Attrition Through Enforcement

8/14/2019 Attrition Through Enforcement

1/16

Center for Immigration StudiesBackgrounder April 2006

Attrition Through EnforcementA Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population

By Jessica M. Vaughan

Jessica M. Vaughan is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Center or Immigration Studies.

Proponents o mass legalization o the illegal alien population, whether through amnesty or expandedguestworker programs, oten justiy this radical step by suggesting that the only alternative a broadcampaign to remove illegal aliens by orce is unworkable. One study put the cost o such a deportation

strategy at $206 billion over the next ve years. But mass orced removal is not the only alternative to masslegalization. This analysis shows that a strategy o attrition through enorcement, in combination with a strongeborder security eort such as the administrations Secure Border Initiative (SBI), will signicantly reduce the size

o the illegal alien population at a reasonable cost. Reducing the size o the illegal population in turn will reducethe scal and social burdens that illegal immigration imposes on communities. In contrast, a policy o masslegalization is likely to increase these costs and prompt more illegal immigration.

Studies o the size and growth o the illegal population show that a borders-oriented strategy like SBI, whichaims to improve border security and ocuses mainly on removing criminal aliens, will achieve only limited resultsI supplemented by attrition through enorcement, which encourages voluntary compliance with immigrationlaws rather than relying on orced removal, the illegal population could be nearly halved in ve years.Accordingto the governments own cost estimates, such a strategy requires an additional investment of less than $2billion, or $400 million per year an increase of less than 1 percent of the Presidents 2007 budget requestfor the Department of Homeland Security ($42.7 billion).

Elements o the attrition through enorcement strategy include: mandatory workplace verication oimmigration status; measures to curb misuse o Social Security and IRS identication numbers; partnerships withstate and local law enorcement ocials; expanded entry-exit recording under US-VISIT; increased non-criminaremovals; and state and local laws to discourage illegal settlement.

The purpose o this analysis is to identiy both the likely cost to the ederal government and the expectedeect in terms reducing the size o the illegal alien population, o re-orienting the nations immigration lawenorcement strategy rom one that relies primarily on border control and removing criminal aliens to one thatalso aims to increase the probability that illegal aliens will return home o their own accord. Among the ndings

A strategy o attrition through enorcement could reduce the illegal population by as many as 1.5 millionillegal aliens each year. Currently, only about 183,000 illegal aliens per year depart without the interventiono immigration ocials, according to DHS statistics.

Voluntary compliance works aster and is cheaper than a borders-only approach to immigration law enorcementFor example, under the controversial NSEERS program launched ater 9/11, DHS removed roughly 1,500illegally-resident Pakistanis; over the same time period, in response to the registration requirements, about15,000 illegal Pakistani immigrants let the country on their own.

Requiring employers to veriy the status o workers could deny jobs to about three million illegal workerin three years, aecting at least one-third o the illegal population. This measure is a central eature o H.R4437, the enorcement measure passed by the House o Representatives in December, and is estimated to cosjust over $400 million over ve years.


2/16

Center for Immigration Studies

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) knows thename, address, and place o employment o millionso illegal aliens, and issues hundreds o millions odollars in tax reunds and tax credits to illegal aliens.Changing the laws to provide or inormation-sharingwould help boost immigration law enorcement atminimal cost.

US-VISIT is a critical tool in curbing illegalimmigration. Screening must be expanded toinclude Mexicans and Canadians, and DHS mustmove orward to deploy an exit-recording system.These steps should be a pre-requisite to adding orexpanding any visa program.

Less than 10 percent o ICE investigative resourcesare devoted to raud, workplace violations, andoverstayers. DHS could double non-criminalremovals at a cost o roughly $120 million per year,

balancing a broken windows approach with itscurrent triage approach to interior enorcement.

Laws enacted by the state governments o Floridaand New York to prevent illegal immigrants romobtaining drivers licenses have induced more illegalaliens to leave than have ederal enorcement eortsagainst certain illegal populations in those states,and have come at virtually no cost to the ederalgovernment.

False ChoiceIn November 2005 Homeland Security SecretaryMichael Cherto presented the Bush Administrationplan to address the nations immigration crisis. Knownas the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), the plan is billedas a comprehensive solution that will secure Americasborders and reduce illegal migration within ve years.1

The cost o SBI was projected to be $2.5 billion.2While SBI addresses a number o grave border

security weaknesses, such as Border Patrol stang levels,detention capacity, and physical inrastructure, and is

certain to reduce the number o new illegal arrivals, it will have no noticeable eect or communities acrossthe country that already are hosting illegal populations.The SBI makes almost no eort to reduce the size othe existing illegal alien population; nor does it addressthe problem o visa overstayers, who make up perhaps asmuch as 40 percent o the illegal immigrant fow.

Ongoing research by leading immigrationscholars strongly suggests that when border controlis the sole ocus o immigration enorcement policy,

illegal immigrants tend to stay put, rather than riskre-entry. According to Princeton researcher Douglas S.Massey, Enorcement has driven up the cost o crossingthe border illegally, but that has had the unintendedconsequence o encouraging illegal immigrants to staylonger in the United States to recoup the cost o entry.The result is that illegal immigrants are less likely to

return to their home country, causing an increase in thenumber o illegal immigrants remaining in the UnitedStates.3 I the goal o immigration policy is to relievethe scal and social burden o illegal immigration andenhance homeland security without spurring moreillegal immigration, then some eort must be made toreduce the existing population o illegal immigrants aswell as to slow the fow o new illegal arrivals.

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertohas said it is simply not practical to try to orciblyremove the illegal population: The cost o identiyingall o those people and sending them back would be

stupendous. It would be billions and billions o dollars.4

The administration, along with some supporters inCongress, maintains that the only alternative is tolegalize the resident illegal alien population through amassive new guestworker plan.

Cost would certainly be a actor in any newguestworker or amnesty program, as well. According to a2004 report by Center or Immigration Studies Directoro Research Steven Camarota, the illegally-residentpopulation produces a net scal drain o about $10billion (scal costs minus taxes paid). Ater an amnesty,

that cost rises to nearly $29 billion, as the amnestybeneciaries become eligible or more services.5 Inaddition, based on past experience, any new amnesty islikely to result in large numbers o ineligible individualsreceiving status, including terrorists, and will spawn newillegal immigration.6

Policies or AttritionThe purpose o attrition through enorcement is toincrease the probability that illegal aliens will returnhome without the intervention o immigration

enorcement agencies. In other words, it encouragesvoluntary compliance with immigration laws throughmore robust interior law enorcement. When combinedwith a strategy to improve border security, this approach will bring about a signicant reduction in the size othe illegal alien population and help deter uture illegalimmigration. This strategy requires a modest investmentin additional resources or certain ederal enorcementprograms totaling less than $2 billion over ve yearsabove and beyond what has already been appropriated


3/16


by Congress or requested by the White House orimmigration law enorcement. The key elements o thisstrategy are:

1) eliminating access to jobs through mandatoryemployer verication o Social Security numbersand immigration status;

2) ending misuse o Social Security and IRSidentication numbers, which illegal immigrantsuse to secure jobs, bank accounts, drivers licenses,and other privileges, and improved inormation-sharing among key ederal agencies;

3) increasing apprehensions and detention o illegalimmigrants through partnerships between ederalimmigration authorities and state and local lawenorcement agencies;

4) reducing visa overstays;

5) doubling the number o non-criminal, non-expedited removals;

6) passing state and local laws to discourage thesettlement o illegal aliens and to make it moredicult or illegal aliens to conceal their status.

Some o these measures are included in H.R.4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal

Immigration Control Act o 2005, passed by the Houseo Representatives in December 2005. Additionallegislative action is still needed to end Social Securityand tax identication number misuse and additionalunds need to be appropriated or expanded removalprograms, support o state and local partnerships, andthe enhancement o the US-VISIT program.

Enorcement: Faster and CheaperTable 1 illustrates the signicantly better results that canbe achieved by pursuing attrition in addition to a border

control strategy such as SBI. With an attrition strategy,the United States could reduce the illegal populationrom its current 11.5 million to 5.6 million over aperiod o ve years, a 51 percent reduction. SBI alonewill produce only modest results reducing the illegalpopulation to only 10.3 million illegal aliens ater veyears, a 10 percent reduction.

A note o caution this exercise is meant simplyto illustrate the relative importance o various areas oocus or immigration law enorcement and how that

plays out over time. While Table 1 relies on the most up-to-date and specic statistics available rom governmentsources and independent research, because the illegalpopulation is by denition dicult to count, thesegures should be considered no more than educatedguesses. Some o the data is several years old. In theabsence o evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that

previous trends o illegal migration and return migrationpersist today. It is possible that orthcoming statisticsrom the Department o Homeland Security based onmore recent data will show a slightly dierent outcome.

This analysis relies on DHS estimates reportingthe past levels o the annual out-fow o illegal aliens,which were broken down according to the reason ordeparture. In addition, it uses data rom a new report byJerey Passell, o the Pew Hispanic Center, which extractsinormation on the illegal alien population rom Censusdata.7 In addition the ndings o Princeton UniversitysMexican Migration Project (MMP) were considered, a

major ongoing study o migration patterns to and romMexico based on annual surveys o Mexican migrantsand villagers.8

The Passell study reports that a large portiono illegal aliens are recent arrivals. According to Passell,two-thirds o the illegal population (7.3 million people)have been here 10 years or less (see Figure 1). Theseindividuals presumably would be the most responsive toincreased immigration enorcement within the UnitedStates. Only 16 percent o the population has been heremore than 15 years.

The MMP has documented a signicant churnin the fow o illegal Mexican migrants; in other words,a large percentage o illegal migrants enter with theintent to work illegally or a temporary period beorereturning to Mexico. However, the probability o returnhas become less in recent years, dropping rom about45 percent in the mid-1980s to about 25 to 33 percenttoday.9

MMP researchers posit that this decline in theprobability o return is due to the increasing dicultyo successul re-entry as border control eorts haveintensied in recent years. It could also be due to the

substantial decline in interior enorcement and increasingaccommodation o illegal Mexicans in the United States. Whatever the reason, the study suggests strongly thatillegal migrants do change behavior in response tochanges in U.S. policies.

Another recent study conrms the responsivenesso illegal Mexican migration to U.S. enorcement trends.Using MMP data, University o Pennsylvania researcherAldo Colussi created a model o illegal Mexican migrantbehavior in response to two kinds o policies: more


4/16


Table 1. Estimated Five-Year Change in the Illegal Alien PopulationUnder SBI and SBI plus Attrition through Enorcement (thousands)

Year 1

SBISBI + Attrition

Total

626581

EWI1

381381

Overstay

245200

New Arrivals Departures

Total

7131,523

Emigrated

183920

Died

2727

Removed2

1822554

Adjusted

290290

11,50011,500

BeginningIllegal

Pop.Let/

Return

as LPR

3131

11,41310,558

Year-End

IllegalPop.

Year 2

SBISBI + Attrition

Total

552462

EWI1

307307

Overstay

2451553

Total

7121,522

Emigrated

183920

Died

2626

Removed2

1822554

Adjusted

290290

11,41310,558

Let/Returnas LPR

3131

11,2539,498

Year 3

SBISBI + Attrition

Total

478343

EWI1

233233

Overstay

2451103

Total

7121,522

Emigrated

183920

Died

2626

Removed2

1822554

Adjusted

290290

11,2539,498

Let/Returnas LPR

3131

11,0198,319

Year 4

SBISBI + Attrition

Total

404224

EWI1

159159

Overstay

245653

Total

7111,521

Emigrated

183920

Died

2525

Removed2

1822554

Adjusted

290290

11,0198,319

Let/

Returnas LPR

3131

10,7127,022

Year 5

SBI

SBI + Attrition

Total

330

105

EWI1

85

85

Overstay

245

203

Total

711

1,521

Emigrated

183

920

Died

25

25

Removed2

182

2554

Adjusted

290

290

10,712

7,022

Let/Returnas LPR

31

31

10,331

5,606

Source: DHS Ofce o Immigration Statistics, Pew Hispanic Center.1 Gradual reduction o new EWI to operational control, i.e. 80 % are stopped (now only 25% are stopped).2The number or non-expedited removals is used as a proxy or interior removals.3Assumes that overstays are reduced 20% due to exit recording and compliance enorcement.4Assumes a doubling o non-criminal removals.

New Arrivals DeparturesBeginningIllegal

Pop.

Year-End

IllegalPop.


Pop.

Year-End

IllegalPop.


Pop.

Year-End

IllegalPop.


Pop.

Year-

End

Illegal

Pop.


5/16


intense border-targeted enorcement and an increase inpenalties imposed on employers. Colussi ound that, overve years, a policy such as tighter controls on employerscould cause a 40 percent drop in the existing population,while a policy o stricter border enorcement caused noperceptible drop in the existing illegal population.10

Table 2 is a comparison o the cost o a borders-

only enorcement approach (the Presidents SBI) withthe cost o a strategy o enorcement through attrition.These estimates are based on the 2006 appropriationsor the Department o Homeland Security, estimatesproduced by the Congressional Budget Oce or billsencompassing these measures, GAO reports, internalaudits, and other public inormation.

Contrary to studies published by groups avoringamnesty, a signicant reduction in the size o the illegalpopulation can be accomplished at a cost ar less thanthe billions and billions o dollars mentioned by Mr.Cherto. At a cost o less than $2 billion, a strategy o

attrition through enorcement is as aordable as the SBI,and will deliver greater reductions in the illegal alienpopulation.

Policies Details and Costs

I. Preventing Employment:

The Basic Pilot ProgramRationale. It is widely recognized that employment isthe most common incentive or illegal immigration

to the United States. With the passage o the 1986Immigration Reorm and Control Act (IRCA), it becameillegal or employers to knowingly hire illegal aliens.The law required employers to demand documentsestablishing an aliens eligibility or work, but providedno easy way or most employers to ascertain i thedocuments were legitimate, spawning a huge countereitdocument industry, enabling employers to look theother way at bogus papers, and holding out the spectero discrimination lawsuits against those employers whoinspect documents too closely.

The bipartisan Commission on ImmigrationReorm, or Jordan Commission, in 1994 concluded:Reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin o acomprehensive strategy to deter unlawul migration....Strategies to deter unlawul entries and visa overstaysrequire both a reliable process or veriying authorizationto work and an enorcement capacity to ensure thatemployers adhere to all immigration-related laborstandards. The Commission supports implementationo pilot programs to test what we believe is the mostpromising option or veriying work authorization:

a computerized registry based on the Social Securitynumber.11

Three pilot programs were introduced in1997 and the most successul, known as the Basic Pilotprogram, was reauthorized and expanded by Congressin 2004. An independent evaluation carried out byTemple Universitys Institute or Survey Research and

the private research rm Westat ound that the BasicPilot program did reduce unauthorized employmentamong participating employers (the program is currentlyvoluntary).12 The study said that the program did this in

Table 2. Total Five-Year Cost oAttrition Through Enorcement

Cost (in millions)

$414.01.2

600.0350.0595.0

0

$1,960.2

$2,500.0

Workplace Status VerifcationTax ID Reorm and Data SharingLaw Enorcement PartnershipsExpanded Entry-Exit RecordingIncrease Non-Criminal RemovalsState and Local Laws

TOTAL

Secure Border Initiative

1980s: 1.8 million(16 %)

1990-94: 2.0 million(24 %)

1995-99: 2.9 million(26 %)

2000-05: 4.4 million(40 %)

Figure 1. Most Illegals Are Recent Arrivals

Source: Pew Hispanic Center


6/16


two ways: It identied illegal aliens who had submittedalse Social Security numbers or immigration documentsand it deterred illegal aliens rom seeking jobs withparticipating employers who participated in the program.The evaluation team ound that about 10 percent o theemployees screened in the program were illegal aliens.A majority o the participating employers surveyed (64

percent) said that the number o illegal workers applyingor work had been reduced under the Basic Pilot programand nearly all (95 percent) elt that the program hadreduced the likelihood that they would hire illegal aliens.The most important program weaknesses identied bythe evaluators involved the accurate and timely entryo inormation into government databases, which theyound had been addressed and improved by the agenciesinvolved by the time o Basic Pilots reauthorization in2004.

H.R. 4437, the immigration enorcement billpassed by the House o Representatives in December

2005, also known as the Sensenbrenner bill, would buildon the Basic Pilot program to make it mandatory or allemployers to veriy the work eligibility o all new hiresupon enactment. Verication o all employees would bemandatory or government and certain private employersby 2009, and apply to all employees at all employers by2012.

Cost. The Congressional Budget Oce estimated thecost o this mandatory employment eligibility vericationsystem to be $414 million over the rst ve-year period,

rom 2006 to 2010.13

Beneft. The implementation o a mandatory versiono the Basic Pilot program has the potential to aect alarge share o the illegal alien population within just aew years.

The ISR/Westat study ound that 10 percent othe workers screened by the Basic Pilot program lackedwork authorization.14 However, because the program isvoluntary, the employers represented are sel-selectedand unevenly distributed across the country, and thusnot necessarily refective o the general population o

national employers who would be required to screenworkers under a mandatory program.

Other research suggests that between 50 and60 percent o employed illegal aliens are working onthe books.15 Many o these workers are employed insectors such as construction, restaurant, hospitality, andarming, where the turnover rates are high. Assumingan illegal working population o roughly 7.2 millionworkers,16 perhaps as many as our million unauthorizedworkers would be identied by the program within the

rst two to three years, and presumably denied jobs withemployers who are complying with the law.

A dierent calculation produces a similar result.It is estimated that illegal aliens make up about 4.9percent o the civilian labor orce.17 According to theCBO (quoting the Bureau o Labor Statistics), roughly50-60 million new employees will be hired annually

between 2006 and 2010. I 55 percent o those 2.45million illegal alien new hires are working on the books,then Basic Pilot could identiy more than one million(roughly 1.3 million) illegal aliens each year. I just hal othe identied illegal aliens choose to return home everyyear, the size o the illegal population would be reducedby at least 2.5 million over ve years, and probably bymuch more, as other illegally-resident amily memberscould be expected to return with them.18 This representsa large share o the 4.6 million likely voluntary emigrantsshown in Table 1.

A number o scenarios are likely to result. Some

illegal aliens will seek employment o the books,to avoid the screening, and undoubtedly there will beemployers willing to hire in this way. Others will resort toidentity raud instead o countereit documents; that is,seeking employment using the name and Social Securitynumber o a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, thoughthis is a more costly and more risky, and thereore lesslikely, option.19

The attrition through enorcement strategy alsoincludes additional attention to routine immigration lawenorcement and compliance, as well as steps to address

misuse o U.S. identity numbers, all o which wouldincrease the likelihood that remaining illegal aliens willhave a more dicult time nding employment andunctioning easily in society.

II. Curb Use of ITINs by Restricting

Issuance and Sharing DataRationale. In1996 the Internal Revenue Service createdthe Individual Tax Identication Number (ITIN) toenable it to collect taxes rom non-resident oreigninvestors who earned taxable income in the United

States, but who were not legal permanent residents orcitizens, and thus did not qualiy or a Social Securitynumber. In an apparent attempt to increase tax revenuethrough increased tax compliance, the agency decidedalso to allow illegal immigrants to obtain ITINs, andhas actively promoted their use in cooperation withimmigrant advocacy groups. Although the agencymaintains the numbers are to be used only or thepurpose o ling an income tax return, other entities,including some state motor vehicle agencies, banks,


7/16


and mortgage lenders, began accepting the ITIN in lieuo customary orms o identication, or the explicitpurpose o providing services to illegal aliens, who otenlack conventional identication.

Since 1996 the IRS has issued more than 7.3million ITINs, o which only two to three million haveever been used on a tax return.20 A number o experts,

including the Treasury Departments internal auditors,have raised concerns over the years about the ITIN,suggesting that the liberal ITIN issuance policy maybe increasing the potential or raud, enabling illegalimmigrants to receive benets to which they are notentitled, and creating law enorcement problems.21

The IRS has resisted pressure to cease issuingITINs to illegal aliens, arguing that its top priority is toencourage tax compliance. This may be a result, but thepractice apparently has not increased tax revenue, and sois o questionable value in act the IRS has issued morein tax reunds and credits than it has collected in taxes

rom illegal aliens.The Treasury Departments auditors studied

the use o ITINs in the tax year 2001.22 About 530,000Form 1040s were led that year by aliens not authorizedto work and using ITINs. The total tax liability o thesereturns was $184 million, ater deductions and creditson total taxes due o $495 million. More than hal o thereturns reported no tax liability, and $522 million in taxreunds were claimed on these returns. Typically, most othe tax collection rom illegal aliens (and all taxpayers)occurs as a result o withholding by employers, not in

voluntary tax lings. As one Arizona tax preparer put it,when ITIN-bearing tax lers learn that their bottom linewill not be a reund, they walk.23

More than hal o the ITIN returns includedW-2 orms listing someone elses Social Security number,and one in our o the individuals ailed to report other wages and compensation or which they should havepaid taxes.24

Under mounting pressure, in December 2003the IRS made a perunctory eort to address theseconcerns. It sent a letter to all state governments statingthat the agency did not veriy the identity o ITIN

applicants beore issuing a number. This careully crateduse at your own risk position simultaneously validatedthe policies o the stricter state agencies already balking ataccepting the document as identication, while reeingup other entities to continue accepting the documentor non-tax purposes, such as licensing and banking.Despite the caveat rom the IRS, six states still acceptthe document rom applicants or drivers licenses.25

In addition, the IRS changed the applicationprocess, so that now all those requesting an ITIN

must include a completed tax return along with theapplication.

I the IRS is allowed to continue thiscontroversial policy which undermines immigrationenorcement eorts, then it would make sense torequire it to share inormation on ITIN holders withimmigration enorcement authorities. Yet the agency

insists that the privacy o tax records is sacred and vitalto tax compliance. In March 2004 testimony beore theHouse Ways and Means Committee, IRS CommissionerMark Everson warned o the chilling eect on taxcompliance that would result rom any eort to useinormation rom tax returns to enorce immigration law:We are ully sensitive to the possible dangers that canarise rom the misuse o ITINs or the purpose o creatingan identity, including the possible threat to nationalsecurity. Regardless o undesirable behaviors actually orpotentially associated with ITINs, the Service remainslegally responsible or enorcement o the nations ederal

tax laws . . . irrespective o the circumstances o theiremployment or the possibility that ITIN applicants maybe solely or collaterally seeking the procurement o anITIN to establish an identity or non-tax purposes.26

However, a strong precedent exists or sharinginormation rom tax returns with other agencies. Section6103 o the tax code permits such arrangements withseveral agencies and could be amended to include DHS.For example, the IRS currently has successul electronicdata-sharing arrangements with the Department oEducation (to collect debt rom student loan deaulters),

the Social Security Administration (to conrm eligibilityor benets) and the Centers or Medicare and MedicaidServices (also to conrm eligibility or benets).27

The unwillingness o the IRS to help withimmigration law enorcement is no doubt reinorcedby the disinclination o DHS to seek its assistance,despite the obvious enorcement value o inormationrom an individuals tax return. In its study o the ITINproblem, the Government Accountability Oce oundthat while many DHS investigative agents it interviewedthought the inormation rom illegal aliens tax returnwould be helpul in tracking them down, higher-ranking

DHS ocials said that, due to limited enorcementresources, the agency was unlikely to pursue any leadsgenerated by the IRS.28 Clearly, any attempt to accesstaxpayer inormation or the purposes o immigrationlaw enorcement would need to be accompanied byadditional resources or immigration agents who wouldbe expected to use it.

Policy Options. While the IRSs devotion to the principleo maintaining the privacy o nancial inormation to


8/16


encourage compliance is not entirely inappropriate, itis also clear that this stance may be undermining twoother important ederal objectives protecting nationalsecurity and enorcing immigration laws. A numbero options exist that respect the IRS prerogative todetermine the best tax policies while also supportingimmigration law enorcement. These options require the

IRS to share certain identiying inormation rom taxreturns with other agencies.

Financial services expert Marti Dinerstein, who has studied identication issues as they relate toimmigration policy,29 notes, No one is asking the IRS todisclose private nancial inormation that should remainprivate, but only such inormation that is importantor the enorcement o other ederal laws, such as thename and last known address o individuals who havesubmitted tax returns accompanied by a Social Securitynumber that appears to belong to someone else, whichsuggests that a law may have been broken.

Ample precedent exists or inormation-sharingbetween the IRS and other agencies, as noted above, andit is very cost-eective. According to one GAO report,ederal agencies estimated that they saved at least $900million annually through such initiatives.30 The IRS-Department o Education initiative is known as theTaxpayer Address Request program. The Department oEducation transmits the name and SSN o individualswho have deaulted on student loans to the IRS, and IRSthen matches the inormation to its records and providesthe Department o Education with the most recent

address it has on le. The Social Security Administrationhas a similar data-sharing system in place to preventduplicate payments rom being made to Medicarebeneciaries.

The rst step should be or Congress to adjustSection 6103 o the tax code to include DHS on the listo agencies that can receive inormation rom the IRS.

In the context o analyzing a dierent IRS-DHS data-sharing proposal, the GAO recommendedthat the IRS develop a taxpayer consent notice as parto the ITIN application, whereby applicants wouldconsent to potential disclosure o some inormation to

immigration authorities.31 Alternatively, the IRS couldput a Privacy Act notication on the ITIN application,as was recommended by the Treasury Departmentauditors, inorming the applicant that inormation maybe provided to DHS. Either version o disclosure consentis apparently possible under existing Internal RevenueCode authority. Either step would likely diminishthe popularity o the ITIN among illegal aliens, andextricate the IRS rom its current untenable position

o shielding illegal aliens rom ederal enorcementauthorities. The data on tax payments by and reundsto illegal aliens suggest that any possible loss in taxrevenue resulting rom diminished compliance couldbe made up by ewer credits and reunds being paidout to these individuals. In 1999, the IRS managementagreed with the idea o a Privacy Act notice, but has

never made the change.32

In addition, the IRS should be required to notiyDHS and the Attorney General o all cases where illegalaliens le tax returns using ITINs and wage reportsusing SSNs belonging to other people. According tothe Treasury Departments audit, there were 265,000such cases in 2001.33 Under the Identity Thet and Assumption Deterrence Act o 1998, it is a crime toknowingly transer or use, without lawul authority, ameans o identication o another person with the intentto commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawul activity... .34Prosecution o selected cases would help address this

problem. It would also help compensate or the BasicPilot Programs inability to detect raudulent use ogenuine Social Security numbers.

Finally, the IRS should end preerential taxtreatment or illegal aliens. In its audit report on ITINs,the Treasury Department noted a signicant inconsistencyin IRS policy while illegal aliens are treated as non-resident aliens or the purposes o qualiying or anITIN, they are taxed by the same rules as resident U.S.citizens and legally-resident aliens. They qualiy orthe standard deduction and the Additional Child Tax

Credit, which non-resident aliens with taxable incomemay not take. According to the audit, in tax year 2001,$160.5 million was given to approximately 203,000unauthorized resident aliens, with about 190,000 othese lers having no tax liability and receiving $151million.35 And, unauthorized resident aliens claimedthe standard deduction on 92.3 percent o the returnsled, reducing their AGI [adjusted gross income] by$3.2 billion.36 Although IRS management agreed withthese recommendations, no changes have been made inthe policy.

Cost. The recommendations above can be implemented without major outlays o government resources, andmay well result in cost savings over time. The cost oapplicant-initiated inormation-sharing authorizationwould be mainly or printing new orms. Any resultingdecline in illegal alien taxpayer compliance would notnecessarily result in declining tax revenue, as ewerreunds and credits would be claimed. Tax withholdingwould still occur.


9/16


I IRS were to reverse its policy and issue ITINsonly to aliens who are legally present, the cost o veriyingapplicants status would be between $0.12 and $0.24 perrecord checked. According to the latest numbers, the IRSis issuing about one million ITINs per year,37 bringingthe annual cost o veriying immigration status to justover $240,000.38

The cost o sharing inormation rom ITIN leswith non-matching SSNs would be similar to existingdata-sharing arrangements, or about $1 million per year.The Department o Education requests the records o4.6 million student loan deadbeats a year, at an annualcost to the agency o $819,000, or approximately $0.18per record. The Social Security Administration programcosts $0.21 per record.39 In addition, there may be somecost to upgrading the ICE technological inrastructureso it can handle these tasks.

III. Law Enforcement Partnerships:

Many Hands Make Lighter WorkRationale. Despite the recent growth in unding or theDepartment o Homeland Security and Immigrationand Customs Enorcement (ICE), its enorcementarm, the agency remains hopelessly out-manned, withewer than 10,000 immigration enorcement agents andinvestigators dedicated to locating and apprehendingsome o the more than 11 million illegal aliensresiding throughout the country. A large share o theseagents perorm support tasks such as processing andtransporting detainees, and so are not actively involved

in the identication and capture o illegal aliens. It wouldtake a huge inusion o unding and personnel or ICEto single-handedly manage this workload eectively soas to bring about a noticeable reduction in the size o theillegal alien population.

The law does not anticipate or require thatthe job be done single-handedly by ICE. Hundreds othousands o police ocers, sheris, and state troopersacross the country regularly encounter illegal aliens inthe course o their daily routine, and these ocers alsohave the authority to arrest illegal aliens. Ater takingillegal aliens into custody, police ocers are to inorm

ederal immigration authorities and turn over the alienor urther processing, i appropriate.40 In some cases,DHS will respond and take custody o aliens. Yet manypolice departments complain that DHS oten reuses,citing higher priorities. Typical is this reaction: Werenot driving hours inland to pick up illegal aliens when were trying to stop terrorists and weapons o massdestruction, said Rich Nemitz, the agent in charge othe Port Huron (Mich.) Border Patrol Station, which was

asked to take custody o several illegal aliens identiedby the Saginaw police orce.41

Further complicating matters, some jurisdictionshave so-called sanctuary policies in place, which orbidpolice ocers rom questioning individuals about theirimmigration status. Other jurisdictions cite concernsthat any police involvement with ederal immigration

authorities will sow ear o authorities in immigrantcommunities.

At the national level, ICE has merely toleratedrather than encouraged involvement rom state and locallaw enorcement, and the enorcement statistics refectthis ambivalence, with only a very small raction o theresident illegal population apprehended and removedeach year (ewer than 100,000 removals o longer-termillegal residents, or about 1 percent o the total illegalpopulation in 2004).42

ICE could become ar more productive interms o apprehensions and removals i it more actively

cultivated partnerships with those state and local lawenorcement departments that wish to participate inimmigration law enorcement. These partnerships haveproved to be mutually benecial; in addition to helpingICE, they also give local police another law enorcementtool to use in addressing local criminal problems, suchas gangs and drugs.

One approach is or state or local lawenorcement jurisdictions to enter what is known asa 287(g) agreement, ater the relevant section o theImmigration and Nationality Act, with ICE. Under

this agreement, ocers receive special immigration lawenorcement training and are then in eect deputizedto enorce immigration law beyond the initial arrestauthority. Mark Dubina, supervisor o the Floridaprogram, told Congress: this program acts as a orcemultiplier by allowing authorized local and state agentsto screen incoming complaints and identiy personsand leads worthy o ollow-up investigation, withoutinitially contacting the regional ICE oce with everylead or complaint.43 At the same hearing, the chie oAlabamas Department o Public Saety declared that the287(g) program is a valuable tool that helps Alabamas

troopers do a better job protecting and serving our stateand nation.44

Three states (Florida, Alabama, and Arizona)and three localities (Los Angeles and San Bernadinocounties and the city o Costa Mesa in Caliornia) havesigned agreements so ar. The Florida program resultedin more than 165 immigration arrests by 35 ICE-trainedFlorida police ocers in the rst year.45 Originallyocused exclusively on counter-terrorism, it has since


10/16

0


been renewed and expanded in scope, to cover domesticsecurity in general. The Alabama program, which wasnot limited to national security cases, resulted in nearly200 immigration arrests over a two-year period.

Beyond arresting illegal aliens they happento encounter in the regular course o business, some jurisdictions are adding their state law enorcement

resources to support ederal border patrol eorts. Inresponse to increasing numbers o illegal immigrantsand increasing violence in the border region, lawenorcement ocers in Texas ormed the Texas BorderSheris Coalition and convinced Governor Rick Perry tound Operation Linebacker. This program deploys scoreso new sheris deputies to the border region to assist inpatrolling and to serve as a second line o deense to theborder patrol eorts. The project received $6 million instate unding, which likely will be supplemented withederal unding in the uture. While no arrest gures areyet available, Operation Linebacker in Texas is expected

to result in a signicantly reduced general crime rate; onetown covered by the pilot experienced a 40 percent dropin the crime rate.46 The Texas sheris coalition is nowdiscussing an expansion o the operation with sherisrom all 24 southwest border counties, rom Caliorniato Texas.

Such partnerships need not be limited to ederal-state or ederal-local relationships. In October, 2005 U.S.army soldiers were sent on a training mission to supportborder patrol operations in New Mexico, known asJoint Task Force North. Part o their assignment was to

station soldiers military vehicles along a major highwayand notiy the border patrol upon spotting illegal aliens.Nearly 2,000 illegal crossers were apprehended in onemonth. The soldiers, who were deployed rom a regimentin Fort Lewis, Washington, received useul desert andmountain training, while the border patrol was able toachieve a 60 percent increase in apprehensions in thatsector.47

Cost. The DHS appropriation or FY 2006 alreadyincludes $5 million or training o state and localocers to enorce immigration laws. In its conerence

report accompanying the bill, the House AppropriationsCommittee expressed strong support or the programand directed DHS to be more proactive in encouragingstate and local governments to participate.48

H.R. 4437 authorizes payments o up to $100million annually to counties within 25 miles o thesouthern U.S. border or the costs o detaining andtransporting illegal aliens. Presumably some o the costo programs such as Operation Linebacker, which isbudgeted at $35 million, could be covered under this

legislation, or under other existing state and local lawenorcement terrorism prevention grant programsalready approved. The bill also directs DHS to expandthe National Crime Inormation Center database.

According to CBO cost estimates, thetotal annual cost o an expanded state and local lawenorcement role in reducing the size o the resident

illegal alien population would be $120 million: $100million or grants to states or transporting and detainingillegal aliens, and $20 million or training and the NCICdatabase expansion.49

Beneft. Supporting the eorts o state and locallaw enorcement to participate in immigrationlaw enorcement is a powerul way to augment theimmigration enorcement presence nationwide withouthaving to open new ICE oces and hire new ICE agents.Together with the planned expansion o prosecutorialresources and detention space under the Secure Border

Initiative, the expansion o the 287(g) program andother local initiatives is virtually certain to increase thenumber o illegal alien removals.

The Sensenbrenner bill would advance thisstrategy by clariying state and local ocers authorityto help enorce immigration laws, requiring DHS toprovide training and unding opportunities to stateand local agencies, and directing DHS to place thenames o immigration oenders in the National CrimeInormation Center database, so that ocers on the beatcan more easily and accurately identiy illegal aliens.

This component o the attrition throughenorcement approach is the most expensive o thosepresented in this analysis (see Table 2). The potentialnumber o removals that would be directly attributable tostate and local authorities is likely to be small comparedwith other programs such as Basic Pilot. However, thisactivity will contribute to the apprehension o manycriminal aliens, who might not otherwise be ound byederal immigration authorities. Having help in dealing with criminal aliens would make it easier or ICE tobetter balance its enorcement priorities and devotemore attention to non-criminal interior enorcement

against other immigration law violators, including aliensmugglers, illegal workers, overstayers, and perpetratorso immigration raud.

IV. Knowing Whos Coming and Going:

Exit Recording with US-VISITRationale. Workplace enorcement, document control,and state and local law enorcement participation areall reactive methods o immigration law enorcement;


11/16


they serve as check-points to identiy or deal with illegalimmigrants who have been here or some time. A moreanticipatory method o enorcement, where, instead owaiting or illegal immigrants to apply or a job, le a taxreturn, or be stopped or speeding, DHS will have theability to identiy illegal immigrant overstayers as soonas they all out o status, is now under development.

This system is encompassed under US-VISIT, the newbiometric screening system or oreign visitors, whichDHS began implementing in 2004. Mandated by aCongress rustrated with the inability o INS to keeptrack o the number o visa overstayers, it also includesSEVIS, another new system set up to electronically trackstudents and exchange visitors.

The exit recording capability is one componento US-VISIT, a multi-layered border security systembased on biometrics that now records the entry o oreignvisitors, authenticates their identity, and screens themagainst security databases. It has been ully implemented

at air and sea ports, but in only a very limited way atland ports. I the program is allowed to proceed asplanned, the exit recording system will eventually requirevisitors to check out as they leave. By matching therecorded entries against the exits, DHS would be ableto determine which visitors have overstayed their visasand become illegal aliens. In addition to providing ICEwith enorcement leads as soon as an alien overstays, itis expected that the act o recording entries and exits,together with increased enorcement activity and theimposition o penalties or visa violations, will help

dampen the temptation to overstay.US-VISIT is still a work in progress, withewer than one-ourth o oreign visitors now screenedand enrolled upon entry, and ar ewer on exit (DHS iscurrently relying on a passenger maniest-based systemand pilot exit programs in a ew airports to record exits).50Mexicans and Canadians are exempt rom enrollment,leaving a signicant gap in the screening activity. Thispolicy is partly due to inrastructure limitations andpartly due to the Bush administrations deerence toconstituencies who benet rom minimal screeningpolicies, such as the travel industry, the immigration

bar, and businesses dependent on cross-border trade.Funding or more port inspectors and inrastructureimprovements, such as port re-design, would make itmuch easier to expand the number o visitors who arecovered under US-VISIT, enhancing security, deterringillegal immigration, and acilitating legitimate travel andcommerce.

Beyond its enorcement value, a ully-unctioning exit recording system must be a prerequisiteor adding new visa programs or expanding existing

ones. Currently the United States is operating its massivetemporary visitor programs almost blindly, with littleunderstanding o which visitors overstay, rom whichcountries, or in which visa categories. The inormationgenerated by US-VISIT and SEVIS will be critical touture policy decisions on the Visa Waiver Program,guestworker programs, and student and exchange visitor

programs.

Cost. Congress appropriated a total o $340 million orUS-VISIT in FY 2006, and the President has asked or$400 million in 2007. It is impossible to determine howmuch o this unding will be devoted to developing theexit recording component o US-VISIT, as DHS has notyet announced how and when it will implement thisrequirement.

Beyond the base cost o US-VISIT, which isalready covered under the DHS budget, over the veyears another $160 million would be needed to add

200 more new Customs and Border Protection port-o-entry inspectors per year, and another $190 million orinrastructure improvements at the largest ports o entry,or a total o $350 million over ve years.51

Beneft. The establishment o a more reliable andcomplete entry-exit recording system will bring avariety o benets or immigration law enorcementand policy management. First, the system alreadygenerates actionable leads or ICE agents that resultin apprehensions and removals. In June 2003, ICE

created the Compliance Enorcement Unit (CEU) totrack down overstayers and other aliens who violate theterms o their admission. CEU analysts cull throughhundreds o thousands o leads, many o which aregenerated automatically rom tracking databases, andreer conrmed and actionable cases to eld agents topursue. Over the time period January 2004 to January2005, the CEU processed more than 300,000 leadsrom our dierent sources,52 resulting in a total o671 apprehensions. These compliance enorcementinvestigations were the second largest category o ICEimmigration investigations completed that year, topped

only by criminal alien investigations.53The CEU is critical to any eort to reduce the

population o resident illegal aliens, and an increasein stang this unit and improving the data sources,particularly through mandatory exit recording, would likely produce a signicant increase in overallapprehensions. Despite the act that it is brand-new, theunit appears to be signicantly more productive thanother ICE Investigations units. The aorementioned 671apprehensions attributable to CEU in calendar year 2004


12/16


were accomplished by 51 ull-time equivalent (FTE)employees. Their work was hampered by several actors,including an only partially-operational US-VISIT andincomplete data entry.54 By way o contrast, in FY2004, the 64 FTE special agents o the ICE WorksiteEnorcement Unit completed only 3,064 cases resultingin only 445 arrests, or about hal the arrest per employee

rate o the CEU.In addition to producing actionable leads or ICE

agents, US-VISIT will also generate reliable quantitativeand descriptive inormation on the overstay population.This data will guide the State Department and DHS inthe adjudication o visas and supplement the array oassumptions, proling, validation studies, and guessworknow used by consular ocers and inspectors at the pointo entry to determine who qualies or a visa.

The inormation will also enable DHS andthe State Department to implement a more objectiveand transparent process to determine which countries

are eligible or the Visa Waiver Program. This programallows citizens o certain countries to enter the UnitedStates or short stays without a visa, and a low overstayrate is one o the criteria or participation. Lacking gooddata on overstays, the State Department and DHS haveused visa reusal rates as a proxy. Because they refect theconsular ocers predictions o uture behavior, ratherthan actual behavior, and can be subject to manipulationor political pressure, reusal rates are a much moresubjective and less dependable measure o eligibility.Participation in the program is a coveted privilege and

a number o important allies, including Poland andKorea, have expressed great disgruntlement with thecurrent process, urther complicating bilateral relations.At the same time, the program is risky; or instance, anumber o terrorists have entered using passports romVisa Waiver-approved countries. More reliable data willmake it easier or the State Department and DHS todeend its policies both here and abroad.

V. Broken Windows:

Doubling Non-Criminal RemovalsRationale. Faced with an overwhelming workload anda perceptible ambivalence in its leadership about theproblem o illegal immigration, DHS has adopted a triagestrategy o immigration law enorcement, with prioritygiven to locating and removing criminal aliens, such assexual predators and people who have participated ingenocide, along with those caught working illegally insensitive locations such as airports and tall buildings.Meanwhile, resources or other types o interiorenorcement have dried up. A recent GAO report

ound that only a very small share o ICE investigativehours are devoted to cases not involving criminal aliens,alien smuggling, or absconders. While 26 percent othe investigative time in 2004 went to drug cases and17 percent to nancial cases, only ve percent o theinvestigative hours were devoted to identity and benetraud, which is acknowledged to be a pervasive problem.

Workplace enorcement did not even make the chart,representing less than two percent o the investigativehours.55

To bring about a noticeable reduction in thesize o the illegal population and deter uture illegalimmigration, DHS will have to move beyond the triageapproach and embrace a parallel strategy o routineimmigration law enorcement that gives more attentionto enorcement at the workplace, visa overstays, andespecially raud in the benets application process. Thestrategy o attrition though enorcement envisions adoubling o non-criminal removals, both to decrease the

size o the illegal alien population directly and to createa climate o enorcement that encourages voluntarycompliance as the likelihood o detection increases.

A broken windows-style approach is consistent with, even essential to, the DHS primary mission okeeping the nation sae rom terrorists. We now knowthat most terrorists have relied on immigration raudand weak interior enorcement to remain in this countryto carry out attacks.56 Consistent, everyday enorcemento routine immigration law inractions will nabcriminals and terrorists, in addition to helping shrink

the population o illegal aliens.To this end, DHS has taken steps to improveraud detection, and equally important, ensure thatapplicants who resort to raud are removed, rather thanmerely denied legal status only to slip back into the illegalpopulation. In a remarkable instance o inter-bureaucooperation, in 2004 the Oce o Fraud Detectionand National Security was created within USCIS, theimmigration benets arm o DHS, in partnership withICE, the enorcement arm. This oce uses technology-enhanced methods to identiy raud and nationalsecurity risks in the immigration benets application

stream beore the applications are adjudicated. Whatmakes this new approach truly innovative is that whilesome o the conrmed raud cases are reerred to ICE orcriminal prosecution, now even more cases are handledadministratively that is, the applicant is denied thebenet and placed directly in removal proceedings which is a much less cumbersome and less costly processthan prosecution. Detailed statistics on the perormanceo this unit are not yet available, but DHS reported toCongress that over the time period spanning October


13/16


1, 2004 to approximately August o 2005, the FDNSunits, staed with 154 employees, generated more than1,500 cases, most o which were ultimately pursuedadministratively. The agency has been authorized todouble the size o the sta in the next year.57

Beneft. Boosting resources to bring about a doubling o

non-criminal removals would bring about a 40 percentincrease in total interior apprehensions, or an additional73,000 removals per year.

Cost. A doubling o non-criminal removals wouldcost approximately $595 million in additional interiorenorcement spending over ve years, based on theollowing calculation: The DHS budget provides ICEwith an additional $37.5 million over the next two yearsor 52 teams tasked with hunting down immigrantabsconders (those who have ignored removal orders).These teams are expected to arrest between 40,000 to

50,000 illegal aliens annually. At 865 apprehensionsper team, that works out to a per/apprehension cost o$834. At that rate, the total cost or sta to complete anadditional 73,000 non-criminal apprehensions would be just under $61 million per year. Congress has alreadyprovided or additional detention unds ($1 billion inthe 2006), but an additional $58 million is needed oradministrative and criminal proceedings and relatedcosts.

VI. Zero Tolerance: State and Local Laws

Discouraging Illegal SettlementRationale. Frustrated with the ederal governments ailureto make progress in reducing illegal immigration, andunder pressure rom impatient voters, many state and local jurisdictions are taking matters into their own hands byenacting laws and ordinances to discourage illegal settlementand by taking advantage o ederal services, such as thedatabase used or Basic Pilot, to veriy immigration status.According to the National Conerence o State Legislatures,lawmakers in 42 states are considering 380 bills related toimmigration; 70 o these bills deal with employment.58Many o these measures, such as laws to restrict access

to drivers licenses, are intended primarily to enhancesecurity and minimize identity raud; nevertheless theyhave provided a powerul incentive or illegal immigrantsto voluntarily return home. In other cases, legislatures haveconsidered more direct approaches, such as mandatory work authorization verication. Because these laws canhave such a positive eect on compliance, and require littlein the way or ederal resources, they must be more activelysupported by ederal immigration authorities.

Cost. The cost o encouraging state and local immigrationinitiatives is minimal, and limited to outreach eorts toencourage states and localities to use existing programssuch as SAVE (used primarily by state benets oces toveriy eligibility) and Basic Pilot. States and employerspay transaction ees or these services. The number ousers could be increased by undertaking a campaign to

explain the advantages.

Benefts. Evidence o the impact o such policies can beound in New York City, where the noticeable decline inthe size o the illegal Irish population is attributed in partto a recent eort to deny drivers licenses to illegal aliens.The Irish government estimates that about 14,000 Irishout o an estimated population o at least 20,000 havereturned home rom the United States since 2001, o whom a large percentage are presumed to have beenliving here illegally. By way o contrast, in 2005 DHSdeported only 43 Irish nationals.59 While the strong Irish

economy and the US-VISIT screening at airports arealso playing a role in this exodus, the inability to obtain alicense, which limits job opportunities and other aspectso a normal daily lie, is clearly an eective deterrent.

The state o Florida has experienced a netoutfow o illegally-resident Argentines, according to arecent report in theMiami Herald. Former illegal alienscited their inability to get a drivers license and travel,in addition to the strong economy in Argentina, asactors in their decision to return home. Records romthe international airport in Buenos Aires show that in

the last three years, 35,000 more Argentines arrivedrom Miami than returned, and the Argentine consulatenoted that the number o citizens seeking a certicate oresidence to return home had quadrupled over the sametime period.60 In comparison, DHS has apprehendedonly 300-600 Argentine illegal aliens per year in theentire United States in each o the last three years.

Dierent states have tried dierent tactics,depending on local issues and conditions. The governorso Texas and Arizona have ocused on the border, andauthorized initiatives to support the ederal borderpatrol with National Guard troops, soldiers-in-training,

and local sheris.61 Police Chie Garrett Chamberlain oNew Ipswich, New Hampshire claims to have created anillegal-ree zone in his small town by invoking the statelaw against trespassing. His approach ultimately wasrebuked by a state judge, but nevertheless, the publicityabout his approach may be accomplishing the samedeterrent eect.62

The Selectboard in the town o Milord, Mass.,a town o about 27,000 residents located in the suburbs


14/16


o Boston, which has experienced an infux o illegalBrazilian immigrants in the last several years, has passeda series o ordinances openly aimed at making lie moredicult or this population. Measures include an anti-scavenger law (orbidding oraging through trash leton the street or pick-up), a prohibition against certaintypes o check-cashing establishments, rental property

licensing, occupancy regulations, permits or use o localparks, and a requirement that restaurants and bars complywith ederal hiring regulations and maintain up-to-datehealth reports on all employees (in response to a localtuberculosis outbreak attributed to illegal aliens). Someo the quality o lie disturbances attributed to illegalaliens perhaps could be addressed more appropriatelythrough community outreach eorts. However, ingeneral, state and local ocials should be encouraged touse their lawmaking authority to promote legal hiringpractices, protect all members o the community romall orms o criminal activity, and promote a climate o

respect or ederal and local laws.In addition, state governments should rerain

rom pursuing policies and providing benets thatimpede or contradict ederal immigration laws, suchas sanctuary laws that prevent police ocers rominquiring about an aliens legal status, in-state tuitionat colleges and universities, subsidized day labor sites,public housing, and preerential-rate mortgages.

ConclusionThis analysis demonstrates that it is not only possible,but would be quite practical to undertake a strategy oattrition through enorcement in order to shrink the sizeo the illegal alien population and relieve the burdenillegal immigration imposes on American communities.This strategy, when combined with conventionalimmigration law enorcement and tighter security at theborders, could reduce the number o illegal aliens by halover a period o ve years. Contrary to some reports,and according to the governments own cost estimates,this strategy is a bargain, costing less than $2 billion overve years. It is less expensive and less radical than eithera massive amnesty/guestworker program, or a massiveapprehension and removal operation.

The strategy o attrition through enorcementrelies on tried and true immigration law enorcementtechniques that discourage illegal settlement and increase

the probability that illegal aliens will return o their ownaccord. Lawmakers must not be intimidated by the sheersize o the illegal population. Both academic researchand recent experience demonstrate that migrantsrespond to incentives and deterrents, and that a subtleincrease in the heat on illegal aliens can be enough todramatically reduce the scale o the problem within justa ew years. The ederal government already has withinits grasp the ability and the tools to control the level oillegal immigration, and its success in doing so is a directresult o the eort it has made. A modest investment oresources to step up this eort will pay large dividends

or the uture.

End Notes1 Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative, Department o HomelandSecurity, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0794.xml.2 Military contractors see new dollars in border deense, byDave Montgomery,Arizona Daily Star, December 29, 2005.3 Backre at the Border, by Douglas S. Massey, Cato InstituteCenter or Trade Policy Studies, June 2005, atwww.reetrade.org.4 Comments o Michael Cherto to Sean Hannity on theFox News program Hannity &Colmes, November 14, 2005.

Cherto s comments echo the results o a paper by theprogressive group Center or American Progress, Deportingthe Undocumented: A Cost Assessment, by Rajeev Goyle andDavid A. Jaeger, July 2005.www.americanprogress.org.5 Steven Camarota, in The High Cost o Cheap Labor: IllegalImmigration and the Federal Budget, p. 5. Seewww.cis.org/articles/2004/scal.pd6 See Lessons Learned From the Legalization Programs othe 1980s, by David North, Center or Immigration Studies,January 2005 atwww.cis.org/articles/2005/back105.html7 The Size and Characteristics o the Unauthorized MigrantPopulation in the U.S.: Estimates Based on the March 2005

Current Population Survey, by Jerey S. Passel, Pew HispanicCenter, March 2006, http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=618 For more inormation on the Mexican Migration Project, seewww.mmp.opr.princeton.edu9 Douglas S. Massey, Beyond the Border Buildup: Towards aNew Approach to Mexico-US Migration, at www.ail.org10 Migrants Networks: An Estimable Model o Illegal MexicanImmigration, by Aldo Colussi, University o Pennsylvania,November 2003.11 U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility, U.S.

Commission on Immigration Reorm, 1994, Executive Summary,p. xxxiv,www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/bacoming/ex-summary.pd12 Findings o the Basic Pilot Evaluation, Institute or SurveyResearch (Temple University) and Westat, June 2002 and Reportto Congress on the Basic Pilot Program, Department o HomelandSecurity/U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, June 2004,p. 3,www.uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/repsstudies13 Congressional Budget Ofce Cost Estimate: H.R. 4437,December 13, 2005, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cm?index=6954&sequence=014 ISR/Westat study, p. 182.


15/16


15 See The High Cost o Cheap Labor, by Steven Camarota,Center or Immigration Studies, August 2004, p. 17,www.cis.org/articles/2004/scal.html16 Passel, p. 9.17 Ibid.18 According to Passel, about hal o all adult male illegal aliens(2.4 million) living here have a wie and/or children. Four-thso the adult illegal alien women are here with husband and/or

children. Illegal alien children represent 16 percent o the entireillegal population (1.8 million). See Passell, p. 7.19 ISR/Westat Study, p. 191-2.20 Statement o Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, beorethe House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight, March10, 2004, available atwww.waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?comm=321 See the Treasury Inspector Generals Report, The InternalRevenue Services Individual Taxpayer Identication NumberProgram was Not Implemented In Accordance with InternalRevenue Code Regulations, September 1999, http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/reports/094505r.htmlandInternal Revenue Services Individual Taxpayer IdenticationNumber Creates Signicant Challenges or Tax Administration,

Tax Inspector General or Tax Administration, January 2004,Reerence Number 2004-30-023.22 Statement o Pamela J. Gardiner, Acting Inspector Generalor Tax Administration, U.S. Treasury, loc cit.23 U.S. Tax Number Abuse Rises, by Ray Stern, East ValleyTribune, (Ariz.), March 29, 2004.24 Gardiner, loc cit.25 National Immigration Law Center, Overview o State DriversLicense Requirements, http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/DLs/index.htm26 Everson, loc cit.27 See Taxpayer Inormation: Options Exist to Enable DataSharing Between IRS and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges,GAO Report GAO-06-100, October 2005.28 Ibid.29 Giving Cover to Illegal Aliens: IRS Tax IdenticationNumbers Subvert Immigration Law, by Marti Dinerstein,October 2002, http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/back1202.html30 GAO-06-100, p. 1.31 Ibid., p. 25.32 Treasury report, p. 39.33 Memorandum rom Gordon C. Milbourn III, Acting DeputyInspector General or Audit, Department o the Treasury,January 8, 2004. www.ustreas.gov34 Public Law 105-318.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.

37 From the statement o Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues,U.S. GAO, beore the House Ways and Means Subcommitteeon Oversight, March 10, 2004, p. 4.38 This estimate is based on the cost o using SAVE. See http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/SAVE.htm39 See GAO-06-100, pp. 31-35.40 State and Local Authority to Enorce Immigration Law, byKris W. Kobach, Center or Immigration Studies, June, 2004,p.1.41 Illegal aliens jailed, reed, by Joe Snapper, The SaginawNews, January 24, 2006.

42 Immigration Enorcement Actions: 2004, by MaryDougherty et al, DHS Oce o Immigration Statistics,November, 2005, http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/index.htm#papers43 Statement o Mark F. Dubina, Special Agent Supervisor,Florida Department o Law Enorcement, beore the HouseCommittee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee onManagement, Integration and Oversight, July 25, 2005.44

Statement o Major Charles E. Andrews, Alabama Departmento Public Saety, beore the House Committee on HomelandSecurity Subcommittee on Management, Integration andOversight, July 25, 2005.45 Statement o Kris Kobach beore the House Committee onHomeland Security Subcommittee on Management, Integrationand Oversight, July 25, 2005.46 El Paso sheri to get backup, by Louis Gilot, El Paso Times,October 31, 2005.47 See Military helps snag migrants, November 15, 2005 andSoldiers report immigrants to Border Patrol, October 30,2005, both by Louie Gilot or the El Paso Times.48 Conerence Report accompanying H.R. 2360.49 This gure is rom the Congressional Budget Oce cost

estimate or H.R. 4437 and or H.R. 2671, the Clear LawEnorcement or Criminal Alien Removal Act o 2003, whichincluded these measures and more, prepared on February 25,2004.50 For more on US-VISIT, see Modernizing AmericasWelcome Mat: The Implementation o US-VISIT, by JessicaM. Vaughan, Center or Immigration Studies, August 2005.51 CBO estimates or H.R. 4437.52 Sources o leads include US-VISIT; SEVIS, the oreignstudent tracking system; NSEERS, the registry or visitors romnations o special concern in the war on terrorism; and the StateDepartment.53 Immigration Enorcement Actions: 2004, by MaryDougherty et al., op cit.54 Review o the Immigration and Customs EnorcementsCompliance Enorcement Unit, DHS Oce o InspectorGeneral, September 2005, OIG-05-50.55 Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve theFederal Response, Government Accountability Oce, GAO-05-305, May 2005.56 Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11Sta Reporton TerroristTravel, by Janice L. Kephart, Center or ImmigrationStudies, September 2005.57 The USCIS/ICE Anti-Fraud Initiative Progress Report,submitted by USCIS to the House and Senate Committees onAppropriations, August 2005.58 Immigrant Policy: News rom the States, 2006, National

Conerence o State Legislatures, March 20, 2006,http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/index.htm59 Irish Immigration Slips Into Reverse, by Michelle Garcia,Washington Post, February 20, 2006.60 Argentines leaving Miami or home as economy rises, byCasey Woods,Miami Herald, March 22, 2006.61 Known as Operation Stone Guard, Operation Linebacker, andJoint Task Force North.62 Remarks o W. Garrett Chamberlain beore a meeting o theMassachusetts Coalition or Immigration Reorm, Wellesley,Massachusetts, January 21, 2005.


16/16


Center or Immigration Studies1522 K Street, NW, Suite 820

Washington, DC 20005-1202(202) [email protected]

Backgrounder

NON-PROU.S. POSTA

PAIDPERMIT # 6

WASHINGTO

CenterforImmigrationStudies

1522KStreet,NW,S

uite820

Washington,DC20005-1202

(202)466-8185(202)466-8076

c e n t e r @ c i s o r g w w w c i s o r g

4-

06

AttritionThroughEn

forcement

ACost-EffectiveStrategytoShrinktheIllegalPopulation

ByJessicaM.V

aughan

Propone

ntsomasslegalizationotheillegalalienpopulation,whether

throughamnestyorexpandedguestworker

programs,otenjustiythis

radical

stepbysuggestingthattheonlyalternativeabroadcampaign

toremoveille

galaliensbyorce

isunworkable.

Onestudyputthecosto

suchadeport

ationstrategyat$206billionoverthenextfveyears.

Butmass

orcedremovalisnottheonlyalternativetomasslegalization.

Thisanalysis

showsthatastrategyoattritionthroughenorcement,incombinationwith

astrongerbo

rdersecurityeortsuchastheadm

inistrationsSecureBorder

Initiative(SBI),willsignifcantlyreducethesizeo

theillegalalienpopulation

atareasonablecost(lessthan$2billionoverfv

eyears).Reducingthesize

otheillegal

populationinturnwillreducethefscalandsocialburdens

thatillegalim

migrationimposesoncommunities.Incontrast,apolicyo

masslegalizationislikelytoincreasethesecostsandpromptmoreillegal

immigration.

Attrition Through Enforcement

Documents

Transcript of Attrition Through Enforcement