Australia Looks to America the Wartime Relationship, 1939-1942

8/6/2019 Australia Looks to America the Wartime Relationship, 1939-1942

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Australia Looks to America: The Wartime Relationship, 1939-1942Author(s): G. St. J. BarclaySource: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (May, 1977), pp. 251-271Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3637934 .

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PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

both Australian domestic politics and Australian external rela-tions as much as that reflected in the words of wartime PrimeMinister John Curtin, which provide the title to this study. Thestatement was made in an article published by Curtin in apopular Melbourne newspaperjust after Hong Kong had fallento the Japanese. Warning the Australian people of their ap-parent danger, Curtin said: "The Australian Governmenttherefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in whichthe United States and Australia must have the fullest say in thedirection of the democracies' fighting plan. Without any inhi-bitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks toAmerica, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinshipwith the United Kingdom. We know the problems that theUnited Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of in-vasion. We know the dangers of dispersal of strength. But weknow, too, that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on.We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, and weshall exert all our energies towards the shaping of a plan, withthe United States as its keystone, which will give to our countrysome confidence of being able to hold out until the tide of battleswings against the enemy."2The words, as was not uncommon with Curtin, were open toconsiderable interpretation. It is only now, more than thirtyyears after the event, that archival material has become avail-able that will enable scholars to define precisely the historicalcontext in which Curtin declared this policy, and the extra-ordinary relationship which subsequently developed between aforeign power and a member of the British Commonwealth.The idea of counting on the United States for support inthe event of Japanese aggression was nothing new to Aus-tralian thinking. It had been entertained since the turn ofthe century.3 Paradoxically, it had been virtually abandoned at

2Melbourne Herald, Dec. 27, 1941. There is still no authoritative political biographyof Curtin in print, although he is probably the most widely respected of AustralianPrime Ministers. The most recent and also the most comprehensive unpublishedstudies are Michael J. Birgan, "Australia's Relations with the United States and theUnited Kingdom, 1939-1942" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Queensland, 1976);and Jan F. Nicolaides, "Curtin's View of the Empire" (B.A. thesis, University of Queens-land, 1975).3See, for example, G. P. Taylor, "New Zealand, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the1908 Visit of the American Fleet," AustralianJournal of Politics and History,XV (1969),

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Australia Looks to Americaprecisely the time when the Australians felt themselves most inneed of external protection, in the global crisis which devel-oped with the coincidence of German expansionism in Europeand Sino-Japanese conflict in the Far East.4 The AustralianCabinet concluded unhappily in December 1938 that UnitedStates attitudes towards the British Commonwealth were con-fused, and United States capacity to assist seriously limited.There was, for example, evidence of "a mood of increasingfriendliness towards the United Kingdom," but it was "modi-fied by a great deal of suspicion and combined with a very firmdetermination not to become embroiled outside the shores ofAmerica," which in turn reflected "a certain jealousy of theUnited Kingdom's position, nourished by the constant suspi-cion that the United Kingdom was intent on entangling theUnited States." The Australians were also given to understandthat there was not a single operative antitank gun in NorthAmerica.5 Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies accord-ingly warned his cabinet on July 5, 1939, that there could be nocertainty that the United States would be either willing or ableto come to Australia's aid in the event of an attack by Japan.The only consolation was that the Japanese could be no surerabout what the United States might do than he was.6The real situation was in fact more definite but also morecomplex than Menzies imagined. In May 1939 the BritishAdmiralty had told United States Chief of Naval Operations,Admiral William D. Leahy, that it was preparing a powerfulnew task force, "Force H," for use in the Mediterraneanagainst the possibility of Italy's allying with Germany and going55-76; Neville K. Meaney, "A Proposition of the Highest International Importance,"Journal of CommonwealthPolitical Studies, V (1967), 200-213; William R. Braisted, TheUnited States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin, 1971), 163, 411, 442-444.4The implications of this dual threat to British interests are discussed in Charles C.Bright, "Britain's Search for Security, 1930-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,1970).5Memorandum for the Prime Minister from the Minister of External Affairs, Dec. 18,1938, External Affairs II, Correspondence Files, item 15, USA, file: CommonwealthRecord Series (hereafter cited as CRS) A981, Australian Commonwealth ArchivesOffice (hereafter cited as ACAO).6Records of the Council of Defense, 1935-1939, file: CRS AA1971/216, ACAO. Theprogressive deterioration of United States-Japanese relations during this period isdiscussed comprehensively in Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, N.J.,1971), and Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-Relations,1941 (Ithaca,N.Y., 1958).

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254 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWto war with Britain and France. This meant, according to theAdmiralty, that Britain would not have any heavy ships tospare for the reinforcement of Singapore against a threat fromJapan. The British suggested to Leahy that a major portion ofthe United States Fleet should be stationed at Singapore "foroffensive operations against the Japanese in the SouthwestPacific and in the South China Sea."7 Leahy did not agree tothis. However, within three weeks the United States Joint Plan-ning Committee had prepared a basic plan, "Rainbow 2,"under which the United States would "undertake to sustain theinterests of Democratic Powers in the Pacific, to provide for thetasks essential to sustain those interests, and to defeat enemyforces in the Pacific."8The Australians were told nothing of these exchanges. TheBritish ambassador in Washington, Lord Lothian, assuredthem that "long before Japanese action threatened Australia orNew Zealand, America would be at war," but he did not giveany reasons for this belief and indeed prefaced his remarkswith the warning that there "is not, I think, any particularlystrong feeling in the United States for Australia and New Zea-land, though they are popular as young democracies."9 It wasthus all the more alarming for the Australian and New Zealandgovernments when British Prime Minister Winston Churchillabruptly warned them in June 1940, as the French armies

7Tracy B. Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation, 1940-1945" (Ms, MicrofilmJob no. 1), World War II Command File, deposited in the Operational Archives, NavalHistory Division, Washington Navy Yard, 316 (hereafter cited as Washington NavyYard Archives), file A-9506. The reference to this monograph in a checklist issued inNovember 1972 by the Naval History Division notes that: "Despite its title, CaptainKittredge only completed this study through the end of 1941." The manuscript has infact two different titles, both inaccurate, and its pages are not numbered consecutivelythroughout. It is, nonetheless, still indispensable as a guide to strategic thinking inLondon as well as in Washington in the period of 1937-1941. The Anglo-Americannaval discussions during this period are also dealt with in Stephen E. Pelz, Race toPearlHarbor (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 193-195, and in G. St.J. Barclay, "Singapore Strategy:The role of the United States in Imperial Defense," Military Affairs, XXXIX (1975),54-58.

8Memorandum, Joint Planning Committee to Joint Army and Navy Board, June 23,1939, in Kittredge, "U.S.-British Naval Cooperation," 44, file A-5774A, WashingtonNavy Yard Archives.9Lord Lothian to Lord Halifax, Nov. 10, 1939, in New Zealand Department ofInternal Affairs, DocumentsRelating to New Zealand'sParticipation n the SecondWorldWar(Wellington, 1963), III, 534 (hereafter cited as N.Z. Docs.).


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Australia Looks to America 255withdrew from the environs of Paris, that they would have torely on the United States to safeguard British interests in thePacific.10 In the first place, Washington had never given themany real encouragement to count on American support.Moreover, there were obviously some grounds for believingthat United States involvement in the Pacific at this stage atleast could be positively disadvantageous for the Allied cause.The British ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, cabledurgently that "our object should be on no account to involve theUnited States in the war in the Pacific on our behalf. Suchinvolvement would be disastrous to our vital interests since itwould divert United States attention from Europe and seri-ously diminish the extent of United States material assistance ata crucial point."1l Even Robert Menzies was prepared to agreethat it possibly "would be contrary to the successful prosecutionof the war for the United States to become involved in war inthe Pacific." However, he also considered it "imperative at theoutset to have a clear indication of United States policy."12Itwas absolutely necessary to know what the American planswere before trying to decide whether those plans would behelpful.Australian naval staff officers, disguised in civilian clothes,were despatched to Washington to see what they could findout. What they learned there went far beyond their wildesthopes. Australian naval attache, Commander Henry H.Burrell, noted after talks with Captain Richard K. Turner,director of the plans division of the U.S. Navy, that "on thequestion of supplies for units in the Far East, it is certain thatplans for passage of units and their maintenance do exist...[and] the Director of Plans asked me if I would give him 'aslant' on my ideas for the employment of USA naval forces

'?Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor-General of New Zealand,June13, 1940, N.Z. Docs., 206, n.2. Correspondence between Winston Churchill and theprime ministers of the other British Dominions was normally transacted directly, on aperson-to-person basis. However, correspondence between London and Wellingtonwas usually carried on according to the traditional procedure under which Churchill'sletters went under the signature of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, and theNew Zealand Prime Minister's under that of the Governor-General."Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Governor-General of New Zealand, July2, 1940, ibid., 4-8.'2Ibid.


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256 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWhaving in view war with Japan, Germany and Italy.... ,13United States naval aviator Commander Frederick C. Sherman"was particularly interested in the reinforcement of Singaporevia Australia by U.S. Navy aircraft (both land planes and flyingboats)."14 What the Australians were not aware of, however,was that Admiral Harold R. Stark, the new United States chiefof Naval Operations, was at that very moment preparing amemorandum on "Plan Dog" for Secretary of the Navy FrankKnox. This plan called for "an eventual strong offensive in theAtlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Paci-fic."15Stark, in fact, reaffirmed Admiral Leahy's objection toprojecting any part of the United States Fleet as far west asSingapore, believing rather that the British should be encour-aged to make a greater military effort in that region them-selves. On the same day on which he forwarded Plan Dog toSecretary Knox, Stark wrote to Robert L. Ghormley, the UnitedStates representative at naval talks with the British in London,congratulating him on having "apparently begun to convincethe British that there is a Western Pacific in which the UnitedStates is interested and in which they also have a very greatinterest."16 Ghormley discussed the general principles of PlanDog with the British Admiralty on November 22.17 On thesame day, Winston Churchill told the First Sea Lord that "PlanD[og] is strategically sound and also most highly adapted to ourinterests.... A strict defensive in the Far East and the accept-ance of its consequences is also our policy."18It was never to be the Australian policy. But circumstances

"'Record by Commander Henry H. Burrell, Royal Australian Navy, of a conversationwith Admiral James O. Henderson, director of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy,Nov. 19, 1940, "Courtmartial, Conferences, etc., Notes of Commander Burrell," fileN.A. 22/4/47, National Archives of New Zealand (hereafter cited as NANZ).'Richard G. Casey to Minister of External Affairs, Canberra, Nov. 25, 1940, ibid.'SMemorandum for the Secretary, Nov. 12, 1940, in Kittredge, "U.S.-British NavalCooperation," 253-264, file A-9505, Washington Navy Yard Archives. The develop-ment of the Atlantic first strategy and the subsequent formation of the United StatesAtlantic Fleet and its involvement in the "undeclared war" against Germany are com-prehensively discussed in Patrick J. Abbizia, "Mr. Roosevelt's Navy: The Little War ofthe United States Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1972).'6Harold R. Stark to Robert L. Ghormley, Nov. 12, 1940, in Kittridge, "U.S.-BritishNaval Cooperation," 272.'7"Record of a Meeting Held at the Admiralty on 22nd November 1940," ibid., 276-287."8PrimeMinister, United Kingdom, to First Lord and First Sea Lord, Nov. 22, 1940,in Winston Churchill, Their Finest Hour (London, 1967), 544.


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Australia Looks to Americawere combining to encourage the Australians to believe thatthe United States was at least committed to a strategy quitedifferent from the "Atlantic first" concept formulated byAdmiral Stark and endorsed by Winston Churchill. The Aus-tralian officers were never shown a copy of Plan Dog. Caseyand Commander Burrell were, however, shown a copy of oneof Ghormley's earlier reports on November 20 during talkswith Navy Secretary Frank Knox and Stanley K. Hornbeck, thepolitical adviser to the State Department. They formed theimpression from reading the report that "these conversationshave not led us any further along the path of an agreed grandstrategy in the event of American cooperation." Nor, they be-lieved, "did the Ghormley conversations in fact discuss thesituation which might arise in the Far East."19This impressionwas justifiable at the time. They would have reported differ-ently to Canberra if they had seen the report of a meetingwhich took place at the British Admiralty two days later, inwhich the "Atlantic first" strategy was recognized as the basis ofAnglo-American defense planning, and its implications for theFar East accepted.Thus, the Australian attempt to secure "a clear indication ofUnited States policy" succeeded only in confirming the Aus-tralian government in the completely erroneous impressionthat the United States was assigning strategic priority to thePacific. Everything conspired to reinforce this delusion. In thefirst place, the continued exclusion of Australians from theAnglo-American staff talks meant that they could only guess atthe direction these talks might be taking. The Australian Depart-ment of External Affairs still assumed in January 1941 that"Little progress . . has been reported in the proposal for Anglo-American staff conversations," noting glumly that PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt "agreed to complete the confidential staffconversations ... which had begun in London, but it is appar-ently not intended that Australia should participate in these."20More importantly, American attitudes toward Australia

"Richard G. Casey to Minister of External Affairs, Nov. 20, 1940, in "Courtmartial,Conferences, etc., Notes of Commander Burrell."2Memorandum from Minister of External Affairs for Department of DefenseCo-ordination, Jan. 16, 1941, file: "British Policy in the Pacific," CRS A816, ACAO.

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258 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWseemed to become increasingly friendly, while relations betweenCanberra and London became more unsatisfactory.21

An American naval force of two cruisers and five destroyersvisited Sydney and Brisbane in March 1941 at a time when rela-tions between the Australian and British governments, as aresult of Australian misgivings about the conduct of the Britishcampaign in Greece, had been strained to an unprecedenteddegree. The American sailors received the most enthusiasticwelcomes ever accorded any visitors to the continent. Aus-tralian Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden said that nothingin the life of the Australian people had stirred and thrilledthem so much as the visit by the United States Navy at such atime. Certainly, nothing could ever have relieved them somuch. Then, at the end of May, the Australian and NewZealand governments received from Admiral Stark himselfwhat seemed to amount to a guarantee of United States pro-tection. As the New Zealand chiefs of staff reported,The U.S. authoritieswereasked ... whatprotectionwould be giventoFrench territory,interalia, in the Pacificarea. The replyof 29th Maymay be brieflysummarised as follows:

(a) The U.S. authorities have no intention of providinggarrisonsexcept as may be necessaryto protectU.S. bases.(b) The U.S. authorities consider that defence of territoryis theresponsibilityof the Power having sovereigntyover the terri-

tory.(c) On the question of support the following comment is made:"On the other hand C. N. O. would view occupationby Axisforces of British and French Islandsin the PacificOcean southof the Equatoras inimical to Associated and U.S. interests.Hewould, therefore, expect the U.S. PacificFleet to takesuchstepsas would prevent the overseasoccupationand the permanentsupport of such garrisons as the Axis Powers might seek toestablish in these Islands. C. N. O. would not undertake toprevent minor raids againstthese Islandsalthoughhe is confi-

21See, for example, the correspondence between General Sir Thomas Blamey,commander-in-chief, Australian Imperial Force, and Prime Minister Robert Menzies,in Barton Maugham, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Tobrukand El Alamein (Can-berra, 1966), 306, 334; correspondence between Winston Churchill and RobertMenzies, in Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 659; and correspondence between Churchilland John Curtin, ibid., 333-335.


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Australia Looksto Americadent U.S. forces in the pacific would, in case such raids oc-curred, be alert to take advantageof the opportunityfor in-flicting loss upon the enemy."22This might have seemed a sufficiently unequivocal assuranceof American support. However, the Australians could not failto observe that the private promises of United States navalofficers were decidedly not being matched by public statementsof United States foreign policy. When the Japanese moved intoThailand in August 1941, Australian Prime Minister Robert

Menzies "noted with regret that Mr. Sumner Welles' warning toJapan seemed to indicate that the objectionable matter wouldnot be the occupation of Thailand but only what might happensubsequently," although he still felt sure that "if we are pre-pared to fight, America will not in fact desert us."23AustralianLabor leader John Curtin went considerably further: Australiashould "bring pressure on the USA to knock Japan out now."24Unfortunately, he could not suggest what pressure Australiamight use to bring about this desired result. In any event,Churchill and the British chiefs of staff were particularlyanxious to avoid any measures which might aggravate tensionsin the Far East, for a new winter offensive was planned inEgypt, in which the Australian and New Zealand divisionswould again have to play the leading combat role. Fearful thatthe Dominion governments might recall the divisions for thedefense of their homelands, London suggested that the Japa-nese threat in the Far East was receding. Japan, Winston Chur-chill stated reassuringly, would probably lie quiet for a whilebecause of its doubts about Russian intentions.25Churchill was wrong. He was also too late. The Australianswere already becoming aware of new grounds for anxiety:their minister-designate to Chungking, Sir Frederic Eggleston,on a fact-finding tour of the Far East, noted with horror the

22Memorandum from New Zealand Joint Chiefs of Staff for the War Cabinet, Oct. 29,1941, C.O.S. 102, "Files of the Governor," G50(9), NANZ.23Prime Minister of Australia to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Aug. 11,1941, in N.Z. Docs., 54-55.24Paul C. Hasluck, Australia in the War of 1939-1945: The Government nd thePeople,1939-42 (Canberra, 1952), 320.25Frederic Eggleston, Diary, Sept. 11, 1940, file NS 423/19/10-11, Frederic EgglestonPapers, National Library of Australia, Canberra.

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260 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWhopeless state of both British and Dutch defenses in Malayaand the Netherlands East Indies.26Curtin, now prime minister,appealed to Churchill for some clear directive on the Pacificsituation. He was told that the only policy for the Britishempire was "to march in line with the United States."27But theproblem was that the United States had not yet made it com-pletely clear when and where it would be marching. In themeantime, regardless of what Roosevelt might intend to do,Curtin believed there were certain courses of action the Britishempire should be prepared to take: it should continue to giveall aid to China short of war; it should not support Thailandwithout United States collaboration, but it should occupy theKra Isthmus in the southern part of that country in the event ofJapanese aggression; it should respond with a declaration ofwar to any Japanese attack on Russia; and it should give assur-ances of armed support to the Netherlands East Indies and toPortuguese Timor.28

Churchill did not reply directly to these proposals. Instead,he informed Curtin of developments which could be regardedas by far the most encouraging yet for the British empire in theFar East. On December 2, President Roosevelt had assuredBritish Ambassador Lord Halifax of United States support inthe event of a Japanese attack on the British empire. He con-firmed on December 4 that this assurance would extend tomilitary support.29 However, Churchill neglected to remind theDominion governments that Roosevelt could not actuallycommit the United States to war in defense of the Britishempire without the approval of Congress. Pearl Harbor, ofcourse, solved all such procedural problems-as Egglestonnoted: "I laughed when I heard of it, for the whole of ourdiplomacy had been directed to getting the USA into the war inthe Pacific, and here was Japan doing it for us."30

Eggleston and the other Australian leaders were not likely tohave found much else to laugh at in the situation facing them.26Eggleston, Diary, Sept. 11, 1940, file MS 423/19/24, ibid.27Hasluck, The Governmentand the People, 554.28Ibid.,555.2See Raymond A. Esthus, "President Roosevelt's Commitments to Britain to Inter-vene in a Pacific War," MississippiValleyHistoricalReview, L (1963), 28-38.30Eggleston, Diary, Dec. 8, 1941, file MS 423/9/1051, Eggleston Papers.


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Australia Looksto AmericaWithin two weeks of the initial Japanese attacks, the UnitedStates Pacific Fleet was virtually out of action; the Japanesewere landing on Hong Kong island; the Malayan front wascracking; Burma had been invaded; General Douglas MacAr-thur's strategy for the defense of the Philippines lay in ruins;and the only two British capital ships in the Pacific had beenignominiously sunk by underrated Japanese air power. Aus-tralia's own military position was hopeless: there were only 18tanks in the whole continent, and the only modern aircraftpossessed by the Royal Australian Air Force were 53 Hudsons,only 40 of which had fully trained crews, 12 of which werealready committed to service in Malaya. In this situation,Churchill's reassurance that there was no "large scale threat toAustralia and much less to New Zealand" was not likely to bewell received in Canberra or Wellington.31 The British PrimeMinister's untimely reminder that Germany was still beingregarded as the main enemy served to convince Curtin thathelp could be expected from only one quarter, the UnitedStates.American assistance was indeed already on the way: as earlyas December 12 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. deputychief of staff for the Pacific and Far East, had decided to re-route the Pensacola convoy to Brisbane instead of Manila, ashad originally been intended. Obviously, more than this wouldbe needed to defend Australia. On December 23 Curtinaccordingly instructed Richard G. Casey, Australian minister inWashington, to inform President Roosevelt that "Reinforce-ments earmarked by the United Kingdom for despatch toMalaya seem to us to be utterly inadequate .... Our resourceshere are very limited indeed. It is in your power to meet thesituation."32A further communication was sent from Canberrathe following day, claiming that "deterioration of war positionin Malayan defence is assuming landslide collapse of wholedefence system.... Present measures for reinforcement of

"Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia, Dec. 11,1941, in N.Z. Docs., 110.32Richard G. Casey to President Roosevelt, Dec. 23, 1941, in U.S. Dept. of State,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941: The Far East (Washington, D.C., 1956), V,390-391.

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262 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWMalayan defences can from the practical viewpoint be littlemore than gestures ... Need for decision and action is matterof hours, not days."33Having told the Americans what he expected from them,Curtin now revealed his views on global strategy to the Austra-lian public. He did so in the article quoted at the outset of thispaper. He also took the opportunity to remind the Russians oftheir responsibilities. Referring to Australia's declarations ofwar against Finland, Hungary, and Rumania, after those coun-tries had attacked Russia, he announced that "with equalrealism, we take the view that while the determination ofmilitary policy is the Soviet's business, we should be able to lookforward with reason to aid from Russia against Japan." ButCurtin's main concern was to reject Churchill's concept ofregarding Germany as the main enemy, and to insist that "werefuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must betreated as a subordinate segment of the general conflict."34In view of the mood of Australian party politics, it was inev-itable that Curtin's words would be interpreted by his politicalopponents as proof that the Labor government had "almostcompletely turned its back on Great Britain."35Curtin, in fact,was merely responding to a situation in which there seemedconsiderable danger that Britain might be turning its back onAustralia. Unable to restore the situation in the Far East them-selves, the British might still be unwilling to abandon a strategicconcept which envisaged Germany as the major enemy. Hisfears were more than justified. The British were not onlyclinging to an "Atlantic first" strategy themselves, but wereactively trying to ensure that the United States also continuedto abide by the principles of Plan Dog. British staff officers inWashington were so fearful that the Americans might become"too Pacific-minded" that they opposed a suggestion by Ad-miral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Fleet, to

33Reginald G. Casey to Sumner Welles, Dec. 24, 1941, ibid., 393-394.34MelbourneHerald, Dec. 27, 1941. Curtin's article was the first public appeal forUnited States assistance made by an Australian prime minister. However, RobertMenzies, with the knowledge of his ministers, had himself written to Roosevelt threetimes in 1940, seeking American intervention. See P. G. Edwards, "R. G. Menzie'sAppeals to the United States, May-June, 1940," Australian Outlook, XXVIII (April1974), 64-70.35CommonwealtharliamentaryDebates,Senate (March 15, 1944), 1306-1307.


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Australia Looksto Americaset up a Southwest Pacific War Council, on which Australia andNew Zealand would also be represented.36 Curtin would pre-sumably not have been surprised by these maneuvers had heknown about them at the time. This was what he had come toexpect from the British. What was to come as a total shock tohim was the revelation that the British had not been trying toimpose their own strategic views on the Americans, but wererather attempting to ensure that the Americans remainedfaithful to a concept of global war originating in the office ofthe U.S. chief of Naval Operations.

This was, in fact, the concept reaffimed by the American andBritish chiefs of staff in Washington on December 31, 1941."Germany," they concluded, "is still the prime enemy .... OnceGermany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat ofJapan must follow. In our considered opinion, therefore,...only the minimum of force necessary for the safeguarding ofvital interests in other theatres should be diverted from opera-tions against Germany."37Essentially, this merely reaffimed theprinciple expounded in Plan Dog thirteen months earlier byHarold Stark. To the Australians, however, it appeared as if anunsympathetic British viewpoint had triumphed. They reactedappropriately. Curtin's minister for external affairs, HerbertV. Evatt, instructed Sir Frederic Eggleston to try to persuadeChiang Kai-shek to put pressure on the British to reverse thisdecision.8 Curtin's own behavior amply justified a warningfrom the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Churchillabout "the present rather cantankerous attitude of the Com-monwealth [Australian] Government."39 In the bitterest ex-change yet between the two governments, Curtin told Chur-chill that "the evacuation of Singapore would be regarded hereand elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal. . . , the more so since

36GraceP. Hayes, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The Waragainst Japan, Vol. 1, Pearl Harbor through Trident," 1943 (Ms, Microfilm Job no.F-108), p. 46, World War II Command File, deposited in the Operational Archives,Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard.37"Memorandum by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff," Dec. 31, 1941, inU.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferencesat Washington,1941-42, and Casablanca,1943 (Washington, D.C., 1968), 214-215.38Eggleston, Diary, Jan. 25, 1942, file MS 423/9/1934, Eggleston Papers.39Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Jan.17, 1942, Operational Papers of the Prime Minister's office, file PREM 3, 167/1, 1246,Public Record Office.

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264 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWthe Australian people, having volunteered for service overseasin large numbers, find it difficult to understand why they mustwait so long for an improvement in the situation when irre-parable damage may have been done to their power to resist,the prestige of Empire, and the solidarity of the Allied cause."40Having reproached the British, Curtin looked to America.On January 26, 1942, Curtin sent President Roosevelt a copy ofanother cable to Winston Churchill requesting that two Aus-tralian divisions should be returned home from the MiddleEast. In his covering note to Roosevelt, Curtin pointed out that"We are now, with a small population in the only white man'sterritory south of the equator, beset grievously. Because wehave added to our contribution in manpower so much of ourresources and materials we now lack adequacy for forces of ourhomeland on our own soil."41Roosevelt referred the communi-cation to Eisenhower, who, as he informed U.S. Chief of StaffGeneral George C. Marshall, had also received at the same timea message from Major General Lewis H. Brereton, UnitedStates military commander in Australia, which endorsed Cur-tin's views on the state of Australia's defenses. General Brere-ton said unequivocally that there was "no, repeat no, adequatedefense available." Moreover, Brereton considered the com-mand situation in Australia so bad that it was necessary toimpose "a strong centralized control of internal Australianpolitics under American influence."42This seemed tantamount to suggesting that the United Statesshould establish a kind of protectorate over Australia. Eisen-hower noted reasonably that both cables reflected "extraordi-nary uneasiness of mind" on the parts of their authors."43Whatwas at least evident was that the Australian defense situationneeded urgent improvement, if only to restore public morale.Major General George H. Brett, deputy supreme commanderof the American-British-Dutch-Australian front (ABDA), com-

40Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Jan. 23, 1942, inChurchill, Their Finest Hour, 50-51.4"Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister, United Kingdom, and PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt, Jan. 21, 1942, in Alfred D. Chandler, ed., ThePapers of DwightDavid Eisenhower,the War Years(Baltimore, 1970), I, 77, n.1.42Lewis H. Brereton to George C. Marshall, Jan 26, 1942 ibid., 78, n.2.43Dwight D. Eisenhower to General Marshall, Jan. 27, 1942, ibid.


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Australia Looksto Americaplained that the Australian government appeared to be ob-sessed with the defense of its own coastline to the exclusion ofany other military interest.44 Eisenhower tried to calm Aus-tralian fears by diverting a fighter group of eighty aircraft forservice with the RAAF. This in turn provoked a protest fromthe British against these ad hoc concessions to the Dominiongovernments. Robert L. Ghormley, now U.S. commander-in-chief, South Pacific, commented later that "the British wereprone to neglect giving what to my mind was proper considera-tion and evaluation to Japan, as a probable enemy.... I do notbelieve that they came to a full realization of the power of theJapanese offensive and the weakness of their defenses, untilSingapore fell."45 But in fact the United States position on theAtlantic first strategy was becoming at least equally removedfrom the Australian view. A minority recommendation at aU.S. joint chiefs of staff meeting on February 18 actuallyproposed leaving the British empire in the South Pacific to itsown devices on the grounds that "it must be accepted that weare unable to establish a system of bases and forces, so disposedas to give depth to the defense of the line between Hawaii andAustralia."46 Eisenhower had not quite reached this point.However, by February 28 he had concluded that "in the eventof a war involving both oceans, the United States should adoptthe strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its majoroffensive effort across the Atlantic. .. ."This analysis, which ofcourse simply restated the principles of Plan Dog, necessarilyinvolved relegating the security of Australia to the category ofthings highly desirable and approaching the necessary, but not"necessary o the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers."47Sir Frederic Eggleston, at least, had fully comprehended thesituation by this stage. He noted in his diary that "The Britishappear to have taken up the attitude that the Far East must besacrificed, if necessary, to the other theatres of war and to have

4Grace P. Hayes, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II," 90.4Robert L. Ghormley, "South Pacific Command History," 1943 (Ms, Microfilm Jobno. NRS-161), pp. 4-6, World War II Command File, deposited in the OperationalArchives, Naval History Division, Washington Navy Yard.46Matloff and Snell, StrategicPlanningfor CoalitionWarfare, 160.47Eisenhower to George C. Marshall, Feb. 28, 1942, in Alfred D. Chandler, ed., ThePapers of Dwight David Eisenhower:The War Years,I, 149-155.

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266 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWagreed with the Americans on this point."48 However, JohnCurtin and his foreign minister, Herbert Evatt, still hoped toachieve some modifications of the Atlantic first strategythrough appeals to the United States. Their next efforts wereperhaps not intended to be devious but were certainly con-fusing. Evatt began directly enough by suggesting to GeneralMarshall on March 23 that the "United States should stop allshipments to Russia, the Middle East and other areas, and sendeverything available immediately to Australia."49Curtin thensent a cable to Winston Churchill, claiming that GeneralMacArthur wanted two British divisions to be sent to Australia"until such time as the 9 A.I.F. Division and the remainder of6 Division are returned" from the Middle East.50Meanwhile,Herbert Evatt gave Presidential Adviser Harry Hopkins a copyof a similar letter from Curtin to himself, for reference toPresident Roosevelt. These unorthodox methods naturallycreated some confusion. Churchill asked Roosevelt if theCurtin-MacArthur request had been authorized in Washing-ton. Roosevelt referred the matter to General Marshall, whowrote a reproving letter to MacArthur. MacArthur claimed inreply that he knew nothing of the correspondence. Rooseveltcharacteristically smoothed the matter over, assuring MacAr-thur that "I see no reason why you should not continue dis-cussion of military matters with the Australian Prime Minister,

48Eggleston, Diary, March 4, 1942, file MS 423/9/1466, Eggleston Papers.49Hayes, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II," 173. Coinci-dentally, Evatt's rather excessive plea for help was made just ten days after the Japaneseprime minister and chiefs of staff had recommended to the emperor that "the questionof whether to adopt new and more positive measures for war guidance," such as theinvasion of India and Australia, "should be decided after careful study, not only of thewar gains acquired so far, but other factors of extensive and profound significance;such as, the enemy's national power and ours, especially the increase in the fightingpower on both sides; the progress of our operations, our relations with the Soviet Unionand China, the German-Soviet war, and various other factors." ("General Outline ofPolicy of Future War Guidance, adopted by Liaison Conference, 7 March 1942, andReport of Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Emperor, 13 March 1942," in LouisMorton, Strategyand Command:The First Two Years[Washington, D.C., 1962], 610-613.)This implies that the Japanese would have invaded only after the victory of the Axis onall fronts had been assured, in which case the invasion would hardly have beennecessary. In fact, Japanese plans for offensive operations in the South Pacific areanever went beyond the establishment of bases in eastern New Guinea. See "JapaneseArmy-Navy Central Agreement concerning South Pacific Area Operations ... Jan. 4,1943," in Morton, Strategyand Command,624-626.50Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower:The War Years,I, 273, n. 1.


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Australia Looks to Americabut I hope you will try to have him treat them as confidentialmatters, and not use them for public messages or for appeals toChurchill and me."51Roosevelt made his own position on theAtlantic first strategy quite unmistakeable when he reiteratedon the following day, in a statement of his views of strategyaddressed to his principal military advisers, that the currentapproach in the Pacific should be "a continuous day to daymaintenance of existing positions and existing strength" andthat "the only large scale offensive operation is to be in theEuropean area."52For Curtin and Evatt, the implications were clear. There wasno more point in looking to America for support of theAustralian point of view than there had been in looking toBritain. Neither, however, was prepared to concede that hisown strategic conceptions might have been at fault, or that hehad been at all unreasonable in his hopes that the British andAmericans could be persuaded to reverse the principles agreedon in Washington in December 1941. Evatt did not hesitate toblame Australia's own diplomatic representatives, as well as theBritish and United States chiefs of staff. He complained angrilyto Curtin that "other Service Chiefs who laid down a generalstrategic policy are loath to admit any fundamental error....The strategy contemplated Germany's defeat before that ofJapan. In a phrase, it was 'beat Hitler first.' The existence ofthis written agreement came as a great surprise to myself, and Ihave no doubt, to you. We were not consulted about the matterand neither Page nor Casey ever reported to us about it."53

5lMemorandum from President Roosevelt to Chiefs of Staff, May 5, 1942, in Hayes,"The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II," 181.52Matloff and Snell, StrategicPlanningfor CoalitionWarfare,220-222.53Herbert V. Evatt to John Curtin, May 14 and 28, 1942, in C. Hermon Gill, Australiain the War of 1939-1945: RoyalAustralianNavy, 1942-45 (Canberra, 1964), 106. Thiswas not strictly accurate. There was no "written agreement" on the Atlantic first strategybefore the Washington Conference of December 1941, details of which were soon madeknown to the Australian government. There were, of course, written statements orreferences relating to the concept. Stark had formulated it as a memorandum forSecretary of the Navy Frank Knox; Ghormley had discussed it at a meeting at theBritish Admiralty, minutes of which had been recorded; and Winston Churchill hadapproved the general idea in a letter to the First Sea Lord. None of these documentshad been shown to either Casey or to Sir Earle Page, who went to London as specialenvoy for John Curtin on September 22, 1941. In December 1940 Casey certainlybecame concerned at "the possibility that a sense of competition might develop betweenthe Atlantic area and the Pacific area," which he believed would be "a false conception,

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268 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWCurtin, for his part, grumbled sarcastically that "people thous-ands of miles from here consider that Australia is in no greatdanger."54 Even those United States commanders who hadshown themselves to be unimpeachably Pacific-minded werenot spared his disapproval. He had himself assured GeneralMacArthur on April 17 that orders issued by him as supremecommander of the Southwest Pacific Area were to be consid-ered "as emanating from the Commonwealth Government."55Now he complained that MacArthur's appointment made"Australia subject to a form of direction by a representative ofanother Government." On learning that Admiral Ernest J.King, now United States chief of Naval Operations, was toattend a meeting of chiefs of staff in London, Curtin com-mented that "It doesn't bode much good for us."56Nobodywould be likely to argue the case for a greater military effort inthe Pacific with more authority or determination than AdmiralKing, but Curtin was apparently unwilling to concede that any-thing good could be expected from the United States. He notedsarcastically on September 14 that the British were "stillputtingup the same case to Santa Claus [Roosevelt] as we have beenputting up since January."57in that there was no advantage in Australia being momentarily safe at the expense ofincreased menace to Britain. The main objective was to check and then to defeatGermany." (Lord Casey, PersonalExperience,1939-1946 [London, 1962], 44.) In otherwords, Casey did not know that the United States had opted for an Atlantic firststrategy, but he presumably would have considered such a decision to be in Australia'sinterests. Sir Earle Page, for his part, had been welcomed by Winston Churchill with theassurance that a British fleet would be sent to Singapore, although no more aircraftwere to be sent to the Far East, despite Page's warning that "byrefraining from acting inthe Indies . .. [Britain] could, at this critical stage, split the Empire asunder." (Sir EarlePage, Truant Surgeon [Sydney, 1963], 310-216.) Page accordingly was aware only thatreinforcements were in fact being sent to the Pacific area, even if they were not the kindof reinforcements John Curtin had told him to ask for.54Record of a conversation between Prime Minister John Curtin and his presssecretary, July 1, 1942, file MS 4675(2), John Curtin Papers, National Library ofAustralia, Canberra.

55Samuel Milner, Victory n Papua (Washington, D.C., 1957), 22.56Record of a conversation between Curtin and his press secretary, Aug. 28, 1942, fileMS 4675(20), Curtin Papers. Curtin was, of course, being wholly unjust to AdmiralKing, who had written to President Roosevelt six months previously that "Australia-and New Zealand-are 'white man's countries' which it is essential that we shall not allowto be overrun by the Japanese because of the repercussions among the non-white racesof the world." Memorandum for the President, March 5, 1942, in Ernest J. King andWalter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (London, 1953), 175-176.Curtin would have agreed wholeheartedly with this point of view.57Record of a conversation between Curtin and his press secretary, Sept. 14, 1942, fileMS 4675(24), Curtin Papers.


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Australia Looksto AmericaIndeed, Curtin was already planning a demarchewhich wouldindicate vividly how little Australia was inclined at this stage

either to seek favors or to grant them. As the Japanese fell backfrom Port Moresby, Curtin requested Churchill to send theAustralian Ninth Division home from the Middle East. Therewas probably no occasion when such a demand would havebeen actually convenient, but Curtin's demand was certainlyextraordinarily ill-timed. The British Eighth Army was aboutto begin its offensive at El Alamein; the situation in the Solo-mons was critical; and the invasion of French North Africa(TORCH) was scheduled to take place within three weeks.58President Roosevelt attempted on September 16 to persuadethe Australian Prime Minister to reconsider: "I am confident,"he told Curtin, "that you appreciate fully the necessity ofrigidly pursuing our over-all strategy that envisages the earlyand decisive defeat of Germany in order that we can quicklyundertake an all-out effort in the Pacific.... I cannot toostrongly stress that leaving the 9th AIF Division in the MiddleEast will best serve our common cause."59Curtin was unmoved. Roosevelt then referred the issue tothe combined chiefs of staff, who reported that "first, therewere no military arguments whatsoever which would justify themovement of the 9th Australian Division and the 2nd NewZealand Division from the Middle East; second, that though itwould be possible to find personnel shipping by cutting onother projects, the shipping required to carry the troops to theDominions would not be available for any other urgent troopmovements for about three months." Indeed, as the reportcontinued, "every military argument is against the move....Such a move would involve a definite reduction of the impactupon the enemy in 1943, and a major diversion of shippingresources which are urgently required for other troop move-ments."60 These arguments weighed heavily with the NewZealanders, but they had no effect on Curtin. Churchill gaveup the struggle and made arrangements independently of theUnited States to have all Australian troops in the Middle Eastreturned home by early 1943. The New Zealanders stayed.

58Hayes, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II," 234.59Roosevelt to Curtin, Sept. 16, 1942, in Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 106, 188.'6Hayes, "The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II," 236.

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270 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWThis victory over Roosevelt and the Allied chiefs of staff didnot seem to placate or reassure Curtin at all. It did not even

alter his attitude towards Churchill. As far as he was con-cerned, Australia was still "WSC's[Churchill's] forgotten land."Addressing appeals to Roosevelt or Churchill was alike useless:"They had made up their minds that if the British Empire inthe Far East had to go, it had to go. The only part which hadnot gone was Australia." As Curtin looked out from his embat-tled but hardly beleaguered island continent at the end of1942, he commented to his press secretary: "Two hundred andseventy planes went over Europe last night, but by Christ wecan't get any here."61Sir Frederic Eggleston, who had a considerable faculty forreflecting the moods of others, had long before suggested someof the reasons for the bitter mood of the Australians to SirHorace Seymour, the British ambassador to Chungking: "Thedifficulties of the Australian Government should be appreci-ated. They had sent away all their best troops and 10,000 airpersonnel, had made munitions for overseas requirements,made bombers but no fighters, postponed the construction oftanks for other work in pursuance of an Empire scheme ofstrategy which contemplated Singapore as impregnable."62This was, of course, only part of the story. The Australianleaders resented these very serious practical problems all themore because they had acquired through their informal con-tacts with the United States certain misconceptions about thethrust of American strategic planning. Curtin had looked toAmerica after the collapse of British power in the Far Eastbecause there was nowhere else to look and because the reportsof Australian missions to the United States indicated thatAustralia could expect massive American aid. What he was notaware of at the time was that the United States was alreadycommitted to an Atlantic first strategy, and that this strategywould be resolutely adhered to, despite the calamities occur-ring in the Pacific. His reactions were undoubtedly excessive,but the military position of Australia in 1942 was hardly

61Record of conversation between Curtin and his press secretary, Dec. 30, 1942, fileMS 4675(44), Curtin Papers.62Eggleston, Diary, Feb. 27, 1942, file MS 423/9/1419, Eggleston Papers.


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Australia Looks to America 271favorable to objective reasoning or self-criticism. The experi-ences and mistakes of the past two years fostered a mood ofresentment and distrust of the United States, the outcome ofwhich was that the man, who had been most vocal in themonths immediately after Pearl Harbor in seeking the maxi-mum American involvement in the Pacific and the Far East,was to become equally dedicated after 1942 to the restorationof traditional British colonial influence in the region.63

63See references in footnote 22; see also Robin Kay, ed., Documentson New ZealandExternalRelations, Vol. 1, The Australian-NewZealandAgreement,1944 (Wellington, 1972),47-48; John J. Dedman, "Encounter over Manus," AustralianOutlook,XX (1966), 135-183; Roger Bell, "Australian-American Discord: Negotiations for Post-War Bases andSecurity Arrangements in the Pacific, 1944-1946," ibid., XXVII (1973), 12-33.

Australia Looks to America the Wartime Relationship, 1939-1942

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