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12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 1/17
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F R O M O U R S E P T E M B E R / O C T O B E R 2 0 1 3 I S S U E
Much of the debate about China’s rise in recent years has focused on the potential
dangers China could pose as an eventual peer competitor to the United States bent
on challenging the existing international order. But another issue is far more
pressing. For at least the next decade, while China remains relatively weak
compared to the United States, there is a real danger that Beijing and Washington
will find themselves in a crisis that could quickly escalate to military conflict. Unlike
a long-term great-power strategic rivalry that might or might not develop down the
road, the danger of a crisis involving the two nuclear-armed countries is a tangible,
near-term concern -- and the events of the past few years suggest the risk might be
increasing.
Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington have managed to avoid
perilous showdowns on several occasions: in 1995–96, when the United States
responded to Chinese missile tests intended to warn Taiwanese voters about the
danger of pushing for independence; in 1999, when U.S. warplanes accidentally
bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air assault on Serbia;
China’s Real and Present DangerNow Is the Time for Washington to Worry
By Avery Goldstein
Chinese soldiers participating in a drill (Courtesy Reuters)
12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 2/17
and in 2001, when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, leading to the
death of the Chinese pilot and Beijing’s detention of the U.S. plane and crew. But
the lack of serious escalation during those episodes should not breed complacency.
None of them met the definition of a genuine crisis: a confrontation that threatens
vital interests on both sides and thus sharply increases the risk of war. If Beijing and
Washington were to find themselves in that sort of showdown in the near future,
they would both have strong incentives to resort to force. Moreover, the temptations
and pressures to escalate would likely be highest in the early stages of the face-off,
making it harder for diplomacy to prevent war.
THIN RED LINES
It might seem that the prospects for a crisis of this sort in U.S.-Chinese relations
have diminished in recent years as tensions over Taiwan have cooled, defusing the
powder keg that has driven much Chinese and U.S. military planning in East Asia
since the mid-1990s. But other potential flash points have emerged. As China and its
neighbors squabble over islands and maritime rights in the East China and South
China seas, the United States has reiterated its treaty commitments to defend two of
the countries that are contesting China’s claims (Japan and the Philippines) and has
nurtured increasingly close ties with a third (Vietnam). Moreover, the Obama
administration’s “pivot,” or “rebalancing,” to Asia, a diplomatic turn matched by
planned military redeployments, has signaled that Washington is prepared to get
involved in the event of a regional conflict.
China might be less cautious about triggering a crisis -- and less
cautious about firing the first shot if a crisis ensued.
Also, the United States insists that international law affords it freedom of navigation
in international waters and airspace, defined as lying beyond a country’s 12-mile
territorial limit. China, by contrast, asserts that other countries’ military vessels and
aircraft are not free to enter its roughly 200-mile-wide “exclusive economic zone”
without express permission -- a prohibition that, given Beijing’s territorial claims,
could place much of the South China Sea and the airspace above it off-limits to U.S.
military ships and planes. Disputes over freedom of navigation have already caused
confrontations between China and the United States, and they remain a possible
trigger for a serious crisis.
It is true that China and the United States are not currently adversaries -- certainly
not in the way that the Soviet Union and the United States were during the Cold
War. But the risk of a U.S.-Chinese crisis might actually be greater than it would be
if Beijing and Washington were locked in a zero-sum, life-and-death struggle. As
armed adversaries on hair-trigger alert, the Soviet Union and the United States
understood that their fundamentally opposed interests might bring about a war.
After going through several nerve-racking confrontations over Berlin and Cuba,
they gained an understanding of each other’s vital interests -- not to be challenged
without risking a crisis -- and developed mechanisms to avoid escalation. China and
the United States have yet to reach a similar shared understanding about vital
interests or to develop reliable means for crisis management.
Neither China nor the United States has clearly defined its vital interests across
broad areas of the western Pacific. In recent years, China has issued various
unofficial statements about its “core interests” that have sometimes gone beyond
simply ensuring the territorial and political integrity of the mainland and its claim to
sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing has suggested, for example, that it might consider
the disputed areas of the East China and South China seas to be core interests.
12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 3/17
Washington has also been vague about what it sees as its vital interests in the region.
The United States hedges on the question of whether Taiwan falls under a U.S.
security umbrella. And the United States’ stance on the maritime disputes involving
China and its neighbors is somewhat confusing: Washington has remained neutral
on the rival sovereignty claims and insisted that the disputes be resolved peacefully
but has also reaffirmed its commitment to stand by its allies in the event that a
conflict erupts. Such Chinese and U.S. ambiguity about the “redlines” that cannot be
crossed without risking conflict increases the chances that either side could take steps
that it believes are safe but that turn out to be unexpectedly provocative.
MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE COLD WAR?
Uncertainty about what could lead either Beijing or Washington to risk war makes a
crisis far more likely, since neither side knows when, where, or just how hard it can
push without the other side pushing back. This situation bears some resemblance to
that of the early Cold War, when it took a number of serious crises for the two sides
to feel each other out and learn the rules of the road. But today’s environment might
be even more dangerous.
The balance of nuclear and conventional military power between China and the
United States, for example, is much more lopsided than the one that existed between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Should Beijing and Washington find
themselves in a conflict, the huge U.S. advantage in conventional forces would
increase the temptation for Washington to threaten to or actually use force.
Recognizing the temptation facing Washington, Beijing might in turn feel pressure
to use its conventional forces before they are destroyed. Although China could not
reverse the military imbalance, it might believe that quickly imposing high costs on
the United States would be the best way to get it to back off.
The fact that both sides have nuclear arsenals would help keep the situation in check,
because both sides would want to avoid actions that would invite nuclear retaliation.
Indeed, if only nuclear considerations mattered, U.S.-Chinese crises would be very
stable and not worth worrying about too much. But the two sides’ conventional
forces complicate matters and undermine the stability provided by nuclear
deterrence. During a crisis, either side might believe that using its conventional
forces would confer bargaining leverage, manipulating the other side’s fear of
escalation through what the economist Thomas Schelling calls a “competition in
risk-taking.” In a crisis, China or the United States might believe that it valued what
was at stake more than the other and would therefore be willing to tolerate a higher
level of risk. But because using conventional forces would be only the first step in an
unpredictable process subject to misperception, missteps, and miscalculation, there
is no guarantee that brinkmanship would end before it led to an unanticipated
nuclear catastrophe.
China, moreover, apparently believes that nuclear deterrence opens the door to the
safe use of conventional force. Since both countries would fear a potential nuclear
exchange, the Chinese seem to think that neither they nor the Americans would
allow a military conflict to escalate too far. Soviet leaders, by contrast, indicated that
they would use whatever military means were necessary if war came -- which is one
reason why war never came. In addition, China’s official “no first use” nuclear
policy, which guides the Chinese military’s preparation and training for conflict,
might reinforce Beijing’s confidence that limited war with the United States would
not mean courting nuclear escalation. As a result of its beliefs, Beijing might be less
cautious about taking steps that would risk triggering a crisis. And if a crisis ensued,
China might also be less cautious about firing the first shot.
Such beliefs are particularly worrisome given recent developments in technology
12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 4/17
that have dramatically improved the precision and effectiveness of conventional
military capabilities. Their lethality might confer a dramatic advantage to the side
that attacks first, something that was generally not true of conventional military
operations in the main European theater of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Moreover,
because the sophisticated computer and satellite systems that guide contemporary
weapons are highly vulnerable to conventional military strikes or cyberattacks,
today’s more precise weapons might be effective only if they are used before an
adversary has struck or adopted countermeasures. If peacetime restraint were to give
way to a search for advantage in a crisis, neither China nor the United States could
be confident about the durability of the systems managing its advanced conventional
weapons.
Chinese analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals
through military actions and underestimate the risks of
miscommunication.
Under such circumstances, both Beijing and Washington would have incentives to
initiate an attack. China would feel particularly strong pressure, since its advanced
conventional weapons are more fully dependent on vulnerable computer networks,
fixed radar sites, and satellites. The effectiveness of U.S. advanced forces is less
dependent on these most vulnerable systems. The advantage held by the United
States, however, might increase its temptation to strike first, especially against
China’s satellites, since it would be able to cope with Chinese retaliation in kind.
COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN
A U.S.-Chinese crisis might also be more dangerous than Cold War showdowns
because of the unreliability of the existing channels of communication between
Beijing and Washington. After the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the
United States recognized the importance of direct communication between their top
leaders and set up the Moscow–Washington hot line. In 1998, China and the United
States also set up a hot line for direct communication between their presidents. But
despite the hot line’s availability, the White House was not able to contact China’s
top leaders in a timely fashion following the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing or the
2001 spy-plane incident. China’s failure to use the hot line as intended might have
reflected the reluctance of its leaders to respond until they had reached an internal
consensus or until they had consulted widely with their military. The delay might
also have reflected China’s difficulties in coordinating policy, since China lacks a
dependable counterpart to the U.S. National Security Council. Whatever the reason,
experience suggests that frustrating delays in direct communication are likely during
what would be the crucial early moments of an unfolding U.S.-Chinese crisis.
Instead, communication between the two countries might initially be limited to
either public statements or tacit signals sent through actions. But public statements
are aimed at multiple audiences, and nationalist passions in either China or the
United States, as well as pressure from allies, might force either side to take a more
aggressive public stance than it actually felt was warranted. Absent direct and
confidential communication, the two countries might be unable to discuss politically
sensitive proposals. They might also be unable to share information that could help
head off a disastrous escalation, such as classified details about military capabilities or
military maneuvers already under way.
Communicating through actions is also problematic, with many possibilities for
distortion in sending messages and for misinterpretation in receiving them. Chinese
analysts seem to overestimate how easy it is to send signals through military actions
and underestimate the risks of escalation resulting from miscommunication. For
12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 5/17
example, the analysts Andrew Erickson and David Yang have drawn attention to
Chinese military writings that propose using China’s antiship ballistic missile
system, designed for targeting U.S. aircraft carriers, to convey Beijing’s resolve
during a crisis. Some Chinese military thinkers have suggested that China could
send a signal by firing warning shots intended to land near a moving U.S. aircraft
carrier or even by carefully aiming strikes at the command tower of the U.S. carrier
while sparing the rest of the vessel. But as the political scientist Owen Coté has
noted, even a very accurate antiship ballistic missile system will inevitably have some
margin of error. Consequently, even the smallest salvo of this kind would entail a
risk of inadvertent serious damage and thus unintended escalation.
A final important factor that could make a U.S.-Chinese crisis more dangerous than
those during the Cold War is geography. The focus of Cold War confrontations was
primarily on land, especially in central Europe, whereas a future confrontation
between China and the United States would almost certainly begin at sea. This
difference would shape a U.S.-Chinese crisis in a number of ways, especially by
requiring both sides to make some fateful choices early on. China’s small fleet of
nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and its much larger fleet of
conventionally armed attack submarines are most secure when they remain in the
shallow waters near the Chinese mainland, where poor acoustics compromise the
effectiveness of U.S. undersea antisubmarine operations. Their proximity to Chinese
land-based aircraft and air defenses also limits Washington’s ability to rely on its
airpower and surface ships to counter them. For China’s submarine forces to play a
role in a showdown with the United States, however, they would have to move out of
those safer waters.
The prospect of China’s submarines breaking out would dramatically increase the
instability of a crisis. Although U.S. antisubmarine warfare technology would be
more effective against China’s submarines operating in less noisy open waters
(where the United States also enjoys air superiority), it would not be perfect: some
U.S. naval assets that came within range of surviving Chinese submarines would be
at risk. Early in a crisis, therefore, the United States would be tempted to minimize
this risk by sinking Chinese attack submarines as they tried to leave their home
waters. Especially because there are only a few narrow routes through which
Chinese submarines can reach deeper waters, the United States would be tempted to
strike early rather than accept an increased risk to U.S. naval forces. Regardless of
the U.S. decision, any Chinese attack submarines that managed to reach distant
deeper waters would face a “use them or lose them” dilemma, thanks to their greater
vulnerability to U.S. antisubmarine forces -- one more potential trigger for
escalation.
China’s nuclear-armed SSBNs present other risks. Under its no-first-use policy,
China has clearly stated that any attack on its strategic nuclear forces would justify
nuclear retaliation, making a U.S. strike against its SSBNs seem unlikely. Early in a
crisis, therefore, Beijing would probably believe that it could safely deploy its SSBNs
to distant, deeper waters, where they would be best positioned to execute their
launch orders. Such a deep-water deployment, however, would introduce new
dangers. One is the possibility that U.S. naval forces might mistake a Chinese SSBN
for a conventional attack submarine and fire on it, inviting Chinese nuclear
retaliation. Another is the danger that a Chinese SSBN could escalate the conflict
without explicit orders from Beijing, owing to the limited communication such
submarines maintain with the mainland in order to avoid detection.
MANAGING THE RISK
The chances of a U.S.-Chinese crisis in the coming years are low, but they are not
negligible, and they are made more troubling by the risk of such a confrontation
escalating. The most important steps Beijing and Washington can take are those
12/20/13 Avery Goldstein | Imminent Threats to U.S.-China Relations | Foreign Affairs
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139651/avery-goldstein/chinas-real-and-present-danger 6/17
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that might help prevent crises from developing in the first place. Since uncertainty
about the scope of each side’s vital interests would be a trigger for such crises, the
two countries should deepen political and military exchanges that focus closely on
this problem. Even if they cannot achieve full clarity, discussions can help draw
attention to what each side believes poses the greatest risks.
Although it will be difficult to eliminate the possibility of U.S.-Chinese
confrontations, both countries can do more to address the sources of potential
instability and improve their ability to manage the risks they would face during a
crisis. Leaders in Washington could share their rich experience in crisis management
with their Chinese counterparts, emphasizing the importance of policy coordination.
In addition, the United States should stress the need for China to use the existing hot
line for prompt, direct communication between the countries’ top leaders during a
crisis.
China and the United States should also deepen their currently modest military-to-
military exchanges. Without compromising essential secrets, increasing familiarity
with each other’s military systems and practices would reduce the risk of inadvertent
escalation during a showdown. Both sides would be wise to foster greater personal
familiarity among the two countries’ commanding officers, which, in the event of a
crisis, would establish a modicum of trust that would be helpful if political leaders
sought to de-escalate the conflict.
Getting Beijing and Washington to tackle the difficult task of containing a future
crisis will not be easy. In the end, it might take the experience of living through a
terrifying showdown of the kind that defined the early Cold War. But it should not
have to come to that.
More from the publisher of Foreign Affairs Newsletters
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• Reply •
Juan Palerm • 3 months ago
Realists always assume that the only strategy is one based upon military might and
self-interest. One difference between the U.S,-Soviet adversarial relationship and the
U.S.-China relationship is that China and the U.S. have so much monetary interaction,
unlike that of the former. Neither would escalate a conflict to the degree stated in this
article. There is too much at stake. China's military has a direct stake in the Chinese
economy and the import-export relationship it has with the U.S. As well, China holds a
huge sum of dollars and would never risk the world financial crisis that would occur if
the two were to have a military conflict. Even the Chinese know that Taiwan, unlike
Hong Kong, is gone and very unlikely to come back to Chinese control. Taiwan won't
declare independence despite all the rhetoric and even referendum coming from Taipei.
Yes, China and the U.S. will continue to have tension. The hotline doesn't necessarily
have to work considering all the other forms of communication out in the world today.
Both sides will get the message in any crisis. The realist zero-sum game scenario is
dead and the intricate relationship that the U.S. and China are developing is far too
important to allow any "minor" conflict (as noted in the article) to undermine such an
important global dynamic. Of course China will flex its muscles, but it will do so
economically before it does so militarily. This is actually a more sobering thought as a
complete economic meltdown would have a far more destructive effect on the
relationship which would lead to a potential conflict more than any military first
scenario.
15 2
• Reply •
Bing520 • 3 months ago Juan Palerm
As a Chinese, you misunderstand our character. Taiwan is an important issue,
unlikely to fade away easily. Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride. The
cost we are willing to pay may be much higher than you think. It does not
mean we will succeed. It is highly unlikely we would let it go without putting up
a fight.
I also think you underestimate the desire of Americans to put down Chinese.
Americans will never let us have a say in international order which they
monopolizes The US ally, Japan, only complicates the issue. Americans have
every intention to make us their pussycat and force us to eat whatever they
throw at us. They will forever push us to the limit because it is in their gene.
Americans are aggressive by nature. They don't feel safe if we are not totally
submissive to them. Just look at how Americans treated Japan in 80's.
15 5
• Reply •
Michal • 3 months ago Bing520
'Taiwan is a deep wound in our national pride.'
Sir, can you explain that to me? And how does Chinese national pride
cope with the fact that Taiwanese have no wish to be part of China? I do
not wish to stir any fight here but my claim can be easily backed up by
reliable data. The ultimate question is, do the Chinese put any
consideration into whether people in Taiwan should have any say in
determining their fate?
14 1
Bing520 • 2 months ago Michal
It is a long story. It would take too long to explain. You can
google the whole history from various angles. Chinese and
Japanese versions are different. Taiwanese version which was
published no more than 2 decades ago deviates from both
Chinese and Japanese stories.
What Taiwan means to China can be understood to a
considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex
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• Reply •
considerable degree by understanding the sentimental complex
between Kosovo and Serbia.
Serbia is too small a country to dictate her terms. China is huge.
if Chinese refuse to have a new perspective on her relationship
with Taiwan, the war in my opinion is inevitable.
I can understand Taiwan's position and her reliance on the US.
The more Taiwan wants to the US to step in, the more China
feels Taiwan is a dagger on Chinese throat.
If I were to suggest a solution, I'd say that China changes her
thinking, but the vast majority of Chinese I spoke to disagree.
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• Reply •
Michal • 2 months ago Bing520
Thanks and sorry for late reply. I am aware of some of the
complexities, I believe, although would not claim that I
understand all of them. The parallel to Kosovo is interesting.
However, one big difference is that Kosovo was until recently
under Serbian rule whereas there is not a single living soul in
China and elsewhere that would remember Taiwan under the
control of central government in China. It is documented that
MZD was not very interested in Taiwan and even mentioned that
Taiwan could seek independence...from Japan of course, neither
Nationalist were expressing great interest in Taiwan until before
the last years of Japanese control of Taiwan. I am really curios
whether there is some consideration among ordinary people in
China about whether people in Taiwan should have their say. My
anecdotal experience is that there is some understanding of the
reluctance on Taiwan's side, but it is very limited anecdotal
evidence.
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Bing520 • 2 months ago Michal
Of course I think Taiwan should determine her future by herself.
The vast majority of Chinese disagree with me.
Nationalist Government from 1911 to 1945 was too weak to do
anything about Taiwan. There was a substantial number of
Taiwanese working within Nationalist Government during that
era. After WW II, the return of Taiwan to China was a main
demand from Nationalists, but they ruined the chance to win
over Taiwanese by sending a bandit-like military garrison to
occupy Taiwan.
14% Taiwanese population immigrated from China after 1949.
Taiwanese support for unification with China has dwindled from
more than 70% 1989 (prior to Tiananmen Square massacre) to
less than 10% 2012. Without democracy, freedom and rule of
law, the chance of China's peaceful unification with Taiwan is
virtually nil.
There were suggestions prior to 1945 that Taiwan should seek
independence from Japan because there was no way for China to
5 1
Anastas ia Mark • 2 months ago Michal
There are two possible answers to this question: how the average
joe feels about Taiwan and how the leadership deals with the
issue.
Most Chinese people have been told from a very early age that
Taiwan is and always has been a part of China in a kind of "one
day the lost child will come home" type of storyline - with no
information or data concerning what people in Taiwan
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• Reply •
see more
information or data concerning what people in Taiwan
want/think. Their baby was stolen by the evil men who fought
Mao, and one day we will all be reunited China family. It might
seem odd but remember - its not as if China asks Chinese people
what they want either, so the idea of looking to what citizens
want to determine what should happen is grafting a very western
perspective onto the whole issue to begin with. The propaganda is
all over the place too -- I was once in a cave tour and at the end
there was lots of bright colorful lights and a song about how one
day, China will be united!
As far as the leadership, it does have to do a lot with pride, as in
3
• Reply •
Kuba Łojewsk i • 3 months ago Michal
They don't and they shouldn't put that into consideration. Why
do western people always want to play democracy everywhere,
even where it doesn't belong? West got rid of Kaddafi and now
they would all give a lot to have him back, because of
"democracy" in north Africa.
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• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago Kuba Łojewski
I don't think it is a matter of democracy. A democratic China
could be more dangerous. Nationalist sentiment is very strong.
Japanese PM Abe said that Chinese and Japanese peoples would
get along just fine if the Chinese Communist Party stop
manipulating the media. It is true that CCP deliberately conceals
the Japanese aids and free technical assistances given to China,
but I think it more accurate to say that CCP abuses the anti-
Japan sentiment that has never diminished since Japan's
invasion of China. Taiwan is the symbol of that wound.
11 1
• Reply •
Michal • 3 months ago Kuba Łojewski
I do not know who do you include in 'We'. In any case, point
made is pointless, my question has nothing to do with what
Western people think. It concerns what Taiwanese want and
think. Are you suggesting democracy does not belong to Taiwan?
Is that a joke suggestion? Democracy there was not West-
imposed but generated from the will of the people to have one.
Are you even remotely familiar with the recent history of
Taiwan?
10 2
• Reply •
Kuba Łojewsk i • 3 months ago Michal
Oh my, a poor idealist. Do you seriously think China cares about
the will of the people on Taiwan? I wouldn't. Democracy doesn't
belong to Taiwan if China wants to annex it. If there was no
USA, they would've done it already, and there's nothing else to
stop them. Simple.
5 1
• Reply •
Michal • 3 months ago Kuba Łojewski
Alright, I am not an idealist but anyway. What I was interested
in was a Chinese perspective on the issue, you can't provide that.
Your assumptions are just that.
6 2
Juan Palerm • 2 months ago Bing520
The fact that after the Cold War, the U.S. was the only hegemon does
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• Reply •
not mean that the dominance in the international arena will continue.
China will continue to increase its wealth, military capability,
technological advancement, etc. and will rival the U.S. in the future. The
U.S. will have no say in the matter. The one power monopoly will end
eventually. You also talk about "national pride" which most people have
towards their own nation. However, it is also a subjective element in
every relationship that can and does get in the way of logical and
rational dialogue between nations and states. Will China and the U.S. go
to war over Taiwan? Not if reason is used in the dialogue. To your point
about Americans and their inherent aggressiveness, it is obvious your
statement is based upon your own anecdotal evidence and not empirical
research. I think I argue objectively the opposite in my previous
dialogue. To your last pint, China is no pussycat and indeed is a tiger
that continues to gain strength. China certainly does not do what the
United States says, and we certainly do not have the power (not without
creating a world military disaster) to compel China to do what the U.S.
says. Japan was an economic powerhouse until their bubble collapsed in
the late 80s. That was their own doing and their continued decline is
their own doing. To sum up my point, use real evidence in your
arguments and don't presume to know what all people in a country are
thinking and what is in their genes.
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• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago Juan Palerm
I don't disagree with you. Mine is simply a Chinese perspective.
Every people believes that their country is peace-loving and
nonaggressive and FIRMLY believes the other one is an
aggressor. Chinese will always look at Iraq, Korea, Chile, Iran
and Vietnam as a fine example of American aggression.
Americans will always see Chinese assistance to North Korea, a
territorial dispute with her neighbors as proof of her aggressive
nature.
By the same token, Pivot to Asia is an American way to provide
peace and stability and viewed by Chinese as a proof of American
threat against Chinese and American means to confine China to
a minor role. Chinese point to Panetta's eagerness to sell F-35 to
India and American assistance to help South Korea to have long-
range cruise missiles that can hit Beijing with ease. It is difficult
for Chinese long-term planners to consider Americans as friends.
Of course Chinese can wait for American relative decline but no
powerful nation has been made into greatness by waiting for
their opponents to fade away.
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IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Juan Palerm
Americans are not aggressive? Ask that question to people in any
of the countries that the U.S. has invaded over the last couple of
centuries.
2
Juan Palerm • 2 months ago IAN MCCORRISTON
I am quite sure one can find numerous examples of U.S. foreign
policy
that is considered aggressive. I surely did not discount that. What
I
did discount is the actual assumption that as individuals, we are
aggressive. There are innate aggressive traits in all humans, and
being
an American does not preclude one to be more aggressive than
another.
So to clarify my point in the previous statement, show me the
empirical
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• Reply •
empirical
evidence that statistically shows that American foreign policy
from the
beginning is inherently aggressive. Tell me what percentage of all
foreign policy decisions have been aggressive vs. those that have
not
been. There are plenty of examples, but I want to see
quantification on
your part. When I posted my argument against what the author
pointed
out, I used a rational, logical argument that one is more than
welcome
to destroy with an even more rational and logical argument. I
would
like for you to do the same with your point.
• Reply •
Mark • 4 months ago
This is a joke-article coming from a bone-head.
26 8
• Reply •
Jimmy Wang • 2 months ago Mark
Mark, Prof. Avery Goldstein is a well reputed professor and an influential
scholar in this field of nuclear deterrence and foreign policy. I had the joy of
attending his classes during college, and I know you are the bone-head. I'm
surprised you even took the time to troll this comment board and leave a
comment
4
• Reply •
qusdis • 2 months ago Mark
Could you elaborate? Even a tiny bit?
• Reply •
BRIAN WEAVER • 2 months ago Mark
Mark, try researching what the author is discussing, this is a huge issue and
actually the subject of my Master's degree thesis. The only issue I see with Prof.
Goldstein's essay is talking about Obama's "Asian Pivot". Many are saying there
is no "Asian Pivot" Writer Calum Macleod quotes Sadanand Dhume from the
American Enterprise Insitute as saying " So far, Obama's 'pivot' to Asia can be
summed up in three letters 'MIA'." Also he reports the Washington Think Tank
The Heritage Foundation as saying "the Obama administrations 'Asian Pivot'
appears to be in name only."
Macleod, Calum. China Launches Charm Offensive as Obama Cancels Asia
Trip
USA Today Oct 4 2013 Accessed Oct. 11, 2013
http://www.rgj.com/usatoday/ar...
• Reply •
bsetrader • 2 months ago
Another strategic studies product brought to you by the interests at Boeing, Lockheed
Martin, Raytheon, the pentagon, and the defense industry consortium. It would be
refreshing and certainly lest costly to invest in a knowledge of Chinese history, culture,
and commerce.
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• Reply •
Warren82 • 2 months ago bsetrader
yup, sounds like someone's trying to get others to draw 'red lines' for them
again...red lines push up the bottom line
3
Bing520 • 2 months ago bsetrader
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Bing520 • 2 months ago bsetrader
Interesting perspective. It has never occurred to me. Eisenhower may be right
warning us about military-industrial complex.
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• Reply •
David Mart in • 3 months ago
B-
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AndrewL • 2 months ago
China is on the rise. America is in decline. The Chinese strategist knows time is on his
side. The American strategist knows time is not. It's the American that will be eager to
exploit his military advantage before it's gone. Hence, America is a clear and present
danger to China, not the other way around.
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• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago AndrewL
Not that simple. Both must have the will to fight and the backing of people. It is
not going to be about money or core interest. It is pride which will be coated as
core interest.
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Alexandre Charron-t rudel • 2 months ago Bing520
"It is pride which will be coated as core interest." Pretty much; the CPC
has been very good about keeping old grudges alive for political,
economic, and international gain. Elsewhere it's called revanchism or
irredentism, but I suppose that to the CPC it's just plain, old,
nationalism.
Additionally, I don't think that economics will stop two sides from going
to war; back in 1914, plenty of people argued that Germany and Britain
were too economically interlinked to go to war........look where that got
them. What brought the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente were their
obligations and sense of national pride; pride, too, was what--along with
the machinations of a crazed madman and economics--was what made
Germany make the opening moves of WWII in europe, and it was
national pride, ethnocentrism, economics and sheer hubris that
encouraged Japanese leaders to engineer the Mukden incident in 1931.
The primary drivers of war have always been wealth, nationalism and
territory. Both the PRC and the U.S possess all three, and the desire to
acquire or retain it, in ample measure.
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• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago Alexandre Charron-trudel
You articulate better.
• Reply •
Alexandre Charron-t rudel • 2 months ago Bing520
is that a request, a comment, or a criticism, Bing520?
1
• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago Alexandre Charron-trudel
A compliment, Alexander.
1
MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG • 2 months ago Bing520
This is the worst history lesson ever. Alexandre's nationalist,
jingoistic, economy-based theory of early 20th century great
power politics is horrendous. Really Bing520? After all of your
articulations, you settle for this baseless nonsense? China is
mimicking the U.S- trying to dominate Asia like the U.S.
dominates the West. It follows realist logic. China is a
provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to
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• Reply •
provocateur that is creating security complications for the U.S. to
keep Uncle Sam out of its perceived sphere of influence. Since
1949, China has settled many of its territorial disputes, but today
has 6 outstanding disputes. Why? Domestically speaking, China
is a victim of hypernationalism. Let's now take the time to
remember ideology and its sway over bullshit economics. The
Cold War ended because two regimes altered their ideas and their
world perspective. Soviet-US face-offs were not about economics,
it was ideology! Values will always trump money when security
implications are concerned, especially those ties to principles of a
state's existence. Go ahead China, throw away your burgeoning
status over Taiwan. Lose credibility, increase domestic threats
capable of threatening the regime. China lacks domestic and
external capital to make any big moves. Vegas showmen, always
with cards folded…
• Reply •
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Bing520 • 2 months ago MICHAEL ROSENZWEIG
@MI CHAEL RO SENZWEI G
Nationalism is real and concrete in China. The small
confrontation between China and the Philippines was not
directed by Beijing but started by a small marine agency which
regulates fishing. Beijing had to reigned in by consolidating all
the related agencies into one central command in Beijing.
Nevertheless, Beijing can't undo the damage because nationalistic
hardliners demanded a tougher position.
Before the incident, Beijing & Manila regularly held jointly
military exercises and enjoyed close cooperation. Many believe
concessions to Manila are necessary to mend the relationship but
can't prevail over hardliners.
This irrationality is at play. Nationalistic sentiment over Taiwan
issue is much stronger. There have been no suggestion within or
outside the government as well as party to lessen the demand for
unification. Indeed China does not have the means to force the
change of status quo at this moment, but they are building the
military strength and capabilities in anticipation of confronting
• Reply •
Jim Ziegler • 3 months ago
You know, one sort of core customer service principle is that you don't shoot at your
customer. China has the wealth it has because of the US buying it's goods. A war
would cause a dramatic economic slowdown for China that would last for decades.
These folks aren't stupid, nor are they hot heads.
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Bing520 • 3 months ago Jim Ziegler
Assuming Chinese will forever be your submissive partner for a fistful of dollars
could be very dangerous.
3
• Reply •
Jim Ziegler • 3 months ago Bing520
Fist full of dollars? Try freighters full of dollars... The Chinese have
shown themselves to be a fairly rational actor who dislikes the use of
force. We have strong economic ties, and good diplomatic ties. There is
no reason to believe that the areas that we do disagree are going to flare
up into a shooting war.
7 1
Bing520 • 2 months ago Jim Ziegler
It is not going to be over money. Americans do not start a war
over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we
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over money. Nor will Chinese. It will always about one thing we
both call principles.
1
• Reply •
fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520
And what principles are those?
Sorry, war is about money, and most Chinese have read enough
Marx to understand that.
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• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf
Hard to imagine Korean War or Vietnam War was all about
money to Chinese. Even the Sino-India border war has little to do
with money. I doubt the Afghanistan or Iraq war is all about
money either. You said yourself that one theory does not explain
all. Money does not explain all the causes of war.
The South China Sea dispute is obviously about economic
resources, but it is a stretch to insist that Senkaku dispute is about
money. The current economic losses for both China and Japan
outweighs the unproven economic potential of those islands.
1
• Reply •
fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520
To quote Lupe Fiasco about the USA in Af/Pak: "what's in
Afghanistan? HEROIN. You think that's by mistake? That they
can't stop that?"
As for the USA's second war in Iraq, there's a clear money
component when you look at the trillions doled out for weapons
contracts.
Way to call me out on my statement that simplistic explanations
do not work in international relations :)
Please tell me what principles would cause a collision between the
USA and PRC. I can't think of anything because both are such
running capitalist dogs at this point.
And the current economic losses are the reason that neither
Japan nor China engages over the islands. There's not enough
economic incentive. If there was proven reserves of
hydrocarbons, however, that outweigh a few deaths...
2
• Reply •
Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf
I can't ascertain. I speculate the national pride. Chinese want to
restore to the old glory lost more than two hundred years ago.
Americans want to maintain the glory of a sole superpower they
have attained over the past 100 years. I can constantly feel the
impatience of Chinese via their writing and daily conversations
about a new place for China and a new order by China. I can
also feel Americans' desire and determination to maintain their
current status as well as their anxiety of being challenged by
Chinese.
3
fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520
Is there anything tangible that you can name other than the
emotional outbursts online, which is potentially just PR
companies on message boards? I mean, a Great Power War is
serious business. When the Italian, German and Japanese
fascists went on their wars of aggression, a major reason was
access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned,
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access to raw materials (as the Germans and Japanese learned,
foreign occupation is not easy). China has no access problems to
raw materials because the American Empire is about non-
restrictive trade barriers, a contrast to the British and French
Empires, which were their own worst enemies.
Chinese people can complain about past glory all they want, but
at the end of the day most Chinese seem to realize there are
bigger problems than the evil American imperialists -- air quality,
food safety, affordable housing, wages, etc. I see these issues are
more fundamental to regain a former civilization than fighting a
war with foreigners on the other side of the ocean.
Further, I don't think China and the USA have democratic
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Bing520 • 2 months ago fdsaasdf
I believe war is irrational. When we embarked on a war, we
rationalized our irrationality. A Japanese lord asked his top sword
fighter to kill a defying samurai in duet, the sword fighter
reasoned with his Lord, "In a duet, a man has to disregard his
own safety in order to win. I have a wife and young kids and
therefore can't take that risk." The Lord stood up, kicked right in
his face and shouted, "You disgrace our clan. I'll kill you if you
don't go."
A war is an emotional outburst complete with distorted tangible
benefits and aspirations. Chinese have irrational expectation of
themselves and Americans. Americans irrationally expect
Chinese to behave in the way Americans approve of. Politicians,
democratically elected or rising through brutal power struggle,
are not as rational as we think they should be.
Human race rarely failed to raise the exuberant expectation of
the outcome of a war preceding the outburst of a war.
Yes, I am the one from Foreignpolicy.com. I recognize your
handle, too. You are very good at laying out a clear argument.
Thank you, my friend.
• Reply •
fdsaasdf • 2 months ago Bing520
That's a great point -- war justifies the irrational. I just sincerely
hope you're wrong, and a peaceful rise of a great power happens!
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• Reply •
IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Bing520
What any country wants is usually about what their leaders want
and not necessarily what their citizens want.
• Reply •
Michal • 2 months ago Bing520
Totally and fully agree with you, people tend to have way too
simplistic idea about why wars are fought. Usually do not go
beyond financial motivation, resource thirst etc.
• Reply •
IAN MCCORRISTON • 2 months ago Bing520
When you get down to it all wars are over money.
Miguel • 2 months ago
How is China an enemy when the U.S. built China, and China, in turn, buys off toxic
U.S. debt? And the U.S. is still at it, shipping evermore technology and jobs every day
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that goes by. This is done by treaty. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. The
Trans-Pacific harmonization deals. Etc.
How is China a threat when China is a totalitarian corporate conglomerate owned by
JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Barclays, and all the rest, using the Communist Party and
the army as internal managers? How is China an enemy when U.S. conquests in
Central Asia are handed out to Chinese-based consortiums? Here's Afghanistan's
copper: it's yours Goldman Sachs, via your Chinese enterprises.
These are the usual Cold War like con games. Back in the Cold War you also had
NATO building up the Soviets with industry, technology and finance, but they were
incredible enemies at the end of the day right? Well, the only ones who suffered from
the "clash of titans" were the Third World, with NATO and the USSR playing their
dialectical games, and managed to keep those countries underdeveloped, at constant
conflict, so as to buy them off on the cheap, and rule them.
And it's very profitable in the war departments too, with the big military contractors
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• Reply •
ALDO MATTEUCCI • 2 months ago
Pity China, it just can’t win with Prof. GOLDSTEIN. It
defines “vital interests”? It risks getting involved in defending them (this is
what happened to the US in Vietnam). It remains vague about them? This may lead
to war through miscalculation. It delays the use of the hotline in order to
achieve a (hopefully reasonable) consensus in the reply? It could be
interpreted as Chinese inscrutability. It might strike first conventionally,
lest the US smother Chinese forces with high tech (This is what the Japanese
did at Pearl Harbor). By deploying its SSBN, it might invite an attack from the
“daughter of USS Maddox”.
I’d like Prof. GOLDSTEIN for providing such a splendid
example of “China paranoia.” Has it possibly ever occurred to him that when
confronted with a global hegemon, a regional power may be forced to react, and
that stop hegemonic bullying may be the simplest and best way forwards? Not one
line of the article is wasted on US restraint!
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Ivan Terrible • 2 months ago
To simplify it down to the level of cartoons, China military might does not scare me.
Chinese are he whipping boy of the Asia. Everybody in Asia kicked their butt: Soviets
did it on small scale, Japanese did it, even Vietnamese did it. No obvious reason why
that should change
2
Bing520 • 2 months ago Ivan Terrible
I could not agree more. Chinese military might, experiences and officer caliber
are of dubious quality. PLA may possess some advanced technology in missile.
It is however limited in scope and striking capabilities. The officer corp is
subjugated by political commissars who are less trained and possess much
smaller military competency. Many officers are firmly convinced that the
numerical superiority will overcome any technological deficiency.
A PLA officer not aligned with political commissars will not be in line for
promotion. It says a lot about the quality of PLA military commanders. PLA is
upgrading its officers, but the effort is resisted and sabotaged by its own officers
whose promotions to a very largest extent are dependent upon personal
connections, instead of demonstrated competency.
Average Chinese are made to believe China is a militarily powerful nation. The
leadership understands the true capabilities of the military forces, but do not
hesitate to fool their citizens into believing that their leaders have toiled hard to
build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy
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build a worthy defense force. That's why China is extremely cautious to deploy
or even to display her military might. Once it is tested, the bubble bursts.
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