ATC Sector Capacities - Eurocontrol

EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONFOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION

EUROCONTROL EXPERIMENTAL CENTRE

EEC Note 02/99

Project PLC–C–E1

Issued: January 1999

The information contained in this document is the property of the EUROCONTROL Agency and no part should bereproduced in any form without the Agency’s permission

The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the Agency..

FAP Future ATM Profile

ATC Sector CapacitiesRequired in-line with the

Capacity Plan

Region: SWITZERLAND

RREEPPOORRTT DDOOCCUUMMEENNTTAATTIIOONN PPAAGGEE

ReferenceEEC Note No. 02/99

Security ClassificationUnclassified

OriginatorEEC - PRF(Performance and Economy Research)

Originator (Corporate author) Name/Location :EUROCONTROL Experimental CentreB.P.15F-91222 Brétigny-sur-Orge CEDEXFRANCE.Telephone: +33 (0) 1 69 88 75 00

Sponsor Sponsor (Contract Authority) Name/LocationEUROCONTROL AgencyRue de la Fusée, 96B-1130 BRUXELLESTelephone: +32-(0)2-729 90 11

Title :ATC Sector Capacities required inline with the Capacity Plan 1999

Region: Switzerland

AuthorsM. Dalichampt

S. Mahlich

Date01/99

Pagesiv + 17

Figs10

Tables8

Annex0

References10

EATCHIP Taskspecification

-

ProjectPLC-C-E1

Sponsor Task No.-

PeriodDec-Jan.1998/99

Distribution Statement :(a) Controlled by : CFMU(b) Special Limitations (if any) : None(c) Copy to NTIS : No

Descriptors (keywords) :

1999, Capacity, ATC, ATFM, delay, CFMU, FAP, Switzerland, capacity shortfall, sectorcapacity, traffic demand, traffic growth, costs, ROI,

Abstract :The study is performed for Switzerland in support of the 1999 Capacity Plan for the EuropeanAir Navigation Services. Subject of the study is the estimation of en-route sector capacitiesrequired to reach the ACC capacity targets for 1999.Assumption: Traffic growth of 8% (1998 – 1999) Airport capacities 1999 as declared to APATSITarget: Total ATFM delay not worse than in 1997Objective: Identification of potential capacity shortfalls in 1999. Determination of sector capacities under consideration of economical aspects such as cost for capacity and cost for delay.Methodology: Future ATM Profile /5,6/. Switzerland is broken down to sectors integrated into the network representing. ECAC modeled on the ACC level.Results: The report highlights the critical sectors in Switzerland, discusses potential problems and estimates the sector capacity increases required for 1999. The biggest capacity shortfall is identified for the Geneva sector INS (+33%).

This document has been collated by mechanical means. Should there be missing pages,please report to:

EUROCONTROL Experimental CentrePublications Office

B.P. 1591222 – BRETIGNY-SUR-ORGE CEDEX

France

EEUURROOCCOONNTTRROOLL EExxppeerriimmeennttaall CCeennttrreePPeerrffoorrmmaannccee aanndd EEccoonnoommyy RReesseeaarrcchh -- PPRRFF

III. EEC: SWITZERLAND - 1999 Capacity Plan iii


Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________________________ 1

2. DELAY ANALYSIS SUMMER 1998 _____________________________________________ 2

2.1 ATFM REGULATIONS ________________________________________________________ 22.2 GENEVA ACC ____________________________________________________________ 32.3 ZURICH ACC _____________________________________________________________ 6

3. CAPACITY COSTS __________________________________________________________ 9

4. ATFM SIMULATION ________________________________________________________ 10

4.1 SELECTION OF THE TRAFFIC SAMPLE _____________________________________________ 104.2 RESULTS OF THE ECAC CAPACITY PLAN FOR SWITZERLAND ___________________________ 114.3 REFERENCE AND SIMULATION SET-UP ____________________________________________ 124.4 TRAFFIC INCREASE _________________________________________________________ 134.5 1999 “DO NOTHING” SCENARIO ________________________________________________ 134.6 1999 CAPACITY PLAN FOR SWITZERLAND _________________________________________ 14

5. CONCLUSION _____________________________________________________________ 15

6. REFERENCES _____________________________________________________________ 16

CONTACT THE FAP TEAM __________________________________________________________ 17


III. EEC: SWITZERLAND - 1999 Capacity Plan iv


Abbreviations

ACC Area Control Centre

AMOC ATFM Modeling Capability

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management

ATM Air Traffic Management

CASA Computer Assisted Slot Allocation

CFMU Central Flow Management Unit

CIM Capacity Indicator Model

CIP Convergence and Implementation Programme

CRCO Central Route Charges Office

EAM EUROCONTROL Airspace Model

EATCHIP European Air Traffic Control Harmonization and ImplementationProgramme

ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference

FDPS Flight Data Processing System

IROI Instantaneous Return on Investment

MECA Model for the Economical Evaluation of Capacities in the ATM System

RAMS Reorganized ATC Mathematical Simulator

ROI Return on Investment

TACOT TACT Automated Command Tool


III. EEC: SWITZERLAND - 1999 Capacity Plan 1


1. Introduction

The Capacity Plan 1999 for the European Air Navigation Services (EEC Note N° 23/98October 98) highlighted Geneva and Zurich ACCs as two of the most urgent problem zonesin Europe.

This paper provides a more detailed analysis of the capacity shortfalls in Switzerland basedon the FAP methodology. The conclusions are derived from a thorough analysis of therecorded 1998 data (traffic, delays, regulations, reports) with the addition of ATFMsimulations at the sector level using our new Air Traffic Flow Management simulationplatform AMOC.

All simulations are validated against real CFMU delay records. The two Swiss centres weresimulated in full detail (on a sector level) and incorporated in the complete Europeannetwork to ensure realistic representation of the network effects (protection of one region bythe other regulations). It appeared to be sufficient to simulate the non-Swiss airspace on acentre level.

The study identifies those sectors in Swiss airspace that caused the most problems in 1998and gives target capacities required to avoid capacity shortfalls in 1999.

The study DOES NOT investigate detailed operational ATC aspects, nor does it considerother constraints concerning technique, training and implementation time. These issues willhave to be covered by more detailed microscopic capacity plans at the states level.

The objective of this study is to build a bridge between the macroscopic European CapacityPlan and the various microscopic plans at the states level so that the microscopic planscan be designed as stand alone packages but are guaranteed to be in-line with the macro-economic concept specified for Europe.




2. Delay Analysis Summer 1998

2.1 ATFM Regulations

The figure below shows the variation of the capacities declared for the 5 most importantregulations for Switzerland within summer 1998. The regulations are:

Red: LSAGSUP (All Sup sectors – SUP3, 4, 5 & 6)Magenta: LSAZUAC (Superior sectors 1,2 & 3, with some traffic excluded, see §2)Pink: LSAGKIN (All KINES – sectors KI2, 3, 4, 5 & 6)Yellow: LSAGSU2 (Sectors INS+KI2)Blue: LSAGINS (Sector INS, Inferior South)

Each line shows a sequence of 42 periods where regulations at various capacities wererequested to the CFMU.

A horizontal line such as the blue representing LSAGINS indicates continuous regulation atmaximum sector capacity. The LSAZUAC regulation varies mainly between 62 and 50aircraft per hour. More than half of the LSAZUAC regulations are set at 80% of its maximumcapacity. The red line represents the LSAGSUP regulation with the highest variancethroughout the regulations. This airspace is in only 5% of the regulations operating at itsmaximum capacity (85 aircraft per hour).

Frequent regulations at capacities below maximum might indicate serious staff shortages.

Variation of Regulations

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LSAZUA14




2.2 GENEVA ACC

The figure below shows the daily traffic and the resulting delay caused by Geneva ACC in1997. Each point represents a day of the year. The two red lines indicate the areas with 1and 4 minutes delay respectively per average flight passing the airspace. We define thedaily capacity of a centre at the point where the 1 and 4 minute delay line intercepts thedelay cloud:The 1 minute delay capacity was around 1350 flights a day in 1997The 4 minute delay capacity was around 1500 flights a day in 1997

The delay sensitivity (curvature of the delay cloud) is high for Geneva. Highest delays wereobserved during summer week-days (points in magenta). Winter week-days show thehighest variation of delays (points in light blue). On some winter week-days the delays weresignificantly above the main cloud. We can assume that on these days the centre was notworking at its maximum capacity. No problems are observed at winter weekends.

LSAG (All 1997)

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Daily Capacity 1 min 4 min delay per flightSummer Weekdays: xxxx 1550Summer Weekend: 1400 1500Winter Weekdays: 1300 1450Winter Weekend: 1300 xxxx




The next figure (below) shows a comparison between summer 1997 and summer 1998.The horizontal lines represent week-days and the little triangles weekends. In summer 1997the week-days were the most critical days. It appears that this was reversed in 1998.

The 1 minute delay capacity can not be estimated for summer 1998.The 4 minute delay capacity was around 1600 flights a day in summer 1998.

The position of the 1998 delay cloud (blue) is compared to that from 1997 in the area ofhigher delays and of higher traffic. The intersection of both clouds with the 4 minute delayline indicates a marginal capacity increase between 4 and 5%.

LSAG (Summer 1997 - 1998)

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Traffic growth 1997 - 1998: 9%

Capacity growth 1997 - 1998: 4-5%

Capacity per day 1 min 4 min delay Summer Weekdays 97: xxxx 1550 --Summer Weekdays 98: xxxx 1600 --Summer Weekend 97: 1350 1500 ∆Summer Weekend 98: xxxx 1600 ∆




The table below shows a complete list of all sector (AS), airport (AD) and point regulations(SP) allocated to the Geneva ACC and the sum of the ATFM delays caused within theperiod of June 1st to Aug. 2nd 1998.

Traffic volumes Definition Total delay (min)

LSAGINS AS (Sector INS, Inferior South) : 161977LSAGKIN AS (All KINES – sectors KI2, 3, 4, 5 & 6) : 146969LSAGSUP AS (All Sup sectors – SUP3, 4, 5 & 6) : 96178LSAGSU2 AS (Sectors INS+KI2) : 46361LSAGINN AS : 629

The regulations LSAGINS (single sector regulation) and LSAGKIN (multiple sectorregulation including sectors KI2-6) caused 2/3 of the total delays caused by Geneva ACC.There are no ATFM delays reported due to airport regulations.

The figure below shows the delays caused by the various regulations on each day withinthe observation period (x-axis: day of the year; y-axis: daily delay in min.). The vertical linesindicate Mondays.

Delay distribution over the days (June 1st to Aug. 2nd 1998)Day No. = xth day of the year; vertical lines indicate MondaysRegulation AS: sector; AD: airport; AZ: group of airports; SP: point;

The delay curve of the LSAGINS regulation shows little variation at high delays over alldays. There are no significant peaks at weekends or week-days. Capacity shortfalls aregiven for all days and all traffic patterns.

The delay curves of LSAGKIN and LSAGSUP show significant peaks at the end of theweek, mainly Saturdays, sometimes Fridays. This might be a sign that these areas requiresectorisation optimised for weekend traffic pattern. On the other side both regulationsprotect multiple sectors. It is therefore possible that some capacity shortfalls are also due tostaff shortage at weekends.

L S A G d e l a y s p e r s e c t o r i n S 9 8

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2.3 ZURICH ACC

The figure below shows the daily traffic and the resulting delay caused by Zurich ACC in1997. The diagram can be interpreted in the same way as for Geneva:Each point represents a day of the year. The two red lines indicate the areas with 1 and 4minutes delay respectively per average flight passing the airspace. We define the dailycapacity of a centre at the point where the 1 and 4 minute delay line intercepts the delaycloud:The 1 minute delay capacity was around 1750 flights a day in 1997The 4 minute delay capacity can not be estimated for 1997.

The Zurich delay cloud for 1997 has its centre near the 1 minute delay line (bottom line).The FAP report (EEC Report 324) demonstrated that an average delay in the area of 1minute delay per flight is close to the cost optimum for the airspace user.

However, the cloud is rather unstructured. There are some high delays at relative low trafficvolumes which might have been avoidable.

There was no significant prevalence of summer and winter nor weekend and week-days.

LSAZ (All 1997)

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Daily Capacity 1 min 4 min delay per flightSummer Weekdays: 1850 xxxxSummer Weekend: 1800 xxxxWinter Weekdays: 1750 xxxxWinter Weekend: 1750 xxxx




The next figure (below) shows a comparison between summer 1997 and summer 1998.The horizontal lines represent week-days and the little triangles weekends.

The 1 minute delay capacity was around 1850 flights a day in summer 1998The 4 minute delay capacity was around 2050 flights a day in summer 1998.

By comparison, the 1998 delay cloud is located at higher delays and slightly higher trafficvolumes (similar to Geneva). Weekends and week-days were affected in the same way.There is no clear evidence for a real capacity increase 1997-1998. We observe a maximumincrease of 3%.

LSAZ (Summer 1997 - 1998)

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Traffic growth 1997 - 1998: 9-10%

Capacity growth 1997 - 1998: 3%

Capacity per day 1 min 4 min delay Summer Weekdays 97: 1850 xxxx --Summer Weekdays 98: 1850 2100 --Summer Weekend 97: 1750 xxxx ∆Summer Weekend 98: 1850 2050 ∆




The table below shows a complete list of all sector (AS), airport (AD) and point regulations(SP) allocated to the Zurich ACC and the sum of the ATFM delays caused within the periodof June 1st to Aug. 2nd 1998.

Traffic volumes Definition Total delay (min)

LSAZUAC AS (Superior sectors 1,2 & 3, with some traffic excluded, see §2) : 265252LSZH AD : 18156LSAZWSL AS : 17770LSAZEL AS : 8371LSAZNSL AS : 78

The main capacity shortfall is due to the upper airspace regulation LSAZUAC including thesectors 1, 2 and 3.

The daily distribution of delays caused by LSAZUAC shows a high variation over the days.However, there is no significant prevalence of week-days or weekends. Lower delays aresometimes caused at Sundays, Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays (see figure below).

Delay distribution over the days (June 1st to Aug. 2nd 1998)Day No. = xth day of the year; vertical lines indicate MondaysRegulation AS: sector; AD: airport; AZ: group of airports; SP: point;

The high variation of the delay caused by LSAZUAC is not proportional to the trafficvariation on these days. There can be multiple causes of the capacity shortfall.

Weather conditions and staff shortage (reported to CFMU) as well as reduced predictabilitycould be just one of several reasons for instabilities. It is therefore possible that a simpleincrease of the sector capacities might not completely solve the problems. A more flexibleand dynamic airspace structure (sectorisation, routes, staffing, etc.) might be another vitalissue to be tackled to enable the Zurich airspace management to cope with short-termcapacity shortfalls.

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3. Capacity Costs

The long term cost development of the ATC cost in Switzerland shows a progressive trendstarting at 1990. The last years starting at 1994 include some interesting jumps.

However, the total ATC cost per production (kilometer controlled) has diminished over thelast 7 years. The investments made were obviously overtaken by the (unexpected?) trafficgrowth.

DISTANCE - COSTSwitzerland

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4. ATFM Simulation

Air Traffic Flow Management simulations are conducted using the Eurocontrol ATFMsimulation platform AMOC.

4.1 Selection of the traffic sample

The first step is the selection of the best traffic sample. The selection was made based onthe traffic and delay representation for Europe and the Swiss airspace. The mostrepresentative days for Europe were already identified for the macroscopic Capacity Plan1999. The two days selected were the 30th of June 1998 and the 10th of July 1998. Thischapter deals with the selection of the most representative day for Switzerland.

The study of the correlation of the delay distribution was conducted on the sector level. Theday with the best correlation between daily delay per sector and average delay per sectorwas selected (see figure below).

The 10th of July gave the best results and was therefore selected.

delay correlationLSAG

R2 = 0.7945

R2 = 0.5244

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For Zurich, only the traffic volume LSAZUAC was simulated for the 3 following reasons :

• Both days were not representative for the other traffic volumes.• The delays are not very significant, compared to the delay caused by LSAZUAC.• One of the other traffic volumes (WSL2) was too complex to be fully modeled by

the current version of our ATFM Simulator.

The following flows were excluded from Zurich Upper :

• Traffic departing from Switzerland : LS** + LFSB (Bâle-Mulhouse)• Traffic arriving to Zurich airport (LSZH) and Bâle-Mulhouse

With these flows excluded, the traffic volume is called UA14. For simplicity and possiblegeneralization of the results, we use the name LSAZUAC.It might also be noticed that the regulation associated to this airspace is known as TRAZUE(from the names of the two main VORs in Zurich airspace).

4.2 Results of the ECAC Capacity Plan for Switzerland

The main results for LSAG and LSAZ, in the ECAC Capacity Plan 1999 (EEC note 23/98)were the following :

Traffic increase (98 to 99) :

LSAG 4% to 7% in the worst caseLSAZ 4% to 8% in the worst case

1999 capacity increase required (for the centre):

LSAG +11%LSAZ +12%

1999 target delay:

LSAG 3416 minutes per day LSAZUAC 2883 minutes per day

LSAZ 3168 minutes per day




4.3 Reference and simulation set-up

In the reference simulation the following regulations were applied for Geneva (as archivedby CFMU) :

Regulation Traffic volume ACC delay regulatedflights

Status Period and rate

LSAG10A LSAGSUP LSAG 133 102 T 1400:1530:080LSAG10M LSAGSUP LSAG 176 148 T 1000:1200:080LSAG10N LSAGSUP LSAG 245 150 T 1700:1930:070LSINS10A LSAGINS LSAG 2369 113 T 1330:1800:028LSINS10M LSAGINS LSAG 906 153 C 0600:1300:028LSKIN10 LSAGKIN LSAG 2406 315 C 0730:1800:036SU10E LSAGSU2 LSAG 209 30 T 0430:0600:028SU10N LSAGSU2 LSAG 872 59 T 1745:2000:028

C = cancelled before regular end

Two of these regulations were not terminated but cancelled. In this case, we terminated theregulation when the number of regulated flights (recorded by CFMU) was reached.

For Zurich centre, only the TRAZUE regulation was simulated as follows :

TRAZU10 LSAZUA14 LSAZ 4714 603 T 0800:1000:050;1000:1320:0561320:1900:062;1900:2000:051

The LSZEL (traffic volume LSAZEL) and LSZWL (t.v. LSAZWSL2) were not simulated.The rest of the ECAC area was simulated as in the ECAC Capacity Plan, with the “currentcentre capacities” and the airport regulations applied on the 10th of July 98, including LSZHairport arrivals.

The following table shows the observed (CFMU) and simulated delays. The correlationcoefficient is 0.94 (low: 0 – high: 1). The simulation results are sufficiently accurate:

ACC observed simulatedLSAGSUP LSAG 554 720LSAGINS LSAG 3275 3688LSAGKIN LSAG 2406 2031LSAGSU2 LSAG 1081 1198Total LSAG 7316 7637

LSAZUAC LSAZ 4714 4652




4.4 Traffic Increase

traffic98 99 % increaseLSAGSUP 1094 1172 7%LSAGINS 393 426 8%LSAGKIN 506 540 7%LSAGSU2 471 511 8%

LSAZUAC 890 966 9%

4.5 1999 “Do nothing” Scenario

In the “do nothing” scenario , we assumed that the rest of ECAC applied the CapacityPlan (capacity increases as forecasted for airports and based on “best ROI” for ACCs, withan overall target of 97 delay level, see also EEC Note 23/98).

With the same capacity figures, the delay would be multiplied by 3 in Geneva and doubledin Zurich, as shown in the following table:

ACC 98 delay 99 "donothing"

LSAGSUP LSAG 720 1678LSAGINS LSAG 3688 9104LSAGKIN LSAG 2031 6517LSAGSU2 LSAG 1198 5589total LSAG 7637 22888

LSAZUAC LSAZ 4652 9631

Note : in the 1999 scenarios, the period of the regulations were extended to cover all delays(i.e. to include the “period end slots”).




4.6 1999 Capacity Plan for Switzerland

We now increase the sector capacities progressively until the delay targets are reached.

ACC delaytarget

capacity Delay

LSAGSUP LSAG 1632 85 (at night 73) 1679LSAGINS LSAG 687 36 860LSAGKIN LSAG 776 41 542LSAGSU2 LSAG 321 34 311total LSAG 3416 3392

LSAZUAC LSAZ 2883 57/64/67/52 (varies over the day) 2743

For LSAZUAC the following capacities were applied: 57/64/67/52* (instead of the currentfigures 50/56/62/50) depending upon the time (see §4 with extension of the last period). Itgave a delay of 2743 minutes (target: 2883 minutes)

* with these figures the delays per period are approximately proportional to the numbers ofregulated flights.

The capacity plan can be summarized as follows :

Traffic volumes Definition Currentcapacity

99 Capacity % increase

LSAGINS (Sector INS, InferiorSouth)

28 36 33%

LSAGKIN (All KINES –

sectors KI2, 3, 4, 5 & 6)

36 41 14%

LSAGSUP (All Sup sectors –

SUP3, 4, 5 & 6)

80 (night 70) 85 (night 73) 6%

LSAGSU2 (Sectors INS+KI2) 28 34 21%

LSAZUAC

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Afternoon

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50/56

62

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67

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8%




5. Conclusion

In the last few years, the Swiss Air Traffic Control shows a trend towards increasing delays.The investments in capacity made over the last 5 years appear to have diminished inrelation to the actual traffic growth.

Historical data and simulations have shown that the sensitivity of the delays to the trafficgrowth is high. If Switzerland does not increase the Geneva and Zurich sector capacitiesand the rest of ECAC applies the Capacity Plan 1999, the delay caused by Geneva couldbe multiplied by 3 and doubled for Zurich in Summer 1999. However, the perspective ofbeing penalised by delays in this order of magnitude might result in a constraint regionaltraffic growth and/or rerouted traffic flows. The consequences of such a change in trafficgrowth and pattern have not been studied here.

The following countermeasures are identified for LSAG:The KINES sectors have to increase their capacities by 14% (approximately what wasfound for the whole centre in the centre-based capacity plan). It should be noted that adetailed study of SRS (Standard Route Scheme), to avoid KINES sectors, was conductedduring the Summer 98 by the Eurocontrol Experimental Centre (approx. 10 scenarios). Theresults can be obtained by the CFMU.

The Inferior South Sector (INS) needs 33% capacity increase. That is a high figure for asingle sector and might not be achievable without a complete re-sectorisation.

In LSAZ, the Upper Sectors need 14% capacity increase in the morning and 8% in theafternoon (inline with the 12% found for the whole centre in the ECAC Capacity Plan).

In this study, Switzerland was considered as a whole. If only one centre applies the plan,the network effect on the other is likely to be significant (as shown in the simulation, duringthe iterative process to reach the target).




6. References

/1/ J.M Pomeret Common ATM Planet alt. EUROCONTROL, Brussels, 1997

/2/ CODA Delays to Air Transport in EuropeMonthly reportsCentral Office for Delay AnalysisEUROCONTROL, Brussels

/3/ CFMU ATFM SummariesDaily, Weekly and Monthly reports

Central Flow Management UnitEUROCONTROL, Brussels

/4/ CRCO Executive Information ReportMonthly reportsEUROCONTROL, Brussels

/5/ M. Dalichampt Future ATM Profile – MethodologyG. Flynn EUROCONTROL Experimental CentreS. Mahlich Brétigny sur Orge, France, June 1997

/6/ M. Dalichampt Future ATM ProfileG. Flynn Capacity Shortfalls in Europe (1996 – 2006)R. Hickling EEC Report No. 324S. Mahlich EUROCONTROL Experimental CentreA. Tibichte Brétigny sur Orge, France, Feb. 1998

/7/ C. Vandenbergh Air traffic Statistics and Forecasts,Number of Flights per Region (1974-2015)EATCHIP Development DirectorateEUROCONTROL, Brussels, June 1997

/8/ IATA Strategic Development of ATFM in EuropeStrategic Objectives – short to medium termPresented at the 4th meeting of the EAMGBrussels, October 1997

/9/ M. Dalichampt Capacity Plan 1998S. Mahlich for the European Air Navigation Services

EEC Note 3/98EUROCONTROL Experimental CentreBrétigny sur Orge, France, Jan. 1998

/10/ M. Dalichampt Capacity Plan 1999J.C. Hustache for the European Air Navigation ServicesS. Mahlich EEC Note 23/98

EUROCONTROL Experimental CentreBrétigny sur Orge, France, Oct. 1998




Contacts

European Organisation EUROCONTROLfor the Safety of Rue de la Fusée, 96Air Navigation B-1130 Brussels___________________ _________________

Organisation EUROCONTROLeuropéenne pour la Experimental Centresécurité de la B.P. 15navigation aérienne F-91222 Brétigny s/Orge Cedex

Contact the FAP team

Contacts Address Tel FaxFAPProject leader

S. Mahlich EECB.P. 15F-91222 Brétigny

++33 1 69 88 7634 7352

ATFMResearch

M. Dalichampt EECB.P. 15F-91222 Brétigny

++33 1 69 88 7574 7352

ATMEconomy

J.C. Hustache EECB.P. 15F-91222 Brétigny

++33 1 69 88 7802 7352

Performance Review Contacts

Contacts Address Tel FaxPRU/PRC X. Fron PRU

Rue de la Fusée, 96B-1130 Brussels

++32 2 729 3778

CFMU Contacts

Contacts Address Tel FaxCFMU J. Penwarne CFMU

Rue de la Fusée, 96B-1130 Brussels

++32 2 729 9800

ATC Sector Capacities - Eurocontrol

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