Attacker Behavior Boston Security Conference 2015

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Boston Security Conference Attacker Behavioral Analysis 2014

Transcript of Attacker Behavior Boston Security Conference 2015

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Boston Security Conference

Attacker BehavioralAnalysis

2014

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INFORMATION SECURITYIS A GAME

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Remove the Threat

REMEDIATIONAccept the Risk

Repair the Vulnerability

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C(ommon) V(ulnerability) S(coring) S(ystem)

“CVSS is designed to rank information system vulnerabilities”

Exploitability/Temporal (Likelihood)

Impact/Environmental (Severity)

The Good: Open, Standardized Scores

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F1: Data FundamentalismSince 2006 Vulnerabilities have declined by 26 percent.” http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/vulnerability-trends10.pdf

The total number of vulnerabilities in 2013 is up 16 percent so far when compared to what we saw in the same time period in 2012. ”http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-intelligence_report_06-2013.en-us.pdf

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FAIL 2: A Priori Modeling“Following up my previous email, I have tweaked my equation to try to achieve better separation between adjacent scores and to have CCC have a perfect (storm) 10 score...There is probably a way to optimize the problem numerically, but doing trial and error gives one plausible set of parameters...except that the scores of 9.21 and 9.54 are still too close together. I can adjust x.3 and x.7 to get a better separation . . .”

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F3: Stochastic Ignorance

Attackers Change Tactics Daily

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Repair the Vulnerability

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I LOVE IT WHEN YOU CALL ME BIG DATA150,000,000 LIVE VULNERABILITIES

1,500,000 ASSETS

2,000 ORGANIZATIONS

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100,000,000 BREACHES

I LOVE IT WHEN YOU CALL ME BIG DATA

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ATTACKERS CHANGE TACTICS DAILY

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WE CARE ABOUTVULNERABILITIES

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BREACHES BY CVE 2014

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2014

Q1 Q2

Q3

Q4

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ATTACKERS DON’T CARE WHEN YOUR VULN WAS PUBLISHED

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HEARTBLEED

SHELLSHOCK

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HEARTBLEED

SHELLSHOCK

HEARTBLEED

POODLE

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ATTACKERS DON’T CARE ABOUT YOUR VULN’S LOGO

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BREACHES by CVSS

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CVSS byBREACHVOLUME+CVE

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CWE

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DEADLY SOFTWARE SINS:

1. ACCESS CONTROL2. INPUT VALIDATION3. BUFFER OVERFLOW4. INJECTION5. BAD CRYPTO

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CVSS AS A BREACH VOLUME PREDICTOR:

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ATTACKERS DON’T CARE ABOUT CVSS

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WE CARE ABOUTVULNERABILITIES

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ATTACKERS CARE ABOUTBREACHES

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CVEsOVER TIME

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CVEsOVERTIME(normalized)

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Probability A Vuln Having Property X Has Observed Breaches

Random Vuln

CVSS 10

Exploit DB

Metasploit

MSP+EDB

0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3

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DATA RULES EVERYTHING AROUND MERANDOM = 2%

CVSS 10 = 4%

METASPLOIT + EXPLOITDB = 30%

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RISK.IO/JOBS@mroytman