphically demonstrated by the recent Air India hijacking, the decrease in number of events does not minimize the gravity of these crimes.

The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation is higher abroad than it is within the United States. The terrorist attacks against the

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United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania remind us of the global nature of terrorism and the need for everyone to work together to oppose it in the world.

The relationship between Osama bin Laden, who was behind those terrorist attacks on the embassies, and Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in New York and also of attempting to place bombs on a dozen U.S. carriers flying in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995, exemplifies the continuing tangible threat to civil aviation.

Only the wholehearted cooperation of our aviation partners thwarted those attacks in the Pacific. Moreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorisM are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have established capabilities and infrastructures here.

Given this security threat, since the early 1970's the FAA has required the screening of passengers and property carried aboard aircraft in order to en5ure that no unlawful or dangerous weapons, explosives, or C\ther destructive substances are carried aboard. We have made very substantial progress in improving the security of U.S. carriers overseas as a restdt of the work of the President's Commission on Security that followed the tragic bombing of PanAm 103 in 1988.

More recently, in response to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and to direction and guidance from this Committee in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, we have focused greatly on improving security within the United States.

We have, to that end, developed a propoMl to improve screening effectiveness, which we published in early January. This proposed rule requires the certification of all screening companies, specifies training requirements for screeners, and establishes requirements for the use of screening equipment.

The proposed rule would require screening companies to adopt the FAA improved security programs end would require carriers to install threat image projection, or TIP-equipped X-rays and explosive detection systems.

A TIP system electronically inserts images of possible threatsguns, knives, explosive devices--on X-ray system monitors as if they were within a bag being screened, or they also project the total image with threats on either X-ray or explosive detection system monitors.

The purpose of TIP is to provide training, to keep screeners alert, and to measure screener performance. High scores in detecting TIP images we believe will equate to a high probability of detecting the real bomb when it comes along.

We will continue to closely monitor TIP's capabilities in an operational environment, making necessary adjustments as we gain more experience with the technology.

Last Friday, we held a public listening session on the proposed rule at FAA headquarters and have scheduled two more in San Francisco and Fort Worth in April. We hope to issue a final rule on certification of screening companies in May of 2001.

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As you know, screeners are a critical link in the performance chain. While it is difficult to verify a correlation between better pay and better performance, wa can all agree that properly-trained and qualified people who ar" on the job longer tend to perform better.

Government sets performance, not design standards. The Government can indirectly influence private sector pay through higher performance standards that require more training and more investment in individuals who do the job well.

One thing we do know is that, for good and effective performance, screeners must be given the best tools available to do the job and must be trained to use them properly. Foremost among these tools are explosive detection systems. EDS installation and utilization re:..""lain among our greatest concerns. These systems have proven th•,ir effectiveness in detecting the amounts and types of explosives likely to be placed in checked baggage or smal! -packages carried as cargo or mail aboard commercial passenger aircraft.

Similarly, explosive trace detection deviceo have been shown to be effective in discovering even the smallest amounts of explosives in carry-on bags and articles.

I would like to briefly highlight our successful computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system, or CAPPS program, which is a computerized program that essentially selects passengers whose checked baggage will be subject to further security measures. FAA security procedures are intended to concentrate on a smaller segment of passengers using parameters developed within the counterterrorism community and reviewed by the Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice has found that CAPPS is nondiscriminatory, does not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and does not involve any invasion of passengers' personal privacy. CAPPS allows us to focus on a manageable population of passengers.

Until we have the technology to screen all checked bags with EDS without causing intolerable delays in processing departing flights, we mu•t continue to focus intelligently on a smaller segment of the bags. In the meantime, we will continue to relocate equipment and foster sharing among carriers to ensure the most effective use of all deployed security equipment and continue our related R&D efforts.

Another area of increasing importance is air cargo. Cargo screening is improving steadily. We have strengthened the cargo security standards for all passenger air carriers and indirect air carriersthat is to say freight forwarders-by narrowing the definition of known shippers and using security resources on unknown shippers.

In September, 1999, changes to the United States and foreign air carrier security programs and indirect air carrier security programs became effective. In addition, onboard couriers are now required to declare themselves to the air carrier, thus assuring that their bags will be treated as cargo and properly processed.

Finally, access control is another important issue of concern to us all. Department of Transportation inspector general assessments and General Accounting Office audits have properly noted industries' problems in performing FAA-required access control measures and background checks of their employees. More needs to be done by FAA and airports in these areas. We are working with air-

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port operators and air carriers to Implement and strengthen existing controls to ellmlnato access control weakness. We are doing that on the basis of validating their background checks, and, where it is necessary, we have required 100 percent reissuing of those checks. We have stopped some 14 companies using IDs until those checks have been done.

A particularly intensive round of access control tests started on February 7, 2000, and will continue at some frequency indefinitely. At one point, 1,500 tests were conducted in only two weeks. In the tests we conducted last year, access control measures stopped 96 percent of our attempts to get aboard aircraft.

Data from the current effort, which was unannounced to industry, shows some improvement. We expect the level of performance to be maintcined. Where it is not, we will move quickly to require the airport or air carrier to post guards, or if necessary, to secure the aircraft or doors. That is an expensive measure but a necessSl""J one where other things have failed.

I assure you that we will continue to work with the IG on these important issues.

Mr. Chairman, we believe the safet,v and security of the traveling public, our own citizens, and those VIsiting the United States from abroad is worth the investment. that will need to be made by both Government and the private sector. We are moving in the right direction. Let us work together to get the job done and achieve our common goal, safe and secure air transportation worldwide.

This concludes my statement. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Flynn. Most people who have looked at this and who have talked to me

about it and articles I have read say that the real weak link in our security system are all these problems revolving around the screener situation. I think most people seem to agree that we need to try to get the pay increased and the training increased and professionalize this workforce and try to do something to cut down on the high turnover rate.

Without going into specifics, we did hear in the closed session some very alarming statistics. Dr. Dillingham, in his testimo11y, mentioned the boring monotonous type of work that is done.

The big question here is, as Dr. Dillingham said, if we increase the pay and increase the training and do all these things, professionalize the service and reduce the turnover rate, will it work. He said in his testimony, "maybe," and mentioned on&-1 got the impression one small study that was done comparing a European country, where the discovery rate for explosives or contraband was twice what it Is here.

Dr. Hartwick, can either you or Ms. Stefani say anything in addition to that or anything stronger than "maybe"?

Dr. HARTWICK. Yes. J believe the European experience, particularly in the UK, in my opinion, proves that you can take care of thi• problem with operator in&ttention. I believe we can improve enhanced security by at least a factor of two with this training.

Mr. DUNCAN. WeU.~.., a little over a year ago I went to the British Aviation Authority. Tney asked me to come over at their expense to Great Britain. They wanted to show me their airports and a lot of things that they were doing. They did introduce me to the head

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of their security, and I had a briefing about how their force over there is highly professional, highly paid. They check every fifth passenger, and they do a lot of things over there.

I know what they are doing, and then sometimes the Israelis are held out.

Admiral Flynn, have we learned something from these other countries in regard to Recurity? And do you feel that they are doing a much better job than we are? Are we doing better than most other countries? What is the situation there?

Admiral FLYNN. Despite the level of threat that I mentioned, we have managed to keep a secure system, as have they, as have the nations that you have mentioned.

The measures and the requirements for screening are appropriate to the circumstances of each country, h<It, with regard to retention and the correlation between that and performance, I think it is obvious that we hav-:l to keep people on the job longer.

At a 400 percent turnover rate, it is difficult to train peorle to sharpen pencils, and it requires considerably more to get a! that can be gotten from the technologies that we are now deploying.

Mr. DUNCAN. What type of background check are these screeners given? We have been told that criminal records, even convictions for such things as robbery and drug convictions, would not disqualify people from positions as screeners. Is that true, or have we been given misinformation about that?

Admiral FLYNN. You have not. The list of crimes is in the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act. The FAA added another disqualifying crime to it, arson. There are other crimes that might be discovered as a result of a fingerprint check, and when brought to attention of the airport, the airport may deny employment because of them, but these on the list are absolutely disqualifying. A single conviction for any one of these crimes is disqualifying. It does not mean that other crimes-it leaves to the airport authority some judgment as to whether to deny employment, taking into account such things as the age at which the crime was committed and the circumstances in which it was committed.

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Stefani? Ms. STEFANI. The screener has the same requirements for back

ground investigations. If you have unescorted access to the secured area of an airport, the law requires the background investigation. But when we looked at the list of 25 disqualifying crimes, they were, in our opinion, insufficient for a number of reasons.

They were primarily aimed at significant crimes associated with activities such as hijacking or terrorists, but if you looked at the recent case at the large airport where the individuals were smuggling contraband, including weapons, onto aircraft, and then looked at the crimes that they had committed, only one of the 15 employees that had a criminal records had a disqualifying crime. And that occurred after he was hired.

In our opinion, it is the concept of being able to put something on an aircraft in return for money that should now be considered as a possible disqualifying crime for the FAA and the airports to be concerned about. In addition, there is a need to do a recurrent criminal check, not just when an employee is hired.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, what about things like drug convictions?

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Ms. STEFANI. It is not on th" list. Posse•sion of a controlled substance, bur;:lary, assault with a dea<lly weapon, those are not on the list of disqualifying crimes.

Mr. DUNCAN. So convictions for ali of those things would not necessarily disqualify somebody?

Ms. STEFANI. Correct. Mr. DUNCAN. All right. That seeme. that we need a little work in

that area, I think, as well. Mr. Lipinski has asked that I go to Mr. DeFazio first. Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Stefani, does the FAA have the authority to expand that list

or does Congress have to do that? Ms. STEFANI. While the 24 crime;3 were listed in the law, FAA

had, by law, the right to add to that. Mr. DEFAZIO. So if you have thee;e concerns and we have these

concerns and any common-sense person would have these concerns, why have not they issued an emergency rule to expand the crimes listed?

Ms. STEFANI. I do not know, Mr. DeFazio. Mr. DEFAZIO. Because the labor pool is too short? So we have to

have burglars and armed robbers working as Gecurity screeners? Admiral FLYNN. There was a very thorough examination of that,

both by the Congress when the Congress adopted the list of crimes in 1990, and by the FAA in bringing in the access control rules. I repeat that there are crimes that are disqualifying. That does not mean that the people who have committed the crimes that you mentioned have to be given access to the airport. It is a matter of discretion. It is a matter of--

Mr. DEFAZIO. Excuse me, Admiral. I was talking to Ms. Stefani. Ms. Stefani was responding to the chairman. She was talking about disqualification for screeners. Is it true or is it not? Is it an absolute that a screening company cannot hire someone who has been convicted of the crimes you mentioned-armed robbery and whatever the other was?

Ms. STEFANI. If it is one of the 25 disqualifying crimes, which does not include assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, of possession of a controlled substance-

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. So--Ms. STEFANI.-you could get hired. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Ms. STEFANI. Part of what we were seeing was the process-Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. I do not have a lot of time here. So the

screening companies can hire these people and we are not doing anything about it. I would suggest that the committee-not putting words in the chairman's mouth-is very concerned at the slow pace at which the FAA is proceeding, particularly given the incidents in Miami where you had these people working there who had committed these sorts of crimes.

But, if I could go on, what is the total cost of providing the security screening at the airports, and what percentage of the airlines' operating cost is it? The airlines have to pay for that; is that correct? The airlines pay for the cost of the screening, the screeners and that?

Ms. STEFANI. Correct.

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Mr. DEFAZio. How much do we spend? Ms. STEFANI. I do not know. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. If the appropriate agency could provide that

number, I would posit that it is probably a very small percentage of the airlines' operating costs. I mean, would anybody disagree with that?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Mr. DeFazio, I think you are right, and I think what goes to that point is that oftentimes the airline will take the lowest bidder for contract screening companies.

What we have been told is that we have not had an incident; therefore, the concern about upping the pay of screeners and improving that aspect of it is certainiy way clown below getting the passengers on the plane and having revenue miles.

Mr. DEFAZIO. I wish I could be here for the ATA. I will try and get back, Mr. Chairman, to ask about that. I have to go to a special task force on oil.

That causes me great. concern. For a number of years, I have proposed-and I believe a few other members of this committee--have supported that either the airports or the Federal Government perhaps should supervise this function, perhaps even have Government employees and then submit a bill to the airlines.

I have got to tell you, when I am flying I doubt that I could ever find one person on the plane who would say, "Gee, I would be really upset if I had to pay 112 of 1 percent more for my ticket to know that the person who screened me was not convicted of various felonies and at high risk of allowing something to happen on this plane." I mean, it is just extraordinary to me that we would let this system continue in this way. Low bidder? Low bidder, with standards that are woefully inadequate on the part of the FAA?

And then, of course, the GAO did recommend in 1987-now, I realize things move slowly and we have only had three Administrations since then, it has only been 13 years, but they did recommend that we have these credentialling standards for the screening companies which might disqualifY some of these low bidders who are hiring felons.

Now, of course we would not want to have that, because that might drive up the price to almost what the burger flippers are getting paid at the airport.

This is just extraordinary to me. I mean, by the grace of God we have got good equipment. Most people are honest. We are doing our best. But why have a weak link in a very sophisticated system? Why have a weak link? I just cannot believe that we allow this to continue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. DeFazio. Mr. Isakson? Mr. ISAKSON. Dr. Dillingham, I really just. have one question. I

apologize. I had to go out, but I heard the earlier testimony in the closed meeting. Tllis question relates-! believe it was your testimony with regard to Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and some of the other countries who had-1 believe it says-twice as good a rate of identification or something like that; is that correct?

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Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. What I said was that the little evidence that we have, which was one test that FAA ran with a European country, the European country was twice as good as we were in terms of identifying the objects.

Mr. ISAKSON. There is a reference in that statement to techniques they use that we do not. Having gone through airports in Asia, Korea in particular, they do random pat-downs and random searches of that nature. Has the FAA concluded in any way that that is a contributor to their higher identification or better performance in terms of recovering items?

Admiral FLYNN. With regard to some items, yes. Pat-down and, indeed, undressing of people does result in revelation of metal things that requires a lot of explanation with regard to prostheses, to articles of clothing that are reinforced with metal, and the like. But that does get to the question-we believe, that the metal detectors, hand wands, are the more appropriate way of doing it in the United States in most instances.

Mr. ISAKSON. Does the United States screener have the authority, if they have some reasonable evidence or some suspicion, to pat anybody down now?

Admiral FLYNN. Yes, they do. Mr. ISAKSON. OK. Thank you, sir. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Cummings? Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to go back for just a moment to the whole question

of who the screeners are. I am just wondering why it is that when I look at what happens in my city of Baltimore, where, for a number of the offenses that are not on the list, you cannot become a fire fighter, you cannot do a lot of things. I am just wondering, when I think about a situation where we have perhaps someone who has been convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous substance-and I certainly have my sympathies with regard to people who may find themselves in difficulty that straighten their lives out, but I am concerned, when we come to something such as a high standard of trying to make sure that when people get on a plane they know that they are going to be safe, and when you consider the catastrophes that could occur and the impact that it could have, not only on individuals that might be harmed in such an incident, but also with regard to the aviation community, it just concerns me.

I have to go back to something that my colleague spoke about a little bit earlier. I am just wondering if we need-we, as a Congress, need or you all or anybody up there think that we need to be doing more with rege.rd to expanding that list.

I also am interested to know, if we do random drug tests and things of that nature. Admiral Flynn?

Admiral FLYNN. Drug testing is required for screeners, as part of their employment check.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How often? Is that random? Admiral FLYNN. No, it is not. It is done 100 percent in the pre

employment check. There is not a requirement for follow-up random testing on a periodic basis.

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Mr. CUMMINGS. It just seems to me-why is that? I mean, has that-! know that in situations like, for example, people who operate trains, areas where security is significant and life could possibly be at risk, a lot of times you find-and I am not a big advocate of drug testing.

Admiral FLYNN. Yes. Mr. CUMMINGS. But, at the same time, I think that-say, for ex

ample, you hire someone who has some type of history of drug usage, and it just seems kind of logical to me that you might want to check from time to time.

Admiral FLYNN. I think the difference is between the danger that is involved when someone is operating a locomotive or flying an aircraft, on the one h;;.nd: an the other hand, the question of attentiveness. There are other ways to observe the performance of people when they are doing the screening job. It :s a question of balance.

With regard to c;:imes, again I say there are certain crimes that, even if they are not necessarily felonies-there can also be misdemeanor convictions on that list provided in the 1990 Act, and with the addition of arson, and not necessarily involving a felony conviction, are absolutely <lisqualifying. There are other crimes that the operators and the screening col!lpanies may deny employment to people on that basis.

We think that a single misdemeanor drug possession at some time, at some age, may well have been committeci by someone who has later gotten his or her life squared away. So I think it is a question of judgment.

We wouid welcome Congress giving some attention to this, and if, in the judgment of Congress, that list of crimes should be added to as absolutely disqualifying, misdemeanor or felony conviction, then we would certainly act with it, welcome it.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ms. Stefani, did you have something? Ms. STEFANI. I just wanted to point out with regard to the drug

testing, the Der,artment, as a whole, has made a distinction between safety-re ated jobs, such as the train operator or pilot, and requiring drugtesting for them, versus security-sensitive jobs. The requirements for security-sensitive jobs are different.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. Ms. STEFANI. They are less strict. Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you think the list needs to be expanded? Ms. STEFANI. I think that the list should be expanded. There is

also a question of how long the disqualification would be. Some of the crimes would be more significant. Right now it is a :en-year disqualification for airport access.

I think there is a need for more of a nationwide approach to this. If you allow each airport to do its own thing, you might considerable differences. There :oore differences in how local jurisdictions will classify a crime. It is a complex issue.

I do not want to leave the impression that FAA is not concerned with it. They are. And the people we have talked to have been very concerned about how to address the background investigation area and strengthen the polky.

Mr. CUMMINGS. My last question, Mr. Chairman, are there certain crimes that when you look at it, when you look at the list, that

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you say just jump out at you and just say, "Well, maybe we ought to have theoe three or four things that are not on there"? In other words, are there things that sort of are just glaringly missing?

Ms. STEFANI. What we conclude from the incident at the major airpo1 t where people were smuggling things onto aircraft, was a need to expand the list to deal with crimes involving a willingness to take money for putting something on a plane that should not go on a plane."

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you. Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Thune? Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Panel, I appreciate your being here today. Just as a matter of personal observation as somebody who flies

a lot, it seems to me that many days you could walk through totally undetected. Enforcement is, from all appearances, very lax at some airports.

I am curious to know if it does vary. Are there more egregious violators? Where are the more-oerious problems? Does it vary from airport to airport?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. That is a part of our work. The answer that we can provide now is yes, it does vary by airport. It also varies by region. For specifics on that, we would be willing to meet with you in private session to talk about that.

Mr. THUNE. I assume it varies by companies, too, the screening companies? Is that fair?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. It varies by company. It varies by threat object. It varies all over the board.

Mr. THUNE. Dr. Hartwick's study points out that a passenger who fits a profile as a potential terrorist could avoid examination of a bag by an explosive detection system by checking the bag at the gate rather than at the ticket counter. Is that something we should be concerned about?

Admiral FLY"NN. It is something to which we give concern. There is a security measure for bags that are checked at the gate and go into the hold of the aircraft, and, of course, the carry-on items as well as that one that is put into the hold have been screened. The question is the efficacy of the screening, and we need to improve that.

There are security measures. If a bag is taken from you at the gate and goes into the hold of the aircraft, it is subject to the same security measures at it would have if you had checked the bag.

Mr. THUNE. I am told that there may be an effort to change the provision that requires-my understanding is, at least right now, foreign airlines abide by the same regulations in terms of security-is that a fair assessment-and that there may be an effort to change that?

Admiral FLYNN. Yes. There is a provision in the 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act that requires the Administrator to make the air carriers flying to the United States from airports served by the U.S. carriers, implement the identical program, the identical security measures as are used by the U.S. carriers.

We have issued a notice of proposed rule-making on that. There are very considerable and cogent objections to that rule. There are

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real problems with the Intent of that and implementing it in a way that would not harm security.

Mr. THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any other questions.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Oberstar, I guess we can start. Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. I have three areas that I want to proceed in

questions, and I can deal with one of them now and in subsequent rounds of questioning come back to the others.

The first is the background investigations. Before I proceed, I would ask unanimous consent to include in the record my written statement.

Mr. DUNCAN. Without objection, so ordered. Mr. OBERSTAR. First, I would also congratulate Admiral Flynn on

his splendid service in this very difficult position. As he contemplates, as is rumored, retirement, I would wish him all good things in retirement, including good health and peace of mind, which certainly will come from knowing that you have done a superb job.

I recall, when Admiral Flynn was engaged by Administrator Hinson, Administrator Hinson went to the White House with this message: "If we are going to be involved in terrorist action against U.S. carriers, I want in charge of security a person who has faced a gun and knows what its consequences are," and that was Admiral Flynn.

You have kept that injunction in mind all these years. I served on the PanAro 103 Commission-in fact, wrote the legis

lation that created it at the request of President Bush-and participated in the writing of all the recommendations. As you can see, my copy of it is well earmarked.

On this subject, we recommended in the Commission a ten-year background check. The law that we wrote provided a ten-year background check, but the rule requires only check of the five most recent years, and there is a very good reason for that.

The airlines engaged former FBI Director William Webster to lobby the Congress on their behalf against a ten-year background check. He came to my office arguing that it would be costly, would not produce benefits commensurate with ·those costs, and the same result could be achieved by investigation of a 12-month employment gap.

But, as Ms. Stefani's teatimony demonstrates, FBI criminal checks are required only under very C9rtain circumstances, and that 61 percent of all State and Federal felony convictions resulted in probation or jail sentence of six months, and for violent felon:;,s, 43 percent in jail time of just seven months. '!'hat does not leave a 12-month employment gap. It certainly leaves one that is explainable.

I think that the wisdom of the law, the wisdom of th~ Commission's recommendation after a year of deliberation on this subject, ought to be restored and reinstated.

I am not opposed to people with felony convictions reentering the workforce. They need to be. Our society needs to be recreated. My daughter works in a job program where 90 percent of the appli-

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cants are ex-offenders. She places them in gainful employment, but not in security positions.

I would like your reaction, Admiral Flynn. Admiral FLYNN. Of course. Thank you very much, Congressman

Oberstar, for your very kind remarks. We think the real way to do this is to go to 100 percent finger

print checks for the screeners and for those who ought to be given unescorted access to the ramps, and consequently have the ability to get to and at the aircraft.

There are now technological improvements in the ability of the FBI to do those checks and to transmit them, and that is the way we ought to go.

Mr. DUNCAN. Admiral Flynn, I apologize to you, but we have just got a little over five minutes left for the vote, so we will have to break at this point, and we will start back in and let you complete your answe:T when we come back.

Thank you very much. We will be in brief recess. [Break.] Mr. LoBIONDO [ASSUMING CHAIR!. The committee will reconvene,

and we will tum to Mr. Lipinski for his questions. Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. I was interested, Dr. Dillingham, when you were talking about

airports in Europe that you checked out. Could you tell me what those five airports were?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. We went to Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France, and we did the major airports in each of those countries.

Mr. LIPINSKI. That is four countries. I thought you said five. Dr. DILLINGHAM. Canada. I am sorry. Mr. LIPINSKI. Canada? Dr. DILLINGHAM. Canada. Yes, sir. Mr. LIPINSKI. I would not think Canada was a foreign country,

either. You did not go to Germany at all? Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir. Mr. LIPINSKI. Are you familiar at all with what they do in Ger.

many? Dr. DILLINGHAM. No, sir. Mr. LIPINSKI. That is unfortunate, because someone told me that

the government is much more involved in Germany in handling the screeners. I was hoping that you were either there or you knew something about that.

Admiral? Admiral FLYNN. Yes, you are right. It is a Federal system, of

course, and it is done at the basis of the lander, which is the province of the airport, and there is a very considerable role of that government and the authority in the training of screeners.

I have seen the screening training being conducted at Frankfort, and it is well done.

Mr. LIPINSKI. And you say it is done by what, in essence, would be a State government here?

Admiral FLYNN. State government. I would need to refresh my memory of the relationship between the airport authority and the State government.

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Mr. LIPINSKI. And someone, in testifying, or maybe Mr. Oberstar or someone else-1 think it was somebo<fy that was testifying-is it In Germany where screeners actually can be tracked into other employment within the aviation Industry with an airline or something?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I mentioned that, Mr. Lipinski, and that is what we learned in England-that, in fact, they try and matriculate the people all the way through with a career path up through the airlines.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Does anybody know if they do anything like that in Gt.rmany? Of course, if the state is running it, more than likely there would not be any career path into employment in the rest of the aviation industry.

Admiral FLYNN. But there may be one into other aspects of secu-rity, Congressman Lipinski.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentleman will yield? Mr. LIPINSKI. I certainly will. Mr. OBERSTAR. During the Presidential Commission inquiry in

Germany, we were given a very thorough review of airport practices on scteeners, and one of the factors that was very important in retention and improvement of skills was the opportunity within the structure of screeners to move to other positions, and regularly screeners are moved after three to four months to another job within the airport, and after three or four months to another position, and ultimately rotated back to security screening to keep them fresh, alert, to give them other opportunities, and also for C?.reer advancement within the German government. But their screeners, of course, are provided by the government--the Federal Government and the lander and the airport authority.

Mr. LIPINSKI. I will yield to you again to answer this question. You said by the "lender," which I assume is the state government, and the Federal Government. What role does the Federal Government play there?

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Federal Government, in effect, hires the screeners, although there are some arrangements for the state to do that, as well, and pays them more than twice as much as screeners were paid in the United States.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Me the standards for the screeners throughout Germany the same? And is that set by the Federal law?

Mr. OBERSTAR. It is set by Federal law, but the difference between our system and theirs is that their bac~und checks are not as intrusive or as thorough as even our skimpy five· year background check becau:re of law and the German Constitution, which recoiled from any such intrusiveness in the background of individuals reflecting on and emanating from the Nazi Era.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. Reclaiming my time, it was mentioned by someone on the panel

and confirmed by the chairman that it seemed like the United Kingdom did an extremely goodJ'ob with screeners there, and he said that he could not understan why. He is not here, so I cannot ask him why he understood that, but someone else on the panel mentioned thst also, and I was wondering, what is it that the United Kingdom does that is so good? I think that might have been Dr. Hartwick?

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Dr. HARTWICK. Yes. Our committee received a briefing about the U nlted Kingdom system and the way trainers are retained and trainer effectiveness, and, in that briefing we recently received, we were told that the airport is responsible for the hiring and retention of trainers.

There are opportunities for advancement and similar types of incentives that Improves the screener performance. That is what we were told.

Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. Getting back then, just for a moment, in the United Kingdom they are hired by the airport?

Dr. HARTWICK. That is my understanding. Yes. Mr. LIPINSKI. OK. And in Germany they are hired by a combina

tion of the state government and the Federal Government. Dr. Dillingham, what about the other three countries that you

were in? Did the carriers hire them, or who does the hiring of the screeners there?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I believe it is either the airport or the government, as opposed to the canier, sir.

Admiral FLYNN. In Canada I believe it i&-perhaps we ought to check, but I believe in Canada it is an airline reAponsibility,

Mr. LIPINSKI. In Canada it is an airline responsibility? I asked the question in the closed session pertaining to who does the hiring of the screeners, and I thought I received an answer that it was, to a great degree, done around the rest of the world the same way it was done here, by the carriers, but in the course of this question and answer period it seems to me like, you know, the system we have here where the carriers do the hiring of the screening company and the screening company does the hiring of the screeners, other than Canada, it seems like no one else we have talked about so far handles it that way.

Admiral, could you give me a clear breakdown on what most of the rest of the world does in regards to hiring screeners?

Admiral FLYNN. Most of the countries that I know of use security companies, and they are genarally contracted by the airport.

Mr. LIPINSKI. By the airport? Admiral FLYNN. By the airport rather than by the air carriers.

The airport doing the central screening rather than the air carriers is the norm, m my experience.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral, do you have any idea why in our country we do it with the carrier hiring the screening company?

Admiral FLYNN. It stems, of course, from the responsibility of the air carrier for the safety and security of that aircraft and, consequently, everything that goes into it.

There is also a question of the-one difference between the United States and these other nations is the scale of things. Some of the countries that Dr. Dillingham mentioned have one major airport and then some rather tiny ones. The UK is not that case, but that is essentially the case in Belgium and the Netherlands.

The scale in the United States is much larger, with more than 40 percent of the world's civil aviation and enplanements here in the United States.

Were we to look for commonality, well, we regulate 450 airports for security. There are 155 air carriers that we regulate for security. So, from the point of view of commonality, we are dealing with

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fewer entitles when we deal with air carriers than we would with airports, with 450 of them.

The sc&!e of things here makes things quite different. Mr. LIPINSKI. And I suppose, also, the fact that, in many cases,

in other countries around the world, certainly up until recently, many of the carriers were owned by the government, Itself. I am sure that that had an Influence on how the situation develoJlf:'d.

Admiral FLYNN. Very much so. And there Is an enormous movement worldwide to privatize both the air carriers and the airports, so the airports are becoming publicly-owned companies rather than government entities. That is happening worldwide.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Does anyone on the panel have any knowledge in regards to where the airports that were responsible for oocurity, where they have been privatized, have they continued to have the responsibility for secunty, or has that been switched to carriers or to a government entity, whether a state government or a Federal Government?

Dr. DILLINGHAM. I do not have any information on that. Mr. LIPINSKI. Admiral? Admiral FLYNN. I could not generalize. I think, generally, it has

stayed that where the responsibility was with the governmentowned airport, it has stayed with the privately-organized and-funded airport, I think. But that heat's checking.

Mr. LIPINSKI. Dr. Dillingham, you were talking about ~hecking some airports in this country in regards to the turnover of screenera, the percentage of turnover.

Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. Mr. LIPINSKI. Did you check O'Hare Airport? Dr. DILLINGHAM. Yes, sir. Mr. LIPINSKI. Can you give me what the percentage of turnover

is there? Dr. DILLINGHAM. They are on the very highest end. They are

closer to the 400 than the 100. Mr. LIPINSKI. Is that 400 percent? Dr. DILLINGHAM. They are closer to that end than the 100 per

cent turnover. Mr. LIPINSKI. That is comforting to know that when I fly in and

out of there twice a week. That will be all for right now. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair-

man. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Mr. Oberstar, I think you want to continue. Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Picking up where we left otT, Admiral Flynn, you were saying

that you believe 100 percent fingeryrint check would be sufficient to delve into the background of applicants.

Admiral FLYNN. I trunk it is a much more efficient system than trying to distinguish between a seven-month gap in employment as an unexplained gap, as a trigger for the fingerprint check.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You were not suggesting, though, that that be a substitute for a five-year background check?

Admiral FI.YNN. Well, I thirik that the--Mr. OBERSTAR. I mean for a ten-year. Excuse me. Admiral FLYNN. Yes, I think so, because recall that those--

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Mr. OBERSTAR. Fingerprint would pick up going back as far as ten years?

Admiral FLYNN. Yes. And then the question that I think we in FAA have given very serious thought to and that we wouid welcome the Congress' thought is: what crimes, committed how long ago, ought to be the disqualifiers, absolute disqualifiers for screenera and for those people who should be given unescorted access to the secured areas of airports?

In the later category, I might point out, we are talking about 600,000 people at those 450 airports that we regulate for security. In the case of screencrs, it is something in the order of 18,000 people.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The 1990 aviation security law set forth a number of crimes by reference to a title of the U.S. code, with further provision that that listing was not intended to be exclusive, because it had a further provision that the FAA could, by regulation, include other crirnes not covered in this list. Has the FAA moved to expand tl:.e list of crimes for which an applicant would be excluded?

Admiral FLYNN. The crimes that would mandatorily prohibit the employment had only one added to them, arson. I think what we are giving very serious consideration to is the addition of others.

I quite agree with the point about propensity to commit crimes. If it is the crime cf putting drugs aboard aircraft, from the security point of view, the terrible danger there is that someone thinks he is putting drugs aboard the aircraft and it turns out to be a bomb.

So we need to look at these indirect indicators not of terrorism, but of criminals who are used as the vehicle for getting bombs aboard aircraft.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, there is much more we could explore on this, but that is sufficient for the moment.

In consid.,ring security, we ask ourselves-! was going to ask the panel, but I will not do that-who or what is the object of the terrorist. We asked that question on the PanAm 103 Commission. The answer is the United States, the flag of the United States. Who are the victims? U.S. citizens. Who provides the protection? Not the U.S. Government, but the private sector.

Mr. Lipinski asked the question, "How did that come to be?" He did not get a very complete answer. It came to be just by accident. It came to be just because that was the way it started in 1968 and 1969. Up until that time, we were having, on average, a skyjacking every two weeks. When the metal detectors went into effect in U.S. airports, it dropped off and we have not had one since.

Who is to pay for it? Well, there is a big debate, and it just fell upon the airlines to pay for it. They hired security providers to do it.

I think we should begin a policy debate about this 30-year-old practice, and the issue would be resolved that security should be provided by a government agency, whether Federal, State, or airport authority, and that it should be paid for by a security tax.

The French have a security tax. It does not go into a trust fund. It goes into the general revenues. But it is a tax calculated to recover the cost of providing the security.

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France uses its national gendanneria and other countries do the same. They use their national police force or their military. I do not want to put ourselves on the same combat footing that lerael does for El A!, but I think that we ought~to revisit the question of who should provide St'JCUl'ity and how shall it be paid for.

My final area of inquiry would be the so-called "Hatch Act." There will be 230 million Americans traveling overseas by air in the next decade. We have to be mindful that security measures and equipment must keep ahead of the state of art of the terrorists.

In the commissiOn's consideration of this issue, we recormnended-page 39 of the report-that the United States must strike a strong negotiating postui'e with host governments, with the goal of assuring that U.S. passengers, whether they fly on U.S. or foreifll airlines, are afforded the same level of protection. Specifically, bilaterals must address the issues of testing foreign security procedures, access to the entire airport, adequate background checks of security employees, and must assure the United States a role in oversight of those procedures.

The CASLO program is supposed to do the latter. Bilaterals have rarely addressed the matter of security measures. Background checks are not uniform around the world. They do not measure up to ours.

But the Hatch Amendment, which was designed to address what was considered by air carriers to be a deficiency in the 1990 act, requires that language, the same level of protection.

We did not include that lan!p!age in 1990 in the conference report because the Bush Admirustration argued that including the same level of/.rotection language was a competitive and not a security issue an , at the instance of our foreign trading ~partners, vigorously opposed "same" language, the word "same." The Hatch Act revisits the issue :md uses the word "identical."

Now, that has created some problems with our foreign trading partners, but the reason we put that language in in the first place is that standing at a counter of a U.S. carrier in Frankfort, commission members observed across the aisle a sign at the check-in desk at Lufthansa, a sign that says, "Tired of waiting in line? Fly us. The lines are short."

That is a competitive practice. They are making security a matter of advertising, attractiveness to fly another carrier.

Carriers should not use security measures to gaiu a competitive edge, but the Hatch Act language does not leave enough flexibility to determine what is appropriate for individual foreign carriers that are serving the United States.

When you further consider that, under code-sharing arrangements, U.S. passengers who leave our country on an America carrier, arrive at a foreign destination, continue their journey on a foreign carrier with the U.S. carrier's code implanted on it, shculd have the understanding and the confidence that securit£ is provided just as in the United States, and it may not be. I may be better, it may be worse. In certain parts of the world it is.

So how do we address this issue, Admiral? Admiral FLYNN. I think by following the wisdom of the 1990 Act

and calling for the-the acljective realJr does not matter very much, whether it is "similar" or "identical levels of protection, which

7/-

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takes into accoiU't the level of threat to the aircraft. And, as you mentioned earlier, the threat is to the flag. It Is to that aircraft as being a United States entity.

There are nations, and, consequently, national aircraft that are less threatened than ours, provided that they are meeting the standards of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, that are providing the Identical level of protection. There Is less threat involved.

Under the 1990 Act, we have negotiated bilaterally with many nations a requirement for them to adopt more-stringent measures than are required by the convention. Many of them had already don-a so because they were fully aware. For example, El A1 does not need me or anyone from the United States to l~t them know about their degree of threat and the measures that they need to deal with it. But, again, that brings a point. Would we have El Al, who has stronger measures, in order to fly to the United States, weaken them to make them identical to the United States?

The problem of identical measures causes us, as we go through the rule, to see that there are very considerable elemente in it, as we would try to implement it throu;!h regulation, that would work to lessen security rather than to strengthen it.

So what was put in place in the 1990 Act, is how we ought to proceed, augmented by not just the CASLOs, who do a tremendous job of integrating airport and airline security and working with the security elements of other nations, but our very strong assessment program where we assess the security of hundreds of overseas airports and inspect, in conformance with the law, the application of the security programs by foreign-flag carriers, not just in the United States but at the airports from which they fly to the United States.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for your very thoughtful answer.

Just one fmal question. Why is it going to take until May, 2001, to issue final regulations lor certification of screeners? What is taking so long with that?

Admiral FLYNN. Well, at the present moment we are on the comment period on the notice of proposed rule-making. That comment period ends on May 4th, and then the process of going to a final rule will take about another year to analyze and do the economic analysis and move it through the rule-making process.

More fundamentally, why has it taken all this time to get whet-e we are now? We needed to be assured that TIP-equipped X-ray would work as a way of measuring performance. We based our projections of how long this would take on what the manufacturers were saying-and they were probably saying it in good faith-of this equipment. Well, when we tested it in order to establish the reliability of this, we saw we needed to change some things.

Mr. OBERSTAR. It is not your problem and it is not your fau!t. It is the way the regulations are set up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar. Mr. Lipinski? Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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Adrnlrai Flynn, in your testimony you talked about In 1996 the reauthorization act asked the FAA to conduct a study and report back to Congress on the possibility of transferring certain air carrier security responsibilities either to airport operators or to the Federal Government. You said that the report was submitted in December, 1998. Who was the report submitted to?

Admiral FLYNN. Well, to the--Mr. LIPINSKI. Has the report been made public? That is a better

question. Admiral FLYNN. Yes. Mr. LIPINSKI. It has? Admiral FLYNN. The report is public, and it was submitted to the

committees that requested it. Mr. LIPINSKI. Do you recall who the committees were that re-

quested it? Admiral FLYNN. I will check on it and get back to you. Mr. LIPINSKI. OK I would like to get a copy of the report. Admiral FLYNN. Certainly. We will provide it to you. Mr. LIPINSKI. No sooner asked than done. That is fantastic. Chairman Duncan never got that material to me that fast. Oh,

this was Schaffer that passed it along to you? [Laughter.] Mr. LIPINSKI. Just trying to make up for not putting my carry

on luggage in the AIR-21 bill. OK. That is an inside joke. I continually harass Mr. Schaffer, who does an outstanding job on the subcommittee.

Talking about that study, can you-at least talking about this study, really, and since I had these questions I will ask them to you. It will save me the trouble of reading that part.

What were some of the elements reviewed in this study? Admiral FLYNN. Some of the elements were the views that had

been expressed in Ccmgressional hearings and analysis of how security is done in other countries and how that relates to the situation in the United States, including an analysis of the scope of what is involved in managing pre-board screening, and teking into account the views and the arguments that have been expressed by the regulated entities and the potentially-regulated entities.

Mr. LIPINSKI. And I will not ask the other question, since I have a copy of the report here. I just want to say, in conclusion, that, Admiral, I am going to be very sorry to see you go because I think you are one of the most competent, professional individuals I have met in the seventeen years and three or four months I have spent in Washir.gton, D.C., and I thank you for all the work you have done on behalf of the United States, not only in your present capacity but in yGur previous capacity.

I certainly hope to see you between now and the time you alleg-edly are going to retire.

And I want to thank the entire panel for their participation, also. Mr. LoBJONOO. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. We would like to thank the entire panel for your participation

this morning, and we will now move to the second panel. I want to thank our second panel for being here. We will start

off with Mr. Cherif Rizkalla.

66·647 200 I · 2

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TESTIMONY OF CHER.IF RIZKALLA, PRESIDENT &. CHIEF EXEC· UTIVE OFFICER, HEIMANN SYSTEMS; THOMAS M. VAIDEN, PRESIDEN'l', AVIATION DMSION, INTERNATIONAL TOTAL SERVICES, INC.; BILL GILCIDUST, PRE-BOARD SECURITY SCREENER, INTERNATIONAL TOTAL SERVICES, INC.; AND WCHARD J. DOUBRAVA, MANAGING DIRECTOR OF SECU· RITY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION Mr. RIZKALLA. Good afternoon, Mr. Chainnan, members of the

subcommittee. My name is Cherif Rizkalla, president and chief executive officer

of Heimann Systems Corporation. Let me give you a brief history of Heimann, just to situate the people here.

Heimann is a company specializmg in X-ray security equipment, with a total of more than 17,000 X-ray units deployed worldwide, 2,000 of which are right here in the United States.

Heimann has five different offices in the world. Our U.S. headquarters are in New Jersey. We also have a manufacturing plant in Tennessee.

I would like to offer a little bit the manufacturer's perspective on what was discussed here today.

First, the X-rays started in the early 1970's, when there were a series of hijacks. Heimann was one of the inventors of such X-ray applications for security.

The equipment that is now deployed 30 years later is, of course, very different from what was back then, and is now pretty efficient in deterring or avoiding the carrying of weapons 0:1 aircraft.

The challenge now is very different than it was 30 years ago. Today, the main challenge is still the interdiction of weapons and dangerous devices, but not only as carry-on, but also in the hold area.

We must, as manufacturers, manage to maintain an efficient, non-intrusive level of passenger screening at the airport security without completely dest!oying the throughput that is of great concern to the air carriers.

The industry has succeeded fairly well in developing X-ray and metal detector technology to almost eliminate the carriage of weap· ons and dangerous de,•ices aboard aircraft. Although there have been some recent ev .. nts, they are, in most cases, not related to the technology, itself, but rather to other circumstances surrounding that.

The passengers' bags are very clearly imaged, but it remains up to the operator to detennine whether there is a threat in this bag or not. I think we touched on this subject a lot today.

Heima:m has, indeed, worked very hard and found that the oper· ator human factors is extremely important. The operator remains right now one of the weak links in the security process at U.S. air· porta.

In conjunction with the University of Heidelberg, Heimann Systems spent approximately two years completely redesigning the human interface of its systems, focusing on two major campo· nents-the reduction of operator fatigue, and offering the clearest image to the operator on the first pass. This is extremely important, as operators do not have much time to make a decision whether there is a threat or not.

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Second, Heimann has developed a software option called "high TIP." Born as a functional requirement by the FAA human factors group, this new feature allows the automatic and random projection of threat images onto otherwise innocent passenger carry-on.

This new powerful option results in an increase of awareness and can also be used tbr on-site operator training and testing. Currently 450 of these units will be deployed, I believe, in the months to come in the U.S. airports.

Many other country governments have expressed an interest in this new technology, including Canada and some European countries.

Heimann has also developed a new tool allowing the automatic detection of organic materials that match the atomic profile of an explosive. This feature, called "X-ACT," is useful in assisting opera· tors in identifying explosive devices more effectively and less intrusively.

The National Safe Skies Alliance located in Knoxville, Tennessee, has recently completed testing of the X-ACT technology and has reported the results to the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City. It is our hope that the National Safe Skies Alii· ance will be soon testing other beneficial features such as a new ergonomics feature and image enhancement options.

One of the challenges for manufacturers is the difficulty to actually have operational test results for the options that we develop, and this is a good opportunity to have them.

Another primary challenge to aviation security is the secure transport of checked baggage and cargo. This challenge is somewhat different from the inspection of carry-on bags for several reasons. First, the focus is only on explosive devices, since weapons such as knives and guns do not constitute a threat once checked. Second, the inspection of bulky, more densely-packed bags is very challenging, from an X-ray technology standpoint. And, third, a passenger's bag cannot be opened and physically searched without the passenger being present.

Initially, there were the positive bag match and also CAPPS that were discussed earlier today.

In Europe, passenger profiling is widespread, and is mostly conducted by security personnel in an interview form. In Canada, I believe there is a new method that is going to be used called "positive profiling," where, instead of profiling the passengers that should be inspected, they are actually profiling the ones that should not, and all others are inspected further.

Whether in the United States or other parts of the world, technology is usually empl.,yed once a passenger is profiled. Although technology is advancing very rapidly, it has not yet reached a level allowing 100 percent detection of explosives with no false alarms. Compromises are, therefore, needed.

Europe and the United States have compromised in different ways. A high explosive detection rate with the current available technology is the greatest obstacle to baggage throughput. In Europe, most countries are employing high-speed systems integrated in baggage handling systems that have a lower detective rate than the certified system here in the United States.

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In the U.S., the FAA has opted for a lower throughput system meeting certification criteria in terms of detection and false alarm rates. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. One allows integration into existing baggage conveyor systems, thus allowing automatic feeding of the system, allowing insl'!ction of a higher number of bags, but without meeting FAA certification criteria.

Actually, m Europe they try to inspect 100 percent of bags, so all checked bags in a lot of European c.ountries are inspected, but the detection rate is lower than required in the United States.

The FAA has actually deployed 20 of these systems in the United States, two of them from Heimann. San Francisco and John F. Kennedy Airports I believe have respectively deployed eight and four of these systems.

The principle of operetion of both types of systems, certified and noncertified, is the same. The technology automatically detects explosives with various detection •ates, depending on the type of explosives and false alarm rates, bearing between 20 all the way up to 30 percent.

The difficulty is, once again, an operator has to look at the image created by a bag that is considered to contain a threat, and he has to decide whether this bag is cleared or whether this hag is, indeed, a real threat. This remains one of the weakest points.

Heimann Systems has addressed this weakness and developed a new detraction-based system called "HDX," allowing to replace the level two operator by technology. This I think is the way of the future. Technology has to replace tbe operator. I think the detection of weapons by an operator is a lot easier than the detection of explosives. Explosives could be in any shape, any form. They are extremely difficult to pick up, so replacing that by technology is actually the way of the future.

This HDX system is a defraction-based system that gives a clear fingerprint of the actual explosive material with a very, very high detection rate and almost no false alarms.

Of course, there are some problems with this in the senoe that throughput is also very low, and we could only analyze with this type of system threat areas, and an entire bag cannot be inspected with this.

Right now, this system is installed at the Nurenberg Airport in Germany and level one and level two explosive detection system is unmanned. Less than 5 percent of bags are transferred to a level three, where we still have an operator there that is going to either open the bag or clear the threat with other technologies.

The HDX can currently only be interfaced with Heimann Systems level one systems, but the FAA has expressed interest in looking at t.he system at the technical center.

While there is uo silver bullet, the industry, and particularly Heimann Systems, continues its quest for high detection, high throughput, and low false alarm system to meet the needs of securing the traveling public.

Thank you. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank _you. Now we will go to Mr. Thomas Vaiden. Mr. VAIDEN. Good afternoon.

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Mr. LoBIONDO. Good afternoon. Mr. VAIDEN. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chalnnan, and the

committee for the opportunity to come and address what we perceive to be a terribly Important issue.

Having said that, and in the essence of time, I think what I will do is attempt to speak with some specificity to the issues assuciated with the certification procesH that more directly aftect the security companies that provide that service within the United Statesmore especially, the one that I represent.

One of the issues that is of considerable concern to us is what appears to be a loss of control of the training process. Because we frequently operate in environments short of necessary personnel, we need to be extremely flexible and aggressive in our scheduling of training classes and the testing sessions that follow. If we need to delay such training and testing until an airline employee is present to oversee these sessions, it will only create additiOnal employee shortages and delays at the check points.

Critical delays in training due to the background in drug testing results is another area of concern to us. In the current environment, ITS •imultaneously obta;ns documentation to verify background histories and drug testing results while the students are in the initial stages of the required training. The requirement that states that no training could be initiated until all background histories and drug testing results are completed will inevitably lead to enonnous delays in the training process.

This element of the proposed certification process works in direct opposition against our often-critical need to fill open lines at the check point. Additionally, it positions us in an at-risk environment as it relates to our ability to fulfill FAA mandates as they currently stand.

The partner versus secondary recipient role is an area that has come under some close scrutiny by us, only out of a lack of clarity. In a shared environment, or an environment of accountability, we need to be considered, at the very least, an equal partner in the certification process. This means that companies like mine, ITS, need to receive material directly from the FAA, versus being the recipient of selected or interpreted material from the airlines.

It makes sense that, as the certificate holder, we would need to receive all infonnation directly from the FAA to avoid any miscommunication or the acddental oversight in information transmission.

Along these same lines, it is also necessary that companies like ITS should be able to gain approval directly from the FAA for any modifications to our training programs that we feel would be appropriate, rather than having to obtain preliminary approval from the airlines.

Again, as the cert' ficate holder, we may, in many cases, be able to more quickly recognize what is needed in tenns of implementation as it relates to full compliance with all FAA mandates.

The program as we understand it also involves computer-based training. While we certainly understand the requirements of the English language capability, a more-flexible approach is necessary to allow for a positive instructor-student environment. The approach offered by the NPRM certification guidelines suggests thilt

32

CBT would be applicable in all circumstances. Many screeners have little to no exparience with personal computers, including senior citizens, who make up a fairly large percentage of our workforce.

A point-and-click environment could be difficult for many emplc.yees who otherwise, under different testing circumstances, understand the material, content, and the testing of same.

Additionally, many screeners may not have a level of fluency in the English hmguage necessary to process the standard CBT format.

As we read through the many pages-in excess of 240-that constitute the proposal for certification, we found some language there relative to disabilities and civil rights that we feel is worthy of the committee's attention.

WP., ITS, need additioneJ clarification on the specific requirements for the Americans with Disabilities Act and civil rights categories so that we can wholly fulfill the comprehensive requirements of the FAA, the DOT, and the ADA.

On a going-forward basis, we would need these Federal Government entities to work closely together to ensure that all training requirements are easily understood by providers that accomplish the following: guarantee that training programs can be designed, implemented, and integrated with relative speed and, more importantly, serve the f-.1ll intent of the law.

The certification guidelines, as offered in the document, are also moderately confusing to us because they do not clearly address the decertification process, and, in the rare times that that may occur, the recertification process that may follow.

In that ITS serves approximately 108 airports in the United States, comprising approximately 80 percent of the commercial facilities, we are very concerned about the certification process in terms of site-specific enforcement.

Additionally, in the rare instances when decertification might prove applicable, the recertification process must be thoroughly and clearly explained.

Given these concerns, we ask the following: We request that the FAA provide detailed information relative to

their internal hierarchy to facilitate the intent of the certification process and clearly define the areas of responsibility. In our view, this could be accomplished via organization charts defining areas of direct responsibility.

In view of the time constraints associated with the training requirements outlined in the certificati'>n guidelines, we request that current employees be grandfathered into their positions, rather than retrained under tlie formal certification guidelines applicable to new employees.

If retention of a service provider's certificate is predicated on overall TIP performance, definitive guidelines must be established prior to the implementation of the program. This will preclude an overly-subjectivn approach to acceptable performance.

Finally, our last concern-and I think of equal importance with all other points raised-is the financial burden that comes with the program.

Given the precedent that has been set with regard to cost for trace detection equipment and in view of the $22 to $24 million

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33

previously stated as applicable to the certification proces&-that being 1'IP-<me question welgiu; heavily: is it l'!!!ISOnable to expect that Federal funding can be anticipated with regard to future costs associated with equipment upgrades?

In the absence of Federal assistance, it is felt that the fmanclal implications of the certification process may well deal a debilitating blow to aviation security as we know it today.

Thank you, sir. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you. Now we will tum to Mr. Bill Gilchrist. Mr. GILCHRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

subcommittee. My position as a pre-board screener is a very interesting yet

challenging job. I am gratified by working with the public and I am proud of my work I do at ITS. There are, however, many challenges to the job that make daily tasks and the overall operation less effective than I know that it could be.

In the last three years I have worked for ITS, staffing has been like a revolving door when it .:ames to pre-board screeners.

Retention is a problem across all the age groups that we have employed. This puts a strain on all aspects of our operation because we constantly have new, inexperienced individuals doing the job.

Training takes time to be a good screener. You must have experience. To be at our best, we must work as a team, and that is quite difficult when we have so many screeners that come and go on the check points.

This is not an easy job. The training is in-depth and the hours are long. Many people we attract do not have customer service backgrounds, which is a big part of our jobs; yet, the importance of customer service is often overlooked in the hiring process. Those who are motivated by serving the public will not enjoy this job.

The turnover problem also puts additional pressure on our supervisors and their staff, because they must constantly monitor on-thejob trainees and the many less-experienced certified screeners.

Our training requirements allow for both classroom training as well as OJT, which is on-the-job training. In my opinion, the real and most valuable training in this job takes place on the check point during the OJT period and continues as the screener builds experience and becomes confident in his or her judgment. Judgment is a big thing in our job. This is the reason that long-term employment on this particular job is important. Learning and applying skills over time allows the screener to build expertise on the check point.

I have found the following procedures in putting my training to work has led me to some success. I was chosen by the FAA as Screener of the Year after deterring what could have been a disastrous situation. While on a temporary assignment in Kalamazoo, Michigan, last year, we had three passengers come through the check point in a great hurry to catch their flight. I sensed that something was not quite .right with this situation, so I ordered a bag search-in other words, we took and went through their luggage-revealing that they had sewn several unauthorized items

34

into their coats, Including stun guns, disassembled revolver&, and police-issue mace, the large canisters.

At that point, we followed procedure, though, and turned the situation over to the law enforcement and to the FBI.

What made me question the situation was that I was not comfortable with the fact that these individuals were trying to rush me in doing my job. I do the job and do it right. Ultimately, it was my training that helped me use my judgment in that snap moment. It made me put the brakes on and say, "Hey, let's do this by the book. Let's do it right."

We have training and procedures in place for this type of incider.t. This is what we are there for.

We have made some improvements. One improvement we have made is we have added the EDT, the explosive detection system; however, if you talk to different screeners across the country, the key piece of equipment we use are the X-ray machines. I would say, on an average, at the airports I have worked, most of the machines are at least 20 years old. They are black-and-white monitors, hard to see. In fact, we had an incident just a week ago on a gate I was working at Kansas City where the monitor started flickering. We replaced the monitor with another one--same thing. So we worked a 12-hour shift with this monitor that was completely hard to see.

At the same time on that day, there were many families going on vacation y,ith their kids. I thought to myself, "Are we really doing the best we can for the public in this type of situaticn?"

Thank you. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Gilchrist. Now we will tum to Mr. Richard Doubrava. Mr. DOUBRAVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Richarr' )oubrava, managing director of security for the Air

Transport Association of America. ATA represents the major commercial passenger and cargo air carriers in the United States, and, on behalf of our 28 members, I would like to thank you and the other members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to participate in this hearing today.

For purposes of brevity, I will summarize my statement. The industry takes its responsibility for the safety and security

of our passengers as our number one priority. The industry and the Federal Government have worked closely to im!)rove the aviation security baseline. We believe the progress made over the past four years has resulted in a more secure environment for the traveling public, but we still confront significant challenges.

Today's hearing is most timely, given the evolution of the sec'Urity check point with relation to equipment, training, and human performance issues, as well as the pending process by the FAA to certify security screening companies.

All of these efforts were guided by the commitment of both industry and government to improve check point performance and screener proficiency in an ever-changing security environment.

During this same time, security threats have grown dramatically. Additional security measures are required to oo conducted as the result of valid domestic and international security concerns, and

• 1

1

i

I

35

the weapona of threat have become more sophisticated and more difficult to detect.

The challengea of the check point have multiplied. In SepteJJlber, 1996, ATA presented a far-reaching aecurity plan to the White Houoe Commlaslon on Aviation Safety and Becurity~ committing our membero to a number of goals, Including calling ror the e~ ilshment of a Federal certification process for aviation aecurity screening companies to enhance check point aecurity.

The industry has strongly supported these efforts throughout the legislative and regulatory process underway to achieve this Important goal.

Clearly, once the regulation is In place, it will result In a major change in the current screening check point environment. The FAA ocreener certification process will make aecurity screening companies a full partner In the check point process.

We have concerns and questrona in a number of areas with the FAA's propooed rule. Theoe Include issues of clearly defining accountability, as well as the regulatory structure which will be devloed to support this process.

It is import&nt that FAA not create a bureaucratic structure which becomes over-burdensome to the Industry.

ATA is also concerned about the ultimate regulatog and economic impact the propooed certification process may infhct on some aspects of the oecurity screening industry, possibly affecting their continued ability to compete in a new regulatory environment.

A number of companies providing such oervices are local business entities in small airport environments and unfamiliar with the Federal regulatory process. They may find it difficult or economically unfeasible to continue such oervices.

We believe that the continued development and deployment of enhanced screening technology will further contribute to this improvement.

We were pleased when the FAA agreed to support the industry recommendation to implement a multi-year plan to replace current check point X-ray technology with new state-of-the-art equipment, which includes threat image projection and operator assist functions.

A number of security equipment vendors are participating in the FAA oelection process, and they have worked clooely with FAA and the industry in developing technology that improves detection and also addresses the carriers' reliability and cu'tomer oervice needs.

With initial deployment oet to begin at our Nation's largest airports within the next oeveral years, this replacement plan needs to be fully funded on a multi-year plan by the FAA and continue until all airports obtain such updated equipment.

The industry continues to be keenly interested in further exploring the human factors and associated responoes at play at the check point operation. This includes the vital role of motivating employees in the stressful environment of an airport check point site.

We also look forward to obtaining reporting data and trend information from current FAA studies underway at a number of check point screening locations to attempt to determine relationships between screener ability, performance, compensation, and workplace environment. This is an area where there is little in definitive data

36

and information and should serve as a preliminary review for issues which need further study and consideration.

The ATA carriers are grateful for the continued support of this committee in providing ongoing commitment and funding to achieve the goals which industry and the government jointly developed in 1996. We remain dedicated to working in partnership with the Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration in all areas of aviation security.

Thank you again for providing us the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I would be pleased to respond to any questions the committee might have.

Mr. LoBIONDO. Thalli< you very much. We have heard testimony concerning the ability and the motiva

tion of screeners, the turnover rate, and there is, obviously, experiences to be shared from other countries that have a better situation than ours.

What are the single biggest factors? I mean, is it just money, alone, that is going to keep people from turning over? Why do certain countries not seem to have this problem anywhere near the degree that we do? What are suggestions for us? Anyone?

Mr. DOUBRAVA. Why do not I start off the conversation here. Mr. LoBIONDO. OK. Mr. DOUBRAVA. I think you have put your finger on a number of

issues. It is an interlocking complexity that industry, the Government, and the FAA have struggled with for over ten years.

Let me refer specifically to the check point operation. When the check point operation was first developed, it was done in the context of hijackings, and at that time what were seeking to identify items viewed as pretty simple to detect-guns, hand grenades, pipe bombs, and dynamite. It initially started as a Federal responsibility.

Then, shortly thereafter, it was the view of the Federal Government, now almost 30 years ago, that the air carriers knew more about the operational nature of what went on at a departure time than did the Government. This is how the transition began whereby the security oversight of the check point migrated to the air carriers.

As a result of that development, the industry has gone through a prolonged series of challenges as the security baseline has had to be raised which brings us to where we are at today.

I think that one of the most important aspects of your hearing today is to jointly determine where we are at and where we need to go.

With regard to international security, as Admiral Flynn and your other witnesses indicated today, it is a much different environment. In most of the other nations the security operations at the check point at the airports are the responsibility of the airport authorities acting as agents of the local or Federal Government. So, in the context of how we approach screening security responsibilities in the United States, it is far different than what the other countries do.

Clearly, there are benefits and negatives in these differing approaches.

37

One of the m~or reiUIOna why the Industry hes strongly supported the screener certification process Is that we operate In an environment that requires ,... · approaches to old systems.

As we move through these processes we clearly know that they need to change-they need to continue to evolve.

This certainly applies to the state of security screening, as well. Admiral Flynn li8a made the comment numerous times, that lays

out the proper scope of what has been jointly accomplished since the Presidential Commission in 1996. That this Ia the big11est deployment of security equipment done on a national bas1s since World War II. This clearly has resulted in a host of challenges. The technology, while improving quickly, still dOGs not meet the operational need• of the industry. The evolution of the check point is going to take a cooperative effort by both Industry and the Government, to make certain that we set the security baseline where It needs to be.

I think It is Important to delineate that, while there are shortcomings In the current checkpoint environment, one only needs to look at the commitment of screeners like Mr. Gilchrist and the other 8,000 screeners out there-to see the good job that they do for us every day. Their record has been very, very good. But. we are in an environment where that baseline needs to improve and ne<>ds to change, and the industry is certeinly committed to that process.

Mr. VAIDEN. May I add one point to that? If I understood your question correctly, the direct answer is no.

It is not driven by money alone. The idea of a security check point, whe:-e these men and women

spend considerable hours each day, is not far flung from a militarytype environment.

These people are a family unto themselves. They work long hours. In order for them to be effective, there has to be some kind of esprit de corps. There has to be some pride taken in the work that they do.

Unfortunately, to try to assemble a workforce where that exists so that it can translate Into the product that we all hope for, we have to find a way to not only use salary but to have a total package for them.

Mr. Gilchrist Is marrl<>d. There are children involved. This gets into Insurance pro!lfams. When we are within the airport community, we compete directly with the airlines. The airlines have entrylevel positions. Their pay Is, obviously, better than what we are able to provide to our people. They have insurance programs. They have free flight benefits.

So it is only natural to assume that when we are able to draw a truly good employee, that he becomes attractive to othero in the airport that are looking for people to come into their entry level positions.

So we are almost in a catch-22 situation. When we are fortunate enough to find good people, we are unfortunate all too often In the loss of those people much too early In their security career.

Mr. LoBIONDO. I appreciate what you are saying, but what I am trying to understand is, last August I had an opportunity to receive a briefing from Israeli security and El AI, and I am disappointed

38

that the panelist from El AI was ill and not able to be here today, but they specifically discussed how the folks in these positions were motivated and there was low turnover and there was a high esprit de corps, and there were a whole lot of things that seemed to make for them being able to have a continuum that we just do not seem to have.

If it is not money that is the motivator, the prime motivator, where are we falling short? Why are we falling short? And why is El AI able to do this'?

Mr. DOUBRAVA. If I could take a minute to respond to that, the Israeli security program is applied by the state of Israel in Israel. El Al, of course, has their own security program, as do our own air carriers. But the screening and operational security of the Israeli airports are applied by the military in Israel. This is an approach that clearly would be difficult to apply elsewhere.

When you put that in the much larger context of the U.S. environment-! think Admiral Flynn pointed out the sheer numbers of U.S. airports and the passengers that we carried-our Federal Government currently does not assume the same oversight role in the u.s.

Mr. LoBIONDO. Well, then, that leads to my next question. Should the Federal Government take that over? Should that be a role of the Federal Government because of what is at stake?

Mr. DOUBRAVA. Let me tip off the discussion here, because I am sure all of our witnesses have discussion points on that.

Mr. LoBIONDO. Go ahead. Mr. DoUBRAvA. This has been the challenge for all of us since

aviation security basically developed in the early 1970's. In two Presidential Commissions, there has been strong discussion about what the Federal Government's security obligations ought to be. Clearly, our industry believes that the proposed Federal certification of the screening companies provides a renewed opportunity to foster discussions on the appropriate obligations of the U.S. Government.

We are having those discussions internally with our own member carriers as well.

If you pick a pure world as who should pay for aviation security and who should apply it-all things being equal-the government has a clear obligation and this has been a major issue since airport screening began.

Clearly, these discussions were undertaken in major ways during both Presidential Commissions on Security. Sadly we have never been able to come to a consensus on this issue.

The airline industry believes this is a very, very appropriate time to renew those discussions, not only between the air carriers and the Federal Government, but between all parties, including the public, as to what that role should be.

Then there :. the difficult issue of how these needs are going to be funded and how it will be applied. I think that this is really the ultimate challenge.

I can tell you that I am not prepared to sit here, as a representative of the ATA, and commit to you that we have a consistent view on these issues among our membership. Howaver, I will make <he commitment to you that we are willing to sit down with this com-

39

mittee and with the other Members of Congress and the other Congressional committees with appropriate oversight to begin these discussions. W6 think this is a vital matter that needs to be resolved.

In the February, 1999, aviation security report entitled, "FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities in Funding for Airport Security and Certified Screening Companies," the GAO lays out that issue by saying in this 1997 estimate that the security needs of the largest airports over a ten-year period would come to over $3 billion in those figures. This amount would only cover the largest and busiest U.S. airports. Further, the report says, "Funding methods for aviation security improvements is an issue that the Congress and the FAA will be faced with for a number of years."

We have yet to begin to resolve those issues. Mr. LoBIONDO. I have some more questions, but, Mr. DeFazio, I

would like to give you an opportunity. Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We heard from the previous panel-I believe it was the GAO who

said that inevitably the lowest bidders get the contracts, so I assume it is a fairly competitive environment in that.

Mr. Vaiden, how many facilities do you have? I am sorry I missed your testimony. I was in another meeting.

Mr. V AlDEN. Approximately 108 airports are served. Mr. DEFAZIO. So you have 108 under your company? Mr. VAIDEN. Yes. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK And that was a competitive bidding process? Mr. V AlDEN. That is correct. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK Did you ever get a contract where you were

not the low bidder? Mr. VAIDEN. Yes, we did. Mr. DEFAZIO. How many, do you think? What percentage? How

common is that? Mr. V AlDEN. It is extremely uncommon. Mr. DEFAZIO. Extremely uncommon. OK. Mr. Gilchrist, if you do not mind-but when you put yourself on

a panel you expose yourself to all sorts of things-what are you paid?

1\fr. GILCHRIST. In KCI at Kansas City we get $7.20 an hour, sir. Mr. DEFAZIO. That is $7.20? Mr. GILCHRIST. Yes, sir. Mr. DEFAZIO. And what kind of benefits do you get? Mr. GILCHRIST. They have some insurance benefits available, you

know. Mr. DEFAZIO. Do you have to pay for it, or do they pay for it?

You have to pay for it? Mr. GILCHRIST. Yes, sir. Mr. DEFAZIO. It is sort of as a group that you can buy into? Mr. GILCHRIST. Right. Group insurance. Right. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Mr. GILCHRIST. This is a key-<:an I just answer one thing here? Mr. DEFAZIO. Sure. Mr. GILCHRIST. You know, we have heard this morning about 100

percent turnover, 400 percent turnover. I see this, even at KCI.

40

We, in some cases, are pe.id a little higher than a lot of the airports. A lot of them are still at min.imum wage.

So it comes down to this industry being run by people yet. Technology is there to replace us, probably, in a certain extent, but still the people on the gate working with the public are the key to this.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. GILCHRIST. And if you talk to any screener at any a.irport,

they will say one thing: we are underpaid for what is expected of us.

This is the whole key to this, from my standpoint and from my fellow screeners.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. GILCHRIST. I cannot say how the funding should go, but we

need to have you gentlemen look at this situation from the point of the people on the gate dealing with the public. Where can we get the funding for improved wages?

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. GILCHRIST. I think, sir, if we do that you are going to see

career-minded people getting into this field, because it is an interesting job.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. GILCHRIST. I have done it three years now, and I have en

joyed it. I think it is a challenge. I like to go to work. But if I did not have some extra income, I could not work at KCI.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Extra income? You mean you--Mr. GILCHRIST. I have got some commercial property that supple-

ments my--Mr. DEFAZIO. So you are subsidizing your job? Mr. GILCHRIST. Right. And you have to. Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. GILCHRIST. I could not afiord to work at KCI. But that is my

point. If we could look at the situation right here for the screeners, it would be much appreciated if down the road something could be done.

Thank you. Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Well, then, that brings us, I think, to the ATA. You know, can you answer the question I asked of the last panel?

What are the total costs for the airlines for the security screen.ing and what percentage of revenues is that and/or operating costs?

Mr. DOUBRAVA. Mr. DeFazio, I do not have that information because it is preferential, but what I can do is to make an effort to obtain that information and provide it to you. This information is not normally provided to the trade association. I will be glad to request it.

Mr. DEFAZIO. I think it would certainly be helpful to the committee in these deliberations.

If we are talking about less than 1 percent, or 1/2 percent, or whatever, which Mr. Oberstar was positing to me in just an estimate, I do not know. I mean, I really do not know.

I have had this conversation on many topics with the ATA. I find very few people in the a.ir sitting next to me on the plane who are not willing to pay an extra $0.50 or $1 to know that they are going to get there alive, whether it is because we have the proper standards for flight duty time, whether we are doing the most rigorous

41

things we can do in tenns of maintenance and preventive maintenance, or whether we are preventing someone from getting on that plane whose intent is to destroy that plane and the people on it, or to minimal?' hijack it.

You know, really think it is a very difficult job, Mr. Gilchrist, because I do 32 round trips a year east to west and spend a lot of time going through airports, and I am always saying to people who are getting really uptight-and I have to even sort of crank down on myself sometimel!-in those lines, and say, "Look, you know, this is for our benefit." They could unwrap a present. I say I have had to do that, too, becauee you have just got to know if you have got something that looks weird on the X-ray you should not wrap it before you go to the airport.

Mr. GILCHRIST. That is right. Mr. DEFAZIO. There are ways I think we could better educate the

public to what this means, but l think intuitively most of them know. And to crank down to Mr. Vaiden or anybody else that the message to him is, "I had better not be raising my wages much here or give a good ber.efits package because I am not going to get that bid," I mean, that is not a good message.

Mr. GILCHRIST. It is a problem. Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. VAIDEN. You should know, if I may, sir, that our company-

and I do believe it applies to all-the way we bid these jobs is wholly driven by the wage, and we make that infonnation available to the airline. We show them what the wages is, we show them what the line items are, and then we add-in our case, we would like to run a target of about 6 percent, and that is the number that we provide to the airlines.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes. Mr. VAIDEN. So it is certainly a very cost-effective program for

the carriers. Mr. DEFAZIO. Right. But we have these other problems, or poten·

tial problems. I mean, I would just observe here on Capitol Hill there are a tre

mendous number of unifonned officers on the Hill providing a deterrent effect and a real screening. Essentially, in a lot of ways, it is an even less-sophisticated version of the job that Mr. Gilchrist is perfonning, in tenns of the equipment they are provided to screen, and yet, of course, their starting salaries are about, I would guess, probably more than twice or three times what these folks are starting at.

We somehow have got to deal with this issue. I really believe we do.

Thank you. Mr. VAIDEN. We agree. Mr. LoBIONDO. Thank you. Mr. Rizkalla, does the threat image library on the screening

equipment reflect up-to-date threats and state-of-the-art explosives?

Mr. RIZKALLA. I am sorry? Could you repeat that? Mr. LoBIONDO. The threat image library on the screening equip

ment, does that reflect the up-to-date threats or the state-of-the-art explosives?

41

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Mr. RIZKALLA. Right now, as it stands, the TIP library is, indeed, pretty close to reflecting what is out there. I think it is a little bit too small right now. We need to add images, and we are waiting for the FAA to provide us with a list of new threats and new images that we need to take. Right now it is a little bit small.

Mr. LoBIONDO. How would the equipment that you are working with compare to, say, what would be used by the Israelis?

Mr. RIZKALLA. That is a very good question. I am not aware of everything that the Israelis use right now, but right now the technologies available are worldwide pretty much the same. There is nothing, I believe, that the Israelis are currently using that is not available here in the United States and used by European and American government.

Mr. LoBIONDO. OK. In your testimony, you mentioned that at the Federal Aviation Administration facility in New Jersey they were looking into the next generation of scanner. Is that what you were saying? I did not quite get that.

Mr. RIZKALLA. No. What I said is that they expressed interest in it. It is a project that we are going to be sending one of our new defraction systems to the FAA for evaluation. B•1t it is not done yet. No. They are not looking at it currently.

We have had thr<>e people from the technical center that traveled to Nurnberg and have witnessed the operation of this new technology.

Mr. LoBIONDO. So the process would be to convince them that this is worth their looking into, and then they take it to their facility and determine if, in fact, they would want to pr~ceed with it?

Mr. RIZKALLA. Yes, that is correct. I believe the first step is already taken with the technical people in Atlantic City. They found this technology to be certainly worth looking at, and they have expressed interest in having us send it to New Jersey.

Mr. LoBIONDO. OK. Well, I want to thank you very much for providing the testimony.

Obviously, this is an area we are going to pay a lot more attention to and appreciate your taking the time to be here.

The meeting stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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-----_____ U=ol""ted"':"'St&'"'tea"'-"Ge""o!!!enl"'""A<"'<o""ao"'tln"'I'-"Otn"""<e'-------

GAO Testimony

For a.1- 011 DeUVI!r'J' Esperted •t 10:00 a.Jn. EST 'llnar.d.-.)', Marrh 16, 2000

GAO/f-RCEI)..()().l25

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

AVIATION SECURITY

Slow Progress in Addressing LongStanding Screener Pelformance Problems

Statement or Gftald L. Dlllingham, As&odate ~r. Transportation Issues, Reso\li"Ce!l, Community, 111d Economic Development Division

44

Mr. Chainnan and Members of the Subcommittee:

Wf.' appreciate the opport\lftity lObe t.ere today to discuss aviation security, iP particular

airport screeners. Securing an air "-;-::;tSportat!on system the size of this nation's-with

hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and tens of thousands of fiighiS daily carrying

mUUCOJts of passengers and pieces of baggage-is a difficult task. Events over the past

decade have shown that the threat of terrorism against the United States is an ever

present danger. Aviation is an attractive target fo,: terrorists, and because the air

transportation system is critical to tl1e nation's well-being, protecting it is an important

national issuP. A single lapse in aviation security can r~ult in hundrf'ds of deaths,

destruction of equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars. and have immeasurable

negative impacts on the economy and the public's confidence in air travei.

A number or measures have been put in place by the Federal Aviation Admini.strnti..Jn

(FAA) and Ute aviation industry to provide the security needed for the aviation system;

among thl• most important ones are the passenger scret•ning checkpoints and the

SC'reem.•rs who operatt.> them. Concerns hav€' been rais<.>d for many years by GAO and

others aboul the effectiveness ofscrl'eners and the need to improve their perfomlanct".

Two Presidential comrnission~tabUshed after the bombing or Pan Am FUght 103 in

1988 and the then-unexplained cra..<~h of TWA Flight 800 in 1996-as well as numerous

GAO and Department of 1ransportation inspector General reports have [email protected]

problems with scr('(>ning and the need for improvements. This !.ituation still exists, Mr.

Chairman, and as J will discuss, thefe are long-standing problems that atrect screener

performancf'.

We havl' been conducting a review that examines airport screeners' performance at the

request of the Senate Conunittee on Commerce, Scienc~. and Ttansportation and its

Suhconunittee on Aviation, which agreed to our appearance before this Subcommittee

today. <hr testimony discusses the causes of screener perfonnance vroblems in

dctt'cting threat objects, the status or efforts being made by FAA to address thest.' caUSt'S,

46

and the screening practk-es in five other countries as compared with the United States.

In summary:

• Two important cauaee for the screeners' performance problems are the rapid turnover among ftel'eeners and human factors iMues involved ln their work. 1~unover

exceeds 100 percent a ytw at most large airports and at one al.rpon. has topped 400

percent. leaving few screeners with much experience at the checkpoint& The main

reason for this tumo::er js the low wages and few beneflta acreenera receive. The

human factors i&sues-tied to the repetitive, monotonous, yet streasful tasks that

require co!l..<U.nt vtgl.lance-have not been addressed sufficiently. These are both

long-standing causes of performance problems that have been noted by FAA for over

20years.

• FAA ha.<> S('Veral intemlak-d b.itiatives undl•rway to address the C4U5C5 of the

screener.J' performance probleim, including establishing a screening company

certification program and a system for the automated monitoring of screenen'

pcrfomtaJlC'l', and has established goals for improving performance. However, these

lnibathrt'S have not been tuUy implemented and~ behind scht'dule. For example,

tlot> screening company certification program is 2 yean5 behind IK'hedule and the first

certifications are not expected until2002. Partially 38 a result of these delays, FAA

has IJI.IIen short in meeting Its scr~ner Improvement goala.

• Other countries we vislted-Belgtwn, Canada. France, the Netherlands, and the

United Kingdom--conduct ~lr checkpoint screening differently. Their checkpoint

operations include rouUne •pat-downs" of aome paseenger.s; they J'eQ\Iire screeners to

have mol'l" extensive qualiftcattons and to meet higher t.."'aining standards; they pay

screeners more and provide benefits; and they place the responsibility for IICI'ftning

with airports or the govenunent instead of with air carriers. The ftve countries we

visited had signiftcantly lower screener turnover and may have better screener

perfonnance-one countJy's screenent detected over twice as many test objects in a

joinl srrt't'ner testing program it conducted with the FAA.

2

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It must be recognized that the screeners' perfonnance problems do not ran solely on

FAA's shouldPnl. The responsibiUty for certain conditions, such as rapid screener

turnover, more appropriately rests with the air carriers and screening companies.

Ne\·ertheless, Mr. Chalnnan, FAA does have JeadeJ'Bhjp responsibWty for aviation

security, and It will be up to the agency to provide the guidance and motivation for

improving the performance of screener.t ln our vkw, the actions FAA currently has

underway are strong steps ln the right direction and, when fully implemented, may

provide the needed improvemenL However, it is crtticaJ that the Congress maintain

vigilant oversight of FAA's efforts to ensure tJl8t It implements these actions ln a timely

manner and achieves lUI performance improvement goals. If performance improvements

a.-e not ach.ieved, FAA and the Congress may need to cort.rddf'r other altematives--8Uch

as somr of thf' pmcticC'S beinR used by other countries-to improvt" the screeners'

~rformancl'.

lk•fon• I discus..."l these i!ISU£'5 in !Uf'alPr dt>tall, I will hrif'ny provide some background on

srrN•nlnJt chPCkpoints and the long-MtandinR conc€'ms <tOOut the screeners' perfonnann•.

Background

Scn-enln!{ checkpoints anc! the screeners who operatt' them are a key line or defen.~

a!{alnst the mtroduction or a dangerou." object into the aviation S}'!'ltem. Over 2 million

passt'n(teB and their baggage must. be checked each day for weapons, explosives, or

other dangerous articles that could pose a threat to the safety nf an aircraft and those

aboard It The FAA Md air carrier.~ share tlds responsibility. FAA prescribes 5CT'eelling

regulations and establishes basic standards for screent'rn, equjpment, and procedures to

be U5ed. It monitors the performance nr thf" 8C'reenef!l by periodically testing their ability

to detect potentially dangerous object£ "Arried by FAA special agents posing as

passengers. The air carrief!l are responsible for screening passengers and their baggage

before they are pennitted into the sect1rt' areas or an airport or onto an aircraft. Air

1

47

carriers can use their own employees r.o conduct screening activities, but for the most

pwt air carriers hire security companies to do the screening.

Screeners use metal detectors, X-ray machines, and physical bag searches to identify

dangerous objects. However, because eqWpment at checkpoints does not automatically

detect threats, the efTectiveness of the screening depends heavily on the performance of

the screeners themselves. It can be a difftcu1t, stressful, yet monotonous job, requiring

sustained attention to the task or identifying faint indications or infrequently appearing

targets. The scref!ners detect thousands of dangerous objects each year. Over the last 6

years, screeners detected nearly 10,000 fireanns being carried through checkpoints.

Nevertheless, screeners do not identify all threat&-tnstances occur each year in which

weapons were discovered to have passed through a checkpoint

Screener Performance Probf~IUIJ Are Attributed to Jlapld Turnover and

Inattention to Hum&D Factors

There Is no single reason why screeners fail to identify dangerous objects. Two

conditions-rapid screener turnover and inadequate attention to human factors-are

beUeved to be important cauaes. The rapid turnover among screen<ers has been a long·

standing problem, having been singled out as a concern in FAA and GAO reports dating

back to at least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among screeners was about 100

percent a year at some alrportB, and today, the turnover is considerably higher.' From

May 1998 through Apri11999, sereener turnover averaged 126 percent at the nation's 19

largest airports, with five airports reporting turnover or 200 percent or more and one

reporting turnover or 416 percenL At one airport we visited, or the 993 screeners trained

at that airport over about a 1-year period, only 142, or 14 percent, we•e still employed at

the end or that year. Such rapid turnover can seriously atrect the level or experience

among screeners operating a checkpoint

1 A\'lii!()O Srcumy fAA Np;4t Prcbgtrd Pvgnzq Sgm!jnc Performance SlN!dltd& (GAO-RCED-87-182, July 24. 1987).

4

~-~·----------------------

48

Both FAA and the aviation tndustry attribute the rapid turnover to the low wages

screenern receive, the minima] benefits, and the daily stress of the job. Generally,

screenl:'rs get paid at or near the minimum wage, We found that some of the screening

companies at 14 of the natJon's 19Iargest airports paid screeners a starting salary of

$6.00 an hour or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the minimum

wagc-$5.15 an hour. It is common Cor the starting wages at airport fast-food

restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport

we visited, screeners wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage M

one of the airport's fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

human factors associated with screening-thOSE' work-related issues that are Influenced

by human capabilities and constraints-have also been noted by FAA as problems

affecting performancE for over 20 years. Screening duties require repetitive tasks as weU

as intense monitoring for the very rare event when a dangerous object might be

observed. Too little attention has been given to factors such as ( 1) individuals' aptitudes

for effectively perfonntng screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to

the screeners and how well th~y comprehend It, and (3) the monotony of the job and the

distractions that reduce the screeners' vigilance. As a result, screeners are being placed

on the job who do not have the necessacy abilities, do not have adequate knowledge to

{'ffectively perform the work, and who then fmd the duties tedious and unstimulating.

FAA l8 Making E1'f'orts to Addre88 Canses or Screeners• Perf'onnance Problems,

but Progre88 Has Been Slow

FAA has demonstrated that it is aware of the need to improve the screeners'

pcrfonnanre by condut'ting efforts intended to address the turnover and human factors

problems and establishing goals with which to measure the agency's success in

imprm.;ng screener performance. The efforts to address turnover and human factors

include establishing a threat image projection system to keep screeners alert and to

monitor their performance; a screening compru1~ {'ertificationprogram; and scre-ener

5

49

selection tests, computer-based training, and readiness tesi.IS. Table I summarize8 FAA

initiatives and the areas needing improvement they address.

Table 1: FAA's Initiative• to Improve Scr!!'en~ra· Performance

•• d lm r011~ment Beleri eaHJdatn EM~~nt -.creener E•llh eereeaer

wlth.creener ill tnfD•d aJt'!l kalert .. d IDenuepaJ,&Rd FAA Initiative _po_t4!DdaJ read_l__~ perfof11l 1110Ritored red11c-e tamover 111reat lnulge proJection X X lJYSLem

Ct'rtlficaUon or X X X !K'reenlnl!: companies Screener !ll.!lecUon k11t!J X X Computer-based X trnlnln R .. adlnes:~ test X

FAA's implementation of these efforts ha1i encountered substantial delays and is behind

schedule. I wou1d like to focus on two key efforts, the threat Image projection system

and the screening company certification program, and then discuss FAA progr-HS In

achieving its screener perfonnancc Improvement Roals.

The Thr£at lmaJU:: Pro!ection fur3ttm

FAA ls deploying an enhancement to the X-ray machines used at the checkpoints called

the threat image projection (TIP) 5)'Stem. As screenem routinely scan passenger.~' cany

on bags, TIP occasionally projects images or threat objects Uke guns and explosives on

the X-ray machines' screens. ~nem are expected to spot the threat objecta and

signaJ roc the bag5 to be manually searched. Once prompted, TIP indicale8 whether an

image iu or an actual object 1n a bag or was generated by the system and also records the

screencrs' responset~, providing a measure or lM'lc perfonnance while keeping them

more alerL By f'requentJy exposing screeners to what a variety or threat images look Uke

on screen, TIP will a1BC provide continuous orHhe-job lraining.

6

50

FAA Is behind schedule in deploying this system. It had planned to begin deploying 284

units to 19large airports in April 1998. But as a result. of hardware and software

problems, FM dropped Its plans to Install the units on existing X-ray machines

nationwide. lll.'!'.ead. beginning in mid-2000, it will begin purchasing and deploying 1,380

new X-ray machines already equipped with the TIP system. FAA expects to have the

system in place at the lw"gest airports by the end of flsca1 year 2001 and at all airports by

Ute end of flSCal 2003.

(Tnfortur.ately, the delays in the TIP syswm's deployment have impeded another key

mitiatlve to improve the screeners' performance: the certification of screening

companies.

Tiw Certification of Screenjng CcmpaniE.•s

!n response to a mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and a

n•c·ommendation from the 1997 White House CommiBBion on Aviation Safety and

&•curity, FAA is creating a program to certify the S'!curlty companies that staff the

Sl::reening checkpoints. The agency plans to establish perfonnance standards -an

action we recommended in 1987' -that the HCreening companJes will have to meet 1n

order to earn and rcta!n certification. It will also require that all screeners psss

automated readiness tests after training and L~t all air carriers have TIP units on the X

ray machines at their checkpoints so that screeners' perfonnance can be measured to

ensure FAA's standards are met. FAA believes that the need to meet certification

standards will give the security companies a greater incentive to retain their best

screencrs longer and so will indirectly reduce turnover by r.dstng the screeners' wages

and improving training. Most or the air carrier, screening company, and airport

representatives we contacted said they believe certification has the potential to improve

scrceners' performance.

1 GA!lfRC'ED-87-182, July 24. 19117

7

61

The agency plans to wte data from the TIP system to !1Wde 1t 1n setting Ito pcrfonnance

standants, but because the system wlll not be at all airports bt!fore the end of fiacal year

2003, the agency Is having to explore additional ways to set smndarda fo~AA plans to

issue the regulation et~tabllshlng the certificaUon program by May 2001, over 2 yean later

Ulan Its original deadline. Accoidlng to l''AA, It has needed more time to develop

performance standards and to develop and process a very complex regulation. The finst

certlficatJon of screening companies ls expected to take plru.:e In 2002.

fAA's Scn:ener lroproyeme:a Goal!f

As required by the Government Perfonnance and Results Act, FAA establlshed goals ln

1998 for improving screencrs' detection of test objects carried through metal detectors

and concealed in carry-on baggage. FAA views specific data relnUng to th25e goal!t, M

wPII as other lnfonnatlon relating to screener detection rates, to be too sensitive to

releast! publlcly. However,ltcan be said that, in part because of the delays in

lmpleml.'ntlng its scree ncr improvement lnitlllti11es, the agency did not meet Its fimt year

gfJals for Improving screener performance. FAA acknowledged that It dJd not meet its

Improvement goal for detecting threats ~ed through metal detectors, but It beUeved

that it had nearly met Its goal for improving detection or threaiB in carry..on baggage.

However, we fowtd Oaws 1.n FAA's methodology for computing dctecuo,l rates and that,

in fact, the goal was not met. We have dlscuooed our flndlng!J with FAA and, as result or

thiH and the delaysln Its truUaUves, the agency Is revising its goals.

We are encouraged that FAA Is currently developing an integrated checkpolntscreentng

management plan to better focus Its screener initi.atives and goals for improving

screenem' perfonnance. According to FM omctaJ.s, the plan, wldch Ls btiU ln draft form,

will (1) incorporate FAA's goals for improving screener perfonnance and detall how JtB

Initiatives relate to the acldevement of the goals; (2) identify and prloriUze checkpoint

and human factom problems that need to be refKJived; and (3) provide measures for

addressing the perfonnance problems, including related milestone and bud~et

Information. Moreover, the draft plan wiU consolidate the responslbWty for

8

0}

52

screening ched:point Improvements under a single program manager, who will oversee

and coordinate efforts at FAA headquarters, field ·.ocations, and the agency's TechrUcal

Center in Atlantic City, New Jerney. FAA expects that the plan will be completed in April

2000 and that it r" ';e continuously updated based on progress.

Screening Practices in Five Other Countries Differ from U.S. Practices

We visited five countries-Belgiwn, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United

Kingdom-viewed by FAA and industry as having effective screening operations to

identify screening practices that differ from those in the United States. These countries

also have significantly lower screener turnover than in the United States-the countries'

screener turnover rates were about 50 percent or lower. We found that some significant

differences exist in four areas; screening operations, screener qualifications, screener

pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility for screening.

First. screening operations in some countries are more stringent For example, Belgium,

the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom routinely touch or "pat down" passengers in

response to metal detector alarms. Additionally, all five countries allowed only ticketed

passengers through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to more

thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also had a greater police or military

presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for example, security forces--often

armed with automatic weapons-patrol at or near checkpoints. At Belgium's main

airport a constant police preSE'nce is maintained at one of two glass-enclosed rooms

dir(>ctly behind the chedcpoints.

Second, the screentrs' qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to the

United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France requires screeners to be

citizens of a European Union country. The NPtherlands, screeners do not have to be

citizens, but they must have been residents of the country for 5 years. Four of the

countries we visited had greater tiaining requirements for screeners. WhilE' FAA requires

that screeners in tltis country have 12 hours of classroom training, Belgium, Canada,

9

!'

63

France, and the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours of

training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an additional 16 to 24

hours for each activlty, such as x-ray machine operations, the screener will conducL

Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of th1.'Se countries.

While in the United States screeners receive wages that are at or sUghtly above minimum

wage, screeners in some countries receJve wages that are viewed as being at the •mtddle

income" level by screer.P.rs. In the Netherlands, for example, screeners receive at least

the equivalent of about $7.50 per hour. 1lds wage is about 30 percent higher than wages

at fast·food restaurants. In Belgium, screeners receive about $14 per hour. Not onJy ir.

pay higher, but the screeners in some countries receive some benefits, such as health

care or vacations-in large part because it is required wH!er the laws of these countries.

Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these countries is placed with the

ailport or with the government, not wilh the air carriers as it is in the United States. In

Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, tl\e responsibility for screening has been

placed witll the airports, which either hire screening companies to conduct the screening

operations or, as at some airports 1n the United Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the

checkpoints tl\emselves. In Ute Netherlands, the government is responsible for

passenger screening and hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations,

which are overseen by a Dutch police force.

Because each COW1ty follows its own unique set of screening practices, and because data

on screener perfonnance in each country were not available to us, it is difficult to

measure the impact of these different practices, either individually or jointly, on

improving screener performance. Nevertheless, there are indications that in at least one

country, its practices may help to increase the screeners' performance. This country

conducted ascreener testing program jointly with FAA that showed that the other

coun~ 's screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did the screeners in the

United States.

10

Swnmuy

The message I bring here today ls not new. The performanct> problems aft'ecting airport

S('reeners ~longstanding. Yet, as we enter the new mil!enium, not only do the same

problems continue to exist but in the case of turnover among the screeners, it is even

getting worse. And, Mr. Chainnan, It must be recognized that the causes of and solutions

to these problems do not fall solely on FAA's shoulders. CertJlin conditions, such as the

screener wages and benefits, are not under FAA's control but rather art> under the

control of the air carri(>rs and the screening companies.

NE'vertheless, FAA does have leadership responsibility for aviation security, and it is

taking steps to address the hroad problems UnUtlng the quality of airport pas.<Jenger

screening. These steps, which address an anay of concerns-the hiring of quality

pE>rsonnel, providing sufficient training, monitoring on-the-job performance, and, albeit

indirectly. increasing the scree nero' compensation and retention-are etrorts in the right

direction and may provide the lmprovE>ments to tht.> screeners' perfonnance that are

llE'<'d€'d in the aviation system. However, FAA's ability to undertake and implement theS(>

efforts in a timely fashJon remains a concern. We note that in 1987, we recommended to

FAA that it establish perfonnance standards that must be met for the detection of FAA

test objects. However, opl~· now is FAA proposing to d€'velop standards as part of its

S<'feening corr.pany certification program. Moreover, the key efforts it is undertaking

the threttt image projection system and the screening t:ompany certification program

are both currently behind schedule. We remain concerned about the timely

implementation of these efforts.

It will be critical that the Congress maintain vigilant oversJght of FAA's progr2SS in

implementing its screening improvem£:nt efforts and that it monitor FAA's progress in

achieving its perfonnance improvement goals for the screeners. These gt>als provide a

road map for assessing the agency's initiatives to improve the sc~ners' perfonnance.

Should FAA not be successful in achieving its goals through its cunent efforts, the FAA

II

55

and the Congress may need to consider requiring other steps, such as some of those

practiced in other cmmtries, to obtain the needed improvements at the checkpoints.

Mr. Chainnan, this concludes my prepared statemenL I will be pleased to answer any

questions that you or Members of Ute Subcommittee may have.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at

(202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Leslie D.

Albin, J. Michael Bollinger, Batty R. Kime, John R. Schulze, Md Daniel J. Semick.

(348223)

12

66

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL CATHAL FLYNN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, ON AVIATION SECURITY, MARCH 16,2000.

Chairman Duncan, Congressman Lipinski, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for

the opportunity to speak with you today on the issue of aviation security. Although I will

discuss several impnrtant security initiatives, I understand that the foclls of this hearing is

on the training, performance, and retention of airline security screcncrs at airports. As

directed by legislation passed by this Committee in 19Y6. the Federal Aviation

Administration {FAA) is conducting a rulemaking that would require screening

companies to be certified by the FAA. I would like to start by describing this rulemaking

and how we expect the training, performance, and retention of airport screencrs to

improve as a result, and then comment briefly on some of the other elements of our

seccrity efforts.

Let me first emphasize that the threat to our Nation's aviation community has not

diminished. It remains a dangerous world. Governments, airlines, and airports must

work cooperatively to achieve our common goal: safe and secure air transportation

worldwide. The number of incidents worldwide of unlawful interference with civil

aviation (primarily hijacking and sabotage) have decreased over the last 20 years, while

the number of flights, enplancments and passenger~miles flown have increased. As

graphically demonstrated by the two most recent hijackings, this decrease does not

minimize the gravity of these crimes.

57

2

The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviation is higher abroad than it is within the United

States. The terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania remind us of

the global nature of terrorism and the need for everyone to work together to oppose it

anyY.:hcre in the world. The relationship between Osama bin Laden, who was behind

these terrorist attacks, and Ramzi Youser, who was convicted of bombing the World

Trade Center in New York and attempting to place bombs on a dozen U.S. air carrier

flights in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995, exemplifies the continuing tangible threat to

civil aviation. Only the wholehearted cooperation of our aviation partners thwarted those

auacks in the Pacific. Moreover, members of foreign terrorist group~ and representatives

from state sponsors of terrorism arc present in the L'nitcd States. There is evidence that a

few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capability and infra'itructures here.

Terrorism is a crime, but th~ threat to civil aviation is not restrictt:d solely to those

motivated by political concerns. We must also prevent other criminal acts, regardless of

motivation, to ensure safe and secure air transportation. Given this security threat, since

the early 1970's the F A.4. has required the screening of passengers and property carried

aboard an aircraft in order to ensure f.hat no unlawful or dangerous weapons, explosives,

or other destructive substances are carried aboard. More recently, in response to the

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Sl!curity and to direction and guidance

from this Committee in the Federal Aviation Reauthorizati')n Act of 1996, the FAA

developed a proposal to improve screening efforts, which we published in early January.

I would like to briefly describe its development and purpose.

58

3

On March 17, 1997, the FAA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Ru\cmaking

(ANPRM), to certify scrceJiing companies and improve the training and testing of

security screencrs through the development of uniform performance standards. On the

basis of the comments received as well as internal deliberations. the FAA determined that

the critical clement in scrcener certification is having a reliable and consistent way to

measure actual screening performance. After evaluation ami consultation, we decided to

add more specific screening improvements to the proposed rule based on the usc of new

technology called threat image projection (TIP) systems. Consequently, in May 1998, we

withdrew the ANPRM in order to focus our rulcmaking efforts on TIP systems.

A TIP system electronically inserts images of possible threats (e.g., a gun, knilfo,

c.xpl~sivc de,·icc} on :>t-ray and exp\•)sives detection system monitors as if:hey were

within a bag being screened. lis purpose is to provide training, keep scrcencrs alert, and

measure screcner performance. High scores in detecting TIP imag..:!s equate to a high

pmbability of detecting actual bombs. Not only can TIP data be potentially used to

assess screcner performance over time, the results can alsc be used to analyze any

correlation between perfom1ance, experience, and compensation.

FAA field agents performed special evaluations using test objects in coordination with

TIP data gathering to see if the data correlated. We conducted these preliminary tests of

the prototype TIP x-ray systems and analyzed data from the fall of 1998 to January 1999,

whereupon we concluded that TIP was potentially an effective and reliable means to

measure screcner performance. We will continue to seek comment aud closely monitor

TIP's capabilities in an operational environment, making necessary adjustments as we

gain more experience with thi!l. technology.

4

Our detennination of TIP's reliability enabled us to move forward on the rule. On

January 5, 2000, FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulcmaking (NPRM) which requires

the certification of all screening companies, specifies training requirements for screcners,

sets standards for screening passengers and cargo, and establishes rcquireO'cnts for the

use of screening equipment. The NPRM would require screening companies to adopt

FAA-approved securily programs and would require carriers to install TIP systems on all

their X-rRy and explosive detection systems. Last Friday, we held a public listening

session on the proposed rule at FAA headquarters and hr.ve scheduled two more in San

Francisco and Dallas-Ft. Worth in April.

Our proposed rule also requires that all screening companies adopt and implement FAA·

approved screening security programs that im:lude procedures for performing screening

functions, including operating equipment; screener testing standards and test

administration requirement; threat image projection standards, operating requirtments,

and data Cllllettion methods~ and perfonnance standards. In addition, all screening

personnel would have to pass computerized knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation

tests before ar1d after thei: on-the-job training and at the conclusion of their recurrent

training. These tests would be monitored by air carrier personnel in accordance with the

air carriers' security programs. We hope to issue a Final Rule on certification of

screening companies in lvJay 2001.

66-647 200 I · 3

5

The 1996 Reauthorization Act also directed the FAA to C(JOduct a study and report back

to Congress on the possibility of transferring certain air carrier security responsibilities to

either airport operators or to the Federal Government, or to provide for shared

responsibilities. We completed the study and submitted it in December 1998, after

extensive research, taking into account the results of several commissions, studies and

working groups, and concluded lhat there is a consensus in the aviation community to

retain the current system of shared responsibilities for st:eurity. We found that, while

there is significant support for more Federal Government invlllvement and funding, there

as little support for the Government's assuming aU air carrier responsibilities. The

existing partnership, where the Government sets goals and works with the industry to see

that those goals are met, is universally supported.

Our study also concluded that the current system achieves an appropriate balance of

responsibilities. While carriers should not have to bear all the costs of security, they

should bear a substantial portion of the persoMel costs to provide security screenihg

and the operational costs of using the advanced security equipment that the Federal

Government provides. At the same time, the Federal Government should continue to

control the quality of aviation security Jllld ~urity screening by setting higher, but

realistically achievable, standards for screener selection, training. and performance.

Screeners are a critical link in the performance chain. While it is difficult to verify a

correlation between b~.·ner pay and better performance. we can all agree tltat properly

,, l .j 4 l l

61

traiued and qualified people who are on the job longer tend to perfonn better.

Government sets perfonnance, not design, standards. The government can indirectly

influence private sector pay through higher perfonnanct- st:mdards that require more

training, and more investment in individuals who do it well.

6

To help improve scrcener performance at the checkpoiPt, data collection and evaluation

of &utomated screener assist x-rays---SAX---for carry-on bags was conducted last year as

part of the National Safe Skies Alliance (NSSA). NSSA'screation in 1997 Jed to the

establishment of a national test bed at McGhee Tyson Airport in KnoxviUe, Tennessee

for operational evaluation and testing of newly developed technologies emphasizing

checkpoint screening. The NS!'A is a consortium of organizations including Oak Ridge

National Laboratory, the Me1ropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, the Minneapolis-St.

Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, the University of Tennessee, Embry-Riddle

Aeronautical University, the Tennessee Air National Guard, the Honeywell Corporation,

and a nwnber of other private companies and public bodies. Their work includes the

development of the best configurations and strategies to integrate security equipment into

the airport environment in thr. most effective way. In addition, other aviation security

research and development projects will also be conducted at this test~.

Although most security personnel are hardworking and conscientious, there is always

room for improvement in the performance of airline screening responsibilities for both

clteck:ed baggage and at the chec!:point. Sueeners can always be better trained and

motivated. There is also room for improvement by FAA personnel to provide clearer,

62

7

more easily und~tood guidance on the proper use of equipment. Working together, I

expect that improvements in these areas will b.: achieved.

For good and effective performance. screeners must be given the best tools available to

do the job, and must be trained to use them properly. Foremost among these tools are

explosives detection systems (EDS). The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990

required that FAA certify EDS based on tests designed to validate their ability to detect,

without human intervention, the amounts and typt'S of explosives likely to be used by

terrorists to cause catastrophic damage to commcreial aircraft. Certification standards

were published in 1 !193. We believe the '1erforrnar.··,e criteria are tough. but appropriate.

EDS installation and utilization remain among our greatest concerns. Deployed EDS

must be factory tested. shipped, installed, and tested on site. The level of cooperation and

ease of obtt.ining the appropriate permits varies from city to city, and from airport to

airport. Operators must be trained and certified before the system becomes operational.

It can take anywhere from three weeks to two months to make an EDS operational

depending upon its location in an airport. the experience of airport personnel, the

complexity of the installation, the training levels of screeners, and other variables noted

in each site survey. In addition. some airports simply have no room for an EDS. Less

complicated installations, not requiring complex reconfigurations of baggage processe&,

major renovation or new construction were done first. We have now completed nearly all

1 l l 5 j

' 1

l l r

of these instaUations and have started work on the more complex, and often more

expensive installations, some of which may take two or more years to complete.

8

Regarding utilization, the Department of Transportation Inspector Genmtl (DOT I G)

reports that over SS percent of the EDS in use arc screening fewer than 225 bags per day,

and that some machines are screening fewer thllll 100 bags per day. During 1999, the

average number of selectee bags scanned ranged from 1635 to 1927 bags per week per

machine, or an average of 234-275 selectee bags screened per day per machine. The

range of avcragefi is due primarily to nonnal lraflic changes throughout the year and the

fact that additional machines have been brought on line during each quancr for which

.Jata was collected. EDS screened more than 5.45 million bags during 1999.

We do not believe these numbers indicate under-utilization of equipment. Rather than

focusing on the number of bags screened by each machine, the more penincnt inquiry is

what per cent of selectee bags arc being screened? The answer to that question is 100%

wherever EDS are deployed. This perspective is consistent with the focused approach tu

security fAA has adopted, an approach that was subsequently endorted by the White

House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.

FAA se<:urity procedures are intended to concentrate on a smaller segment of passengers,

using parameters developed within the counterterrorism community and reviewed by the

Department of Justice (DOl). DOl found that the Computer-Assisted Passenger

Prescreening System (CAPPS) used to identify selectees is nondiscriminatory; does not

9

violate the Founh Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures;

and does not involve any invasion of passengers' personal privacy. To further ensure that

the CAPPS program is carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, we have proposed in

our NPRM that airline and contractor security oersonnel receive civil rights and customer

relations training. Further more, DOT, with the assistance of the Department of Justice,

will be conducting a study in the ncxl year tv ensure that members ofmincrity grot1ps arc

not disproportionately affected in an unlawful manner in the security screening process.

CAPPS allows us to focus on a manageable population of passengers. Until we have the

technology to screen all checked bags with EDS without causing intolerable delays in

processing departing passengers, we must continue to focus intelligently on a smaller

segment of the bags. In the meantime, we will continue to relocate equipment and foster

sharing among carriers to ensure the most effective use of an deployed security

equipment. To reach the goal of 100% checked baggage screening by EDS, we are

continuing R&D along two paths, both of which will be required to address the diverse

configurations of U.S. airpons. First, we must develop effective EDS that afford

significantly higher throughput (the rate that bags are moved through the equipment) at a

cost comparable to that of existing systems. &nd, second, we must also develop a lower

cost EDS with lower throughput for use at smaller stations where the volume of bags is

lower.

As pan of our overall program of realistic testing of aviation security measures, access

control testing has also increased. About 5,000 c:ccess control tests have been conducted

10

since March 1999 when the DOT IG provided their initial findings. The final report was

released on Nove;nber 18, 1999. FAA generally agrees with the final report and is

aggressively responding to th.: DOT IG'11spccific recommendations. We arc workins

with airport operators and air carriers to implement and strengthen existing controls to

eliminate access control wcaknesset. We are requiring airport operators and air carriers

to develop and implement comprehensive training programs to teach cmploy~s their role

in airport security, the importance of their participation, how their perfonnancc will be

evaluated, and what action will be laken if they fail to perform. We arc requiring airport

operators and air carriers to develop and implement programs that foster and reward

compliance with access control requirements, and discourage and penalize

noncompliz..1ce. We will continue to work with the DOT IG on these important issues.

A pa•1icularly intensive round of access control tests started on February i, 2000, and

will continue at some frequency indefinitely. At one point, 1,500 tests were conducted in

only two weeks. In the tests we conducted last spring, aceesc; control measures stopped

96% of our attempts to penetrate aircraft. Data from the current effort, which was

unannounced 10 industry, shows some improvement We expect the level of performance

10 be maintained. Where it is not, we will move quickly to require the airport or air

carrier to post guards as necessary to secure the aircraft or doors, an expensive, redundant

measure.

The revision of the basic Federal Aviation Regulations fur airport and air carrier secl!rity

under Part 107 and Part IO!:s that is currently ongoing will include strengthening access

II

controls. For example, individuals will now be more accountable for displaying proper

identification and challenging unauthorized persons in restricted areas of the airport. The

revision will also pem1it enforcement action against anyone who enters secured areas

without authorization. Previously, enforcemen\ action was taken against the company

and not the individual. The rulemaking would make both the individual and the company

accountable. The final rule should be published later this year.

Another area of increasing importance is air cargo. Cargo screening is improving

steadily. The cargo security standards for all passenger air carriers and indirect air

carriers (air freight forwarders) have been strengthened by narrowing the definition of

known shipper and focusing security resources on unknown shippers. In September

1999, changes to U.S and forei!:,'ll air carrier security programs, and indirect air carrier

security programs became effective. In addition, onboard couriers are now required to

declare themselves to the air carrier, th~s assuring that their bags will be treated as cargo

and properly processed.

We have approved cargo security programs for approximately 200 U.S air carriers, 200

foreign air carriers and 3000 indirect air carriers. In FY99, we conducted 1802

comprehensive assessments of air carriers, 1580 comprehensive assessments of indirect

air carriers, and 1369 inspections of dangerous goods shippt::rs. We continue to conduct

cargo security tests of air carriers using agents to pose as unknown cargo shippers

offering packages. These tests indicate substantial industry compliance.

6'1

12

Internationally, FAA a.;sesses the effectiveness of security measures both at rbreign

airports served by U.S. carriers and also at airports that are a last point of departure by

foreign air carriers for service into the United States. Currently the Foreign Airport

Assessm~.:nt Program covers 240 airports in over I 00 countries. Since t 995, the FAA has

cumulatively conducted approximately 550 foreign airport assessments. The annual

number of assessments fluctuates as air carrier service changes. Our focus is on the need

for governments to have the institutional ability to sustain security measures and we

continue to work with airports and countries with persistent security deficiencies. In

addition, we continuously conduct inspections of U.S. and foreign air carriers at foreign

airports with direct service to the United States to ensure compliance with approved

security programs. These inspect~ons are more frequent at foreign airports assessed to

have a higher overall terrorist threat. During the last four years, we conducted 1,888

foreign and U.S. air carrier station inspections at foreign locations for an average of 472

inspections a year.

Finally,! would like to mention the Federal Air Marshals (FAM's) who protect the

traveling public, passengers, and flight crews on U.S. air carrier flights worldwide. Since

1985, the F AM program has provided specially trained, armed teams of civil aviation

security specialists for deployment worldwide on ~nti-hijacking missions. The thrust of

the program is 99% deterrence, aimed at disrupting and confusing the planning and will

of criminals and terrorists, and I% response, to be able to assess, meet. and defeat any

threat aboard an aircraft. All FAM's are volunteer FAA employees. They undergo

sophisticated and realistic initial and recurrent training. We believe that one of the

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IJ

reasons there has not been a hijacking of a U.S. air carrier is the deterrent value of the

FAM program. Terrorists considering a hijacking must take the possible presence of

FAM's into account. We want the traveling public to know that we can be on any U.S.

air carrier anywhere in the world at any time. The passenger sitting next to you on any

flight could be a Federal Air Marshal.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. Thank you for the opportunity to

testify. J would be happy to answer any questions at this time.

l ' '

UPDATE ON AVIATION SECURITY

Statement of

Thomas S. Hartwick, Ph.D. 10510 !96th St. SE

Snohomish, W A 98296 360/668-4257

Chainnan of the Committee on Assessment ofTechnologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security

National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences

before the Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives

~ .)j ":., ·_'! '16, 2000

(69)

70

Mr. Clainnan o.nrl Members of the Subcommittee:

My name is Dr. Thomas S. Hartwick. I am the chairman ofdle National Research CoWlcil

{NRC) Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Secwity. At.

you know, this study is being conducted in response to a Congressional directive (Section 303 PL

I 04·264, 1996) that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) engage the NRC to study the

deployment of airport secur·>tt equipment. The NRC is the operating ann of the National

Acal.lemy of Sciences, Natioa~l Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine,

chartered by Congress in 1863 to advise the government on matters of science and technology.

The FAA requested that the NRC assess the operational perfonnance of explosives-detection

equipment and hardened unit loading devices (HULDs) in airports and compare it to performance

in laboratory testing to determine how to deploy this equipment more effectively to improve

aviation security. As requested by Congress, th1s study addresses the following issues:

1. Assess the weDpons md explosive-detection technologies available at the time of the

study that are capable of being effectively deployed in commercial aviation.

2. Determine how the technologies referred to in paragraph (l) could be used more

effectively to promote md improve security at airpon md aviation facilities md other

secured areas.

3. Assess the cost md advisability of requiring hardened cargo containers to enhance

aviation security and reduce the required sensitivity ofbomb-detection equipment.

4. On the basis of the assessments and determinations made under paragraphs (1), (2), and

(3), identify the most promising technologies for improving the efficiency and cost

effectiveness of weapons and explosive detection.

71

In my opinion, it is important to note that there are several "threat vectors" or paths by which

a terrorist could attack an airplane. These are presented in Figure I. In my testimony this morning

J will only focus on security measures deployed by the FAA for detecting and contAining

explosives introduced by checked baggage and cany-on baggage.

In November 1999 the NRC Committee on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to

Improve Aviation Security (the Committee) published the report, "Assessment ofTcclmologics

Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: First Report" (first report)1• This report is the flfSt of

four planned reports assessing the deployment of technologies (i.e., equipment and procedures)

by the FAA. In the first report the 1997-1998 deployment of technologies by the FAA to improve

aviation security was assessed. This report, which was submitted to you in advance of this

hearing is the basis for my testimony today (March 16, 2000).

DEPLOYED TECHNOLOGIES

In 1997, the FAA was directed by President Clintlln and authorized by Congress (PL 104·

264, PL 104-208) to deploy 54 FAA-certified explosives-detection systems: (EDS) and more

than 400 trace explosives-detection Cevices (TEDDs) at airports around the country. The purpose

of these deployments was to prevent attacks against civil aviation. The congressionally mandated

deployment of bulk explosives-detection equipment began in January 1997 and continued

throughout 1998. The FAA fonned the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIP1) to

carry out this deplo}men.t 'fPF SW M'Yr~ the availability of explosives-detection equipment

____ - ._, _ _:. 1..:....:11 tl t't I 9 O:J l ;,;.:.. .. 1 NRC (National Research Council). 1999. Assessment of Technologies ~oyc.:lto Improve Aviation Secunty:

First Repon. National Materials Advisory Board. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Available on line at: hnp:/lbooks.nap.edu/utalog19726.html.

1 The following tenninology is U$td throughout !hi~ testimony. An up'o.siw:s-detecllon J)'.sttm is a self-contained unit composed or one or more integrated devices that has passed the FAA's 1 enification test. An aplrulves-detection device is an instrument that ineOTpOrates a single detection method to det~~ one or more aplosive material categories Explosives-dttectlon equipment is any equipment, certified or otherwise, that am be use<J to detect explosives.

2

72

FIGURE I 111reat vectors. The paths by which people, baggage, and equipment board a

plane are also routes by which lhreats may board a plane.

3

BE.Sl COPY AVA\LABLE

73

cap!!ble of being effectively deployed in commercial aviation and Cannulated a plan to deploy

this equipment in airports throughout the United States. In a oeparate program, the FAA h'1S

tested HULDs designed to contain a discrete explosive blast.

The FAA'~ aviation security equipment and procedures include bulle" cxplosivcs-dc~tion

equipment, TEDDs, HULDs, computer-aided passenger s.crecning (CAPS), and positive

passenger-bag matching (PPBM). These equipment and procedures are described in the fnt

F1NDINGS

It is well documented'·' that the F AAISEIPT is behind schedule in the deployment of

aviation-security equipment. In 1997, Congrcs:> provided 5144.2 million for the purchase of

commercially available screening cqu1pment, and the FANSEIPT planned to deploy 54 cenified

EDSs and 489 TEDDs by December 1997. In addition, the FAA planned to implement CAPS

fully by December 1997. Once it became apparent that these goals could not bt met, the FAA set

11 new goal of deploying 54 certified EDSs, 22 nonccrtificil bulk explosives-detection devices,

and 489 TEDDs by Decem beT 31, 1998. The FAA also planned to implement CAPS fully by

December 31, 1998. As of February 28, 2000 93 certified EDSs, 18 noncertified bulk

explosives-detection devices, and 552 TEDDs had been installed in airports, and CAPS and

Jln this tcsliroony, bulk up/osivu include all forms and configuralions of an eJOploslve at threat. level (e.g., shaped eltplo~ives, sheet aplosives, etc.).

~DOT {U.S. Department o£Transportation). 1998. Aviation Security-Federal AviaJion Adminimation. WashmgtOn, D.C.: U.S. Dcpanmcnl o£Transporta~:ion, Office ohhe Inspector General,. Available on line: http:llwww.dot.gov/oiglauditslav 1998134.htm

'GAO (General Accounting Office}. 1998. Aviation Secu!11)': lmplcmcnwioll of Recommendations Is Under Way, But Completion Will Take Several Years. GAOIRCED-98-102. Washington, D.C.· General Account1ng Office. Available on line at: http:l/www.gao.gov/AlndaFY9Siabmaetslrc981 Ol.htm

4

74

PPBM had heen adopted by all major U.S. carriers. In addition, 14 HULDs have been deployed

to three airlines fo,- operational testing.

The committe.:: ~oncluded that the combined e(fort:; of the government, the airlines, and the

airports to date have been effective in deploying aviation security technoloiJICS (improving

aviation secur!ty to a level that will be quantified when additional data are collected during future

studies), although, because of the urgent need for immediate action against incipient tetTorism,

equipment and procedures were implemented rapidly without regard for how they would

contribute to a total architecture for aviation security (T AAS). The committee believes that

definition of such an an::httccture is essential to the success of this program, hence, it suggests

fonnality in defming and using aT AAS. That is, although the capacity of individual pieces of

equipment to discretely improve security at the point of deployment is known to some rle~, the

integrated effect of the total deployment of equipment and the implementation of procedures on

the whole of aviation security is not. After much deliberation, the committee conch.dcd that the

performance of the T AAS could be measurM by a single factor, the security cnhancem.."'llt factor

(SEF}, which will enable a quantitative evaluation of the perfonnancc of diverse deplr,yment

scenarios and show the importance of specific clements (e.g., explosives-detection equipment] to

the performance of the T AAS.

RESPONSE 10 CONGRESS

Protecting civil aviation against terrorist threats is a complex problem. Given the short

response time and the complexity of the terrorist threat. the committee concluded that the

research and development and deployment by the FAA and others has hem successful in

qualitative terms. The urgent need for security equipment and procedures, expressed by the

s

75

White House Conunission on Aviation Security and Safety' and by Congress in 1997, did not

leave time for extensive system IUUllyses. Therefore, the FAA proceeded with the deployment of

hardware ItS it became available. The absence of a system architecture is the basiJ for the m~~jor

recommendations of the conunittee. Nevertheless, the FAA wilt have to address these issues in

the future.

Explosives-detection equipment and HULDs are part of a total system architecture and

should be evaluated in the context of aT AAS. Although the FAA, its contractors, the airlines,

and the airports have adopted some elements of the total systems approach, in the conuni~'s

opinion they have not gone far enough. This study, and future aviation security studies conducted

by the NRC, will be most useful to the FAA if they adopt the recommender' r•nnprehensive

T AAS approach. Furthermore, adopting the T AAS approach will enable the FAA (and others) to

characterize improvements in aviation security quantitatively using the SEF.

The committee has addressed (in part) the four points raised by Congress below. For clarity

these points are listed again, followed by the relevant conclusions and recommendations.

1. Assess the weapoas aad e~:ploslve-.detectloa tecltaologk:s available at tbe time orth~

study that tue capable of being effectively deployed la commercial ~viJitloa.

To date this study has focused on explosives-detection technologies. While it is conceivable

that some of these technologies could also be used for weapons detection, this topic was not

addressed in the ftrst report.

• White House Conunission on Aviation Safety and Sccunty. 1997. Fmal Repo11 to the Prestdent Fcbr\la~y 12, 1997. Available on line at: http:J/www.aviationcorn;nission.dot.goV!

6

76

The vast majority of bulk explosives-detection equipment deployed is the FAA-certiflCd

In Vision CIX-series EDS (cxplosives«fC4:tion system). Most of the performance data on this

equipment was generated during laboratory testing-largely certification teating-at the FAA

Technical Center. However, in tenns of evaluating the detection rates of the equipment,

certification tests only reflect the ability of the equipment to detect a bag that contains an

explosive, and the detection rates arc based on bag-alum rates. 'That is, an explosive is

corl!lidcred to be detected if the alann is set off for the bag containing the explosive, even if the

alam~ is triggered by a nonexplosive object in the bag. Certification testing does not measure

alann resolution and does not include testing in the operational environment of an airport. maktng

it difficult to assess explosive&-detection tcchnoiogies for deploymenL In the committee's

opinion, some of the unanticipated problems encountered with the CfX-5000 SP in the field can

be reasonably related to the limitations of certification testing. Under current certification

guidelines, equipment certified in the future may encounter similar problems.

Recommeadatloa. During certification testing, the FAA should, whenever poss1ble, measure

both true detectim, rates (i.e:., correctly idtntifying where the: c:xplostve is when an alarm occurs),

and falsc·detection rates (i.e., an alann triggered by something other than the explosive in a bag

that contains an explosive). The FAA should also include the ability of explosives.detection

equipment to assist operators in resolving alarms (including in an airport) as part of certification

testing. Alann resolution should be included in the measurement of throughput rate, detection

rate, and false alarm rate.

7

7'1

TEDDs arc widely used in airports, but no comprehensive mdhodology hAs been developed

to evaluate their eft'ectivenep. such u atendard 1e1t articles or instrument and opemor

requirements. Because no standard lest articles forTEDDs have been demonstraled-end

because of the resultnnt inability to separate instrument and operatorpcrfOf11'UUl(:C---i iJ not

possible to measure the performance ofTEDDs.

RecommeadAtioo. Tile FAA should develop and implement a program to evaluate the

effectiveness of deployed trace expto:~ives.dctection devices. This evaluation should im;Jude

measurcmenl5 of instrument and operator pcrfonnance, includins measurements m the deployed

(i.e., airport) environment.

Compater·Aulsted Passenger Scnealaigaad Posttlve Pu~eager-Baa: Matclllaa:

CAPS appears to be an effective way to screen pusengcn to tdcnbfy selectees who require

further security measures, such as bag matching or bag screening. The cormnittcc: anticipates that

PPBM combined with CAPS will be an effective tool for improving aVlabon secunty. Despite the

positive attributes of CAPS, the committee is concerned that the FAA has not demonstrated a

measure for chara.cterizing quantitatively the effectiveness of CAPS. In <!.ddition, ~are some

methods by which a CAPS selectee could bypass PPBM.

Rec.ommeacbtloa. ComputeT-assisted puse:ngcT screening (CAPS1should continue to be used as

a means of tdenbfymg selectee passengers whose bags wi11 be subject to positive passenger-bag

matching (PPBM) or screening by explosives-detection equipment. or both. PPBM combined

with CAPS should be part of the five~ year plan reconuncnded below. Passengers that have been

8

78

designated as selectees at the origination of their flightlsbould remain selectees on all connecting

legs of their flights.

:z. Deten:oJae bow tbe tedaaologla. referred to la paragraph (1) could be llHd more

errecttvely to promote ud Improve security at airport ud avlatloa facWda ud etl!er

KCllred IUeaJ,.

ProgrnslD tbe Deployment or Avlatloa S«:arlty Equipment

The committee concluded that the F AA/SEIPT, the airlines, alrpOrts. and auociated

contractors have gained significant experience from the 1mtial deployment of sec:unty equipment

and procedures, and the current Implementation of sccunty equipment does not appear to have

interfered unreasonably w1th anline operatioflll. Most Importantly, m the collective op1mon of the

committee, the deployment of security equipment has improved avumon scx:unty (see F1gurc 2).

The committee believes that continued emphaSIS on, fundmg of, and deployment of secunty

cqu1pmcnt will further enhance aviation security. Future deployments should be more cfficlCflt 1f

they arc based on the cxpenencc f,om the tmtial deployment.

Rec:ommeadatloa. 1be U.S. Congress should contmue to fund and mandate the deployment of

commercially available explosives-detection equipment through the F AAISEIYf. Continued

deployments wdl increase the coverage of domestic auports and eventually provule state-of-the

art security equipment system wide. Further deployments can improve aVJat1on security in the

short leTm and provide the mfrastructure for mibgating potential threats m the long tmn.

9

79

100

~ ThO ponet ~ that lhe U!fftrilt'a ,PflfC09Ckln of the~ of tho TMS detet'l diCkl end fulth8f lnae8lee

j the SEF. Although M il dlft'lcuft lo queniJfy !he atfect, 1M l)llfMit btloYM llil algnlftalnl end ClOt*:! btl~ by a

/ ... for a 1ecur1ty optem lhat lncospcwatM an

I EDS and a TEDD a

10

/ l>

/_ t:

£ 1

/~ # ~~ .~ ~ .; #." "'~ # #;· ~ # .

Figure 2 ~Comparative contributions (notional) to the SEF of various security technologies and

ttaining (EDS • explosives detection l)'stem. TEDD .. b'acc explosives detection device, HULD

"" hardened unit loading device).

Note: The baseline illustn.ted in Fipe 2 reprcsentJ the state of aviation aecurity prior 10 the

1997 deploymentofEOS. Each additional poim (e.g., EDS) repmcntJ the notional irnprovemmt

in aviation security afforded by the deployment (or future deployment) ofaechnology,

combinations of technology, and implementation of training. The seewity enhancement factor

(SEF) is a measure of the improvanentofaviation security and is discuued in detail in tbt ftnt

report.

10

80

Optrator Performance

Human operators are integral to the performance of all deployed explosives-detection

equipment. Because fully automated explosives-detection equ1pment will not be developed in the

foreseeable future, particularly with respect to alann resolution, human operators will continue to

be immensely important to realizing the full potential of depl'lyed security hardware. The T AAS

analysis presented in this report quantilies the impact of the operator on the SEF. Certification

testing of tllplosJVes-dctection equipment, however, docs not mclude testing of human operators.

Current testing only defines the Openltional c:.pab11ity (or perfomumce) of the equ1pment.

Recommeodation. The FAA should institute a program to qualify sccurity-eqUJpmt:nt operators

to ensure that the human operator/explosives-detection system (EDS) combination meets the

performance requnemenlo; of a certified EDS. This program should mclude the defimtion of

operator performance standards and a means of monitoring operator performance.

Measuring Operational Performance

Because of the paucity of operational data for deployed explosives-detection equipment, the

committee found it Impracticable to cha!acteriu- the deploj'ulent status of security equipment and

processes quantitatively. The data are insuflicient both for the equipment and for operator

performance, and no quantitative measurt"S of lite effectiveness of the total security system (e.g.,

T AAS) were provided to the committee. The majority of data focused on subsystems, such as

bulk explosives-detection systems. A thorough assessment of equipment and system performance

requires well defmed perforno..ance me tries and the collection of data. The committee conclt1ded

that the FAA has not defined adequate pn-fonnance metncs for security subsystems (e.g.,

TEDDs) or for the T AAS.

II

8i

Recommendation. The FAA should make a concerted cffon to define Opc'!I'BtiOnlll performance

mctrics for security subsystems and for the total architecture for aviation security (T AAS). TI1c

FAA should also create an action team to systematically collect operational data, which should be

used to optimize the T AAS, as well as to identify and correct substandard perfonnancc of

equipment and operators. The data collected would also provide insights into the deployment and

use of equipment in the future.

Measuring Seu.rity Enbaacemeat

Besides the deanh of operational data and total·system performance mctrics, the FAA has not

defined an overall mcasme of security enhancement. The primary performance measure for the

T AAS is, of course, protection against the threat of explosives. Consequently, the committee

believes the critical fQctor in assessing the performance of the TAAS is the measure of false

negatives (i.e., unidentified bags that contain explosives). The committee dcfmed improved

perfonnance (i.e., the SEF) a,; the ratio of the number of simulated bombs that defeat the baseline

security system to the number of simulated bombs that defeat the newly deployed ~ystem.

Recotnme~~datloa. The FAA shouJd formul· tea security enhancement factor (SEF) for the

integrated total architecture for aviation security systems, The SEF should be calculated from

data collected during operational testing. Nonclassified SEF measures should be published and

used as a project-control and mamgement-control tool. The SEF wouJd provide the FAA with a

quantitative measure of the impact of security equipment and procedures.

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82

Decisions based on systems of systems analysis (e.g., TAAS) involve both management and

cost factors, which are airport and airline specifiC. Stakcholdcr7 involvement. therefore, will be

cructal for the development of an effective deployment strategy. Furthermore, aU line and airport

buy-m will be critical to the successful implementation of the deployment strategy. 'The FAA did

not provide the commtttee wtth a long-range lfive-year) TAAS deployment plan det•eloped

JOmtly and agreed to by the FAA and other ,;takeholders. Thus, the committee concluded that the

FAA has not obtamed comprehensive airhne buy-m for a long-term deployment plan that

addresses all of the relcvanttssues., such as operator tram mg. the opttmallocabon of detec:tion

cqutpment, and the operattonal deoloymcnt of HULOs.

Recommcocb.tloa.In COOJ.Imltlon wnh the other stlkeholders, the FAA should develop ll five-

year JOint-deplo}ment plan that tncludes cost, stakeholder responstblhhcs, quahty measures, and

other tmportant factors. llus }.'ian should be a hvmg documentthat1s formally updated annually.

Buy-m li-om all stakeholders wdl be rn:cessary for the plan to be effecnve.

3. Assess the cost aad advbabllity or rcqalrlag hardeatd eargo coatalaers to eabaa~!'

aviation secarity aad redact the reqalnd seasilivity of bomb.detec:tloa eqaipmeat.

Two Galaxy HULDs (both LD-3 stze) that confonn to NAS-3610-2K2C arrworthiness

cntcnon have passed the FAA blast and shockholmg• tests. The initial phase of operational

tcstmg of the HULDs have revealed shortcomings that have resulted in design changes. The

' In lhts repon the lmn staklwld~r tll(ludes rhc FAA, the anhnes, and the 81rpottS. Althou&h there are cenamly other stakeholders 1n avtallon 5e'Ctlnt)', these three wtll have: lhc: moSI mfl~ on~ deploymc:nl marc:gy for avtaltOII sc:cunry cqutpmc:nl

• A sluxHrul"rg {or fragmc:nralton) 1=s1 me:uures the: abtltty ora HULO 10 prevc:n1 pc:rforauon oftLS walls by a melal fragnw:nl m.vc:l;ng II arclal\vc:ly high ~loctt)'

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83

redesigned HULDs have passed FAA blast tests and arc now undergoing operational testing with

two airlines. It should be noted that, as currently configured, the HULD can only be used on

wide-body aircraft. Thus, no HULD concept for narrow-body aircraft has passed the FAA test.

although 75 pc.-rcent of the aircraft in service (as of 1994) are narrow-body aircraft, and more than

70 percent of bombing attempts have been against narrow-body aircmft.

The committee's greatest concern is that research on HULDs has not been conducted on a

system-of-systems (SOS) basis and has not involved all of the stakeholders, mainly the airlines.

So far, HULDs have largely been developed and designed as single, stand-alone entities. Limited

research has been done on their role as part of aT AAS. Coordination with the airlines, airports,

and aircraft manufacturers has been focused mainly on specific designs and utility requirements

rather than on the interactions, boundary conditions, and trade-offs (including cost and

operational consideratiQns) of using HULDs along with other set::urity measures, such as

passenger profihng and baggage screening. The committee believes that alternative HULD

designs may be more practical than existing designs in the T AAS context.

Recommendation. The FAA should continue to support research and development on hardened

unit loading devices (HULDs), including ongoing operational testing. If the FAA recommends,

mandates, or regulates the use of HULDs, explosion-containment strategies for narrow-body

aircraft, including the development of narrow-body HULDs and cargo-hold hardening concepts,

should be investigated. However, the FAA should not deploy HULDs unless they are part of the

T AAS joint five-year deployment plan.

4. On the basis of the assessments aad determloatloos made under paragraphs (1), (2),

and (3), Identify the most promising tecbnologlts for Improving the efficiency and cost

effectiveness of weapons and ezplosive detection.

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The data were not sufficient for a COllllfthensive asscasmem of available technologies for

improving aviJtion security. Therefore, at this time, the committee is not:tble to identify or

recommend the most promising technologies for improving the efficiency and cost e!l"cctivcness

of weapons and explosives detection. If the recommendations in this report are followed, these

data will become available for subsequent assessments.

Mr. Chainnan, that concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to address any

questions at this time.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman:

Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for holding this hearing on such an important issue. There is great concern among the flying public that the security screening program in the nation's airports is inadequate. Everyone has seen the stories on the news and in the papers about the high turnover and low salaries among security screeners. The public has a right to be concerned. Inadequate

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training and low morale among screeners threatens safety and security in the skies. The men and women who stand at security checkpoints are forced to work long, constant hours at minimun1 wage. The flying public deserves better. We need to pay screeners better. We need to give them the training they need. We need to increase the retention rate so experienced screeners do not constantly cycle out of the system.

8'1

Further, we need to pursue the best and newest technology possible to screen checked and carry-on baggage.

The FAA's Notice ofProposed Rulemaking is a step in the right direction. Providing uniform training for security screeners is absolutely necessary. However, I urge the FAA and the airlines to take drastic and immediate steps to improve the performance of airport screeners.

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We cannot wait until disaster strikes before we act.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

STEVEN T. II.UYICENOAU ... a.. ........ c..

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€ongress ot ll.lt \Unittb &tates JlloWJt oll\rpnfmtatili<O

Representative Steva:l. T. Kuykmdal.l Aviatioa SubcommiUee flc:mrina

Tninina Bid Rctc:Dtioa o(Securlty Sctcc:nen Mlrcb.l6, 2000

---...,.. ___ _ -~ -o--... ~--

........ __ _ Etroc:tlve tra&Uos • evaJuatb or ooc:urky ICf'N8!n, pcdcu.llrty at C8biD becPP aod indMdual tc:m:llliq lfiCIIrily cbectpoiDtJ hMloltg paeal8d dift'ic:u.ldes ia mais:ltaiDiea IUfficieol quality. Oae baUIII dal pady llil:ldGrwd tbe CYaJuUm prc!Cftl- tbl r.:c lbst aliaWid number of fAA impeccon mudocly performed spot dlec:b &t cbeckpoiab: CO ckccrmirle cbo ability of - 10 later'CCipl coctrablad. weGpOU or otber dnata. Becaule ~ weie Dillar with tbeae illdivlctasll. tiM)' would mer- tbeir lnel o( alct .... iMpec:ton .we .... diDir -A eolutioa so dais problelll - dftoeJopod ft broqbt lo opentbaJ re.diMa by a .AIDericu coms-r, OSI I lt8piec:D.ICJtmioB u 'I1Inllt lmap Projectioa ('llP), this ' ' Jk •' IONtioa;. ~ of rmdomJy ialedlst; the imlp of a 1111cdoa from aut:nry of av« 4000 dlftllra iDto a pieo= of~. If the ...,_. propll'ly ichatUieo 1M dnM by pMlliq • IMloa oa lb. c.bbl bl(,:pp ICiflllliDa uall. tile I)'IOIID .W idiBdty dlelln;l.t u red or u • dlre&t iiMp IDd irlfonn the teneaer oftbo proper ccune of ac:doa (deca!n die peaaeas:r &ftd IOirdl tbe bq or reecc tbe ~)'*en). Tho ~)'~faa l1lo records tbo aumber of tal!e a.e- idea!ified b)' tbe liCrt!eMf and tr..lalathlapafu:a ialodmlobeUIOdha~~

Hearing Queotions for the Heimann witness:

o I understand that Threat Image Projeotioo (or ... TIP) was developed and bnJus1tt into production by an Ameri<on <Oillj>Oily - b that c:omot'l

• Could you give me an idea of bow your TIP 1ystcm bu compared in lechnical performance with theee of domestic U.S. DWlufiooturers?

• In the cum::nt FAA evaluations of TIP·ready cabin baggage X-ray sy.tems, how have yoor sy.tems compared to domestic sy.tems in terms of"down time" I!Dd l}'ltem roiilbili!y?

o In the cum:ol FAA evalllllioos of TIP-ready cabin baggage X-ny S)'lllemS. how have yoor trainins and implemenlll!ioo programs compared to thoee of domestic~?

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

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Statement of The Honorable James L. Obentar Aviation Subcommittee Hearing

Aviation Security Measures: Training and Retention of Sereeners Marcb 16, 2000

We are here to discuss the very critical issue of aviation security. On

December 21, 1988, the world of aviation security was changed forever as a.

terrorist bomb tore apart Pan American World Airways flight I 03, a Boeing

73 7, killing all 259 passengers and crew, and II residents of the small town

of Lockerbie, Scotland. This terrorist act propelled the families of those

victims on a tireless mission to prevent such future tragedies, culminating in

the creation of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and

Terrorism, in which I served as a Commissioner.

The Commission's 1990 Report found the nation's civilian aviation

se-curity system to be seriously flawed, and made 64 recommendations to

correct those flaws. Of paramount importance, the Commission

recommended that FAA aggressively pursue a research and development

program to produce new techniques and equipment that will detect small

amounts of explosives in an airport operational environment. I introduced

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legislation implementing the Commission's m:ommendations and they were

enacted in the Avietioo Security Improvement Act of 1990. In addition,

spurted by initial ooncems that a terrorist act was responsible for the TWA

BOO explosion, President Clinton orgaoized soother commission, the 1996

White House Commission on Aviation Sefety and Security, which made 31

recommendations for enha'lcing aviation security. Again, Congress acted

swiftly and, in the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act, included measures to

heiahten security.

Since the passage of the 1996 FAA Reauthorization Act, Congress has

provided over$ 350 million for deployment of security equipment, aod over

$250 million in research funds. To date, the FAA has installed 92 FAA

certified explosive detection machines at 35 airports, 553 explosive trace

detection devices at 84 U.S. and foreign airports, and 18 advanced

technology bulk explosives detection x-ray machines at 8 airports. In

addition, FAA has deployed 38 computer based training device platforms at

37 airports.

We will hear teetimony today from the governmeot witnesses,

including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Departm_eot of

66-647 2001 • 4 q;

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Transportation's Office of Inspector Geneml (OIG), the General Accounting

Office (GAO), and the National Academy of Sciences. This testimony will

further detail FAA's progress in installing detection equipment. However, I

am deeply concerned about reports that although the FAA is deploying this

much needed equipment, there is no long-term strategy for integrating that

equipment into a seamless security system.

While deploying EDS equipment is a critical component to increase

aviation security, it is also of paramount importance to maintain passenger

screening checkpoints and ensure that the screeners that operate them are

qualified. Millions of passengers and pieces of baggage pass through our

airports each day. Both the GAO and the OIG have uniformly described

security screener performance as the "weak link" in aviation system. The

FAA and the airlines share the responsibility to ensure optimal performance

of security screeners. However, high turnover, low wages, and lack of

adequate training hinder security screener performance. Although the FAA

has recently proposed a rule that would implement the Gore Commission

recommerdation to certify screening companies, and enhance screener

training, it is already two years overdue. In addition, the OIG has made

some very startling findings regarding the ineffectiveness of FAA's

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background investigative procedures, and the vulnerabilities in airport access

control. The FAA reust l!lke a holistic view towards its security

responsibilities to ensure that all areas ofvulnembility are addressed.

However, the airlines and airports also share in that responsibility- and

should not put costs above passenger safety.

I made a promise when I was on the President's 1990 Commission on

Aviation Security and Terrorism that I would not let that Report gather dust

on a shelf. This Committee has time and time again responded to the call for

greater funding to enhance our nation's civil aviation security system, and

this session is no exception. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and

Reform Act (AIR-21 ), which ha" been passed overwhelmingly by both the

House and the Senate, contains several provisions on aviation security. AIR

21 authorizes $5 million annually for the DOT to carry out at least one

project to test and evaluate innovative aviation security systems. The bill

also authorizes such sums as may be necessary to develop and improve

security screener training programs; and such sums as are necessary to hire

additional inspectors to enhance air cargo security programs.

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However, aviation security does not stop at our nation's boarders. We

must also be constantly vigilant to ensure the security of aviatior. abroad.

Recent polling data indicate uneasiness among the American public about

aviation security in an era fraught with international terrorist acts. With

anticipated passenger traffic between the United States and foreign

destinations expected to reach over 230 million by 2010, we must be ever

mindful that security measures and equipment keep ahead of the "state of the

art" of the terrorist.

I know that many have voiced objections to the U.S. law which

mandates that foreign air carriers travelling to the United States, employ the

same security procedures as our airlines: this is the so-called "Hatch

Amendment." l think it is important to understand that the measure was

enacted to thwart attempts to make security a marketplace competition issue.

Certain foreign airlines were capitalizing on the requirement that U.S. air

carrier passengers be subjected to stricter security measures than their

foreign counterparts. Some foreign airlines went so far as to approach

passengers standing in a U.S. carrier's check-in line at a foreign airport,

trying to persuade passengers to switch because the security check-in at the

foreign carrier's counter would be less time consuming. As you might

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expect, our airlines were outraged and persuaded Senator Hatch to enact

corrective legislation.

Although carriers should not use security measures to gain a

competitive edge, I believe that the Hatch Act language does not leave the

FAA with enough flexibility to detennine the most appropriate security

measures necessary for individual foreign air carriers serving the United

States. It is important that security measures be tailored to the risk involved.

We must remain vigilant in our oversight of the FAA's progress in

resolving these very significant and complex secwity issues. We owe it to

the American travelling public both here and abroad, and I thank Chairman

Duncan and Ranking Member Lipinski for holding this very important

hearing.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

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HEIMANN SYSTEMS 30 Hook Mounlllln Road

Pine Brook, NJ 07058 (9731 830·2100

The very basic X-ray based technology developed in parallel by Heimann Systems and Astrophysics Rese~rch Corporation (now Perkin Elmer) in the 70s has rapidly evolved into much more sophisticated sy(l.tems now deployed at US airports and abrood.

This rather effective X-ray deterrent prompted individuals and groups engaged in unlawful acts against aviation targets to shift their activities from the traditional hijacking to the planting of explosive devices in checked baggage with such tragic consequences as the Pan Am 103 crash over Lockerbie, ScoUand.

Today, the main challenge facing ciVIl aviation remains the interdiction of weapons and dangerous devices from the ahcraft interior as well as the cargo hold. This challenge must be accomplished while maintaining an efficient, non-intrusive level of passenger screening at the airport's security checkpoints.

The industry has succeeded fairly well in developing X-ray and metal detector technology to almost eliminate the carriage of weapons and dangerous devices aboard an aircraft.

The contents of a carry~n bag is precisely imaged and presented to an operator on a monitor. It is ultimately up to the operator to determine whether the bag contains a threat or not. Security checkpoints with high passenger volume give operators only a few seconds to make this decisiun. Additionally, only very seldom will they ever actually encounter a real threat item.

Heimann Systems has addressed both of these issues in the latest generation of carryon X-ray screening systems.

First, in conjunction with the University of Heidelberg, Heimann Systems has completely redesigned the human interface of its systems focusing on two major components: The reduction of operator fatigue and offering the clearest image to the operator on the first pass.

Second, Heimann Systems has developed a software option called HI-TIP, an acronym for Threat Image Prcjection. Born as a functional requirement by the FAA Human Factors group, this new feature allows the automatic and random projection of threat images into otherwise innocent passenger carry-on baggage.

This now powerful option results in an increase of awareness and can also be used for on-site operator training and testing. Currently, the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) has purchasing authority for up to four hundred fifty (450) TIPready X-ray systems to be deployed to Category X airports nationwide. Many other country governments have expressed an interest in this new technology.

0311NOO P .... ntodby: Cherif Rlzkalla

P,_klent & CEO

HEIUANN SYSTEMS 30 Hook MountoCn Road

PIM Broo!<, HJ 070158 (973) 830-2100 . '.

Heimann Systomo h .. aloe developed Q new tool allowing the outomatlc detoctJon af organJc materials that match the atomic profile of an explosive. This feature, called XAct, Is useful in assisting operatora In identifying exploeive devices more effectively and less ln1rullvely. Tha National Sale Skloo Altlanoo, located In Knon~ilo, Ten.......,, has recently completed teotlng af the X -Act tochnology and h3s reported the nssults to the FM's William J. Hughes Technk:al Center in -.tic City, New Jersey. It 13 our hope that the National Safe Skloo Alliance will be soon teot1ng other beneficial fealurea such as ergonomics and image-enhanc:emant options.

Another primary challenge to aviation security is the secure transport af cheol<ed baggage and cargo. This challenge Ia somewhat ditlerenl from the lnopeetion af canyon bags for several reasons.

First, the focus is only on expkt&ive devices since weapons such as knives and guns do not constllute alhreat once cheol<ed.

Second, the inspection of bulky, more densely packed bags is very chaUenglng from an X-ray technology standpoint.

Third, a passengers bag cannot be opened and physically &e&rched Without the pasaangor being preaent.

Initially, a quick fiX method af avoiding the caniage af dangeroua contraband in checked baggage Is a method known as positive bag match. The method is wldaspreod In Europe and Canada and has two major weatmeszes. Firat, it ltJ used only on international flights and two; it does not prevent a perpetrator from carrying out an act of suicide.

A aacond procedure has been introduced called Computer Aided Profiling Systam or "CAPS". This systfll11 automatically alerls airline security personnel of a passengor that meets a certain number of objective critafia. Tho bags cheol<ed by a profiled pasaangor are th<>n inspected. The difficulty h<>re io to establish the objec:tlve criteria without stumbling upon civil rights lnues.

In Europe, passenger profiling hi very widespread and is mostly conducted by security pemonnel in an interview form. In Canada, a new method of profiling hn been introduced called •positive profiling•. This method avoids the civil rights issues by profiling passengers that do not need inspection.

Whether in the Unttad Statoo or other parts of the Wort<!, technology Is usually employed once a passenger is profUed. Although technology is actl&ncing very rapidly, it has not yet reached a level allowing one hundred percent detection of explosives with no false alarms.

03114100 P....-by: ChortfRJzbllll

Prooldont&CEO

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HEIMANN SYSTEMS 30 Hook Mountain Road

Pine Brook, NJ 070118 (973) 830-2100 .,.

Compromises are therefore needed. Europe and the United Statas have compromised in different ways.

A high explosive detection rate with ~he current available technology is the greatest oll8lacle to baggage throughput. In Europe, moat countries ore employing hlgh-speod systems intagratod In baggage handling systems that have as high a dotectlon rate. In the United Statl1S, the Federal Aviation Administration has opted for a lower throughput system meeting certi'iication criteria in tenns of detectton and false alarm rates.

Both methods have their advantages and dfsadvantages. One allows integration into existing baggage conveyor systems thus allowing autom3tic feeding of the system allowing inspection of a higher number of bags, but without meeting FAA certification criteria.

The FAA has purchased twenty such systems deployed in various airports. Furthennore, San Francisco and JFK airports have purchased respectively eight and four such systems. +-·

Right now, only two manufacturers have EOS meeting FAA certification. They are lnVision and L3 Communtcations.

The principle of operation of both types of systems certified and non-certified is the same. The technology automatically detects explosives with various detection rate& depending on the type of explosive and false alann rates varying between twenty and thirty percent. The threat is then either confirmed or dearcd by an operator. Once again, this is one of the weak links.

Heimann Systems has developed a new diffraction-based system called HDX allowing to replace L,.o101 Two operator by technology thus adding consistency to the threat-dearing process. This new technology concentrates exclusively on areas identified as being potential threats by the firat level EDS and gives a fingerprint of 1l:e material under inspection with a high degree of precision. The total false alann rate is reduced to less than five percent with no compromise to the detection rate.

The HDX can currently only be interfaced with Heimann Systems Level One systems but the FAA and one of the manufacturers of certified systems have eiCJ)I"eSsed great interest in the HOX as Level Two in a certified environment.

While there is no Msilver buller the industry and particularly Heimann S)'£items continue rt's quest for a high deto<:tion, high throughput and low false alann system to meet the needs of securing the traveling public.

03114100 Prnlt1!0dby: Chattl Rlzlulllo

Pnloldoni&CEO

Pogo3

llefore tile Subcommittee 011 Avlalloo, Committee on Tnauportalloa and lafraslruchtre, U.S. House ofRepreseDtallves

Aviation Security Federal Aviation Administration

Stotemeat or Alaia M. Steralli

Assimlat wpector Geaenl for ABdltiag U.S. Departmeat ofTraDSportotica

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Mr. Chaimum and Members of the Subcommittee:

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss aviation security. One ~fthe Department of Transportati~'s (DOn five stnotegic goals is National Security. Likewise, FAA has as a stnotegic goal the prevention of security incidents in the avirdion system. Security of the Nation's aviation, surt'ace, and marine tmosportation systems is one of the 12 management issues we hnvc identified for DOT this y..,.,

Aviation security is a layered system of systems that is dapcndcnt on the coordination of aiJport and air canier security operations and the integration of people and technology. Pcrhnps the most important factor in au effective security program is wcU-tnliocd, alert scrccncrs, baggage handlers, and other employees processing passengers or having access to secure arc:ss of the airport. Aviation security relics heavily on each employee in the aviation system doing his or her part.

Today we would like to discuss four issues: (I) implementing and deploying technology that crtbaoces scrceuer perfonnaoce, (2) strengthening background investigation requirements for granting access to secure areas of the airport. (3) controlling unauthorized access to sccun: aiJport areas and holding employees accountable for access control requirements, and (4) establishing a stnltegic plan that integrates employees and technology into a comprehensive. seamless security program.

• Fint, in fiscal years (FY) 1997 through 2000, Congress authorized more than $350 million for the deployment of advanced security technologies. FAA hns used these funds to deploy FAA-certified• and non-certified bulk explosives detection machines, explosives trace detection devices, Computcr .. Based Trsiniog platforms, and Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescrceuiog Systems. FAA plans to continue deploying many of these same technologies in the future, as well as deploying new scrceuiog checkpoint x-mys machines. Although advanced security technologies arc effective in detecting explosives, each one is ultimately dependent on the human opemtor.

FAA believes - and we agree - that opcmtors of advanced security equipment arc critical in improving security. FAA test results indicate that new technologies to detect explosives in passenger baggage can corrcctly identify a potential threat but a scrcener can make a wrong decision and "clear" the bag.

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Screeners who operote security equipment must be cuefuJiy selected, mooitored, and txained.

In September 1996, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (Goo: Collllllission) recommended that FAA certify screeniDg companies and improve screener perfoi'IJUlllll<. In May 2001, FAA expects to issue a final rule establishiDg uaining n:quilement5 for screeners and requiring screening companies to be certified. To achieve this, FAA needs to have a mellll! to measure screener performance, and melhods of providing initial and recurrent screener uaining u weU u ensuring thit the screeners maintain their proficiency dlrougb IICIUil experience with the machines in the aiJpon environment

FAA wiU rely on Threat Image Projection (TIP) to measure the performance of individual screenm and certify screeniDg companies. TIP is a computer software program, wltich project5 fictitious images on to hags or an entire fictitious hag containing a dneat. TIP is imended to keep equipment optJIIIOrS alert, provide real world condili0115, and measure performance in identifying the fictitious items ot hags. TIP is installed on the IICIUil equipment the screenet uses each day to screen passenger baggage. TIP has been installed on all CTX' machines used to screen checked baggage. FAA is cumntly testing TIP equipped x-ray machines used to screen cmy-on items. FAA plans to purchase mote than 1,200 new TIP equipped x-ray machines for scteening cbeckpoinl5 by the end ofFY 2003.

Anotbet needed technology is Computet-Baed Tnining (CBT), an intensive course of self-paced, rcaWtic teaming using computet wotkslolions. It is used to select, tmin, evaluate, and mooitor the perfotmance of etnployees whn opetate x-ray machines at pus<~~ger screeniDg checkpoinl5. Although FAA began deployingCBT in Aprill997, u ofMan:h 1999 FAA has only 38 CBT platforms• imtalled at 371i:"pons. However, tbete has not been any increase during the Jut year in the number of deployed CBT .platforms and some ue being used infreqnently. To complete deployment to al1 79lmge oilpoii!l an odditicmal42 platforms need to be instolled.

Explosives detection equipment such u the CTX IIUICbine wu developed to assist scteenetS in identifying dueat items in pusenget baggage. Howevet, CTX machines ue stiU undetused, . and scteener~~' performance needs

2 The Jn'Vilkll Ti '" A.! sJM Cf'A .:J!OO 1111Cti1e1 11'1 1b!1 oaJy FM-certl&d hlk eqlbtvel detec:tica --~·u.s.oiJpanl.

'ACBT-..-ofa-----~~~~~---(oCN-

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improvement Our recent audit work found that over 50 percent of the deployed CTX machines still scn:en fewer tbao 225 bap per day, on avemge, C<>rnJlll"d to a certified rate of225 bap per hour.

According to a recent report by the National Research Council, "Undetutilization poses a potential problem for the maintenance of operator skills, particularly the skills required for resolving alarms, because undetpra<ticed skills often deteriorate." Recent testing by FAA ahowed a significant nmnber of failures by CTX operators. FAA concluded that a major factor in the test failures appeared to be the perfo!IIIllllce of CTX operators, and not the CTX machine itself. In response to our 1998 report on the deployment of explosives detection equipmen~ FAA agreed to conduct a study to determine the minimum CTX daily processing rates needed to ensure operator proficiency, and use the results to establiah minimum daily use rates. To date, no study has been conducted.

• Second, actions are needed to improve the process used w ensure that employees with access to secure areas of"" airport are trustworthy.

Our recent review of industry's compliance with FAA's background i.avestigation requirements at six U.S. airports found that the requirements were ineffective, and aiiport operators, air caniers and aiiport users' frequendy did not comply with these requirements. For example, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) crimi.rud checks' are currently only required in certain cases, suth as when then:: is an unexplained gap of employment of 12 months or more. However, according to the U.S. Department of Justice 43 percent of violent felony convictions resulted in probation or an average jail time of just 7 month"i.

When the current requirements were proposed in 1992, processing fingerprints and performing the criminal check took up to 90 days. Today, technology allows this process lo be completed in oDiy a few days, and airport operators and FAA both agree the requirements need to be revised.

Although the background investigation tequirements need to be revised, it is important that airport operators, air caniers and airport users comply with existing background investigation requirements as well as requirements to

.. Airport 1BDCll ioc:ludc fordp. lit amicn. 00!1.-air-c:micr airport lCDIDll, and CO!IIpRDicl tbld do DOt bavc omca at tbe drport. but requite JCCCII co tbc tet'llle lirport .a~~~.

s A com:periloa at the i.DdMdua1'1 finFrprintl to lbc FBI's d!daba.le of iDdividlllll couvictecl of c:rimcs in tbc UDked States. The FBI raums a c:ompktc atmioal bistmy lf there ilaliqaprtat tUch.

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account for airport idemilicolioo (ID). Our recall audit fOUIIOI tl!M for 3~ pa<e111 of the employoe files mM>ted then! wu no evidel!l:o dud a ~.year history verificalioo wu cooduct<d, the verificalion wu incomplelo, or oo file wu awilablc for .mew. In additioa, 9 pei<CIII of the acliw airport IDs we reviewed wcn> i..-1 to employees who ao tonser neotlod ..,.... to """""' areas.

• Third, once him!, employees must be beld accmmublc for compliallcc with airport ..,.... <OOirol requimnenls. AiqJort ....,.. CODIIOI bu been, IIDd continues to be, m ... of great cooccn> doc to iDmoscd threat to U.S. airport fiiCililies IIDd oin:nft. During late 1998 IIDd cody 1999, we succeufuJJy IICCCSsed secure .,.... in 68 pei<CIII of our tests Ill eisht mojor U.S. airports. Once we entered secure oren, we boonled ein:taft 117 times. The majority of our ein:taft bomlings would not have occurred if employees had token the Jli"SOribed steps, such as making sure doOis closed behind them.

Rec:ent FAA resulll! demoostnte that c:omplianoc oan improve with oootinuous oversish~ but testing is not the only .......,.., During testing in December 1999 IIDd January 2000 111 10 aiiports, FAA sUCUJSfully IICCCSsed scourc areas 40 pa<e111 of the time without being ciWicoged by employees. In Fcbnwy2000, FAA cxpmded its testing to 80oirporlo, IIDd as of Fcbnwy 23, 2000, FAA wu successfUl in ocoe.,ing secure IIICIUI 32 pen:ent of the time without being challenged by airport perso!lllel. When nonc:ompliancc was found, FAA took IIC!ions to <orrec:t the problem, such as requiring guards on doOis to Oll!ure only anthorized employees ....,.sed the secure .,..,

In June 2000, FAA plans to issue regulati0115 malting individuals cliJectly accountob1eto FAA. for noncompliance with ...... control ~. This will permit FAA to take enforcement IIC!inn agoimt the employee ~·.ad of the air c:anier or airport wben ID employee docs not follow ..,..., CODIIOI rtquirements.

• FinaOy, FAA has made significiDI progress in deploying existing advanced .....my technologies; however, it continues to focus on the ocquisition and deployment proc:eu, rather than on the necessary lnm!ition to intcgmting nU the Vllrious wets into o c:omprehcnsive, seamless security progmn. From FYs 1997 through 2000, Congreu has authorized $200 million in Research, Engineering, end Development funds, IIDd o·;er $3~0 million in FIICitities ood Equipment funds for Vllrious security etforll!. FAA is approximately at the

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halfway point in the effort started by the Gore Comnliuion. FAA expeots to spend "" odditional 5600 million ona.wicm security through fY 2004.

To meet CUIJ'CDI ODd 1\nur'l tlm:als to aviation security, FAA needs on integnlled slmleli• pion to guide its efforts ODd prioritize iimdins needs. Concentration on deployment (wbat to buy, when to buy i~ ODd where to put it) is not the complete solution. This pion should include a balanced approach coverin& basic rcseon:h, equipment deployment ODd """' certilicllion ODd operator testing processeo, dele coUectioa ODd onslysis on actual equipment and operator perfonnance, ODd regulation an.1 enforcement Although we ~ IIUCbaplmin 1998, FAA has made little progress in de110loping this strategic plan.

BACKGROUND

The responsibility for aviation security is shared between FAA. the airlines,

aiipotts, ODd employees. FAA sets guidelines, establishes polioiel and procedures,

and makes judgments on how tn meet throats to aviation based on information

from the intelligence community. FAA then tests the aviation indumy to ensnro

they ... complying with the many security reqnimnents. FAA ah!o sponsors the

developm~ purclwe, ODd deployment of new security technology, such as

explosives detection equi~ for indumy nse. Airports ... responsible for the

security of the airport enviroom<m. Airlines are responsible for acreeniDg

baggage. passengers, ODd cargo. Until recently, airlines ODd oiiports have been

responsible for pom:lwing security equipment ODd system>.

The July 1996 c:ruh of TWA Flight 800 wu the CllltlyJt for important odvances in

aviation security. Althongh the FBI and the National Transportation Safety Boord

have ruled out terrorist activity as a potentill canso of the c:ruh, the c:ruh

prompted the Augout1996 creation of the White Honse Commission on Aviation

Safety and Security (lmowll as the Gore Commission). Its September 1996 ODd

February 1997 repons addreased safety, security, ODd air llllffic control

modemization. The Gore Commission made 31IOCOIIIIIICIIdations regardiDs

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aviation security, including rocommendations that FAA: (I) certify screening

companies lll!d improve .....,... performance; (2) reqWn: FBI crimlDal checks for

all aiJport lll!d air canier employ.., with access to secure areas, no Wer thJD

mid-1999; (3) develop comprebecsive lll!d effective means to coottol onauthoriud

access to aircraft and secure airport areas; and (4) deploy new explosive> detection

equipment

Since 1997, Congress bu provided over $350 million for deployment of edvanc<d

security technology, lll!d $200 million in aviation security Research, Engineering

and Development including about $21 million for hiDDID factors .....,.,b. As of

Febnwy II, 2000, FAA lwJ ins!alled new security technologies, including

92 FAA-certified explosives detection mnchines at 3S airports, lll!d SS3 explosives

tmce detection devices at 84 U.S. lll!d foreign airports. For FY 2001, FAA has

requested $98 million to continue the deployment lll!d $49 million for aviation

security research. engineering. and development

SECURITY SCREENER PERSONNEL

The Gore Commission recognized that it is critical to ensure that those chnrsed

with providing security for over SOO million passengers a year in the United States

arc the best q118lified and trained in the industty. The Gore Commission limber

recognized thet better selection, lrlinin& lll!d testing of the people who work •t

airpcrt x-ray machines would result in a signilic1111t boost in security. Therefore,

in September 1996, the CommisBion recommlll!ded that FAA certify screening

companies and improve screener performance. In Oc:toher 1996, the President

signed the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of IS% (Public Law 104-264),

which requires FAA to certify companies providing security screening. IIJld to

improve the lr!lining lll!d tcating of security s=enen through development of

uniform performance stonderds.

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In February 1997, the Gore Commission recommended that FAA work with the

private sector and other Federal agencies to promote the professionalism of

security personnel through a program that would include perfonnance standards

that reflect best practices, and adequate, common. and recurrent training that

considers human factors.

TIP Must Be Proeer/y Dq!loved Bdore Screenltrg ComDIIJI.ies Can & Cotlfkd.

In response to the Gore Commission recommendation and the direction contained

in Public Law 104-264, FAA publisbod an advance notice of proposed rulemaking

on the certification of screening companies in March 1997, but withdrew it in

May 1998 because there was no reliable and consistent way to Ncasure scrceners'

perfonnance at the time. Ill January 2000, FAA again publisbod a notice of

proposed rulemaking that would require screening companies to be certified by

FAA. The comment period for this proposed rule ends on May 4, 2000.

TIP is the system that FAA will rely on to provide uniform data regarding screener

performance, and thus usc to evaluate and certify screening companies under the

proposed rule. The TIP systcr.lS usc two different methods of projection. One

method, used with screening checkpoint x-ray machines, superimposes the image

of a threat item onto the x-ray image of the actual passenger baggage being

screen«!. The other method, used with CTX machines, projects a prefabricated

image of an entire threat bag onto the monitor.

FAA has only recently establish«! procedures and controls for implementing and

using the TIP program that has been installed on deployed CTX 5500 machines

for almost a year. In response to our October 1999 audit report, 7 FAA issuod new

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guidance to air canim in November 1999 that standardizes froquency of threat

image p=entalion, provides beltfr control over passwords, ODd requi!es that TIP

be activated for each scn:ening sessioo. This should result in more consistJ:ut dala

on CTX scrccncr performance.

The TIP program is not as fully developed for w.e on s=ing checkpoint x-ray

machines, which are used to screen carry-on items. FAA is cum:nl!y cvoluoling

the TIP program for checkpoint x-my nw:hines in "" opemtional airport

environment When this evaluation is complete, FAA intends to purchase ODd

deploy 390 TIP-configured x-ray machines in FY 2000 for $24.26 million. FAA

expects to begin this deployment next month. FAA must complete a successful

field evaluation ODd ensure that mansgement controls are in place prior to

beginning the planned largMCa!e acquisition ODd deployment of this technology.

FAA plans to purchase a total of more than 1,200 TIPooequipped x-ray machjnes by

the end ofFY 2003.

F M Has Bun Slow ill Dqloyhw SysJm! N'ffffl to TraJn Squnbrg Compa11p

Employ-. CBT, a system that provides initial ODd recurrent training to

screenm, is ooe of the technologies FAA is developing and deploying to improve

screener performance. CBT offers an intensive course of realistic lemUug usiug

computer workstatioos. It is used to selec~ train, evaluate, and monitor the

performance of employees who operate scn:ening cbeckpoinl x-ray machines to

screen carry-on items. The potential benefits of CBT are self-paced learning,

enhanced opponunities for rcolistic practice, combined training ODd performance

testing, and instruction that is unifonn across the country.

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Despite lhe potontiol benefits of ClllT, its depluyment and implementstion bas

been slow. Deployment of CBT platfOIIIIllto 1he 19 Categmy X• aiJports bel!llll io

Aprill997 and was completed in March 1999. The deployment of CBT platforms

to 18 Category 19 airports was completed io October 1998.

1o March 1999, FAA reported that 42 additional platforms would be required to

complete depluyment to the mnaioiog 60 Categmy I aiJports. Now, a year later

there bas been no change io the nwnber of CBT platforms or the aiJports to which

they bad been deployed above wbat was reported last March.

1o addition, some air canier representstives told us lhat they were not using CBT.

AI five airports, they told us they ore not using CBT prinwily because of an

inadequate niDDber of available workstations iosta!led at their aiJports and lhe

inconvenient location of the iosta!led workstations. For example, at

Ronald Re•l!llll Washington National Aiqlon, the CBT workststions are located

away from the new main terminal building in a maintenance hangar. However, at

Honolulu lotemationol Aisport, 1he SCIOeDiog company that provides oil security

screening servir"' at the maio terminal was very pleased wilh both the location of

the CBT worlcststions and lhe quality and effectiveness of lhe CBT software, and

used CBT frequently.

CBT bas demonstrated that it can be a valuable and effective component in a

system of systems intonded to enhance aviation !CCurity. FAA needs to accelerate

the deployment of this wluable training and evaluation teclmology.

I Co!qocy X olJpol1l - the ....... , larpot ond buolcsl olJpol1l u - by the volume rsl J!U1C11Ftm1II<:IDII.,.poiCDiiallyatlllctM:-forcrimiDoliDIIIanlriol-.

9 Co!qocy I ollpoiU""' """'""ballllllllcr !boo c.t.J!OIY X oi1porll, llld bove 111 IIIIIZlOI wlumc rslll -2mli1Joo-

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109

Em/os/vq l)d<¢on Mtu:hhru Used to Scr«!! C/rt#ed .!Wg411!r Au Still

Umln11•gl. """ Scr«~~ttn' Pn(prlltlllfc• Nw/s Inwro1¥lf!tl!t. Ar. the proJ!IIIIl

to deploy bulk explosives cletectiOJl equipment maiVl'eS, and the rwmi of

operational experience with deployed machines lengthens, we expected to see an

increase in utilization rates over what FAA was reponing a year ago. Certainly,

there bas been a steady increase in the total number of bags screened across the

system, as more CTX machines are deployed. On the other hand, comparison of

quarterly perfonnance statistics compiled OJl a per machine basis in 1998 and 1999

shows no significant increase in CTX average usage rates. as shown below.

Qlft1W Qlft'l111 12CTX 43CTX

emu• anu• 1aCTX IIICTX

emu• QTia'lf :z.tcrx MCTX

We comp:!red the average number of bags screened daily by each CTX in 1998

and 1999, as reponed quarterly by FAA, and found that there had been an average

increase of only 20 bags per day per machine. We also found that the majority of

deployed and operational machines still do not screen as many bags in a full day

of operation as the machine is certified to screen in an hour. As shown in the table

below, more than SO percent of the deployed machines still screen less than

225 bags per day, on average, compared to a certified 111te of22S bags per hour.

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no

CY1tll CY1-

1"Qtr t" Qtr 3"atr 4•atr ,. Qtr 2"'atr 3"Qtr -4"'Qt:

Total machines In use 12 18 24 34 43 so &I 75

Machines averaging

10 11 18 23 27 311 37 rowerlllan225 .. -per cloy

Percent ol - 83.3'11> 81.1% 118.7'11> 87.8% 82.8'11> &1.4'11> 57.8% 58.7'11> undenlsecl

FAA doeo not requiJe the air camers to SCieen mote thm the number of bags

checked by "selectees. • Selectees include (I) passeng= selecled by

Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening Systems (CAPPS);" (2) passengers

who CIIDIIOt produce an approved form of identificalion; and (3) passengers unable

to com:ctly answer the security questions requiJed by the Air ClUTier Stondard

Security Program." Befono full implementation of CAPPS, FAA expo<. ted a

greater number of selectees then are cunen11y being identified. These expensive

machines have the demonsttated capability to screen mote bags now than the

air caniers are SCieening. Unless the number of CAPPS selectees is incmosed, or

the air caniers agree to screen more than the minimum requiJed number of bogs,

CTX machines will continue to be underused, which in tum could negatively

affect the proficiency of screenOIS.

"CAPI'SIIm--pnlllllq-tlool..,. __ lo!lllrlb.e--10--illloavuylqomrjorilywho_..,_rhll,aoda~-.y(lalowo .. -)------....... -- ........ - .... e>q>losiYco dot-oqu;-.

II 'lbo Air Cmior--ty Pmplm, reqalnd by Title 14, Code clFadcnl Ropl- Pin lOll, dcocrlbesllloiiOCUiity procodmallllolllr..m.r...- .. -.

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According to a recent ropon by the National Research Council," "Undemlilizolion

poses a potential problem for the mainll:!Wlcc of operator skills, porticularly the

skills ~ for resolving false alam>•. because undc!practiccd skills often

de'.erionte. At some [CI'X] locations, the througbput rate bu been sc low that

operators could C1ICI!losc their skills for operating the equipment."

This underutilization could result in screenm being less proficient when !be

equipment is being used. Our ; 999 audit oo securi1y of checked baggage"

demoostrated that CTX scroening persoonel were not compe- at Openlling the

equipment We found that when CTX 5500's wanted of a throat, the equipment

operator did not look for or identify the t1u<at object in a significant IIUDiber of

cases. During more recent testing by FAA, operators continued to fail a

significant number of tests. The failures prinwily occmred because operators

clearod the test bsg without a search, even though the machine bad alam>ed. FAA

concluded that one of the major factors in the test failures appeaied to be the

perfonnance of CTX opeilllors, md not the performance of the machine ilseU:

In response to our October 1998 ropon oo the deployment of oxp!Mives deteotioo

equipment, FAA agreed to conduct a study to detmnine the miDimum CTX daily

processing rates needed to ensure operator proficieocy, and use the results to

establish miDimum daily utilization rates for macbine operators. FAA expected to

conduct this study and tq>ort tho results by the and of FY 1999. To date, this

study bas not been conducted.

12 , t ql TIIShoolnrip pmkrmi'P lmgys Ayiedpp Spr:pdty. Fint Report. NadoMI Rl:lf.1udl Couadl, _ .. 1999.

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BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

Effective security also requires tbat only uuste<l individuals ore autboriud access

to sccme areas. To accomplish this, FAA requires aiJport operators, air cmiers

and airport ....,. to conduct employee background investigations before issuing

airport ID that allows access secure airport areas.

FAA's background investigation procedures include: obtainillg a 10-y..-.

employment bistocy from those applying for access; verifying the moot recent

5 years of ti.At biotol)l; and performing an FBI criminal check when specific

conditions are ideutified, such as a 12-montb unexplained gap in employment.

Individuals convicted within the past 10 years of any of 25 enuroerated crimes are

denied an aiJport ID.

However, our recent review at six U.S. airports found lllat FAA's background

investigation requirements wc:;e ineffective. Speciiically:

• FBI criminal checks are only required for employees applying for aiJport ID

when one of four conditions triggers the checks. For e:wnple, one of the

triggers, a 12-month unexplained gap in employmen~ was de!;igned to identify

indhiduals who were incarccratcd for committing a scri~us crime. However,

according to the U.S. Department of Justice, 61 percent of all otate and federal

felony convictions resulted in probation or ao average jail sentence of

6 months. Even fur violent felonies, 43 percent of convictions resulted ia

probation or an average jail lime of just 7 months.

• The list of 25 crimes tbat disqualilied 1111 employee from being issned oirport

lD was insufficient and did not include serious erimes, such as assaolt with a

deadly weapon, unarmed robbery, burglary, !arcany, and possession of drugs.

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Our llllllysis of 53 employees issued aiJport ID and mested in a recent

Department of Justice investigation for smuggling contraband into and out of a

major U.S. aiJport showed 1hat individuals convicted of the 2S disquolifyiDs

crimes were not the only employees who presented a security risk. Of the

IS (28 percent) a.rested employees wilh FBI criminal reeotds, just one had a

criminal rerord for a disqualifying crime (committed after being issued aiJport

ID). Other arrested employees (14) had FBI criminal records for

non-disqualifYing felonies, snch as Wce:ly, battery, possession of a stolen

vehicle, possession of drugs, and eredit card flaud.

FAA should revise its background investigation requirements to include initill and

recurrins criminal checks for all employees issued aiJport ID to allow access to

secure airport areas. In February 1992, FAA proposed requiring a criminal cb<ek

for all individuals wilh uneseorted access privileges. However, industty opposed

the proposal based on its cost and the impraeticality of escorting employees while

waiting for results of a criminal check. In 1he past, performing a criminal check

took up to 90 days, but wi1h new technology, it can be completed in a few days.

Airp;nt uperators have II1IJ'I)Ofted requiring criminal checks for all employees wilh

access to secure airport areas, and expanding the list of clisqualifYing crimes in the

proposed FAA Reauthorization Act As a result of lhe technology advancements

and quicker processing time, FAA plans to initiate new rnlemaking requiring

criminal checks for all employees. We support lhese initiatives and recommend

1hst new rnles include initW and randomly recurrins criminal checks for all

employees wi1h access to secure areas.

Al1hough background investigation requirements need to be revised, it is

important 1hat airport opaatoil, lit c:miers and airport users comply wilh cum:n1

requirements. Our rec.."llt worl< at six airports foond 1hat these requirements were

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not being met For 35 pc1tCD1 of the employee Iiles Rviewed, ~hen: wu no

evidence 1hat a complete background investif!Biion wu paformed. Despite !Iris

failure to comply wi1h security requimnents, the employees wen: issued airport ID

and granted access to secure airport areas.

Also, IS pen:ent of the employee Iiles ~<viewed showed an unexplnined gap of

employment of 12 months or mon:, but the required FBI criminol check was not

paformed. Further, 9 pen:ent of the background verifications we Rviewed nsed

an unacceptable method, such as veriJYing an employee's background with a

personal reference or family member. The chsrt below S11111J118rizes the specific

noncompliance with background investif!Biion requimnents for the six airports

~<viewed.

• .No E~ of Comptellt 1-Y .. VCIItftcllt:!on aunuplt~~Md 12:-McMh o.p ac~ Nom crtntfmll cttedc .Un ;IIMtV..IR Ilion

I

AJ,_r 1 Ntpon z Ntpon" Ntpon" Ntpon ts Ntpon e ,... ................. Akpert

The most serious noncompliance wu at Ailports I and 2, which pamitted airport

users to self-certiiY 1hat background investif!Biions were paformed but had not

established controls to ensun: the investif!Biions were pmperly completed. For

example, 58 pcltCDI of the employee Iiles ~<viewed at Airport I did not bave

evidence 1hat a complete verification wu conducled of the S-year histmy. In

contrast, Air!Jort 6, with the lowest mil: of noncompliance, did not penDit ai.,.,n users to self-certiiY 1hat background investif!Biions were paformed.

IS

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We also found FAA bas not taken effective aolion to CII5UJe compliance with

current background investigation requimnents. For ClWI!ple, FAA performs

annual . oirport and air canier assessments of compliance with security

requirements and national assessments that fOCWl on areas that require special

empbasis. However, we found the assessments were limited in seope with rogml

to reviewing background investigation requirements. To illustrate, during on

annnal compliance review, FAA agents independently reviewed records for ODiy

oirport operaror employees and excluded airport user employees, wbere we found

the majority of deficiencies. Also, FAA's national assessments of compliance

mainly focused on oirport users at 20 major U.S. airports.

A/mort lD Controls. All six oirport operators we reviewed did not properly

account for airport ID or immediately deny access to secure areas when an

employee's authorization cbaoged. One of the primary requimnents of an

airport's access control system is the ability to immediately deny access to

individnals whose authority cbaoges, such as someone who bas resigaed. At the

six airports reviewed, 9 percent (234 of2,586 reviewed) of the IDs issued to

employees for access to secure oirport areas remained active even though the

employees no longer needed the access.

Air carriers and oirport usors were not notifying the airport immediately when an

employee no longer needed access. Although in some ipstances the employers

had the aolive IDs in !hair possession, others were kept by employees who had

resigned or had been tennina!ed. For example, a regional air canier could not

account for 22 (18 percent) of 119 aolive oirport IDs. Five of the IDs belonged to

employees terminated prior to 1998.

We will be issuing a report to FAA on our wotk on oirport ID coni!Ob. We will

be recommending FAA revise its background investigation requimnents, and

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work with airport openotors and air carrim to improve compliance v.ith

requirements for issuing and ACCOUIIIing for airport ID.

ACCESS CONTROL

Once hired, employees must be held ACCOuntable for compliance with airport

access control requirements. Onr December 1998 through Apri11999 testing of

airport access controls demonstrated significant ru:cess control vulnerabilities at all

eight airports visited. We suc.:essfully penetrated secure areas on 117 (68 percent)

of 173 attempts. Once we penetrated secure areas, we boarded aircraft openoted

by 3S different air carriers 11714 times. Passengers were onboard 18 of the aircraft

we boarded. In 12 instances, we were seated and ready for departure at the time

we concluded om tests.

In these tests, the human element c~ntinucd to be the primary access control

weakness. Tbe majority of our penetrations into secure areas that resulted in

testers boarding aircraft would not havo occurred if employees had (I) ensured the

door closed hahind them after entering the secure area; {2) challenged us for

foUowing them into secure areas; or (3) taken other steps required to restrict entry

into secure ereu, such u controUing pedestrian access through cargo facilities ond

vehicle gila.

After our testin& fAA conducted llpp<OXimately 3,000 tests at 79 airports in the

spriDs of 1999. FAA rq>Ofll:d that ils test resulll wen: "strikingly" different liom

our resuillll!d that c:omplilnce with access COIIIrOI requi=lenll had dnmolicaUy

improved. We have compktod a RVicw off AA '1 test data IIIII fonnd the lalllts

14 11 61 II,.,; . ' 1hla dlellll"'!!ber ~ ileo _..- llllll *eaft bolnfilall badJ. eqad 117. Naull .......,..,.......,._.,._ .......,..,-..,--

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were veey similar 10 those we repot!ed with resard 10 penetmting securo areas.

Specifically, FAA succossfuUy penetmted secure areas 56 percent of tho limos

tested venus our rate of 68 percent

FAA reported improvement because 96 percent of its tests ciid not result in testers

boarding aircraft for 3 minutes or more without being challenged However, our

testers were not required 10 remnin onboard aircraft for a specified period of time,

1111d some tests, such as driving through vehicle gates, could not result in boarding

aircmft Therefore, it is not accurate 10 compare FAA's test results 10 our results

in terms of aircraft hoardings.

In December 1999 and January 2000, FAA agents performed follow-up testing Ill

10 airports. They gained access to secure areas 40 percent of the times attempted

without being challenged by employees, and they boarded 13 aircmft In

February 2000, FAA npanded its testing 10 80 airports, resulting in FAA agents

penetrlllina securo areas 32 percent of the times attempted with 57 aircraft

boarded." Although accordingiO FAA the number of aircraft hoardings compared

10 the number of tests performed bas continued 10 decline, a different testing

protocol for boarding aircroft wiS 1Utd during each Msessmenl Therefore,

comparing test results wid! prior poriods and detctmining improvement in

compliance bMed on aircraft hoardings may not be appropriate.

FAA's test results demonstrate that aggressive testing can result in improved

compliance. Also, when FAA ensures tho! c:orrective actions are taken, occoss

control violations are reduced. For example, for one li1port we reviewed in 1999,

FAA's recent testing r.howed that tho employees continued 10 allow unanthorized

access. FAA demanded that c:orrective action be taken immediately. As a resul~

IS Tell Rlltllll.-e 11 ~Pebril:lly 23, 2000.

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securi1y guanls were posted at d<X>n entering secure ueas and ..:cess was

effectively controlled.

However, OIG and FAA testing alone will not be enough to motivate employees

to accept and consistently meet their responsibilities for airport security.

Employees must be held occountable for failing to meet their responsibilities for

airport security. In June 2000, FAA plans to issue regulations malting individuals

directly accountable to FAA for noncompliance with a<cess control requirements.

This would permit FAA to take enforcement ections against employees. FAA also

plans to issue regulations requiring airport operators to bevc a security compliance

program, which describes !he disciplinary actions and penalties to be assc•sed

when employees do not comply with security requirements.

STRATEGIC PLAN

FAA has made significant progress in deploying existing advanced security

technologies, including 92 FAA-certified CTX 5500 machines equipped with TIP

at 35 airports, 553 explosives trace detection devices Ill 84 U.S. and foreiga

airports, I 8 advanced technology bulk explosives detection ~-ray machines at

8 airports, and 38 CBT platforms at 37 airports. FAA will continue the acquisition

and deployment of CTX 5500s, explosives trace detection devices, and CBT

platforms. In addition, FAA will begin to deploy several other recently-certified

bulk explosives detection technologies, including one with a slower throughput

intended for small airports and low-traffic stations within larger airports;

TIP-ready x-ray machines for screening checkpoints; aad Threat Containment

Units. 16

16 Threat Coma.lnmcm Urtiu are mobile aHitli1Mn lhl!: provide a ate IDd ilotllai e:aviromaad to r'CIIOivc lllmd itcml diJcoveRd at ai.rpcrtl.

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FAA has also conducted or sJl01150Rd aviation secmity rosearcb, engineering, and

development oo bulk cxplo•iveo detection equipmen~ explosives tmce detection

equipmen~ integration of airport secmity technology, aviation secmity human

factors, and aircraft hardening.

lmprossive as the deployment of technologies is, FAA bus continued to focus on

the acquisition and deployment process, rather than on the nec<:JmUY transition to

integratiag all the various assets into a comprehensive, seamless secmity progmm.

In 1998 we recommended ~ to meet cumnt and future threats to aviation

secmity, FAA develop an integrated stmegic plan to guide il5 elf om and

prioritize funding needs. Concentmion on deployment (whnt to buy, when to buy

i~ and where to put it) is not the complete solution. This plan !lbould inclnde a

balmced approach covaring basic research, equipment deployment and use,

certification and operations tearing processes, data collection and analysis on

actual equipment and operator performance, and regulation and eoforeemr:nt.

FAA shnuld work with the aviation industry (air carriers, shippers, and airport

operators) in developing this integrated secmity plan.

The stmegic plan that we recommended has not yet been developec!. In onr

opinion, this mUll be douc to guide the future $600 million Facilitieo and

Equipment; and Reseordl, l!llgiDceriDg, and Development funding expected in

FYs 2001 through 2004.

M!. CltaimiiD, this concludes my stllemelll. I would be hippy to answer any

questions yon might have.

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Aviation Subcommittee March 16, 2000

Aviation Security - (Focusing on Training & Retention of Screeners)

Mr. Thomas M. Vaiden President, Aviation Division International Total Services, Inc. 5005 Rockside Road 1200 Crown Center Cleveland, OH 44131

Telephone: (216)642-4522 ext 615

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On behaH ollntemat10nal Tnt&l Services, also known as ITS, I would like to prl'lace my rei'I'IIIIM by staling that our company IS In complete and total support of a certiftCBUon process That said, I would like to take thi!o opportunity to acklreu our concerns regarding the applicabl~ty of the proposed certlf1C8tion process as Et pertams to our company specifically

Our concerns u'ICiude

I. Loss of Control Over Traimng Process II. Cr1Ucal Delays 1n Training Due to Background & Drug Tesllng Results Ill. Partner vs Secondary Recipient Role IV. CBT Tratnmg V. Clar1ftcal1on on OiS3bllilies and C1v1l Rights Categones VI. Cert1ficallon GUidelines VII. Fmanc~al Burden

I. loss of Control Over Training Process Because we lrequenlly operate 10 env1ronments short of necessary personnel, we nee<! to be extremely flexible and aggressive in our schedutmg of training classes and testing sessions If we need to delay such training and testing until an airline employee is present to oversee these sess10ns, it will only create addrllonat employee shortages and delays on the checkpoints

11. Critical Delays In Training Duo to Background & Drug Tutlng Results In the current environment. ITS simultaneously obtains documentation to verify background histories and drug testmg results white the students are in the initial stages of training The requirement that states that no training could be inL\1ated until all background historres and drug testmg results are completed will me,fllably lead to enormous delays in the training process. This element of the proposed certlfiC3tion process works in direct opposit1on against our often critical need to fill open \me.; at the checkpoint Additionally, it positions us 1n an "at risk" environment as rt relates to our ability to fulfill FAA mand;:Jtes as thev currently stanrl

ill. Partner vs. Secondary Recipient Role In a shared environment (accountability), we need to be considered, at the very least. an equal partner in \h1s certihcallon pro...:ess This means that compames l1ke ITS need to rece1ve material d1rectly from the FAA versus be1r.g the recipient of selected or mterpreted material from the airlines It makes sense that as the certif1cate holder, we would need to rece111e all information directly from the FAA to avoid m1scommunicat1on or lhe accidental oversight in information transmission

Along these same hnes, it is also necessary that companies like ITS should be able to gain approval d1rect1y from the FAA for modrfications to' our training programs, rather than havmg to obtain preliminary approval from the a1rlrnes Agam. as the certif1cate holder. r•1e may, in many cases, be able to more qu•ckly recognize what is needed 1n terms of implementation as it relates to full comptrance wr\h all FAA mandates

IV. CBT Training Wlule we certarnly understand the requirements of the Engtrsh language capabrlity. a more flexible approach rs necessary to allow for a pos1t1ve rnstructor/student environment The approach offered by the NPRM certolocai!On gurdelrnes suggests that CBT would be applicable in all Circumstances Many screeners have lillie to no experience with personal computers. includrng senror cit1zens who make up a large percentage ol our work force A "point-and·Ciick" enwonment could be drffrcutt lor many employees who otherw1se, under drfferent testrng circumstances, understand the materraVcontent ol the testmg Additionally. many screeners may not have a level of fluency 1n tho English language necessary to process the standard CBT format

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v. Clarification on Disabilities and Civil Rights Calegorlea ITS needs clarifiCCitJon on the speCJh(. requuement&lor the Amencan D•sabtllbes Act and Ctvll Rights categones $0 that we can wholly lulftll the comptehflnSIVe requtremcmts of the 1) FAA. 2) DOT, and J) ADA On a ·gotng forward" basts. we would need these Federal Government <mttllt!S to wont Closely together to ensure that all tram•ng reqUirements are f' lStly und<Hslood by prov!dms to accomplish t~.e lollowmg

guarantee thi'ltlr<ltntng programs can be destgnetl Implemented and tntegrated w.tn relatwe speed serve the lull tntent of the law

VI. Certification Guidelines In 1hatiTS serves appro••mately 106 atrports tn the llllllcd States cornpns1ng appro~tmatety BO% of the commerctal factllttcs. we are very concernt:!'d about the certtftcat1on process 10 terms of Slte-speco11c enforcement Addottonatl~ 10 the rare mstam:e when de-certtftcatton mtght P'"~e ,"'IDhcabte.the recerttflcahor> process must be thoroughly and clearly e~tplamed Gtven th~·~t! concerns we ask the foiiOWiflQ

We request that the FAA prov1de deta1led mformallon relat1ve to lhe1r lfltl!rnal h1erarchy to 1) facthlate the mtent of the certlflcat•on process and 2) clearly defmr.the areas of responstbtloty Thts could be accomplished v1a organtzallon charts def1n1ng areas of dtrect responsibility

In 111ew of the 11me constra1nts associated with the trainmg reqUirements outhned m the certtl1cal10n guidelines. we request that current employees be "grandfathered" mto their postttons, rather than retramed under the formal certif1ca\10n guidelmes for new employees

If retentton of a service prov1der cerllflcate IS predicated on overall TIP performance. delmot1ve QUideltnes must be establoshed pnor to imptementahon of the program ThiS witt preclude an overly subjeCtive approach to acceptable performance

VII. Financial Burden Gwen the precedent that has been set with regard to costs lor trace detec\10n eqwpment. and in vtew of the S22-24 m1tlton prevtously stated as apphcabte to the cer\lflca\lon process {TIPS). one quest1on we1ghs heavily

Is 11 reasonable to expect that federal fund1ng can be anltcopated w1th regard to future costs assoc1ated w1th equ1pment upgrades?

In the absence of federal aSSIStance. it IS felt that the f:nanctallmptica\lons of the certtftcatlon process may welt deal a debtlllallng b!ow to avialton ~unty as we know 11

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ADDmONS TO THE RECORD

Tatlmoay Submitted by Rep. Louloe M. Slaugh..,. (Do NY) Committee oa Tnmaportatloa ••d IDfrutnactare, Subeommf«ee em Arimtioa JleariBc;

Avlatloa Sec:urity (Foaulac on TraiahlgA Retcadoa ofSereeaen) March 16.%099

I want to praise the Cha.inntul and Ranking Member for holding this hearing and for their continued attention to aviation safety.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) deserves pmisc for prioritizing computer-based training for security screaters at the nation's busiest airports. 1be Government Accounting Office and the Inspector Oeneml have cited the lack oflnlining u a primaiy reaon for either the poor utilization of equiD,Dlcnt or the improper use of equipment. i strongly believe that the professionalism of the security workforce. including airport screeners, must be i.nercascd. Aviation security sc1eeners are the front line of defense in protecting our nation's flyers. It is critical that ftur airlines be able to select the best qualified candidates and provide them with the most up to date, state of the art traln.ing.

It is my understanding that :his computer-based training is a module of the Screener Proficiency Evaluation and Reporting System (SPEARS) being developed by FAA to select, train, evaluate and monitor the performance of employees who operate the X-ray screening checkpoints. Airlines can use this module of SPEARS to test candidates and select those who show the greatest potential for the job. The new screeners undergo an intensive course of self-pl\ced, realistic learning using the new workstations, and later use the workstations for any needed refresher training. The new computer-based training system ensures high- quality, standardized screener training, provides opportunities for realistic practice with all types of threats, reduces the overall training time, and combines training with performance testing.

I would like to call particular attention to Safe Passage International Inc. lOC;J!ed in my district of Rochester, N.Y. The FAA and Safe Passage have had an ongoing relationship since 1993, when the FAA entered into a partnership to support the SPEARS effort. Safe Passage courseware is deployed in over 120 airports, in 20 countries on five continents. The company's courseware is translated into eight languages. Safe Passage has sold its courseware to governments, airports, guard companies and airlines.

Since 1998, Safe Passage has developed special reporting capabilities unique to FAA needs, expanded its data collection and data management J;llpabilities, significantly enhanced its security and encryption capabilities, developed the functionality to launch other software, and created the capability to conduct recurrent and remedial training. Simultaneously, Safe Passage developed seven new courses for the FAA. Six courses trained security personnel on various pieces of equipment One course, the Pre board Screener Tmining Course (PSC), trained checkpoint screcners on their duties and responsibilities.

In 1998, the FAA av:arded Safe Passage an $11 million contract to install the SPEARS computer-based training workstations and train instructors on its usc at up to 60 airvorts. The contract included software and multimedia computer platfonns that would be installed in airport

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classrooms, with each classroom m:eiving two to ten sepuu1e Wt>rkstalions. A future feature of SPEARS would be the Threat hmgc Projcaion (TIP) module that will be installed dirccdy onto airport X-ray screening machines. With TIP, scrcencrs would see llrtificial imBges of improvi5Cd explosives devices and other tlut:at objecb projected onto imAges of real bags they are mooitoring at the X-ray stations. TIP is capable of projecting thousands of realistic 1hn:at imagn in different c:on.figurations that will automatically fit the dimensions of real bags.

But tlw FAA contm<:t has now been reduced to $1.7 miUion, with only 19 aiJport slated for the use of this technology. Moreover,l have been informed that the FAA int.c:nds to encourage olhcr companies to dev:lop competing software, and that thiJ wmpctition will ~tude e foreign company. I am a strong supporter of the fcdcml govcmment'sefrorts to procure the bet product Ill a competitive price. But 1 do not support procurins: such sensitive technology from abrorad while companies in the U.S.Iike Safe Passage (whicb tw invested sutma.ntW resources in ilCW equipment and staff) are abandoned. Safe Passage dev,eloped its opemtina sysb!m prodigiously to FAA expectations. This software and cowxware bold linle mukct value outside the scope ofF AA's ~.

It ls my strong hope that the FAA will contin:.~e to view Safe Passage as 11 valuable resource in its effort tt' improve security, and I look forward to hearing from the FAA regarding their commitment to the SPEARS project.

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I am p!cDed 10 sub.nil die C!ldo=:d at!ltcma:ll cf my ~ OS I, for the ramd. Tbc staer::mcl:d m.s 10 the he:aina bdd O:D Mad1 16_ 2000 £ocuaU:ss on Training aad ~ of """""'-Thaul!: you for yow CODSidcra!ioo. ~ would be brppy 10 aa5WCI' eny questions you IDisbt have.

SU=dy,

~ STEVEN T. KliYKENI>All Member of CoDcrcss

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t:hJRI"i+t4~' Raplecen SOcuriiY -.Inc.

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'lllreal laup l'rejectloa (I1P) ud TIP ready X·r.y Systnu for

Secariey Sc!'eaH:r Tn.ba.bl& aud Evaktatlos

AprU 14,2000

Lee me ~ by th&nkina tbc Cbairmaa and tho IUbl;:onuai:seo for allowina us 1be opponunity to submit testimony oc this very iDJrortD illoe. AlaJeldinaaupplia- of x-ray IOCWity ~)'Stem~ we 1'IOI't with every upo;t ofaviatioa sccuril}·. bu1oooc mora cloecly tbaa fiOetlrity Ja'DCIICn. Ow iDvotvancat with tbo FAA Tedmic:aJ Cemler overtbo put S-yesn baa alknwd various HUIIWI Facun pt!Jl'MM to pros:n:a into field trid\1. Support aDd advmccmcatoftbcsc progmns was made poaiblc by imcmal Rapiseaq COipCII'1Ille f'undiDg. The 1'bmd fn.qe Projection {TIP) ptOgBI'll wu instituted in tbo fall of 1997, after laboBlofy and f.eld ecrtif!Calion ofRipiscan cquipmmt. to dd.r:rmine the df'ecdvmeu and dar.- reportina reliability of a TIP r=dy x-ray sy1tem. ("ITJC). For a ftvO-mOIItb period end in& in mid 1991a total orJO+ RJpilean TRX S)'f4CmS {ecrtifled) 1'IUe installed and iD ~»~:at lix major airport~. To date thea J)'Stelnll are still openDmaJ and I1!Dd to coiJcd cvalllllion dltL

We submillt.is t.estimooy as to dcmonsfnte tblrt Rlpisem TRX S)'Siem$ have moved bcyoCid '"praUJt)'pew sutus. While $000 manufi!CtumS continue Ill~ &oehnic.al iDCffieiencies (equipment limit.tion.s), Rapi....a and cauin odJer mmur.ctutcrs are produc:ingopentional TRX S)'I&CmJ. Cumntly, we arc one of throe veodcn qUIIifted, and undueomr.ct, to deploy r.omc 100 TRX I)'SlmlS in tbo next 24-montbs. W~~J arc pleucd to sec progress witfJin tbo FAA to ~ I«Urity and opcnUJrdl'ccti~mm by dcployina: TRX S)'lllCmJ. bowever, we mnain con<:«ned diM tbis kdulieal propess over the put two r-:: bu btaef"rtcd foreign govemmcots tiKI cifizaul before our OW!!. In tbe last yar our ~ bu bom coatraetcd to supply over SOO TRX I)'JtemS to mhance *W'icy in OCher eountrics; of Mtieh 200 have &lrc&dy been instJikd. RapiJclrl TRX systems cumotly ~ well over 90'Y. of the TRX l)'ltemS deployed in aviation ltCUrity eovironmeab worldwM!c. As of tbis date, the FAA hu not issood a comprdlatsive plan to tUc f\lll•.fvantaF oftbiJ l«boolofly by mandatinG IUppOf1 prognrns. sucua oqoin& operator traitlllllo dacabue manascmcnt and opcrator pcdormanee cktA rcportins. dW will ensure the cominued sucuss of the propm. We rcspoctfully CflCOUd£C' the SubCAmmkke to exerciJe incP.:aMd ovenls;bt of these very important and noccssuy prosnm

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numerous repf"eleftt&tives from natiorfal aeromwtical authorities- amori& :han a aepsur.ntui~ of

my authority- unanimou1Jy ~ ~ objcaiocu to this pr~r· Furtblmnore. tho Gcnnon Fedcnl Gov<mmcnt uiCd -~ poslibiHiy of MUfmg~tional comments in • bymeansotNot.Velbtleno.~or21 May 1999.Ia ordCI' to avoid R:petition. I wau1d to rdct to the ln!ltCial contenl of ibis Nvtc:. 1be

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Admlnisuarion to rcpcal the law. Nei tbe PM north« tJS Dep

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My C~ G~neral for ~1·1,j;,~ ~;~;·to your ~~o~-· SWim commM\tls on tha ~ Mlendments to pvt 1251.25 of Federal fttgulation.s of the \Jnih:ij' Grata conc;emlng the Scc:urity grama of Forcign·l4r

concemed "'•' ame b U'ICI'I~tco~.<Ufn p aee..AlaOitie ,_nave -"'"""'An•g ~rs. th~ ~~ =g*· en,!~~~} ~1wrtfl1n~now ~~~-- 2- •• ~~:.1 ~~u-ft abundanUy dnr theyWll be o Bged ta fmplement the -rc~omiail ~ ptOvislon next year utlles$ U1e law ,.._ •• ,..

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You wiU r.caD fh:U In my Dinsc:taf= letter. we pointed out lile set' COI'\IelqUenCM 1h• -.Ia1cb AmMdma1r c:cukS hava~r the upe" at fulunl coo · of cperattons and lindy also under eccnomic::al ai)eGIS far the whofe eviDtfon indus if the Hate~~ Amend-mantw.rato btl aJfowod to go uncheCked. In adcfrricn to th q~o~estion or slot Jo.sHs

~-- ,JiM\CflO)Ioll!lt- ... -.~~,.--· plemenwy owrall casts at USC 7,611"11111Cn per year. Furths re, I WDUld like tct ,_ tl!ol SwiTz.oJ1&nd Ia going a C<OIIIy ,_..... ofimpletn l'llng 100% hold toag. a=9t1 scruning on all flights. In s perspec:dve we are ecmrineed cecuffty measur• laJcen at Swiu airports are at I aimllartc tnase taJcan at U.S. CIW ecf we. ~ foro. do net Me any reason tor lntroductlon of any meuui'H at U.S. airports.

TheJioJd!Amondmentis lol>fe!Qiho SwiUG.,..I1lii!OIII. .lhaFM~.ollliTiod to bring i1 into force. then yau • uld be In no doubt thai we WfH not faemtete Us lmpla-mematlon In SWitzemL-.d, 1~. ma .PIQIIP8c:t of th• ~SA Dying ta lh• ACll ~ :serfous concerns aDciatwp iff ads an tutur• c:o-opemtlon our GcmmYnlnt en aviation secvrfl)' and on c.ou~,...lerrorism In general. If lhe FAA ule w•r•lo be ap-piiWto:~d, i.W:;~;',;.;. :.::;:~ ~s;j1otherthanfor • a~~~ll;l'» eporaflcn uncfltf Annex 17 of th Chicago Convontlon and torus to • ln dole co-

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C!:f...:$. Cr<;;~·AsOi!IDUA CONlliJLDNG BNGINI!BIIS

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COMMI1"l'EE ON11tANSJ'alTATION 41.NPRAST1lUCTURS

S una: on AYiatioa US HGIIIOof~ ll51 RHOB w~.oc:zos1'

Anc:ribon: Mt DIMd Sdtsfra<ouaad

Dear Mr Sc.llafrcJ·

Dllnfts OIU' pboDe COIMllllhiM lHt \\'liCk you Ulkt me tNI: their .,.. 1 pro1!km hsvizl& ~ wi!Nn the FAA f!lllld 1hc addiOaall dDlflm .-kd for laY team to OCiftiPlde the reiiiCIIf'CII em Ole LDJ Jmd ct.e N.lm:lw

-""""'-· I Wllh to call )'OW' 811CS10a &o the book you 1CZ11 me on diU IIBtljcct. I n Rfenu!IIO dKiplcr f'M. Wd!ua tNil ~ arolncral bJ the CIIIINIIdtCC WI ""'* a• ~- Two a ' kwM liiOOd oa1 m my aW!d. 11ae ftnC- die 1 1 km dal WPM f1Md dU&pmjealo~ 1bc IICIIXJfad .,.. for the P AA DOt 10 MAJIIDA'B d!e mti!XS irdo -.: tt:ac: COidllillc:n mlli1 the pokl!iU1 pchicmlfi'Cr'e ~-!he Nanvw Body Ain::nft. My ..... ._ die~ 6om 1M PM 10...,_ diM prvbkm_ We .W RqUire~ dolllnloa:aplcte IDd a ~ail~ m ~ oltldlyar for tile PAA

ltu nOdb aotu~~thll wl!cl die P AA bdd ftiiCCtlnp Y11d:l various pa!plc 011 die ~ cmiiiiDd by PANAM 103 die D1naor or Ariletoll Scamly for die PM WH a:JUplcUolll bJIWI ~ Vel PWIpmclft boCIIht iftto dill boUafthlt tile a6riiMI-=e &Die& to lollC IS bdUos doUm ~ lhcJ ..W Mve to \tiC dleiC c:ontaiacn. All ..J)'Ilil do. by Emil A YOIDIJibta dwl tJrc mlida oaly aee five of ~~=tie CO!Il&iaenOBwl!kbodyain:nft. Bucdo.M~aacl ;g 11 r' ,- IMD.W.SWC*Id~ Chc COlli 011 ;o the Jli2MC8IIII' the CCIIIdaMn wu dtll Ulifta lbe IIIIIIDI' ollnYdl:n oa 1lrida body llirc:raft the A!ltiDes WOIIk1 miP 11.66 bllbon dolkn wonk (I( rm:aue -..ly, , .. 11ft yea ant IIWIU'B .... Chc ---IIYb-r 0111 ~c:::ewpl --........ Sllould ....... can)'ilta carp with~ Fa1Y1p1 dlilu • qDC~UGD for coapca 10 8ddral Mill dae atrlma.

U you nail I to&dyca the SbleofWliCOIIIUiball • ~aomce ta Oen!lay. We Mw IMl 'lrilll die people: tram. J..aftlllnllto dl~~e~a our~- TMy have IIMIOd • badt la Mrly October 10 .-widl d!e pllllSllc wb:o IDikc d!cclcc:tiiOU for E&!ropc. We WIU be~ ft1lh ~ otLaft..._a tbl: <icna:a ~ 14Cfucqo UIIJic DCXI daRe Meb. Thdr ~ b!Mibcealltiq;tlwlotk US Altlille um.try. J do~ lllld:rltadbow UAL ll.udlc capital to pay fer IIII«JJtt' mdl. US Alna)'land c:a~BJt bdp m ~ lhc COII'I ofiOmll::tfwiJ &hit **W b:: iM8dMofy !of ..tccy -s MCWUY CoJ n. ,......,..

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The Honorable John Duncan 2400 Rayburn House Office Building Washington. DC ;'05 I :"i

Dear Congressman Duncan·

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June 23. 2000

I appreciated your comments and questions during last week's hearing on the proposed merger of United Airlines and IJ~Airwnys (Howe Tran.~portntion Committee 6115100) as well as your '-'"illingness to allow olUr VP of Corporate /\ffair:1, ·r ammy Lee, to h:stify in my place before your cur•lmiuee

I h.:lie\·c you :ll't: truiy suppurt;vc of C·.>mpcwiru, and making air travel more afli•rd~·blc. s;ul!r and ··o~o\'<!'Oicnt f(•r all AmcriciUls,

I al:o;o read with imcrc.~l in the June 5 osc;uc cf /wiation Dally about your lJill whrd• .... ·ouiJ tightcu standards for Airport Security Screenen. In your Dill. you propose expandin~ the liM of crimes th.1t ""ould disqualil)' sumeonc from bccommg a'l uirport security scrcener.

Whrle this is a step in the right dircctim., I bchcvc c\en more can be done by airpons. the: FAA and airlines to improve the quality ofscrecners.

Pan of the problem is that many airpons subcontr.!ct this service to a groundhandling company or other tnir<c~ pany wi',ereby ··quamy · ot'u:n Occomes a.n1u~ennought tv aliordabUU)'. \'t"nm: security should be the top priority for airpons, it is ofter1 among the least imponant priorities for airpon investments •• leaving the security imercsts of the airpon and the airlines in the protection (in the loosest sense of the word) of some of the lowest-paid and lea.-tt-trained airpon personnel.

As the CEO of an airline, this concerns me greatly because ultimately it i<J the airline that will be fined by the FAA for a :>ecurity breach or worse yet, responsible for actions taken by any person who puts its passengers in danger.

CIJ/11/1/UC;/

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In addition to the bill you are proposing, I would also like to see a provision that encourages airports, the FAA and airlines to collaboratively improve the safety of the traveling public by:

• Eneournging the FAA to set higher training standards for airport screeners

• Encouraging airpons to recruit higher quality employees, provide better training and retain employees thmugh incentive programs

Encournging dirlines to assist in fonnulating standards for airpon screeners and provide flight passes as incentive rewards for quaJity screeners

These are just some initial thoughts on how we could enhance your airport security bill by rn.mking others accounUlble for this vital effon.

Please let me know if I can assist you with the issue in any way or contact my Vice President of Airpon Affairs. Tammy Lee, at 651/681-4840.

Bill La Macchia. Jr. President and CEO

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Na.tlo1111l AMOd•t'oo of SecuiltF A La; us 's '+e B.qp•'.,... 8300 Colesville Road, Sui[e 750, Silver Spring. MD 20910

Phone: 3011585·1844 Fa: 30115854442 E-mail: staff@n:uir.org Internet: www.nasir.org

August 9, 2000

John Duncan, Representative Chair, Hou....-.e Transportation & Infrastructure Committee-Avialion 225 I Rayburn House Office Building Washington. D.C. 205 IS

Dear Rep. Duncan:

I wou1d like to take this opportunity to introduce you to the Ntlliolttd A.ssocllllloiJ ofS«arlly flUid lnvutlgllllvt! Regllf•tor, Inc. (NASIR). NASIR is a professional organization dedicated to the enhancement of industry regulatory programs and professionalism of security and investigative services.

As a professional security and investigative association. we have adopted a position of concem regarding the unsafe conditions created by the lack of adequate bockgrmmd investigations of passenger and baggage screening personnel. We believe that in not conducting comprehensive backgrounds that security at airport facilities is compromised.

NASIR has specifically identified the lack of comprehensive criminal background checks of airport passenger/baggage ~ng personnel. It is NASIR's position that a key security responsibility is held by this staff. There is an ineffective application of a mandatory crimina] history record chock. with indisputable disqualification criteria that compromises the safety and security of the traveling public.

NASIR's membership includes active participation of state and provincial government regulators of these indusuies. It po55eSX5 substantial knowledge and expertise in rnatter.J of !le:Cllrity and wi!hcs to make that expertise available to you in addressing this serious concern.

II is understood that this is a federal concern. however, NASIR feels it is incumbent upon our organization to express ils position of concan and offer iLs ~. Pleax feel free to conuct me regarding any manr.::r ofwistance we ma~· be to you. 615/532-9160.

~ .. ~~! .. DonnaW.H~ President NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECVRITY AND INVESTIGATIVE REGIJLA TORS

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~ lnVWon Technologies

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INVISION TECHNOLOGIES RECEIVES f7 .8 MILUON ORDER FROM F.AA FOR EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS

NEWARK, CA- (July 20, 2000)- In VIsion Teeht1Gicgla, Inc. (Nasdeq: INVN) today announced thld the Fodera/ ~.·.~ Administration ("FM1 has ordered $7.0 million of the compeny's CTX 5500 OS and CTX 2500 ~osive ~~action systems ("EOS"J and anclltefY Items. The company plans to shfp these systems In the third qu.rter or 2000.

'"This Is a delivery order under the new contracts with the FAA that we announced In March: saki Sergio Maglstrl, lnvtsSon's President and CEO. "This order demonstrates the FAA's continued $1dlsfac:tlon with and confidence In our EDS technology and connrms the Federal government's .mgolng dedication to Improving aviation security.M

"lam happy to atso repoft !i'lllt the hardware problems encountered at the end of the second quarterr and discussed in our earlier ntrw:i release hDve bo11tt1 rectified Bnd that we plan to ship those umts this quarter.• continuod Or. Maglstri.

lnVrsion Technofogies develops, manufactures, matkets and supports explosive detection systems based on advanc:ed Com!"..lted T omogfllphy (CT) technology for civil aviation security. Today, OVItt' 200 F~ CTX systems have been shipped worldwido to provide the tmveting public with the best SfiCurity agaenst ttHTorism available. The compony also develops, manul'ac:ttHes, mlllbts and supports CT -bNed systems for other •ppllcations, lnctucHng wood

'"""""' ond ..... -· lnVtsion's whoHy owned subsidiuy, Quantum Magntltlcs, dttwlnps and comrnercia~es patented and proprietary technologies. These include, but are net limited to. Quadrupole Resonance (QR) petWib Hcensed from the Naval Research Laboratory, that ate bllsed on stateof-tho-art, Jow..cost version of megnetlc reson•nc• adapted for explosive detection.

In Vision's whoM) 011med subs.ldiary, lnov.c, develops, m~~nufacbns, mmkMs and supports scanning, optimization and control ISySttlfn$ fof the forest products Industry. Today, over 600 systems have been tnsbttled in mlh worldwide to produc:a more lumber from ach log and to control product quality. Addtionallnformatlon about lnVislon can be obtained on the c:ompany's web site at hltp:Jiwwtv lny!slon-tech com.

This news reiMse cont.ams fo~ooking statementslncludlng statements regarding projoa.d revenues. lnvutors ere cautioned to com:lder the Important risk factor$ that could cauu lld:WII results to differ l'nllltedlllfy from those In the forw'llftHooklng statements In this news retoasa. These statements lnvotv• Rsb and uncertaintiu, Including risks k\herent to doing bualnas with pubic agenc:ln, such u lfmfted funcfing; n.sc. Inherent In manufacturing and delivMtng products on time; end otfw rtaks d«aaied from lime to time In tM corrtpMy"• SEC reports, lnckldlng the moat recent reports on Forms 1().Q and 10.K. ...

CTX 5SOO OS and CTX 2500 are ndemerks of lnVIsktn Technolog+es, Inc.

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Ul'l

Threat Image Projection (TIP) Ready X-Ray (TRX) Contract Award

Today, the FAA will aw~~rd contncUto Wee verulcm for the prodU<:tion of llm:ctlmage Projection (TIP) Ready X-Ray (TRX) system>.

The contr¥15 are indefinite delivery/indefmitequantil)' (lDJQ) with a 1\WMteCd minimum purc:twe of I 00 units from caeh of lhc following three vendors:

Rapiscan Seauity Products, HAwthorne, CA

PerkinElmer lnsnuments. Lons Beach, CA (fonnerly EG.I!:G Asuophysics, headquanercd in Wellesley, MA)

Heimann Systems, Ine .• Pine Brook. NJ

Each of the three contracts will have provisions to order up w a maximum 800 uniu. Maximum value for each of the Uuee conn¥lS is approxinuuely $40,000,000.

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1118

FAA News API\65-00 Fri.. ScpL a, 2oou CODUIICT. ~ Ttaln Phone: 202·267·3462

FAA Namn Harvey Natloaal Sc""'""" of die Y car WASHINOTON-J~~DC F. Ocvqo, ~ufd:lc U.S Dcpanmcnr ofTranspotWioa's Fedctal A~ .,A..dmlnistmrlon. and 1cpo: ri'f'D tiom lh=: aviatioo indu5uy IOda)' ~ lbis)car'~ N&tioaal ~oflhe YCM Awud «o Aubrc1 .. BiD"" Harvc) Jc., acl:.ttkprriAI ~«t>rit)' Sl4Jd"isor !or United Airlines Ill Chicago o·~ lDkmatiouJ Ai.-pon. Harvr:). a cmpluyce wilb ~gbt Securit)', tteeid tb: award ina«mneny ar FAA~

-M•innoinina c:ooJlll;ftt "igilaoce Vthilc ~~at~ of the' busiest airporu in die worLl is a~ ac:h1 •c:mcnt. .. Oarvc:y said.. -we u!Ull:: Bill tbney fot bU wadi: as a ~. a supm.isor and a uaina fO'r United u O'Huc, \\'bere he consistcady striwes fer supmor pc:rforrnantt both an l:.inuelfand in the~ he en-men. ..

~ Admini2mnur for Civil Avielion S¢uriry Catha; L. Fl)'Dll abo~ Herve, Md ~&11 oftbeoadon',. •viarion sc:curity~ -A:J harried p!d~ 'W~ fort;n thfo tecUrity "-~~~.nut to slow U:5 down. but to make sure our fli&bU are safe,'" he mid. -am Harvey aDd bis colla&ucs play a vital rok ia aviation Sttt.'l'itt. and~ owe lbem a debe of anmtudoe tor thcic wo-.;t in prot.ectin& the aalion. :1 skies. ..

IU a dxckpoi!U sccuriry supervisor (or Uniu:d Airlines Ill Cbiea&o O'Hau-, Harvey~ S«Urily tOrtbt: world's largest airline: .e.t oncofi:M world's bu.Jicst Airpons.. Afkr Mina bin:d b,. Af¥l:Dbricbt Sc:curily in 1996, be wa quidO) ~ bJ chcckpniDJ ~t)' ~end a cati&d duuoom 4Dd advmced equipmcnl rraincr.ln 11191, Hevey !Kip:d detect a 12-gau;~ sbutaun. which rnulle'd in lllJ em:sc; ad in 1999, be comrolkd an anempccd ~urity bmlch. ptC'VmliDs coumless pasxnger delays oaod abo rnultina in an arrest. As I! rminer ad ~iS«. Harvey is invol~ in n"'J ftSF'-1 ~~ scc:urit) screeningac Chk&Ja O'll.l.rc, ~be bat en <St>bli>hed r<pUWion fer cxtmplory pcrr...,...,..

EYCrJ )car,lhe avcrace ~~men= thin 300,001.1 bap mel ISO.OOO pas~. In 1998, ~ ~ worfdon:.t ~ 1.9 bllliao ~and detected mon:tb:m I,SlS ~.lbc FAA, Air Tmupon As5oc:llrion. R.eaioneJ Airline Assoc:i;r.rion. Ni~Maal Atr Camc-r A:ssociation, Air L!.ne PUo1• .1\ssocUttion IIQIJ A!neric&n AtJOCladon of Airpon Exeeurivn !pmtor this annual nwud 10 ~r lhe best sa:uriry ~from • pool of rqiOMJ v.-in.nen. -A to rln.,rtllfK "'JIIM IIJ lhu,...,., rrkeA· '' Rll'fMIMk...., ,,_

W011IJ Wlllr trill e11tnpi~••JM JwloJPtlpfl"""r: r/rtl

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THE SECRETARY OF Tft.AHGPORTATIOH

WAIK:NGTOH., o..c. -February 10, ZOOO

The- John J. Duncan, Jr. ChUmsn, Subc:onun!ttue on .&.vtaUon Comml!looonT~andl..-.o U.S.HouooofR..,_ w..hlngton, DC 20515

Ilea· Mr. Chal.mon:

RECEIVED

•rs 1 s rooo

On J.lnuary 20, 1998, ldetl;rmlned lha! .-.security.......,.. were not being malnla!nod and corrlod out at Port-au-l'rlnco lmemat!onal Allport, Port-au.Prlnco, Haiti. lthenofofelo&ued Order98-1-24dlnldlng-~ oflhopubic- proce<luma ~by 49 usc§ 44907,lncludlng lhe requiroment lha! all U.S. air caniero and fotC!gn air c:anlenl providing oervk:e between the Uni!od s-and Port..,u-Prlnco pn>Vi<lto notk:o of my delenn!naOOnlo anypun:llaslng alk:kel between lhose dos1fna11ons.

In the last )'081, the Government of Haiti hos made extensive efforto 1o Improve security at the airport. During the period of January 18-21, a loam ofFeden!IAvia'<m Admln!stmUon aviation oecurity opec:lallsts visited the airport lo -. securi!y. - upon lho findings of the loam, I havo now dotonnlnod that ef!eotive security """"""""""' being maintained and carriad out at Port-au.Prirn:e International Allport. Accoltllngly, I om lilllng the DOT Order that Imposed the public notiflcollon requiroments.

The U.S. llepar1mont of Slate It! In file procoss of delivering the enclosod tetter 1o the Haitian Minister of Public Woma, Traneport, and CommunicaUons Informing him of my delerlnlnaUon.

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On .tam.-y 23. 1oot~, I noUfte.cS you thsd I hed dftaill*ood lhst PorS-eu-P'rf:nc hdeliliillkAiiii!IAirport did not rMin1llln end~ otfec:ttve aecurly ~ llharefora dnlded vfa OrdlttG-1.-24Ihel .. ~ pubic itA'

7

•

requkamOntl mendl:led by 48 usc §44807 be ihdl 7 r; lii ...... Aid.

On thebetbda.Januaty 11-21,2000. Feden!IAWIIklnMmlrdab&dkw• aecurtty I Gilt ofPoft«t..Prtnco lrdsai .......... Mpart. I hlwe deUmlned 1'1&1 ..

Mport now rnalnl!llnl aRI2 adn'Ji&lrJltibii.......,. MCJrRy ~

Allllched 8 a lilct8t to Mr. Sergo Ralphelf,lng.., Mlnldlf cf Pubic Wodla. T .......... ond~ofHalll. ,......, __ ... U.S.Oepobi•d ofS'*_my_ID_~·--

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!

M:. Se<go ~.lng. -'JIPubllcWorko, T"""I)CMt.

ondCc>mrn.-.. Part-. Holll

!leo< Mr.-

141

1 w.mt to expraa my llh»nn app1 cietion to you and yow collellguu for the HCWity i:mprO'cl .. , ... a that have been implemelltod lit Port....u-Prlnee fntematkmaJ Airport. The -ofthoF_A_•'•dllllulolr-o(FM)hoopnwldod~noporton,...._. lhecu-11!<1--bytho-~and lho entn airport community to lmpfe;a•lt dec:tlve eecurily I1'MIMUf'N.,. noteuuudiy.

M you 111'8 III'MIII'II, 111 October 199711ifpact llllllrnet"4 by FAA Halltty II' I ell 1 It& -"""""""" olgnii!C64- of -'!yilt Part-holomlilfuuol Airport 11181 loll below tho mlnl.num -idoods requlnld by Annox 17 of tho ~ Convellllo!• -an !loilo ~llonl1lllolo,lmads • -~~~~~-· llialtho olrpmt did not malrol8ln ond __ _.,. __ OUr-----· COi-illoiOO-<Iay l>lriod during----,....- oooc:urity pemonnool to-tho oooc:urity -· A e•lb11qtlltlt .....atrhlnt In .lenuwy 1Q9S nJV'8IIIed that &~~though aome irrtprovements

hOd- mads, ---·iidl ... - had not -.~mp~o .... -. ·---by u.s . ._ to notify tho..-. ondto noqulow- oorvlng Part.-Prtnce ltlt&iMticwtel Alfpa«t to nomy MJ p111 111191f P\RhUing :a tk:ket between the

Unllad --Part---oooc:urity --notbolng ----On January 18, II tHin of FAA MCUrtty apaclanats returned to,....._. aecurtty at Poft. IIU-Prtnce lntemaUonal Akport I am WfY piMHd to report that the I8CUrity apoclnMstw found -ny meaouroslil tho oirpolt now.- 011 s-or Annox 17.

1he Govemmont of Holll ond tho -Airport Aulhcflty .... to bo ~o!Od lor

-----ln--.g -lmportoo~oooc:urity-. Tho ----·or,......-. oooc:urity_.oei....., C!lllclollntho -y -of lhlo -· I om now reoc:lndloog tho Onlor thlllimpuoed tho putllc- requRmonto.

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!'1(

1 -you to mo1ntm1n your high- rA euppatt ror 111<1 llirporiiiUiho<IIJ onc1 1111 -· SUdiiiUPIJOIIII-toenouro--111 Port-eu-1'11nceiAllporl CO<Itlnlln -· Thlo euppatl will be oopedllly lmporlanl OYOf time w pemonnol "'*"'" occur. I have -lho FAA to- ..-.g you 1r ..,...tng -lho- oocurlly ,__,_In place ot tile llirporl..., ..-. To -tond. ""plan to c:onllnUo --to Porl-eu-1'11nce -AIIpafl. lo\lowlll-llleexaol -"'---In odvanoltlhn>uglllho u.s.~. The U.S. Government apptll I ttm the attentkm you have gJyen to this Important MCUifty .-. The oatlolfoclo,yconduolon donwn""'_lhe_working_lllolpour

""""'""" enjoy.

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RECEIVED JUN ·7 2000

106TH CONGRESS H R A529 IIOO.Joi!IIJ.Illmcii!,Jr. 2D SESSION e e "':

To amend title 49, United States Code, to prohibit the empl")ment of certain individuals in po:itions afleeting air transportation security.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY24, 2000

Mr. DUNCAN (for himself, Mr. SHuSTER. Mr. 0BERSTAR. Mr. LIPJNSKJ, Mr. SwEENEY, Mr. EHLEBB, Mr. LAHooD, Mr. COOKSEY, and Mr. GARY MILLER of Califomia) introduced the following biU; which was referTed to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

A BILL To amend title 49, United States Code, to prohibit the em

ployment of certain individuals in positions affecting air transportation security.

Be it erwcted by tM Senate and H~J~WJ of /leptvlenta-

2 tives of tM United Statu of America in C&ngre&s assembkd,

3 8ECI'ION 1. EMPLOYMENT III:STIIICl'IONB l'OB. PO!Ili'IONB

4 IIJfii'JIX;TJNG AVIATION !IBCUIIliT.

S Section 44936(b)(l)(B) of title 49, United States

6 Code, is amended-

7

8

(1) by striking "or'' at the end of clause (xii);

(2) by redesignating clause (xiii) ns clause (xiv);

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(3) in clause (xiv) (as so redesignaw.l) by strik-

2 ing u(xii)" and inserting "(xiii)"; and

3 ( 4) by iDSerting aftel· clause (xii) the following:

4 "(xiii) bribery, burglary, illegal possession

5 of a controlled substance punishable by a max-

6 imum tenn of imprisonment of more than 1

7 year, or any other crime ciiiSSified as a felony

8 that the Administrator detennines indicates a

9 propensity for placing contraband aboard an

10 aircraft in return for money; or".

0

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