Dann Slayden Cross l l l , MBA,et alia

In the United States District Court. for the Middle District of Georgia

Macon Division

Dr. Sharon Cross, )

plaintiffs in propria personaV.

Patrick Eidson, et alia

defendants Jury Trial Demanded

Plaintiffs'rebuttalto defendant Patrick Eidson's motion to dismiss

Plaintiffb have thrice attempted to bring defendant Patrick Eidson (Eidson) to the instant federal

conversation within which he is being sued in his individual capacity. Plaintiffs third attempt, resulted

in Eidson's motion,to dismiss. Plaintiffs, herein, rebut Eidson's motion to dismiss brief document 100.

Eidson asserts that he acted as a "SpecialAssistant Attorney General with the Macon County

DFCS" during the instant matter. Document 100 does not evidence that Eidson is authorized by Law,

license, or parental consent to make medical decisions for the plaintiffs.

Eidson's role in this matter

Defendant Eidson prepared the so-called "ORDER FOR SHELTER CARE" (ORDER) at exhibit

A to the complaint utilized by defendants Lewis, Albritton, and Barr to unreasonably seize F,C. The

ORDER contains some factual statements, a few deceptions, and is not supported by Oath or

affirmation as is required by Law as evidenced at the Fourth Amendment. Eidson crafted the ORDER

based exclusively upon hearsay. Eidson's ORDER expresses no exigency regarding F.C. receiving

the vaguely and inadequately described "shot" or "shots".

Defects on the face of the ORDER

The second paragraph of the ORDER references private (copyrighted) GEORGIA CODE 15-

11-58 (a) and asserts that "reasonable efforts have been made by the Deparlment to preserve and

reuntfy the family prior to the placement of the chitd in foster care..." lf the "child" being referenced is

Civilaction number:

5:14-cv-00006-CAR

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 1 of 12

the natural person, F.C., then this aspect of the order is a complete fabrication. Defendants and social

workers Jane and Janet Doe, by way of terroristic threat, expressed to plaintiffs that F.C, would be

taken by DFCS if plaintiffs failed to provide consent for the administration of the tetanus vaccine to

F.C. Terroristic threats levied by State actors toward plaintiffs do not constitute "reasonable efforts to

preserve plaintiffs' family".

The third paragraph of the the ORDER then makes a one hundred and eighty degree turn

expressing that "reasonable efforts to preserve the family were nof required pursuant to GEORGIA

CODE 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C) which reads:

(4)Reasonable efforts of the type described in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall not be

required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction has

determihed that:

(A)The parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances which may include but

need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse;

(B)The parent has:

(i)Committed murder of another child of the parent;

(ii)Been convicted of the murder of the other parent of the child;

(iii)Committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the parent;

(iv)Aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit murder or voluntary

manslaughter of another child of the parent; or

(v)Committed a felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of

the parent; or

(C)The parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily;

Utilizing the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing

excludes all others") defendants Eidson and Lisa Rambo are asserting that plaintiffs have been found to

be guilty of at least one of the following as per the list contained in 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C): abandoners,

torturers, chronic abusers, sexual abusers, murderers, a convicted murderer, voluntary man-

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slaughterers, felony assaultors. Plaintiffs have never been involved in any of those actions listed at 15-

11-58 (a) (4) (A-C) and defendants Eidson and Rambo know it, Therefore, this third paragraph is a

complete fabrication written by Eidson and authorized by Lisa Coogle Rambo. Defendants within this

so-called juvenile court deceived at every possible turn in order to have F.C. unreasonably seized.

Defendant Eidson was being paid with public funds while he was, by way of plain and demonstrable

deception, depriving plaintiffs of their rights making him an embezzler of public funds,

On January 19th, 2013 plaintiff Dann Cross questioned defendant Barr about the statement

concerning the preservation of the family as stated on the "ORDER FOR SHLELTER CARE,,,

Specifically, plaintiff Dann Cross asked defendant Barr,"The MACON COTJNTY DE?ARTMENT OF

FAMILY AND CHILDRENS SERV/CES made reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the famity

prior to the ptaiement of the chitd in foster care? Can you explain that?" Defendant Barr responded,

"That is some standard wording that is in court orders and the bottom tine is we had to get

emergency [emphasis added] custody based on the information we were given and so that had to be

done. Ihose things are required wording in our court orders". Dann Cross then respo nds, ,,What

sfnkes me about fhis is that's also an inaccuracy. The other DFCS workers up there said lf you don,t

do this we are going to take your children. Other than that there was never an attempt to preserve the

family prior to F.C. being taken. Defendant Barr replies , "YotJ are welcome to address that with our

attorney". The attorney referenced by Barr is defendant Eidson. Eidson flat out lied within a court

order, when he asserted that reasonable efforts have been made by the Department to preserve

plaintiffs'family then lied again when he asserted that said reasonable efforts were not required

because plaintiffs have been found by a competent court of being abandoners, torturers, chronic

abusers, sexual abusers, murderers, a convicted murderer, voluntary man-slaughterers, or felony

assaultors. Defendant Barr then asserts that "standard wording", true or not, goes on these court

orders. Defendant Eidson conspired with defendant Rambo to kidnap (criminal side) and

unreasonably seize (civil side) F,C. under color of Law and by misrepresenting private statutes as

evidenced at GEORGIA CODE 15-11-58 (a) (4) (A-C). Furthermore, plaintiffs attempted to ascertain

information regarding their case from defendant Eidson via defendant, and DFCS supervisor, Karan

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Albritton. The plaintiff never received responses to these requests.

Defendant Eidson operates within a Court of No Record without

plaintiffs' express and willing consent to do so

Juvenile Court is not a Trial Court nor is it a Court of Record. A Court of Record must meet all

of the following five criteria:

1. Keeps a record of the proceedings.

2.The tribunal must be independent of the magistrate (Judge).

3. Proceed according to the common law (not statutes).

4. Has the authority to fine or imprison for contempt.

5. Has a Seal.

Plaintiff6 were deprived of their inalienable rights without a trial, without a jury, the judge and

prosecutor relying exclusively upon hearsay testimony within the auspices of a court of no record and

were never charged or convicted of any crime whatsoever,

Plaintiffs made several written and verbal requests to defendants Rambo and Albritton to

produce the record evidencing their accuser and what he or she actually alleged, Said requests were

ignored or maintained as "confidential" by defendants Albritton, Rambo, and Eidson. No Court of

Record is authorized by Law to maintain secret records in regards to an "accuser" especially when

that accuser misrepresented plaintiffs putting into motion the seizure of their two year old son.

The tribunal and Judge were apparently identical that being defendant Lisa Coogle Rambo,

The juvenile court (this would be defendant Lisa Rambo, Eidson, Hurt exclus ive of a jury) proceeded

according to profound personal bias and the misrepresentation of juvenile statutes nof common law

(Constitution),

'The juvenile court may have the ability to fine and imprison yet plaintiffs assert that the

juvenile court has not the lawful authority to fine and imprison beneficiaries of the Trust. Plaintiffs have

provided many of the documents issued by the juvenile court and not one "order" signed by defendant

Lisa Rambo (prepared by defendants Eidson and Hurt) has, upon its face, a Court Seal. The physical

juvenile court room was devoid of a Seal and of Federal or State standards (flags). By all

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appearances, the juvenile court was 1000/o private and not subject to common Law.

Therefore, the plaintiffs, also beneficiaries of the common and fundamental law Trust, were

subjected not to a Court of Record but to a private cabal of attorneys intending to deprive plaintiffs of

their property (inclusive of plaintiffs'wealth and young sons).

Plaintiffs' rights violated by defendant Eidson

Defendant Eidson wrote the order to unreasonably seize F.C. thereby subjected or caused to

be subjected the plaintiffs to deprivations of their inalienable rights as expressed at the Fourth

Amendment, their rights to due process, and their parentar rights.

No lmmunity for defendant Eidson

Defendant Eidson acted under color of law thus had the superseding obligation to protect the

beneficiary's' (plaintiffs') rights to life, liberty, and property. An obligation defendant Eidson simply and

maliciously refused to perform to the manifest injury of plaintiffs. Furthermore, defendant Eidson

prosecutes by way of deception and outright lies within a Court of No Record which is to say that his

juvenile court is not a "State" Couil". Instead the juvenile court is a private court depending entirely

upon the consent of all parties in order to proceed. Plaintiffs were at all times coerced via duress into

participating with said court thus plaintiffs never consented to the jurisdiction of the private juvenile

court. Defendant Eidson appears to be a private actor proceeding under mere pretense of Law making

him fully liable for the injuries he caused plaintiffs.

Defendant Eidson is not a duly licensed attorney

Eidson asserts that plaintiffs are not lawyers. In fact, plaintiffs are not attorneys nor are they

licensed attorneys, nor could they be if they wanted to be, nor do these facts have any relevance

whatsoever, Does OCGA 15-19-51 empower and authorize the courts or the BAR to issue business

licenses not under the Great Seal of the State of Georgia? lf so, where is the enabling authority

empowering the Legislature to give executive power(s) to the Judiciary or to a privately held and for

profit professional organization to be found? Defendant Eidson is not a duly licensed

attorney thus illegally "represents" his client the "DEPARTMENT". Plaintiffs (all five having an interest

in the Trust) will not tolerate defendant Eidson or anyone depriving them of their rights to prosecute

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those who deprive them of their rights or compromise their estate of which all three of plaintiffs' sons

are a part. Furthermore, plaintiffs have been viscously attacked by several BAR attorneys regarding

the instant case. Plaintiffs would be remiss to hire BAR attorneys to prosecute BAR attorneys or to

defend their (plaintiffs') positions.

Rooker-Feldman

Defendants, including defendant Eidson, are raising, in their defense, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. To apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this instant matter would indicate that the plaintiffs

have no lawful remedy for the deprivation of their inalienable rights by state actors and those utilizing

state actors to "do their dirty work." Furthermore, to do so would also allow and encourage the

violation of Constitutional rights in "State" court, or any court's, proceedings. Plaintiffs specifically

rebut the deferidant's presumption that Rooker-Feldman decisions are relevant or applicable in the

instant action for the following reasons:

Beneficia[ies of the Trust are guaranteed the benefits expressed within the Trust.

A Trustee liability for breach of the Trust is personal (no immunity for State actor Trustees) in

character with all the consequences and incidents of personal liability and is enforceable against the

Trustee's estate. To be sure, the Trust's authority supersedes any and all presumptions provisioned

within the Rooker-Feldman "doctrine", "statute,', "code',, "case law,', etc,

Plaintiffs will not receive a fair trialwithin a Georgia Court.

It has been demonstrated to plaintiffs that Georgia judicial, legislative, and executive officers,

regarding this case, have combined their offices to specifically deprive plaintiffs of their inalienable

rights. Attorneys and defendants James Hurt, Patrick Eidson, and Lisa Rambo came together to form

a united front upon the pretense of being judicial Trustees (while waging all out war upon the

Constitution and its beneficiaries) to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to the manifest physical and

emotional injury of plaintiffs (beneficiaries). In response, plaintiffs sought assistance from Sumter

County Sheriff Smith, Macon County Sheriff Cannon, Peach County Sheriff Deese, Dooly County

Sheriff Peavy, and Richmond County Sheriff Roundtree to report the injuries and crimes committed

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 6 of 12

against them (plaintiffs). Said executive branch Trustees refused to address these crimes in any

meaningful, reasonable, or professional way thereby vacating the Office of the Sheriff in the instant

case,

Plaintiffs then escalated their complaints to the Governor, Nathan Deal, in order find someone

within the Georgia Executive Office to enforce the Law and to hold the Official wrongdoers to account.

Mr. Deal has been a criminal prosecutor, a State circuit Judge, a juvenile judge, and was elected to the

Georgia Senate, Nathan Deal, vacating his Office, has demonstrated that he is also at war with the

Constitution and with the plaintiffs by also refusing to enforce the Law as it is found at the Georgia

Constitution. Nathan Deal has also exhibited considerable interest and promotion of both defendant

Lisa Rambo and her (allegedly) state Court Judge spouse William Rambo who both work within the

Sumter County Courthouse. Consider that the STATE OF GEORGIA is demonstrably adverse to the

plaintiffs' rights given that State attorney general and executive legal advisor to the Governor, SamI

Olens, currently opposes plaintiffs in this civil action. Given just these examples it should lead this

Court to reasonably conclude that no Georgia Judicial Trustee, Executive Trustee, or Legislative

Trustee will be in any way committed to remedying the deprivations heretofore suffered by plaintiffs

(beneficiaries).

Relevant Court Gonversations

As indicatedinWallacev. Powell, No,3:09-cv-286, No.3:10-cv-1405,(2012), "With respectto

liability for these claims, guilt or innocence is not relevant to the determination of whether a

constitutional right has been violated. lf someone were subjected to a search and seizure in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the the search produced incriminating evidence and may even

have resulted in a criminal conviction, would not nullify the violation of the Fourth Amendment or

necessarily bar a $ 1983 claim for damages. Indeed, this is the hypothetical posed by the Supreme

court in Heckv. Humphrey,512 u.s. 477,497 n.7,114 s. ct. 2364, 1|29 t. Ed. 2d (1gg4):

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 7 of 12

For example, a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even

if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial

resulting in the S 1983 plaintiffs still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like

independent source and inevitable discovery and especially harmless error, such a $ 1983

action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was

unlawful. ln order to recover compensatory damages, however, the $ 1983 plaintiff must prove

not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensabld injury, which,

we hold today, does not encompass the "injury" of being convicted and imprisoned (until his

conviction has been overturned)."

"Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under $1983" Patsy v. Board of

Regenfs of F\a.,457, U.S. 496, 501 (1982). The Supreme Court has expounded on this concept

extensively as seen in their commentary of Patsy, "beginning with McNeese y. Board of Education,

373-U.5. 668, 379 U.S. 671-673 (1963), we have on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a

S1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.

See Barryv. Barchi,443 U.S. 55,443 U.S. 6A n, 10 (1979); Gibsonv. Berryhil l,411 IJ.S.564,411 u.S.

574 (1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 405 U.S. 671 , (1972); Wilwording y. Swenson,4O4 tJ.S.

249, 404 U.S. 251 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 392 U.S. 640 (1968); King v, Smith,392

U.S. 309, 392 U.S. 312 n. a (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967). Cf. Steffetv.

Thompson,415 U.S. 452,415U.5.472-473 (1974) ("When federal claims are premised on tS 19831 --

as they are here -- we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies,

recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional

rights").

Brokaw v Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 665 (7th Cir 2002) found that whether a plaintiff is

presenting an independent claim, rather than a claim premised on an injury caused by the state court's

judgment, is paramount, but is also a complex question. The Court indicated that it is often "'difficult

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 8 of 12

to distinguish' between situations in which the plaintiff is seeking to set aside a state court judgment

and ones in which the claim is independent." Edwards v. lllinois Bd. of Adm. to the Baf 261 F.3dT23,

728-29 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Long, 182 F.3d at 555). However, in this instant matter plaintiffs are

clearly not indicating that any'Judgment" be set aside--they are seeking remedy for constitutional

rights violations at the hands of the defendants. In support of this position, the plaintiffs cite Nesses

v. Shepard, 68. F, 3d. 1003. In that case, Nesses brought suit in federal court against the lawyers and

some of the judges involved in a breach of contract case wh.ich he had filed in Indiana state court and

lost. ld. at 1004. Nesses claimed that his opponents' lawyers used their political clout to turn the state

judges against him. ld. The district court dismissed Nesses' suit for lack of jurisdiction based on

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ld, The appeals court rejected that conclusion, reasoning that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar Nesses' claim because his suit was not premised on a claim

that the state court judgment denied him some constitutional right; rather, his federal claim was based

on a right indepetdent of the state court proceeding, As explained in Nesses v. Shepard, any other

conclusion would mean that "there would be no federal remedy for a violation of federal rights

whenever the violator so far succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a favorable

judgment,...." ld. at 1005. Moreover, the court reasoned that such a "result would be inconsistent with

cases in which, for example, police officers are sued under 42 U,S.C. S 1983 for having fabricated

evidence that resulted in the plaintiffs being convicted in a state court." ld, Other circuits have applied

similar reasoning to arrive at this conclusion. See Holtoway v. Brush,22O F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000),

and Emsf v. Child and Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997). ln Hoiloway,a

mother brought a Section 1983 action against the county and the county social worker alleging that

they had improperly interfered with her right to the custody of her children, (Hottoway v. Brush ,220

F.3d at 772). The Sixth Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the mother's federal

claim because she was not seeking review of the custody decision, which was an entirely separate

state matter. ld. at778-79.Instead, as the court in Holloway explained, the mother's claim presented a

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 9 of 12

distinct question as to "whether certain actions in the course of those proceedings may have involved

a violation of her federal constitutional rights for which the responsible party may be held liable for

damages." ld. at779.

Similarly, in Ernsf, 108 F.3d 486, the Third Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar a claim

based on alleged constitutional violations stemming from child custody proceedings. /d. at 491-92.

In Ernsi a grandmother, who had sole guardianship of her granddaughter, sued the child welfare

department and case workers alleging substantive and procedural due process claims after the

defendants removed and retained custody of her granddaughter for five years. /d. at 488-8g. The court

held that "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the district court from deciding those claims

because a ruling that the defendants violated Ernst's right to substantive due process by making

recommendations to the state court out of malice or personal bias would not have required the court to

find that the state court judgments made on the basis of those recommendations were

erroneous." ld.at 491-92. The court fudher reasoned that "it is clear that deciding the substantive due

process claims did not involve federal court review of a state court decision because Ernst's

substantive due process claims were never decided by the state court." ld, at 492.

On the other hand , in Goodman v. Srpos, 259 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.2001), the Eleventh Circuit

held that Rooker-Feldman barred jurisdiction over due process claims brought by a mother and her

son against the Georgia Department of Family Services for damages caused by the defendants'

allegedly unconstitutional investigation and initiation of state removal proceedings. To the extent

Goodman conflicts with Holloway and Ernst, the findings in Holloway and Ernst are more consistent

with the Supreme Court's rulings on exhaustive claims and with other circuits' rulings on Rooker-

Feldman, namely that constitutional violations may arise independently from state court proceedings,

and thus not be barred by Rooker-Feldman. Moreover, while Goodman expressly rejected the

holdings of Holloway and ErnsL the court in Goodman did so in a conclusory manner with litfle

explanation (see Goodman,259 F,3d at 1333 n. 7). Of primary importance in Goodman was the

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 10 of 12

ability of the plaintiffs to have a "reasonable" opportunity to present constitutional claims in state court

proceedings. Of relevance to this instant matter is that Plaintiffs Dann and Sharon Cross did present

constitutional claims to several of the defendants, including defendant Rambo, and had these claims

ignored. While many of the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' claims must be barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine because a successful constitutional challenge in federal court could mean that the

state court erred, "the fact that the plaintiffs pursuit of federal claims could ultimately show that the

state court judgment was erroneous [does] not automatically. make Rooker-

Fetdman applicable." Long,182 F.3d at 555-56. Rather, the appropriate question is whether "the

federal plaintiff [is] seeking to set aside a state court judgment, or does [s]he present some

independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to

which he was a party." GASHAssoc. v. Village of Rosemonl 995 F.2d726,728 (7th Cir.1993),

While the above is by no means an exhaustive selection of decisions involving the Rooker-

t

Feldman Doctrine, it is illustrative and supportive of the plaintiffs' assertions that the Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine is not applicable in this instant matter.

For the foregoing reasons and all the others reve.aled in the plaintiffs'complaint, defendants'

motion to dismiss this instant action should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of May 2014,

C*'477'a4plaintiffs in propria persona

Case 5:14-cv-00006-HL Document 104 Filed 05/08/14 Page 11 of 12

Gertificate of Service

I hereby certify that I have electronically filed plaintiffs' rebuttal to defendant James Hurt'smotion to dismiss wiifr tfre Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically sendemail notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record:

AIMEE P SANDERS aimeesanders@frailswilsonlaw.com

BRETT A Wl LLIAMS bwill iams@i nsleyrace, com, ehoward@insleyrace. com

BRYAN M GRANTHAM bg.rantham@hptylaw.qom

DAVI D V JOH NSON dj @i nsleyracq. com, cdeel @i nsleyrace. com, ehoward@insleyrace, com

JAMES W HURT iameshuftlaw@bellsouth,net

JOH N S I-ADE EDWARDS isedwards@m artinsnow. com

JOSEPH CHARLES LEWIS timlewis@thetimlewisfirm.com

KEVIN P RAC'E krace@insleyrace,com, klatos@insleyracq'com

KIM M JACKSON kjackson@hptylaw.com, measton@hptylaw.com, mhyde@hptylaw.com

PATRICK S EIDSON eidthekid@gmail.com

RAN DOLPH FRAI LS ra ndvfrai ls@frailswi lsonlaw com

ROGER E HARRIS roger.harris@swiftcurrie.com, sharon.noble@swiftcurrie.com

SHANNON S HINSON shannon.hinsgn@swiftcqrrie.com

SUSAN ELIZABETH TEASTER steaster@law.ga.gov,.04crmail@law.ga.gov, dorland@lawga.gov

WILLIAM DALLAS NESMITH , l l l wnesmith@sumtercountyga,us

This 7th day of May, 2014.

;/z/ zg/Llplaintiff in pro per

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