Attribution and Affective Polarization Malice and ... · (Pettigrew 1979), especially when social...
Transcript of Attribution and Affective Polarization Malice and ... · (Pettigrew 1979), especially when social...
MaliceandStupidity:OutgroupMotiveAttributionandAffectivePolarization
July2019
SeanFreederUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley
ABSTRACT:Affectivepolarizationweakensvoters’willingnesstocrosspartylines,supportbipartisancompromise,andtrustoutgroupmessages.Existingscholarshiponcausesofrisingpartisanhostilityhasfocusedonmassideologicalpolarization,eliteincivility,andpartisandemographicsorting.Thispaperadvancesnegativemotiveattribution—citizens’tendencytoassumeill-intentguidesoutpartyinterests—asanotherkeydynamicunderlyingaffectivepolarization.Inonesurvey,subjectsdemonstratethatabouthalftheattributionsmadeaboutpoliticaloutgroupsarenegative.Then,intwoexperiments,subjectsareexposedtoaseriesofothercitizens’statementsofmotiveforsupportingagivenpartyorpolicy,whichvaryintermsofthoughtfulnessandpro-sociality.Subjectsexposedtomoreadmirableoutgroupmotivesdemonstratedecreasedoutpartyhostility,andincreasedwillingnesstointeractwithandvotefortheoutparty.Themagnitudeoftheseeffectssurpasseseventhatofperceivedattitudinalsimilarity,suggestingaffectivejudgmentsdependnotjustonperceptionsofwhattheoutgroupwants,butalsowhytheywantit.Thesefindingssuggestanewapproachtowardsattenuatingaffectivepolarization,butalsohighlightthedifficultyofchangingcitizens’partisanattributions.Acknowledgments:IwouldliketothankGabrielLenz,LauraStoker,JackCitrin,RachelBernhard,MerrillShanks,RobVanHouweling,AndrewMcCall,MichaelDougal,JakeGrumbachandJoshKallafortheircommentsandsuggestions.EarlierversionsofthispaperwerepresentedattheResearchWorkshopinAmericanPoliticsatUniversityofCaliforniain2018,andatthe2017meetingsoftheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation,WesternPoliticalScienceAssociation,andInternationalSocietyofPoliticalPsychology.Ithankallparticipantsintheseforumsfortheirfeedback.Anyerrorsaremyown.
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"Neverattributetomalicethatwhichisadequatelyexplainedbystupidity"-Hanlon'sRazor
"Peopleareevil.Wealsoliveinastupidsociety."-Anonymoussurveyrespondent
Overthepastseveraldecades,politicalpolarizationintheUnitedStateshasbecomea
focalpointofacademicandsocietalconcern.Whilescholarsagreethatideologicaland/or
partisanpolarizationoccuramongelites(PooleandRosenthal1984;Hetherington2001;
McCartyPooleandRosenthal2016),theydisagreeovertheextenttowhichmasseshave
polarized;someclaimthattheyhave(AbramowitzandSaunders2008;NivolaandBrady2008;
BafumiandShapiro2009;Abramowitz2010),whileothersfindlackingevidence(Fiorinaand
Abrams2008;BaldassarriandGelman2008),arguingthatpeoplehavenotbecomeextremeor
constrainedintheirviews,butratherbettersortedideologicallyintothecorrectparties.Whether
ornotcitizensaregrowingapartideologically,theyarecertainlypolarizingintermsofaffect.
Partisansincreasinglythinkofeachothernegatively,shunclosetiestooneanother,andoccupy
separatesocialandpoliticalrealities(Iyengar,SoodandLelkes2012;IyengarandWestwood
2015;Mason2015;Lelkes2016).
ThedynamicsofthisincreasedoutgrouphostilityinAmericanpoliticsarenotyetwell
understood.Politicalscientistshavesuggestedanumberofplausiblecauses,thoughallface
empiricalortheoreticalchallenges.First,increasinglyextremepolicypreferenceswithinthe
DemocraticandRepublicanpartiesmaydriveeachsidetogreaterdislikeoftheother(Rogowski
andSutherland2016;WebsterandAbramowitz2017).Whileplausible,thisviewremainsat
oddswiththeaforementionedscholarshiparguingthatthepublichasnotpolarizedinitsviews,
especiallygiventhatalargeshareofthepubliclacksattitudinalstabilityandbasicknowledgeof
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partypositionsonevenhigh-salienceissues(Freeder,LenzandTurney2018).Someresearchers
haveevenfoundthatmediacoverageofpolarizationattenuatespolicyextremitywhile
neverthelessincreasingpartisanoutgrouphostility(LevenduskyandMalhotra2016),suggesting
atleastthatthelatterisnotasimple,exclusivefunctionoftheformer.
Second,affectivepolarizationmayresultfromexposuretoahostile,partisanmedia—
whencitizenswitnesselitepoliticalcommunication,theyadopttheapparentnormsofincivility
thatoperatebetweenbickeringpundits(BerryandSobieraj2011;Levendusky2013;Mutz2015).
Again,whileplausible,somestudieshavefoundthatpartisanmediaexposuredoesnotincrease
polarization(Prior2013),andmaysometimesactuallyexposepartisanstothemorereasonable
viewsoftheotherside(Mutz2007).Furthermore,onlyasmallfractionofthepublicregularly
payscloseattentiontopartisanmedia,andthosewhodolikelyhavealreadyformedstrong
opinionsofthoseintheotherpartybeforeviewing.
Third,affectivepolarizationmayarisefrombeliefsthattheoutgroupdiffersintermsof
salientnon-politicalbehaviorsandcharacteristics,suchasrace,sexualorientation,and
occupation.AsaresultofsomecombinationofgrowingsocialalienationbetweenDemocrats
andRepublicans(AbramowitzandWebster2009;Mason2016),atendencyformanypeopleto
perceivepoliticalconflictprimarilyasgroup-based(Converse1964;GrossmanandHopkins
2016),andcognitivebiases,partisansincreasinglyassume(oftencorrectly,sometimesnot)that
theothersidelooks,acts,andlivesverydifferentlyfromthemandtheirco-partisans(Ahlerand
Sood2018).Thatsaid,opportunitiesforpartisaninteractionstillexist;usingsocialmedia
networkssuchasFacebookandTwitterincreasestheoddsofobservingandinteractingwith
membersofpoliticaloutgroups(WojcieszakandMutz,2009).Despiteconcernsaboutnetwork
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homophilyandtheformationofechochambers,scholarsdisagreeovertheextenttowhich
politicalpruningofone'ssocialnetworkactuallyoccurs.
Thispaperadvancesanunder-examined,complementaryaccountforaffective
polarization—negativemotiveattribution.Scholarshiptendstofocusoninter-partisan
perceptionsofwhotheotherparty’smembersare,andwhattheywant;lessexploredisthe
impactofperceptionsofwhytheywantwhattheywant.Theimportantofthelattercanbe
illustratedinashortvignetteinvolvingtwocitizens:thefirststronglydisagreeswithyouona
matterofpolicybutmakescleartheirpositionarisesfromthesamefundamental,value-laden
concernsthatyoursdoes—harmreduction,justice,fairness,andsoon.Anydisagreementarises
thereforeentirelyfromdifferencesoverhowtoachievethosegoals.Thesecondpersonhappens
toholdthesamepolicypositionasyou,butadmitsthattheydosobecausetheymaterially
benefitfromthatoutcomedespiteacknowledgingitsdetrimentalimpactonothers,orbecausethe
policyharmsademographicgrouptowardswhichtheyareprejudiced.Towardswhichindividual
wouldyoufeelmorewarmly?Thoughdebatable,thisvignetteclarifiesthataffectisnotpurelya
functionofcongruenceonpolicypreferences,butalsothequalityofone’sintentions.Whenwe
encounterdisagreement,wemaybelievethatoutgroupmembersneverthelesspossessgood
intentions,butthatwesimplydisagreeoverhowtobestrealizethem.Alternatively,wemay
believetheyaremotivatedbytherepugnantandindefensible—stupidity,madness,ignorance,
greed,bigotry,cruelty,hungerforpower,andsoon.Citizensoftheformerinclinationmayseea
complicatedbutfunctioningdemocracyamongstdiversecountrymenwithacommongoal,while
thosewhobelievethelattermayperceivemanyoftheircompatriotsasalienandunrecognizable.
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IfAmericansincreasinglybelievethelatter,ourdemocracyconstitutesatenseandincreasingly
untenablearrangementbetweentribesthatsharelittletobindthem,morallyandsocially.
Dopeopletendtomakenegativeattributionsaboutpoliticaloutgroups?Ifso,dothese
attributionshaveacausalimpactonoutgroupaffectindependentfromotherstudiedcausal
variables?Howmuchandwhatkindsofevidenceofpositiveoutgroupmotivesisnecessaryto
haveanoticeableimpactonoutgroupaffect?Thethreestudiesshowninthispaperprovide
evidencethatspeakstothesequestions.Inthefirst,usingopen-endedresponses,respondents
revealtheirattributionsaboutthepeoplewithwhomtheydisagreepolitically,demonstratingthat
abouthalfofpoliticaloutgroupattributionsarenegative.Inthesecond,subjectsareexposedtoa
seriesofmotivestatementsofvaryingqualitybythosewithwhomtheydisagree;asthequality
ofmotivesshownimproves,sodoesoutgroupaffect,toadegreesurpassingeventheeffectof
perceivedattitudinalsimilaritybetweenthegroups.Inthethird,subjectsseeaseriesofmotive
statementsasbefore,buttheconsistencyofpositivemotivestatementsisvariedsystematically.
Theresultsdemonstratethatimprovingoutgroupattributionscanimproveoutgroupaffect,but
thatmotivatedreasoningmakessuchupdatingunlikelyinallbutthemostextremeofconditions.
Takentogether,thesestudiesdemonstratetheimportanceofunderstandingtheroleofattribution
inexacerbatingoutgrouphostilities,andhighlightanothermeansbywhichscholars,journalists
andpublicpolicyadvocatesmayseektoreduceaffectivepolarization.
TheoryandDesign
Theexistingliteratureinpsychologyandpoliticalsciencesuggeststhatpeoplearelikely
tomakenegativeassessmentsofoutgrouptraits,andnegativeattributionsaboutoutgroup
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behavior.Thisisgenerallytrueaboutassessmentsofallothers,aspeopletendtoassumethey
themselvesmakerationaldecisions,whileotherssuffercognitivebiases,asdescribedinworkon
naiverealism(Wardetal.1997;Pronin,LinandRoss2002;Pronin,GilovichandRoss2004).
Thefundamentalattributionerrorcausespeopletooverlyrelyoninternalfactorslikepersonality
orself-interest(Ross1977;MillerandRatner1998)asexplanationsforothers’behavior(Heider
1944;Aronson2003).Theultimateattributionerrordescribesthispracticeatthegrouplevel
(Pettigrew1979),especiallywhensocialstatusisatstake(TajfelandTurner2004;Brewerand
Brown1998).Becausepeoplehaveavestedinterestinmaintainingthesuperiorityofthe
ingroup,theyalsoengageinmotivatedreasoningtorejectanyevidenceofstatusthreats(Lord,
RossandLepper1979;Kunda1990;Westenetal.2006).Scholarshavefoundevidenceof
negativemotiveattributioningroupconflictgenerally(Reederetal.2002;Kenworthyand
Miller2002;Reederetal.2004;WaytzYoungandGinges2014)andforspecificpoliticalissues
suchaswar(Reederetal.2005),affirmativeaction(Sherman,NelsonandRoss2003),abortion
(Robinsonetal.1995),andracialinequality(Knight1998).
Inamodelforunderstandinghowaffectivepolarizationisgenerated,motiveattribution
shouldbeconceivedofasafeedbackmechanism,likelyservingasbothitscauseandeffect.That
is,peoplemightfirstnegativelyassesssomeone,thenformnegativeattributionsaboutthemasa
result(e.g.wethinkpoorlyofsomeoneandthenassumetheywanttoharmothers).
Alternatively,onemayfirstassumetheworstaboutsomeone'sintentions,thenevaluatethem
accordingly(e.g.someonewantstoharmothers—therefore,wethinkpoorlyofthem).Negative
motiveattributionthereforeisbothacauseandconsequenceofoutgrouphostility:motivated
reasoningaboutout-partisansencouragesout-partisanstereotyping,whichinturnleadsto
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increasedhostility,whichincentivizesfurtherstereotyping,andsoon.Theliteratureon
ethnocentrismmakesclearthatasingroup-outgroupdynamicsformandstrengthen,group
membersincreaseoutgroupstereotyping,bothasameansbywhichtoenlargethesocialdistance
betweenthetwogroups,aswellasanexcusefordismissinganyadmirableorsympathetic
qualitieswhichtheymaypossess.Oncepartisanpolarizationbegins,negativemotiveattribution
mayprovidepartisanswithaneasywayto"other"theoutgroup.Suchafeedbackloopleads
citizenstoperceivethemselvesasincreasinglysurroundedbymonsters.Negativemotive
attributionisnotnecessarilythe‘firstmover'ofaffectivepolarization,butratheramajorpartof
theiterativedynamicsthatpropelthegrowthinoutgrouphostility.Combinedwithother
explanationsforaffectivepolarization,negativemotiveattributionservesasaforcemultiplierfor
existingoutgrouphostilities.
Ifmotiveattributionisakeycomponentofaffectivepolarization,whatwouldexplainthe
increaseinnegativeattributionsovertime?Onepossibleexplanationisthechangingnatureof
masspoliticaldiscussion.Justdecadesago,politicaldiscussionsbetweendifferingpartisanswere
rarer,andmorelikelytotakeplaceamongstfriendsorfamily,ifatall,givensocietalperceptions
ofpoliticalconversationastabooordangerous.Indeliberationswithclosecompany,normsof
civilityandgood-faithassumptionoperate;suchindividualsostensiblyalreadylikeoneanother,
andexpectrepeatedinteractioninthefuture.However,inthepresentday,socialmediahas
significantlyincreasedthelikelihoodofobservingthepoliticalcommunicationsfromstrangers,
thoseforwhomthesamenormsofcivilitylikelydonothold.Underthecloakofanonymity,
peoplelacktheincentivetotreateachotherrespectfullyandtosuppressopenhostility.Worse
still,thosewhoactwithhostilityarealsomorelikelytospeaktheirmind,leadingtotheir
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overrepresentation.Therefore,comparedtopastenvironmentsforassociative,behavioraland
sociallearningaboutoutgroups,themodernpartisanismuchmorelikelytoencounterexamples
ofanti-socialandcruelbehavior.Whilethisaccountofrisingnegativeattributionisplausible,
giventhepriorlackofpoliticalscienceattentiontomotiveattribution,thisaccountcannoteasily
betested,asmajorsurveyshavefailedtoprobecitizens’politicalattributions.
Mostresearchonaffectivepolarizationfocusesexclusivelyonpartisanaffect,butin
theseexperiments,Ialsostudyattributionsandaffectiveevaluationsofissueoutgroups,orthose
whomwedisagreewithonspecificpoliticalissues.Affectbetweenthosewhodisagreeover
policyhasbeenlargelyignoredbypoliticalscientists.Thisisperhapsjustifiedgiventhatpartisan
identificationiscommon,stable,andstronglylinkedtokeypoliticalbehaviorslikevotingand
cuetaking(Green,PalmquistandSchickler2004).Ontheotherhand,issueattitudestendtobe
lesscommon,relativelymoreunstableovertime,andplayalimitedroleinvotechoicewhen
controllingforotherkeyvariables.Still,therearegoodreasonsforstudyingissue-basedaffect.
Partisanhostilitydoesnotoccurinavacuum,butinthecontextofwhateverpartisanconflictis
mostsalientatanygivenmoment.Issuedisagreementsarenexuspointsatwhichpolitical
differencesmostclearlymanifestthemselves.Injustthepastyear,anumberofpolicydisputes
havegeneratedintensepublicinterestandanger—healthcare,illegalimmigration,transgender
rights,guncontrol,responsestopolicebrutality,andsoon.Forpartisans,iftheyknowwherethe
partiesstandontheissues,thenattributionsaboutissuepreferencesshouldimpactoutparty
evaluations.Ontheotherhand,trueindependents,orthosewhodonotknowwheretheparties
stand,mayevincelittlepartisanhostility,butstillpossessanimosityforthoseontheothersideof
thatissue.Assuch,issue-basedaffectivepolarizationshouldnotbeignored.
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Ifnegativeattributionshelptoexplainaffectivepolarization,thenitmustfirstbe
demonstratedthatcitizenstodaydoinfactcommonlytendtomakenegativeattributionsabout
thebehaviorsandattitudesofpoliticaloutgroups.Thefirststudypresentedinthispaperrelies
uponacombinationofclosedandopen-endedquestionstogetabettersenseofthelandscapeof
attributionspeopletendtomakeabouttheotherside.Undergraduateresearcherslatercodethese
responsesforvalenceandcontent.
Thesecondtwostudiesusesurveyexperimentstorequirethenecessaryexogenous
variationtodeterminewhetheranyrelationshipbetweennegativemotiveattributionoutgroup
hostilityisactuallycausal.Aresearchdesignreliantuponobservationaldata—forinstance,
askingrespondentsabouttheiroutgroupattributionsandaffect,thenlookingattherelationship
betweenthetwo—wouldbeflawedforatleasttworeasons.First,anyapparentrelationship
betweenattributionandaffectmightactuallyresultfromanomittedvariable.Forinstance,it
maybethatpeoplewithmoreextremeviewsholdmorenegativemotivebeliefs,andthatsome
formofattitudinalorideologicalextremityisreallywhatdrivestherelationshipwithaffect.
Evenifoneweretocontrolforthesefactors,someunobservedcharacteristiccouldstillbiasthe
effectestimate.Second,evenifacausalrelationshipexistsbetweenaffectandmotiveattribution,
muchofwhatwouldbepickedupmightbeinthewrongcausaldirection;indeed,itisquite
likelythatincreasedoutgrouphostilityleadstomorenegativeattributions.Thesolutiontoboth
oftheseproblemsisexogenousmanipulationofattributionsviaexperimentaltreatment.
Intwoexperiments,subjectsareshownaseriesofstatementssaidtobewrittenbyother,
realcitizens,inwhichtheyexplaintheirpoliticalpreferences.Thesestatementsarenotreal,but
arebasedheavilyonthoseofferedbyrespondentsfrompilotstudies.Ifcitizenslearnaboutthe
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motivesoftheothersidebyobservingmassoutgroupcommunications,thenexposuretothese
profilesshouldpromptthemtoupdatetheirattributions,atleasttemporarily.Inturn,improving
outgroupattributionswilldecreaseoutgrouphostility.
HowCommonAreNegativeOutgroupAttributionsinPolitics?
Docitizensoftenmakenegativeattributionsaboutpoliticaloutgroups?Ifsuchbeliefsare
rare,thenmotiveattributionlikelydoesnotcontributesignificantlytoaffectivepolarization.The
followingstudyusesacombinationofclosedandopen-endedsurveyquestionstorevealwhat
motivescitizensattributetoothers’politicalattitudesandbehaviors.
Fortheopen-endedresponseitem,respondentswereaskedtothinkaboutwhatmotivates
someonetotakeaparticularposition,andthenwritedownanythingthatcomestomind.Two
undergraduateresearchassistantsandIthencodedtheopen-endedresponsesintothreegeneral
motivecategories:bad,good,orambiguous.Responsesthatwereeitheroff-topicor
unintelligible,constitutinglessthan10%ofthesample,wereremovedfromanalysis.We
countedresponsesascontainingbadmotiveifwhatsomeonesaidwasunambiguouslynegative.
Mostothermotivementionswerecountedasgood.Asmallsubsetofresponsesweretoo
ambiguoustoascertaintheirvalence.Aresponsecouldcontainmultiplemotives(potentially
bothgoodandbad),thoughsuchresponsesconstitutedasmallportion(3-9%ofrespondentswho
offeredamotive)ofthesample.Incasesinwhichallthreecodersdisagreedoveracoding,I
droptheresponsefromanalysis.Disagreementsinwhichtwoofthethreecoderswerein
agreementwerecodedinfavorofthemajority.
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Fortheclosedresponseitems,respondentswerepresentedwithalistofpotentialmotives
fortakingagivenpoliticalpositionandaskedtoassesswhatpercentageofpeoplewhoholdthat
positiondosoprimarilyforeachreason(allpercentagessumto100).Themotivespresented
wereacombinationofbad(e.g.ignorance,bigotry,selfishness)andgood(e.g.values,morals,
empiricalevidence).Ithensummedpercentagesacrossallbadmotivestogetthepercentageof
individualstowhomanybadmotivewasattributed.
Eachmethodhasitsadvantagesanddrawbacks.Theopen-responsequestionallows
respondentstoanswerastheywishwithoutoutsideprompting,andthemeasureitselfreflects
whatarespondentseesasthetypicaloutgroupmember.Open-endedresponsesallowforcoding
intofurthersubcategories,makingitmucheasiertocapturethevarietyofmotivesattributed.
However,peoplemighttendtofocusonparticularlybadexamplesofoutgroupmembers,while
stillbelievingmosttobepositivelymotivated.Iftrue,thismeasuremightnotrevealthat.The
closedresponsesdoallowustoassessthetotalpercentageofoutgroupmembersbelievedtobe
negativelymotivated.Unfortunately,themotiveoptionsprovidedonthelistwerelimitedtoa
smallset,sorespondentsmayhavefoundthemotivelistinexhaustive.Also,thetaskofsumming
percentagesmayconfusesomerespondents.
Giventhevarietyofpotentialsitesforgroupconflictinpolitics,Iassessedmotive
attributioninthreebroaddomains:policyissues,partisanidentity,andvoteintent.Inthecaseof
policyissues,tocapturevariationacrossthelargenumberofpoliticalconflicts,Iusedasetof
nineissues(taxes,healthcare,guncontrol,gaymarriage,immigration,affirmativeaction,global
warming,Israel/Palestine,andflagburning)thatvaryinpublicsalience,mediacoverage,and
issuetype.ThegroupsusedintheotherdomainsareDemocrats/RepublicansandClinton/Trump
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voters.Furthermore,todemonstratethatthenatureofmotiveattributiondependsonwho’sbeing
evaluated,Iconductseparateanalysesforingroup,outgroup,andunaffiliatedjudgments.
Negativemotiveattributionshouldoccurforoutgroupsfarmorethantheothers.
ThisstudywasfieldedacrossthreeseparatesurveysbetweenDecember2015andJune
2017,eachofwhichfocusedonadifferenttypeofpoliticaloutgroup(disagreementsover
policies,candidates,andpartiesrespectively).Inthefirstsurvey(December2015),1811
respondentsinasampleprovidedbySurveySamplingInternationalansweredaseriesof
questionsonthreerandomlyselectedpoliticalissuesfromthefullsetofnine.Foreachissue,
respondentssawabriefdescriptionoftheissueconflict,thenindicatedtheirissueattitudeona
sevenpointscale(plus"don'tknow").Theythensawtheopen-responsequestion.Foroneofthe
threeissues,respondentswereaskedtospeculateonthemotivesofotherswhoagreewiththem,
ortheirown.Fortheothertwoissues,theyattributedmotivestothosewhodisagreewiththem.
Individualswhotooknopositionwereaskedabouttheirviewsofthoseonbothsidesofthe
issue,separately.Therespondentsinthisstudydidnotseetheclosedresponsequestion.
ThesecondsurveywasfieldedinNovember2016,justbeforetheelection,using879
respondentsrecruitedfromMechanicalTurk.Inthissurvey,respondentsindicatedifthey
plannedtovoteintheupcomingelectionand,ifso,forwhichcandidatetheyplannedtovote.
Then,eachpersonsawbothopen-endedandclosedresponsequestionsaboutthemotivesof
TrumpandClintonvoters.ThethirdsurveytookplaceinFebruary2017with711Mechanical
Turkrespondents.Here,respondentsplacedthemselvesona7-pointpartisanscaleatthe
beginning,thencompletedboththeopenandclosedquestionsforboththeirpartisaningroupand
outgroup.Toavoidcoloringresponses,open-endedquestionsalwaysprecedeclosedquestions.
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Figure1:FrequencyofNegativeAttributionsAcrossSurveysParticipants
Note:Thenumberofobservationsforeachsurvey(Issues,Parties,Voting)aboveisn=1811,n=879,andn=711,respectively.95%confidenceintervalsarenotshown,butdifferencesarehighlysignificant(p<0.001).The"Closed,Issues"panelisblankassubjectsintheIssuesstudywerenotaskedclosed
Theabovefigureshowsthefrequencyofnegativeattributionstakenacrossallthree
surveys.TheY-axisdisplaysthepercentofresponsesinagivencategorythatciteatleastone
negativemotivefortheotherside.Resultsareseparatedbysurvey,andthereforewhether
respondentswereevaluatingpeoplewhodisagreedwiththemonpolicy,candidate,andparty
preferences.Respondentsineachsurveyarethengroupedbywhethertheywereevaluatingtheir
side,theotherside,orwereunattachedandevaluatingeitherside.
Severalfindingsstandout.First,acrossalldomains,respondentsalmostuniversally
perceivetheiringrouppositively,thoughlesssointhecaseoffellowpartisans,asnegative
attributionsrarelyriseabove10%.Second,aspredicted,peoplecommonlyattributenegative
motivestotheoutgroup.Generally,abouthalfofalloutgroupassessmentsrunnegative(open
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responses),andhalfoftheoutgroupisthoughtofasprimarilynegativelymotivated(closed
responses).Openassessmentsofvoteroutgroupsconstitutethesoleexception.Infact,inthis
case,theunaffiliatedopenresponsesweremorenegativethantheoutgroupassessments—
unsurprising,perhaps,as"unaffiliated"herereferstothosethirdpartyvoters.Theirlackof
affiliationlikelyresultsfromdislikeratherthandisinterest.
Whiletherespondentsinthesestudiestendedtobesomewhatunrepresentativeofthe
publicatlarge,thisdoesnotinvalidatethesefindings.Women,peopleundertheageof35,
Democratsandthecollege-educatedwereallquiteabitoverrepresentedinthesesubjectpools.
Thesegroups,however,werealsoeitherequallyorlesslikelytoholdnegativemotivebeliefs
relativetotheircounterparts—men,Republicans,andthelowereducatedwereallmorelikely
tohavenegativebeliefs.Therefore,totheextentthatthisstudyisunrepresentative,itislikely
underestimatingthedegreetowhichpeoplemakenegativeoutgroupattributionsinpolitics.
Experiment1a:HowMuchDoAttributionsImpactAffectiveEvaluations?
Thepreviousstudydemonstratesthatnegativeattributionsarecommon,butdonegative
attributionsaboutoutpartypreferencesandidentitiessignificantlyimpactpeople’soutparty
affect?Thisexperimentteststhispossibilitybyexposingrespondentstoaseriesofstatements
madebyotherpeople,eachcontainingadescriptionofapolicyattitudeorpartisanpreference,
andabriefexplanationforwhytheyholdthatview.Ifattributionisapartialdeterminantof
affect,respondentswhoareexposedtohigherqualitymotivesshouldindicatelesshostilitytothe
associatedgroupsinfollowupquestions.Ifthiseffectisnotjustexistentbutalsomeaningful,its
magnitudinalimpactshouldbecomparabletothatofattitudinalsimilarity,whichhaslongbeen
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demonstratedtoimpactpartisanaffect,andisconsideredoneofitskeydeterminants.Asinthe
earliervignette,ifattributionmatters,wemayprefersomeonewithwhomwedisagreeonpolicy
butwhosereasoningwerespectoversomeonewithwhomweagree,butwhosemotivesare
suspect.
InJune2017,594subjectswererecruitedfromMechanicalTurktotakeashortopinion
survey.Subjectsbeganbyindicatingtheirpartisanaffiliationandtheirattitudesonfourissues
(guncontrol,immigration,healthcare,environmentalprotection)onaseven-pointLikertscale.
Then,subjectswereshownthemabriefseriesofprofilesofotherindividualswho,theywere
told,hadpreviouslybeenaskedasimilarsetofattitudinalquestions.Eachprofilecontainsonlya
shortquotefromafictionalparticipantindicatingtheirpositiononanissue(theirplacementon
theseven-pointscale,plusabriefexplanationofwhattheyinterpretthatscaleplacementtomean
intermsofsubstantivepolicy),andtheirself-statedreasonforthatpreference.Subjectsthen
expressedtheirfeelingstowardsthisindividualusinga9-pointscale.Eachsubjectsawten
profiles:eightprofilesaboutissueattitudes(onefromeachsideofeachofthefourissues),and
twoprofilesindicatingpartisanpreference(i.e.strengthofpartisanidentityandstatedreasonfor
preferringthatparty).Theorderofthesetopicswasrandomized.Asmallsubsetofsubjects
(n=85)participatedinacontrolconditionwheretheyalsosawtenprofiles,butwithoutany
informationaboutmotive.
Thesurveyrandomizedthestrengthoftheattitudeandthequalityofthemotive
displayedineachprofile.Anattitudecouldtakeononeofthreelevelsofextremity(e.g.slightly,
somewhat,andstronglyopposeorsupport).Toensureagivenscalepointwasinterpreted
similarlyacrosssubjects,eachattitudeincludesabriefexplanationofwhatthepersoninthe
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profilebelievesthatscalepointtosubstantivelymeanforthatissue.Imeasureattitudinal
distancebetweenthesubjectandtheprofileastheabsolutevalueofthesubjectandprofilescale
positions(suchthatmeasureruns0-6,with0representingfullagreementbetweenrespondent
andtheexampleindividual,and6indicatingthattheyareonoppositeendsofthepolicyscale).
Asformotive,subjectsseeoneofsixexplanationsoneachprofile,halfpositive,half
negative.Eachstatement,whilenotoriginatingfromotheractualsubjects,drawsheavilyon
open-endedresponsesfromrealpeoplefieldedduringpreviousstudies(seeSISection3.4for
details).Statementsweredesignedtoreflectarangeofmotivetypesbothnegative(greed,
ignorance,bigotry,laziness,etc)andpositive(fairness,concernforothers,desireforliberty,etc).
Toconfirmthatrespondentsviewedmotivestatementsaspositively/negativelyasintended,I
fieldedaseparatestudyusing450MechanicalTurkrespondents,whowereaskedtoratethe
motivesforreasonabilityona9-pointscale,where1isperfectlyreasonableand9completely
unreasonable.Motivequalityinthisstudyisthereforemeasuredastheaverageoftheseratings.
Becauseingroupandoutgroupsjudgemotivequalitydifferently,thescoresoneachprofile
reflectaveragesfromone’singrouponly.
Table1belowshowsasampleofpositionsandmotivesthatmightbeshownineach
profile.Inthiscase,thesearethepositionsandmotivesusedfortheguncontrolprofiles.PanelA
showsthewordingthataccompanieseachposition,whilePanelBdoesthesameformotives.
PanelBalsoshowstheaveragemotivequalityratingforeachexample(loweraverages
correspondtobetterpreferredmotives).PanelCshowsexamplesoftheprofilesrespondents
actuallysee.Forthefullsetofpositionsandmotivesacrosstopics,seeSISections1.2and1.3.
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Table1:SamplePositionsandMotivationsPanelA:Positions
PanelB:Motivations
PanelC:ExampleProfiles
Note:Only“guncontrol”motivesandpositionsarelistedabove.Forafullsetofmotives/positionsacrossallissues,seeSISection1.InPanelB,“MotivationalQuality”referstotheaverageratingsofeachmotivebyaseparatesubjectpool.Thescoresrangefrom1-9,where9istheleastreasonable.
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Figure2:RelativeAffectiveImpactofMotiveBeliefsPanelA:EffectofMotiveQualitybyIssueDistance
Note:Confidenceintervalsare95%.Standarderrorsareclusteredbyindividualrespondent.Eachpointcorrespondstotheaverageratingacrossprofilesatthatlevelofdistance.N=5276.
PanelB:EffectofMotiveQualitybyObjectofJudgment
Note:Eachpointrepresentsanevaluationofaprofile,basedonthequalityofthemotiveassignedinthatprofile.Theratingonthey-axisrepresentsresidualaffectaftercontrollingforpositiondistance.Ingroupjudgmentsreflectevaluationsofthoseonthesameside,andOutgroupoftheother.Neutraljudgmentsreflectevaluationsbysubjectswhowereuncommitted.TheTotalpanelshowsthepooledresults.N=5276.
18
Affectdoesindeedappearstronglyinfluencedbymotivebeliefs.Figure2aaboveshows
themeanprofileratingofthoseinthecontrolgroupcomparedtothosewhosawthehighestand
lowestratedmotivationsforagivenitem,ateachpossiblelevelofissuepositiondistance.For
example,whensubjectssawsomeonewhosepositiondifferedfromtheirsbyadistanceof4ona
7-pointscale(e.g.subjectswhomoderatelyagreeratingsomeonewhomoderatelydisagrees),
theiroutgroupaffectrelativetoacontrolsubjectincreasesordecreasesonaveragebyabout15%
ofthescalelength,dependingonifthemotivetheyseeispositiveornegative.Thedifference
betweenthehighestandlowestratedmotives,onaverage,isaboutathirdtherangeoftheentire
scale,orthedifferencebetweenclearlikeandcleardislike.Itshouldbenotedthatsubjects
narrowlypreferindividualstheystronglydisagreedwithbuthadgoodmotivestothosewhothey
agreedwithbuthadbadmotives,furthersuggestingtheimportanceofattributionforaffect.The
plotalsoindicatestherearesomefloorandceilingeffects;highly-ratedmotivesdonotappearto
improveaffecttowardsthosewithwhomwestronglyagree,andpoorly-rateddonotfurther
loweritforthosewithwhomwestronglydisagree.Thisisconsistentwithpeopleassumingthose
withwhomtheyagreetobethoughtful,orthosewhodonottobeboorish.
Notonlydoesmotivequalitymatterforoutgroupjudgmentsatalllevelsofdisagreement,
butalsoforingroupandneutraljudgments.Figure2bplotsmotivequalityagainstresidualaffect
ratings(aftercontrollingforpositiondistance)bytypeofgroupjudgment.Thebottom-right
panelshowsalldatacombined.Thedashedlinerepresentsakernel-weightedlocalpolynomial
regression,andeachpointrepresentsasingleevaluation.Inallcases,affectdeclinesasmotive
qualityworsens,thoughsomewhatlessforthosewhotakepositionsatthemiddleofthescale.
19
Figure3:MotiveQualityImpactbyPositionDistance
Note:Confidenceintervalsare95%.Standarderrorsareclusteredattheleveloftheindividualrespondent.Ingroupjudgmentsreflectsubjectevaluationsofthoseonthesameside,andOutgroupoftheother.Neutraljudgmentsreflectevaluationsbysubjectswhoplacedthemselvesatthemidpointofascale.
Theaffectiveimpactofmotivationequalsorsurpassesthatofposition.Figure3shows
theresultsofastandardOLSregressionofaffectonbothissuepositiondistanceandmotive
qualitytreatments,separatelyforthosewhojudgesomeoneontheirside,theotherside,and
neutralpeoplejudgingeitherside.Thebottom-mostpanelshowstheresultsforallsubjectstaken
togetherinawithin-subjects,fixed-effectsregression.Higherabsolutemagnitudesindicate
strongereffects.Thecoefficientonmotivationisseveraltimesthatofposition,regardlessof
whetheroneisjudgingone’sownsideortheotherside.Ofcourse,giventhevarietyof
substantivechoices(i.e.typesofissues,chosenpositionsonthoseissues)thatcouldbemade
differentlyinconstructingbothofthesemeasures,resultsshouldbetakenwithagrainofsalt.
Still,thesescaleswerecreatedtocapturethewholerangeofpositions(e.g.thehealthcarescale
20
goesfromfullgovernmenttakeovertoeliminatingMedicare)andmotivations(e.g.thoughtful
claimsversusopenracism),sotheresultsshouldstillbeinstructive.
Oneadditionalfindingbearsmentioning—therelativeimportanceofpositionand
motivationdependsonone'sinterestintheissueathand(seeSISections1.5and1.6fordetails
andplots).Asinterestdecreases,sodoestheimportanceofpositiondistance,andforthosewith
lowinterest,positiondistancehasnoeffect.However,themagnitudeandsignificanceofmotive
qualityhold,regardlessofextremityorevenpoliticalinterest.Thisdemonstratesboththe
robustnessofmotiveattributionasadeterminantofaffect,andthatimprovingmotivebeliefs
wouldhelpeventhosewhomaynototherwisepayagreatdealofattentionorinteresttopolitics.
Experiment1b:DoAttributionsImpactAffectTowardsPartisanGroups?
Whiletheaboveresultssuggestthatattributionsplayasignificantroleinpolitical
evaluations,thesewereevaluationsofindividuals,notgroups,andthusdonotdirectlydealwith
outgroupaffect.Thisexperimentusesthesamedatasetasthefirst,butwithindependentand
dependentvariablesthatmeasuregroup-levelmotivebeliefsandaffect,respectively.
Inthepreviousexperiment,thekeyindependentvariablewastherandomlyassigned
motivequalityforeachindividualprofile.Theinformationlearnedinthesetenprofilesshould,
takentogether,contributetogroup-levelmotivebeliefs—DemocratsandRepublicanshave
stakedoutclearpositionsoneachissueusedintheseprofiles,sopoliticallyattentiveindividuals
shouldbeabletoattributemotivesforagivenissuepositiontotheassociatedparty.Aseach
profile’smotivequalitywasrandomlyassigned,bychancealone,someindividualssawmore
high-qualitymotivesassociatedwiththepartisanoutgroupthandidothers.Thisvariationis
21
leveragedheretocreatea"motivequalityindex"representingtheaverageofratingsfromeachof
themotivesseenbyanindividual.Ifindividualsapplywhattheyhavecollectivelylearnedfrom
theseindividualstothepartieswithwhichtheirpreferencesareassociated,astheindexscore
improves,soshouldoutpartyaffect.
Afterseeingtheprofiles,andansweringaseriesofdistractionquestions(apolitical
generalknowledgebattery),respondentsindicatedpartisanaffectinseveralways.First,they
providedpartisanfeelingratingsonanine-pointscale.Second,theyspeculatedonhowthey
wouldreacttotheirchildmarryingamemberoftheoppositeparty,aquestionnowfrequently
usedtomeasureoutgrouphostility.Third,toperhapsbettercapturethesentimentsofthosewho
donothave(orplantohave)children,andtofurthergaugewillingnesstosociallyinteractwith
theotherside,subjectswerealsoaskedaquestionaboutdatingpreferences.Thequestionsasks
themtosupposetheyseeaprofileonadatingserviceforsomeonewhoinitiallyintereststhem,
butaffiliateswiththeoutparty.Subjectsthenindicatehowtheywouldreacttothisinformation
ona5-pointscale,where1equalsincreasedinterest,and5atotalunwillingnesstocontactthem
(a“dealbreaker”).Ialsouseadummythatequals1forthedealbreaker,and0otherwise.
Table2:AverageOutgroupMotiveQuality
Note:***p<0.01,**p<0.05.Allvariablesrecoded0-1.Rows1-3reflectstandardOLSregression;Row4useslogisticregression.Outgroupcolumnsuseonlyoutgroupratings,whiletheIngroup-Outgroupcolumnsuseingroupratingsminusoutgroupratings.
22
Figure4:AffectIndexbyOutgroupMotiveQuality
Note:Confidenceintervalis95%.Eachpointrepresentsasinglesubject’sevaluationoftheoutparty.They-axisshowsanindexthatcombinesthethreeaforementionedmeasuresofaffect(partisanfeeling,marriageindicator,andwillingnesstodate).
Table2abovereportstheresultsofaseriesofsimplebivariateOLSregressionsofthese
dependentvariablesonthemotivequalityindex.Eachrowcorrespondstoadifferentdependent
variablechosenfromthefouraforementionedaffectmeasures.The“outgroup”columnusesonly
ratingsofoutgroups,whilethe“ingroup-outgroup”columntakesthedifferencebetweeningroup
andoutgroupratings.Eachrowshowsthattheeffectofmotivequalityissignificantregardlessof
specification.Forinstance,inrow1,movingfromthelowesttohighestassignedmotivequality
improvesaffectbyalittlemorethanafifthofthescale.Forthedealbreakerresults(row4),
movingfromthebottomtothetopofthemotivequalityindexcorrespondstoabouta33%
decreaseinthelikelihoodofselectingthedealbreakeroption.Overall,subjectsappeartohave
learnedfromtheprofilesandupdatedtheirbeliefsaboutoutgroupmotives.Figure4above
summarizestheresultsbyshowingtherelationshipbetweenthemotivequalityindexandan
indexofthethreeaffectivemeasures(asimpleaverageacrossallthree).Thosewhosawabetter
23
motivesetindicatedgreaterwarmthtowardstheoutparty,andincreasedwillingnesstointeract
withitsmembers.Thestrengthofthiseffectisremarkablegiventhatrespondentswereleftto
drawconclusionsaboutpartiesfromasetofprofilesthatfocusedprimarilyonissuepositions.
Experiment2:WhatDoesItTakeForPeopleToUpdateTheirAttributions?
AlthoughExperiment1btestswhetheroutgroupmotiveattributioncausallyimpacts
outgroupaffect,itdoessousingonlyahandfulofexamplesacrossseveralissues.Onemotive
perissueseemslikeaninadequatedraw,especiallygiventhatissuemotiveswon’tcontributeto
partisanfeelingunlessrespondentsknowwherethepartystandsonthatissue,whichisoftennot
thecase.Choosingasingletopic(issuepreferenceorpartyaffiliation)andprovidingrespondents
withmotiveexamplesfromalargenumberofindividualsmaybetterapproximatereal-life
situations–outpartybehaviorsandattitudesaremostlikelytobeencounteredinthediscussion
ofasingletopicorevent,suchasonsocialmedia.
Anotherexperimentalsoprovidestheopportunitytobetterunderstandhowpeople
interpretdirectevidenceofoutgroupmotives.Forinstance,whatweknowabout
ingroup-outgroupdynamicssuggestsmotivebeliefswillbedifficulttocorrect.Peoplearelikely
toacceptpositiveinformationaboutingroups,ornegativeinformationaboutoutgroups,asthese
revelationseasilyaccordwithpreexistingbeliefs.However,whengivenevidenceoutof
alignmentwithone’spriors(i.e.evidenceofgoodmotivesforoutgroups,andviceversa),
rejectionofthisnewinformationbecomesmuchlikelier.Anindividualmayoverlookbad
ingroupbehaviorasthatof"afewbadapples",butseizeuponanyillintentfromtheoutgroupas
24
typical.Iftrue,tosuccessfullychangeoutgroupattributions,wemayneedtostackthedeckin
favoroftheoutgroup—thatis,showsubjectsuniformpositivityintheexamplestheysee.
Thissecondexperimentisthereforedesignedtoimproveexperimentalrealismandto
bettertestthefactorsthatinfluencewhetherpeopleapplywhattheylearnaboutgroupmembers
tothegroupasawhole.Whiletheindependentanddependentvariablesremainthesameasin
thefirstexperiment,thetreatmentprotocolischanged.Subjectsareexposedtoaseriesofmotive
profiles,asbefore,butnowtheseprofilesalladdressasingletopic,andthepercentageof
profilescontaininggoodorbadmotiveinformationissystematicallyvariedacrossparticipants.
ThissecondexperimentwasconductedinJune2017,using3,266participantson
MechanicalTurk.Toreducepotentialdemandeffects,recruitmentmaterialsstatedthatsubjects
wouldparticipateinaratingtaskthatwouldlaterbeusedtocreateatrainingsetformachine
learning—notuntilthedebriefingattheendwererespondentstoldtheyweretakingpartinan
academicsurvey.Asbefore,subjectssawmultipleprofilescontainingbothaposition(only"for"
or"against,"–tomaintainexperimentalpower,strengthofpositioninnotvariedinthis
experiment)andamotiveforthatposition.Foreachprofile,subjectswereaskedtocategorize
themotivestatementusingapresetlistofmotives(sixoptions—threenegative,threepositive
—plus"other").Statementswereagainbasedonrealcommunicationsbyrespondentsin
previousstudies,anddesignedtogiveanimpressionofwhatshareofoutgroupmembershave
negative(e.g.bigotry,selfishness,stupidity,cruelty)orpositive(e.g.seekingjustice,seeking
freedom,careforothers)motives.Torestrictthestudy'sfocustopartisaningroup/outgroup
dynamics,onlythosewhoindicatedapreferencefortheDemocraticorRepublicanparty(i.e.
thosewhodidnotidentifythemselvesastrueindependents)participated.
25
Thekeyexperimentalvariationisthepercentageofmotivestatementsthatarenegatively
valenced.Somesubjectswererandomlyassignedtoseemostlynegativestatements,somemostly
positiveones,andanothergroupsawexclusivelypositivestatements.Asvalenceimproves,we
shouldexpectoutgroupaffecttoimprove.However,ifmotivatedreasoningorsomeother
cognitivebiasisatwork,subjectsshouldupdatetheirpriors,ifatall,onlywhenunabletodraw
onanyexamplesofoutgroupmisconduct.
Asmentionedabove,whileeachprofileinExperiment2pertainedtoadifferenttopic,
hererespondentsseeaseriesofprofilesonthesametopic,alsorandomlyassigned.Thegoalwas
toprovidesubjectsalargerpoolofevidencefromwhichtomakeattributionsaboutasingle
outgroup.Asbefore,Iusebothissueandpartisanoutgroups.Subjectssawoneoftwoversionsof
theabovetask—about"issues"(affirmativeactionorhealthcare),or"partyidentification"
(DemocratorRepublican)—ortookpartinacontrolcondition,inwhichrespondentscompleted
aneutralratingtaskonanunrelatedtopic.Allrespondentsinthe"issues"conditionsaweight
statementsfromdisagreersontheirassignedissue.Iassignedrespondentstooneofthreevalence
conditions—bad(sixbadmotives),good(twobadmotives),orperfect(nobadmotives).Half
ofthosechosentosee“party”profileswereshowneightoutgroupprofiles,asabove,butwith
motivesabouttheirpartisanidentificationratherthanissueposition.
Theotherhalfof“party”subjectswereassignedtoprofilesfrombothinpartyand
outpartymembers(twelveinall,sixfromeachparty).Itmaybethataffectivepolarizationcanbe
diminishednotjustbyrevealingthatmanyoutgroupmembersarepositivelymotivated,butthat
manyingroupmembersarenegativelyso.Totestthepotentialeffectsofingroup-outgroup
comparison,subjectsinthisconditionwereassignedtovalencesusinga2x2factorial(ingroup
26
"good"or"bad,"outgroup"good"or"bad").Ofthesixstatementsusedforeachparty,fourare
negativeinthe"bad"valencecondition,andtwointhe"good"valencecondition.Therefore,
subjectswererandomlyassignedtoseeoneoffoursetsofprofiles(bothpartiesgood;both
partiesbad;inpartygood,outpartybad;andviceversa).SISection2.2containsalistofall
possiblemotives.Figure5belowshowstwoexamplesoftheprofilesrespondentsmightsee.
Figure5:SampleProfilesUsedinExperiment3
27
Uponcompletingtheirassignedratingtask,subjectsansweredaknowledgebattery,then
placedthemselveson9-pointscalesforpartisanaffectandissuegroupaffect.Finally,totest
whethermanipulatingattributionsmighthavebehavioralconsequences,Iaskaquestionto
gaugewillingnesstovoteacrosspartylines.Subjectssawavignetteinwhichacandidatefrom
theirpartywasunderinvestigationbeforeanelection,andaskedwhethertheywouldvotefor
thatperson,someoneelse(theoutpartychallengeroranindependent)ornotvoteatall.
Inordertoconfirmthatthetreatmentsdidsuccessfullymanipulatetheintendedbelief
(attributionsforoutgroupattitudes/behaviors),immediatelyfollowingtheexercise,Ishowed
respondentsalistofpossibleattributions,goodandbad,aboutoutgroupmembers,andasked
themtowriteinthepercentagetheythoughtwereprimarilymotivatedbyeachattribution(forced
summingto100%).Ithensummedthepercentagesacrossbadmotivestogetameasureof
overalloutgroupattributions.Themanipulationsweresuccessful;asvalenceimproved,the
percentageofoutgroupmembersgivennegativeattributionsdecreased(seeSISection2.3).
Figure6belowshowstheexperimentalresults.Ineachpanel,theY-axisshowsthe
differencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect(scaledfrom-1to1,where-1correspondsto
lowoutgroupaffect)ineachcondition.Theoneexceptionisthefourthpanel,wheretheY-axis
showsthepercentageofpeoplewhopreferredtheirownparty's(possiblycorrupt)candidateif
theywereforcedtovotefortheirownortheotherparty'scandidate.Thetoptwopanelsshow
effectsforthosewhosawissueoutgroupmotives,thenexttwopanelsforthosewhosawparty
outgroupmotives,andthefinalpanelforsubjectswhosawpartymotivesforboththeingroup
andoutgroup.Thedashedlinesineachpanelcorrespondto95%confidenceintervalsoncontrol
groupaffectratings(notshowninthetoppanel,asthecontrolgroupwasnotaskedaboutissues).
28
Figure6:AffectRatingsinResponsetoEvidenceofOutgroupMotiveQuality
Note:Errorbarsare95%confidenceintervals.Dashedlinesreflecttheupperandlowerof95%confidenceintervalsontheestimateofaffectinthecontrolgroup.AllDVsabovearemeasuredasthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect,scaledfrom-1to1,where-1correspondstomaximumoutgrouphostility.Plotsshowmarginalaverages.AlldifferencesineffectmagnitudebetweenthePerfectandControlgroupaffectratingsabovearesignificantatthe95%confidencelevelinthemultivariateregressionanalysis.
29
Theseanalysesuseonlythesubsetofsubjectswhoappeartohavecompliedwiththe
instructionsoftheexercise—somesubjectsmerelyclickedthroughtheexercisewithoutreading
thevignettes,thusnotreceivingthetreatment.Todealwiththeinattentiveorotherwise
noncompliant,Icountthetotalnumberofmotivescorrectlyidentified(goodorbad)bythe
subjects,anddropthoseroughlyinthebottomquintileofthismeasure(generallycorresponding
tothosewhodidworsethanchancewouldpredict).Becauseextremityandpolitical
sophisticationcorrelatewithcompliance,alltreatmenteffectsshownabovearisefroma
multivariateregressionincludingpartyextremityandgeneralknowledge.Still,theaboveresults
holdwhenusingatwostageleastsquaresregressioninwhichtreatmentisinstrumentedon
compliance(seeSections2.4-2.6fordetailedanalyses).
EachpanelinFigure6showsthatthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect
decreasesasoutgroupmotivevalenceincreases.Inthetoppanel,forinstance,whenpeoplesaw
mostlynegativemotivesfromthosewhodisagreedwiththemonaffirmativeactionorhealthcare,
theiraffecttowardsthatoutgroupwassignificantlylowerthanthosewhosawmostlyorentirely
positivemotives.However,inmostcases,thetreatmenteffectisonlysignificantintheperfect
condition.Inotherwords,peoplewhosawmostlygoodmotivesdidnotevaluatetheoutgroup
significantlydifferentlyfromthosewhosawmostlybadones—onlythosewhosawnothingbut
goodmotivesshowedclearimprovement.Inotherwords,affectimprovedonlywhensubjects
completelylackedrecentevidenceofnegativeoutgroupconduct.Thissuggestsoneoftwo
possibilitiesabouthowpeopleinterpretgroupmotivesfromexample.First,ingroupmembers
maythinkbadmotivesaremorecommonthangoodonesintheoutgroup,sowhentheyseeone,
theyfigureitisbetterrepresentativeofthetypicaloutgroupmember.Second,negativemotives
30
maybeparticularlysalient,soevenifsomeonedoesn'tassumedeficiencyonthepartyofmost
outgroupmembers,theymightoverlyfocusonthefewwhoare.Eitherway,theseresults
demonstratethehighdifficultyofchangingperceptionsoftheoutgroup.
Learningnegativemotivesaboutone’sownpartydoesnotappeartoimprovethe
outparty-inpartyaffectdifferentialunlessitisalsopairedwithpositiveevidenceabouttheother
party.Thebottompanelshowsresultsfromtheingroup-outgrouppartisancomparisoncondition.
Whentheingroupappearstohavebettermotivesthantheoutgroup,thecontrolconditionis
replicated.Showingbothgroupsascontainingseveralnegativelymotivatedindividualshasno
impactonaffect.Here,assubjectsmightdismisspositiveoutgroupexamplesasunrepresentative
ofthegroupasawhole,theymaysimplydothesamewithnegativeingroupexamples.Asinthe
othermanipulations,however,providinggoodinformationaboutoutpartymotivesimproves
outpartyaffect,thoughagainonlysignificantlysowhentheevidentiarydeckisstackedinthe
outgroup’sfavorasmuchaspossible.
Asdemonstratedinthefourthpanel,manipulatingmotivebeliefsmayimpactnotjust
attitudesbutalsobehavior,oratleastbehavioralintent.Whileabout85%ofthoseinthecontrol
groupsaidthey'dvotefortheirownparty's(likelycorrupt)candidate,only74%ofthosewho
sawnothingbutpositiveoutgroupmotivesindicatethesame.Thissmallbutsignificantdecrease
suggeststhatsomepeoplearewillingtocrosspartylineswhenfacedwithaninadequateinparty
candidate,butonlyiftheybelievethatpeopleintheoutpartypossessgoodintentions.Sucha
findingseemsrelevanttothe2016presidentialelection,whichfeaturedthetwoleastpopular
majorpartycandidatesinhistory,eachwithanarguablyquestionablelegalpast.Nevertheless,
peoplestilllargelyvotedalongpartylines.Inalesspolarizedpartisanenvironment,votersmay
31
havefeltfreertorejecttheirparty'scandidatebasedonundesirablequalities.Ofcourse,asthese
resultsreflectbehavioralintentinahypothetical,andnotreal-lifebehaviorsthemselves,they
shouldbetakenwithagrainofsalt.
Experiment2demonstrates,asdidexperiment1,thatmotiveattributionisakeycausal
contributortooutgrouphostility,andthatgivingcitizensreasontobelievetheoutgrouphasgood
intentionscanreduceoutgrouphostility.Theseresultssuggestitmaybepossibletofight
affectivepolarizationbydirectlyprovidingevidenceofpositiveoutgroupmotives;however,this
mayonlyworkwhentheevidenceofwell-intentionedoutgroupmembersappearsoverwhelming.
Evenasinglebadapplemayspoilthewholebunch.
DiscussionandConclusion
Whileaffectivepolarizationiswell-documented,itisstillnotwellunderstood.What
explainsthepersistentriseinanimositybetweenpartisangroups?Thispaperaddstotheexisting
setofexplanationsanadditionalanswer,thatcitizensoftenattributenefariousmotivesto
outgroupmembers,ratherthanassumethattheirpreferencesresultfromlegitimatevaluesand
concerns.Roughlyhalfofthepublicappeartoholdnegativebeliefsaboutoutgroupmotives,and
thosewhodoevaluateoutgroupmembersmorenegatively.Theimpactofmotiveattributionon
outgroupaffectappearstobeequaltoorlargerthanthatofattitudinalsimilarity,akeyfinding
foraliteraturethat,tothispoint,hasfocusedonaffectivepolarization'srelationshipwithwhat
peoplewantratherthanwhytheywantit.Theimpactofmotivebeliefsonaffectisstrong
regardlessofwhoisbeingjudged(ingroupmembers,outgroupmembers,andjudgmentsof
eithersidebytheuncommitted)orone’slevelofinterestintheissue,somethinguntrueof
32
attitudinalsimilarity.Mostimportantly,peopleappearwillingtochangetheiroutgroupmotive
beliefs,butperhapsonlyunderthebestconditions;whentheydo,theiroutgrouphostility
lessens,theirwillingnesstointeractwithoutgroupmembersincreases,andtheyappear
somewhatmorewillingtovoteacrosspartylinestoblockproblematicingroupcandidates.
Theseexperimentsarenotwithoutlimitation—surveyswerenotconductedusinga
random,nationallyrepresentativesample,thoughinallcases,underrepresentedrespondent
groupswereequallyormorelikelytoengageinnegativemotiveattributionandshowsignificant
effects;therelianceuponsurveyresearchraisessomeconcernaboutexternalvalidity;thestudies
donottrackmultiplewaves,andthereforecannotspeaktolong-termeffectdecay;dependent
variablesarenon-behavioralandself-reported.Manipulatingbeliefsand/oraffectonamore
permanentbasis,inamorerealisticenvironment,maybemuchmoredifficult.
Theresultsofthisstudyshouldinformfuturestepslawmakersorprivateorganizations
mighttaketocombataffectivepolarization.Peopleacquireinformationabouteachother’s
motivesfromtheirmediaenvironment;ifthiscontentiseitherlargelynegativeorinfrequently
provided,citizenswilllearn,oratleastassume,thatpoliticaldisagreementsstemfromnefarious
outgroupmotives.Journalists,therefore,shoulddoabetterjobofexplainingwhypeoplesupport
thepoliciestheydo,andavoidsuggestionsthatsaidsupportisunderlaidprimarilybyillintent.
Socialmediaorganizationscanalsoworktorestructuretheirplatformstominimizethe
likelihoodofshallow,hostileoutgroupinteractions.Thismayincludeinterventionssuchasthe
minimizationoftheroleofcommentssectionsonnewsarticles,preventinganonymous
commenting,andincentivizingthoughtfuldeliberation.
33
AffectivepolarizationisasignificantproblemintheUnitedStates.Hostilitytowardsthe
othersidemakespoliticalcompromisemoredifficult,encouragestheformationofinformational
echochambers,makesvotingfortheout-partydifficultevenwhensensible,incentivizeselected
officialstoapproachpoliticaldecision-makinginanincreasinglypartisanfashion,andincreases
thelikelihoodofpartisanviolence.Thehighamountofcongressionalgridlock,increasing
partisandisagreementonevenbasicfactsofreality,thechoicebymostpartisanstostickwith
theirparty'scandidateinthe2016electiondespitehighunfavorables,agrowingtendency
towardspartisanhardball,therecentpublicshootingsofReps.GabbyGiffordsandSteveScalise,
andtheviolenceatprotestsinCharlottesville,VAandBerkeley,CAarejustafewrecent
manifestationsoftheseproblems.Ifaffectivepolarizationcontinuesoverthecomingyears,we
willundoubtedlywitnessthefurthererosionofpoliticalnormsofcivilityandgoodfaith
deliberation;afunctioningdemocracywouldseemtorequire,attheveryleast,itscitizenstonot
assumetheirneighborstobemonsters.
34
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SupplementalInformationfor“MaliceandStupidity”TABLEOFCONTENTS
1Experiment1Materials1.1AttitudinalSelf-Ratings(4issues)1.2PositionsShowninProfiles1.3MotivationsUsedinProfiles1.4ExerciseInstructionsforRespondents1.5EffectofMotivationQualitybyPosition1.6EffectofMotivationQualitybyIssueSalience1.7MotivationQualityIndexDistribution
2Experiment2Materials2.1ExerciseInstructionsforRespondents2.2MotivationsUsedinProfiles2.3ManipulationCheck2.4TreatmentCompliance2.5OutgroupAffectbyCompliance2.6InstrumentalVariableAnalysis2.7RatingExercise
3AdditionalMaterials3.1StudyInformation3.2DependentVariables3.2GeneralKnowledgeBattery3.3MeasureofPartisanIdentification
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1Experiment1Materials
1.1AttitudinalSelf-Ratings(4issues)
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1.2PositionsShowninProfilesIssueType PositionType PositionWording
GunControl StrongOppose "Ifullysupportthe2ndamendment.Idon'twantanynewrulesongunownership,andwouldliketorollbackmanyexistingregulations."
GunControl Oppose "Iwanttorollbackseveralexistingregulations,butthereisaneedforsomeverybasiclawsongunownership."
GunControl WeakOppose "Isupportmostcurrentgunlaws,butdon'twantanyadditionalregulations."
GunControl StrongFavor "I'mcompletelyinfavorofmakingprivategunownershipdifficult,eventhebanningofprivategunownershipaltogether."
GunControl Favor "Isupportmuchstricterregulationsthancurrentlyexist,butIdobelieveinthebasicrighttoownfirearms."
GunControl WeakFavor "Isupportafewadditionalregulations,butIdobelieveinthebasicrighttoownfirearms."
Healthcare StrongOppose "Privatecompaniesshouldbecompletelyresponsibleforinsurance.Thefreemarketshouldsetpricesandaccess."
Healthcare Oppose "Healthcareshouldprimarilybehandledbyprivatecompanies,butthegov'tshouldsetsomebasicrules,andmaintainMedicare."
Healthcare WeakOppose "Healthcareshouldmostlybehandledbyprivatecompanies,butthegov'tshouldkeepthemincheck,andofcoursecontinueMedicareandMedicaid."
Healthcare StrongFavor "Thegovernmentshouldbethesoleproviderofinsuranceandtreatment,andguaranteeitforeveryoneinthecountry."
Healthcare Favor "Thegov'tshouldguaranteeeveryone'saccesstoinsuranceinaregulatedmarket,andapubliclyfundedoptionshouldbeavailabletoall."
Healthcare WeakFavor "Thegov'tshouldguaranteethateveryone,includingpeoplewithpre-existingconditions,hasaccesstoinsuranceinaregulatedmarket."
Immigration StrongOppose "Ithinkallillegalimmigrantsshouldbedeportedhoweverandwheneverpossible,andweneedtobuildaborderwall."
Immigration Oppose "Iwantaborderwallandthedeportationofmostillegalimmigrantsthatarealreadyhere,thoughmaybewithexceptionsforcertainminors."
Immigration WeakOppose "Iwanttoimprovebordersecurity.Ifavorthedeportationofillegalimmigrantsalreadyhere,withexceptionsforminorsandtheelderly."
Immigration StrongFavor "IstandinsolidaritywithundocumentedimmigrantscurrentlyintheUS,andagainstanyeffortstodeportorharassthem."
Immigration Favor "Iapproveofdeportingillegalimmigrantswhohavecommittedcriminalacts,butotherwiseweshouldleaveillegalimmigrantsalreadylivingherealone."
Immigration WeakFavor "Iwanttodeportillegalimmigrantswhohavecommittedcriminalacts,buttherestshouldhaveachancetobecitizens,providedtheypaypenalties."
Environment StrongOppose "I'magainstnewregulations,andwouldliketoseealotoftheonesonthebooksweakenedoreliminatedentirely."
Environment Oppose "Idon'twantanynewregulations,andI'dliketogetridofmanyoftheexistingones.Still,Iseetheneedforsomebasicrules."
Environment WeakOppose "Ingeneral,I'malittlewaryoftherulesthatexistandthosewemightmakeinthefuture."
Environment StrongFavor "Ourcurrentenvironmentalprotectionstandardsarecompletelyinadequate.Iwantamajorexpansionofexistingregulations."
Environment Favor "I'dliketoseethegovernmentkeepmostexistingrules,andaddnewoneswhereneeded."
Environment WeakFavor "Igenerallysupporteffortsbythegovernmenttoprotecttheenvironment."
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1.3MotivationsUsedinProfilesIssueType
PositionType
MotivationQuality MotivationWording
GunControl Oppose 4.25 "Iliveinaruralareawithoutmuchpolicepresence.Regulationsagainstgunownershipwouldrendermeunabletodefendmyselfandfamilyagainstpossibleintruders."
GunControl Oppose 4.45 "Ibelieveintheoriginalmeaningofthe2ndamendment-I'mevenopentosomestrictfirearmregulations,buttheconstitutionfirstneedstobeamended."
GunControl Oppose 5.05 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-morepeoplewouldbeharmed,asunarmedcitizens,thanwouldbesavedbythepassageofanti-gunlaws."
GunControl Oppose 5.6 "Ilikegunsandownmanydifferentkinds-gunviolencealonedoesn'tjustifymakinglawsthatwoulddeprivemeofmyguns."
GunControl Oppose 6.58 "Iliveinamixedraceneighborhood-gottabeabletodefendmyselfifmyhomegetsvandalizedortargetedbyminorities."
GunControl Oppose 6.83 "Eventually,thegovernmentisgonnatrytoenslavethepeopleoftheUnitedStates,andcitizenswillneedtostockpilegunsandammunitioninordertoresistthem."
GunControl Favor 4.39 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-stricterlawswouldreduceaccidentaldeaths,andpreventcriminalsandunstablepeoplefromusinggunstocommitviolentcrimes."
GunControl Favor 5.33 "Ilivenearaschoolwhereseveralkidswerekilledbyagunman.Strongergunlawswillreducetheoddsofthesekindsofthingshappeningagain."
GunControl Favor 5.55 "Guns,especiallythosewithhigh-capacitymagazines,makeittooeasyformassmurderstooccur.Othercountrieswithstricterlawshavefewermassmurders."
GunControl Favor 6.09 "Iliveinamixedraceneighborhood-thelastthingweneedismoreofthosepeoplearmed."
GunControl Favor 7 "Idon'tlikegunsandIdon'tlikegunowners-there'srarelyajustifiablereasonforowning,using,orcollectingguns."
GunControl Favor 7.69 "Gunownersarerednecks-Icouldn'tcarelesswhethergunlawsimpacttheirlivesnegativelyornot."
Healthcare Oppose 3.78 "Healthcaredecisionsshouldbemadebyindividuals-peopleshouldbefreetoforgoinsuranceiftheyfeelit'sintheirowninterest,andtochooseamongoptionsinthefreemarket."
Healthcare Oppose 4.33 "I'mgenerallyopposedtoexpandingthegovernment.Theyneverendupworkingforthepeople,butratherrichinterestgroupslikepharmaceuticalcompanies."
Healthcare Oppose 4.33 "Idon'twantmytaxesgoingup-payingforotherpeoplewhoaren'twillingtopayforthemselvesjustmeanslessmoneyforme."
Healthcare Oppose 4.8 "Thegovernmentwouldrunthehealthcaresysteminefficiently-thelackofcompetitionwouldgivethegovtnoincentivetohandlethingscost-effectively.Thefreemarketisthebestoption."
Healthcare Oppose 6.02 "Iamfirmlyopposedtohandouts.Peopleshouldworkforwhattheywant,andnotrelyupongettingfreestufffromthegovernment."
Healthcare Oppose 6.07 "I'vealreadygotgoodinsurance.Don'tseeaneedtofixthesystem,it'sworkingfineforme."
Healthcare Favor 3.76 "Ijustdon'twanttopeopletobehurt,suffer,ordie-inthe21stcentury,nooneshouldhavetoworryaboutthemselvesortheirfamilysufferingfromtreatableillnessesandconditions."
Healthcare Favor 4.15 "I'monwelfareandcan'taffordinsurance.Ineedthegovernmenttostepinandpayforme."
Healthcare Favor 5.04 "Governmentcontrolofhealthcaresimplyworkselsewhere-theUSisoneoffewdevelopednationswithoutgovernment-runhealthcare,buthasthehighestcostsandpooresthealth."
Healthcare Favor 5.19 "Thegovernmentisbestabletorunthesystemefficiently.Thefreemarketisgoodbutfailsinmarketswherepeopleneedthegoodstosurvive.Thegov'tisneededtonegotiateontheirbehalf."
Healthcare Favor 5.5 "Simple,Ineedfreebenefits-I'mnotworkingrightnow,can'tpayintothesystem,butIstillwantgoodhealthcare."
Healthcare Favor 6.48 "Governmentcontrolmeanswecanstartfixingpeople'slifestyles-peopleneedtoeathealthilyandsustainably,exerciseregularly,andthegov'tcanenforcethat."
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IssueTypePositionType Motivation
Quality MotivationWording
Immigration Oppose 3.23 "Thecurrentsystemisunfairtolegalimmigrants;manyimmigrantsplayedbytherulesandearnedtheirrighttobehere.It'sunfairforillegalstoskipaheadoftheminline."
Immigration Oppose 4.63 "IwanttoprotectAmericanjobs-whereIlive,thelossoffactoryjobshasledtohighunemployment,andmanybusinesseshireillegalimmigrantstodowhatworkremains."
Immigration Oppose 5.67 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives-manyillegalimmigrantshaverapedormurderedAmericansinthepast.AstricterimmigrationpolicywouldprotectUScitizens."
Immigration Oppose 6.21 "IwanttoprotectthecultureoftheUS-illegalimmigrantsdon'tassimilateandbringunwantedbeliefsandtraditionsintotheAmericanmainstream."
Immigration Oppose 7.3 "AmericansaremoreimportanttomethanMexicans-I'dbefineallowing1000mexicanstoremaininpovertyifitmeantprotecting1Americanfamily."
Immigration Oppose 7.69 "Idon'tlikemexicans-alotoftheminmyareaarelazy,won'twork,andareinvolvedwithcrimeanddrugs."
Immigration Favor 4.15 "Iwanttosaveinnocentlives.Manyillegalimmigrantsfleetheircountrytoescapeviolenceandoppression.Deportingthemwouldbecruelandimmoral."
Immigration Favor 4.24 "Weareanationofimmigrants,andgiventhathistory,weshouldbeparticularlywelcomingtothosethatcometothiscountryforanopportunityforabetterlife."
Immigration Favor 4.79 "Iknowafamilyofundocumentedimmigrants-theyaregoodpeoplewhoarerespectedinthecommunity,andI'dneverwanttodoanythingtoharmtheirfamily,orotherslikethem."
Immigration Favor 5.27 "Ibelieveinaborderlessworld!Weshouldn'tbefocusedonbordersatall,weneedtolearntoliveasasinglehumanrace."
Immigration Favor 5.45 "Illegalimmigrationdoesn'taffectme.Combattingitisawasteoftime,whocares.Let'sspendmoneyelsewhere."
Immigration Favor 6.84 "Hey,it'sgoodfortheDemocrats-illegalimmigrantswillfindawaytovote,andit'llkeepRepublicansoutofoffice."
Environment Oppose 4.03 "Inmyarea,we'velostalotofjobsduetoenvironmentaloverregulation-smallbusinessescan'tmeetexpensiverequirements,whilebigcorporationscaneasilypayforthem.It'snotfair."
Environment Oppose 4.81 "Idon'twanttoreallyhurtoureconomyjusttoonlyslightlyimprovetheenvironment.I'veseensmallbusinessownershavetocloseshopjusttoprotectcertainreptilespecies!"
Environment Oppose 5.53 "Privateentitiescantakebettercareoftheenvironmentthanthegov't-publiclandshouldbemanagedbyprivatecitizens,who'llhaveself-interestinpreventingpollution/damage."
Environment Oppose 5.92 "Well,honestly,Iownstockinacouplebigcoalcompanies.EnvironmentalregulationswouldlikelycutintotheprofitIcanexpectfrommystockportfolio."
Environment Oppose 7.38 "Honestly,Ijustdon'tcaremuchabouttheenvironment-Iliveinabigcity,andIdon'tgooutdoorsmuch.Aren'ttherebiggerpriorities?"
Environment Oppose 7.81 "I'mjustsickofwhinyhippiesandliberalswhodon'tunderstandhowtherealworldworks."
Environment Favor 3.31 "Mycommunityhasbeencompletelydevastatedbyfrakking-itmadethewaterundrinkableandtherewerebirthdefects.Weneedregulationstopreventthisfromhappeningtoothers."
Environment Favor 4 "Withoutregulations,overtime,privatecompanieswilldestroytheenvironment.Corporationsonlyfocusonshort-termprofits.They'llalwayschoosethatoversafetyandhealth."
Environment Favor 4.58 "Bottomline,Iwanttoleaveourchildrenbetteroff-it'sunfairforourgenerationtolivehoweverwewantwithnothoughttotheglobalcriseswearecreatingforthenextgeneration."
Environment Favor 5.58 "It'sREALLYsimple.We'llbedeadsoonifwedon'tactnow-I'veseenresearchontheinternetthatsayshumanswillbewipedoutinlessthanfiveyearsbyglobalwarming!"
Environment Favor 5.85 "I'veinvestedprettyheavilyinrenewableenergycompanies-environmentalregulationsshouldputtheoldcompetitorsoutofbusiness,andresultinsomeprettyniceprofits."
Environment Favor 6.88 "It'sonemorewaytohurtbigbusinesses-evilcorporationsneedtobepunishedandrunoutofbusinessusingregulations,evenifitweakensthewholeeconomyforawhile."
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IssueType
PositionType
MotivationQuality PositionWording
Party Democrat 3 "Ibelieveintakingcareofthepoor,sick,andvulnerableinsociety."
Party Democrat 3.43 "Iwanttofightdiscriminationagainstonthebasisofrace,religion,class,gender,orsexualorientation."
Party Democrat 4.24 "Isupporttherightsofworkers.Iwanttoleveltheplayingfieldbetweentherichandthepoor."
Party Democrat 5.74 "It'sgreatwhenthegovernmentprovidesmewithfreethings,themorethebetter."
Party Democrat 6.09 "IsupportCommunism.IwanttheUStobeaCommunistnation.Closeasitgets."
Party Democrat 6.74 "Republicansarethepartyofoldwhitemen.Idon'ttrustthem,don'tlikethem."
Party Republican 4.31 "Ibelieveinindividualresponsibility,freedomofchoice,andfreedomofspeech."
Party Republican 4.52 "Privateindividualsmakethebestdecisionsabouttheeconomyandjobcreation,notthegovernment."
Party Republican 4.54 "Idon'tbelievethatthegovernmentiscapableofrunningmostprogramswithoutcorruptionandwaste."
Party Republican 5.46 "Idon'twantlazypeopletryingtotakefreestuffoutofmypockets."
Party Republican 6.25 "Honestly,Ijustwantthingstogobacktohowtheywere50yearsago."
Party Republican 6.59 "Democratsarethepartyofminorities.Whitepeoplearelosingcontrolofthiscountry!"
Motivationqualityisscoredfrom1-9,where1representsaratingof“highlyreasonable”and9“highlyunreasonable”.Allmotivationqualityscoresabovearetakenfromtheaverageofoutgroupjudgmentsonly.
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1.4ExerciseInstructionsforRespondentsALLRESPONDENTS:“Forthefollowingexercise,youwillseeaseriesofprofiles.Thecommentsintheseprofilescomefromrealpeoplewhopreviouslyparticipatedinasimilar,earlierstudy.Whilehundredsofpeopleparticipated,weareshowingyoutheresponsesofonlyasmallsampleofpeople.”THEN,IFCONTROLGROUP: “Justasyoudid,theseindividualswerefirstaskedtoindicatetheirpositiononanumberofissues.Oneachofthefollowingpages,you'llseeadifferentindividualandtheirpositiononacertainissue.Giventhisinformation,pleaseindicatehowyoufeeltowardsthem,positiveornegative,usingthescaleprovided.”THEN,IFEXPERIMENTALGROUP:“Justasyoudid,theseindividualswerefirstaskedtoindicatetheirpositiononanumberofissues.Then,foreachone,theywereaskedtotalkaboutwhytheytakethatposition.Oneachofthefollowingpages,you'llseeadifferentindividual,andboththeirpositionandmotivationonacertainissue.Giventhisinformation,pleaseindicatehowyoufeeltowardsthem,positiveornegative,usingthescaleprovided.”
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1.5EffectofMotivationQualitybyPosition
Note:Theabovefigureshowsthemeanaffectratingsforeachtypeofmotivation,witheachpanelrepresentingadifferentlevelofpositiondistancefromtheindividualintheprofile.Eachobservationreflectsasinglerating(eachrespondentrankedmultipleprofiles).Onlyoutgroupjudgmentsareused,sotheminimumpositiondistanceis2(e.g.3and5ona7-pointscale).Thex-axisshowsthemotivationseachprofilemightcontain,arrangedinorderfromthehighesttolowestratedmotivationforeachissue.They-axisrepresentsthemeanaffectratingforagivenindividualprofile.Thedashedlinesaretheedgesofthe95%confidenceintervalofthemeanaffectofthecontrolgroup.Eachpanelshowsthatthepresenceofthehighestratedmotivationhasasignificantpositiveeffectrelativetothecontrolgroupand,inmostcases,thelowestratedmotivationshaveasignificantnegativeeffect.Evenforthoseevaluatingsomeoneontheoppositeendofthescale(AttDiff=6),theaffectiveimpactofseeingthebestmotiveissuchthattheiroutgroupaffectequalsthatofthecontrolgroupintheminimaldifferencepanel(AttDiff=2),amovementacrossaboutathirdoftheentirescale.
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1.6EffectofMotivationQualitybyIssueSalience
Note:Theabovefigureshowstheeffectsizesofmotivationqualityandpositiondistanceonprofilerating,bytherespondent’slevelofinterestinagivenissue.Eachobservationreflectsasinglerating(eachrespondentrankedmultipleprofiles).Thedashedlinerepresentsanulleffect.Foreachissue,respondentswereaskedtoindicatetheirlevelofinterestintheissueona5-pointscale,andeachpanelaboverepresentsallratingsbythosewiththegiveninterestlevel.Thesepanelsshowthatmotivationqualityalwayshasasignificanteffect(exceptfortheVeryLowpanel,whichhasveryfewobservations).Positiondistance,however,onlymatterstothosewithahighamountofinterestinanissue.
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1.7MotivationQualityIndexDistribution
Note:ThetoppanelshowsahistogramdensityplotoftheMotivationQualityIndexasdescribedinthemainpaper.Thisindexrepresentstheaveragemotivationqualityeachrespondentseesacrossallfiveoutgroupprofiles.Theindexvalueconsistsoffiverandomlyassignedvalues,andthereforevariesacrosssubjectsbychancealone.Motivationqualityrangesfrom0-1,where0isamotivationratedbyaseparatepilotgroupas“highlyunreasonable”,and1as“highlyreasonable”.Thebottomshowsthesamedistributionasabox-and-whiskersplot.
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2Experiment2Materials
2.1ExerciseInstructionsforRespondentsISSUECONDITION:“Forthefollowingtask,wearegoingtopresentyouwithseveralshortquotesfromanumberofcitizens.Theseregularpeopletoldustheirattitude(fororagainst)on<AFFIRMATIVEACTION/GOVERNMENTINVOLVEMENTINHEALTHCARE>,thenprovidedabriefexplanationforwhytheytakethepositionthattheydo.
Foreachstatement,wewantyoutodothefollowing:
1)indicatewhatyouthinktheirmotiveisfromapresetlistofmotives(checkallthatapply)2)evaluatetheemotionalcontentoftheirresponse(checkallthatapply)3)evaluatehowreasonable/justifiableyouthinktheiranswertothequestionis
Wewillbeusingyourresponsestodevelopanalgorithmtocodeamuchlargerofasetofthesestatementsautomatically.Thoughtfulresponsesarecrucialtoourresearch,sopleasedonotanswerrandomlywithoutreadingtheprompts!Therewillbeanattentionchecktoensurethis.”PARTY/PARTIESCONDITIONS:“Forthefollowingtask,wearegoingtopresentyouwithseveralshortquotesfromanumberofcitizens.Theseregularpeopletolduswhichpoliticalpartytheyidentifywith,thenprovidedabriefexplanationforwhytheytakethepositionthattheydo.Foreachstatement,wewantyoutodothefollowing:1)indicatewhatyouthinktheirmotiveisfromapresetlistofmotives(checkallthatapply)2)evaluatetheemotionalcontentoftheirresponse(checkallthatapply)3)evaluatehowreasonable/justifiableyouthinktheiranswertothequestionisWewillbeusingyourresponsestodevelopanalgorithmtocodeamuchlargerofasetofthesestatementsautomatically.Thoughtfulresponsesarecrucialtoourresearch,sopleasedonotanswerrandomlywithoutreadingtheprompts!Therewillbeanattentionchecktoensurethis.”
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2.2MotivationsUsedinProfiles
IssueTypePositionType
ValenceType PositionWording
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good "Ibelieveeveryoneinthiscountrydeservesanequalchanceofgettinghired,nomattertheircolororbackground."
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good "Iwanttomakesurepeoplearehiredbasedonhavingthehighestmeritofallthecandidates."
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkraceshouldonlyplayaroleinjobhiringifallthetopcandidatesareequallyqualifiedinallotherways.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkitsunfairtominoritiestotreatthemliketheyneedthehelp-thesoftbigotryoflowexpectations.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good“Ipersonallylostanopportunitytoadvanceinmycareerrecentlybecausethepositionhadhitaquotaforwhitecandidates.Affirmativeactioncreatesfairnessforonegroupbycreatingunfairnessforanother.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Raceorethnicbackgroundarealwaysunfaircriteriaforevaluatingfolksforajob.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Itjustseemsunfairtopotentiallydisadvantagethemostqualifiedapplicantforapositionjustbecausetheymightnotbeaminority.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Good “Ithinkitmightjusthurtminoritiesinthelongrun.Affirmativeactionwilljustgiveracistwhitesawaytoconvincethemselvesthatminoritiesdidn’tdeservethepositiontheyweregiven.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Its2017,racismisntaproblemanymore,minoritieswillbefine.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Idontneedtomakeitanyharderformetogetajobthanitalreadyis.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Imwhite.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Itsjustforlazypeoplewhowanteverythingtobehandedtothem.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “Everyoneneedstoquitmakingsuchabigdealaboutrace.”
AffirmativeAction Oppose Bad “theyresnoreasonfordoingthatinUSAtoday”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Althoughminoritieshaveequalrightsnow,theirfamilieswereoppressedformanygenerations.Theeffectsofthis,aswellasthediscriminationwhichstilloccurs,warrantsaffirmativeaction.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “It’sgoodtohelppeoplewhoaredisadvantaged.Equalityinournationiskey,andthatmotivatesmetowanttohelp.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Itiscleartomethatminoritiesdonotreceivethesamesocioeconomicconsiderationsthatcaucasiansdointhiscountry.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Iwanttobalanceaplayingfieldthathasbeenunequalforcenturies.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Ibelieveinfairnessandjustice.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Ihaveseenfirsthandhowminorityjobapplicantsaretreatedpoorlyandwanttohelpfightdiscrimination.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “I’veseenresearchthatpeopleofcolorandwomendomorepoorlyonthejobmarketthanequallyqualifiedwhiteormaleapplicants.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Good “Iwanttohelpminoritiesgetalegupinaninherentlyunequalsociety.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Itstimeforwhitepeopletogetatasteoftheirownmedicine.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “dontknowmuchaboutitbutifithelpsmegethiredthangreat.”
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Imawhiteallythatthinkswhitepeopleneedtochecktheirprivilege!”
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “mysisterneedsajob”
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “thatswhatDemocratspositiononthatissueis.
AffirmativeAction Favor Bad “Whitesshouldfeelguiltyaboutwhatwhiteshavedonetoblacks,theydeservestuffinreturn.”
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IssueTypePositionType
ValenceType PositionWording
Healthcare Oppose Good “Thefreemarketisthebestwaytoensurethataproductisproducedwiththehighestpossiblequalityandsoldatthelowestpossibleprice.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “I’mconcernedthatthegovernmentwouldprovidepoorhealthcoverage.Weknowhowbadlythey’vescrewedupotherthingsinthepast.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “It’snotintheconstitution.Thegovernmentdoesnothaveanybusinessgettinginvolvedintheprivatemedicaldecisionsofitscitizens.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “Thegovernmentisnotgoodatmanagingbigprograms.Justlookatwhatthey’vedonewithsocialsecurity-it’sbankrupt.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “Ithinkit’saniceideaintheory,andpeopleshouldhavegoodhealthcareoptions,butIdon’tthinkgovernment-runhealthcarewouldworkinacountrythiscontrolledbythepharmaceuticalindustry.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “Incountrieswherethegovernmentrunsthehealthcaresystem,thereareterriblewaitingtimesforsurgeriesandotherimportantmedicalprocedures.Idon’twantthathere.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “Peoplearegoingtolosetheircurrentinsuranceplansifwemakebigchangestothesystem,andthatsnotfairtothosewhoarealreadyhappywithwhattheyhave.”
Healthcare Oppose Good “Governmentisalreadytoointrusiveinourdailylives,dowereallyneedtogivethemourmedicalrecordstoo?”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Therearetomanypeoplejustlookingforahandoutthesedays.”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Ivealreadygotgoodprivateinsurance,dontseeareasontodothingsdifferently.”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Idon’twanttopayhighertaxesjusttosupportlazypeople.”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Thegovtwouldtrytosavemoneythroughdeathpanelsandpopulationcontrol.”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Ifyouwanthealthcaregetajob.”
Healthcare Oppose Bad “Don’tneedtohelpabunchofimmigrantsfillupourwaitingrooms.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Everyhumanbeingshouldhaveaccesstoadequatehealthcare.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Othercountriesthatusegovernment-runhealthcaresystemshavehigherqualitycareforlowerspending.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Theprivatesystemisnotworkingandcan’tbefixed.Wecouldnegotiatebetterpricesforhealthcareifthegovernmentweretheonlybuyer.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Lowincomefamiliesareoneillnessoraccidentawayfrombankruptcy.Weneedtoprotectthemostvulnerablepeopleinoursociety.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Mybrotherwouldn’tbealivenowifitweren’tfortheACA,everyoneneedstohaveinsuranceaccess.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Insurancecompaniesmakelifeordeathdecisionsbasedonprofits,healthcareshouldonlybeaboutmakingpeoplehealthy.”
Healthcare Favor Good “Thegovernmentisfarfromperfect,butItrustthemmorethanprivatecorporationswhenitcomestomyfamily’shealth.”
Healthcare Favor Good “IseepeopleinneedandIwanttohelpthem.”
Healthcare Favor Bad “idontseewhyishouldhavetopayformyownhealthcare”
Healthcare Favor Bad “ThatswhatthedemocratssayisrightandIusuallygoalongwiththem”
Healthcare Favor Bad “justbecauseidonotworkdoesnotmeanishouldnthavehealthinsurance.”
Healthcare Favor Bad “themoregovernment,thebetter.”
Healthcare Favor Bad “Igotalotofissues.Ineedhealthcare.”
Healthcare Favor Bad “thegovernmentshodjusttakecareoffit.”
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IssueType
PositionType
ValenceType PositionWording
Party Democrat Good “Icareaboutthelessfortunateandwanttohelpthemout.”
Party Democrat Good “Isupportequaltreatmentofpeopleregardlessofrace,gender,sexualorientationorreligion.
Party Democrat Good “Isupportcivilrights,acleanenvironment,betterconditionsforworkers,andqualityhealthcareandeducationforall.”
Party Democrat Good “Idon’tlikehowtherichgetricherandthepoorgetspoorer,andIthinktheDemocratsaremostlikelytodosomethingaboutthat.”
Party Democrat Good “I’mliberalonmoreissuesthanIamconservative.TheDemocratshavetheirproblemsbutthey’reclosesttowhatIbelievein.”
Party Democrat Good “Iamveryprogressiveonsocialissues.”
Party Democrat Good “I’mascientist.Itshouldn’tbepolitical,butnowadays,Democratsseemliketheleastlikelypoliticalpartytorejectanestablishedscientificfinding.”
Party Democrat Good “Ithinkasacommunityitisourdutytotakecareofoneanother,nomanisanisland.”
Party Democrat Bad “dontknowreally,parentsbroughtmeuptobeaDemocrat.”
Party Democrat Bad “Theywanttogiveusfreebenefits.”
Party Democrat Bad “theirbetterthanevilRepublicans.”
Party Democrat Bad “Weneedabiggovernmenttokeepeverythingundercontrol.
Party Democrat Bad “Whitepeopleareawfulanddemocratshaveourback.”
Party Democrat Bad “Imonwelfareanddisability”
Party Republican Good “Ibelieveinhardwork,individualresponsibilityandfreedomtolivemylifewithoutinterference.
Party Republican Good “Imfiscallyconservative,Iwanttokeepthedebtdown,andsupporttaxcodesimplification.
Party Republican Good “Icareaboutjobcreation.Wearelosingfartoomanyjobswiththepoliciesofthepast,andmanydecenthardworkingpeoplearesufferingbecauseofit.”
Party Republican Good “Ithinkgovernmentshouldbehandledaslocallyaspossible,andthedemocratswanttoexpandthefederalgovernment.”
Party Republican Good “Thegovernmenthasdemonstrateditcantbetrustedwithourmoneyandourprivateinformation.Theyarefarfromperfect,butIexpectprivateindustrytodoabetterjoboverall.”
Party Republican Good “Iservedinthemilitaryfor22years,andknowhowimportantastrongnationaldefenseis,andhoweasilywecanfindourselvesindangerwithoutproperfundingandleadership.”
Party Republican Good “Ithinktheydoabetterjobforsmallbusinessowners,toomanyregulationsaredrivingpeopleoutofbusiness.”
Party Republican Good “Iwantabalancedbudget.Neitherpartyhasbeengoodforthat,butRepublicansseemtocareaboutitmore.”
Party Republican Bad “Icantstandthefilthydegeneracyofhomosandblacksandhispanics.”
Party Republican Bad “Iwanttokeepmymoney,ifyouarentlivingthelifeyouwant,youneedtoworkharder.”
Party Republican Bad “dontknowreally,parentsbroughtmeupasarepublican”
Party Republican Bad “itstimetogetridofalltheforeignersandtakeourcountryback”
Party Republican Bad “imsickofliberals,noonemessswithmyguns,myflag,ormyfamely”
Party Republican Bad “idontwantmyhardearnedmoneygoingtoabunchoflosersanddrugaddicts”
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2.3ManipulationCheck
Note:Theleftandrightpanelsshowtheeffectofrandomassignmentofmotivationcontentonrespondentestimatesofoutgroupmotives.Aftertheratingexerciseandadistractionexercise,respondentsweregivenaversionoftheclosedresponsemotiveexercisethatcorrespondedtotheparticularissue/partyprofilestheywereshown(seesections3.1and4.1forexamples).Asthepercentageofpositivemotivesshownintheseprofilesincreased,thepercentageofoutgroupmembersestimatedtobenegativelymotivatedsharplydecreases,by30pointsinthecaseofissueoutgroups,and10pointsinthecaseofpartisanoutgroups.Thedifferenceineffectsizebetweenthesetwogroupsmightreflectpartisanviewsthataremuchmoreentrenchedthanthoseforissueoutgroups.Overall,thisplotdemonstratesthattheexperimentalmanipulationsareimpactingthedesiredconcept-motivejudgments.
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2.4TreatmentCompliance
Note:Theaboveplotsshowthedistributionofperformanceontheratingexercise.Respondentswereaskedtoevaluateanumberofprofiles(8forissueandpartyoutgroups,12forpartisaningroup/outgroup),andindicatewhichmotive(s)(fromalist)theysawintheprofile(thelistisshowninSISection1.2).Themotives(showninSISection1.4)presentedtendedtobeeasilycategorizableasgoodorbad.Foreachprofiletheyareshown,Icounttheirjudgmentaseither“correct”(iftheyselectedatleastonemotiveofthecorrectvalence,or“other”)or“incorrect”(otherwise).Ithencreateavariableequaltothenumberofcorrectidentificationsmadebyeachsubject,whichisdisplayedaboveonthex-axis.Thebarsrepresentthepercentageofrespondentsineachbin,whilethelinerepresentsthecumulativepercentageofpeoplewhoscoredthatamountorlower.IntheanalysespresentedinFigure7ofthepaper,Idropallobservationsfromroughlythebottomquintileofthismeasure(lessthan4correctintheleftpanel,andlessthan8correctintherightpanel).Giventheeaseoftheexercise,itishighlylikelythatrespondentsinthisbottomquintileweresimplynotpayingattention,andthereforenotreceivingthetreatment.
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2.5OutgroupAffectbyCompliance
Note:Thefourpanelsaboveshowtherelationshipbetweenoutgroupaffectandcompliancewithtreatment.Allobservationsincludedabovereflectrespondentswhowereinthestrongesttreatmentcategory(i.e.“100%good”motivesintheIssueorPartyconditions,or“Ingroupbad,Outgroupgood”intheMultiplePartiescondition),soastobestdemonstratetherelationshipbetweentreatmentcomplianceandtreatmenteffectiveness.Eachpanelrepresentsoneofthethreedifferentconditions;theIssueconditionshowsuptwiceasIanalyzetwodifferentoutgroups(issueandpartisan)forrespondentsinthiscondition.AllDVsareconstructedasthedifferencebetweeningroupandoutgroupaffect,andscaledfrom-1to1,where-1representsstrongdislikeoftheoutgroupandstrongsupportfortheingroup.Inthebottom-rightpanel,0-3aredroppedduetolowN(n=11acrossallvalues0-3)
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2.6InstrumentalVariableAnalysis
Note:Theabovetableshowstheresultsfrommultipleregressionsofoutgroupaffectontreatment.Eachrowrepresentsadifferentcombinationofcondition(issue/party/parties)andoutgroupusedastheDV(issue/party).AllDVsaremeasuredasingroupminusoutgroupaffect.Eachgroupofcolumnsshowsadifferentmodel,withthebetacoefficientandobservationslistedbelow.Inallmodelsabove,treatmentisavariableequalto1whensubjectswereexposedtothemostpositiveoutgroupcondition(“100%good”motivesintheissueandpartyconditions,“Ingroupbad-Outgroupgood”inthemultiplepartiescondition).Itisequalto0forthoseinthecontrolconditionorfor,inthecaseoftheissuecondition,whichhadnocorrespondingcontrolgroupaffectratings,thosereceivingthe“75%bad”treatment.Thefirstmodelshowsasimplebivariateregressionofaffectontreatmentforallsubjects.Theresultsarenullintheissuecondition,andsignificantintheparty/partiesconditions.Inmodel2,Idroproughlythebottomquintileofcompliers(seesection6.2).Withthismodification,treatmentisalwayssignificantandmuchlargerinmagnitude.Thecutoffpointfortreatmentcompliance,however,isarbitrary.Todemonstratethatthetreatmenteffectincreasesinmagnitudealongsidecompliance,Iperforma2SLSregressionbyinstrumentingtreatmentoncompliance,shownhereasthethirdmodel.Unfortunately,thiscannotbedoneinrow1,asthecontrolgroupwasneveraskedaboutissuegroups.Fortheothercases,treatmentremainssignificant,exceptinrow2.Thereasonforthefailureofthetestinrow2isthatoneofthemid-levelcompliancegroups(#correct=4),perhapsbychance,showsastrongertreatmenteffectthanthemorecompliant(asshowninSIsection6.3).Tohelpdemonstratethatthetreatmenteffectisstillsignificantwithoutthispotentialartifact,thefinalmodelshowstheresultsofanalysisinwhichthosegetlessthan5of8correctaredropped.Theeffectsaresmallerthaninmodel2,butstillsignificant.
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2.7RatingExerciseProfilesofthoseinsupportofaffirmativeaction
Profilesofthoseinoppositiontoaffirmativeaction
Profilesofthoseinfavorofgovernmentinvolvementinhealthcare
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Profilesofthoseinoppositiontogovernmentinvolvementinhealthcare
ProfilesofDemocrats
ProfilesofRepublicans
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3AdditionalMaterials
3.1StudyInformation
Note:ThesurveypopulationsusedacrossthesestudiesdifferfromthatofarandomsampleofAmericanadultsinanumberofsignificantways-thesurveygroupstendtobeyoungerandbettereducated,andhavegreaternumbersofwomenandDemocrats.
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3.2DependentVariablesMarriageIndicator:
WillingnesstoCrossPartyLines(exampleforDemocratidentifyingrespondents)
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IndividualProfileRating(Experiment1a)
PartyFeeling
WillingnesstoDate(orderrandomized)
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3.2GeneralKnowledgeBatteryIndexcreatedfromnumbercorrectof5questions,randomizedorder
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3.3MeasureofPartisanIdentification
Followingresponsescorrespondto1and2,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale
Followingresponsescorrespondto6and7,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale
Followingresponsescorrespondto3,5and4,respectively,on7pointpartyIDscale