Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation … · 1 Assuring the Transition...

Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation SystemA New Strategy for Networked Governance

Findings and Discoveries of the Executive Session on the

Next Generation Air Transportation System

March 2010

Stephen Goldsmith

Harvard Kennedy School

Zachary Tumin


Fred Messina

Booz Allen Hamilton

Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation SystemA New Strategy for Networked Governance

Findings and Discoveries of the Executive Session on the

Next Generation Air Transportation System

Stephen Goldsmith


Zachary Tumin


Fred Messina

Booz Allen Hamilton

March 2010

Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation


TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ExecutiveSummary...................................................................................... 1 II. AviationattheCrossroads........................................................................... 3 III. TheExecutiveSessiononNextGen............................................................. 4 IV. ProgressandNextMovesonNextGen....................................................... 4 V. AssuringtheFuture....................................................................................... 5 VI. Lessons—andLenses—ofHistory............................................................... 6 VII. TheBlueSkyofNextGen.............................................................................. 7 VIII. TheFiveChallengesofTransformation..................................................... 8 1. Financing......................................................................................... 9 2. IncentivizingInvestment............................................................. 10 3. GainingAcceptance:“New-Product”Adoption...................... 12 4. FailureModes:“PredictableSurprises”..................................... 13 5. Governance................................................................................... 13 IX. ANetworkedGovernanceStrategyforNextGen.................................... 14 X. ATechnicalR&DAgenda.......................................................................... 15 XI. TenElementsofStrategyforNextGenNetworkedGovernance.......... 16 XII. OptionsforAction:ThePathForward..................................................... 20 XIII. PartingWordsinFiveVoices..................................................................... 22 XIV. AppendixA:Members,ExecutiveSession............................................... 24 XV. AppendixB:Agenda,November3-4,2009............................................. 26

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Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System

I. Executive Summary

OnNovember4–5,2009,Harvard’sKennedySchoolofGovernment,incollaborationwithBoozAllenHamilton,convenedtheExecutiveSession,Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System. TheSessioninviteda“cross-boundary”groupofseniorgovernmentandbusinessleaders,organizationandassociationexecutives,andresearcherstomeetinclosed-doorroundtablediscussionswithpeersandfaculty,andtoconsiderthefutureoftheNextGenerationAirTransportationSystem,alsoknownas“NextGen.”

NextGenisamongthemostsignificanteffortsatcross-boundarytransformationeverundertakenbytheUnitedStatesGovernment,incollaborationwiththeaviationcommu-nity.Suchmovesarealwaysfraughtwithchallenges,opportunities,andpossibilities.Successacrossthemanystakeholdersrequiresthatallalignonstrategy;thatallseevalueandunderstandriskthroughthesamelens;thatauthoritiesandresourcesconvergeonsharedinterestsandgoals;andthatleadershipkeepsallmovingforwardwhileprovidinggovernancetoresolveconflict,confusion,andobstacles.

NextGenreliesheavilyuponinvestmentsbybothgovernmentandindustry,includingintechnicalinfrastructureanddatasystems,newrules,proceduresandtraining,andsignifi-cantoperatingchanges.Investmentsintechnologies,suchasflightmanagementsystems,precisionnavigationsystems,anddatalinkcapabilitiesinparticular,areexpensiveandrequirearaftofcollateralinvestmentsfortheirvaluetobefullyrealized.

ThismeetingexploredcriticalissuesinacceleratingtheuptakeandadoptionofNextGencapabilities.Itinvestigatedwhetherandhowbestto“incentivize”suchinvestments;governanceandleadershiprequirementsformakingsuchsignificantcross-boundaryimprovements;andprospectsforbroadening“bestequipped,bestserved”strategies.

Findings and Discoveries. Significantprogresshasbeenmade,butthereisstilldistancetogo.AllshareapassionandcommitmenttothesuccessofNextGen,butdisagreeonhowtogetthere.

Issuesremain,forexample,regardingwhoshouldpayasinfrastructuremovesfromthegroundtotheplane,perhapschallengingthelong-establishedpracticeof“governmentpaysforinfrastructure,airlinesforplanes.”Althoughthenation’scupboardmaybebareinsuchdirefiscaltimes,theairlinestoo,arestressed.Moreover,theyareskepticalofthegovernment’sabilitytomovefastenoughtoundertakeneededreformssufficienttogeneratethereturnsindustryneedsonanyNextGeninvestmentitmightmake.Thereisaprospectthatgovernmentcoulddemonstrateitsresolveandprovethebenefitsby

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implementingelementsofanewbestequipped,bestservedstrategy;but,sucharoll-outitselfraisesthornyissuesofhandlingmixedequipageoperations,alteringflightpaths,andchangingprocedures.Itisbynomeansassured,either.

TheseissuesareamongthecomplexitiesconfrontingNextGen—aseriesof“Yes….but”dilemmasthatseemtothwarteverygoodmoveforward.Howthentomakeprogress?

SomearguethatwhatisneededisanewstrongcentralauthoritydirectingtrafficonNextGen—clarifyingandresolvinggovernanceissuesinternaltotheFederalAviationAdministration(FAA),andclearingthepathaheadforthetoughchoicesthatmustbemade.

Otherssuggestthatthechallengesaregreaterthanasinglesetofinternalalignmentscanaddressandthatadifferentpathofgovernancemightbeconsideredaswell—oneofnetworkedgovernance.

Onthismodel,ratherthanexpectingtop-downhierarchiestoresolveandbreakthroughallthecomplexitiesofNextGen’sdilemmasandproblems,thegroupofinterestedpartici-pantscouldinsteadfosteranetwork of networks wherethesolutionprospectsmightbediverse,andevensuperior.

Iftheconundrumis“Who shall pay?”forexample,clearlyatop-downapproachhasrunintosignificantheadwinds:neithergovernmentnorindustryhasyetshownfullandjointcommitmenttodoso.

However,variousmunicipalitiesorregionsmightwellfindacompellingbusinesscasetosupporttheintroductionofNextGentotheirareas—forjobs,economicdevelopmentprospects,andrelatedcommerce.Similarly,localnetworksmightmanagetheissuesandrisksofairportexpansions,flightpathchanges,noise,andrelatedmatterswhereFederalleadershipwouldbelessavailing.

Theroleofthegroupmeeting—perhapsexpandedandformalizedasaconsortium—mightbetosponsortheformationofanetworkofsuchnetworks,providingoverallgovernance,standards,andmodelsandtakingonclearlynationalissues—butcharteringthenetworkofnetworkstocraftawiderangeofpotentialsolutionstoNextGen’sconun-drums.TheywouldprovideacompellingbusinesscaseandrallyingcryineachofperhapsfiveorsixdifferentareasforfurtherNextGendesign,development,andimplementation.

ThemembersoftheExecutiveSessionresolvedtoexploresuchissuesofgovernance,financing,incentives,andrelatedmattersinaseriesoffollow-onworkstreams.

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II. Aviation at the NextGen Crossroads

Americancivilaviationhoversatacrossroads.NextGen—theNextGenerationAirTransportationSystem—offersthepromiseofanewuniverseofflightefficiency:reduceddelaysandcarbonemissions;smootherin-flightandon-groundoperations;andfarlessvulnerabilitytothevagariesofairportcongestion,weather,orhumanerrorinairtrafficcontrol.Properlyandwidelyimplemented,NextGencouldremakecivilaviationandsavebillions.

FAA’sNextGenisthusoneofthemostsignificanteffortsofcross-boundarytransforma-tionevercontemplatedbytheUnitedStatesgovernmentanditsindustrypartners.NextGen’sgoalistomakecivilaviationsafer,moreefficient,andbetterabletosupportthelikelydemandsofairtransportinthenewcentury.NextGencallsfortheintroductionofavarietyofadvancedtechnologiesandrelated,supportingchangestotheoperationsandbusinessprocessesofthenationalairspacesystem.Tothatend,CongressandFAAhavecommittedtoa20-year,$20billionNextGeneffort.

Thefutureoftheskyhasarrived,yetitremainsslowtorealize,complextomoveforward,andhasmuchdistancetogobeforeitcanbeimplementedanditsbenefitsrealized.

Thefrustrationsarepalpable.“IfIhadamagicwandandIcouldwaveit,”anindustryexecutivetoldcolleagues,expressingawidelyheldview,“IwouldaskforthePresidentoftheUnitedStatestomakeadeclarativestatement—andtobackitupwiththefullforceoftheadministration—thatNextGenisamajornationalandinternationalpriority.”

Theremaybesuchsilverbulletsahead.ButNextGen’simplementationiscomplicatedbyitssignificantrelianceonadvancedaircrafttechnologies,suchasnewflightmanagementsystems,precisionnavigationsystems,anddatalinkcapabilities.Whiletechnicallyfeasible,theinvestmentsarecostly,anduntilnowoperatorshaveprincipallybeenexpectedtobearthem.

Moreover,muchoftheseinvestments’valuereliesonsignificant,collateralchangesinoperatingandbusinessprocessesthatothersmusttake.

Howmighttheaviationcommunitybestaddressandmanagethisriskto“incentivize”equipageinvestments,assuretheneededchangestooperationsandbusinessprocesses,andensurethatallrealizevalueofthepromisedreturns?Further,whatarethegovernanceandleadershiprequirementsformakingsuchsignificantcross-boundaryimprovementsandtheprospectsforbroadeningbestequipped,bestservedstrategies?

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“ThestruggleofNextGen,”oneanalysthasobserved,“hasbeenhowdoyoubuildapathfromevolutiontotransformation?”

Withmyriadfiefdoms—competingandcollaboratingbyturn—awareoftheirowninterestsandyetdeterminedtomakethecomplexitiesofNextGenareality,howtoproceed?Howtobalancetherolesandinterestsofgovernment,business,publicinterest,andprivateprofit?Howtomodernizeprocedures?HowtodeterminemetricstomeasureNextGen’ssuccess?Wheretofindthefunding?Howtoframeandmakethebest next move?

Inshort,howtotransformcivilaviation?

III. The Executive Session on NextGen

Togaininsightintoobstaclesandthepathforward,wegatheredleadersovertheperiodofNovember3–4,2009.Thosewithusrepresentedthehighestlevelsofgovernmentandadministration,trade,industryandlaborgroups.WewerejoinedbyuniversityandMassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyfaculty.AfullmemberrosterisfoundinAppendixAofthisreport.

Wetookasourstartingpointthisobservationfromaparticipant:“We’realldevelopersandconsumersofthis,”shesaid,“andthatmakesitmuchmoredifficulttohaveaconversation.Everybodyknowsexactlywhatthefutureshouldbe,butnoneofourconclusionsmatch.”

Underthisresearchumbrella,wewelcomedall.Thisisareportofthatgroup’sdelibera-tions,itsfindingsanddiscoveries,anditssenseofthenextbeststepstobringNextGenforwardfasterandmoreassuredly.

IV. Progress and Next Moves on NextGen

FAAhasbeenhighlyactivealready,envisioningthefuture,seekingconsensus,1buildingplans,2andlaunchingcornerstoneprojects.3

Inparticular,FAAformulatedanewconceptofoperations.Currently,FAAlargelyprovisionsairtrafficservicesona“firstcome,firstserved”basis.Thatconcepthaslongprevailed;iseasilyunderstood;andisdeeplyembeddedinarchitectures,operations,andthinking.Formingbedrockpolicysincethefirstdaysofaviation,firstcome,firstservedhasservedglobalaviationwell.

Asanyairtravelercanattest,however,today’sairtrafficsystemisatconstantriskofcongestionanddelays,especiallyinmetroplexareasorwhendemandregularlyexceeds

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capacityincertainairspaceregions.NextGenpromisestoalleviatethesepains.Yettransitioningglobalaviationtotheequipage,businessprocesses,policiesandprocedures,andgovernanceoftheNextGenfutureiscomplex.

FAAproposedafundamentalstrategicshiftintheprovisioningofairtrafficservices,embracingtheconceptofbestequipped,bestserved.Underthisnewrubric,theprovi-sioningofairtrafficserviceswillfavorthosemakingthefirstmovestoNextGencapabili-ties.Thisshift,itisargued,willacceleratetheuptakeandadoptionofNextGenequipageandhelpallrealizethefullbenefitsofNextGeninvestmentsandimprovements.

Theintroductionofbestequipped,bestservedwilldependonnumerousfactors,suchaslocation,airspaceenvironment,airportconfiguration,levelofequipage,leveloftraining,andpossiblyeventimeofday.Itislikelythatfirstcome,firstservedwillremainineffectacrossthemajorityofthenationalairspacesystem,particularlyinareaswhereexcesscapacityisthenorm.

Inthecongestedmetroplexareas,however,wherechangeisessential,abestequipped,bestservedworldmustco-existwithfirstcome,firstservedinanever-changingmixedequipageenvironmentastheevolutiontoafullyNextGenworldtakesplace.

V. Assuring the Future

TheRTCA NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force of September 9, 2009,hasbecomethecontextforallfuturediscussion.Itscoreconclusionsformacomprehensiveoverviewofthechallengesahead.Theyinclude,forexample,thatuserswillsupportFAACommunication-Navigation-Surveillance(CNS)infrastructureinvestmentonlywhentheyhavea“clearandunambiguous”pathtoimmediateandtangiblebenefits,establishedinasolidbusinesscase.Moreover,tobuildmoreconfidenceinFAAplanningandtoencourageuserstoinvestinNextGenequipage,FAAshouldfocusondeliveringnear-termoperationalbenefitsratherthandeliveringinfrastructure.

Yet,asindustryandgovernmentseekcommongroundandacceleratedtransformationtoNextGen,criticalquestionsarise.

• HowcanthemovetoNextGenequipagebestbe incentivized andassured—whetherbystrategychange,changeinpoliciesandprocedures,financialincentives,orothermeans?

• Inthemovetomixed-equipageoperations,whatarethecriticalissuesandareasforcollaborationbetweenpartiessothattheymayeffectivelyaddresstheirsharedoperating,business,andtechnicalrisksandopportunities?

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• Whatnewformsofcross-boundarygovernance mightbestservetherequirementsandarrangementsofall?

• WhatarecriticalelementsofstrategyandtheroadmapforwardthatcanbestensurethesmoothtransformationtoNextGen?

• Whatistheroleofleadershipanditsimperativesinframingpoliciesandmovingforward?

• Howcanprogressbestbetrackedandissuesresolvedacrossmultiplestakeholdercommunities?

VI. Lessons—and Lenses—of History

Thelessonsofhistorycanexertpowerfulforceonhowthemanypartiesinvolvedviewthepathforward.BecausethenationhasgrappledwithairspacemodernizationandNextGenforsomeyearsnow,theselessonsabound—manybeingthelensthroughwhichdecisionmakersnowseetheircurrentchoicesandlikelyfutures.

The hegemony of first come, first served has been paramount. Wehavealongtraditionofsuccessful,egalitariancoexistenceinself-managedairspace.Anairlineexecutivespokeof“thedecadeswhenbusinessesrepresentedmanydifferentcustomerswithdivergentneeds,resources,operationalprioritiesandmodels,andallmanagedtocoexistinAmericanairspace”—this,onafirstcome,firstservedbasis.

Many are skeptical of FAA’s ability to execute large transformations, even once funds have been appropriated. “Thereislittlepoint,”saidonerespondent,“intryingtomovetowardadaywheneveryonecansimultaneouslyflipaswitch.”Cited,forexample,isthefailedAdvancedAutomationSystemprogram;somesayithasbrandedFAAnegativelyandleftmanypeople“very,veryskittishaboutanymajortransformationinthesystemforquitealongwhile.”Describedas“thebigbangtheory”inthatthesystemmightbechangedovernightusingaleadsystemintegratorwithagreatdealofauthority,AASstumbled.YetAASwasnotnearlysoambitiousasNextGen.

Evolutionary change requiring investment by both industry and government cannot proceed without delivering its stream of promised benefits. Historysuggeststhatavia-tionmustevolveandgainbenefitsduringitsevolutiontoNextGen.Yetthereisdeepskepticismthatbenefitsdelayedmighteverberealized.Across-industrywillingnesstoacceptevolutionaryprogressrequiresthataviationleadersbedefinitiveaboutdirection,setspecificgoalsandobjectives,assureinterimbenefits,andmeetthosegoalsontime.Whether transformational or evolutionary, leadership is essential.

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Government pays for infrastructure. Governmenthasalwaysunderwrittenairtrafficcontrolinfrastructure—towersandrunways,forexample—aspublicbenefits.Theairlineshavebeenresponsibleforcockpitinvestments.YettheseparadigmsblurintheNextGenfuture:theveryessenceofNextGeniscontrolfeaturesbuiltintocockpitavionics.Wheninfrastructuremovestothecockpit,whopays?

The National Highway Administration is a potential paradigm for change on a similar scale—and points to potential leadership requirements. Someinvokethetimeinthe1950’swhentransportationbecameanationalpriority,whenthegovernmentappointedanAdministratortooverseethecreationoftheNationalHighwaySystem.TheyviewthescaleandnecessityofNextGenascomparabletothechallengesrequiringsuchanappointment.

VII. The Blue Sky of NextGen

Thereisanindisputableconsensusaboutthefuture—bothitsimaginedrealizationin20yearsanditstacticalexecutionin5years.“Forthefirsttimeinthehistoryofaviation,”oneparticipantobserved,“theaircraftisbecomingthecenterofthesystemaroundwhichallplanningmustbemade.”

20-Year Vision

Thesharedlong-termvisionisofferedconciselyhere:

Airspacewouldbemanagedinareal-timeenvironmentwithlaborandindustrialissuessatisfied.Alllogisticsofdemand,capacity,airroutes,andschedulingandblocktimeswouldbecomputedwellinadvanceofflights.Thewidelyhoped-forgrailofbettermanagedairspaceisreducedseparation,bothhorizontalandvertical,withnolossofsafety.Aircraftwillmonitorandcontrolseparationwithlittlehelpfromtheground.Ablue-skyenvironmentwouldallowregulatorsto“teardownwallslikeartificialairspaceboundariesthatforceairplanestostayhighorgetlowandthusmakeflightinefficient,lesssafeandlessgreen,”asoneparticipantstated.

5-Year Vision

Ashared5-yearvisionstartswiththisconstruct:“Wehavethetechnology,theknow-how,andthecapabilitytomakeallofthemajortransformationsthatweneedtomake.Everythingispossibleinfiveyearsifyouhavethatandarefreefromsomeofthelogisticalandfinancialissues.”

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• Deliver the Capabilities Articulated in the RTCA Task Force 5 Report. “WecandoatremendousamountwiththecurrenttechnologywealreadyhavebyimplementingalotmoreRNAV/RNPoperationsthataredesignedfromthestarttoimprovecapacityefficiencyandbalanceenvironmentalaspects.”

• Push Ourselves for the First Retrofit Airplanes and First Approvals.In5years,thefirstretrofits,thefirstsatellitegroundcontrolsystems,andthefirstapprovalsshouldbeoccurringforallfeasibletechnology.Evenwithsomeofthehardestproblemstosolve,likecloselyspacedparallelapproachesto800feetandIMClandings,“wehavethetechnologiesandhandstodoallthosethings,”arespondentstated.“Withtherightattentionandfocus,wecouldgetallofthatworkdonesothatthefirsttwoairplanes,andmaybeit’sonlytwo,butthefirsttwoairplanescouldactuallyconductthatoperationinfiveyears.”

• Make Available Performance-Based Procedures for Those Aircraft That Are Suitably Equipped. Withoutdenyingaccesstoothers,thenormwouldbetoprovidethebestbenefittothosethatareontherightequipage.

• Prove Trajectory-Based Operations. Atthehigheraltitudes,demonstratemoretrajectory-basedpreferenceandstartmakingthatflexibility,andmoreautonomousoperations,available—notlimitingaccessforthosethatarenotequipped,butprovidingrealandmeasurablebenefitsinkeyareastothosethatare.

• Install Crucial New Technology.AconsensusvisionincludesdeliveringthegroundinfrastructureforADS-Bby2013andhavingdigitaldatacommunicationsoperating.Thiswouldincludeafullyintegratedsystemofsatellite-basednavigationforimprovedtrajectoryoperations.

• Achieve Rapid Certifications. Thesystemwillmaintainsafetyandincreaseefficiencybyrapidlycertifyingairplanesandallowingnewtechnologiestooperateatfullcapacity.

• Optimize Problematic Metropolitan Airports.Theoperationsaroundbusymetroplexareaswouldbecomemuchmorerigid,structured,andefficient.Thiswouldlikelyinvolvetheimpositionofmandatesforequipmentinsuchplaces.

VIII. The Five Challenges of Transformation

Howthentoproceed?Significantinvestmentsinplanninganddevelopmenthavealreadybeenmade,bothintheRTCATaskForce5reportandFAA’sownplanninganddevelopment.

Yetissuesremain,andquestionsabound.Fiveissuesstandout:Financing, Incentives, Innovating, Failure Modes, and Governance.

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1. Financing

Thehistoricparadigm—andcurrentpractice—saysthatairlinespayforplanes;govern-mentpaysforinfrastructure.Governmenthasalwaysunderwrittenairtrafficcontrolinfrastructure—towersandrunways,forexample—aspublicbenefits.Theairlineshavealwaysequippedtheplanes.

“Clearly,”onerespondentobserved,“governmentneedstopayfortheFAA’sinfrastructureortheinfrastructurethat’snecessarytodelivertheservice.”Thisincludesradars,transmit-ters,groundinfrastructure,andcontrollerswhooperatethesystem.

TheNextGenparadigmarguablyshiftsthisequation:underNextGen,publicbenefitinfrastructurerelocates from the ground to the cockpit. Withinfrastructuremovingtothecockpits,manybelievethatgovernmentshouldfundthecapitalimprovements.Afterall,theveryvirtueofNextGenisthatavionicsintheaircraftarenotjustservingtheairlinesortheairplaneoperationanymore.Theyareservingthesystem—makingitmorecapableandprovidingbenefitsacrosstheboard.

Thisthenbecameacaseofsupportinganimportantpublicbenefitinfrastructurethathasmovedfromthegroundtotheplane.Iftheairplaneistobecomeacentralcogintheairtrafficcontrolsystem,shouldgovernmentnotsubsidizetherequiredtechnologyonparwithsubsidiesforground-basedairtrafficcontrolequipment?

Intoday’sfiscalclimate,thoseinvestmentsaredear,whetherbygovernmentorindustry.Oneairlineexecutiveassertedthatequippinghisfleetwouldcost$80millionto$100million.

Who,then,shouldpay?Andwhowillmovefirst?

Yetthe“whopays?”issuemightbearedherringofsorts.Somearguethe“realpocket”thatwillpayisthecitizen,andthatthedecisionisreallyhowtoapportionthatcost:eitheronthosewhopaytofly(freightandpassengers)orontaxpayers,eveniftheyneverleavetheground.

“Inanyevent,”onerespondentstated,“eitherithastohappenbymandate,whichwouldforcetheuserstopayforitandthenpassthecostalonginticketprice,orbygovernmentfinancing.Tome,there’snotabigdifferencebetweenthetwo.”

“Therestoftheargument,”theparticipantsuggested,“isreallyjustaboutthemosteffectivewaytocapturethatrevenuestream.”

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2. Incentivizing Investment

FAA’sroleisto“lookforopportunitiestoallowaircrafttoflytheprofile/missionthattheyareequippedtofly,”oneparticipantasserted.Makethispossible,hesaid,and“you’llgetthepioneersleaningforwardtoequip.”

Currently,thereareobstaclesinthepath.Becausethesystemcurrentlyworks“belowitscommondenominator,”asoneparticipantputit,“there’snooperationaladvantagetoactuallyequipping.”

Withrespecttoseparationstandards,forexample,“thecontrolfunctionisexceedinglyinefficient,”theparticipantsaid.“We’recurrentlylegaltoseparateairplanes3mileswithin40milesoftheairport,and5milesthroughtheremainderofthewholeUSairspace.Thetypicalcontrolisaboutdoublethosemeasures.Alotofitisjustsimplylackofanysortofincentivetodoanybetter.”

Asaresult,“It’shardforairlinestomonetizeoperationalbenefit,”aparticipantobserved.“WhenyougetonaplanethecustomerisnotmakingadecisionbasedonwhetherithasADS-Bornot.”

Breakingthelogjamishard.Theairtransportationsystemiscurrentlyfunctioningatextremelyhighlevelsofsafety,forexample.Infact,therehasbeena“ratchetingup”of“targetlevelsofsafety”assubsystemshavegonethroughcyclesinwhichthemanysubsystemownershaveaddedtechnicalrequirements,makingthecumulativesafetyrequirementsfornewsystems“almostunattainable,”oneparticipantasserted.

“Nobodygetscriticizedforover-specifyingthesafetyrequirementsfortheirsubsystem,”hesaid,“Butitmakesitextremelydifficulttomakethetypeofchangesthatwillbenecessary—preciselybecausewecannotactuallygetmostofNextGenthroughthesafetyapprovalsprocessfast.”

Thisconstructtranslatestobalkingbyairlinesthatareuncertaintheywillrealizereturnontheirinvestment—intime,oratall.

MakingtheargumenttoaChiefFinancialOfficerevenonthebasisofa5-yearreturnoninvestment(ROI)whenhisorherinvestmentROItimescaleisbetween18and24months,forexample,is“animpossiblesell,”oneexecutivesaid.Thedealis“deadonarrival”oncecoupled,further,withthelackofcredibilityofanybenefitanalysis.Manypriorinvestmentsintechnologyhavenotyieldedpromisedoperationalbenefits.

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“Theurgetoinvestagainisnotoverwhelming,”oneparticipantsaid.Government’spastfailuretomakegoodonpromisesofcollateralchangesinpoliciesandproceduresringsloudly.“Riskneedstobeapportioneddifferentlythistimearound,”hesaid.

Ifcurrentmarketforcesseemtooweaktoincentfirstmoversonthisround,howthentoensurechange,whenthereisnorushtobefirst—andnodownsidetobeinglast?

Mandates. FromFAA’sperspective,mandatesareappropriateonlywhenthereisnot—orneverwillbe—sufficientincentiveforoperatorstoequip.However,mandateshavetheeffectofreducingbusinessuncertainty—whichsomeoperatorsmightprefer,ifintel-ligentlyappliedandmatchedbygovernmentaction.If,forexample,FAAmandatedthepurchaseofequipmentofacertainlevelinordertooperateinNewYorkClassBairspace,thiswouldbe—accordingtooneobserver—“anobrainer.Icanwalkintomyboardmeetingandgetapprovalin15minutes.”

Managing the Mixed Equipage Environment.Demonstratingcapabilitytorolloutandmanageamixed-equipageenvironmentmaywellprovidestrongincentive,demonstratingthevalueofinvestinginbestequipped,bestserved-enablingequipage.“Best-equipped,bestservedisasystematicrewardforNextGenupgrades,”aparticipantobserved,a“purecompetitivemarketsystem.”FAAcouldthenmandatetheremaindermuchmoreeasily—limitingittothosewhodonotvoluntarilyequip.

“Butweneedtoproveourwayintothis,”agovernmentparticipantobserved.“We’vegottoprovethatwearegoingtoburnlessfuel,thatwecanspaceourplanesclosertogether,thatwecanflymoreefficiently,thatwecanflymoredirectroutes.”

Industrytakesa“showme”attitude.Tobemeaningfulforbusinesscasepurposes,espe-cially,andattractinvestment,theseresultsmustbemeasurable.“Theonlywaygovern-mentcanreallyproveoutthetruebenefitistogetenoughofthefleetequippedtoactuallytryit,”oneindustryparticipantsaid.“Itcannotbedoneonpaperandproved.”

Evendemonstratingmixed-equipagecapabilityatthelevelofaproofmayonlygosofar.ThelocalpoliticalequationmustalsobesolvedsufficienttoallowNextGentogrowtheamountoftrafficoperationsthatcanbeachievedfromthesamefootprint.Flightpatterns,particularlyinthenortheasterncorridorandNewYork,thatproducenewefficienciesalsoshiftnoiseandraisepoliticaldisputes.

“Willlocalpopulationsletusmoveforwardwiththat?”oneparticipantasked.“Ifyoucan’tdotheredesignintheairspaceyoucanhaveallthetechnologyintheworld,youcansolvealltheseotherproblems,butyou’renotgoingtohaveanefficientsystem.”

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3. Gaining Acceptance: The Challenge of “New-Product” Adoption

Atitsheart,NextGenisamajorcross-boundarychangeinitiativerequiringdeepconsensus,broadalignment,andsharedrisktaking.Yettheclassic“burningplatform”thatwouldmobilizesupportandactionisabsent—no9/11,forexample.

“Wedon’thaveastrongexternaldriveronthecapacityissue.Whenyouhaveaslowdegra-dationinperformanceofaninfrastructure,it’sthe‘boiledfrog’problem,”oneparticipantstated.“Theurgencyisnottheretosaythatwehavetosolvethisproblemtoday.”

“It’saveryinterestingmarketingchallengebecauseyou’renotsellingNextGenasit’sgoingtosavelives—thatbarisnowsetveryhigh,”anotherparticipantobserved.“You’resellingNextGenonthebasisit’sgoingtosavedollars,andit’sgoingtosavetime,andit’sgoingtosavetheenvironment.”

Absentanationallyfeltcrisislike9/11,themovetoNextGenispronetobeingslowedorderailedbyadiversepubliconmanyissues.Moreover,theSessionalsolearnedofresearchthatpointstotheinherentdifficultyofnewproductadoptionunderthebestofcircumstances.

“Lossesloomlargerthangains,”researchshows—meaningthatanynewproductmustbemorethansimplyalittlebitbetterthantheoldtoensureadoption.Itmayneedtobeupto10 times better tobefelt.Whereoldwaysmustgivewaytonewways,users’familiaritywiththeold,combinedwiththeuncertaintyofthenew,meansusersareloathtopartwiththeold(andwell-known)onlyforsomemodestgainsfromthenew(andunknown).

Clearly,“wartsandall,”operatorsineverydomainofthenationalairtransportationsystemhavefiguredouthowtomakethe“old”system“work.”Introducingnewequip-ment,newprocedures,anewethos—bestequipped,bestserved,forexample—runstheriskofrejectioniftheintroducerscannotgainthesupportofthoseconcerned.Attheveryleast,thismeansbeingtransparent,collaborative,andinclusiveinplanningany“newproduct”introduction.

ThisisespeciallysoassomeNextGenmodelssuggestlikelycontractionoftowersasthecontrolinfrastructuremovesfromthegroundtothecockpit.Intheinterim,thereisasignificantchallengeforcontrollersinhandlingthemixedequipageenvironments.Andpilots,whenasked,expressreluctancetotakeup“airtrafficcontrolduties”inthecockpits.

“Wedon’ttalkenoughabouttheworkforcedimensiontotheproblem,”onerespondentobserved.“Youcanbringasmanytechnologiestothetable[as]youwantbutwestillhavepilotsandcontrollersinvolved.They’vegottoseethevalueaddedthatcomesfromthese

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changesandithastobevalueaddedtothem.Theyhavetoappreciatethat,inorderforthemtobuyintoit—andit’snotgoingtobesuccessfulwithoutthem.”

4. Failure Modes: Averting “Predictable Surprises”

Participantscametounderstandtheimportanceofconsidering“predictablesurprises”asanapproachtoaddressinglikelymodesoffailure.5InNextGen,aswithanycomplexcross-boundaryinitiative,therearepotentialrisksandfailurepoints.Areasofriskcouldbepolitical,conceptual,labor,financial,technical,ororganizational,forexample.

WhatarethesefailurepointsinNextGendevelopment?Whatbarriersmightpreventthecommunityofinterestfromforeseeingthem?Whatstrategieswouldhelpmitigatetheserisks?TherewasconsiderableinterestexpressedattheSessioninfurtherinvestigatingthe“predictablesurprises”ofNextGen.

5. Governance

TheissuesofgovernanceloomlargeforNextGen,inbothexpectedandunexpectedways.

Aswithanygovernment-involvedinitiative,questionsariseforNextGen,includingdetermininglevelsandconcentrationsofauthoritywithinFAA;achievingunambiguouslinesofreportandcharters;anddistributingoracquiringpowerstobind,commit,andultimatelylead.

Ultimately,suchgapsdoslowdecisionmakingormakemandatesfuzzy,frustratinggovernmentandindustryexecutivesalike.Remediesultimatelyinvolvestraighteninglinesofreport,clarifyingduties,empoweringthosetaskedtodocertainworktoaccomplishthemission,andperformingotherbureaucratichousekeeping.Theyoftenleadtocallsforstronganddecisive—evensomewhatautocratic—leaders.ThesolutionsproposedforNextGenarenoexception.

Whatischaracteristicofthesemovesisthis:theyarepredicatedonthebeliefthatmuchthatimpedesNextGenfromdeliveringneededexternal transformationscanbeaddressedbyremedyingFAA’sinternal governancearrangements.ItistruethatNextGenmightimproveitsoverallperformancebymakingitsoperationsmoreefficientfornecessarydecisionmaking,policyredesign,financingandacquisition,andotherdeliverables.

Theroundtable,however,producedthenotablediscoverythattheconundrum,challenges,andobstaclesoftheNextGenexternalenvironmentwillnotlikelybesolvedbyfixinginternalNextGengovernancealone.Essentialastheinternalmovesareforimproved

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performance,themeetingalsofoundthatsolvingalltheexternalchallenges—fromfinancingandincentivizing,toprovinganddocumenting,torescriptingproceduresandflightpaths,togainingpoliticalsupportandnewuserbuy-in—representedasetofcapacitiesthatfewcouldeasilyenvisionanyonegrouppossessingorabletodeliveralone.

Indeed,solvingany oneoftheseproblemshasproveddifficult;solvingthemaltogetherandatonceappearspracticallyimpossible—evenwithastronghierarchy;chartersandauthorities;andclear,unambiguousinternalgovernance.

IX. A Networked Governance Strategy for NextGen?

Mightanewstrategyof networked governance provideaworkaroundtothesestubbornobstacles?

Withthisstrategy,theroleofFAAmightbelesstomanufacturespecificNextGenoutcomesorresults,andmoretostewardtheformationofanetworkofnetworksthatcanensuresuchresults.

ManyofNextGen’schallengesatthenationallevelseemmonolithic,riskytoembrace,andfilledwithuncertainty.Bycontrast,theypresentthemselvesatthelocallevelinuniqueconstellationsandseemtooffermanymoreleversforchangelocally.

Byexpandingtheproblemtothelocallevel—andempoweringlocalnetworkstosolvethem—theprospectsforchangeseemhigher, bothbyavoiding“predictablesurprises”andbycraftinglocallyrelevantsolutions.

Thetaskofourcurrentnetworkofpartisans,representedbythoseattheroundtable,mightbetodesignitsownnetworktosupportthecontrolledproliferationofanetworkofnetworkseach solving the NextGen challenge at the local level. Atthelocallevel,networkswouldassurethattherightpartiescometothetable,makingitpossiblefortherightincentivestoalign,therighteconomicdriversandinvestmentcasestobemade,andtherightlocalintereststoconverge.

Airspaceisofcourseanationalasset,andsomesolutionswillrequireresponseatthenationalscale,withtop-downaccountability.DesignandplanningforNextGen-wideenterprisearchitecture,developmentofcertainpoliciesandprocedures,andfundingandprocurement,forexample,allrequireastrongcentralrole.

“Wehavetoaskfortop-down.That’sthepoliticalmandatefromthePresidentorfromtheAdministration,”oneparticipantsaid,anditiscriticaltothesuccessofNextGen.“There

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mustbesomeoneontheFAAsidewhohastheaccountabilityforeverythingthathastohappenwithinthatorganization,beheldaccountable,andmakethecommitments.”

Butthegreatchallengesofimplementationmightbebestaddressedbygrassroots-levellocalnetworksifsuchnetworksweregivenabroadbottom-up chargeconsistentwithanationalstrategy,resourcedbyFAAwithsomeauthorityandsupport,andtaskedtodevelopthelocalsolutionthatworks.

Underthismodel,theopportunityexistsforFAAtouseitspowersandauthoritiesnotsolelytodirectlymanufactureNextGenproductsandservices,butrathertostewardthenetworksthatwill.Theroleofgovernmentmightbetoencourage,convene,andsupporttheformationofsuchnetworks.Thechallengeofgovernanceshiftsfrommanagingbureaucraciestogoverningnetworks.

Thismodelbecomesanopportunityforthisgroup,theroundtablefelt,tocontributeasanetwork—perhaps,aconsortium—thatitselfcandesigngovernancefortheproliferationoflocalsolutions,whichtogethercreatenationalimpactandoutcomes.

Thechallengetothisgroup,then,wouldbetodesignitself asagroupofenlightenedindustryandgovernmentexecutiveswhoagreethatthefutureofthecountrydependsonitssuccessinmovingouraviationinfrastructureforward.

Theprospectoftop-downeffortwherenecessary,withrichbottom-upnetworksactivelydevisinglocalsolutions,andamid-rangeconsortiumassuringvitality,consistency,andgovernanceacrossthenetworks,seemspotent.

Whatstepscouldsuchaconsortiumtaketocreateanetwork of networks representingavastnewcapabilitytoaddressthechallengeofNextGendesignandimplementation?

“Wehavealotofworktodoasacommunitysittingatthistable,”oneparticipantoffered,“evenanincompletecommunity,toformthisconsortium—acoalitionforNextGen.Itmakesitpalpable,”hesaid.“Itcreatesthemandateforgovernancetochange,tomakeithappen.”

X. A Technical Research and Development Agenda

Opportunitiesexistforresearchanddevelopment.Participantssuggestedthefollowingprioritiesforaction:.

• “Weatherproofing the nest.”Systemsoperatewellingoodweather;whentheweatherturnsbadandcapacitygoesdown,problemsarise.Weatherproofingthenestmeansusingavailabletechnologiesto operate as if the weather is good all the time.

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• Networked governance of research and development (R&D). Howtobestmaintainabalanceandinformeddialoguebetweenthosechargedwith“lookingoverthehorizon”andthoseinvolvedindeploymentsandimplementation?Neithercanfunctionsuccessfullywithouttheother.AnetworkedR&Dapproachcansolveproblemsfrommultipleperspectivessimultaneously—whetherfromtheperspectiveofpassengersecurityorunmannedaerialvehicles(UAV)intheeventualsystem—balancingallinterestsinthemodelandthesky.

• The role of automation versus humans; the role of air versus ground. Manytradeoffsloomforwhichwelackclearanswers—nottheoreticalanswersbutpractical,tested,andprovensolutions.Changemustaddressthiscomplexquestion,butwearenotyetincommandofthisaspectofourfuture.

• Policy on best equipped, best served doctrine. Thereisanecdotal,operationalevidencetoinformpolicy,butalackofscientificbasis.“It’seasytoagreethatthatshouldbeourpriority,”saidoneobserver.“We’vegottohaveaninfrastructureinplacethatallowsustogetthisrightlevelofinformation.”

• The role of air versus ground.Whatcanwedointheairandhowmuchcanwedoontheground?Whatisthegoodbalanceofthat?Thisstillrequiressignificantinvestigation.

• Separation standards. Consensusholdsthatplanescanandmustflynearertooneanother,buthowcloseisclose?Is2,500feet,assomesuggest,feasible?Orperhapseven2,000feet?Whatisthemostefficientandsafestlong-termstandard,andhowcanweproveortestforthatstandardtoday?

• “Laying concrete.” Assumingthattheairspaceproblemhasbeensolvedandthatrunwayscanoperateindependently,canwe“laydownconcrete”inNewYork—andinnewsites—openinguparangeofoptionsthatdonotexisttoday?Theimplicationsofthismustbeexamined.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles.Thisisnotafuturequestion.UAVsarehere,now,andareproliferating.USCustomsandBorderProtection,tonameoneclient,operateUAVsconstantlyalongthenorthernandsouthernUSborders.UAVswillbecontrolledbysoftware,eitherautonomouslyorfromtheground.Theautomationandhumanchangesintheroleofcontrollerwillrequirecomplexsoftwaresolutions.Howwillwedevelopandcertifysuchcapabilitiesforuseindomesticairspace?

XI. Ten Elements of Strategy for NextGen Networked Governance

Ago-forwardstrategymightinvolvefosteringanetworkofnetworksbasedonashared

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senseoftheurgencyforactionandaunitaryvision(perhapsbornoftheRTCATaskForce5reportrecommendations)comprisingtop-down,bottom-up,andmid-levelrolesandsupportingapreliminarytechnicalR&Dagenda.

Whatwouldbetherequirementsofsuchastrategy—theimperativesforthenetwork of networks totakeaction?Whatcouldthisnetworkdo—if,forexample,formedbythegroupasaconsortium—tocreatethenetworksthatwouldproducetheresources,gover-nance,andthroughputforNextGen?

1. Clarify the Win. “Igobacktothequestionofhowdowedefinesuccess,”oneparticipantsaid.“Withthepeopleofthistable,atwhatpointwillyousaywe’vebeensuccessful—andthatyouwillhavedeliveredsuccesstoyourconstituency?”Itisimperativetoresolvetheambiguityofbenefits,understandtheoverlappingvitalinterests,andalignstakeholdersonasetofobjectivestoattainwithinstatedtimes.

Asoneparticipantobserved,“Ifyoudon’tknowwhatsuccesslookslike,thenanyroadwilldo.Itdoesn’tmatterwhichroadwetakebecausewe’llneverknowwhetherwearethereornot.”

2. Evolve a New Form of Leadership. Withthewin“clarified,”thedistributedleadershipmodelofanetworkwillhaveitsobjectives.Howmightthismodelwork?

Althoughnetworkedgovernanceisoftenseenformingaroundcomplexsocialproblems,itisstillevolvingasascienceandanart.Unliketraditionaltop-downformsofbureaucraticmanagement,nooneis“incharge”ofanetwork,comprisingasitdoeslikemindedpartisansfromdiverseinstitutionsandorganizations.Howwouldthenetworkofnetworksfunction?Whatwouldbeitsprotocols,howwoulditoperate,whatwouldbethepurposesofitsnodesorelements?Howwouldanetworkofnetworksestablishcollectiveaccountabilityaroundendresults?

3. Map the Networks’ Beneficiaries. “Theideaofabeneficiary,”oneparticipantstated,“issomeoneorgroupwhowillstandupandcheeroncewehaveachievedourobjectives.Whowillbeouttheresupportingus,whetheritbeinCongressorelsewhere?Whowillcommittohelpingusgetthere?”

Thegroup,ifre-formedasaconsortium,couldsponsordetailedmappingofbeneficiariesateveryrelevantlevelofbenefit.

Somesaythereisalreadya“rocksolid”clarityofbenefitsatthe“macro”levelregardingtheoverallenvironmental,safety,andcapacitybenefitstoberealizedthroughNextGen.Goodmetricsexist,forexample,on“fuelburn,”whetherforAtlanta,Dallas,orelsewhere.

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Whatmaybemissingiswho this benefits at the micro level—whostandstogainfromthesebenefits?TheRTCATaskForce5reporttakesafirstpassatdescribingsomeofthesebeneficiaries,butgapsremain.

Thegroup-re-formed-as-a-consortiumcould,forexample,specifyagenericmapofbeneficiarynetworkssothatlocalnetworkscouldmaptheirownmicro-levelbeneficiaries.Unlikeamanufacturingmap,abeneficiarymapwouldshowwherejobswillbe,wherecostswillbesaved,howthiseffortmightbemadevivid,andwhatpotentialrisksexistgoingforward.Localbeneficiarymapscouldrolluptonationalmaps—andpermitmarketingatthelocalandnationallevels.

4. Raise the Key Strategic Issues.Notallquestionshaveanswerstoday—butaskingtherightquestionisessential.Thisgroupmightsay,forexample,“Wedon’tknowwhattheansweris,butweask,‘Arewebettertobepartofthehugenationalinfrastructuredeficit?’Theportsarebillionsofdollarsbehind,theroadsarebillionsofdollarsbehind.Arewebettertobepartofthatconversation,orseparate?”Therearemanysuchimportantconversations—fromwhoisatthetable,towholeadstheconversation,tohowtheconversationtranslatesintoacongressionalmandate.

5. Build New Metrics/Focus on Outcomes. Thenetworkedgovernancemodelrequiresnewkindsofsuccessmetrics.Thesemetricswillspan,capture,andmeasureperformanceacrosstheboundariesofindividualorganizations.Forexample,beyondthesuccessoflayingnewconcrete,whataretheexpectedbenefitsinthoseareasthathaveinvestedinmorecapacity,efficiency,andreliabilityforcustomers?Theywant outcomes.

“Itisn’tjustdevelopingordeployinginfrastructure,”saidoneparticipant.“It’snotjustthetechnology.It’sallofthethingsyouhavetodotogettothatactualimprovementintheperformance.”

Whatdoesittaketorealizetheseboundary-spanningoutcomes?Thoserequirementswillbetheelementsof plans.

6. Develop the Plan, Gain the Commitments.Evenwithanetwork,allpartieswhohavearoledeliveringtheelementsofsuccess,howevertheyaredefined,mustcommit. Thosecommitments,oneparticipantsaid,“havetobetangible,theyhavetobeonthetable,andpeopleneedtosignupforthem”whetherfromgovernmentorindustry.SuchcommitmentimpliessufficientlystrongleadershipfromFAA,inparticular,tocommitandbindthatorganization,aswellasfromoperatorsandmanufacturers.

7. Reset/Realign the Economic Incentives. Thesearedifficulteconomictimes.“It’sveryhardformetofigureouthowyoucreatepoliticalwillforalargeappropriation,”

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oneparticipantsaid,“orfindanybodyatthe‘table’whowillwanttotaxthemselvesdramaticallytosolveaproblemwherethebenefitsarehighlydiffused.”Havingmappedthebeneficiariesandtheirmicrocost/benefitperspective,mightwerearrange the incentivestocreatetheeconomicimpetusforasolution—“aspartoftheprocesstoconvincefolksthatthereneedstobechange?”Theprospectisintriguing.

8. Pulse the Status. Evenwithallthesefactorsinplace,andexecutedtoplan,successrequiresconstant“pulsing”oftheimplementationtoassurebenefitsarebeingrealized.Thenetworkedmodelcouldbedesignedforthispurpose.

Oneparticipantrecalledapastimplementation.“Aswerolledoutandproducedallthoseoutputs,”hesaid,“weoverlookedtheissueofintegrationasitrelatestoairspaceproceduresandamixedequipageenvironment.Wedidn’tseeitasasystem.Sowhilewegotconsensusonawayforward,arguablywemissedthemarkfromreallyproducingsomethingofgreatvalueforthesystem.”

Thenetworkdesign,then,shouldprovideforacapabilitytocontinuouslypulsetheimplementation—toseeifthebenefitskeepproducingtheresultstheoriginalframersintended.

9. Raise the Visibility/Market the Effort.Someparticipantssuggestedre-formingthegroupasabroaderconsortium.Thatconsortiumwouldbringtheactivistpartisanstogether,eveninadvanceofknowingwhatconstitutedawin.Theconsortiumwouldhelptoframeaseriesofwinsthatwouldbemanageableandadvancecollaborationbetweengovernmentandindustryaroundsharedpurposes.Itcouldfillawhitespace,drawattention,makethings“vivid,”andenergizelocalnetworksofpartisansaroundclearbenefits.Itcould,forexample,capturetheimaginationsoflocalorstategroupsthatarelookingforeconomicdevelopment.

Ultimately,somesuggested,“thegovernmentisgoingtohavetostarttobuildit,andthey’regoingtohavetobethepush,whetherit’sincentivizingtheindustrytoequipormandatingit.”Butthatpushmayneedtocomefrombelow:somedoubtwhetherairlines,FAA,andallieshavethesupportnowtomakemuchheadwaybytop-downmeansalone.

10. Rinse the Mystery Out of Accountability.Whatwillbeexpectedoftheairlines?FAA?Pilots?Airtrafficcontrollers?Airports?Assigningaccountabilityforrepresentingtheseinterestsinthenetworkmaybeessential.Evenso,assuringtransparencytotheorganizationsthemselvesiscrucial.

“Ifallofthoseboxesaresecret,”oneparticipantobserved,“andwedon’tknowwhatweexpectfromtheairlinesortheFAA—who,specifically,intheorganizationis

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responsibleforactionagainsttheorganization’scommitments—we’regoingtobetalkingincirclesforalongtime.”

Evennow,withtheRTCATaskForce5report,thereismystery,somesay.“Doyougoouteverywhereinthesystem?Doyougoouttocertainlocations?”oneparticipantasked.“There’sawholelevelofdetailwhichfranklyhasn’tbeendone.It’snotclearwhoistherealdecisionmakerfromasystemarchitecturestandpointsaying,‘Yeah,we’regoinghere,we’renotgoingthere,’makingthehardcalls.”

XII. Options for Action: The Path Forward

Whatarethenear-termoptionsforactionfortheroundtablegroup?Howmightittranslatethesefindingsintopractice?Anumberofcontinuedinvestigationsintriguedthegroup.Someofthosearedescribedaspotentialworkstreams:

Governance

1. Provide an overarching governance model for the network represented at the table.Investigatetypesofgovernancemodelsthatwouldworkforanationalnetworkofnetworks.Explorealternativesandofferoptionsforconsiderationanddevelopment.Encompassallthestakeholdergroups,expandedtoincludethosenotyetpresent.Bethebow-breakers,thestrategicinvestorsforNextGen’snetworkedgovernance.

2. Define a series of overall goals and “win” for the network of networks. Definetheoverallvisionandmetrics.Helpnetworksfollowaprocessbywhichtheycandefinelocalmetricsandassuremetricsarewell-specifiedandconsistentwiththeoverallobjectives.Resolveambiguitiesandclarifyoverallgoalsandobjectivessufficienttoarticulatethroughoutthenetworkandfocustheeffortsofall.

3. Select five or six geographic areas where networks might be fostered and begin the work at hand. UsingtheTaskForce5recommendations,identifyseveralgeographicregions,includinghighlycomplexmetroplexenvironments.Letthechoicerepresentacross-sectionofairspacecomplexity,convergingrunwaycomplexity,andrelatedfactors.

4. Assure overall integration of networks. Enablethecapacitytopulsetheimplementationsforimpact,stitchallconstituenciestogetherforthelongertermvision,capturethesuccessstories,andmeasureperformanceacrossthenetworks.

5. Create a learning bank. Everysolutionhastobelocal,buteachhastomakesensenationallyandglobally.Thosediscoveriesneedtostitchtogetherinwaysthatlinkallstakeholderssotheysharethelearningbeingobtainedandpooltheirnetworkedimpactsandinfluence.Thenetworkedenvironmentisadynamiclearning

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environment.Withconstantcaptureandreplayoflessonslearned,noonewillmakethesamemistaketwice.

Incentives

1. Map the networks’ beneficiaries.Supporttheconveningoflocalnetworkedgroupsineachlocation.Lookatthecompletestakeholderdynamicintermsofwhobenefits—andwholoses,fromjobsandimprovedefficiencies—fromalltheoutcomesthatareNextGen’spromise.

2. Help networks define their success criteria, and integrate to national priorities.“Clarifythewin”bothasanetworkofnetworks,andforindividual(local)networks,sothatgoalsareclear.Decideoneasilyunderstoodmeasurements.

3. Charter the development of networks’ plans to reflect national priorities and requirements, but also to capture the value proposition for local beneficiaries.Helpnetworksaligntheirstakeholdersontheoverlappingvitalintereststheyshareandonasetofobjectivestoattainwithinstatedtimes.

4. Help evolve a new form of networked leadership.Incentparticipationandcommitment.

5. Define network communication strategies.Basedontheindividualsites,defineacommunicationstrategyfocusedongrassrootsapproaches.Lookbeyondjusttheobviousbenefitsofreducedemissions,reducedfuelconsumption,orreducedtaxitimes.Look,rather,tothepotentialoftheeconomicbenefitsinthesurrounding communitiesandhowchampionsinthosecommunitiescouldsupporttheeffort.

Financing

1. Charter networks’ efforts to design, develop, and support financing solutions. Everynetworkwillhaveuniqueconstellationsofbeneficiariesandfinancerequirements.Bycharteringthenetworkstodevisethesolutions,thebesteffortsofmanycanbemobilized.

2. Identify the shared and unique financing requirements for networks’ implementation of needed next steps.Createbestpracticesforthenetworksbyshowcasingtheirsolutionsandlettingothersuseorimprovethem.

3. Identify roles and capabilities of a national network to address further networks’ financing requirements. Somefinancingrequirementsmaybebestaddressedbyalargernetworkthansmallernetworks;identifyingthefinancingroleandprospectsforthelargernetworkversusthelocalnetworkswillbeimportant.

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4. Support efforts to champion NextGen as an issue for local community involvement and development. Involvethecommunityinachange in the social contract.Withchangesinprocedures,reachoutandinvitetheairporttohelpusunderstandhowtobetterworkforthecommunity.

Predictable Surprises

1. Understand and document the local risks.Localrisksincludeclassicstumblingblocks,suchasenvironmentalissuesofnoiseabatementandissuesinairspaceredesign,aswellaswhatmightbe“predictablesurprises”nationallyorlocally.

2. Do it fast.Formworkingteams.Developatimetabletoforcethenetworktomeetself-imposedmandates.Makesure,asSecretaryMinetaremindedalloverlunch,thatasanationinglobalcompetition,wegettherethe“firstest”withthe“mostest.”

XIII. Parting Words in Five Voices

All of us are stakeholders. Why don’t we look back over notes and the discussions of the last day and a half and think of one piece that each of us would like to advance that comes out of these areas, that we need to address. It can be big or small, and I don’t mean to suggest that as an individual, one of us is going to take it on and solve it. But where do you see your role in this? Imagine we’re a part of a virtual group: where could you really make some constructive contribution?

NextGen is a magic mirror. We’re all looking in that mirror and we’re seeing what we want to see: that is an obstacle to our joint success. It’s complicating our ability to get a ground swell of support because we communicate in different ways. It’s complicating our ability to plan the details and truly implement because we are implementing different pieces that don’t line up. So it’s essential for us to roll up our sleeves and agree on what NextGen is. It’s a content issue: What it is really? Does it include Tier 3 technologies? Does it not? At what stage? How does that work? But to some extent, it’s a communication challenge.

We need to cut it out, guys. At some point in all of this “we can’t define the problem, we have different visions, different views, et cetera, et cetera” there ought to be a way that we could agree. If we take the following steps or we do the

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following things, then we’re going to lock in on what it is essential, and how to do it. We do not know where R&D is going to take us. But we’re spending too much time on all of us saying, “Well, I’m not sure I know.” Well, if we don’t know, believe me, we’re not going to sell this to anybody.

We should stop worrying about something that we’re all in so much alignment on. I don’t hear any dissent. On the vision thing—if we all had to put it on a piece of paper and ask, “Can we talk clearly about NextGen?” I think we can do that. I absolutely do. And we need to go ahead and put something together. We say, “All right, here are the key points we’re going to all start using and making, and let’s use the same language.” This isn’t that hard.

If someone were to show up here at 4:00 today and say, “I have looked at five geographic regions. I have determined a potential governance structure and roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities. I have looked at how one might distribute the benefits and what that means in a quantitative sense. I have looked at how we can achieve a champion locally who, by the way, could reach upward into their congressional district then ultimately to the appropriators. I have looked at what that means in terms of equipage or incentives or operational incentives or financial incentives, and what would be required to do that?” I think we would all want to hear that.

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AGENDA

“Assuring the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System”

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

November 3-4, 2009

November 3, 2009 Location: Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy St., Cambridge

12:00–1:00p.m. Lunch and Registration:Library, 2nd Floor

1:00–1:15p.m. Welcome,Introductions,PlanoftheDayandGoals

1:15–2:05p.m. TheBlueSkyofNextGen:ImagesoftheFuture

2:05–2:55p.m. “They’reHoldingtheHorses”:TheChallengeofTransformation

2:55–3:15p.m. Break

3:15–4:10p.m. TheNext,BestNextGenMoves:“GoingIn”Perspectives

4:10–5:00p.m. MakingtheRightmoves:StrategyinthePublicSector–andNextGen

5:00–6:15p.m. OptionalHarvardYardTour/Shopping/FreeTime

6:15–7:00p.m. Reception: North Dining Room, 1st Floor

7:00–9:00p.m. Dinner: North Dining Room, 1st Floor

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November 4, 2009 Location: Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy St., Cambridge

8:00–8:45a.m. Continental Breakfast: Library, 2nd Floor

8:50–9:00a.m. RecapandPlanoftheDay

9:00–10:15a.m. CriticalIssues,DifficultConversations(1):MarketingandCommunications

10:15–10:40a.m. Break

10:40–11:50a.m. CriticalIssues,DifficultConversations(2):Financing,MandatesandIncentives…Outsourcevs.Insource,Buyvs.Build,Publicvs.Private

11:50–12:00p.m. Recap

12:00–1:15p.m. Lunch

1:15–1:30p.m. Break

1:30–2:30p.m. CriticalIssues,DifficultConversations(3):GovernanceandLeadership

2:30–3:10p.m. TheNext,BestNextGenMoves:“GoingOut”PerspectivesandTheCounselforLeaders

3:10–3:50p.m. R&DandtheRoleoftheGroupGoingForward

4:00p.m. Adjournment

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Marion C. BlakeyAerospace Industries Association

Captain Joe Kolshak

United Airlines

Steven BrownNational Business Aviation Association

Catherine M. LangFederal Aviation Administration

John McGrawFederal Aviation Administration

Russ ChewJetBlue

Bob LekitesUPS Airlines

Jim ChristiansenNetJets

Nancy LoBueFederal Aviation Administration

Victoria CoxFederal Aviation Administration

James ManchisiBooz Allen Hamilton

Patty HigginbothamAir Transport Association

David DavisBooz Allen Hamilton

Jim MayAir Transport Association

Richard DayFederal Aviation Administration

Alfred MessinaBooz Allen Hamilton

Bruce DeCleeneFederal Aviation Administration

Norm MinetaHill & Knowlton, Inc.

Mark GerencserBooz Allen Hamilton

Captain John PraterAir Line Pilots Association

Margaret GilliganFederal Aviation Administration

Dr. Agam N. SinhaMITRE Corporation

Attendees of the Executive Session

Shown for informational purposes only. The views expressed here are the authors’. No endorsement by any attendee of the Session is expressed or implied.

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Professor John HansmanMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Captain Ken SpeirDelta Airlines

Keith Harrison

National Air Traffic Controllers Association

Dr. Karlin TonerUS Department of Transportation

Margaret JennyRTCA, Inc.

Captain Brian TownsendUSAir

Nancy KalinowskiFederal Aviation Administration

Michael WambsGanssBooz Allen Hamilton

Professor Max BazermanHarvard Business School

Professor John GourvilleHarvard Business School

Professor Mark H. MooreHarvard Kennedy School

Professor Stephen GoldsmithHarvard Kennedy School

Harvard Faculty and Staff

Zachary TuminAssociate Director, Ash Center


Tad Oelstrom, Lt Gen, USAF (ret)Director, National Security Program


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End Notes1AtFAA’srequest,forexample,theRTCAestablishedagovernment-industrytaskforcetoachievecommunity-wideconsensusontherecommendedNextGenoperationalimprovements,andpriorities,betweennowand2018.ThisNextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force,knownasTaskForce5,hasattractedactiveparticipationfromover300aviationexpertsrepresentingover100stakeholdergroups.Itssoon-to-be-publishedreportwilllikelyacknowledgethatadditionalmulti-stakeholderworkisrequiredtobothdevelopastrategyforacceleratingequipageandreachclosureontheuseofincentives.2AnupdatedFAANextGen Implementation Plan,releasedinJanuary2009,forexample,ishelpingtheaviationcommunityreachacommonunderstandingofNextGen.TogetherwiththerecentlyupdatedNAS Enterprise Architecture,itprovidesanincreasinglyclearerdepictionofdeliverablesandactivitiesfortheperiod2012to2018.3CornerstoneprojectsincludeAutomaticDependentSurveillance-Broadcast(ADS-B)andSystemWideInformationManagement(SWIM).Thesetechnologyinitiativeswillallowthetransitionfromground-basedtosatellite-basedsurveillanceandnavigation,andmovefromstove-pipedandincompatibleinformationsystemstonetwork-centricarchitecture.Bothoftheseprogramsareprogressing;forexample,ADS-BessentialservicesarealreadybeingdeployedacrosstheUSandintheGulfofMexico.4JohnT.Gourville,Eager Sellers and Stony Buyers: Understanding the Psychology of New-Product Adoption. HarvardBusinessReview.June2006.ReprintR0606F.5MaxH.BazermanandMichaelD.Watkins.Predictable Surprises.Boston,MA:HarvardBusinessPress.2008.

Further Readings, References, and Sources Consulted by the Executive SessionAgranoff,Robert.2006.“InsideCollaborativeNetworks:TenLessonsforPublicManagers.”Public Administration Review

66(s1):56-65.

Agranoff,Robert.2007.Managing Within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations.Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress.

Arino,Africa,andJosedelaTorre.1998.“LearningfromFailure:TowardsanEvolutionModelofCollaborativeVentures.”Organization Science 9(3):306-325(May/June).

Bardach,Eugene.2005.“HowDoTheyStackUp?The9/11CommissionReportandtheManagementLiterature.” International Public Management Journal 8(3):351-364.

Bardach,Eugene.1998. Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution.

Bryson,JohnM.,BarbaraC.CrosbyandMelissaMiddletonStone.2006.“TheDesignandImplementationofCross-SectorCollaborations:PropositionsfromtheLiterature.” Public Administration Review66(0):44-55(December).

Considine,Mark.2005.Partnerships and Collaborative Advantage: Some Reflections on New Forms of Network Governance.CentreforPublicPolicyBackgroundPaper(December).

Considine,Mark,JennyM.Lewis,andDamonAlexander,eds.2009.Networks, Innovation and Public Policy: Politicians, Bureaucrats and the Pathways to Change Inside Government.Basingstoke(UK)andNewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Considine,Mark,andSylvainGiguère,eds.2008.The Theory and Practice of Local Governance and Economic Development. Basingstoke(UK)andNewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

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