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Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and SocietyOccasional Paper Series No. 5

The Raids Across the Malacca and SingaporeStraits during Confrontation 1963 – 66Dr Andrew Ross

Australian Centre for the Study of Armed Conflict and Society (ACSACS)

ACSACS Occasional Paper No. 5: The Raids Across the Malacca and Singapore Straits during Confrontation 1963-66; written by Dr Andrew Ross and edited by Dr Rita Parker (2017).

ACSACS Occasional Papers Series No.5

Occassional Paper No. 1: Soldiers, Squadrons And Strategists: Building an ethical Backbone for the armies of the twenty-first century – an Anglo-Australian Practitioner’s View. Major Tom McDermott DSO MA.

Occassional Paper No. 2: Nobility Down Under: How the duchess became an Australian. Professor Tom Frame.

Occassional Paper No. 3: Australian Political Perceptions of the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin. Dr Stephanie James.

Occassional Paper No. 4: Intelligence Analysis: What is it good for? Dr Dirk Maclean.


Occasional Paper Series No. 5 | 1

IntroductionThe purpose of this study is to show that low intensity guerrilla wars are not confined to land operations, but can have a full-blown maritime dimension. The British Commonwealth experienced this as an aspect of its struggle with Indonesian subversion and sabotage of the new state of Malaysia in Confrontation 1963 to 1966. The study draws on a number of computerised databases to chart the ebb and flow of the maritime campaign through the quantitative analysis of Operations Research.

Confrontation arose when Britain sought to combine its territories of Singapore, Malaya, and North Borneo, into one political entity called Malaysia. The idea emerged in 1961-2 and gained the support of nearly all the territories involved. However, Indonesia did not like the close presence of a new and powerful state that was closely allied with a former colonial power. Having had a bitter struggle with the former Dutch colonial power, Indonesia, led by President Sukarno, saw the concept of Malaysia as a front to preserve the presence of colonialists in their region. These developments threatened to obstruct Indonesian ambitions to acquire some of the former British territories, particularly those in North Borneo.

Indonesia was not strong enough to directly challenge Britain and Malaysia with military operations, so it launched in April 1963, guerrilla raids over the border of North Borneo in an undeclared low intensity war. This war grew in geographical scope in the following years, and extended to raids into mainland Malaya and Singapore. This was the maritime campaign referred to above and is the focus of this study. As the study will show, the campaign put great strain on British resources, and drew in other members of the British Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand, who helped to supply ships, aircraft and ground forces to protect mainland Malaya and Singapore.

During the period of Confrontation, April 1963-August 1966, in excess of 500 significant incidents (i.e. verified hostile acts by the enemy) occurred on land, sea and in the air, around mainland Malaya and Singapore.1

Incidents at Sea: 377

Incidents on Land: 197

Incidents in the Air: 1

Total: 575

(Source: Databases Incidents at Sea; Incidents in Malaya; Incidents in Singapore).

The incidents took place around much of the 1600Km coast of mainland Malaya and Singapore, although most occurred on the West Coast area of the Malayan peninsula and the Singapore area. The ability of the enemy to promote this number of incidents over this area succeeded in tying down a British Commonwealth land force more than 10 times larger than that of the raiding force.2 Large British Commonwealth naval and air forces

1 Databases created by A T Ross from: THE(LONDON) TIMES 1963-1966; ROYAL NAVAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS; INDONESIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST MALAYSIA; by the Malaysian Government, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, Vols 1 and 2; NAVAL REVIEW, Vols 51-54; KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES; 1963-1966; THE MILITARY BALANCE; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1963-1967; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE; 1957-1971; Chin K W Cambridge University Press 1983; THE UNDECLARED WAR; James H, London 1971; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE; Hawkins D, RUSI, London, 1972; BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ 1947-1968; Darby P, Oxford University Press 1973; THE LONG RETREAT; Bartlett C J , London 1972; The National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK); The National Archives of Australia;

2 See later in this study.


2 | Occasional Paper Series No. 5

were also tied down in the Malacca and Singapore Straits area of operations. Although the British Commonwealth succeeded in controlling and drastically reducing the number of incidents, as the Indonesian campaign progressed, British Commonwealth forces were trapped in an asymmetrical war, where they required vastly more forces and effort than the Indonesians. The struggle cost the British Commonwealth far more than it cost the Indonesians, who held the initiative in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Unlike in North Borneo where British Commonwealth forces launched the Claret Raids against Indonesia, the British Government never approved retaliatory raids across the Malacca and Singapore Straits, for fear of escalation to a higher level of conflict.3

Indonesian Strategy in the StraitsThe Indonesians were significantly influenced by the success of their West Irian campaign against the Dutch, where they had successfully applied economic, political and military pressure, without the necessity of full-scale war.4 The Indonesian concept of operations envisaged initially a sustained campaign of piracy against the Malayan fishing industry in the Straits. This was to increase economic pressure on Malaysia, and to distract and scatter naval security forces of the British Commonwealth. As Figure 1 shows5, the piracy campaign grew steadily from January 1963, although it suffered a partial collapse during the period Jan to June 65, probably because of increasing tension and lack of purpose in the direction of the Indonesian effort leading up to the coup in September 1965.

After that, the piracies resumed, peaking in the period July to December 1966. This did not represent a vigorous conclusion to the Indonesian program, but rather the last opportunity before the peace settlement, for enterprising profit taking (robbery) concealed behind a government policy. It also represented a way for Indonesian servicemen to gain remuneration in the absence of being paid by their Government.

3 But see David Easter, “British and Malaysian Covert Support for Rebel Movements in Indonesia during the ‘Confrontation’, 1963-66” in The Clandestine Cold War in Asia.

4 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1123;

5 See database Incidents at Sea;

The second phase of Indonesian strategy was to exert political pressure on Malaysia through encouraging riot and dissent through left wing organizations (principally in Singapore), and engaging in acts of sabotage to demonstrate the Government's lack of control or authority. Many left wing nationals of Malaysia were recruited as saboteurs, but Indonesian volunteers were also used from amongst the Indonesian population resident in Singapore. This was a sustained campaign that began in January 1963, and involved many successful acts of sabotage by the Indonesians and their agents. Figure 26 shows the number of incidents of the campaign, including sabotage missions intercepted at sea and on land by British Commonwealth forces. The time periods are for half years beginning in January and July.

The campaigns of piracy and sabotage set the scene for serious military pressure from Indonesia, through seaborne and airborne insertions of heavily armed men, to establish liberated areas in mainland Malaya, from which further operations could be launched to undermine the central government and to encourage dissent. These insertions could involve groups of seven to 100 men, and represented a direct military challenge to the authority of the Government of Malaysia. The number of contacts between Indonesian raiders and British Commonwealth naval and land security forces is given in Figure 3.7

6 See databases Incidents at Sea, Incidents in Malaya, Incidents in Singapore;

7 Ibid.



Indonesian ForcesThere were about 40,000 Indonesian troops in Sumatra opposite Mainland Malaya, and in the Rhio Islands a few kilometres S of Singapore. 75% of these were regular garrison troops employed on home defence and internal security duties having no connection to Confrontation. The remaining 10,000 troops were part of the overall command organisation for carrying out Confrontation. Two infantry brigades were stationed along the NE coast of Sumatra, and one amphibious landing brigade was stationed in the Rhios. The Royal Navy considered that these forces were unlikely to be used, but were useful in that their presence was an overt threat.8

The Indonesian force used to create the 500 or more incidents in the mainland Malaya and Singapore area, was only 1,000 men, organized into various units known collectively as Special Forces. They were based along the East Coast of Sumatra, and the Rhio islands. They were armed with SMG's, Armalites, SLR's, grenades and other light personal weapons, but also usually carried explosives. The main means of infiltration was by sea, usually by small boat or fishing vessel.9

Aircraft were used only once, possibly because of difficulty in dropping parachutists accurately in their area of operations. Weather conditions of deep cloud, and the necessity of flying at night to avoid British Commonwealth fighters, made such operations hazardous as well as difficult to navigate. Conditions on the seaways of the Malacca and Singapore Straits rarely inhibited navigation of sea craft. Sea states were normally low enough to provide long periods of good sea transit for raids and sabotage missions.10

The size of raiding and sabotage parties is given in Table 1.

Table 1: The Size of Raiding and Sabotage Parties sent against Malaya and Singapore.

Size of Raiding and Sabotage Parties

No of OccurrencesPercentage of total occurrences

1-5 66 58

6-10 25 22

11-15 6 5

16-20 5 4.4

21-25 3 2.6

26-30 3 2.6

31-40 2 1.8

41-50 2 1.8

51-100 2 1.8

8 NAUK DEFE 24/98, 1122 “Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singa-pore Straits 1964-1965”.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

Problems Facing Commonwealth ForcesApart from the narrow seaways separating Malaysia from Indonesia, mainland Malaya had a coast of 1600km, most of which was accessible to Indonesian operations. The Malacca and Singapore Straits were amongst the busiest seaways in the world, providing a packed seascape of neutral shipping, together with thousands of fishing vessels from Malaya and Indonesia. This environment gave ideal cover for the type of operations the Indonesians planned to launch. How were British Commonwealth forces going to identify the hostile small craft from the fishing vessels and neutral merchant ships? The control of airspace over Malaya was nearly as complex. Singapore was a major international airport with scores of arrivals and departures every day, right next to Indonesian controlled airspace.

The British Government considered that its first priority was to prevent the escalation of the low intensity war promoted by Indonesia. Various tactical measures were enforced. British Commonwealth naval vessels were not allowed to patrol the waters of the Indonesian claimed 12 -mile territorial limit. International law only recognized the 3-mile limit at that time. Indonesian naval or government vessels were not to be interfered with on the high seas (international waters).

Small craft could be stopped and searched in international waters or Malaysian waters. A redeeming feature of these rules of engagement was that fire could be opened in self-defence on any Indonesian vessel that fired on British Commonwealth vessels.11

The major action to counter escalation was the building up of very large air and naval forces in the exercise of force majeure, to intimidate the Indonesian Government with the threat of overwhelming force, should Indonesia push the conflict into a high intensity war. The naval forces (largely British) that were unequivocally devoted to this end were as follows:

Table 2: Commonwealth Naval Deterrent Forces in Confrontation12

Major Naval Unit 1963 1964 1965 1966

Fleet Aircraft Carrier 1 2 2 1

Commando Carrier 1 1 1 1

Cruiser 1 - - -

Guided Missile Destroyer - 2 2 2

Escort Destroyer/Frigate 8 10 10 8

Submarine 10 10 10 10

11 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1132-1135;

12 This data was compiled from: NAUK DEFE 24/98, 1139 “Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 1964-1965”; THE(LONDON) TIMES 1963-1966; ROYAL NAVAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS; NAVAL REVIEW, Vols 51-54; KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES; 1963-1966; THE MILITARY BALANCE; The International Institute for Strategic

Studies, London 1963-1967; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 1957-1971; Chin K W Cambridge University Press 1983; THE UNDECLARED WAR; James H, London 1971; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE; Hawkins D, RUSI, London, 1972; BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ 1947-1968; Darby P, Oxford University Press 1973;



The British Commonwealth air units committed to controlling or deterring Indonesian escalation were as follows:

Table 3: Commonwealth Air Deterrent Forces in Confrontation13

Major Air Force Units 1963 1964 1965 1966

Javelin Fighter Squadron 1 2 2 2

Vulcan Bomber Squadron - 0.5 0.5 0.5

Canberra Bomber Squadron 2 3 4 4

Sabre Fighter Squadron 2 2 2 2

Confrontation did not escalate into a full-scale conventional war either around mainland Malaya and Singapore or in North Borneo, which probably justified the British build-up.

Commonwealth Force StructureThe protection of the long exposed coasts of Malaya and Singapore required substantial contributions of naval craft from five navies (Britain, Australia, Malaya, New Zealand and Singapore).

The British Commonwealth naval forces assigned to defeating Indonesia's maritime guerrilla war against Malaya and Singapore were as follows:

Table 4: Commonwealth anti maritime guerrilla naval forces14

Anti Guerrilla Naval Forces 1963 1964 1965 1966

Escort Destroyer/Frigate 4 6 6 4

Coastal Minesweeper 9 17 24 27

Patrol Boats 6 10 14 14

Of these forces, 1 frigate was based in Tawau, Sabah, North Borneo, and approximately 4-6 Minesweepers were based somewhere in North Borneo or the South China Sea.

In addition to these forces were the largely in-shore vessels of the Marine Police. There were 40-50 of these from Singapore and Malaya.

At the height of the seaborne raids across the Malacca and Singapore Straits in 1965 there were an average of 2 Frigates, 12 Minesweepers, and 34 Marine Police vessels and Patrol boats available every night. They covered approximately 700 Km of coastline from Kuala Selangor on the West coast of Mainland Malaya, and Tinggi on the East Coast. Luckily for British Commonwealth forces, this was as much of the coast of mainland Malaya and Singapore that the Indonesians chose to threaten. This was much less than the 1600km of the whole coast. Even so, major patrol problems remained.15

The air forces assisting in the containment of Indonesia's maritime guerrilla war included 0.5 -1 squadron of Shackleton Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 NAUK DEFE 24/98, 1122-1139 “Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 1964-1965”;

aircraft; 1-2 Squadrons of Hunter Fighter/Ground Attack aircraft; many helicopters and transport aircraft, most of which were supporting operations in North Borneo. The Shackletons provided radar surveillance of large areas of ocean. In practice, one Shackelton was available for an on task time of 6 hours every night over the Malacca Strait area. This was complemented by a limited amount of air effort by RMAF Doves, which flew dusk patrols; and by RAF Pioneers, which would occasionally fly dawn beach patrols.16

Land forces in Singapore and mainland Malaya were a major part in anti guerrilla operations conducted by the British Commonwealth. Malayan Army forces totalled:

Table 5: Malayan Army Forces17

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966

Manpower 12000 14000 19000 25000 26000

Brigades 2 3 4 4 5

Infantry Battalions 5 6 8 12 13

Artillery Regiments 0.25 1 1 2 2

Recce Regiments 1 1 1 2 2

Signals Regiments - - - 1 1

From October 1963, two Malayan Infantry Battalions were permanently assigned to North Borneo. Two Malayan Infantry Battalions were watching permanently, 500 communist terrorists on the Thai Border in North Malaya. Two of the four new Malayan Infantry Battalions commissioned in 1965 were in fact Borneo Ranger Battalions that had been transferred from British to Malayan control. The Ranger Battalions were based permanently in Borneo. The Malayan Infantry Battalions and Brigades tied down by the threat of incursions in Peninsula Malaya were:

Table 6: Malayan forces Defending Western Malaya and Singapore18

1963 1964 1965 1966

Infantry Battalions 2 4 6 7

Brigades 1 2 3 3

Manpower 10000 14000 17000 18000

Besides these forces there were two Infantry Battalions from Singapore. And there was also the Commonwealth Brigade of one British, one Australian, and one New Zealand Battalion totaling three Battalions, plus a supporting artillery regiment. Thus the trained Army Forces available for the defence of Western Malaysia and Singapore were:

16 Ibid.

17 THE MILITARY BALANCE; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1963-1967; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 1957-1971; Chin K WCambridge University Press 1983; THE DEFENCE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE; Hawkins D, RUSI, London, 1972; BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY EAST OF SUEZ 1947-1968; Darby P, Oxford University Press 1973; THE LONG RETREAT; Bartlett C J , London 1972;

18 Ibid.



Table 7: Total Regular Army Forces Deployed in Western Malaya and Singapore19

1963 1964 1965 1966

Infantry Battalions 7 9 11 12

Brigades 3 4 5 5

Manpower 17000 21000 24000 25000

The Police Field Force was a paramilitary organisation in addition to the normal police. It totalled about 23,000 at the beginning of Confrontation and was still at that figure by 1966. 1,500 of this force were assigned to North Borneo soon after the beginning of Confrontation in April 1963. By the end of 1965 this figure had risen to about 2,000. This left about 21,000 available for operations in Mainland Malaya and Singapore.

Local defence forces, organised on a village basis, were also created as part of the anti raids defence structure. This began in mid 1964 in Singapore and the beginning of 1965 in Malaysia. The force totalled about 25,000 by 1966.

Therefore, total ground forces available to counter incursions and sabotage in Western Malaysia and Singapore were:

Table 8: Total Ground Forces available in Western Malaysia20

1963 1964 1965 1966

Regular Forces 17000 21000 24000 25000

Police Field Force 21000 21000 21000 21000

Local Defence Forces 0 ? ? 25000

38000 42000+ 45000+ 71000

Countering the Piracy CampaignBritish Commonwealth naval forces were never really able to control the piracies enacted by Indonesian gunboats, customs and police craft, and armed volunteers in motorised sampans. These ranged from stealing fish catches and money, to seizing boats and nets, and kidnapping fishermen and holding them to ransom. Some unlucky sailors were shot. Figure 4 shows the incidents of piracy and the number of interceptions of vessels engaged in piracy (as distinct from sabotage and raiding missions).21

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Database Incidents at Sea.

There were in excess of 272 acts of piracy noted by British Commonwealth authorities. It is clear from Figure 4 that the efforts of naval forces were negligible. One reason for this could have been that naval forces were distracted because they were responding to seaborne sabotage and raiding operations. But the main problem was probably the large number of fishing craft, spread throughout Malaysian territorial waters and international waters in and around the Malacca Strait and Singapore. In the South Malacca Strait alone, there were 2000 registered off shore fishing craft, plus many small sampans and koteks.22 Mixed in with them, on international waters, were Indonesian fishing craft and barter traders. The opportunities for sudden acts of armed piracy were many, and few Malaysian craft had radio communications with which to call security forces. Most fishing craft from Malaysia were unarmed, and therefore unable to defend themselves from Indonesian sailors armed with small arms. The latter seem to have been widely available from within Indonesia for personnel who were loosely associated with Indonesian operations.

There may be a specific explanation for the dramatic increase in piracies from January 1966. Indonesian barter traders had, for many years, engaged in exchanging goods in Singapore and to a lesser extent in Malaya. This barter trade was banned in August 1964, because of the risks of sabotage carried out under cover of the trade. In August 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia, and became anxious to increase trade with other countries, including restarting the barter trade. The solution to the security problem of sabotage was found by anchoring merchant ships in international waters for barter traders to meet and trade in daylight hours. This began in January 1966, and soon scores of barter traders were attending the various merchant ships. However, by May/June 1966, Indonesian marine police were harassing the Indonesian barter traders to get their cut of the profits. Traders were trying to hide in Malaysian and Singapore waters, where security forces were told to guide them back out, but not to prosecute them. So the international waters around Singapore were now full of fishing craft, barter traders trying to evade Indonesian police, neutral merchant shipping, and navigation hazards. The Indonesian police made no distinctions and pillaged Malaysian and Singaporean fishermen, as well as their own barter traders. In July 1966, all British Commonwealth naval patrols were withdrawn from the area because it was too difficult to implement security in the cluttered environment.23

The level of piracy, between January 1963 and September 1966, should have led to the collapse of the important Malaysian fishing industry.24 However, the onset of Confrontation coincided with the arrival of improved trawling techniques on the West coast of Malaya. These were adopted quickly by more modern fishing vessels, and led to increasing tonnages of fish being caught, despite the piracy campaign.

22 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1125;

23 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1101-2;

24 In 1965, 78000 people were involved in the Malaysian fishing industry. See J G Butler, The Closing of the Frontier: A History of Marine Fisheries, 2004.



Table 9: Thousands of tons of fish caught in Malaysia25

Year 1948 1960 1965 1966

Metric Tons (1000s) 145 169 252 294

So the impact of piracy was small in that it did not affect the fish-catch. However, the inability of British Commonwealth naval forces to be able to be at the right place at the right times, was devastating for many of the poorer fishermen with slower craft. They could not escape the attention of pirates, and suffered many material losses. But their losses did not have much impact on the Malaysian economy. Except for the advent of improved fishing techniques, the Indonesian campaign of piracy would have seen the collapse of the Malaysian fishing industry, with widespread impacts on the Malaysian economy.

Countering the Sabotage CampaignIndonesian authorities launched at least 211 sabotage missions involving parties of between three to seven men. These required a response from the British Commonwealth security forces. These missions included many land based interceptions as well as seaborne.

The Indonesian sabotage campaign could have been as difficult to control as Indonesian sponsored piracy. Most sabotage missions were launched at night, when visibility was poor. Indonesian craft tended to be long, low and narrow, with powerful outboard motors. Sometimes, captured Malayan fishing vessels were used. The best form of detection for these small targets was the radar mounted in coastal mine sweepers, for which the detection range was only two miles.26 It was found that one ship could only patrol on a front of between two to four miles.27 This meant that naval patrols could not present a broad front across the focal points of Indonesian operations (the South Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, and South East Johore)28 because there were not enough ships.

However, Commonwealth security forces were able to monitor Indonesian bases from which sabotage (and raid) missions were launched. Increased levels of activity indicated the imminence of sabotage and other missions.29 In the South Malacca Strait, when any of the three main Indonesian bases30 showed signs of launching a mission, a patrol group was formed to patrol against that base, and the mainland Malayan coast immediately opposite. Patrol groups consisted of three to six ships. When two bases were active, one was discouraged by sending a frigate into

25 See www.fao.org.

26 This was less a case of weak radar, but more of the extreme difficulty in detecting small targets in an undulating sea. However, Australian coastal mine sweepers had a different radar, bought commercially off the shelf, which had enhanced detection ranges of about four miles.

Source: Ian Pfennigwerth.

27 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1129;

28 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1088-9, 1128;

29 It is likely that most of this data was gained from Sigint. Commonwealth reading of Indonesian signals was probably extensive. See David Easter, “British Intelligence and Propaganda During the ‘Confrontation’, 1963-1966”, in Intelligence and National Security, Vol 16, No2 (summer) 2001 p83-102, published by Frank Cass London.

30 Sinaboi, Makreh Kembang, Selat Panjong.

the Indonesian claimed 12 mile waters opposite the base, where it flaunted its presence. This deterrence allowed the available patrol vessels to be concentrated against the other base.31

The position in the Singapore Strait was more complex. There were many fishing vessels and merchant ships and many navigation hazards. Saboteurs only had to travel a few kilometres from Indonesian territory to reach targets. At one stage of the sabotage campaign, British Commonwealth security forces had to station 12 patrol vessels in the straits every night.32

A multi layered defence had to be adopted. Off shore were the naval patrols. Inshore, the marine police conducted inshore seaborne patrols. On land, there were shore lookouts and coast watchers, backed up by the police. A chain of four naval shore radar stations was set up to improve the cover of ship-borne radar. Anti sampan booms were also laid in various areas. A local maritime operations centre was set up in Singapore. This was a police headquarters, which integrated onshore activity with police inshore sea patrols, as well as the information from the land based radar stations. Naval ships were not controlled by this HQ.33

Elements of this multi-layered defence were adopted on the coast of mainland Malaya as well.The effectiveness of the naval measures in countering the Indonesian sabotage campaign is indicated in Figure 5.34

Clearly, the maritime response to the sabotage campaign against Singapore and Malaya was lagging seriously between July 1963 and June 1964. After July 1964, when an organized response was finally put in place, seaborne interceptions of all sabotage missions averaged 51%. All sabotage missions intercepted at sea tended to result in a total loss of boats, weapons and saboteurs (as POW, killed and wounded). Thus the interception rate of 51% represented a major hazard for the Indonesians.

Interceptions at sea were also dangerous hazards to the British Commonwealth security forces. Intercepted saboteurs often opened fire with small arms. The main interception vessel was the coastal minesweeper. This had a wooden hull and an aluminium superstructure,

31 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1087, 1128;

32 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1088;

33 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1088;

34 The data for this graph is based on the following databases: Incidents at Sea, Incidents in Malaya, Incidents in Singapore.



neither of which provided much protection from high-powered small arms such as Armalites or light machine guns. Interceptions usually took place at night, requiring some form of illumination of the target vessel, usually at a distance of two to three cables (60-80m). Searchlights provided excellent targets for the saboteurs, and proved to be quite dangerous for the operators and nearby members of the minesweeper's crew. Other devices were quickly employed, such as the 2 inch mortar firing flares, or Icarus flares. Much later, infrared searchlights were trialled and found to be excellent.35

The threat of small arms fire, and the explosion of saboteur boats, led to interceptions being conducted at about 60m range. Boats were brought to a halt by the threat (or actual) fire from machine guns and anti-aircraft guns. The saboteurs were then ordered to abandon their vessel and swim to the British Commonwealth naval vessel. In this way, Commonwealth vessels did not expose themselves to accurate small arms fire, and the detonation of explosives aboard the sampans.36

One of the major problems for vessels on the anti sabotage patrols was to maintain vigilance after long periods of enemy inactivity in their patrol area. Experience showed that vessels should only be on patrol for a maximum of 10 days; then they needed two days in harbour to recover their vigilance. A complete break from patrolling was needed after three months, for a week or two.37

Countering Military RaidsMilitary raids were more elaborately planned operations than sabotage missions, and generally involved 10 or more trained military personnel. On one occasion the size of the raiding party totalled nearly 100 trained soldiers. Most were about 15 to 20 men. Figure 6 shows the location of the major raids.

Figure 6: Major Indonesian Raids on West Malaysia38

35 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1089,1130;

36 NAUK DEFE 24/98;

37 NAUK DEFE 24/98 1130-2;

38 Map credit: John Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s wars, p132.

There were about 100 contacts that required a seaborne or land based response from Commonwealth security forces. 84 of these were on land and represented clashes (or contacts) with various parties of raiders who were being hunted by Commonwealth security forces. 16 were clashes at sea with Commonwealth patrol vessels. However, these clashes emanated from a total of 31 military raids, of which over half were intercepted at sea. Figure 7 shows the occurrence of military raids over time, and how often they were intercepted at sea.39

Nearly all the seaborne interceptions resulted in the loss of most of the raiders encountered. Many clashes between raiders and land based security forces were brief and inconclusive. Once raiders had landed, British Commonwealth security forces often had to launch complicated and prolonged operations to track the raiders down and eventually capture or kill them. Clearly, it was very much to the advantage of the Commonwealth security forces to intercept as many raids as possible at sea.

Initially, the British Commonwealth security forces were surprised at the beginning of the Indonesian military raids. The first raids (in the July 1964 quarter) were not intercepted at sea at all. The next quarter saw five out of 12 raids intercepted at sea. There was further improvement in the January 1965 quarter, with seven out of 10 raids intercepted at sea. The next quarter was nearly as good with four out of six raids intercepted at sea. After that, the losses seem to have become too high for Indonesian authorities to continue their strategy of military raids. Senior generals within the Indonesian Army had always opposed the idea of Confrontation, and restricted the supply of resources to the command organising and launching raids against mainland Malaya and Singapore.40 In that context losses inflicted by British Commonwealth forces probably did close down the raids strategy, because equipment and trained personnel were not being replaced by the Indonesian Army. Indonesian Confrontation forces in the Malacca and Singapore Straits concentrated on sabotage until the end of Confrontation.

The methods used to detect military raids were very similar to those used to detect sabotage missions, except that targets tended to be larger and more numerous, and therefore somewhat easier to detect at short range.

39 NAUK, WO 268/802, Indonesian Offensive Against West Malaysia;

40 See John Roosa, Pretext for Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup D’Etat in Indonesia; University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2006, p187. See Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, Allen and Unwin 1998, p208.



ConclusionsThe difficulties associated with a maritime guerrilla campaign, launched in restricted waters populated with many fishing boats and merchant ships, are particularly obvious in the Malacca and Singapore Straits between 1963 and 1966. British Commonwealth naval forces and maritime police were not able to make a meaningful impact on Indonesian sponsored piracy. Fortunately, it did not matter in the grand scheme of Commonwealth strategy.

Naval and maritime police forces had a major impact on the Indonesian campaign of sabotage, intercepting up to about 51% of all missions. This probably simplified greatly the task of the police in responding to those saboteurs who had landed.

Naval forces also intercepted an average of 51% of all military raids across the Straits. This was a powerful contribution to containing the military threat.

Of about 850 raiders and saboteurs actually sent against Singapore and Western Malaysia, nearly 430 landed successfully. Depending on how you choose to look at it, this fact represents a handsome contribution to the defence of mainland Malaya and Singapore. But it also represents the number of raiders and saboteurs the naval and police maritime cordon failed to stop (i.e. over half). Land forces of considerable size were needed to back up the naval and maritime police effort in prolonged and complex operations. These were all subsequently successful, with only 25 Indonesian personnel getting back to Indonesia. The rest were all either killed or captured by land forces.

However, the Royal Navy concluded that these disruptive operations by Indonesia were achieved despite ramshackle management. A feature of the seaborne raids was that they were poorly organised and coordinated, and suffered from poor intelligence on the British Commonwealth patrolling patterns. No systematic attempt seems to have been made by Indonesian naval and air forces to gather and pool such intelligence. Indonesian signal security seems to have been compromised. If these problems had been more professionally handled, it is quite likely that the British Commonwealth detection at sea of Indonesian raiders would have been lower than it was.41

This means that more raiders would have made it to the coast of Western Malaysia and Singapore. Despite the well-organised Malaysian surveillance systems, the raiders often made it easy for the defence because they were poorly briefed on the nature of the country and people they would meet, and had poor maps and bad general navigation. Consequently, raiders often approached locals thinking they were friendly only to be reported to the police or army. Alternatively, the raiders got lost, and their tracks, or general presence, were quickly detected by locals or police. It is reasonably clear that with better preparation, the Indonesian raiders could have been much harder to detect and round up than they actually were.42

41 Naval Operations in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 1964-66, NAUK DEFE 24/98 1122-24;

42 Ibid; Incidents in Malaya database.

The huge effort to contain a poorly organized and unprofessional enemy trapped the British Commonwealth forces in an asymmetric trade-off in forces. The Commonwealth needed far more ships, manpower and effort than the small Indonesian forces. This was largely because the British Commonwealth chose to respond to Indonesian initiatives in the maritime struggle, rather than impose its own initiatives through, for example, raiding Indonesian bases in nearby islands. This was considered by the Malaysian and British governments, but dismissed because of the danger of escalating into a larger war requiring more effort and resources than required to respond to Indonesian maritime initiatives.43 A united and better-organised military effort by Indonesia might have required more resources to contain than Malaysia and Britain could supply. This would have forced the British Commonwealth forces to escalate the conflict by launching raids of their own in order to regain the military initiative.

Modern advances in radar and other detection technologies do allow nearly all small boats to be detected in a defined restricted area such as the Straits. However, the real problem is how to distinguish friend or neutral from foe. As long as this problem remains a significant one, it will continue to provide cover for the type of operations that were once launched by Indonesia. The concept of Maritime Guerrilla War is likely to be re employed sometime in the future, perhaps in modified form, by nations other than Indonesia.

Nations are not the only actors in this scenario. It can be argued that people smugglers forced Australia into an asymmetric trade-off in effort and manpower. Australia spends huge sums of money in maintaining an air/sea cordon that can detect with reasonable certainty, any attempt by people smugglers to insert boats into Australian waters. Like the Indonesian Government during Confrontation, people smugglers can choose the time and place of their insertion for very limited cost. It is perhaps significant that nearly all the people smugglers are based in Indonesia. Thus the tradition of maritime guerrilla war lives on.

43 However, the military initiative was seized in North Borneo. British Commonwealth land forces raided deep inside Indonesian territory removing Indonesian freedom of action and forcing greatly increased defensive measures, including heavy reinforcements. However, the humiliation and great cost imposed on the Indonesian forces in this area was largely concealed by the remoteness of the North Borneo battlefield, and was judged by British Commonwealth Governments to reduce the risk of escalation.



Dr Andrew RossDr Andrew Ross is a former Operations Research analyst at Central Studies Establishment, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Department of Defence. He is also a military historian and political scientist. He is currently an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of New South Wales Canberra. Ross’s numerous excursions into quantitative analysis of military operations, has amongst other things, led to the development of many computerised databases. One of these was the 1ATF Contact Database, which drives the Australia’s Vietnam War website, operated by UNSW ADFA. The database was developed to write the study The Search for Tactical Success in Vietnam: An Analysis of Australian Task Force Combat Operations, published by Cambridge University Press. Ross was a principal author. He is also the author of other books, monographs and journal articles including Armed and Ready: The Industrial Development and Defence of Australia 1900-1945.

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