Austrian Nobles, Unity and the Kleindeutsch Solution
-
Upload
scott-william-linger -
Category
Documents
-
view
63 -
download
1
Transcript of Austrian Nobles, Unity and the Kleindeutsch Solution
7468207
1
Austrian Nobles, Unity and the kleindeutsch Solution
This paper will examine the reaction of the Austrian nobility to their exclusion from a
unified Germany in order to show that too much emphasis can be placed upon the ethno-
linguistic and historical commonalities between the Austrian lands of the Habsburg Empire
and the German states. Much research has already been carried out on the reasons for, and the
results of, the exclusion, yet they do not deal with the reaction of the Austrian nobility, or
where the interests of this stratum of society were likely to lie. The existing literature treats
the „German‟ character of the Austrian nobility with too much importance, assuming that the
kleindeutsch solution wrongly excluded Austria from a unified Germany, an assumption that
was to bear rotten fruit in the twentieth century with the Anschluss of Austria and the
realisation of the pan-German ideal.1
A brief look at the existing literature yields a few consistent themes. Austensen
describes the Metternichian position on the German problem and discusses Austrian foreign
policy between 1848 and 1864, showing how the Habsburg Monarchy attempted to react to
developments within and between the German states.23
Murray highlights the interpretation
of Robert Morier to unification, a British diplomat to various German states between 1853
and 1876, highlighting the interest of foreign powers and individuals in the German
Question.4 Sondhaus, Schmitt, Elrod, Austensen and Schroeder have written extensively on
the roles of the individual Austrian foreign ministers.56789
The assertion of ethnic identities
1 Robert A. Kann, „The Case of Austria‟, Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980), pp. 37-
52 (p. 43). 2 Roy A. Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?” Another Look at Metternich‟s View of the
German Dilemma‟, German Studies Review 6 (1983), pp. 41-57. 3 Roy A. Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany,” 1848-1864‟,
Journal of Modern History 52 (1980), pp. 195-225. 4 Scott W. Murray, „In Pursuit of a Mirage: Robert Morier‟s Views of Liberal Nationalism
and German Unification, 1853-1876‟, International History Review 20 (1998), pp. 33-67. 5 Lawrence Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟,
International History Review 13 (1991), pp. 1-20.
7468207
2
and the rise of nationalism within Central Europe, and Europe in general, is well documented;
Silesia‟s inclusion within the Prussian kleindeutsch unification project; 10
the assertion of a
Czech national identity; 11
Galician attempts to gain autonomy; 12
the assertion of Hungarian
nationalism, to the detriment of the other nationalities in Hungary, resulting in the Ausgleich;
13 and the loss of the Habsburg‟s Italian possessions.
1415 There has also been much debate on
the economic rise, or failure, and integration of the Empire, with Hertz, Whiteside and
Kolossa hailing the success of the Empire‟s economy, its free trade area and commercial
success, and Jaszi, Macesich and Gross contending that this is largely a fallacy, that
geographic obstacles prevented true integration and that trade would have been more natural
with certain areas outside of the Empire.1617
Much of the literature as outlined treats the German unification under the kleindeutsch
solution as a matter of high politics, the result of the policies of a few „great men‟
manipulating liberal and nationalist sentiments. The unification of Germany did not happen
6 Hans A. Schmitt, „Count Beust and Germany, 1866-1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or
Resignation?‟, Central European History 1 (1968), pp. 20-34. 7 Richard B. Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition: The Dilemma
of Conservative Statecraft‟, Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 430-455. 8 Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟ pp. 41-57.
9 Paul W. Schroeder, „Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute Over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-
1855,‟ Journal of Modern History 40 (1968), pp. 193-217. 10
Tomasz Kamusella, „Nations and their Borders: Changing Identities in Upper Silesia in the
Modern Age‟, German History 19 (2001), 400-407 (p. 401). 11
Gary B. Cohen, „Recent Research on Czech Nation-Building‟, in Journal of Modern
History 51 (1979), pp. 760-772 (p. 760). 12
Piotr S. Wandycz, „The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3
(1967), pp. 261-286. 13
Peter F. Sugar, „Nationalism as a Disintegrating Force‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3
(1967), pp. 91-120 (p. 116). 14
Kent Roberts Greenfield, „The Italian Nationality Problem of the Austrian Empire: The
Early Period of Austrian Rule‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3 (1967), pp. 491-526. 15
Geoffrey Wawr, „The Habsburg Flucht nach vorne in 1866: Domestic Political Origins of
the Austro-Prussian War‟, pp. 221-248 (p. 223). 16
Alexander Gerschenkron, An Economic Spurt that Failed (Surrey, 1977), p. 46. 17
David F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (London, 1984),
pp. 96-97.
7468207
3
in a kleindeutsch fashion solely because of the machinations of Bismarck, nor was Austria
excluded from Germany purely as a result of the Battle of Sadowa. Likewise, the exclusion of
Austria from Germany did not just impinge upon a few political elites, it impacted upon all
stratums of Austrian and German society and therefore it is of great importance to understand
the reactions of those who had a vested interest in the outcome of German unification,
especially given the eventual use of the opposing grossdeutsch solution to justify annexation
of Austria by the German government of 1938.18
Taken on their own, each of these studies or
themes is unable to account for the reaction of a whole stratum of society to Austria‟s
exclusion from German unification, but when examined in concert, provides a facet in
determining how the Austrian nobility would have reacted, and therefore an examination of
the justice in this exclusion. Therefore this paper will focus on three key areas; the identity of
the Austrian nobility; the economic interests of the Austrian nobility; and Austria‟s foreign
policy, as expressed through certain members of the nobility.
The first section will examine the identity of the nobility with regard to religion,
ethnicity/race and language, highlighting the weight placed upon national identity in the
existing literature. There is a vast literature on Austria‟s participation in German history, with
the Habsburgs having been the titular head‟s of the Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation from 1440 to 1806, with but one exception, the Bavarian Emperor, Charles VII.
Following the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the Congress of Vienna,
Austria once more stepped into a leading position in the German Confederation, this time
sharing the privilege with Prussia.19
This raises the issue of whether or not the Austria
nobility can be considered German, or if their participation in the Habsburg Empire
18
Rüdiger Wischenbart, „National Identity and Immigration in Austria - Historical
Framework and Political Dispute‟, West European Politics 17 (1994), pp. 72-90 (p. 82). 19
Enno E. Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation, 1851-
1863‟, American Historical Review 56 (1951), pp. 276-294 (p. 276).
7468207
4
complicates such a simplistic understanding of Austrian identity. An examination of Ritter‟s
work on Austria and its struggle for an identity along with his examination of whether
Austria shares a German history or if Austrian‟s can legitimately disavow a common
heritage, will highlight the importance of reaching a conclusion as to the cultural and national
sentiments of the Austrian nobility.20
This will be followed by a comparison of the language,
ethnicity/race and religion of the nobility, leading to a conclusion as to whether the Austrian
nobility were „ethnic Germans,‟ or if the loyalties of the nobility were shared between the
German states and the Empire.21
Having shown the limitations of looking at identity through a nationalist lens, the
economic interests of the Austrian nobility will be explored to show that whilst ethno-
linguistic ties are of importance, using this as an a priori framework can result in ignoring
other vital aspects of Austrian identity. To better understand the orientation of the Austrian
nobility, whether towards the German states, the Empire or Europe, the economic structure of
Austria will be examined. This will begin with a look at the role of the Austrian nobility in
the Empire‟s economy. Tariff barriers and industrialisation/regional specialisation will be
examined to evidence the orientation of the nobilities economic interests; specifically a
comparative look at the Habsburg Empire as a Customs Union against the Prussian
Zollverein.2223
The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the economic interests of the
nobility to highlight whether exclusion from a unified Germany would have grossly altered
their economic orientation.
20
Harry Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, German Studies Review 15
(1992), pp. 111-129. 21
Pieter C. Van Duin, Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National
Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921 (Oxford, 2009), p. 114. 22
John Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in
Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Surrey, 1983). 23
Wolfram Fischer, „The German Zollverein: A Case Study in Customs Union‟, Kyklos 13
(1960), pp. 65-89.
7468207
5
Having established the „nationalist‟ identity and economic interests of the Austrian
nobility, it will be to the foreign policy of the Empire that this section will turn. An
examination of the competing ideologies on German unification will be discussed followed
by a look at the foreign policies the Empire with regard to Germany. 24
Of note to this paper
is that within the foreign office, two of the three branches, the diplomats and the central
office, were predominantly staffed by the nobility; one laregly by the courtly first society and
the other by the bureaucratic second society.25
Indeed, Heindl notes that the bureaucracy was
dominated by the middle class and lower aristocracy as early as 1780 and that between 1781
and 1848, the prevalence of the nobility in the higher bureaucracy increased.26
Therefore
action taken by the foreign office can be considered to be largely representative of those
nobles serving in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. This will be followed by a brief
examination of Metternich, Schwarzenberg, von Buol and von Rechberg during their
respective tenures as Chancellor or foreign minister. This examination will be used to see if
Austensen is correct in his contention that Austrian foreign policy was consistent in the post
Metternich era,27
and therefore that Austria sought to avoid entanglement in a unified German
state as much as it sought to impede the creation of a Prussian-led kleindeutsch unification.
Having thus ascertained the cultural/ethnic identity of the nobility, their economic
orientation and their reluctance to be part of a unified German state, a conclusion will be
reached which, whilst acknowledging the importance of Austria identity, will show that the
nobility were not motivated solely by nationalist or ethno-linguistic interests and that the
24
Lawrence Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, History Teacher 27 (1994), pp.
133-143 (p. 135). 25
William D. Godsey Jr., Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the
Eve of the First World War (Indiana, 1999), p. 17.
26 Waltraud Heindl, „Bureaucracy, Officials, and the State in the Austrian Monarchy: Stages
of Change since the Eighteenth Century‟, Austrian History Yearbook 37 (2006), pp. 35-57 (p.
42). 27
Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany “‟, p. 199.
7468207
6
kleindeutsch unification was not as large a travesty as portrayed. Therefore too much
emphasis placed on such an arbitrary characteristic as ethnicity or nationality can obscure the
past and place events within an incorrect context.
Beginning with Ritter‟s work on the search for an Austrian identity, integrated within
a German framework or separate to the unified German states, there will be a discussion on
the proper placement of Austria‟s history. This will be followed by a comparison of the
themes of religion, language and race/ethnicity across the nobility of Austria and their
counterparts in Hungary and the Empire, and Prussia and the German states. This section will
show whom the Austrian nobility would have been better able to communicate with, across
the three criteria, and draw a conclusion as to whether the nobility were more culturally,
linguistically and ethnically integrated within the Empire or with the German states. Thus an
assessment of Erdmann‟s claims can be made, noting the difficulty of taking Austria out of its
integrated history, a history shared with Hungary as much as with Germany.28
This
comparison will be conducted under the auspices of a functionalist theory of nationalism; that
the ability to communicate more effectively, over a wider range of subjects or criteria, with
one group over another leads to greater cohesion and therefore nationalist feeling.29
This
exploration will therefore highlight the nationalist claims of the pan-German movement and
the justification for Austrian inclusion. Kedourie‟s theory of nationalism provides the reason
for the selection of race/ethnicity, language and history as characteristics to be explored,
claiming that, „In nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture and sometimes even religion
constitute different aspects of the same primordial entity, the nation.‟30
28
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 124. 29
Karl W. Deutsch, „Nationalism and Social Communication‟, in John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 26-29 (p. 27). 30
Elie Kedourie, „Nationalism and Self-Determination‟ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.
Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 49-55 (p. 49).
7468207
7
Ritter‟s study on a search for an Austrian identity deals with Erdmann‟s claim that
there is “Drei Staaten –Zwei Nationen – Ein Volk”, and his detractors who have argued
against these statements.31
Erdmann subscribes to the idea that whilst Austria may be a
territorial nation, it is part of a German cultural nation, with a past rooted in German history
and therefore the framework in which to study Austrian history and culture is one shared with
Germany.32
In response to Erdmann‟s claims, Ritter acknowledges three arguments against
such an attempt to place Austrian history within an overarching German Kulturnation;
political; methodological; and historical.33
On the political argument Ritter notes the claim
that placing Austria within the framework of German history performs an historic Anschluss;
following decades of Austrian nation-building separate to Germany, placing its culture and
history with that of Germany demeans and contradicts Austria‟s modern small-state
identity.34
The methodological argument of Schmid and Ardelt takes issue with Erdmann‟s a
priori German national-historical paradigm and idealist attempt to see this grand narrative
developing towards a contemporary German and Austrian telos.35
The historical argument of
Stourzh accuses Erdmann of perpetuating the Nazi policy of a grossdeutschland through his
relocation of Austria within German history whereas Weinzierl takes an extreme position,
claiming that Austria‟s defeat at Konnigratz led to joint German/Austria history being
severed at this point.36
Erdmann‟s work therefore imposes a grossdeutsch view of history retroactively; it
claims that Austria needs to be returned to a confederative German history, a history from
which Austria was politically excluded. Pertinent to this paper is that it appears to presuppose
31
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, pp. 114-125. 32
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 116. 33
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 119. 34
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 119-120. 35
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 121. 36
Ritter, „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, p. 121-122.
7468207
8
that Austria should not have been excluded from German unification, and that therefore the
Austrian nobility would thus have not wanted to be expelled from Germany, owing to the
staggering importance of inclusion within the Kulturnation. These claims can be assessed by
comparing Austria and its neighbours across the three topics of religion, language and
ethnicity/race.
Starting with religion, Austria‟s integrated nature becomes obvious, integrated within
both the German states and the Empire. Pombeni notes the dominance of Protestantism in the
Prussian state and Savelsberg highlights the prevalence of Lutheranism in Germany applying
this to Prussia, Silesia, Saxony, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Mecklenburg and Wurttemberg and
noting that in the main, the states south of the Danube River remained Catholic, mentioning
Westphalia, Palatine and Bavaria.3738
In his discussion on Austrian state education, Gruber
states, „The House of Habsburg was strictly Roman Catholic, and made sure that its nobility
and its subjects retained the Catholic faith,‟ and further commenting on the Counter-
Reformation and the expulsion of Protestantism from their lands.39
Sugar‟s discussion of non-
Germanic societies living under the Habsburgs, states that the Magyar inhabitants of Hungary
were predominantly Catholic and Peter goes further in noting the differences between the
Catholic, titled aristocracy and the Protestant provincial gentry, highlighting the influence
once exerted by the Catholic Church.4041
Whilst these statements clearly cannot account for
each and every noble or aristocrat of Prussia, Austria and Hungary, a few tentative claims can
37
Paolo Pombeni, „The Ideology of Christian Democracy‟, Journal of Political Ideologies 5
(2000), pp. 289-300 (p. 293). 38
Joachim J. Savelsberg, „Religion, Historical Contingencies, and Institutional Conditions of
Criminal Punishment: The German Case and Beyond‟, Law and Social Inquiry 29 (2004), pp.
373-401 (p. 377). 39
Karl Heinz Gruber, „Higher Education and the State in Austria: An Historical and
Institutional Approach‟, European Journal of Education 17 (1982), pp. 259-270 (p. 259-260). 40
Peter F. Sugar, „The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule‟, Slavic
Review 22 (1963), pp. 1-30 (pp. 4-5). 41
Laszlo Peter, „The Aristocracy, the Gentry and their Parliamentary Tradition in Nineteenth-
Century Hungary‟, Slavonic and East European Review 70 (1992), pp. 77-110 (p. 77).
7468207
9
be made; the Austrian nobility, whilst having a common Christian faith with both the
Magyars and German nobles, shared a denominational faith with the Hungarians and South
Germans, anathema to the protestant Prussia and emerging German Reich with its eventual
Kulturkampf.42
On the subject of language and its importance to identity and nationalism, Weber and
Breuilly advanced contrasting views; Weber claimed that language is not necessarily linked
to nationalism or a nation whilst Breuilly discusses language as an expression of community,
understood as both a spoken tongue and an expression of common values.4344
Whilst placing
different emphasis on the importance of language to their understanding of nationalism, they
do both acknowledge the importance that communities can place upon it. To this end Weber
states, „The pretension, however, to be considered a special „nation‟ is regularly associated
with a common language as a culture value of the masses.‟45
On the subject of German
nation-building in particular, Wright discusses the importance of language, citing Herder,
Fichte and von Humboldt as focusing on the critical import of culture, blood and
language.46
Unlike the case of religious beliefs, Austria is much more closely linked to the
German states in terms of language. Indeed, as Medgyes and Miklosy note,
42
Ronald J. Ross, „Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of
Coercion in Imperial Germany,‟ Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 456-482 (pp. 457-
458). 43
Max Weber, „The Nation‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism
(Oxford, 1994), pp. 21-25 (p. 22). 44
John Breuilly, „The Sources of Nationalist Ideology‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.
Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 103-113 (p. 105). 45
Weber, „The Nation‟, p. 22. 46
Sue Wright, „Language as a Contributing Factor in Conflicts between States and Within
States‟, Current Issues in Language and Society 4 (1997), pp. 215-237 (p. 222).
7468207
10
Hungarian is a unique and isolated language of central Europe, because it is not Indo-
European in origin; rather it belongs to the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic family of
languages.47
Since the German Confederation, including Austria and Prussia, were German
speaking, as opposed to the Hungarian Magyars, it is likely that the Austrian nobility, at least
in relation to language, would have felt a much greater affinity towards the German states and
Prussia.
The final comparison to be made is on the idea of ethnicity/race which corresponds to
two competing theories of nationalism; one claiming that nations are an extension of kin
groups and the other that there is an essence, a primordial nature, which is a result of a
common history, culture and geographical position.4849
The importance of race/ethnicity has
been overstated in the Austro-German case and whilst not disregarding the importance that
may have been placed upon this „German essence,‟ it can be equally argued that Austria
shared similar ties within the Empire and therefore there was an „Austro-Hungarian essence‟.
Nevertheless, if ethnicity is defined against another group, it is likely that the Austrian
nobility would have defined its ethnicity against that of the Magyars and identified more
closely with the German states.50
Indeed, Karner‟s study on modern Austrian identity claims
that there is one essential German nation, comprising the blood, soil and people of both
47
Péter Medgyes and Katalin Miklós, „The Language Situation in Hungary‟, Current Issues
in Language Planning 1 (2000), pp. 148-242 (p. 149). 48
Pierre Van Den Berghe, „A Socio-Biological Perspective‟, in John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 96-103. 49
John Hutchinson, „Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration‟, in John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 122-131. 50
Walker Connor, „A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is and Ethnic Group, is a...‟, in John
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 36-46 (p. 45).
7468207
11
Germany and Austria; the often assumed belief that the Austrians and Germans, and therefore
Austrian nobility, were of the same essential and ethnic composition.51
This brief look at identity has therefore shown that when looking at the identity of the
Austrian nobility, Austria cannot be disentangled from its German heritage and that to an
extent Erdmann is correct to claim that Austria is part of a German Kulturnation, sharing a
common language and ethnicity with the other German states. This claim does appear to
negate Austria‟s integration within the Habsburg Empire. By comparing the themes of
religion, language and race/ethnicity it has been shown that Austria also had common
interests within the Empire and therefore, whilst situating the history and identity of the
Austrian nobility within a German Kulturnation, care must be taken not to solely construct a
German identity, nor do so to the exclusion of other vital characteristics.
It can be concluded that on the subject of nationalist feeling and shared identities, the
Austrian nobility are likely to have felt a greater affinity to their German counterparts, and to
have felt apprehension at their exclusion from their ethno-linguistic compatriots in Germany
but this position is largely overstated in the existing literature. Indeed this justification in part
led to the Anschluss given the greater weight and priority attached to ethno-linguistic ties,
much as Erdmann attaches far too much import to the idea of a Kulturnation. Whilst perhaps
mourning their exclusion from German unification on these grounds, the Austrian nobility
had other interests besides their ethnicity and language and therefore it is to the economy of
Austria, and the economic interests of the nobility that this paper will now turn.
The aim of the next section is to highlight that whilst sharing a German identity
outside of the Empire, it was actually within the Empire that the Austrian nobility found its
economic sphere of interest. This will be evidenced by an examination of the role of the
51
Christian Karner, „The “Habsburg Dilemma” Today: Competing Discourses of National
Identity in Contemporary Austria‟, National Identities 7 (2005), pp. 409-432 (pp. 411-412).
7468207
12
Austrian nobility in Austria‟s economy followed by a look at regional specialisation within
the Empire. A discussion of the internal and external tariff barriers of the Habsburg Empire in
conjunction with the Prussian led Zollverein will lead to a conclusion as to whether exclusion
from a united Germany would have grossly affected the nobility‟s economic concerns.
Good notes the emergence of an entrepreneurial class within the Austrian and
Bohemian lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and goes on to discuss the
integral role of the aristocracy in this emerging class, particularly in the iron industry.52
He
goes on to highlight the active involvement of the aristocracy in the industrial and financial
sectors of the Empire, an industrial sector which did not really exist in 1830 and was built
largely on the estates of the nobility, concluding that they effectively performed the role of
capitalists in other societies and helped to finance economic development.5354
Godsey points
to the unrivalled position of the land-owning aristocracy in the Empire, the economic power
that land-ownership entailed and going on to distinguish between the landowning courtly
society and the bureaucratic and entrepreneurial second society.55
He also notes that,
Despite aristocratic involvement in modern aspects of the economy, like banking and
industry, the basis of aristocratic Weltanschauung and prestige during our period
remained landowning. In this respect, the court nobility differed from the new
plutocracy of the industrial age, whose wealth had been derived through
entrepreneurship in the financial and commercial markets.
These two interpretations appear to contradict one another, with Good stating that the
aristocracy performed the role of an entrepreneurial, industrialising capitalist class and
52
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 21-22. 53
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 233. 54
Helmut Haberl and Fridolin Krausmann, „Changes in Population, Affluence, and
Environmental Pressures During Industrialisation: The Case of Austria 1830-1995‟,
Population and Environment 23 (2001), pp. 49-69 (p. 57). 55
Godsey, Aristocratic Redoubt, pp. 59-61.
7468207
13
Godsey stating that the nobility derived its wealth and power from the land, pointing to a
more agrarian economic base. This discrepancy can be alleviated by both Good and
Rudolph‟s acknowledgement of the role of the landowning aristocracy in developing
manufacturing industries upon their great estates.565758
Therefore the Austrian nobility had an
important role in financing and growing the industrial sector in Austria, and therefore within
the Empire.
Regional specialisation, combined with tariff barriers, provides the evidence in
highlighting the economic interests of the Austrian nobility. Good acknowledges the claims
that Vienna actively encouraged capitalist manufacturing in the western Austrian lands and
sought to hinder it in the east, thus providing the West with a market for its goods and a
source of raw materials from the East, culminating in the customs union which reinforced this
colonialism.59
In another of his studies, Good states that,
For the Empire the scattered evidence on trade, urbanisation, and industrial activity
reveals a modest gradient stretching from West to East in the later eighteenth century.
Habsburg mercantilism indirectly confirms such evidence since it aimed at promoting
regional specialisation between an industrial west and an agrarian east.60
Whether Vienna actually encouraged such specialisation or if the levels of
industrialisation reflected a European wide trend of west to east diffusion of industrialisation
is of little concern to this paper; the evidence shows that an easily accessible market existed
56
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 22. 57
David F. Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparison of the
Habsburg Empire and the United States‟, Journal of Economic History 46 (1986), pp. 137-
151 (p. 148). 58
Richard L. Rudolph, „Economic Revolution in Austria? The Meaning of 1848 in Austrian
Economic History,‟ in John Komlos (ed.), Economic Development in the Habsburg
Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century: Essays (New York, 1983), pp. 165-182 (p. 171). 59
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 126. 60
Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, pp. 140-141.
7468207
14
for the manufactured goods of the Austrian nobility given the promotion of greater transport
links within the Empire.6162
Indeed, export figures of manufactured goods for the period
1841-1858 highlight this trend; Hungary exported between 1 and 1.3 million florins worth of
manufactured goods each year to Austria, whereas in the same period, Austria exported
between 32.7 and 46.9 million florins worth to Hungary.63
Outside of the Empire, Hungary
exported between 2.4 and 4 million florins worth of manufactured goods and Austria
exported between 25.2 and 34.3 million worth.64
These figures therefore confirm the fact that
the interests of the entrepreneurial second society and landowning courtly society had a
greater interest in Hungary as a market for their goods, as opposed to outside of the Empire.
Having shown that the Empire acted as a readymade market for the exports of the Austrian
nobilities manufactured goods due to industrial levels within the Empire, an analysis of the
tariff barriers of the Empire and Prussia-Germany will highlight the other reason for Austria
favouring Hungary as a market.
The elimination of the internal customs barrier between Austria and Hungary in 1851
had the effect of causing the price of agricultural products in Hungary to rise and in Austria
to fall, and the price of industrial goods to rise in Austria and fall in Hungary leading Komlos
to conclude that the customs union benefitted both partners after 1850.6566
This customs
union therefore had the effect of perpetuating the colonialism of Austro-Hungarian relations
and aided in, „Promoting regional specialisation between an industrial west and an agrarian
east.‟67
Good highlights the low levels of exports relative to the rest of Europe and Germany,
61
Patrick Karl O‟Brien, „The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the
Perspective of the World‟, Journal of Historical Sociology 4 (1991), pp. 288-316 (p. 289). 62
Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, p. 145. 63
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 118. 64
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 118. 65
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 39. 66
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 44. 67
Good, „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century‟, p. 141.
7468207
15
whilst simultaneously acknowledging the large volume and complementary nature of Austro-
Hungarian trade, a point concurred by Rudolph.6869
He concludes that whilst from a strictly
geographical point of view the customs union may not have been of vital importance, it
functioned sufficiently for both Austria and Hungary and assuring a market for their
specialised goods.70
Given this internal customs union, it is unsurprising to note the external barriers
erected by the Habsburg‟s and the preferential treatment for the exchange of goods within the
Empire.71
Komlos concludes that the main market for Austrian industrial products was
therefore Hungary, though noting that Austria could have done just as well with other
markets.72
So whilst both Good and Komlos note the functionality of the Habsburg custom
area and concentration of Austrian markets in Hungary and vice versa, they also both
conclude that the customs union was not a necessity to Austria. Pahre however claims that
whilst Hungary favoured lower external tariffs and looked to Germany as an export market,
Austria favoured higher external tariffs, saw Germany as a threat to its manufactured goods
and looked within the Empire for its markets.73
Therefore from these three arguments it can
be seen that whilst the Empire may not have been the best possible market for Austria, as per
Komlos, it was either a guaranteed market, on Good‟s argument, or a preferred market on
Pahre‟s view, given the subordination of economic policy to foreign policy.74
68
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 109-110. 69
Rudolph, „Economic Revolution in Austria?‟, p. 171. 70
Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 123-124. 71
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, p. 30. 72
Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, pp. 218-219. 73
Robert Pahre, „Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary,
Sweden-Norway and the European Union‟, European Union Politics 2 (2001), pp. 131-162
(p. 148). 74
Pahre, „Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-
Norway and the European Union‟, p. 148.
7468207
16
On the subject of the Prussian led Zollverein Hallerberg and Weber make the claim
that,
Prussia, recognising that internal trade impediments were obstructing national
prosperity, began the process by reducing and harmonising its remaining internal
tariffs soon after the Treaty of Vienna, and raising the tariffs (and enforcing them) for
goods headed outside of the country. It wanted a customs union, and by making it
more costly for its neighbours not to enter into a union it hoped to convince them to
change their minds.75
They go on to note that Prussia, due to its size and wealth, defined the terms for new
membership, negotiated with foreign countries, distributed revenues and that in the years
following 1850, the Austrian government‟s attempts to join were refuted by Prussia, by then
openly engaged in a struggle for the hegemonic position in Germany.7677
Therefore a
situation arose in which Austria was economically excluded from Germany, many years
before its political exclusion, adding additional weight to its reliance on the Empire as a
market. Within the central states of Europe, two rival customs areas thus existed, the Prussian
led Zollverein and the Habsburg‟s custom union, and given Prussia‟s insistence that Austria
remain excluded, and the internal removal of tariff barriers, Austria‟s nobility will have been
faced with an obvious avenue for their economic activities.
From this examination of the economic interests of the Austrian nobility, a number of
conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the aristocracy had both industrial and agrarian interests
within the Empire and the industrial growth which occurred upon their great estates is of
75
Mark Hallerberg and Katja Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for
Integration Theory‟, Journal of European Integration 24 (2002), pp. 1-21 (p. 5). 76
Hallerberg and Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration
Theory‟, p. 5. 77
Hallerberg and Weber, „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration
Theory‟, p. 6.
7468207
17
especial note. Industrial growth in the Austrian portion of the Empire, whether government
encouraged or not, differed from the more agrarian, slower eastern portion of the Empire and
indeed put it in an advantageous position within the Empire. With the eastern portion of the
Empire less industrialised, the Austrian nobility found a market for both investment and for
their manufactured goods, as evidenced by the levels of exported goods. With the removal of
internal tariff barriers and improvement in transport infrastructure, the Austrian nobility were
given added incentive to focus their economic activity towards Hungary, whilst the Prussian-
led Zollverein actively discouraged a more German centred economic sphere. It has therefore
been shown that despite their ethno-linguistic ties in Germany, the Austrian nobility focussed
their economic activity towards the Empire, highlighting that these characteristics do not
carry much weight when it comes to material concerns. This is not to claim that Austria did
not attempt to gain entrance to the Zollverein or to propose alternatives, nor that Prussian
initiative was met with equanimity. As the next section will highlight, Austria‟s foreign
policy was not one which accepted exclusion from German affairs and given the prominent
roles of the Austrian nobility in pursuing and formulating this policy, it is these issues which
need now to be explored.
The final section will explore the reaction of Austria‟s nobility, as expressed through
the actions of those in the employ of the Austrian state, to Prussia‟s growing influence
amongst the German states. This will show that as with their economic interests, the Austrian
nobility were not motivated by the elusive „German essence‟ and that the interests of the
Empire were deemed more important. It will begin with an examination of the competing
solutions to German unification: grossdeutsch; kleindeutsch; and Mitteleuropa. This will lead
to an exploration of the consistency of Austrian foreign policy in the decades following
Metternich‟s departure. This look at foreign policy, and those formulating it, will allow
conclusions to be made as to how specific members of the nobility perceived the issue of
7468207
18
German unification and how they would have reacted to their exclusion from Bismarck‟s
kleindeutsch Reich.
Prior to examining Austrian foreign policy in the decades preceding German
unification, an exploration of the themes of kleindeutsch, grossdeutsch and Mitteleuropa will
allow a better understanding of the issues facing the respective Foreign Ministers. Birken
surmises the competing traditions as,
The first calling for the complete exclusion of Austria from the German state, the
second for the inclusion of German Austria, and the third for the inclusion of the
entire Austrian Empire, Prussia and the German statelets in a vast multinational
polity.78
Each of these solutions found supporters across the German states, though as Birken
goes on to argue, the grossdeutsch solution was the only one which genuinely represented an
attempt to realise the creation of a genuine German state.79
This statement itself represents
the issue previously highlighted in the discussion of Erdmann‟s claims; it presupposes the
existence of a German people of which Austria was a constitutive part. Such statements are of
little use in assessing the reaction of the Austrian nobility; any statement pertaining to
Austria‟s rightful inclusion or exclusion presupposes a German or Austrian identity.
Sondhaus, however, notes that in the Frankfurt parliament,
In October 1848, when voting on a motion for the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire
and inclusion of the German Austrian lands in a united Germany, the Austrians split
78
Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, p. 135. 79
Birken, „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, p. 135.
7468207
19
into three roughly equal camps: those in favour, those opposed, and those casting no
vote at all.80
Clearly German unification was a contested issue, with pan-German nationalism an
important aspect, yet the attitudes and policies of the Austrian Foreign Ministers highlight
that as with economic interests, ethno-linguistic and historic ties were not of paramount
importance. Therefore it is to the issues of Austro-German integration that this paper now
turns, to assess the validity of claims that Austria should have been included within a unified
Germany and if Austensen is correct to assert the consistency of Habsburg foreign policy.
Of Prince Metternich, Austensen states that, „He regarded men such as Felix
Schwarzenberg, Karl von Buol-Schauenstein, Bernard von Rechberg, and a number of others
as the “pupils” of his “school.”‟81
Austensen goes on to claim that between 1849 and 1864,
unity without unification became Austria‟s main policy with regard to Germany, in the same
vein as had been previously pursued by Metternich.82
This policy of unity without unification
carries with it the implicit acknowledgement that neither Austria nor the Habsburg Empire as
a whole should be involved in German unification, on either a federal or unitary basis. A
memorandum of September 3rd
1849 from Metternich to Schwarzenberg contains the formers
views on Germany; unity was a German ideal, represented by the Holy Roman Empire and
German confederation whereas unification was a new concept that was largely impractical,
the grossdeutsch solution was impossible, the kleindeutsch would be nothing more than a
disguise for Prussian expansion and he therefore advocated the restoration of the
Confederation.83
Of the three solutions, Metternich advocated a policy closest to the
80
Lawrence Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟,
International History Review 13 (1991), pp. 1-20 (p. 1). 81
Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, p. 42. 82
Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, p. 44. 83
Austensen, „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?”‟, pp. 44-45.
7468207
20
Mitteleuropa option, though accepting the exclusion of the non-Austrian Habsburg lands; a
strong German confederation, including Austria, was his desired German outcome.84
Schwarzenberg, much like Metternich, would not relinquish Austria‟s primacy in
Germany, but was prepared to use the medium sized states against Prussia rather than
compromising with Berlin and, according to Rock, had the intention of bringing all of the
Habsburg lands into the Confederation, making Austria the predominant power of
Germany.85
This interpretation is challenged by Austensen who claims that Schwarzenberg
promptly dropped plans for the inclusion of the non-German Habsburg lands and merely
considered this course initially because of the difficulties involved in maintaining the
Confederate and non-Confederate portions of the Empire separately.86
Sondhaus discusses
the various positions on the debate over Schwarzenberg‟s conduct and the interpretations of
his attempts to institute a Mitteleuropa empire of seventy millions: Schroeder‟s contention
that post 1848 Austria merely fought a defensive battle to maintain its position in Austria;
Austensen‟s claims that Schwarzenberg followed the Metternichian school and aimed for a
restored Confederation and conservative Austro-Prussian partnership; Rumpler‟s assertion
that above all Schwarzenberg desired an alliance with Prussia and all other actions pertained
to improving the Empire‟s bargaining power with Austria‟s rival; Lutz who argued that
Schwarzenberg indeed sought the Mitteleuropa empire of seventy millions; Sked‟s criticism
that Schwarzenberg was not a Metternichian, but a failed Realpolitiker; and finally Nipperdey
who attempts to reconcile the various positions by positing Schwarzenberg as a Realpolitiker
but noting that the Mitteleuropa program, the Reich of seventy millions, was still an attempt
84
Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 204. 85
Kenneth W. Rock, „Felix Schwarzenberg, Military Diplomat‟, Austrian History Yearbook
11 (1975), pp. 85-100 (p. 94). 86
Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 209.
7468207
21
at confederate unity as opposed to federal unification.87
Whilst noting the range of opinion
and possible interpretations of the evidence, it has been shown that Schwarzenberg, much
like Metternich, did not attempt to include Austria within a unified federal Germany.
Sondhaus‟s work on Austria and the German Navy highlights Schwarzenberg‟s machinations
over Germany and a joint Navy, concluding that,
In the German question as a whole, Austria could not seriously consider a settlement
which would require the abandonment of her non-German territories; likewise, in the
navy question, she could only consider solutions which took into account the defence
of her interests in the Adriatic.88
The issue of the German Navy thus represents the Austrian interpretation of the
unification dilemma; unwilling to relinquish its rights in Germany, much like its influence
over the Navy, yet entirely against subsuming Austria within a unified Germany and severing
it from the Empire, thus contributing to a genuine Germany Navy; Schwarzenberg‟s hands
were tied. At one extreme he can be argued to have been attempting to maintain the status
quo of the Confederation, at the other he sought to create the Empire of seventy millions,
though still a confederacy of states. Schwarzenberg did not seek to include Austria in a
unified Germany, nor was he prepared to allow the confederate states to dissolve into a
Prussian led union.
Whilst Schwarzenberg pursued his confederate Empire, the task of convincing Prussia
at the Dresden conference fell to von Buol, who quickly became disillusioned and
recommended that the policy be dropped and Austria return to the Metternichian policy of
87
Sondhaus, „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟, pp. 4-6. 88
Lawrence Sondhaus, „Mitteleuropa zur See? Austria and the German Navy Question 1848-
52‟, Central European History 20 (1987), pp. 125-144 (p. 143).
7468207
22
reviving the federal diet, exclusive of the non-Austrian Habsburg lands.89
Austensen goes on
to claim that upon succeeding Schwarzenberg, von Buol‟s ideas were entirely Metternichian;
he did not attempt to include the Habsburg Empire within a grossdeutsch unification, nor
would he allow a kleindeutsch unification under Prussian hegemony and as already shown, he
was not enthusiastic about Schwarzenberg‟s Mitteleuropa solution, given the opposition of
Prussia and loss of prestige among the middle sized states.90
Schroeder illustrates this point in
a discussion of von Buol‟s relationship with Bruck over Austrian foreign policy and quotes
von Buol thus,
A great union with Germany in order to decide the issue vis-a-vis both East and West
is a beautiful but empty dream. Prussia feels nothing but hatred and envy toward us
and the small states can only at best be compelled to do what they feel like doing.91
Therefore, much like Schwarzenberg, von Buol sought to maintain Austrian prestige
within a German confederation, but did not seek to include the Empire or Austria lands
within a unified Germany; „His German policy as foreign minister was to assert Austria's
rights to leadership in Germany and to hold the line against Prussian pretensions to the
contrary.‟92
Indeed Austensen notes that despite their differences, both von Buol and von
Rechberg agreed that the German Confederation should remain the way it was.93
Von Rechberg, „Was fundamentally unsympathetic to the idea of making changes in
Germany and acquiesced in Austrian efforts to reform the German Confederation only with
the greatest reluctance.‟94
Elrod further goes on to claim that Rechberg‟s policy rested on
89
Roy A. Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, Austrian History Yearbook
9 (1973), pp. 173-193 (pp. 182-183). 90
Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, pp. 186-187. 91
Schroeder, „Bruck versus Buol‟, p. 212. 92
Austensen, „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, p. 187. 93
Austensen, „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”,‟ p. 210. 94
Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition‟, p. 442.
7468207
23
Metternichian principles; Austria should maintain the Confederation and independence of the
smaller states and that German issues were secondary to European issues.95
Rechberg‟s
repeated attempts to accommodate Prussia serve to highlight his interests in maintaining a
German Confederation over either a grossdeutsch or kleindeutsch solution. Kraehe does
however discuss Rechberg‟s reluctant backing of Baron von Dalwigk‟s grossdeutsch reform
plans for the Confederation, including a federal court, an alternating presidency between
Austria and Prussia, an assembly of delegates from the Landtage, the advancement of general
legislation and an executive committee based on trialism.96
This grossdeutsch reform was a
response to the possibility of the revival of the Prussian Union project and a proposal from
Baden calling for Prussian leadership of Germany.97
As with Metternich, Schwarzenberg, von
Buol and von Rechberg would not accept complete exclusion from German affairs, but were
equally opposed to greater Austrian involvement in German affairs; the Empire‟s sphere of
interest was to remain European and German affairs were but one aspect of this outlook.
This examination has shown that there was considerable consistency in Austria‟s
foreign policy and attitude towards German unity and unification. The nobility who guided
Austria policy between 1848 and 1864 thus followed a similar course in Germany; Austria
was to retain its position within a confederation of German states, preferably with a
conservative alliance with Prussia. The impracticality of subsuming Austria into a unified
Germany prevented the grossdeutsch solution, which would have been likely to precipitate
the collapse of the Habsburg Empire or reduce its prestige to that of a secondary power, from
becoming a reality and likewise a retreat from Germany went against Austria‟s historic rights,
95
Elrod, „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition‟, p. 442. 96
Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 283. 97
Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 282.
7468207
24
thus rendering the kleindeutsch solution equally, if not considerably more, abhorrent.98
The
evidence for the Mitteleuropa plan is tentative at best but even assuming Schwarzenberg had
genuinely considered this a suitable alternative to German unification, the case remains that
this was to be a confederation of states, not a unitary state. These Austrian nobles did not
want to be included with a unified Germany; they wanted to retain Austria‟s rights within the
German Confederation, a separate Austrian existence.
The reaction of the Austrian nobility to German unification under a kleindeutsch
program can be highlighted by von Rechberg, who in response to Bismarck‟s suggestion that
Austria focus its attentions upon Hungary, replied that Austria intended to preserve its
historic rights in Germany.99
For Hobelt,
The Habsburgs and a majority of their bureaucratic and aristocratic camp-followers
clearly opted to hold on to the Empire they had got rather than exchange it for an
uncertain future as overlords of the new Germany.100
Whilst acknowledging the cultural identity shared between the ethno-linguistic
German states, including Austria, Breuilly rightly acknowledges that, „National identity is not
a mysterious cultural essence which can endure without appropriate political and economic
conditions.‟101
This paper has therefore evidenced that economically and politically, the
Austrian nobility were not focussed upon the German states, at least not to the extent that
they were focussed upon the Empire. The Empire acted as a market for entrepreneurial and
industrial activity, the nobility had avenues for investment and a market for their
98
Bo Strath, „Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann‟, European Journal of Social Theory 11
(2008), pp.171-183 (p. 176). 99
Kraehe, „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation‟, p. 290. 100
Lothar Hobelt, „The Austrians in the German National Assembly in 1848‟, Parliaments,
Estates and Representation 18 (1998), pp. 91-101 (p. 95). 101
John Breuilly, „Nations and Nationalism in Modern German History‟, Historical Journal
33 (1990), pp. 659-675 (p. 662).
7468207
25
manufactured goods. Politically, the Austrian nobility, as embodied in the foreign ministers,
followed a policy aimed at maintaining Austria‟s position in the German Confederation, but
only as a part of their European policy which concerned the Empire as a whole. They wanted
to maintain Austria‟s historic rights but were not willing to disentangle Austria from the
Empire for inclusion in a unified Germany, nor were they willing to concede a kleindeutsch
solution to Prussia.
It is therefore most likely that whilst there may have been lamentation at the exclusion
of Austria from German unification, it arose as a result of ethno-linguistic ties being severed
and an acknowledgement of the decline in Austrian prestige, not as a result of any practical
concern. Economically the nobility will have found little change in the situation, the
Zollverein having already excluded them from the common German economic union.
Politically, the Austrian‟s had failed at maintaining a presence in Germany but given the
pursuit of policies aiming at maintaining a confederacy of states, it could be argued that the
exclusion of Austria from German unification only represents a partial failure. The Austrian
nobility did not want to be included in a unified German state; a confederacy became
impossible, therefore exclusion became inevitable.
Erdmann‟s claims that Austrian history needs to be relocated in that of a German
Kulturnation relies on the ethno-linguistic links between the two. This paper has shown that,
for the nobility at least, these links are not the only ones of relevance. If Austrian history is to
be placed within a framework, it can equally be placed within a similar one to the
Mitteleuropa solution. To this end, Boyer claims,
7468207
26
Austrian history is embedded in the cultural history of the various German-speaking
lands, and, in a much less predictable fashion, a part of the institutional and policy
history of what might loosely be called Central European state development.102
Indeed, Spohn concurs, noting that Austrian identity, „Oscillated between an Empire-
oriented, regional Austrian as well as pan-German nationalism.‟103
It would be folly to
attempt to disentangle Austrian history from either its German or Empire roots and therefore
any attempt to retroactively place Austria in a grossdeutsch framework, or to claim the
injustice of the kleindeutsch unification, presupposes the importance of nationalist sentiment
over political and economic reality.
102
John W. Boyer, „Some Reflections on the Problem of Austria, Germany, and
Mitteleuropa‟, Central European History 22 (1989), pp. 301-315 (p. 314). 103
Willfried Spohn, „Austria: From Habsburg Empire to a Small Nation in Europe‟, in
Atsuko Ichijo and Willfried Spohn (eds.), Entangled Identities: Nations and Europe
(Hampshire, 2005), pp. 55-71 (p. 55).
7468207
27
Bibliography
Austensen, Roy A. „Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany,” 1848-1864‟,
Journal of Modern History 52 (1980), pp. 195-225.
Austensen, Roy A. „Count Buol and the Metternich Tradition‟, Austrian History Yearbook 9
(1973), pp. 173-193.
Austensen, Roy A. „”Einheit oder Einigkeit?” Another Look at Metternich‟s View of the
German Dilemma‟, German Studies Review 6 (1983), pp. 41-57.
Berghe, Pierre Van Den. „A Socio-Biological Perspective‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony
D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 96-103.
Birken, Lawrence. „Volkish Nationalism in Perspective‟, History Teacher 27 (1994), pp. 133-
143.
Boyer, John W. „Some Reflections on the Problem of Austria, Germany, and Mitteleuropa’,
Central European History 22 (1989), pp. 301-315.
Breuilly, John. „Nations and Nationalism in Modern German History‟, Historical Journal 33
(1990), pp. 659-675.
Breuilly, John. „The Sources of Nationalist Ideology‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.
Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 103-113.
7468207
28
Cohen, Gary B. „Recent Research on Czech Nation-Building‟, in Journal of Modern History
51 (1979), pp. 760-772.
Connor, Walker. „A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is and Ethnic Group, is a...‟, in John
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 36-46.
Deutsch, Karl W. „Nationalism and Social Communication‟, in John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 26-29.
Elrod, Richard B. „Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition: The Dilemma of
Conservative Statecraft‟, Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 430-455.
Fischer, Wolfram. „The German Zollverein: A Case Study in Customs Union‟, Kyklos 13
(1960), pp. 65-89.
Gerschenkron, Alexander. An Economic Spurt that Failed (Surrey, 1977).
Godsey Jr., William D. Aristocratic Redoubt: The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the
Eve of the First World War (Indiana, 1999).
Good, David F. The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (London, 1984), pp.
96-97.
7468207
29
Good, David F. „Uneven Development in the Nineteenth Century: A Comparison of the
Habsburg Empire and the United States‟, Journal of Economic History 46 (1986), pp. 137-
151.
Greenfield, Kent Roberts. „The Italian Nationality Problem of the Austrian Empire: The Early
Period of Austrian Rule‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3 (1967), pp. 491-526.
Gruber, Karl Heinz. „Higher Education and the State in Austria: An Historical and
Institutional Approach‟, European Journal of Education 17 (1982), pp. 259-270.
Haberl, Helmut and Krausmann, Fridolin. „Changes in Population, Affluence, and
Environmental Pressures During Industrialisation: The Case of Austria 1830-1995‟,
Population and Environment 23 (2001), pp. 49-69.
Hallerberg, Mark and Weber, Katja. „German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for
Integration Theory‟, Journal of European Integration 24 (2002), pp. 1-21.
Heindl, Waltraud. „Bureaucracy, Officials, and the State in the Austrian Monarchy: Stages of
Change since the Eighteenth Century‟, Austrian History Yearbook 37 (2006), pp. 35-57.
Hobelt, Lothar „The Austrians in the German National Assembly in 1848‟, Parliaments,
Estates and Representation 18 (1998), pp. 91-101.
Hutchinson, John. „Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration‟, in John Hutchinson and
Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 122-131.
7468207
30
Kann, Robert A. „The Case of Austria‟, Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980), pp. 37-
52.
Kamusella, Tomasz. „Nations and their Borders: Changing Identities in Upper Silesia in the
Modern Age‟, German History 19 (2001), 400-407.
Karner, Christian. „The “Habsburg Dilemma” Today: Competing Discourses of National
Identity in Contemporary Austria‟, National Identities 7 (2005), pp. 409-432.
Kedourie, Elie. „Nationalism and Self-Determination‟ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D.
Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford, 1994), pp. 49-55.
Komlos, John. The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in
Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century (Surrey, 1983).
Kraehe, Enno E. „Austria and the Problem of Reform in the German Confederation, 1851-
1863‟, American Historical Review 56 (1951), pp. 276-294.
Medgyes, Péter and Miklós, Katalin. „The Language Situation in Hungary‟, Current Issues in
Language Planning 1 (2000), pp. 148-242.
Murray, Scott W. „In Pursuit of a Mirage: Robert Morier‟s Views of Liberal Nationalism and
German Unification, 1853-1876‟, International History Review 20 (1998), pp. 33-67.
O‟Brien, Patrick Karl. „The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the Perspective
of the World‟, Journal of Historical Sociology 4 (1991), pp. 288-316.
7468207
31
Pahre, Robert. „Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary,
Sweden-Norway and the European Union‟, European Union Politics 2 (2001), pp. 131-162.
Peter, Laszlo. „The Aristocracy, the Gentry and their Parliamentary Tradition in Nineteenth-
Century Hungary‟, Slavonic and East European Review 70 (1992), pp. 77-110.
Pombeni, Paolo. „The Ideology of Christian Democracy‟, Journal of Political Ideologies 5
(2000), pp. 289-300.
Ritter, Harry „Austria and the Struggle for German Identity‟, German Studies Review 15
(1992), pp. 111-129.
Rock, Kenneth W. „Felix Schwarzenberg, Military Diplomat‟, Austrian History Yearbook 11
(1975), pp. 85-100.
Ross, Ronald J. „Enforcing the Kulturkampf in the Bismarckian State and the Limits of
Coercion in Imperial Germany,‟ Journal of Modern History 56 (1984), pp. 456-482.
Rudolph, Richard L. „Economic Revolution in Austria? The Meaning of 1848 in Austrian
Economic History,‟ in John Komlos (ed.), Economic Development in the Habsburg
Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century: Essays (New York, 1983), pp. 165-182.
Savelsberg, Joachim J. „Religion, Historical Contingencies, and Institutional Conditions of
Criminal Punishment: The German Case and Beyond‟, Law and Social Inquiry 29 (2004), pp.
373-401.
7468207
32
Schmitt, Hans A. „Count Beust and Germany, 1866-1870: Reconquest, Realignment, or
Resignation?‟, Central European History 1 (1968), pp. 20-34.
Schroeder, Paul W. „Bruck versus Buol: The Dispute Over Austrian Eastern Policy, 1853-
1855,‟ Journal of Modern History 40 (1968), pp. 193-217.
Sondhaus, Lawrence. „Mitteleuropa zur See? Austria and the German Navy Question 1848-
52‟, Central European History 20 (1987), pp. 125-144.
Sondhaus, Lawrence. „Schwarzenberg, Austria, and the German Question, 1848-1851‟,
International History Review 13 (1991), pp. 1-20.
Spohn, Willfried. „Austria: From Habsburg Empire to a Small Nation in Europe‟, in Atsuko
Ichijo and Willfried Spohn (eds.), Entangled Identities: Nations and Europe (Hampshire,
2005), pp. 55-71.
Strath, Bo. „Mitteleuropa: From List to Naumann‟, European Journal of Social Theory 11
(2008), pp.171-183.
Sugar, Peter F. „The Nature of the Non-Germanic Societies under Habsburg Rule‟, Slavic
Review 22 (1963), pp. 1-30.
Sugar, Peter F. „Nationalism as a Disintegrating Force‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3 (1967),
pp. 91-120.
7468207
33
Van Duin, Pieter C. Central European Crossroads: Social Democracy and National
Revolution in Bratislava (Pressburg), 1867-1921 (Oxford, 2009).
Wandycz, Piotr S. „The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy‟, Austrian History Yearbook 3
(1967), pp. 261-286.
Wawr, Geoffrey. „The Habsburg Flucht nach vorne in 1866: Domestic Political Origins of
the Austro-Prussian War‟, pp. 221-248.
Weber, Max. „The Nation‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), Nationalism
(Oxford, 1994), pp. 21-25.
Wischenbart, Rüdiger. „National Identity and Immigration in Austria - Historical Framework
and Political Dispute‟, West European Politics 17 (1994), pp. 72-90.
Wright, Sue. „Language as a Contributing Factor in Conflicts between States and Within
States‟, Current Issues in Language and Society 4 (1997), pp. 215-237.