Attorney Fee Objections

RICHARD L HOLCOMB (HI Bar No. 9177)

BRIAN BRAZIER (HI Bar No. 9343) (Of Counsel)

Holcomb Law, A Limited Liability Law Corporation

1136 Union Mall, Suite 808

Honolulu, HI 96813

Telephone: (808) 545-4040

Facsimile: (808) 356-1954

Email: [email protected]

ALAN BECK (HI Bar No. 9145)

Attorney at Law

4780 Governor Drive

San Diego, California 92122

Telephone: (619) 971-0414

Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

Hawaii Defense Foundation,

Christopher Baker,

and Derek Scammon

Plaintiffs,

vs.

City and County of Honolulu;

Andrew Lum, in his personal and

official capacity;

John Does 1-10 in their personal and

official capacities.

Defendants.

________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. CV 12-00469JMS-RLP

PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN

PART PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES [Doc. 64]; DECLARATION OF RICHARD L.

HOLCOMB; EXHIBITS ONE

THROUGH THREE; CERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

HEARING:

Date: ________________________

Time: ________________________

Judge: Honorable J. Michael Seabright

Case 1:12-cv-00469-JMS-RLP Document 65 Filed 05/05/14 Page 1 of 33 PageID #: 883

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

A. Calculation of the Reasonable Hourly Rate . . . . . . . . . 2

B. 25% Meat-Axe Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

C. Task-based limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

D. Duplicative Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

II. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Reported Cases:

Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Bell v. Clackamas Cnty., 341 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 12

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . 4, 12, 22,

28

Casey v. City of Cabool, Missouri, 12 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1993) . . . . . 21

Christensen v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am.,

557 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 17, 18,

19

Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

690 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


ii

Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12, 14,

20, 28

HonoluluTraffic.com, et. al. v. Federal Transit Admin., et. al.,

742 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

In re Smith, 586 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 23

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp, Inc.,

488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Missouri v. Jenkins by Agvei, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . 13

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . 6, 15, 19,

23, 24, 26,

27

Prison Legal News v. Schwarznegger,

608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 13

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 23

Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J.

v. AT &T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 557 F.3d 1041 (9

th Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Unreported Cases:

Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc.,

07-00007 DAEKSC, 2007 WL 2320672

(D. Haw. Aug. 10, 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Deocampo v. Potts, CIV. 2:06-1283 WBS,

2014 WL 788429 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28-29


iii

Harris v. Trash Man, LLC,

CIV. 12-00169 HG-KSC,

2013 WL 1932715 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4, 17

Hohlbein v. Utah Land Res., LLC,

467 F. Appx 715 (9th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Jo.R. ex rel. C.R. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist.,

12-5446, 2013 wl 6654048 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Ko Olina Dev., LLC v. Centex Homes,

CIV. 09-00272DAE-LEK,

2010 WL 447451 (D. Haw. Feb. 9, 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Mancini v. Dan P. Plute, Inc., 358 F. App'x 886 (9th Cir. 2009) . . . . 18

Marquez v. Harper Sch. Dist. No. 66,

546 F. Appx 659 (9th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 26

Olson v. Lui, CIV. 10-00691 ACK,

2012 WL 3686682 (D. Haw. Aug. 27, 2012) (attached) . . . . . . . . . . . 16-17

Statutes and other authority

Pub. L. No. 101-194 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Executive Order No. 13655 (Dec. 23, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


1

PLAINTIFFS OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES [Doc. 64]

COME NOW Plaintiffs Hawaii Defense Foundation, Christopher Baker, and

Derek Scammon, by and through the undersigned counsel, and pursuant to U.S.C.

636(b)(1),1 Rules 54(d)(2)(D) (treating motions for attorneys fees as pretrial

matters) and 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 54.3(h)

(referring to Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 54(d)), and 74.2 or 74.3 of the Local Rules of this

Court, and object to the Findings and Recommendation to Grant in Part and Deny

in Part Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys Fees entered April 22, 2014 as Document

64 (hereinafter referred to as Recommendation). Plaintiffs request de novo

review as required by Rule 72(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or

Local Rule 74.2, that the Recommendation be modified pursuant to the following

objections, and compensation for. Moreover, should this Court choose to receive

further evidence, see Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 72(b)(3) and/or Local Rule 74.2, Plaintiff

requests a hearing and that the Court provide guidance as to the nature of the

further evidence that would assist the Court in making its determination.

1 Counsel notes that footnote 1 of the Magistrates Report and Recommendation

cites 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). However, the applicable provision appears after

subsection (b)(1)(C) and is not subdivided further than (b)(1).


2

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs object to the magistrates: hourly rate imposed for Attorneys

Holcomb, Brazier and Beck, [Doc. 64, pp. 9-16]; the 25% meat axe reduction for

billing quarter-hour increments, [Doc. 64, pp. 22-23]; the magistrates task-based

billing limitation, [Doc. 64, p. 18]; and, the reduction for duplicative time, [Doc.

64, p. 20]; and,. Although the last two reductions are somewhat nominal, these

remaining reductions primarily account for the vast reduction in the requested total

award of $64,690.29 to $21,071.50, a 67.43% reduction which is not reasonable or

fair and does not encourage competent counsel to accept these types of cases in

Honolulu.

A. Calculation of the Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiffs requested fees relying on the Laffey Matrix as evidence of a

baseline standard that would reflect the true market value of legal services. [Doc.

56-1, p. 31] In support of this request, Plaintiffs presented an extensive survey of

this Courts prior awards for years, beginning with Harris v. Trashman, LLC, Civ.

12-00169 HG-KSC, 2013 WL 1932715 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 2013)2 where the

Magistrate correctly stated that [n]ot only are Hawaiis prevailing market rates

considerably lower than those in California but the rates awarded in this district

are lower still. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 13-24] (emphasis added).

2 Unless otherwise specified, unreported cases were attached as an appendix to the

Motion, Docs. 56-13 56-55.


3

From this extensive analysis, Plaintiffs observed: this Court notoriously

awards fees far below any reasonable rate on the mainland and/or Hawaii, [Doc.

56-1, pp. 13-15]; these reductions amount to a judicially imposed de facto ceiling

on attorneys fees, [Doc. 56-1, pp. 21]; that empirical data presented by a number

of attorneys (including numerous declarations, publications of big firm rates in

the Pacific Business News, and Plaintiffs submission showing that the City pays

its independent counsel rates in line with Plaintiffs request [Doc. 58]) are

universally rejected in favor of the Courts knowledge of prevailing rates, [Doc.

56-1, pp. 21-23, 30]; and that these extraordinarily low rates have not consistently

increased despite inflation or any other market considerations. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 23-

24, 31]

Plaintiffs concluded that the extraordinarily low but persistently awarded

rates are particularly troubling in Honolulu where the cost of living is surpassed

only by Manhattan,3 and that the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1988 is not promoted by

the imposition of these rates. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 24-28] Had this Districts awarded

rates continued to increase for the past 8-10 years, the rates would have risen

3 The cost of actually living in Honolulu is likely inflated beyond what is reflected

in the Cost of Living formula. See Collective Exhibit One, Civil Beat Price of Paradise series.


4

consistent with the Laffey Matrix.4 [Doc. 56-1, pp. 31-32] Plaintiffs also observed

that this was an extremely novel case, counsel assumed an inordinate risk in the

expense and complexity of litigation when taking the case, and that Plaintiffs and

counsel were subjected to public ridicule by bringing this case.5

Defendants responded by summarily reviewing Attorneys Holcomb, Brazier,

and Becks qualifications and arbitrarily determining that $180, $175, and $125

were reasonable hourly rates for each, respectively. [Doc. 62, pp. 9-11] Citing

Harris v. Trash Man, LLC, supra., Defendants argued that this Court had rejected

Plaintiffs arguments. [Doc. 62, p. 11] Defendants also argued that Plaintiffs had

presented no evidence of the rates,6 and that this Courts familiar[ity] with the

prevailing rates warranted the rates proposed by Defendants. [Doc. 62, pp. 11-13]

4 Notably, each of Plaintiffs attorneys was awarded far less than each would have

expected had they had comparable experience in 2004 and 2005.

5 Despite these factors, Plaintiffs did not and are not requesting a lodestar

multiplier.

6 Defendants completely ignored the various Declarations and Pacific Business

News articles presented in the prior cases cited in and attached to Plaintiffs brief. These past decisions discussing the evidence presented in those motions for fees

and the rates awarded are proper evidence. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,

1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992). Defendants also understandably completely ignored

Plaintiffs evidence showing that the City pays its own independent counsel rates consistent with what Plaintiffs requested, [Doc. 58] and did not assert that rail

litigation was more complex than the instant litigation. Plaintiffs presume this was deliberate as the City will not want to pay opposing counsel in rail cases any

higher rates based on a lodestar multiplier.


5

The magistrate determined that Attorneys Holcomb, Brazier, and Beck

should be awarded $185, $175 and $150, respectively. [Doc. 64, p. 16] The

magistrate stated that Plaintiffs was an assert[ion] that Laffey matrix rates should

be applied for all counsel.7 Based on his aware[ness] of previous awards, the

magistrate found that Plaintiffs analysis only confirmed that this Court

consistently applies the correct standard and that this Court had never awarded

rates as high as those requested by Plaintiffs. [Doc. 64, p. 11]

The Recommendation ignores each of Plaintiffs arguments derived from the

analysis of prior awards. [Doc. 64, pp. 11-12] Plaintiffs arguments should have

been considered and the magistrate should have articulated his reliance on or

rejection of the facts presented by Plaintiffs in support of those arguments. See

Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover,

the past requests, Declarations, and evidence from those opinions (which included

7 While it is true that Plaintiffs requested the rates listed on the Laffey matrix,

Plaintiffs did not advocate blind adherence to the Laffey matrix. Instead, it was

offered as evidence of a fair market rate. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 31-32] Moreover, it is

true that the Ninth Circuit questioned whether Washington D.C. rates should apply in other districts. [Doc. 64, p. 10] However, in that case, it was the

government who urged adherence to the Laffey matrix plus a 9% cost of living

adjustment to account for the expense of San Francisco compared to Washington

D.C. instead of the actual San Francisco rates which were much higher. Prison

Legal News v. Schwarznegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth

Circuit has never disparaged the use of the matrix to suggest what rate might be

necessary to promote the purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1988.


6

Pacific Business News articles showing higher rates) were ignored.8 Thus, relying

solely on another of this Courts cases where this Court denied having held the

line, the magistrate attempted to distinguish this case and/or the previous cited

cases from Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008) by

finding that because each attorney is assigned a different rate based on experience,

this Court does not hold the line. [Doc. 64, p. 12] Once again, the Courts

omniscience overrode all contradicting evidence.

The magistrate then specifically found that Plaintiffs reliance on Hawaiis

high cost of living as a factor in measuring hourly rates is misplaced. [Doc. 64, -.

12] Although Plaintiffs can find no remote indication from this Recommendation,

any previous awards, or Defendants arguments that the Court or the government

disagrees that any person living and conducting business in Hawaii is extremely

burdened by these extraordinary costs as well as the various imposing taxes, see

Collective Exhibit One, the magistrate suggests that because Plaintiffs are

requesting a rate that is more than the Court has previously awarded, Plaintiffs

would somehow enjoy a windfall if the requested rates were awarded. [See Doc.

64, p. 12] And, while Plaintiffs agree that counsel is not entitled to a windfall, the

8 Plaintiffs also presented compelling evidence definitively demonstrating that

even the City does not believe the awarded rates are reasonable. Again, the City

pays the least experienced associates at private Honolulu law firms $295 per hour.

[Doc. 58] This comparison was rejected as somehow completely inapt, [Doc. 64, p. 14], and is discussed below.


7

Recommendation ignores the fact that the entire purpose of 42 U.S.C. 1988 is to

attract competent counsel to precisely this type of case. [See Doc. 64, p. 12]

Clearly, the cost of living is a relevant consideration.

In justifying the drastic reduction, the magistrate quotes extensively a 2009

article from Pacific Business News entitled Mainland-Hawaii Salary Gap Grows.

Plaintiffs have attached this article as Exhibit Two.

Although it cannot be gleaned from the Recommendation, the numbers in

that article do not come close to supporting the drastic reductions in Plaintiffs

attorneys fee rates. The article is now five years old. And, the article states [t]he

legal profession in Honolulu pays an average of $78,270 a year, while the national

average is $92,268, about 15 percent less, although thats a slight improvement

over 2005, when the difference was 17 percent. It is unclear whether that gap

has increased or decreased in the past five years. And, the gap is actually less than

15% as the article goes on to state Honolulu attorneys make an average of

$85,092 and on the Neighbor Islands they make even less, about $76,000,

according to the Labor Department. Thus, the first statement clearly included

non-attorney legal profession[als]. Nevertheless, had Plaintiffs attorneys been

awarded a rate 15% less than that requested, this objection would not have been

raised. Yet, the requested rates were reduced far below the requested rates. The

reductions approach 50%.


8

Moreover, Mr. Slovin did not say that he or any other partner at Goodsill

billed $250 per hour.9 That figure was based entirely on unspecified PBN

research research that is inconsistent with the magazines prior publications in

which the big firms disclosed some rates and are discussed in the various

opinions cited in the Plaintiffs Motion. And, the phraseology of the statement,

i.e., Law firm partners on the Mainland charge between $300 and $1,000 an hour,

while most of the bigger firms in Hawaii charge closer to $250, according to PBN

research, begs the question whether PBN research indicates that is a minimal,

maximum, mean, weighted average, guesstimate, or other approximation of the

rate. It also does not specify what kinds of cases resulted in the data that was used

to somehow extrapolate the result of the research.

Obviously, such unspecified research should not be relied upon to set the

market rate in fee shifting federal cases, particularly civil rights cases. And,

even if it were properly considered, none of Plaintiffs attorneys received a rate

9 Even if Mr. Slovin had said that Goodsill partners billed $250 per hour, an astute

reader would wonder what possible motivation could have prompted such a

representation, which is contrary to the evidence submitted in numerous cases and

cited by various Plaintiffs, including in this case. The big firms certainly have an interest in excluding mainland firms from their market. The big firms clearly have an interest in justifying the somewhat lower associate salaries, despite billing

them at $295 per hour. Moreover, the big firms often have several big clients which offer stability and consistent, almost guaranteed income which might justify

a lower rate. Further, even if some partners do bill at $250 per hour, those partners

realize personal financial gain from the time billed by associates which, according

to the article, the partners pay 15% less than comparable mainland associates.

Plaintiffs attorneys in this case enjoy no such gains.


9

anywhere close to the purported partner rate. Must a lawyer practice three, five,

seven or thirty years before he or she is considered a partner? The analogy in the

Recommendation leaves open the question of why these solo practitioners should

not be treated as a partner. It is impermissible to assign a lower rate to a solo

practitioner just because the solo practitioner must rely largely on lead counsel.

Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2008). Why

should solo practitioners be penalized when they handle marketing, administration,

and other necessary but less fulfilling tasks (which partners can dump on their

underlings or extensive legal staff) in addition to practicing law which solely

accounts for billable fees?

Mr. Holcombs Declaration sets forth a number of significant legal victories

and publications. [Doc. 56-2] Even in the approximate five years of practice in

Hawaii, Mr. Holcomb has won no less than two Hawaii appellate cases that had or

will continue to have far-reaching statewide impact. Most recently, with the able

assistance of Mr. Beck, counsel won (at least for the time being) the somewhat

related case styled Christopher Baker v. Louis Kealoha, et. al., No. 12-16258, __

Fed.Appx. __ , 2014 wl 1087765 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) in the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. This case will likely allow Hawaiis citizens to fully enjoy their

rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment rights that have been deprived for

decades. It is doubtful that all or even most partners, even those who have


10

practiced for significantly more time than the average partner, have achieved

victories with such significance. Certainly, none could have won Baker, because

no big firm would take his case. [Doc. 56-5] Moreover, Mr. Brazier and Mr.

Holcomb share a case that is billed hourly by a paying client at $250 per hour.

[Doc. 56-3] While Plaintiffs believe that their attorneys deserve more, this

purported partner rate was not even adopted as a baseline for Mr. Holcomb.

Nevertheless, the magistrate contends that [t]his [drastic reduction in rates]

has been accepted as the price of paradise. [Doc. 64, p. 13] Yet, the article does

not suggest acceptance. Instead, it addresses Hawaiis businesses struggle in

recruiting and maintaining competent employees at lower salaries. Exhibit Two.

Yet, 42 U.S.C. 1988 is designed to attract counsel. And, the price of statehood is

the promotion of congressional intent rendering this so-called price of paradise

too high. Clearly the cost of living and doing business is a very relevant factor in

determining a reasonable rate and should be reflected in a market rate. See Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892-93 (1984) (rejecting Solicitor Generals argument that

[b]ecause market rates incorporate operating expenses non-profit organizations

should not receive market rates which also include an element of profit

unnecessary to attract nonprofit counsel).

Further, the magistrate rejected Plaintiffs evidence showing that the City

pays its own independent lawyers from Honolulu law firms between $295 and


11

$495 per hour. In other words, the bottom-rung associate at those firms are billed

at $295 per hour, despite their obvious inexperience.10

Those attorneys are not any

more experienced in rail cases or any other cases than Plaintiffs counsel. The

requested rates were within or even less than those rates. Despite the Defendants

having deliberately declined to object to or explain this evidence, the magistrate

found that Plaintiffs comparison was inapt, implying that this case was less

complex. [Doc. 64, p. 14] The magistrate simply implied that this case was less

complex, which does not suffice to explain the magnitude of the reductions.

Costa v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 113637 (9th Cir.2012).

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs object to this finding for three reasons.

First, Defendants did not raise it. The party opposing the fee application

has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court

10

Kobayashi, Sugita and Godas website reveals that they have eighteen partners and ten associates. The partners range in experience from 49 years (Mr.

Kobayashi) to 7 years (Jonathan Moore, who was licensed in Louisiana in 2007).

The associates range in experience from 0 to 7 to years experience. Notably, these attorneys were awarded fees in Ko Olina Development, LLC v. Centex Homes,

2011 WL 1235548 (March 29, 2011), cited in and attached to Plaintiffs Motion. It is clear from that opinion that, not only did the attorneys strategically petition

this Court for rates less than those they actually charge, but that this Court reduced

their requested fees further, imposing what appears to be the $350 senior attorney cap on Mr. Kobayashi.

Due to the structure of Carlsmith Balls website, it is much more difficult (and therefore time-consuming) to evaluate the most and least experienced partners and

associates. However, there appear to be 77 attorneys employed at Carlsmith Ball

with widely diverse levels of experience.


12

challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the ... facts asserted by the

prevailing party in its submitted affidavits. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523

F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 139798).

Second, while recognizing that civil rights awards should be governed by

the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal

litigation, the United States Supreme Court specifically likened civil rights cases

in complexity to antitrust cases and directed those awards not be reduced

because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in nature. Blum, 465 U.S. at

893. Moreover, like the rail cases, Plaintiffs in this case were required to

maneuver the procedural requirements of this Court and were entitled to and did

seek extraordinary injunctive relief, further complicating the case. The lack of

duration of the case, which certainly was not foreseen by counsel when taking the

case, was a product of the strength of the merits of the case rather than a lack of

complexity. This case involved not only issues of first impression pertaining to the

First Amendment (an area of law that is complex even without any extraneous

factors), but also highly complex technological issues which would have

complicated this case exponentially had the Court not admonished the City the day

after the complaint was filed. These facts should undoubtedly be considered and

counsels risk in taking the case should not be minimized. Crawford v. Astrue, 586


13

F.3d 1142, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2009). The case should not be held any less complex

despite the benefit of hindsight that the parties and the Court now enjoy.

Third, the Hawaii Supreme Court did not find the rail case in which it

awarded fees any more complex than other cases. See Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, et.

al., No. SCAP-11-0000611 (Haw. May 2, 2013) (opinion attached as Exhibit

Three). And, insofar as rail cases might be more complex,11

the complexity is

subsumed in the lodestar calculation because attorneys in those cases will

necessarily bill more hours. This effect on the lodestar was specifically noted in

the Recommendation [Doc. 64, p. 8 n. 3] (quoting Morales v. City of San Rafael,

96 F.3d 359, 364 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Prison Legal News, 608 F.3d at

454-55 (determination of rates not limited to reviewing a specific type of case).

And, this Court should not isolate civil rights cases from other types of cases when

determining the appropriate market rates. Christensen v. Stevedoring Servs. of

Am., 557 F.3d 1049, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting Fourth Circuits definition

of relevant community which looked solely to other LHWCA cases in the same

region in favor of a more broad definition).

11

The issues litigated appear to be no more than whether the rail project complies

with its own rules and/or federal law. Exhibit Three; See HonoluluTraffic.com,

et. al. v. Federal Transit Admin., et. al., 742 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2014). Yet,

insofar as the magistrate implicitly found that the Citys private lawyers are somehow burdened beyond the burdens faced by Plaintiffs counsel in this case, the undersigned observes that two federal agencies shared the defense burden in

HonoluluTraffic.com. Id. And, the State shared the defense burden in Kaleikini.

Exhibit Three.


14

Plaintiffs also observed that the awarded rates have only increased

nominally over the past ten years. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 23-24, 31, 32] Yet, inflation

alone should result in a steady increase in the awarded fees. See Bell v. Clackamas

Cnty., 341 F.3d 858, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (Clearly, compensation received

several years after the services were rendered as it frequently is in complex civil

rights litigation is not equivalent to the same dollar amount received reasonably

promptly as the legal services are performed . . . [w]e agree, therefore, that an

appropriate adjustment for delay in payment whether by the application of

current rates or otherwise is within the contemplation of the statute.) (emphasis

added); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1406 (recognizing an increase during the course of

litigation). Economic conditions have approved since the Great Recession. Cost

of living has continued to rise. Exhibit One.

The failure to raise the rates due to inflation and other market influences

does not attract competent counsel to litigate these cases in Honolulu, despite the

intent of 42 U.S.C. 1988 and the fact that rates in other jurisdictions have

increased as have salaries in other professions.12

As discussed in Moreno:

12

Federal judges, for example, received an approximate 14% raise in 2014

following a finding that, pursuant to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, their salaries

should have increased each year despite the absence of increases between 2009 and

2014. Pub. L. No. 101-194; Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012),

cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1997; Barker v. United States, No. 12-826 (Fed. Cl. filed

Nov. 30, 2012). In addition, federal judges will receive an additional 1% cost of


15

One problem with any such policy is that it becomes difficult to

revise over time, as economic conditions change; here the rate

apparently hadn't changed for 10 years, and even a $50 increase in the

hourly rate was considered a big step ... for the court generally. Unless carefully administered and updated, any such policy becomes a

strait-jacket. More fundamentally, such a policyno matter how well intentioned or administeredis inconsistent with the methodology for awarding fees that the Supreme Court and our court has adopted. The

district court's function is to award fees that reflect economic

conditions in the district; it is not to hold the line at a particular rate, or to resist a rate because it would be a big step. If the lodestar leads to an hourly rate that is higher than past practice, the court must award

that rate without regard to any contrary practice.

Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115.

This stagnation of the awarded fees was not discussed by the magistrate. No

explanation was given. And, offering only nominal (if any) adjustments for years

results in a fee that does not reflect a fair market rate. Plaintiffs object.

Other than simply denying Plaintiffs contention that the rates awarded by

this Court appear to set a cap on attorneys fees, the magistrate made no effort to

discredit Plaintiffs argument. [Doc. 64, pp. 11-12] Yet, Plaintiffs presented an

exhaustive survey of prior awards that suggest the imposition of a de facto cap,

whether intentional or not. [Doc. 56-1, pp. 13-24] This evidence was simply

living adjustment every year pursuant to Executive Order No. 13655 (Dec. 23,

2013). Historically, judges have received increases each year with few exceptions,

the longest period being 1993-1997 (a time when apparently the 1989 Act also

intended unrealized adjustments). See Beer, supra. Had awarded rates increased

at the intended rate of federal judges salaries, Plaintiffs would not have objected

to the awarded rate.


16

dismissed as proof that this Court has consistently applied the correct standard of

awarding attorneys fees while also recognizing that this Court has never awarded

fees as high as those requested. [Doc. 64, p. 11] The magistrate did not address

the consistent and drastic fee reductions [Doc. 56-1, p. 13-15] or the maximum

hourly rate this Court has awarded for senior attorneys.13 Id. at 15. These rates

are universally established by elevating this Courts knowledge of the prevailing

rate over empirical data, including published rates, declarations, and the requests

of attorneys. Id. at 15-23. Indeed, as discussed above, the magistrate rejected

Plaintiffs proof showing that the City pays its own attorneys rates consistent with

13

Counsel has since found a departure from this cap imposed on senior attorneys.

Paul Alston who has practiced for 40 years and has an AV rating from Martindale-

Hubbell has been awarded $450 at least three times. Olson v. Lui, CIV. 10-00691

ACK, 2012 WL 3686682 at *4 (D. Haw. Aug. 27, 2012) (unpublished) (attached).

However, in that case, the magistrate had specifically imposed the cap on senior

attorneys:

As an initial matter, the Court observes that the Magistrate Judge's

reliance upon Blake v. Nishimura, Civ. No. 0800281 LEK, 2010 WL 1372420, at *7 (D.Haw. Mar. 31, 2010), wherein the court found that

$350 was a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Alston and was the highest hourly rate awarded in any case and within the range of rates for similarly situated law partners, must be viewed in light of the two

more recent cases wherein Hawaii courts awarded Mr. Alston a fee

much higher than the discounted $450 rate that he has requested.

Id. Yet, noting that Nishimura was a civil rights case unlike Olson, Senior Judge Kay rejected the cap in that case, implying that the cap remains in full effect in

civil rights cases. Id. Clearly that was improper and is further evidence of towing the line. See Christensen, 557 F.3d at 1053-54. The $450 awarded rate was also, nonetheless, a discounted rate from the $675 per hour that Mr. Alston actually

charges. Id. at n. 5.


17

or higher than the rates requested by Plaintiffs attorneys. The evidence of this

cap is overwhelming. See Harris, supra. ([n]ot only are Hawaiis prevailing

market rates considerably lower than those in California but the rates awarded in

this district are lower still.) (emphasis added); Olson, supra., (rejecting $350

highest hourly rate awarded in a case that was not a civil rights case); See Aloha

Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Air Grp., Inc., 07-00007 DAEKSC, 2007 WL 2320672 (D.

Haw. Aug. 10, 2007) (unpublished).

Empirical evidence should not be universally discarded each and every time

it is brought to this Courts attention. Once the prevailing attorney offers

evidence of a market rate, there is a presumption of reasonableness, and the court

may not reduce that rate without explaining the basis for its decision. Mancini v.

Dan P. Plute, Inc., 358 F. App'x 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (attached)

(citations omitted). The only explanation ever offered by this Court in any of these

cases is the Courts knowledge of the prevailing rate. In the Ninth Circuit, an

award of attorneys fees based solely on past fee awards is considered

unreasonable, because holding the line at a flat rate does not define the relevant

market rate. Mancini, 358 F. Appx at 889-90 (citing Christensen, 557 F.3d at

1053; Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115); compare Marquez v. Harper Sch. Dist. No. 66,

546 F. Appx 659 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (attached) (suggestion that court

may have held the line by using the 2007 Oregon State Bar Survey as a


18

baseline, which is also impermissible). This is because [a]rbitrarily holding the

line at past court-generated fee awards does not respect the congressional intent

animating fee-shifting statutes. Van Skike v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp.

Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Student Pub. Interest

Research Group of N.J. v. AT &T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1446 (3d Cir. 1988)

(Courts that try to establish public interest market rates by looking to the going

rate for public interest work therefore do not examine an independently operating

market governed by supply and demand, but rather recast fee awards made by

previous courts into market rates ... [thereby] ... perpetuat[ing] a court-established

rate as a market when that rate in fact bears no necessary relationship to the

underlying purpose of relying on the marketplace: to calculate a reasonable fee

sufficient to attract competent counsel.).14 Plaintiffs maintain that these prior

awards and the present award demonstrate and are derived from an impermissible

de facto cap on attorneys fees.

Finally, the magistrate attributed the 35 page memorandum, a violation of

Local Rule 7.5, as reflecting Plaintiffs counsels lack of skill and experience.

14

Plaintiffs recognize that some of the cases on which they rely involved one rate

that was set for attorneys of varying levels of experience. see Moreno, 534 F.3d at

1115; Christensen, 557 F.3d 1049. However, the fact that this Court awards

different de facto caps for attorneys with varying experience makes no difference.


19

[Doc. 64, p. 16] Accordingly, the magistrate factored this violation into his

determination of appropriate hourly rates. Id.

Counsel has filed a number of documents in complex civil rights litigation in

this Court. With the exception of a complaint that was unduly called prolix,

counsel has never heard any complaints about the quality of the work submitted.

This violation was the result of negligence as counsel misremembered the page

limitation as being 35 pages rather than 30. If this mistake, which was akin to a

typo, warrants any deflation in the awarded rates, it should be nominal at best. See

Jo.R. ex rel. C.R. v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 12-5446, 2013 wl 6654048

(9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2013) (unpublished) (attached) (finding abuse of discretion for

denying fees because counsel attempted to violate page limitations by including

much of the discussion in single-spaced footnotes).

However, it is unclear from this decision how much weight the magistrate

attributed to the mistake. It is also unclear whether Mr. Brazier and Mr. Beck

received rate reductions due to the mistake. The reduction should have been

limited to Mr. Holcomb, alone, as Mr. Holcomb drafted the memorandum and was,

therefore, solely responsible for the mistake. [See Doc. 64, p. 23] It is improper to

reduce the rate without answering such rudimentary questions. See In re Smith,

586 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399 (citations

omitted), and Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1146


20

(9th Cir. 2001) (the magistrate should explain[ ] the relationship between the

time improperly billed and the size of the [fee] reduction.). A reviewing Court is

unable to determine whether this mistake resulted in the almost 50% reduction

from Mr. Holcombs requested rate or, perhaps the almost 30% reduction Mr.

Holcomb received from the purported partner rate. It is also impossible to

determine whether or to what extent Mr. Holcombs mistake operated to reduce the

requested rates of Mr. Brazier and Mr. Beck.

Plaintiffs are not seeking a windfall. Plaintiffs are seeking a rate that

would not discourage attorneys from continuing to represent citizens whose rights

have been violated particularly those who have not sustained significant

monetary damages and are, accordingly, underrepresented in Hawaii.15

Attorneys

Holcomb, Brazier and Beck have several such cases pending before this Court.

However, this business model cannot be sustained at the awarded rates. In order to

receive fair pay, counsel is left with the options of moving to California,

abandoning personal morals in order to defend the actions of municipalities or

businesses against private and often vulnerable citizens, or to join a big firm

where the same morals would be jeopardized. Such is not the intent or design of

Section 1988. And, the magistrate did not address Plaintiffs observation that

15

The magistrate does not deny Plaintiffs contention that this Court is rarely confronted with First Amendment litigation, particularly where no damages are at

stake. [Doc. 56-1, p. 13]


21

Hawaii is not attracting competent mainland lawyers, despite the small market

the magistrate relies on in the drastic reduction of the requested rates. [Doc. 56-1,

pp. 13-15, 32-33] Although mainland attorneys may not be necessary in civil

rights actions, particularly if local attorneys were paid an actual market rate,

ensuring the widespread enforcement of civil rights may justify this Courts

looking beyond the local geographic community in determining an appropriate

rate. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 501 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Casey v. City of

Cabool, Missouri, 12 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiffs object to the rates

imposed by the magistrate and again request an award of reasonable rates offering

the Laffey matrix as an indication of what those rates should be.

Plaintiffs attorneys are entitled to a reasonable and fully compensatory

fee comparable to what is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying

client. Missouri v. Jenkins by Agvei, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989); Camacho,

523 F.3d at 981 (in order to encourage counsel to undertake FDCPA cases, as

congress intended, it is necessary that counsel be awarded fees commensurate with

those which they could obtain by taking other types of cases). While Plaintiffs

recognize that 42 U.S.C. 1988 is not designed to make counsel rich,

[a]dequate compensation is necessary, however, to enable an attorney to serve his

client effectively and to preserve the integrity and independence of the profession.

Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1974),


22

abrogated by Blanchard, 489 U.S. 87. As shown by Plaintiffs declarations and

evidence, the evidence in past cases, and even the article cited by the magistrate,

adequate compensation was not awarded.

Although not raised by the magistrate or discussed in any opinion known to

Plaintiffs, counsel is compelled to also observe that the Citys financial hardships

do not justify the fee reduction. See Hohlbein v. Utah Land Res., LLC, 467 F.

Appx 715, 717 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (attached).

B. 25% Meat-Axe Reduction

The magistrate expressed concerns about Plaintiffs counsels practice of

billing in primarily half-hour increments. [Doc. 64, p. 22] The magistrate stated

[t]his Court routinely reduces hours when attorneys bill in quarter-hour

increments because the tasks reflected in the time entries likely took a fraction of

the time billed and the practice of billing in such large fractional increments

typically results in requests for excessive hours. Id. The magistrate then

reviewed counsels billing statements and, apparently based solely on this typical

result, meat-axed 25% across-the-board to offset the excessive hours that

resulted from Plaintiffs counsels primarily half-hour billing practice. Id. at 23.

While a court may make across-the-board percentage cuts . . . in the number of

hours claimed . . . as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee application, .

. . a small reduction of fees necessitates only cursory explanation, [but] anything


23

more disparate requires a more specific articulation of the courts reasoning. In

re Smith, 586 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399

(citations omitted), and Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111). The magistrate should

explain[ ] the relationship between the time improperly billed and the size of

the [fee] reduction. Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1146. The greater the reduction, the

more explanation is needed. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111.

Here, there was no explanation at all. The magistrate simply stated that the

incremental billing typically results in inflated fees and, reduced the hours by a

whopping 25% because of the unexplained excessive hours that resulted from

the billing, decimating the presumption that the hours submitted by counsel were

reasonable. [Doc. 64, p. 23]; Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112 ([b]y and large, the court

should defer to the winning lawyers professional judgment as to how much time

he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have, had he

been more of a slacker.) This 25% reduction is far more than a 10% haircut

that is permissible without specific explanation. Moreno, 534 F.3d at1106, 1112

(9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs object to this complete lack of explanation.

Moreover, the mere assertion that this case is typical is unsupported by the

record. Each attorney swore that the hours actually submitted had been reduced

and/or hours omitted from the billing. [Doc. 56-2, p. 8; 56-3, pp. 5-6; 56-4, p. 3]

Further, the magistrate cites as a glaring example Mr. Holcombs fees-on-fees


24

request. [Doc. 64, p. 23] Yet, Mr. Holcomb had already specifically reduced the

hours actually submitted by 25%. [Doc. 56-2, p. 9 (specifically informing the

Court that Mr. Holcomb did not seek to recover 4.5 hours spent researching the

motion)]; cf. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1110-11 (Morenos principal trial counsel had

excluded around 9% of her total hours). Indeed, Mr. Holcombs timesheet

includes numerous no charge entries. [Doc. 56-2]

In addition, although it is unclear from the Recommendation, surely the

magistrate is not accusing counsel of fabricating entries. Instead, the magistrates

concern is more likely that counsel rounded up increments that should have been

rounded down and/or billed as a 6 minute increment. [See Doc. 64, p. 22 (tasks

reflected in the time entries likely took a fraction of the time billed)] There are a

total of 81 separate line-item entries in counsels timesheets. [Docs. 56-2 56-4]

Even without considering that each 15 minute entry must have derived from at

least 6, if not 12, minutes of accurately billed time, deducting 15 minutes from

each of those entries (a deduction which results in the complete removal of many

of Mr. Holcombs entries) results in a total deduction of 1215 minutes or 20.25

hours. A 20.25 hour reduction is very close to the 10% haircut of the total

201.85 hours submitted by counsel and is a reduction that would be tolerated by

Moreno. If a 10% haircut had been applied, Plaintiffs would not be raising this

objection. And perhaps more telling is the fact that Defendants only requested at


25

20% reduction in regards to the billing increments and the cases cited by

Defendants only reduced the award by 10%. [Doc. 62, pp. 24-25]

The 25% meat-axe reduction despite counsels having sworn to the omission

of numerous hours, the no charge entries, and the fact that the hours were

rounded down is grossly unfair and does not serve to attract counsel to take these

types of cases. Plaintiffs object to this reduction.

Finally, insofar as the Court finds the billing increments were a result of

counsels inexperience, this reduction was error as purported inexperience was

specifically considered in establishing counsels rates. [Doc. 64, p. 16] Thus,

Plaintiffs object as this further reduction would be impermissible double

counting. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115-16; Marquez v. Harper Sch. Dist. No. 66,

546 F. App'x 659 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (attached).

C. Task-based limitations

Despite the novelty of the case, the magistrate also found that the Complaint

should not have taken 39.5 hours to complete. [Doc. 64, p. 18] The magistrate

deducted 19.5 hours from Mr. Becks request. Id. This should not be permitted,

particularly with a complete absence of explanation as to how this number was

somehow conjured. By and large, the court should defer to the winning lawyer's

professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case;

after all, he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker. Moreno, 534


26

F.3d at 1112. And, in this case, Plaintiffs were very concerned as to the complete

lack of guidance as to the whether social media could serve as a public forum.

Accordingly, Mr. Beck properly spent time attempting to ensure that no

outstanding issues would surprise Plaintiffs following a significant investment of

time and money into this litigation.

Plaintiffs also object to the magistrates unexplained deduction of 7 hours

from Mr. Brazier and 6 hours from Mr. Beck because the motion [for summary

judgment] could have been avoided and also because large portions of the

motion for summary judgment were taken verbatim from the motion for

preliminary injunction. [Doc. 64, p. 18] Plaintiffs again object because there is

no explanation at how the magistrate arrived at that arbitrary number.

Perhaps more importantly, the motion could not have been avoided. In fact,

as set forth in Plaintiffs reply [Doc. 63, pp. 3-5], counsel attended two settlement

conferences one with the magistrate and one with this reviewing judge.

Defendants flatly refused to agree to pay Plaintiffs out-of-pocket expenses until

the conference of January 16, 2013. [Doc. 51] This was literally only two

business days before the scheduled hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

[Doc. 45 (hearing set January 21, 2014)] And, Plaintiffs prevailed on this issue

which was not only very important to Plaintiffs but also was memorialized in the


27

Stipulation and Order itself. [Doc. 55] Could Plaintiffs really be expected to blow

the Motion deadline in hopes the City decided to reasonably resolve this case?

And, insofar as the magistrate implicitly accuses counsel of excessively

billing for work that was already done, necessary review is appropriately billed

particularly where years have passed as in this case. Moreno, supra. Attorneys

cannot simply cut and paste a two year old document into a current filing without

first refreshing their memories and, then, ensuring the law has not changed.

Plaintiffs object to those reductions.

D. Duplicative Time

Plaintiffs object to the reduction of 2.5 hours from Mr. Braziers request and

2.0 hours from Mr. Becks request based on duplicative time. [Doc. 64, p. 20]

Without evaluating whether the time spent was reasonable and again relying solely

on this Courts previous fee awards, the magistrate simply held that [t]he Court

does not permit more than one attorney to bill for attending: (1) a meeting between

co-counsel; (2) a client meeting; or (3) a meeting with opposing counsel . . . [and]

[i]n such a situation, the time spent by the lowest-billing attorney(s) is deducted.

Id. This rule, without considering the reasonableness of the time spent is

contrary to the lodestar method adopted by the Ninth Circuit, particularly where, as

here, Defendants have offered no reason why the billed time was unnecessary or

excessive. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (quoting Gates, 987 F.2d at 139798).


28

As the Eastern District of California has observed:

Numerous courts have recognized that staffing multiple attorneys on a

single task may improve a party's chance of success in litigation. See,

e.g., PSM Holding Corp. v. Nat'l Farm Fin. Corp., 743 F.Supp.2d

1136, 1157 (C.D.Cal.2010) ([D]ivision of responsibility may make it necessary for more than one attorney to attend activities such as

depositions and hearings. Multiple attorneys may be essential for

planning strategy, eliciting testimony or evaluating facts or law. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. United States v.

City & County of San Francisco, 748 F.Supp. 1416, 1421

(N.D.Cal.1990) (noting that the presence of several attorneys at strategy sessions for complex civil rights class actions may be crucial

to the case).

Likewise, although defendants object to several time entries spent on

office conferences, [a] conference with only one participant is no longer a conference, and [t]he upshot of accepting [this] view would be to hold that all conferencing by [plaintiffs'] attorneys was excessive

and duplicative. Prison Legal News v. Schwarznegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095, 110304 (N.D.Cal.2008), aff'd, 608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir.2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent any

specific evidence that plaintiffs' decision to staff multiple attorneys on

particular tasks was excessive, the court will not reduce the billed

hours of plaintiffs' counsel on this basis. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at

1114 (noting that the district court may not set the fee based on speculation as to how other firms would have staffed the case).

Deocampo v. Potts, CIV. 2:06-1283 WBS, 2014 WL 788429 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb.

25, 2014) (unpublished) (attached). Presumably for the reasons set forth in

DeCampo, the City certainly does not hesitate to bring more than one lawyer to

various hearings and/or more than one City lawyer often defends these cases

demonstrating that those lawyers must communicate. Obviously, the City does not


29

stop paying those lawyers because they are communicating with one another or

collaborating on specific tasks. Plaintiffs object.

II. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs request that this Court modify the Recommendation consistent

with these objections and award Plaintiffs attorneys fees commensurate to the

award requested. As set forth in the attached Declaration of Richard L. Holcomb,

Plaintiffs also request this Court award Attorney Holcomb an additional $7,952 for

the work done relating to these objections.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 5, 2014.

s/Richard Holcomb

Richard Holcomb

Attorney for Plaintiffs


Attorney Fee Objections

Documents

Transcript of Attorney Fee Objections