THE MEMPHIS BUFFTHE MEMPHIS BUFFVOLUME 36, ISSUE 8 NATIONAL RAILWAY HISTORICAL SOCIETY VOLUME 36, ISSUE 8 NATIONAL RAILWAY HISTORICAL SOCIETY AUGUST 2009 AUGUST 2009

Bad Day at Dongola Bad Day at Dongola Amtrak Releases “Sunset Limited” Report Amtrak Releases “Sunset Limited” Report

“Memphis Rails” Website“Memphis Rails” Website

Memphis Chapter OfficersPresident – David Chase dchase@memphisredbirds.comVice President – Bruce SmedleyNational Director – Bill Strong williambstrong@bellsouth.netSecretary – Oliver Doughtie doughtio@bellsouth.netTreasurer – Thomas Doherty TRDoherty@aol.comLibrarian – Mike PendergrassPublication Editor – Tom Parker tscottparker@gmail.com

Last Month’s MeetingNo report

This Month's MeetingVideos again for August. This time courtesy of Carl Lancaster, a selection from “Workin' on the Santa Fe”, a series of training films produced by the ATSF. Carl is still deciding what to show, but it should be interesting.

New Memphis Rails Website

For years I have had a Memphis railroad web site as part of my site, illinoiscentral.net. I have now taken it out of the Illinois Central site and given it its own web address, memphisrails.com. As part of the transition, the online Memphis Buff has been moved to the new site. The old address will work for a while, but it is now a menu option on the Memphis Rails home page. The user name is still “Member” and the password is still “Buff”. (Capital “M” and “B”). I am updating and adding content to the new site all the time, so check it out!

Tom Parker

Cover Photo:Looking east down Broadway from Kentucky Street. A hot Sunday afternoon in July. Probably a sign of the times, except for a string of cars in the far distance, not a sign of any activity on the rails.

Tom Parker Photo

A Bad Night at Dongola By Mary T. McPherson

Copyright Mary R. McPherson and used with permission

In today’s Canadian National rulebook, it is rule 518: Move-ment At Restricted Speed. It reads as follows:When a train is required to move at restricted speed, it must proceed prepared to stop within one-half the range of vision short of:* Train* Engine* Railroad Car* Roadway workers or equip-ment fouling the track* Stop Signal, or* Derail or switch lined im-properlyThe crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not exceed 20 MPH.Comply with these require-ments until the leading wheels reach a point where movement at restricted speed is no longer required or have reached the end of signaled territory.This rule, or some variation of it, has been in railroad rule-books since time immemorial. The rule number and exact wording may have changed over the years, but the prin-cipal is the same: go slow enough to be able to stop shy of hitting something.In the same rulebook are rules 819 (approach) and 815 (re-

stricted proceed). An ap-proach, or yellow signal, tells a crew to proceed prepared to stop at the next signal. A re-stricted proceed is a red signal with a number plate on the signal, which allows a train to proceed at restricted speed. On passing a restricted pro-ceed, a train is governed by rule 518. The rules were mostly the same in the Illinois Central rulebook of 1970, though restricted speed at that time allowed a maximum speed of only 10 MPH.Southbound I.C. piggyback train #51 pulled out of IMX piggyback terminal in Chica-go at 6:20 the evening of Sat-urday, September 12, 1970, with GP40 #3013 in the lead. The train made an additional pickup at Markham Yard, where it departed with 42 cars consisting of 38 loads and 4 empties. The train changed crews at Champaign and ar-rived at Centralia at 1:25am the 13th.At Centralia, there was anoth-er crew change. While the new crew took over, car inspectors went to work giving the train its 500 mile brake inspection. When engineer H.W. Dunker kicked off the brakes and notched out the throttle de-

parting B Yard at 1:40am, the train was two hours and 35 minutes behind schedule.Five minutes later, extra 8177 south pulled out of North Yard in Carbondale. The train was a local consisting of two diesels, twenty-six cars and a caboose. Before leaving Car-bondale, the local’s crew re-ceived a train lineup from the dispatcher showing #51 due by Carbondale at 2:00.The local stopped at Anna to set out a car, and then contin-ued on to Dongola where it had switching work to do. On arrival at Dongola, conductor L.E. Rees called the dispatch-er to enquire on #51’s loca-tion. The dispatcher told Rees that #51 had passed Car-bondale at 2:29, so he figured he should be able to have his switching finished and his train in the siding between the main tracks before the piggy-back train arrived. Rees’s 20 year old son was riding along with his father this night, and stayed in the caboose as the crew set about their switching work.In the meantime, #51 was making up time. The crew was taking considerable liberties with the speed limit; not an

uncommon practice at the time. With a 3,240 ton train and three three-thousand horsepower GP40’s doing the work up front, the crew was able to make time in the hill country south of Carbondale. It must have been quite a ride that night, as the train was making considerably better time than Amtrak’s City of New Orleans does today.North of Dongola, #51 passed an approach signal at mile-post 335.9. Engineer Dunker started slowing the train, making a fifteen pound brake reduction. He and brakeman Morgan called the signal to each other.“Yellow!”“Does the local work Sat-urday nights?” Dunker asked.“Yeah, I think so,” Morgan replied.“Maybe he’s clearing up at Dongola.”The local was still switching the Ramp Track at Dongola. The ramp track was a stub ended siding on the west side of the mainline, located between the main tracks and a side street. Conductor Rees was on the ground near his ca-boose, while the brakeman and flagman were doing the switching work at the south end of the siding.At 2:59am, conductor Rees heard a train to the north and

saw a headlight lighting up the curve. Instantly he real-ized the train was not going to stop. He shouted a warning to his son, and started running away from his train.#51 was riding the brakes down the .8 percent grade to-ward Dongola, approaching signal 337.5 at around 25 miles per hour. The signal was located in the middle of a re-verse curve; the track coming out of a left hand curve, passing the signal, and curving back to the right into Dongola.“Red!” brakeman Morgan called as the signal came into view, and Dunker put the train into emergency. At the same instant, the men in the cab of #51 saw the red marker light on the local’s caboose,

which was only 600 feet south of the signal.Brakeman Morgan decided to jump. He ran out the back door of the cab behind the en-gineer, down the walkway to the rear steps and bailed off after the passing the signal. Dunker and a deadheading engineer decided to ride out the collision, hitting the deck seconds before impact. The rest of the men aboard, an off duty engineer in the second lo-comotive and the conductor and brakeman in the caboose, had no idea anything was wrong until hearing the brakes go into emergency.The impact of the collision shoved the local 150 feet. The caboose was spun around nearly 150 degrees, coming to rest across the northbound

main. It was considered a total loss, as were the four rear cars of the local. #51 traveled 544 feet from the point of the initial impact; the lead unit tearing up the Ramp Track and plowing into Front Street. All three locomotives were derailed, as were the first two cars of the train.Conductor Rees’s son was still in the cupola of the caboose when #51 hit it. Fortunately he suffered only minor injur-ies; abrasions and a concus-sion. None of the local’s crew were injured. Engineer Dunker on #51 received a fractured rib and bruises in the back an shoulder in the wreck, while brakeman Mor-gan sustained strained muscles jumping from the train. None of the rest of the men aboard reported injuries, though the deadheading en-gineer who was riding in the

second unit died six days later of heart failure.The cause of the Dongola wreck boiled down to one thing: speed. The crew of #51 had a late train, and was in a hurry to get over the road.It was 82.5 miles from B Yard in Centralia to the point of the

collision, and the train aver-aged 62 miles per hour for that distance. The posted speed limit for last 30 miles was 50 miles per hour, and speed restrictions of 40 through DuQuoin and 10 through Carbondale also came into play. From Centralia to Carbondale was

posted 60 miles per hour. Needless to say, for the train to average 62 miles per hour the train had to have not only been speeding, but speeding by a considerable amount.The final piece of the puzzle was the crew of #51 approach-ing a signal that was likely to indicate proceeding at restric-ted speed too fast to stop in vi-olation of the rules. Perhaps the crew assumed the next sig-nal would be something other than it turned out to be.Whatever the reason, it turned out to be a bad night at Dongola.Author's note: This article was written using the official acci-dent report as a reference. Dia-logue is inferred from state-ments in the report for dramat-ic effect.

Amtrak releases “Sunset Limited”

ReportExcerpted by Tom Parker

As mandated by the Passen-ger Rail Investment and Im-provement Act of 2008, om July 16, 2009, Amtrak re-leased its report on restoring passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford Florida.

HistoryIn 1993, Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, which operated between Los Angeles, Califor-nia and New Orleans, Louisi-ana, was extended east from New Orleans to Jacksonville, Orlando, and initially to Miami, Florida. This created a new transcontinental Amtrak route and brought passenger rail service to the Gulf Coast Region between New Orleans and Jacksonville. ln August 2005, Sunset Limited service east of New Orleans was sus-pended due to Hurricane Kat-rina, which caused massive damage to rail infrastructure on the portion of the train’s route between New Orleans, Louisiana and Mobile, Ala-bama. The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associ-ated with restoring service to this route.

About the Author: Mary McPher-son is a lifelong railfan, writer and photographer. She is cur-rently a conductor on "Amtrak's City of New Orleans". Visit her Bolg at: http://talesoftherails.b-logspot.com/

Map of "Sunset Limited" Route. Thirteen of the seventeen stations shown lost all Amtrak service.

Preferred Options for Service Restoration

Amtrak initially evaluated 12 alternatives for restoring ser-vice between New Orleans, and Florida. Of the 12 altern-atives, three were selected as preferred options for evalu-ation in the study based upon projected ridership, revenue, operating costs, and operating loss.The preferred options, which are depicted in the route map below, are:• Option 1: Restore tri-weekly Sunset Limited serviceb-etweenLos Angeles, California and Orlando, Florida.• Option 2: Extend the daily City of New Orleans service, which currently operates between Chicago, Illinois and New Orleans, Louisiana, east from New Orleans to Or-lando, Florida.• Option 3: Implement daily stand-alone overnight service between New Orleans, Louisi-ana and Orlando,Florida.Each of the three proposed options would restore service between New Orleans and Or-lando. This report assumes that all of the 19 stations between New Orleans and Or-lando would be served by the restored service.

Capital Improvements and Mobilization Costs

Projected capital and mobiliz-ation costs for restored service are $32.7 million for Option 1 (tri-weekly Sunset Limited) and $57.6 million to $96.6 mil-lion for both Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train). Capital/mobilization expendit-ures required for all three op-tions are:• $10.7 million for restoring the 13 Suspended Service Sta-tions to a state of good repair and bringing them into com-pliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) re-quirements (including $3.2-million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station);• $600,000 for improvements at Amtrak’s Sanford mainten-

ance facility where equipment would be maintained;• a preliminary estimate of $20 million for Positive Train Control (PTC) costs as the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 may require installa-tion of PTC by 2015 on por-tions of the route solely be-cause of the restoration of passenger service; and• training and engineer/con-ductor qualification costs of $1.4 million for Option 1 and $2.3 million for Options 2 and 3.For Options 2 and 3, addition-al equipment would be re-quired to support this service. Each of these options is pro-jected to require the acquisi-tion of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of $24 million to $63 million.

The Three Options

These capital and mobiliza-tion cost estimates do not in-clude expenditures, if any,re-quired to increase rail line capacity. CSX Transporta-tion, Inc., the host freight railroad that owns nearly all of the New Orleans - Orlando route, has indicated that it will seek significant capacity investments as a prerequisite to any service restoration. Contrary to this assertion, Amtrak does not believe that any infrastructure capacity investments on CSX are re-quired to restore the formerly operated tri-weekly service (Option 1), and holds that the need for any trackinvestments to support daily service, Options 2 and 3, should be determined through capacity modeling undertaken in collaboration with CSX.

Financial PerformanceThe projected annual direct operating loss associated with restoring service between New Orleans and Orlando is:• $ 4.8 million for Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly Sunset Limited);• $11.7 million for Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans ex-tension); and• $18.4 million for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train).Projected farebox recovery – the percentage of direct oper-

ating costs covered by pas-senger revenues generated by restored service (including additional revenues on con-necting routes) is 56% for Option 1, 44% for Option 2, and 23% for Option 3.

Ridership ForecastRidership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred options. The projected additional Amtrak annual ridership associated with each is:• 53,300 for Option 1 (restor-ation of tri-weekly Sunset Limited);• 96,100 for Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans exten-sion); and• 79,900 for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train).Projected additional passen-ger miles on the Amtrak route system (on both the re-stored service and other routes with which it would connect) for each train mile-operated are:• 228.3 passenger miles for Option 1;• 125.9 passenger miles for Option 2; and• 80.5 passenger miles for Option 3.Option 1 produces the highest passenger miles per train mile because it attracts-more passengers making longer trips (e.g., Los Angeles

to Orlando). Potential rider-ship between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely im-pacted by the circuitry of the rail route (769 miles versus 639 miles by highway) and slow speeds that result in a rail trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 hours by auto-mobile.

Public BenefitsAssuming additional federal or state funding is provided, Amtrak anticipates that restoring passenger service between New Orleans and Orlando will produce modest net economic benefits. Direct benefits include the impact of the approximately $11.3 mil-lion in station and facility capital investments along the route and the creation of between 32 and 122 perman-ent Amtrak jobs, depending upon which option is chosen. Such expenditures would cre-ate jobs, primarily in con-struction, manufacturing and material supply, for the dura-tion of these projects. Opera-tion of the service will also lead to expenditures for food, supplies, lodging for train crews, etc. that will benefit local economies, and can also be expected to produce signi-ficant ongoing spillover eco-nomic benefits. The daily ser-vice options – Options 2 and 3 – would require additional capital expenditures of $24-

$63 million for new equip-ment. While construction of new equipment is likely to cre-ate domestic manufacturing jobs, these jobs are unlikely to be located in the Gulf Coast Region.Restoration of passenger rail service between New Orleans and Orlando would also pro-duce mobility benefits by cre-ating a direct link between Florida, the Gulf Coast Re-gion, and the Central and Western United States. Com-munities along the Gulf Coast, many of which have limited or no intercity public transporta-tion service and continue to be affected by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, would re-gain a passenger rail option.Option 1, which generates the highest number of additional passenger miles per train mile, may produce some en-ergy savings due to diversion of trips that would otherwise be taken by less energy effi-cient automobiles and air-planes. Options 2 and 3 are not likely to produce measur-able environmental, energy or congestion relief benefits be-cause they generate relatively few additional passenger miles per train mile operated and the distance by rail between many city pairs they would serve is considerably longer than the distance by air or highway.

TimelineImplementation of Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly Sunset Limited) would require a minimum of 20 months lead time from the date on which funding is made available. This is due to the time re-quired to hire, train, and qualify locomotive engineers, and to bring stations into to a state of good repair and make them ADA compliant. Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train) would take approximately four years to implement, since purchase of new equipment would be re-quired. These projections are subject to a number of contin-gencies.

Conclusion and Next StepsThis plan identifies the most viable options for restoring in-tercity passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisi-ana and Orlando, Florida. Amtrak recommends that fed-eral and state policymakers determine if passenger rail service should be restored between New Orleans and Or-lando; and if so:1. Identify the preferred op-tion for service restoration; and2. Provide theadditional fund-ing for capital and ongoing operating coststhat will be re-quired to implement that op-

tion.Once these actions are taken, Amtrak will move quickly to initiate the stepsrequired for service restoration, if such an option is chosen.

The complete report is avail-able at : http://www.amtrak.-com/pdf/PRIAA/GulfCoast-ServicePlanReport.pdf

Proposed City of New Orleans Schedule

CABOOSE

Autotrain 92 From the collection of Mike Pendergrass

Meeting Schedule

August 10, 2009September 14, 2009

October 12, 2009November 9, 2009

Meetings are the 2nd Monday of each month in the White Station Branch

Library from 7-9 pm.5094 Poplar Avenue

Memphis, TN (in front of Clark Tower)

Contact the EditorTom Parker

3012 Wood Thrush DriveMemphis, TN 38134

tscottparker@gmail.com

THE MEMPHIS BUFF welcomes contributions for publication. Copyrighted materials must contain the source. Original documents and photos are preferred for clarity. Enclose a SASE for the return of your materials. Articles sent via the Internet should be in Microsoft Word format. Photos should be JPEG files @ 72 dpi and at least 800x600 size. Consideration for a cover photo would require a much higher resolution. THE MEMPHIS BUFF is a not-for-profit publication for the Memphis Chapter of the NRHS. All credited photos herein are copyright by the photographer and may not be reused without permission.